In an April 1, 2009 administrative complaint (here), Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth William Francis Galvin accused Madoff feeder fund Fairfield Greenwich Advisors and its Bermuda affiliate of "complete disregard of its fiduciary duties to its investors" and of "flagrant recurring misrepresentations" that "rise to the level of fraud."

 

If you have not yet seen the complaint, you should take a look, because it contains some rather striking allegations, the most provocative of which are based on the transcript of a telephone conversation in which Bernard Madoff coaches senior Fairfield officials on how to respond to inquiries from the SEC.

 

At one time Fairfield has a much as $14 billion of assets under management, of which nearly $7 billion was invested with Madoff through its flagship funds. The firm earned hundreds of millions of dollars in fees from investors in connection with the Madoff related investments. (Detailed background regarding the Fairfield group can be found here.) UPDATE: Fairfield’s principals were on track for payouts totalling over $117 million in 2008, before the scandal surfaced, as reflected in documents filed with complaint, according to the Dealbook blog (here).

 

The complaint alleges that Fairfield’s managers were "blinded by the fees they were earning" and "did not engage in meaningful due diligence" but instead "turned a blind eye to any fact that would have burst their lucrative bubble."

 

The complaint alleges that in contrast to the due diligence efforts Fairfield claimed in its marketing materials, the firm "neglected to do any meaningful check into whether Madoff was actually making trades he said he was making." The complaint further alleges that "the concept of due diligence was merely part of Fairfield’s marketing pitch, not an activity it meaningfully engaged in with respect to Madoff."

 

The centerpiece of the complaint is a transcript of a December 2005 telephone conversation between Madoff and several senior Fairfield officials. Fairfield apparently recorded the conversation then apparently unbeknownst to Madoff and produced the recording in connection with the Massachusetts investigation. The transcript of the call can be found here.

 

The SEC was about to interview the Fairfield officials in connection with the SEC’s investigation of allegations against Madoff by Harry Markopolos. The transcript shows that Madoff opened the call by stating "obviously, first of all, this conversation never took place, okay?"

 

Madoff then gave the Fairfield officials precise instructions on what to say in response to the SEC’s questions, noting at one point that "the secrecy as to information is the key issue for everybody," even going so far as to say to the Fairfield officials that "the less you know about how we execute… the better you are."

 

The complaint alleges with respect to this phone conversation that Madoff was "manipulating the flow of information to the SEC" and that as a result of its cooperation, Fairfield helped Madoff "evade SEC detection."

 

The complaint also alleges that Fairfield’s reliance on the outside audit firm’s audit of Madoff’s investment company was "absurd," and that Fairfield made "patently false representations" about the audit and the auditor even though Fairfield "did not know one thing about this one-person auditing firm."

 

The complaint also alleges that as 2008 progressed, client redemptions and larger problems in the financial marketplace began to trouble the Fairfield officials. They began to debate internally about "gaps" in their knowledge about Madoff. Their internal communications reflect liquidity concerns as well as concerns about Madoff’s counterparty exposures.

 

The complaint alleges that the officials did not follow up on these concerns. Instead, in response to Madoff’s anger about increasing fund redemption in the late fall 2008, they tried to support him by marketing against redemptions as well as by placing their own cash in new Madoff funds formed at the eleventh hour.

 

The complaint seeks a cease and desist order and restitution to all investors who invested in Madoff through Fairfield, as well as disgorgement of related fees and an administrative fine.

 

In response to the complaint, Fairfield issued an April 1, 2009 statement (here) in which it characterized the complaint as "false and misleading" and asserted that it "conducted vigorous and robust monitoring [of Madoff] on an ongoing basis." The complaint, according to the statement, is based on "nothing more than 20-20 hindsight that supposes that anyone familiar with Madoff’s operation should have determined that it was a Ponzi scheme." But, the statement notes, not one person detected the fraud.

 

Among the Fairfield officials mentioned by name in the complaint is Andres Piedrahita (a Fairfield partner and son-in-law of Fairfield founding partner Walter Noel), whom the complaint alleges in 2007 alone earned in excess of $45 million. The March 31, 2009 Wall Street Journal ran a fascinating front-page article about Piedrahita entitled "The Charming Mr. Piedrahita Finds Himself Caught in the Madoff Storm" (here), reporting among other things that Piedrahita had once told a friend that his "real job" was "to live better than any of my clients."

 

Piedrahita, trading on his "outstanding public relations skills," played a key role in "expanding the reach of the Madoff fraud by wooing wealthy Latin Americans and Europeans." Piedrahita is now under investigation with both Spanish and U.S. authorities, and is a defendant in numerous class action lawsuits, along with Fairfield and other Fairfield officials.

 

Meanwhile, the April 2009 issue of Vanity Fair has a lengthy article (here) about Fairfield founder Walter Noel and his family. The article features a particularly striking photgraph of Noel’s five daughters, one of whom is the wife of Piedrahita. An October 2002 Vanity Fair article focused just on the five daughters can be found here. After awhile, trolling through the backstory on these sidelights to the Madoff scandal begins to create the same sensation as reading an overwritten novel.

 

A comprehensive list of the Madoff-related lawsuits, including the numerous lawsuit filed against Fairfield and related entities and individuals, can be accessed here. I have added the new Massachusetts complaint to the list.

 

Hat tip to the Wall Street Journal for the Fairfield Statement.

 

Other Stories We’re Following: According to news reports (here), a man in Newark, Ohio has been charged with drunk driving on a bar stool. The man apparently had built a motorized bar stool using a dismantled lawn mower. He managed to crash the stool, apparently as a result of the 15 beers he reportedly consumed prior to the accident. Readers interested in seeing this amazing (albeit unexpectedly dangerous) vehicle will want to refer here.

Meanwhile, on March 27, 2009, the Macomb (Ga.) Daily reported (here) that "a woman who sued a city of Warren police dog that she says bit her on the buttocks was ordered by a judge to pay $500 for frivolously naming the dog as a defendant." Frivolous? Has the judge ever been bitten on the butt by a police dog? Incidentally, the dog’s name is "Liberty" which is clearly what the dog took with the plaintiff’s behind

And in world news, Barrack Obama has apparently given Queen Elizabeth II an iPod as a gift in connection with his visit to Buckingham Palace today, as reported here. Alas, it is too late now, but had I been consulted in advance, I would have suggested loading the device with the music of this year’s inductees into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, in particular the songs of Run-D.M.C.

The Rock Hall induction, by the way, is this Saturday, April 4, 2009, in Cleveland, Ohio. (Cleveland Rocks, baby.)

Largely driven by litigation in the financial sector arising from the ongoing credit crisis, the heightened pace of securities filings continued during the first quarter of 2009.

