RiskMetrics has issued its year-end 2009 scorecard of the Top 100 securities class action lawsuit settlements. The list, which is updated quarterly, can be accessed on the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here). The details in this very interesting tabulation support a number of interesting observations, discussed below.

 

The year-end Top 100 tally reflects the incorporation of 15 new settlements added to the list during 2009. However, because RiskMetrics identifies a specific case’s Settlement Year as "the year in which the hearing to grant final approval of the settlement or most recent partial settlement occurred," there were several high-profile settlements entered late in 2009 that are not, because they are not yet final, reflected in the most recent update, including the $225 million Comverse Technology settlement (about which refer here) and the $160.5 million Broadcom settlement (here).

 

The settlements added to the list during 2009 include the tenth largest all-time settlement, in the form of the $925 million UnitedHealth Group settlement (refer here and here). Among the all-time top 25 settlements are several other settlements added to the list in 2009, including the $586 million IPO Securities Litigation settlement (refer here), the $554 million HealthSouth settlement (refer here), the $475 Merrill Lynch settlement (refer here), the $445 million Qwest Communications settlement (refer here), and the $400 million Marsh & McLennan settlement (here).

 

The price of admission to the Top 100 list is steep. Taking into account the late-year Comverse Technology and Broadcom settlements, which presumably will be added to the list during 2010, future settlements will have to excess $80 million to crack the Top 100. And to break into the top 25, a settlement will have to exceed $400 million. (It should not be overlooked that there have been 25 settlements of $400 million or greater, which is a staggering fact all by itself.)

 

The Securities Litigation Watch blog also notes that the price of admission to the Top 100 list has doubled since the end of 2005; at year-end 2005, the 100th largest settlement on the list was in the amount of $39 million. By year-end 2009, the 100th largest settlement was $79.75 million.

 

Settlements related to options backdating securities cases are well-represented among the Top 100 settlements, including number 10 all-time, the UnitedHealth Group options backdating securities lawsuit settlement. Other Top 100 options backdating settlements include Brocade Communications Systems ($160 million) and Mercury Interactive ($117.5 million). The yet to be added Comverse Technology ($225 mm) and Broadcom settlements ($160.5 mm) also rank among the top all-time settlements. The separate $118 million Broadcom options backdating-related derivative lawsuit settlement, though not relevant to this list because it did not arise in a securities class action suit, is nevertheless noteworthy in this connection.

 

The Top 100 settlements also include two subprime-related securities class action settlements, the $475 million Merrill Lynch settlement and the $150 million Merrill Lynch bondholder settlement. Call it a hunch, but I am guessing that before all is said and done with the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, there will be a lot more of those cases on the Top 100 settlements list.

 

The Top 100 settlements involve cases in 38 different federal district courts, with the largest number in the Southern District of New York (25). Other districts with significant numbers of settlements include the District of New Jersey (8), the Northern District of California (7), the Central District of California (6), and the Southern District of Texas (5).

 

Among the plaintiffs’ firms, the law firm with the highest number of Top 100 securities class action settlements is the Milberg firm (in its various manifestations), with 29, followed by the Bernstein Litowitz firm, with 26 and the Coughlin Stoia firm, in its various forms, with 14.

 

Of the Top 100 securities class action settlements, over two-thirds (68) were finalized in the most recent five year period between 2005 and 2009. The bar graph on page 5 of the report, which depicts the definite upward trend in the more recent years, strongly communicates the increasing severity of securities class action claims.

 

The inevitable implication of this inexorably increasing claims severity is that the price of poker is going up. This fact, taken together with the dramatic increases in the costs associated with defending securities suits, has important implications for D&O insurance limits selection. Simply put, commonplace notions about limits adequacy that have developed over time may have gone completely out of date in the most recent years.

 

The significant recent increase in the number of mega settlements suggests that the answer to the question "How much insurance is enough" may be categorically greater than even a short time ago. The inevitable ratchet effect from these settlement trends, creating ever greater measures of what "cases like this settle for," also suggests that these numbers will not be going back down either.

 

In my year-end analysis of the 2009 securities class action lawsuit filings, I noted a number of filing trends that developed in the second half of the year, including the incidence of new filings against leveraged Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and the surprising numbers of belated securities suit filings where the filing date came well after the proposed class period cut-off date. If the lawsuit filings in the first two weeks of January are any indication, these trends have continued into the New Year.

