Much of the attention to recent high-profile events at Nvidia has focused on former CEO Jensen Huang’s alleged personal misconduct. This focus overlooks the arguably more significant detail that the current tumultuous circumstances at Nvidia ultimately arise out of the export controls the U.S. government has put in place for Nvidia’s high-end AI-powering graphics processing units and the Chinese government’s extraordinary efforts to try to circumvent those controls. Indeed, and as discussed below, the shareholder derivative lawsuit filed last week against Huang and the Nvidia Board highlights these geopolitical aspects of the recent company developments.

The new Nvidia derivative suit is only the most recent example of an export control-related D&O claim. A Delaware Court of Chancery derivative lawsuit filed last month against the board of Applied Materials also highlights the company’s board’s alleged fiduciary duty breaches relating to the board’s oversight of export controls over a key company product, as discussed below.

As these recent cases make clear, and as discussed further below, geopolitical issues, including issues arising from export controls, are an increasingly important source of D&O risk.

The Nvidia Derivative Lawsuit

As discussed in a post last week (here), the unfolding developments involving Nvidia and its former CEO Jensen Huang have already resulted in the filing of a securities class action lawsuit. On November 11, 2026, shortly after the securities suit was filed, an Nvidia shareholder filed a separate shareholder derivative lawsuit in the Northern District of California against Huang and the individual members of Nvidia’s board of directors. A copy of the derivative lawsuit can be found here.

The derivative lawsuit complaint opens with the allegation that the U.S. government treats Nvidia’s high-end graphics processing units “as national-security assets and forbids their export to China.” The complaint asserts that “compliance with those export controls, and protection of the Company’s technology from foreign intelligence services, are mission-critical to Nvidia.” A lapse by the company in its compliance with the controls, the complaint alleges, “threatens its government relationships, its license to sell abroad, its reputation and consequently the value of the company.”

Despite these risks, the complaint alleges, the Company’s board allowed Huang to “keep a romantic relationship with a senior executive of an NVIDIA customer” despite warning signs that were “public and specific.” The complaint alleges that Huang “breached his duty of loyalty by concealing a conflict that put the Company at risk and by making and allowing misleading public statements.”

The other directors, the complaint alleges, “breached their duty of oversight by consciously ignoring red flags about the CEO, a customer under export-control investigation, and a foreign intelligence threat that was intent on infiltrating NVIDIA to allow espionage for China.” The complaint seeks to recover NVIDIA’s losses and to impose governance reforms on the company.

The Applied Materials Derivative Lawsuit

The Applied Materials derivative complaint, a redacted copy of which can be found here, and filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery on October 26, 2026, arises out of the circumstances that led to Applied Materials’ (AMAT) February 11, 2026, agreement to pay a $252.5 million penalty to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for allegedly exporting controlled technology to a Chinese company with ties to the Chinese military. The BIS contended that the allegedly illegal sales to SMIC, China’s biggest chipmaker, violated the U.S. government’s express ban on exporting specific equipment – ion implanters classified as “ECCN 3B991” technology – to SMIC because of the “unacceptable risk” that “SMIC would divert that technology to the Chinese military.”

The BIS alleged that through a secret “dual-build plan,” AMAT shifted part of its manufacturing process for the ion implanters from Massachusetts to South Korea. This plan allegedly was implemented “solely to supply one product (ion implanters) to one customer (SMIC), while AMAT continued to ship ion implanters to every other customer directly” from its Massachusetts plant. The derivative complaint alleges that the sales to SMIC provided AMAT revenues of over $100 million annually.

The complaint alleges that the documents obtained through a books and records request “support the plausible inference” that AMAT’s board “either knew of the ‘dual-build plan’ to continue supplying SMIC with ion implanters or consciously disregarded the likelihood that those sales continued.” Either way, the complaint alleges, “the facts support the inference that the Board (1) knowingly supported a business plan that prioritized profits over U.S. national security, or (2) consciously ignored red flags that senior executives were racing through two giant regulatory stop signs.” The Board, the complaint alleges, “breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty under Delaware law for exercising their oversight responsibilities in bad faith.”

Discussion

Both of these recent cases show how companies’ alleged responses to export controls can translate directly into D&O risk. In both cases, the complaints allege that compliance with the export controls was “mission critical” for the companies involved and allege further that the companies’ boards ignored “red flags” concerning export control compliance.

These recent cases are not the first D&O claims this year arising out of alleged export control non-compliance. For example, in March 2026, as discussed here, a plaintiff shareholder filed a securities class action lawsuit against Super Micro Computer and certain of its executives, alleging that the company had concealed that it was engaged in efforts to export the high-end NVIDIA chips to China in violation of U.S. export controls.

Indeed, the March 2026 securities suit against Super Micro Computer was not even the first export control-related securities suit against the company. As discussed here, in October 2024, a plaintiff shareholder filed an export control-related securities suit against the company, alleging that the company misrepresented its compliance with trade control regulations restricting exports to Russia.

Nor are cases involving alleged violations of export controls the only D&O claims arising out of geopolitical risks. For example, last month, digital brokerage platform Webull was hit with a securities suit based on allegations that the company had misrepresented the extent of its operational ties to China and understated the regulatory and geopolitical risks associated with those connections, as discussed here. Similarly, as discussed here, in August 2026, U.S.-listed Chinese Internet company Alibaba was hit with a securities class action lawsuit alleging, among other things, that the company had misrepresented the risks associated with its alleged status as a “Chinese military company” under U.S. law.

There are numerous other areas where geopolitical risks have led to D&O claims, including, for example, trade sanctions (as discussed here); tariffs (discussed here); operational difficulties arising from the Iran-U.S. War (discussed here); and anti-money laundering (discussed here). The bottom line is that in recent months geopolitical concerns have become an important (and apparently growing) source of D&O risk.

The fact is that in the current fraught geopolitical environment, companies – particularly those with significant cross-border operations – face a variety of complicated challenges that can undermine company operations and financial results. As the above examples show, complications arising from these challenges can and frequently do result in D&O claims. In addition to the topics mentioned above, there are further complications from supply chain vulnerabilities, cross-border money transfers, and the threat of further nation- state conflict and tension.

The likelihood is that geopolitical concerns are likely to continue as a significant source of D&O risk in the months ahead. A particular feature of the geopolitical risk is the China connection. Readers will undoubtedly have noticed that many of the circumstances referenced above pertain directly to China-related connections. As Sarah Abrams noted in a recent post, these developments do at least raise the question whether China itself represents a D&O liability risk factor – and not just for U.S.-listed companies that are based in China, but really for any company that has a China connection.

In any event, as we get ready to head into 2027, it is clear that geopolitical issues represent an important and arguably growing source of D&O risk.