 

There were a total of 57 separate, new securities class action lawsuits filed during the first quarter. The 57 new securities lawsuits represents an annualized pace of 228 filings, which would be basically unchanged from the 226 lawsuits filed in 2008. (My analysis of the 2008 filings can be found here.)

 

However, the 57 first quarter filings do represent a decline from the 67 new lawsuits that were filed in the fourth quarter of 2008, when the Madoff-related filings that came in at year end and increased the quarterly numbers.

 

The filings during the first quarter 2009 were driven by the filing of new subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits. Of the 57 first quarter suits, 35 (61% of the total) were subprime and credit crisis-related. A spreadsheet of the 2009 subprime and credit-crisis related securities lawsuit filings can be found here. A table of all of the subprime and credit crisis securities cases filed during the period 2007 to 2009 can be found here.

 

The first quarter lawsuit filings targeted entities in 26 different Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code categories. But consistent with the predominance of the subprime and credit crisis cases, most of cases were filed with SIC codes in the financial sector. A total of 30 of the 57 cases (52%) involved companies in the 6000 SIC Code (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) series. Indeed, 21 of the 57 cases (37%) were filed against companies in just three SIC Codes: SIC Code 6021 (National Commercial Banks), 9 filings; SIC Code 6029 (Commercial Banks not elsewhere classified), 6 filings; and SIC Code 6189 (Asset Backed Securities), 6 filings.

 

Not only were the first quarter cases largely concentrated in the financial sector, but many of the cases involved very specific kinds of financial transactions. At least 12 of the 57 cases were based upon the offerings of subordinated, preferred or other specialized classes of the issuer-defendants’ securities. (Some entities, for example, Deutsche Bank, were hit with multiple distinct suits relating to different securities offerings, as discussed further below.)

 

In addition at least five of the new filings involved actions against the issuers of mortgage pass-through certificates.

 

The various Ponzi scheme frauds were also a material factor in the first quarter filings. For example, the Madoff and Stanford Financial frauds accounted for a least six distinct cases among the first quarter filings. (There obviously were multiple additional duplicate filings involving these frauds, a source of one of the many counting problems associated with the first quarter filings.)

 

A significant number of the first quarter filings did not involve publicly traded companies. For example, the first quarter securities lawsuit filings targeted mutual funds, private investment firms or investment partnerships, and other private entities. At least eight of the 57 first quarter filings involved entities that lacked an SIC code designation.

 

Thirteen of the 57 new filings (or about 23%) involved foreign-domiciled companies, representing six different countries. However, many of these cases involved separate suits filed against the same companies. For example, while there were five separate lawsuits filed against U.K.-based companies, only two different companies, RBS and Barclays, were actually involved in those five separate cases.

 

The 57 cases were filed in 25 different courts, but 29 of them (about 51%) were filed in the Southern District of New York. Only one other court, the Northern District of California (5 filings) had more than two.

 

Even though the 57 first quarter filings represent a heightened level of litigation activity, the impact of those cases on D&O insurers will be more muted than might otherwise be expected, due to the nature and distribution of the filings.

 

First, the litigation activity was predominantly concentrated in the financial sector, which means that carriers that have not been active in this sector have largely avoided significant claims activity so far in 2009. The carriers that were active in the sector are not as fortunate, but that represents only a subset of the overall D&O insurance marketplace.

 

Second, the incidence of multiple distinct lawsuits against the same company, which was a significant part of the first quarter lawsuit activity, means that the maximum potential aggregate insurance exposure from the new lawsuits is likely substantially less than if 57 separate lawsuits had been filed against 57 complete separate companies.

 

Third, a certain percentage of the cases, particularly the Ponzi scheme cases, are likelier to produce E&O losses rather than D&O losses, so the impact on the D&O insurers from these cases could be more limited than might otherwise be the case for the more typical securities class action lawsuits.

 

All of that said, the pace of litigation activity certainly shows no signs of abating. There are still reasons to believe that the current litigation wave will spread more generally beyond the financial sector. The likelihood of litigation from corporate insolvencies also threatens continued heightened litigation activity as the year progresses.

 

Counting: A final word about counting the filings. I suspect that other observers have or will likely reach differing counts than I have for the first quarter filings. Part of the difference is a result of the perennial counting problems – for example, whether or not to count merger objection lawsuits or lawsuits where the main allegation is that the defendant failed to register securities (neither of which categories I count).

 

But beyond these recurring issues, the kinds of cases that were filed in the first quarter made counting particularly uncertain. The cases themselves made it very challenging to determine whether or not a new complaint represent a duplicate lawsuit or a new lawsuit.

 

For example, how many different lawsuits can there be regarding Deutsche Bank preferred securities? Is a lawsuit involving a different class of preferred securities a duplicate or distinct?

 

The multiple Madoff-related lawsuits post a particularly difficult categorization challenge, as the protean mix of defendant feeder funds targeted in the lawsuits present a dizzying array of combinations.

 

Just to cite one specific counting challenge, I refer to the complaints that have been filed in connection with Wells Fargo’s Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate offerings. One lawsuit represent certificate investors was filed in January 2009 (refer here). A second complaint was filed in March 2009 also brought on behalf of Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate investors (refer here). The March complaint related largely (but not exclusively, as far as I can tell) to different specific offerings of Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates. Reasonable minds (particularly reasonable minds with an abundance of time to undertake an intense textual comparison between the two complaints) might reach a different conclusion, but upon consideration of the different offerings involved, I counted these as two distinct filings rather than as duplicate filings.

 

These are not easy issues and different people could and probably will reach far different conclusions. I have at least tried to be internally consistent with my own counting. In any event, don’t be surprised if other securities lawsuit counts published elsewhere vary from my own. Even if the precise numbers differ at the margins but the general findings should be generally consistent.

 

A federal judge has ruled that securities class action plaintiffs who availed themselves of UBS’s auction rate securities regulatory settlement cannot separately maintain claims for damages against UBS. But while this ruling would seem to represent at least the beginning of the end for many similarly placed plaintiffs, we may still be a long way from the end of the auction rate securities litigation, despite the regulatory settlements.

 

Background

UBS was one of the 21 different companies named as defendants in the wave of auction rate securities lawsuits filed during 2008. The names of all of the auction rate securities lawsuit targets can be accessed here. Background regarding the case against UBS can be found here.

 

Essentially the plaintiffs alleged that UBS had failed to disclosure the liquidity risks associated with the auction rate securities, and also failed to disclose that UBS and other broker dealers regularly intervened in the market for the securities to maintain trading –and allegedly to manipulate the market as well. When the broker-dealers simultaneously stopped supporting the market on February 13, 2008, the market for the securities collapsed and investors were left with securities for which there was no active market.

 

On August 8, 2008, UBS announced a nearly $20 billion settlement with regulators regarding the auction rate securities (about which refer here). In the settlement, UBS agreed to buy the securities back from retail investors at par value, or to make up the difference to retail investors who had already sold for less than par.