 

First, this past week, plaintiffs’ lawyers launched two new lawsuits on behalf of leveraged ETF fund investors, the UltraBasic Materials ProShares Fund (refer here) and the Direxion Energy Bear 3X Shares Fund (refer here). My prior post discussing the phenomenon of securities class action lawsuits and including a link to a running list of the ETF-related suits can be found here. I have updated the list to include these most recently filed suits.

 

Second, in the first 2010 instance of the belated lawsuit filing phenomenon, on January 15, 2010, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a securities class action lawsuit against Stryker Corporation and certain of its officers and executives. The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ January 15 press release about the case can be found here.

 

The class period cut-off proposed in the Stryker complaint is November 13, 2008, well over a year before the lawsuit was filed.

 

We may have entered a new calendar year, but at least a couple of last year’s securities suit filing trends appear to have carried over from year-end, at least so far.

 

Galleon Out as Lead Plaintiff: Among the stranger circumstances surrounding the Galleon Management insider trading scandal is the fact that just two weeks before the scandal surfaced Galleon had been reaffirmed as lead plaintiff in the Herley Industries securities class action lawsuit. My prior post discussing these circumstances can be found here.

 

However, according to a January 15, 2010 Bloomberg article (here) written by Thom Weidlich, Galleon has now dropped out as lead plaintiff in the case.

 

In a January 15, 2010 order (here), Eastern District of Pennsylvania Judge Juan R. Sanchez permitted Galleon to withdraw as lead plaintiff. According to the Bloomberg article, Galleon’s counsel had advised the court that it had "become clear that the now-defunct Galleon can no longer continue in this role."

 

Delaware Chancery Court Tosses Bribery Follow-On Civil Suit: In numerous prior posts (most recently here), I have noted as along of the increasing number of antibribery enforcement actions has come the increasing incidence of follow-on civil litigation in the wake of the bribery enforcement action.

 

As reflected in a January 15, 2010 post on The FCPA Blog (here), a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision dismissing a case involving Dow Chemical contains language that may be important in future bribery enforcement follow-on civil actions.

 

The Dow suit arose after the Kuwaiti parliament acted to rescind the purchase of certain Dow assets (in a transaction known as K-Dow) based on the suspicion of profiteering and improper commissions paid to the Kuwaiti state owned enterprise that was the actual buyer. The plaintiffs filed suit in Delaware alleging that the Dow board "failed to prevent bribery in connection with the K-Dow transaction."

 

In a January 11, 2010 opinion (here), Chancellor William B. Chandler III dismissed the action on the grounds that the plaintiffs "do not allege that the board knew about or had reason to suspect bribery."

 

The FCPA Blog points out that in a footnote "that may have important consequences beyond this case," the court said that Dow’s compliance program was evidence that the board had met its fiduciary duty to prevent overseas bribery. The Chancery Court specifically referenced the company’s Code of Ethics prohibiting any unethical payments to third parties. The FCPA Blog concludes that this case provides "a powerful reason for directors and officers to insist on robust antibribery compliance programs that include regular reports back to the board."　

　

The financial relationship between plaintiffs’ securities firms and the clients they represent has long been questioned, and not only because of the kinds of improper kickback payments for which Bill Lerach and Mel Weiss, among others, wound up in jail. Another practice that has raised recurring concerns is what is referred to as "pay-to-play" – which in this context refers to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ payment of political contributions to elected officials in charge of public pension funds, supposedly in exchange for the lawyers’ selection as the funds’ class action counsel.

 

But while these kinds of concerns are frequently raised, a preliminary question is often overlooked – that is, regardless of questions about the effect the practice might have on the counsel selection process, are the plaintiffs’ lawyers in fact making political donations to elected officials who have authority over public funds?

 

That is the question examined in a recent New York University Law Review article by Drew T. Johnson-Skinner entitled "Paying to Play in Securities Class Actions: A Look at Lawyer’s Campaign Contributions" (here). The article’s author notes that while alleged pay-to-play practices are often discussed, and have even been the subject of various reform proposals, many commentators have simply "skipped" the "first stage of the analysis," which is the question "whether law firms are contributing to investment funds’ leadership at all."

