Outside corporate directors named as defendants in D&O litigation are rarely required to pay settlements or judgments out of their own personal assets, as prior research has shown. But the question of how frequently outside directors are held liable is a different question from the question of whether and to what extent directors are held accountable.
A June 2013 paper by Harvard Business School professors Francois Brochet and Suraj Srinivasan entitled “Accountability of Independent Directors – Evidence From Firms Subject to Securities Litigation” (here) takes a look at this question of independent director accountability. The authors report that while directors are rarely held liable, independent directors that are named as defendants in securities suits are more frequently held accountable. A July 26, 2013 post on the Harvard Business School website about the paper can be found here.
The authors start by noting that investors have two mechanisms for holding independent directors accountable. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits and they can also express their displeasure with the ineffectiveness of the directors’ oversight of manager by voting against the directors’ reelection. In order to assess the extent to which directors are held accountable, the authors studied the incidence of independent directors being named as securities suit defendants and the record of shareholder votes against those directors.
The authors examined a database of 921 securities class action lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2010. The authors found that with respect to the companies that were named as defendants in these suits, 11% of their directors were named as defendants. The likelihood of an independent director being named as a defendant is much higher for directors serving on the audit committee (54% of named independent director defendants); for directors that sold shares (16% of named independent director defendants); or that have been on the board for the entire class period. The incidence is also higher when the lead plaintiff is an institutional investor and when the lawsuit is files under Section 11.
The authors then examined subsequent shareholder votes involving the directors named as defendants. The authors found that these independent director defendants have a great percentage of withheld votes (5.47%) than a controlled sample of independent directors whose companies had not been sued.
The authors also noted that accountability can also be reflected in a greater turnover among independent directors who have been named as defendants. The authors found that independent directors that are named as securities suits defendants are more likely to lave the board of the sued company within two years of the lawsuit than other directors in the same firm. The propensity of directors to leave the board is greater in lawsuits that are not dismissed and for audit committee members. The likelihood of leaving the board increased for both independent directors named as defendants and for other directors of companies that have been sued after 2002 (post-SOX), which the authors “use as a proxy for greater governance sensitivity.”
The authors also examined lawsuit outcomes when independent directors are named as defendants. They found that the more independent directors are named as defendants, the less likely the lawsuit is to be dismissed, settle faster, and settle for a larger amount. The authors noted that “some of our evidence points to the strategic naming of independent directors by plaintiffs to gain bigger settlements.”
The authors conclude that “overall, shareholders use litigation along with director elections and director retention to hold some independent directors more accountable than others when firms experience financial fraud.” In other words, though independent directors are only infrequently held liable, that does not mean that they are not held accountable.
Does a D&O insurance policy provide coverage for attorneys’ fees awarded in settlement of a breach of contract class action? That was the question before the court in an insurance coverage action brought by the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) against its D&O insurer. In a July 11, 2013 decision, Central District of California Judge
The many travels of readers’ D&O Diary mugs have continued, with stops in places both familiar and exotic. The results are a variety of mug shots taken on location in places both far and wide. As reflected in the pictures below, the mug is at ease with lobsters, gnomes and volcanoes, and is an appropriate ornament at temples, halls and castles.






The volume of misstatement-related securities litigation in Japan has “increased dramatically” since the 2004 revisions to Japanese securities laws, according to a June 2013 report from the consulting firm Alix Partners. The report, entitled “Recent Trends in Japanese Securities Litigation: 2000-2012,” can be found
Securities class action lawsuit filings “remained at depressed levels” during the first half of 2013 according to the latest report from Cornerstone Research and the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The report, entitled “Securities Class Action Filings: 2013 Mid-Year Assessment,” can be found
The collectors’ edition D&O Diary mugs that we have sent to interested readers have proven to be both ceremonial and functional, as reflected in the latest round of readers’ pictures. And the mugs have once again proven to be well-travelled, as well.



As part of its scheme to improve corporate transparency and director accountability, a UK government ministry has proposed what UK Business Secretary
The difficulty with pure “claims made and reported” insurance coverage was put into sharp relief in a recent decision out of the South Carolina federal court. The question before the court was whether there is coverage for a claim made during the policy period of one claims made and reported policy but not reported to the insurer until the subsequent renewal policy period.
Does the multiplied portion of an attorneys’ fee award constitute the “multiplied portion of multiplied damages” such that it is precluded from coverage under a D&O insurance policy? That was the question addressed in a
In an environment where public company directors and officers face increasing scrutiny and expanding liability exposures, the indemnification and insurance protections available to them are increasingly important. A July 15, 2013 memorandum from the Gibson Dunn law firm entitled “Director and Officer Indemnification and Insurance – Issues for Public Companies to Consider” (