 

The plaintiffs in the UBS auction rate securities settlement took advantage of the regulatory settlement and redeemed their securities as par. The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit on that basis.

 

Judge McKenna’s Ruling

In a March 30, 2009 opinion (here), Southern District of New York Judge Lawrence McKenna granted the defendants’ dismissal motion, with leave to amend. Judge McKenna found that

 

Given that Plaintiffs have availed themselves of the relief provided in the Regulatory Agreement, Plaintiffs cannot now allege out-of-pocket damages. When Plaintiffs elected to have UBS buyback their ARS at par value, they received a full refund of the purchase price. Therefore, Plaintiffs have already been returned to the position they were in before they purchased the ARS and before any fraud ensued….Plaintiffs’ out-of-pocket damages are necessarily zero because after choosing to rescind the ARS purchases, Plaintiffs have effectively paid nothing for their ARS.

 

Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled damages despite the regulatory settlement because "UBS’s fraudulent acts prevented Plaintiffs from receiving a sufficiently high rate of interest or dividends to compensate them for the risk of illiquidity associated with their ARS investments." Essentially, they were arguing that if they had been appropriately informed about the securities’ liquidity risk, they would demanded and would have been paid higher interest rates or otherwise have enjoyed a higher investment return.

 

Judge McKenna rejected this argument because plaintiffs in securities actions must choose among prospective remedies, between rescission and out-of-pocket damages. Having elected rescission, the plaintiffs "may not now seek additional interest or dividends as benefits of ARS purchases they have already elected to disavow."

 

Finally, Judge McKenna found that the class plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to asset claims on behalf of "class members who purchased UBS-underwritten ARS from brokerage firms other than UBS and investors who transferred to another brokerage firm ARS they purchased from UBS before October 2007."

 

Discussion

Judge McKenna’s ruling might seem to suggest that the regulatory settlements represent the end of the auction rate securities lawsuits. However, conclusions along those lines could well prove to be premature.

 

First, Judge McKenna granted the motion with leave to amend. Although there is ample reason to doubt that these plaintiffs can circumvent Judge McKenna’s concerns in an amended pleading, the case itself is not over yet.

 

Second, other courts may decline to follow Judge McKenna’s conclusions. Indeed, in a March 31, 2009 AmericanLawyer.com article (here) Alison Frankel quotes the plaintiffs’ attorney from the UBS case as saying "we’re not convinced other courts will rule the same way."

 

Third, there are still the claims of those erstwhile class members who were frozen out of the UBS regulatory settlement, such as those who bought the auction rate securities from a non-UBS broker or who transferred their account away from UBS. As the plaintiffs’ lawyer from the UBS case also is quoted as saying in the American Lawyer article, "the key to the auction rate securities litigation is plaintiffs whose securities were not bought back by the banks."

 

This category of investors who were shut out of the regulatory settlements also includes the investors who bought their securities from banks or broker dealers who have not yet entered regulatory settlements.

 

Fourth, in all the regulatory settlements, institutional investors’ interests were treated differently. For example, in the UBS settlement, institutional investors cannot hope to have their investment redeemed until at least 2010. These investors’ liquidity issues continue to give rise to new litigation; for example, I described in recent post (here) the lawsuit that KV Pharmaceuticals filed in late February against Citigroup, in which the company alleged that the illiquidity of its auction rate securities investments was, among other things, forcing the company to lay off workers.

 

And finally, there is the separate category of litigation that has arisen against auction rate securities investors, rather than against the auction rate securities sellers. These cases involved companies whose balance sheet exposure to auction rate securities has harmed their financial condition, and who face litigation from their own shareholders who claim the companies failed to disclose their exposure. The most recent of these cases, involving Perrigo Company, is discussed here.

 

In short, while Judge McKenna’s opinion unquestionably represents a significant milestone, it by no means represents the finish line for auction rate securities litigation. Unfortunately, these cases likely will be around for some time to come.

 

All of that said, Judge McKenna’s opinion does hold out the hope that a large portion of these cases can eventually be cleared out, and the problem at least reduced over time, perhaps to more manageable levels.

 

I have in any event added the UBS dismissal to my roster of settlements, dismissals and dismissal motion denials in connection with the subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits. The roster can be accessed here.

 

Among the recurring sources of D&O insurance coverage disputes are issues relating to timely notice of claim. A 6-3 decision by the Texas Supreme Court on March 27, 2009 (here), written over a vigorous dissent (here), recapitulates many of the perennial notice issues and reaches a result that while unquestionably policyholder friendly also poses certain concerns.

 

Background

At the time of FlashNet Communications May 2000 merger with Prodigy Communications, FlashNet purchased a 3-year discovery period under its existing D&O insurance program, which extended coverage for claims first made during the period May 31, 2000 to May 31, 2003.

 

The notice provision in the policy had been amended. The original provision required as a "condition precedent to coverage" that the insured provide notice of claim "as soon as practicable…but in no event later than ninety (90) days after such claim is made." The amended provision required "as a condition precedent" to coverage that the insured provide "notice, in writing, as soon as practicable of any claim first made against [the insureds] during the Policy Period, or Discovery Period (if applicable) but in no event later than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the Policy Period, or Discovery Period."

 

On November 28, 2001, FlashNet was named as a defendant in a securities class action lawsuit that was one of the many IPO laddering cases. Prodigy was served with a copy of the complaint on June 20, 2002.

 

Prodigy first communicated with the insurer by letter dated June 6, 2003, in which Prodigy sought the insurer’s consent under the policy to settlement of the securities case. The insurer responded that the June 6 letter failed to comply with the policy’s notice requirements. In reply, Prodigy sent a formal notice of claim on June26, 2003, which Prodigy claimed was timely because it was sent within ninety days of the May 31, 2003 expiration of the 3-year discovery period. The carrier denied coverage and Prodigy initiated an action seeking a judicial declaration of coverage.

 

Proceedings Below

The trial court ruled that Prodigy had failed to comply with the condition precedent to coverage and that this failure "avoids coverage, with or without prejudice to [the insurer]." The court of appeals affirmed, holding among other things that notice given almost one year after the lawsuit was filed was not "as soon as practicable," and that the insurer was not required to proved that it was prejudiced.

 

The Majority’s Opinion

Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson’s opinion for the majority framed the question before the court as "whether, under a claims made policy, an insurer can deny coverage based on its insured’s alleged failure to comply with a policy provision requiring that notice of claim be given ‘as soon as practicable’ when (1) notice of claim was provided before the reporting deadline specified in the policy; and (2) the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay."

 

The majority did not consider it determinative that notice as "as soon as practicable" was identified in the policy as a "condition precedent" to coverage. Rather, the Chief Justice wrote, in order to determine whether or not a showing of prejudice is or is not also required in order for the insurer to assert late notice as a defense to coverage, the question is whether the "notice as soon as practicable" language was "an essential part of the bargained-for exchange in the claims made policy at issue."