 

In order to analyze the question, the article’s author looked at all 1076 securities class action lawsuits that were filed from 2002 to 2006, and then narrowed the data set to the 74 cases where "the filing lead plaintiff was an institutional investor with at least one state-level elected official or a person appointed by a state-level elected official, on its controlling board."

 

The author then looked at whether the law firms selected as counsel in each of the 74 cases had made campaign contributions to any elected officials affiliated with the funds that selected the firm. Reviewing publicly available information, the author found that "in a majority of cases where pay-to-play was possible, at least one law firm made a political contribution to an elected official with a lead plaintiff pension fund in the case."

 

The author concluded that his analysis "confirms that plaintiffs’ law firms are contributing to the pension funds that select them as counsel," and that "campaign contributions that could be the basis of paying-to-play are present across a broad range of cases." Moreover, the amount of money contributed by firms is also "significant."

 

However, the author cautioned that his research "does not explain why firms contribute to pension funds or the role that campaign contributions actually play in funds’ counsel-selection decisions." Rather, the author suggests that the value of his research is that it rules out any possible contention, in response to pay to play allegations, that law firms are not contributing to pension funds. In fact, they are.

 

While the law review article’s author declined to question whether the plaintiffs’ law firms’ political contributions are a form of pay-to-play, a separate legal study suggests at a minimum that the existence of political contributions may affect the attorneys’ fees that a public pension fund may pay.

 

A December 22, 2009 article (here) by New York University law professor Stephen Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, and University of Michigan law professor Adam Pritchard suggests that "state pension funds generally pay lower attorneys’ fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity," but that when the authors controlled "for campaign contributions made to officials with influence over state pension fund" the differential disappears. Thus, the authors conclude, pay to play "appears to increase agency costs borne by shareholders in securities class actions."

 

In any event, questions continue to arise whether plaintiffs’ lawyers campaign contributions to officials that control public pension funds represents a form of improper influence.

 

For example, in connection with the class certification motion in the Countrywide subprime-related securities class action lawsuit, the Defendants had argued that the lead counsel in the case had made a series of campaign contributions to the New York State Comptroller, the sole trustee of the New York State Common Retirement Fund, one of the lead plaintiffs in the case. (The other lead plaintiff group is the New York City Pension Funds.) The various contributions for the lawyers at the firm ranged in amount from $6,200 to $9,600, all made within four days’ time, after the law firm had been selected as lead counsel. The payments totaled "precisely $50,000."

 

In her December 9, 2009 order certifying the class (here), Central District of California Judge Mariana Pfaelzer noted that any suspicion of pay-to-play activity "would be relevant to attorney-class conflicts and the willingness of [the State Fund] to monitor its attorneys and make decisions for the benefit of the class rather than its attorneys," but she found that any such suspicion "may be somewhat speculative" in the Countywide case.

 

Judge Pfaelzer noted as a preliminary matter that "attorneys are free to exercise their right to donate to politicians who support their views" and that the defendants "do not allege that the donations violated any law." She also noted that "though not exactly correlative," lawyers and parties on the defense side have "similar political-donation freedom."

 

Perhaps more importantly, in rejecting the defendants’ objections, Judge Pfaelzer found that the lead plaintiffs’ firm had been retained for the case "after career staff recommended" the firm, following "reasonable ethics protocols" and based on the law firm’s "independent investigation of the case."

 

A December 10, 2009 WSJ.com Law Blog post about Judge Pfaelzer’s ruling can be found here.

 

The suggestion of similar concerns surfaced more recently in connection with the composition of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which commenced its high profile investigation of the financial crisis on Wednesday. As detailed in a January 13, 2010 Wall Street Journal article (here), one of the individuals on the ten-member commission is a lawyer with the Coughlin Stoia law firm. In addition, a senior commission staffer is on leave as a partner in the Coughlin Stoia law firm.

 

The Journal article reports that the commission chairman, Phil Angelides, received $250,000 in contributions from the law firm during his 2006 campaign for governor. The article quotes a representative of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform as saying that the appointment of plaintiffs’ class action attorney to the commission and its staff "raises a very real concern as to whether they will use the important work of the commission ultimately to feather their own nest." A law professor is also quoted as saying that the ties to the law firm could hurt the commission, noting that "the commission must maintain its distance from the perception that this is all a ‘gotcha’ exercise."

