In the following guest post, Sarah Abrams, Head of Claims Baleen Specialty, a division of Bowhead Specialty, takes a look at the new whistleblower program that the DOJ’s antitrust division recently announced in conjunction with the U.S. Postal Service, and considers the D&O liability and insurance implications. I would like to thank Sarah for allowing me to publish her article as a guest post on this site. I welcome guest post submissions from responsible authors on topics of interest to this site’s readers. Please contact me directly if you would like to submit a guest post. Here is Sarah’s article.
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In July, the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division (DOJ) announced a partnership with the United States Postal Service (USPS) and USPS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to create the Whistleblower Rewards Program. In conjunction with the announcement, the DOJ and USPS published a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlining the program details and procedures. Notably, the new Whistleblower Rewards Program can offer whistleblowers 15% to 30% of $1 million or more of the DOJ recoveries if they have provided original information about antitrust crimes related to the Postal Service.
Will the new opportunity for DOJ antitrust investigations stemming from the use of U.S. mail result in increased regulatory and antitrust-related D&O underwriter exposure?
The following discusses the Whistleblower Rewards Program announcement and MUO, a brief comparison to existing DOJ whistleblower programs, and the potential impact of the new USPS-involved program on executives, companies, and their D&O carriers.
USPS Whistleblower Reports Program
The DOJ’s initiative with the USPS and OIG was announced as being geared to reward individuals who provide original, credible, and timely information about price fixing, bid rigging, or market allocation. To qualify, the whistleblower’s tip must lead to a criminal conviction or comparable resolution, culminating in a fine or recovery of at least $1 million. The MUO provides a formal structure for intake, evaluation, and award determinations relative to the Whistleblower Reports Program.
Statutory Authority
The MOU relies on USPS’s statutory authority, which permits the Postal Service to collect fines and penalties and to pay up to one-half of penalties imposed for violations of law affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property, to a whistleblower. The MUO states that the DOJ’s Antitrust Division will retain supervisory authority over resulting investigations and actions and manage the program in coordination with USPS and the Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).
Eligible Criminal Violations
In addition, the MUO states that the Whistleblower Reports Program is designed to cover criminal antitrust violations under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3, which includes price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation. This provision also applies to procurement fraud, kickbacks, false claims, and other criminal conduct that may undermine competition and affect USPS operations. Basically, any corporation using the USPS to send or receive mail affects USPS operations and may be subject to a Whistleblower Reports Program inquiry. Also, the monetary upside for eligible whistleblowers may be significant.
Rewards Framework
According to the MUO, whistleblowers who voluntarily provide original information leading to a resolution involving a criminal fine of at least $1 million (or an equivalent recovery under a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement) may be eligible for monetary awards. Awards range from 15% to 30% of the recovered criminal fine, and the MUO states that the DOJ has sole discretion over the award percentage, considering factors such as the quality of information, the extent of cooperation, and whether the whistleblower participated in the violation. The Postal Service will retain one-half of the portion of the fine remitted to it, while the other half will be paid to the whistleblower as the award.
Who can be a Whistleblower?
Certain individuals are excluded from eligibility, including DOJ or USPS employees, contractors, or their immediate family members; ringleaders or originators of the illegal activity; and those who obtained information through privileged communications or prohibited means.
The MUO also states that there will be safeguards to protect against frivolous or bad-faith submissions. However, an important for corporations and D&O carriers, there is no ability to recover expenses incurred in responding to DOJ inquiries that are determined to be unfounded. This differs from other regulatory whistleblower programs, like those established by the SEC and CFTC.
Comparison to SEC and CFTC Whistleblower
D&O carriers may be familiar with the SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs, and therefore, comparing the similarities and differences with the new DOJ–USPS program may help analyze. Like the SEC and the CFTC’s whistleblower program, the new DOJ-USPS program offers monetary awards to individuals who voluntarily provide original information leading to successful enforcement actions. The range of potential awards, 15% to 30% of monetary sanctions recovered, is also consistent.
However, unlike the SEC and CFTC, the USPS–DOJ initiative is focused on prosecuting criminal antitrust and procurement-related violations involving the Postal Service. While SEC and CFTC awards are tied to civil penalties and sanctions exceeding $1 million in securities and commodities enforcement actions, the DOJ-USPS whistleblower program applies when there is a criminal fine of at least $1 million.
D&O Diary readers may recall that in 2025, there was a precipitous drop in SEC whistleblower awards granted. Rather, the number and percentage of awards as well as payouts to whistleblowers declined. It will be interesting to see whether the DOJ’s antitrust division will follow the SEC whistleblower program trend, potentially stalling the DOJ-USPS program before it gets started.
Another notable difference between the whistleblower programs is the administration and discretion of the government agencies. The SEC and CFTC have formal Office of the Whistleblower units, and awards are subject to administrative appeal processes, including judicial review in certain circumstances. By contrast, the DOJ–USPS program vests sole control in the DOJ’s Antitrust Division to determine eligibility and award amounts, without an external review mechanism.
The DOJ-USPS program is thus tightly controlled by the DOJ and, potentially, administrative targets. Therefore, if a certain sector or corporation comes under scrutiny by the administration, the ability to act on whistleblower activity may accelerate by leveraging the business’s use of the Postal Service.
Finally, eligibility limitations for whistleblowers are stricter under the DOJ-USPS program than under the SEC and CFTC. As mentioned above, instigators of the illegal activity and those who obtained evidence of antitrust violations through privileged communications are ineligible for whistleblowing awards under the new program. The SEC and CFTC programs, on the other hand, provide broader carve-outs for reporting individuals so that whistleblowers, including co-conspirators, may still qualify under defined circumstances.
Whether DOJ-USPS eligibility restrictions impact complaints or inquiries remains to be seen. Even so, however, regulatory actions may still be initiated and defended against while whistleblower eligibility is parsed out.
Implications for Companies and D&O underwriters
D&O underwriters may want to scrutinize antitrust and procurement compliance programs as well as reconsider pricing and scope of regulatory coverage. Particularly for D&O underwriters that may provide coverage for regulatory inquiries or attorneys’ fees for executives or the named corporation up to final adjudication in an antitrust suit brought by the DOJ.
Because many companies operate within USPS’s vast contractor ecosystem, there may be several prospective antitrust whistleblowers under the DOJ-USPS program. Whistleblowing activity and regulatory investigations resulting therefrom may generate significant defense costs as well as potential follow-on criminal and civil antitrust litigation. Even if the program, the prospective risk of the DOJ going postal may be high.
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