 

After reviewing the role of the notice provisions within claims made policies generally, the Chief Justice concluded that the insured’s obligation to provide notice "as soon as practicable" was "not a material part of the bargained-for exchange," and further concluded that "in a claims-made policy, when an insured gives notice of a claim within the policy period or other specified reporting period, the insurer must show that the insured’s noncompliance with the policy’s ‘as soon as practicable’ notice provision prejudiced the insurer before it may deny coverage."

 

Therefore, because the insurer had admitted that it was not prejudiced by the delay in receiving notice, the majority held that the insurer could not deny coverage based on Prodigy’s failure to provide notice as soon as practicable.

 

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Phil Johnson and joined in by two other justices, asserted that "today the Court rewrites an unambiguous insurance contract and changes the agreement of the parties." Justice Johnson wrote that "the record does not show as a matter of law that the notice language was not essential to the parties’ agreement," adding that "the Court’s conclusion otherwise is in derogation of the parties’ intent as expressed by the policy language."

 

Justice Johnson added that "there is no basis in the record for concluding that Prodigy’s one-year delay in reporting the claim was any more or less important to [the insurer’s] insurance business than if Prodigy had delayed for a year reporting a claim made on the last day of the Discovery Period."

 

Discussion

If nothing else, the majority opinion in this case confirms the frequent observation that courts disfavor insurance coverage denials based on late notice defenses. The general reluctance of courts to recognize notice defenses is based on an apparent perception that a policy notice requirement can operate like a "gotcha" to cut insureds off from the policy coverage for which they paid and to which they would have been entitled if notice were timely – and if the carrier is not prejudiced by the late notice, well then, no harm, no foul, right?

 

But even allowing for these assumed biases, the majority’s opinion’s disregard of the policy’s explicit "condition precedent" language and its own determination that the "as soon as practicable" language was "not a material part of the bargained for exchange" are both discomfiting.

 

Some perspective seems in order here. Not only was Prodigy’s notice to the insurer delayed by nearly a year, but Prodigy’s first contact with the insurer was a request for settlement consent. At some level, these facts exemplify the very kinds of circumstances to which insurers will sometimes refer in attempting to explain why notice provisions are necessary.

 

It may well be objected that if the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay here, what difference did the one-year delay really make? The typical insurer answer to this question is that they don’t want to get caught up in sometimes complicated and potentially fraught debates about whether or not a delay prejudiced their interests. After all, what really constitutes prejudice? What has to shown to establish prejudice? Rather than having to debate these kinds of fact intensive and divisive issues, the insurers prefer certain bright line tests that specify the minimal requirements under certain circumstances.

 

On the other hand, the policy language itself may have preordained a policyholder friendly outcome here. The notice provision the court was interpreting had in fact been amended to make it more policyholder friendly, by substituting the more flexible "as soon as practicable language" for the policy’s base form requirement of notice within a specified number of days.

 

The question is whether the majority opinion’s ruling represents more of a policyholder friendly outcome than the insurers may have thought they were offering with the more flexible language – an outcome that may in the future constrain the insurers’ willingness to offer the flexible language and encourage them to insist on more rigid alternatives as reaction to this kind of outcome. A more rigid approach could in turn lead to more questions about the timeliness of notice and potentially to more coverage disputes.

 

All of that said, and knowing full well how devastating any coverage denial can be to policyholders, and how some clerical or administrative error potentially could produce notice problems that otherwise might leave policyholders in the lurch, there arguably is some fundamental fairness to the judicial system’s chronic suspicion of notice defenses. Viewed in that light, the outcome in the Prodigy case is at least understandable, even if the majority opinion itself could be unsettling in certain respects.

 

Special thanks to the several readers who provided me with copies of the Prodigy opinion.

 

A rare jury trial has commenced in a long-running securities lawsuit that resonates with overtones of the current subprime mortgage meltdown. On March 30, 2009, Northern District of Illinois Ronald Guzman began empanelling a jury in the securities class action lawsuit styled as Lawrence E. Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household International, Inc., a case that has been pending since August 2002. Background regarding the case can be found here.

 

According to the plaintiffs’ consolidated amended complaint (here), the case was brought on behalf of all persons who acquired Household International securities between October 23, 1997 and October 11, 2002. The plaintiffs contend that during the class period, the defendants concealed that Household "was engaged in a massive predatory lending scheme."

 

According to the complaint, Household "engaged in widespread abuse of its customers through a variety of illegal sales practices and improper lending techniques." Household also reported "false statistics" that were intended to "give the appearance that the credit quality of Household’s borrowers was more favorable that it actually was." The plaintiffs allege that the "defendants’ scheme" allowed them "to artificially inflate the Company’s financial and operational results."

 

In the third quarter of 2002, the company took a $600 million charge and restated its financial statements for the preceding eight years, and in October 2002, the company announced that it had entered into a $484 regulatory settlement regarding its lending practices. On November 14, 2002, the company announced that it was to be acquired by HSBC Holdings. (In recent months, HSBC’s results have been significantly affected by losses in the subprime mortgage portfolio it acquired in the Household deal and its chairman has publicly admitted that "with the benefit of hindsight, this is an acquisition that we wish we had not undertaken.")

 

The defendants in the lawsuit include Household International and its mortgage finance subsidiary, Household FInancial Corporation, and Household’s former CEO and CFO, as well as one other former individual officer of the company, as well as the former company’s former directors. The company’s offering underwriters were also initially named as defendants, but they were later dismissed from the case (refer here). The plaintiffs also reached a prior settlement with the company’s former auditor, Arthur Anderson.

 

According to news reports (here), Judge Guzman has bifurcated the case into two parts, with a damages phase to follow the initial liability phase, which is expected to last four weeks, if the initial phase results in a finding of liability.

 

As most readers undoubtedly are aware, jury trials in securities class action lawsuits are extremely rare. According to data compiled by Adam Savett at the Securities Litigation Watch (here), only 20 cases have gone to trial since the PSLRA was enacted in 1995. Six of those 20 cases involved conduct that occurred after the PSLRA’s enactment.

 

Two recent high profile trials involved JDS Uniphase and Apollo Group. As noted here, on November 27, 2007, the jury in the JDS Uniphase trial returned a defense verdict. The Apollo Group trial initially resulted in a January 2008 plaintiffs’ verdict and an award of $277.5 million in damages, but as detailed here, on August 4, 2008, the judge granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, which set aside the jury verdict. A detailed discussion of the two cases can be found here.

 

With the adjustment for the post-trial motion in the Apollo Group case, the jury verdict scoreboard for the six post-PSLRA cases now stands at three each for the plaintiffs and defendants, as explained in my post regarding the Apollo Group post trial motion.