 

These kinds of concerns about plaintiffs’ law firms’ political contributions at a minimum draw upon a suggestion of at least the appearance of impropriety. As one way to try to avert this appearance, Florida has instituted a public process, conducted by its State Board of Administration, which oversees the state employee pension funds, to determine which firms will represent the Board in future securities class action lawsuits.

 

According to Allison Frankel’s December 14, 2009 AmLaw Litigation Daily article (here), 31 firms submitted proposals, from which a field of 12 candidates was selected. In a January 12, 2010 update (here), Frankel reported on the outcome of the process and the names of the five law firms finally selected. Her January 12 article also reports on the many "interesting tidbits" revealed in the law firms’ public submissions, including the firms’ hourly rates and the portfolio monitoring services the firms provide for many public pension funds.

 

Though the Florida process has all the virtues of transparency, the process itself did not eliminate the phenomenon of plaintiff’s lawyers’ campaign contributions to influential public officials. According to a December 12, 2009 St. Petersburg Times article (here), in the preceding 14 months, "lawyers and others tied to the firms interested in representing the SBA have spent at least $850,000 on Florida politics." The article quoted critics who suggested that "Florida’s short list mirrors the entrenched, pay-to-play culture between public pension funds and prominent class-action law firms."

 

In other words, as the law review article cited above demonstrates, the plaintiff’s law firms are in fact making political contributions to elected officials who are in a position to influence the counsel selection process. Whether or not the contribution are made for the purpose of influencing the counsel-selection process and whether the process is in fact influenced may be questions about which there may be a diversity of views; the plaintiffs’ lawyers are quick to defend their actions.

 

But I wonder whether this is going to be one of those kinds of issues that is out there and frequently noted, but then suddenly blows up when some very specific development moves it to the front burner. This is the kind of issue that could get people very excited if a certain combination of facts and circumstance should come to light. Even absent some dramatic revelation, the questions will continue, simply because of the way it looks.

 

Indeed, given the shadow it inevitably casts over plaintiffs’ attorneys and their motivations, you do wonder why they continue these practices. More cynical minds might suggest that it is obvious why the plaintiffs lawyers don’t stop.

 

　

Since the outset of the subprime securities class action litigation wave I have tried to keep track both of the lawsuits as they are filed (refer here) and on the outcome of the cases as they are resolved, including in particular the outcome of the defendants’ motions to dismiss (refer here). But these tabulations alone don’t tell you who is winning and who is losing, or why.

 

Those questions are the subject of a thorough and interesting December 30, 2009 Bloomberg.com article by Jon Eisenberg of the Skadden Arps law firm entitled "Subprime Securities Class Action Decisions: Who’s Winning, Who’s Losing and Why?" (here).

 

Eisenberg looks at dismissal motion rulings in 16 of the cases that have reached the dismissal motions stage. (Eisenberg explains that he narrowed the pool of decisions he reviewed from the universe of all subprime and credit crisis-related dismissal motion rulings in order "to focus exclusively on subprime cases…in which plaintiffs have alleged that defendants misrepresented or omitted material facts regarding the quality of subprime loans that the defendant company was making or financing or rating.")

 

He found that out of the 16 decisions, plaintiffs’ complaints survived motions to dismiss in ten cases and failed to survive in six cases.

 

Eisenberg has a number of observations about these dismissal motion rulings. First, he noted that all seven cases that asserted claims under Sections 11 and 12 (a)(2) of the Securities Act survived motions to dismiss. Indeed, even in cases in which ’33 Act claims were combined with claims under Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act, the Section 10(b) claims survived as well. By contrast, in the nine decisions involving standalone Section 10(b) claims, the dismissal motions were denied in only three cases.

 

Although the defendants asserted a number of defenses in their dismissal motions, scienter "turns out to be the perfect predictor of outcomes across all 16 cases." If plaintiffs were not relying on claims that required pleading scienter (i.e., the ’33 Act claims) or convinced the court that the scienter allegations were sufficient, they survived the motion to dismiss. And in the Section 10(b) cases in which the plaintiffs met the standard for pleading scienter, "they also convinced the court to reject the merits of the other defenses asserted in the motion to dismiss."

 

Plaintiffs were successful in pleading scienter when relying on statements by confidential witnesses that "allegedly detail executives’ knowledge of facts inconsistent with public statement" and when relying on "reliable external sources of information," such as bankruptcy examiner’s report, as well as when relying on "market events linked with questionable internal practices and representations fundamentally at odds with a company’s core business."

