Years from now, when the history of the Roberts Court is finally written, I hope that the historians will be able to explain why during the first dozen years of the 21st century, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed so eager to take up securities cases. But whatever the reason, on June 27, 2011, on the final day of a term in which the Court heard three different securities cases, the Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to hear yet another securities case next term.


The case is styled as Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds and the question that the Supreme Court will address has to do with the interpretation and application of the statute of limitations in Section 16(b) of the ’34 Act, relating to so-called “short swing profits.” Here is the Question Presented in the case:



Whether the two-year time limit for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), is subject to tolling, and, if so, whether tolling continues even after the receipt of actual notice of the facts giving rise to the claim.



The litigation arises out of the IPO laddering scandal from the dot com era. The plaintiff filed fifty-four related derivative complaints under Section 16(b) in connection with 54 IPOs in 1999 and 2000. The gist of the plaintiff’s allegation is that the supposed arrangement whereby the underwriters had arranged for post-IPO stock purchases of the issuers’ securities at progressively higher prices (“laddering”) constituted prohibited short-swing profits. The plaintiff seeks to compel the underwriter defendants to disgorge their profits.


The District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. As to thirty of the cases, the district court granted the dismissal motion as to thirty of the companies based upon the inadequacy of the derivative demand letters the plaintiff had sent to the issuer companies. The District Court dismissed the remaining twenty-four cases on the basis of Section 16(b)’s two year statute of limitations. The plaintiff appealed.


In a December 2, 2010 opinion (as amended on January 18, 2011) written  by Judge Milan Smith a three-judge panel the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the demand letters, but reversed the district court as to the statute of limitations issue. The specific issue the Ninth Circuit addressed was whether the two-year statute of limitations is a strict statute of repose, or whether it is a “notice” or “discovery” statute that is tolled until the claimant has sufficient information to be put on notice.


The Ninth Circuit, following its own prior precedent, held that the two-year statute operates as a “notice” statute, and the running of the statute is tolled until there has been adequate disclosure of the trade. Because the statute begins to run only when the defendant files a Section 16(a) disclosure statement, and because the defendants did not file a Section 16(a) statement, the Ninth Circuit held that the claims are not time-barred.


In an unusual twist, Judge Smith, the author of the opinion for the three judge panel, added an additional opinion “specially concurring” in the result and expressing his view that the two-year statute of limitations is a statute of repose, and that were it not for the prior Ninth Circuit precedent on which the court relied in deciding this case, he would have voted that the Section 16(b) cases could not be brought more than two years after the short-swing trades took place.


The defendants affected by the Court’s ruling on the statute of limitation filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court and on June 27, 2011, the Court granted the petition.



There was a time when the Supreme Court rarely took up securities cases. That time is long passed. The Court is not only routinely taking up securities cases, but it is even taking up routine matters – this is the second securities-related statute of limitations case the Court has taken up recently. Just last year the Court dealt with statute of limitations issues in the Merck case.


The Court has only just accepted this case and it has not yet been briefed, much less argued. The Supreme Court does not explain why it takes up the cases it takes up. But I have to say that it doesn’t seem very likely that the Supreme Court took up this case to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding. I have no idea how five or more votes on this case will line up, but if I had to predict I would guess that the Court will say that two –year statute of limitations in Section 16(b) operates as a statute of repose.


It seems that Judge Smith’s unusual appended opinion specially concurring in the holding but in effect dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s precedent operated like an entreaty to the Supreme Court to clean up the situation.


The one wild card is that Chief Justice Roberts may not participate in this case. The Court’s June 27 order specifies that Roberts did not participate in consideration of the cert petition. He may be conflicted out, perhaps as a result of his prior activities while in private practice. If Roberts does not participate, the conservative majority that lined up together this past term on the Janus Capital (refer here) and Wal-Mart Stores case (here) may not be able to put together the five votes to control the outcome. In which case, the outcome of the Supreme Court review may be too close to call.


But in any event, next October we will enter yet another Supreme Court term with at least one securities case on the Court’s docket. I know for sure at least one blog post I will be writing somewhere between next October and next June.


Special thanks to a loyal reader for alerting me to the cert petition grant.  


A Year After Morrison: Speaking of the Supreme Court and securities cases, the first anniversary of the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case has just passed, and in recognition of the event, Luke Green had an interesting retrospective post on his ISS Securities Litigation InSights blog (here). I have long thought that the Morrison case was one of the most interesting developments in this area, and as Green’s post makes clear, the case has had a multitude of interesting implications.


Summertime: “Love to me is like a summer day/silent because there’s just too much to say./Still and warm and peaceful,/even clouds that may drift by can’t disturb our summer sky.”


Pentwater, Michigan  June 26, 2011