 

As for the question why this case is going to trial when so many others settle, there undoubtedly are many factors but one may be the "billion-dollar price tag" that news reports suggest that plaintiffs have put on the case.

 

A March 30, 2009 AmLaw Daily article discussing the case can be found here.

 

Along with the flood of securities lawsuits, the current credit crisis has also generated a wave of litigation under ERISA, as I have detailed here. And just as many of the credit crisis-related securities cases have failed to survive preliminary judicial scrutiny (as noted recently here), at least some of the ERISA cases also may encounter judicial skepticism, if the recent decision in the Huntington Bancshares ERISA litigation is any indication.

 

On February 9, 2009, in an opinion that bespeaks a reluctance to sustain litigation based on the effects of the global financial crisis, Southern District of Ohio Judge Gregory Frost granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Huntington ERISA case. A copy of the opinion can be found here.

 

Background

The lawsuit had been brought on behalf of participants in Huntington’s 401(k) plan. The plaintiffs alleged that the plan fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties in connection with Huntington’s July 1, 2007 acquisition of Sky Financial. The plaintiffs alleged that Huntington’s risk of loss greatly increased by subjecting Huntington to $1.5 billion of subprime exposure through Sky’s relationship with Franklin Credit Management Corp.

 

The plaintiffs alleged that because of the merger with Sky Financial and its subprime exposure, Huntington stock became too risky to be considered a prudent plan investment. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to take any action to protect the plan assets from the "enormous and entirely foreseeable" risk that he increased subprime exposure would injure the plan and its participants’ retirement savings. The plaintiffs claim that defendants’ alleged breaches caused over $100 million in losses to the plan.

 

 

The February 9 Opinion

Judge Frost first agreed with the defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs’ allegation that Huntington violated ERISA when is acquired Sky "is simply an attempt to second guess Huntington’s business decisions and is not governed by ERISA."

 

Judge Frost also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty when they continued to invest in Huntington shares after the merger. Among other things, Judge Frost noted that large public pension funds had continued to invest in Huntington, and indeed had even increased their investment, after the merger.

 

He also noted that "although Huntington has experienced a significant drop in its stock price," its share price essentially "moved in tandem with the other regional banks in Huntington’s geographic footprint." Judge Frost also noted that the plaintiffs "do not point to any ‘red flags’ that should have placed Defendants on notice of a need to cease offering the Huntington stock."

 

Judge Frost also rejected plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants had failed to warn investors (including plan participants) of the risk, finding that in its SEC filings, Huntington "specifically disclosed its exposure to subprime, housing and construction markets and frequently disclosed the effect of increasing market turmoil."

 

Discussion

Judge Frost’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ ERISA claims was based on the specifics of plaintiffs’ allegations. However, his rejection was also clearly based in part on his perception of what the case represents. Among other things, he observed that:

 

it is clear that federal courts are currently experiencing a significant rise in "stock drop cases" due to the current status of the Stock Market and the economic climate in general, which of course includes the subprime lending crisis. However, ERISA was not intended to be a shield from the sometimes volatile stock market.

 

Judge Frost’s reference to "stock drop cases" shows not only how he perceived the Huntington case itself but also reflects a more general perception of the overall subprime litigation wave – that is, that the current influx of cases is the due to stock market volatility caused by the global economic downturn.

 

His general view the subprime cases represent an effort by investors to avoid the consequences of market volatility could, if widely shared, represent a substantial hurdle to the plaintiffs in many of these cases – both cases filed under ERISA as well as cases filed under the federal securities laws. Indeed, I have already noted (most recently here) numerous other credit crisis-related securities cases where courts clearly have shown skepticism that the plaintiffs’ losses were the result of anything other than the financial crisis itself.

 

To be sure, there have been subprime-related ERISA cases that have survived dismissal motions, just as there have also been subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits that have survived motions to dismiss. For example, as I discussed here, the judge in the NovaStar ERISA case recently denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, a decision that is particularly noteworthy because the motion to dismiss was granted in the NovaStar subprime-related securities lawsuit. (My discussion of the NovaStar securities lawsuit dismissal with prejudice can be found here.)

 

But while some of the ERISA cases may yet survive preliminary motions, many of the cases could also face the same kind of judicial skepticism reflected in Judge Frost’s opinion in the Huntington case. If so, a substantial number of the lawsuits being filed in the current wave of subprime and credit crisis-related litigation could fail to make it past the preliminary stages.

 

I have in any event added the Huntington decision to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements, dismissals and dismissal motion denials, which can be accessed here.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of the Huntington opinion.

 

An Unusual Madoff Victim Has Unusual Problems: As reflected in my register of Madoff-related litigation (which can be accessed here), the Madoff scandal has resulted in a wide range of suits and other legal proceedings. But the most unusual of the Madoff-related proceedings may be the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed on March 11, 2009 against Bernard Madoff in the Middle District of Florida by Gino Romano.

 

In his hand-written motion (a copy of which can be found here), Romano, an inmate in the federal prison system, alleges that Madoff enlisted him to recruit other inmates to invest with Madoff, by guaranteeing Romano "an annual return of 18.5%." Romano alleges that Madoff initiated this contact with Romano by sending him an "investment package" in January 2005.

 

Romano alleges that he "collected $1 million dollars from gang leaders" including members of "the Mexican Mafia, Chicago’s Gangster Disciples, the Black Panthers, the Aryan Brotherhood, and D.C. Blacks." Romano asserts that "now I’m in danger from these gangs because Madoff Ponzi scammed us."

 

The dangers Romano claims he now faces include not only irate gang members, but Madoff himself, whom Romano asserts has sent Romano threatening letters. Among other things, Madoff allegedly has communicated to Romano that "he is going to kill me and he has stolen Ponzi money to hire the best hitman money can buy."

 

As readers might well imagine, Romano finds all of this very distressing. He alleges that because of Madoff’s threats he has "suffered a mental breakdown, bed wetting, [and] panic attacks."

 

Call my cynical, but I have my doubts about many of Romano’s allegations. However, I am willing to allow the possibility that the part about "bed wetting" might well be true – although it seems unlikely that Madoff is responsible for that.

 

Special thanks to loyal reader Jon Jacobson for providing me with copies of numerous new Madoff-related pleadings, including Romano’s. I have added all of these new pleadings to my register of Madoff-related suits (here).

 

On March 18, 2009, Judge John F. Walter of the Southern District of California granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, with leave to amend, in the subprim-related securities lawsuit involving certain former directors and officers of Downey Financial Corp. A copy of the order can be found here.