 

Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in pleading scienter when the factual allegations on which the plaintiffs are relying might "easily coincide with non-fraudulent misstatements or omissions." For example allegations such as senior level positions, certifications under Sarbanes-Oxley, resignations of senior executives, normal selling by insiders, GAAP violations, restatements and even decisions by auditors to not continue as auditors were found not to create a strong inference of scienter.

 

Eisenberg found further that massive complaints do not necessarily establish scienter and often backfire on plaintiffs. Similarly, though many complaints seek to rely on confidential witnesses, confidential witness statements "do not ensure that a complaint will survive." Courts have dismissed fraud claims where "the confidential witness statements failed to show what the executives knew or how the confidential witnesses knew what the executives knew."

 

Eisenberg concludes his article with an analysis of the problem of "hindsight bias" – the tendency for people with knowledge of an outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe the outcome should have been predicted. The risk of hindsight bias in the subprime cases exists because of the competing narratives; that is, the plaintiffs argue that defendants were reckless in not seeing what was coming and adjusting their business practices accordingly, and defendants argue that they, along with the entire rest of the global financial marketplace, were blindsided by events "so severe, unexpected and unprecedented" that no one saw them coming.

 

"The good news for defendants," Eisenberg concludes is that at least in cases involving standalone Section 10(b) cases, "defendants’ narrative is often persuasive and courts have granted motions to dismiss because they are not convinced that defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, of the calamity that lay ahead."

 

Very special thanks to Jon Eisenberg for providing me with a copy of his article.

 

My own status report, as of September 2009, on the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits can be found here.

 

The FDIC has picked up where it left off at the end of 2009, with its first bank closure of the New Year. On Friday, January 8, 2010, the FDIC took control of Horizon Bank of Bellingham, Washington, for the first bank closure of 2010. While the FDIC’s continuation of its regulatory actions regarding troubled banks seems likely in the near term, what remains to be seen is whether the FDIC’s actions will include litigation against the former directors and officers of the failed banks.

 

Though the FDIC has yet to launch D&O litigation, the lawsuits may be just ahead. The FDIC is taking a series of steps clearly designed to prepare for litigation.

 

First, as reported in a January 10, 2010 article in FinCri Advisor (here), the FDIC is "subpoenaing bank officials and workers, hoping to gather evidence to use in potential litigation." By way of illustration, a recent motion filed by bank officials in connection with the bankruptcy proceedings involving Haven Trust Bancorp, the holding company for a Duluth, Georgia bank that failed in December 2008, states that certain of the officials "received subpoenas…issued by counsel to the [FDIC] regarding the FDIC’s investigation of certain matters relating to the failure of Haven Trust Bank." (The former officials’ motion sought access to the D&O insurance policy proceeds in order for the officials to be able to defend themselves.)

 

Second, as I noted in a prior post, the FDIC is sending civil demand letters to former directors and officers of failed banks. According to the FinCri Advisor article, former directors in Florida, California, Illinois, Texas and Georgia have received FDIC claims letters. According to a commentator in the article, one obvious trigger for a demand letter is the approaching expiration date of the D&O insurance policy.

 

An example of one of these demand letters is described in a January 8, 2010 Atlanta Business Chronicle article, here (registration required). The article describes a September 28, 2009 letter sent to the D&O liability insurer for Georgian Bank, an Atlanta bank that the FDIC closed on September 25, 2009. According to the article, the letter details the potential claims the FDIC might make against the bank’s former directors and officers, including allegations of "unsafe and unsound banking practices."

 

Industry experts quoted in the Atlanta Business Chronicle article say that "such letters likely have been filed with insurers by all 30 banks that have failed in Georgia since August 2008."

 

But while the FDIC is clearly pursing investigations and taking steps to try to preserve the right to try to recover D&O insurance proceeds, it "has not filed any D&O lawsuits in connection with the bank failures since the crisis began in 2008," according to an FDIC spokesman quoted in the article.

 

According to the FinCri Advisor article, "the FDIC spends about a year conducting an investigation into a failed bank before deciding whether it can pursue a claim against former directors and officers."

 

Because of the FDIC’s many continuing investigations, 2010, according to an attorney quoted in the FinCri Advisor article, "will be the year of investigation and tolling agreements." One reason for the FDIC to proceed carefully is that it doesn’t want to push cases early that may set bad precedents, which could "doom subsequent cases."

