In a recent post (here), I discussed a recent federal district court ruling in which the court broadly interpreted the professional services exclusion in a bank’s D&O insurance policy in order to preclude coverage under the policy for a claim that had been made against the bank and certain of its directors and officers in a case arising out of the long-running Rothstein Ponzi scheme scandal. Southern District of Florida Kathleen M. Williams’s May 2015 opinion in the case, which I discussed in that earlier post, can be found here. As I noted in my earlier post, the case presents an example of the problems that can arise when a professional services firm’s D&O insurance policy contains a professional services exclusion with the broad “arising out of, based upon, or attributable to” preamble language.
As discussed below, a recent law firm memo analyzing the court’s ruling called Judge Williams’s expansive reading of the language “troubling” and expressed the concern that the breadth of the court’s reading of the exclusion’s preclusive effect could render the D&O insurance policy’s coverage “largely illusory.”
Continue Reading The Problem with a Broadly Worded Professional Service Exclusion in a Service Firm’s D&O Insurance Policy
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One of the standard features of D&O insurance policy is the fraud exclusion, which these days typically provides that the exclusion is triggered only after a “final” judicial determination that the precluded conduct has occurred. But what is it that makes a determination “final”?