Background

Securities class action lawsuits were first filed against Downey and certain of its directors and officers in May 2008, following the company’s announcement before the market opened on March 17, 2008 that the company had experienced a significant increase in its nonperforming assets and that it found itself forced to restructure its loans with many borrowers. As reflected in its subsequently filed First Amended Consolidated Complaint , the plaintiff alleged that

(a) defendants’ portfolio of Option ARMs contained millions of dollars worth of impaired and risky securities, many of which were backed by subprime mortgage loans; (b) prior to the Class Period, Downey had seen Countrywide’s growth and had started to get more aggressive in acquiring loans from brokers such that the loans were extremely risky; (c) defendants failed to properly account for highly leveraged loans such as mortgage securities; (d) Downey had very little real underwriting, which led to large numbers of bad loans that would cause huge numbers of defaults; and (e) Downey had not adequately reserved for Option ARM loans, the terms of which provided that during the initial term of the loan borrowers could pay only as much as they desired with any underpayment being added to the loan balance.

In the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged certain specific misrepresentations as to each of the three defendants, as well as other misrepresentation not attributed to any one defendant.

On November 21, 2008, the FDIC took control of Downey and sold its assets to another institution (about which refer here).

 The March 18 Order

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint. Judge Walker summarized the plaintiff’s amended complaint (and perhaps tipped his hand about how he felt about plaintiff’s allegations) when he observed that "in short, Plaintiff alleges that the decline in Downey’s shareholder value resulted from alleged misrepresentations made to the investing public by Downey’s current and former officers and/or directors, and not from the current economic climate."

Judge Walker granted the motion on each of the grounds urged by the defendants: he found as follows: first, that the plaintiff failed to plead that the individual defendants made a material misrepresentation or omission; second, that the plaintiff failed to plead scienter adequately; and third, that plaintiff had failed to plead loss causation adequately.

With respect to the individual defendants’ own alleged misrepresentations, Judge Walter found that "there is not a single actionable misrepresentation or omission in the 161 pages of the [amended complaint] attributed to the Individual Defendants."The specific statements on which plaintiffs sought to rely were "far too vague to be actionable."

He also found that "the general allegations against Downey cannot be attributed to the Individual Defendants under the group pleading doctrine, because as this Court previously held, the group pleading doctrine did not survive the PSLRA."

With respect to the issue of scienter, Judge Walter found that the plaintiff’s allegations "when considered collectively, do not give rise to a strong inference of scienter." In reaching this conclusion, Judge Walter specifically observed that the defendants’ corporate positions alone do not give rise to scienter.

He similarly found that the plaintiff had not adequately pled scienter in connection with Downey’s public filings; the resignation and termination of Downey officials; the plaintiffs’ allegations of GAAP violations; and allegations based on confidential witness statements. In each instance, Judge Walter said the allegation were too vague and general and lacked the requisite specificity.

Judge Walter also found the absence of insider stock sales also negated the inference of scienter. He observed that two of the individual defendants had not sold any of their massive holdings of Downey stock. He found that “their substantial losses suffered "¦due to the failure to sell any stock during the class period negates any inference of scienter that may have been raised by other allegations."

Finally, with respect to loss causation, Judge Walter found that "the public disclosures referred to in the [amended complaint] do not contain disclosure of wrongdoing, and, at best, demonstrate only that the market learned of and reacted to Downey’s ‘poor financial health’ rather than any alleged fraud."

Judge Walter gave the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint by April 1, 2009.

Discussion

Judge Walter’s opinion has a number of interesting features. First, in rejecting plaintiff’s contention that the defendants had misrepresented Downey’s exposure to "subprime" loans, he rejected plaintiff’s contention that a subprime loan is any loan made to a borrower with a FICO score below 660. He accepted defendantss argument that the company had fully disclosed that the company itself defined a subprime loan as one made to a borrower with a FICO score below 620. Because the company had fully disclosed its own definition of "subprime" loans (which definition Judge Walter also found had some support in financial literature), the defendants could rely on the company’s own definition of "subprime" in arguing that there had been no misrepresentations about the company’s exposure to subprime loans. 

Second, Judge Walter’s blanket statement that the "group pleading doctrine" did not survive the PSLRA is interesting, but it is a view that is not necessarily universally shared. Indeed, as I have noted elsewhere, the group pleading doctrine has recently undergone something of a revival in recent months.

In any event, the Downey Financial case can now be added to the lengthening list of subprime-related securities lawsuits in which motions to dismiss have been granted. It is also yet another example of a case, along with NovaStar Financial

I have added the Downey Financial decision to my register of subprime-related securities lawsuit settlements, dismissals and dismissal motion denials, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the Downey Order.

More Bank Failures: On March 20, 2009, the FDIC took control of three more banks: TeamBank N.A. of Paolo Kansas (refer here); Colorado National Bank, Colorado Springs, Colorado (refer here); and First City Bank, of Stockbridge, Georgia (refer here). The addition of these three banks brings the 2009 year to day bank failure tally to 20 (compared to 25 during the entire year of 2008). The FirstCity Bank closure is the eighth in Georgia since October 2007. The FDIC’s complete list of failed banks can be found here.

The possibility of additional claims growing out of these continuing banks failures undoubtedly remains as a significant factor, but prospective claimants might do well to review Judge Walter’s opinion in the Downey Financial case before pulling the trigger on filing a new securities lawsuit against the failed bank’s former directors and officers.

Apologies: I apologize for any typing, layout, font, or other errors that may appear in the published version of this post. I had more technical difficulties getting this one online than just about anything I have ever attempted with this blog. Gremlins, I suppose.

Private equity firms and the funds they organize frequently place individuals on their portfolio companies’ boards. However, all too frequently, it is not until a claim has arisen that the various entities consider how the potentially implicated indemnities and insurance will interact. Unanticipated interactions sometimes can produce unintended consequences, particularly from the perspective of the private equity firm.

 

A March 19, 2009 article by the Latham & Watkins firm on the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Forum blog entitled "Indemnification of Director-representatives by PE Firms" (here) takes a closer look at these issues.

 

Among other things, the authors note that "the allocation of responsibility for indemnification and advancement obligations … are not considered until after litigation has been filed" and the same "holds true with respect to the amount of available insurance, especially at the portfolio company level."

 

The authors offer a number of excellent practical suggestions.

 

First, they suggest that the contractual arrangements between the private equity firm and the individuals serving on the portfolio company boards "provide clearly that the private equity firm’s indemnification and advancement obligations to its director-representatives are secondary to the indemnification and advancement obligations of the portfolio company." Otherwise, courts may consider the private equity firm and the portfolio company to be "co-equally liable," which could prove very costly for the private equity firm if it advances costs in the first instance and later seeks reimbursement from the portfolio company.

 

Second, the authors suggest that if the indemnification documents with the director-representative cannot be modified, the private equity firm "should seek an assignment of the director-representative’s rights to indemnification and advancement from the portfolio company prior to the fund paying out defense or settlement costs on their director-designees’ behalf."