 

But though the FDIC is now proceeding cautiously, when the litigation ultimately comes, there is likely to be a lot of it. The FinCri Advisor article quotes the FDIC’s former head of litigation as saying that "about half" of the bank failures will "see some director litigation." Before all is said and done, the coming litigation "could rival the litigation that occurred in the 80s and 90s as a result of the many thrift failures."

 

Special thanks to loyal reader Henry Turner for providing me with a copy of the Haven Trust pleading and the Atlanta Business Chronicle article.

 

Another Perspective: As a continuation of my early post in which I linked to a variety of Top Ten lists, I note here the recent post on the Corporate Disclosure Alert blog (written by my law school classmate and investor advocate, Sanford Lewis) about "10 Questions of Risk Management for the New Decade" (here). Lewis contends that "far more must be done to turn the patchwork of risk management approaches into viable public policy and corporate governance solutions." The list of issues that Lewis contends should be addressed is interesting and provocative.

 

We Aren’t What We Watch – Are We?: On New Year’s Day, my hyperkinetic eldest daughter — collegiate swimmer, rugby player – who rarely sits still long enough to watch TV, announced "I think I’ll watch some college football" and she plopped herself down beside me on the couch. Unfortunately for the nascent possibility of a little father-daughter bonding, the game broadcast at that moment was in the middle of the Flomax halftime report, and the commercial had just reached the point where it advised that Flomax’s adverse side effect may include a "reduction in semen."

 

As she was leaving the room, my daughter offered the observation that at least on TV college football is clearly meant for a "different demographic."

 

Indeed. But what exactly is the intended demographic?

 

The commercials themselves suggest that the target audience consists of people who are basically worried. They are not only worried just because they have to go pee all the time. They are worried about their credit scores. They are worried that their nest eggs have shrunk. They are worried about figuring out their taxes. They are worried because their computers are too slow and because their 3G network’s coverage areas are too small.

 

So many things to worry about. Too bad for you if all you want to do is watch a little football.

 

But in the midst of all of this apprehension and fear, there is cause for hope. For the overweight, for example, Taco Bell would like to communicate the optimistic message that you can lose weight by eating fast food. (I am not making this up.)

 

If playing time alone is any measure, the most important message for our society seems to be that Taco Bell now has a five-layer burrito for 89 cents. For those of you thinking, "No Way!" — you have to understand that they are not offering to pay you 89 cents to eat that thing. They are expecting you to pay them. Seriously. As my son said, "Is that supposed to be food?"

 

Perhaps (I can hope optimistically) we are all in the wrong demographic. How much more fortunate are the viewers of the UK premier league soccer games. Since the game clock never stops, there are no commercial interruptions – which obviously is the reason that soccer has never been allowed to catch on commercially in the U.S. Of course, the soccer games do have halftimes, which does hold open the theoretical possibility for Flomax halftime reports.

　

According to its January 6, 2010 press release (here), the U.S. Equal Employment Commission announced that near record numbers of workplace discrimination charges were filed with the agency in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009. As reflected in the agency’s statistical presentation, there were 93,277 charges filed in FY 2009, which is the second-highest number the agency has recorded.

 

The highest annual number filings occurred in FY 2008, when 95,402 charges were filed. The FY 2009 filing levels were about 2.2% below the FY 2008 levels, but still well above any prior year. After 2008, the next closest year in terms of filing activity was FY 2002 (during the prior economic downturn), when there were 84,442 filings.

 

Consistent with recent historical trends, the most frequently alleged types of discrimination are race (36%), retaliation (36%) and sex-based discrimination. (A single charge filing may allege multiple types of discrimination.) Allegations based on age-based disability (up about 10%), religion (up 3%) and/or national origin (up 5%) hit record highs. Allegations of age-based discrimination reached the second-highest level ever.

 

The EEOC also reported that through its enforcement, mediation and litigation programs, the agency "recovered more than $376 million in monetary relief for thousands of discrimination victims."

 

The EEOC’s press release states that the "near-historic level of total discrimination charge filings [in FY 2009] may be due to multiple factors," including "greater accessibility of the EEOC to the public, economic conditions, increased diversity and demographic shifts in the labor force, [and] employees’ greater awareness of their rights under law."