 

Third, the authors point out that advancement rights are distinct from indemnification rights, and they suggest that the portfolio company’s advancement commitments "should be examined to be certain that advancement is contractually required and that any advancement obligations owed by the private equity firm or its fund are secondary to the obligations of the portfolio firm."

 

The authors’ final observations relate to insurance. They comment that typically "neither the director nor the private equity firm will look at the portfolio company’s D&O insurance policies until after the director needs to defend/or settle such claims."

 

The authors correctly note that the private equity firm should review the portfolio company’s policies to ensure that the policies are "adequate to protect their director-representatives." The authors also suggest a review of the provisions that will determine how the portfolio company’s policies and the private equity firm’s policies will interact in order to "prevent a battle of the insurance companies."

 

The authors cite the interaction between the portfolio company’s D&O insurance policy and the private equity firm’s policy as a potential concern. These insurance issues become particularly critical if the portfolio company goes bankrupt, in which case portfolio company indemnity issues drop out of the picture and the portfolio company’s insurance can becomes critical.

 

Bankruptcy often has a way of demonstrating the insufficiency of the limits of insurance that the portfolio company purchased. Moreover, bankruptcy also has a way of demonstrating –after the fact – the need for auxiliary insurance structures (such as Side A/DIC insurance or independent director insurance) to protect individuals in the event of complex claims while the portfolio company is bankrupt.

 

The authors are correct that the the various potentially implicated insurance policies terms and prospective insurance interactions all too often go unexamined. However, looking at the terms alone is not enough. Limits selection and program structure should also be carefully considered. Private equity firms should take steps to ensure that the portfolio company’s insurance program will sufficiently protect the director-representatives in all contingencies, even bankruptcy—or, rather, especially in bankruptcy.

 

I disagree with the article’s authors on one point. The authors state that "private equity firms should also strongly consider having the same carrier write the primary policies at both the firm and at each of its portfolio companies." The authors suggest this approach avoids the "other guy’s" policy coverage dodge.

 

The authors are correct that this would avoid the "not my problem" dodge. But it could be a terrible insurance solution in every other respect, both for the private equity firm and for the portfolio companies. First, from the private equity firm’s perspective, there are relatively few carriers willing to write those kinds of risks in the first place, and within that small group, the available terms and conditions vary dramatically. The private equity firm should focus first on placing the optimal insurance solution for its own risks and needs, without being forced to accept a suboptimal solution out of an artificial effort to try to match carriers with its portfolio companies.

 

By the same token, the portfolio companies are unlikely to have uniform exposures and interests. Given the incredible diversity of potential insurance alternatives available in the marketplace, it is very unlikely that the same carrier would provide the best insurance solution for each of the various portfolio companies. And by the same token, the portfolio companies should not have their range of potential D&O insurers restricted only to the relatively few carriers that also will write private equity firm D&O insurance.

 

In short, trying to cram all of the various insured entities under a single carrier’s umbrella could address one single issue but create a host of potentially more significant problems as a result. The preferred approach is exactly the one the authors otherwise recommend, which is to consider policy interaction issues in connection with the insurance placement process – a process that should in the first instance be addressed to providing the best solutions for each respective entity.

 

The authors’ interesting article highlights the need for private equity firms to enlist knowledgeable and experienced insurance professionals in connection with their insurance placement and in connection with their consideration of the issues discussed above. Insurance can sometime appear like a peripheral or relatively unimportant matter– unless things go seriously wrong, in which case insurance can turn out to be the most important thing. At the point that things have gone seriously wrong it a very poor time to discover that critical insurance issues were insufficiently considered.

 

Break in the Action: The D&O Diary is taking its act overseas, and so the publication schedule will be disrupted for the next few days. Regular publication will resume the week of March 30.

 

The current global financial crisis may result in "unprecedented levels of litigation" that "will either serve to identify ‘weak links’ in the chain of participants who originate, appraise, and service collateral and underwrite, manage, insure, rate and sell securities," or it will serve to "highlight where the market may have underappreciated certain risks or failed to appreciate certain circumstances," according to a paper featured in a March 17, 2009 post (here) on the Harvard Law School blog.

 

The paper, entitled "Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising From the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis," was written by Babson College Professor Jennifer Bethel, Harvard Law Professor Allen Ferrell, and Babson Professor Gang Hu, can be found here.

 

The paper explores the "economic and legal causes and consequences of the 2007-2008 credit crisis." In particular, the paper examines "the risks that can arise from financial and technology innovations and losses that are uniquely related to correlated events in the setting of loan markets." The paper sets for a detailed and interesting overview of the economic and financial causes that contributed to the current credit crisis.

 

The paper also notes that "the credit crisis is not solely an economic phenomenon, but a legal one as well." The paper discusses a number of different types of lawsuits that have arisen, but focuses in particular on securities class action lawsuits against public companies, which the paper describes as "by far the most important litigation likely to arise out of the credit crisis."

 

The paper asserts that "plaintiffs that bring Rule 10b-5 class action lawsuits will face substantial challenges," and notes in particular that the securities plaintiffs will have to navigate around three basic legal principles: "(i) there can be no ‘fraud by hindsight’; (ii) there can be no actionable disclosure deficiency with respect to information the market already knew (the ‘truth on the market’ defense); and (iii) plaintiffs must establish loss causation for their claims."

 

First with respect to the "fraud by hindsight" concern, the paper notes that it will not be enough for plaintiffs to show that there have been economic losses; they will also have to show that the adverse developments were reasonably foreseeable at the time the supposedly disclosures were made. The authors note that

 

Whether a failure of certain market participants to provide detailed disclosures regarding the implications of an event – the first full national fall in housing prices since World War II in conjunction with a dramatic and increasingly global crisis – from which the actors themselves suffered huge losses is actionable will likely prove an important stumbling block, in our judgment, for a number of actions being brought.

 

The authors add that "the presence of disclosure failures and materiality thereof must be assessed in light of what was known at the time of the disclosures without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, even if losses occur."

 

Second, with respect to the "truth on the market" defense, the authors question whether the target companies in fact had "special knowledge that was not known by the market at large." The authors suggest that this may have been a situation where the market was at least as informed, or at least no less informed, than the defendants on relevant issues.

 

Third, the authors suggest that "loss causation is likely to be a challenging litigation issue for plaintiffs, because market prices, especially of financial-sector securities, declined overall."

 

The few dismissal rulings that have accumulated so far provide at least some support for the authors’ theories. In at least two cases where dismissal motions have been granted with prejudice – the NovaStar Financial case (about which refer here) and the Impac Mortgage case (refer here) – the courts seemed particularly concerned that the defendant companies had been caught in an industry-wide or even economy-wide downturn. Even if the courts did not use the price phrase "fraud by hindsight," the concept was seemingly implied in the rulings.

 

At the same time, however, there have also been significant cases where courts have had no difficulty denying dismissal motions – for example, New Century Financial (refer here) and Countrywide (here) – in which the courts have expressed open outrage regarding the alleged misrepresentations and omissions. The authors’ analysis seems deficient to me to the extent it fails to recognize the possibility that at least some courts’ judgments potentially may be affected by this sense of outrage, particularly over the extent of damage done, to investors and to the economy. (A list of all of the subprime dismissals and dismissal motion denials can be accessed here.)

 

In addition, given the authors overall hypothesis that plaintiffs will face substantial hurdles in pursuing these cases, it seems a noteworthy and even odd omission that the authors detailed and exhaustive paper neglects to even mention the possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Tellabs case could also represent a significant hurdle for the plaintiffs. In that regard, the Tellabs decision has generally proven instrumental in those cases where dismissal motions have been granted thus far.

 

Finally, with respect to the authors’ suggestion that loss causation issues may prove critical, I note that in a prior post (here) I discussed the challenge that plaintiffs may face where they have sued for supposed economic losses on securities that continue to provide scheduled interest payments on time and in full. These arguments may be particularly relevant in claims brought by mortgage-backed securities investors who have sued the securities issuers and the securities offering underwriters.

 

Defenseless: Laura Pendergast-Holt, the erstwhile Chief Investment Officer of Stanford Financial Group, has a few legal problems to sort out. First, she is a defendant in an SEC enforcement proceeding involving the Stanford Group. Second, she was arrested on February 26, 2009 and charged with obstructing a proceeding before an agency of the United States. Third, she has been named as one of the defendants in numerous civil lawsuits brought by irate Stanford group investors. (A complete list of Stanford-related litigation can be accessed here.)

 

Ms. Pendergast-Holt clearly needs the services of an attorney. Unfortunately, she is also party to one more lawsuit, one in which she is the plaintiff, and which suggests the challenges she may have in providing for her legal representation in the above matters.

 

On March 17, 2009, she filed a lawsuit in Texas (Dallas County) District Court against Stanford Group’s directors and officers’ liability insurer, alleging that the insurer has "failed and refused to provide a defense so that she can defend herself in the SEC action, the civil class action, and in the criminal matter." A copy of her Original Petition can be found here.

 

Ms .Pendergast-Holt seeks a judicial declaration of coverage. Arguing that she has no way of satisfying any self-insured retention, she also seeks a "declaration that any self-insured retention or deductible be waived, held inapplicable or enjoined." She also alleges breach of contract and bad faith. She seeks damages estimated to exceed $5 million, as well as punitive damages estimated to exceed $40 million.

 

The bases on which the insurer has declined coverage for Ms. Pendergast-Holt’s defense are not specified in her Original Petition. While the scandal surrounding Stanford Group is notorious, as yet there have been no verdicts and no guilty pleas, nor to my knowledge have there even been any admissions. Whatever the facts ultimately prove to be, nothing has as yet been determined. These considerations may prove relevant to the coverage dispute, for example, with respect to the potential applicability of policy exclusions. On the other hand, representations made in connection with Stanford’s policy application (particularly with respect to Stanford’s finances) may also figure into the insurer’s coverage position.

 

A March 18, 2009 AmLaw Daily post regarding the coverage lawsuit can be found here. Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service (here) for a copy of the Original Petition.

 

Last fall, the New York Department of Insurance ignited a firestorm when it issued an opinion that a D&O insurance policy may not place the duty to defend on the insured. As I discussed in an earlier post (here), the opinion is contrary to both the uniform practice of the D&O insurance industry and the unambiguous preference of public company D&O insurance buyers.

 

On February 26, 2009, following his keynote address at the the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) D&O Symposium, New York Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo acknowledged the industry’s reaction to his department’s opinion, and indicated that the department would reconsider the issue and address it through the issuance of a new regulation. He also invited the industry to help his department to shape the new regulation.

 

Based on the Superintendent’s invitation, PLUS is now working with the American Insurance Association (AIA). The AIA has drafted proposed revised regulatory language that is now being circulated among its members. PLUS has also invited its member companies to comment on the draft regulatory proposal. PLUS will compile the comments and share them with the AIA and the New York Department of Insurance.

 

One representative from each PLUS member company can obtain a copy of the draft proposed regulatory language by contacting PLUS’s Executive Director, Derek Hazletine, dhazeltine@plusweb.org.  

 

I am setting all of this information out in a separate blog post because the deadline for comment to be received is next Monday, March 23, 2009, so companies that want to participate will have to move quickly.

 

In his Feb. 26 presentation, Dinallo indicated that he intends to act quickly on the proposed regulations and that he hopes to have the regulations in place by late spring.

 

Insurers Must Disclose Climate Change Exposures: On March 17, 2009, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners adoped a "mandatory requirement that insurance companies disclose to regulators the financial risks they face from climate change, as well as the actions the companies are taking to respond to those risks." According to the NAIC’s press release (here), all insurance companies with annual premiums of $500 million or more will be required to complete an annual Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey with an initial deadline of May 1, 2010. 

 

In the Survey, insurers will be required to report on "how they are altering their risk-management and catastrophe risk moedline in light of the challenges posed by climate change" and they will also be required to report  on "steps they are taking to engage and education policymakers and policyholders on the risks of climate change" as well as "whether and how they are changing their investment strategies." 

 

These reporting requirements could have a singificant impact, not just on insurers disclosures, but on their conduct as well. The requirement to disclose what the carriers are doing to "engage and educate" policymakers seems to suggest that the NAIC expects carriers to become proactive on the legislative and regulatory front regarding climate change. The disclosure regarding investment strategies potentially could influence insurers” investment decisions. The clear implication of the NAIC’s rule is that the regulators expect the disclosure requirements will motivate the carriers to become proactive in these areas.

 

 

The web page for the NAIC’s Climate Change and Global Warming Task Force, including a link to the draft language of the new disclosure requirements, can be found here.

 

The Hits Just Keep on Coming: Bernard Madoff may now be in jail following his recent guilty plea, but that does not seem to have slowed the flow of new Madoff-related lawsuits. As the new suits have come in, I have added the new suits to my running tally of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

 

The litigation register has now grown to be quite lengthy. Madoff’s fraudulent scheme may have cost investors billions, but he has stimulated a heaping stack of litigation.Special thanks to the many readers who have been sending me the new complaints as they have come in, especially Jon Jacobson of the Greenberg Traurig law firm. Readers may be interested to know that Jon is also reporting on the new cases on Twitter (here) as they come in.

 

Speaker’s Corner: Next week I will be in London speaking at the C5 D&O Liability Insurance Conference. The specific panel on which I will be speaking is entitled "Current Litigation Trends in Europe and the U.S.: Are Class Actions on the Horizon?" The conference, which will take place March 24 and 25, 2009 at the Grange City Hotel., will feature a diverse array of speakers on a wide variety of D&O insurance related topics. The entire program agenda can be found here.