 

The sustained record level of EEOC charge filings during the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 should be a matter of concern for every employer. These figures not only underscore the need for every employer to adopt and implement best employment practices, they also highlight the need for every employer to procure employment practices insurance as a critical and indispensible part of their insurance program.

 

The EEOC’s suggestion that the heightened level of filings of individual charges is due in part to the economic conditions and to employees’ greater awareness of their rights also suggests that, as the current economic downturn drags on, the elevated filing levels could continue for some time to come.

 

A January 6, 2010 National Law Journal article about the EEOC’s statistical release can be found here (registration required).

 

Another Securities Class Action Trial: We are all awaiting the outcome of the long running Vivendi trial, which is just wrapping up this week in the Southern District of New York. But while all eyes were on the Vivendi trial, few of us noted that another securities class action trial was going on in the Central District of California, in the American Mutual Funds Fee Litigation.

 

Kudos to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog, who first brought this development to my attention in his blog post here.

 

The case apparently went forward as a bench trial this past summer before Judge Gary Feess, whose December 28, 2009 post-trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law can be found here. Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated the federal securities laws by charging excessive advisory and distribution fees. Judge Feess concluded that the plaintiffs had not sustained their burden of proving that the fees were so "disproportionately large" that they bore "no reasonable relationship" to the services, as the plaintiffs were required to show in order to prevail.

 

As the Securities Litigation Watch details here, there have now been 22 post-1996 securities class action lawsuit cases that have gone to trial (not counting Vivendi), eight of which involved post-PSLRA conduct and that have actually gone to verdict. Taking into account post-verdict motions and appeals, the current scoreboard on these post-PSLRA lawsuit verdicts (according to the SLW’s data) now reads: Defendants 5, Plaintiffs 3. (Soon to be updated, I suppose, after the Vivendi jury reaches a verdict.)

 

Andrew Longstreth’s January 6, 2009 American Lawyer article about the American Mutual Funds Fee Litigation verdict can be found here.

 

In a January 4, 2010 order (here), Southern District of Texas Judge Nancy Atlas held that an insurance broker’s Professional Liability Insurance insurer must defend the broker and one of its employees in connection with claims arising out of the Stanford Group fraud.

 

Background

The Bowen Miclette & Britt insurance brokerage and one of its employees (Winter) have been named as defendants in several civil actions filed following the revelations of the Stanford Group fraud. The plaintiffs in the cases had deposited money in or invested in Certificates of Deposit issued by the Stanford International Bank (SIB).

 

The plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuits alleged that the brokerage provided the Stanford Group with "safety and soundness letters" that Stanford used in marketing. Among other things, the letters allegedly asserted that SIB was "insured by various Lloyd’s insurance policies" and that SIB had "qualified" for the Lloyd’s policies.

 

The defendants sought to have their insurer under the brokerage’s Professional Liability Insurance policy defend them in the underlying actions. The insurer denied coverage, and in July 2009, the insurer initiated an action against the brokerage and Winter in the Southern District of Texas, seeking a judicial declaration that there was no coverage under the policy for the claims. The defendants counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration of coverage. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

 

The January 4 Order

In her January 4 order, Judge Atlas denied the insurer’s summary judgment motion and granted the defendants’ motions, ruling that the allegations in the complaint gave rise to a duty for the insurer to defend. Judge Atlas’s ruling was without prejudice as to the duty to indemnify, the issues with respect to which she held were not yet justiciable because the underlying actions remain pending.

 

Judge Atlas first concluded that the allegations in the underlying cases about the defendants’ provisions of the "safety and soundness letters" were claims for "Professional Services" within the meaning of the policy.

 

The insurer argued that coverage under the policy nevertheless was precluded by the policy’s securities exclusion, which excluded coverage for any claim "based upon or arising out of any violation or alleged violation" of federal or securities laws. The insurer argued that the underlying complaints alleged securities violations and therefore the exclusion precluded coverage.

 

Judge Atlas agreed that the underlying complaints alleged violations of the securities laws, but noted that the complaints also "alternatively asserted negligence-based claims" that were not within the securities exclusion, and therefore the insurer owed the defendants a duty to defend all claims in the underlying lawsuit.

 

Winter had also sought to have the insurer defend him. Winter was an employee of the brokerage who allegedly had provided and signed the "safety and soundness" letters. The plaintiffs in the underlying case alleged that Winter had not disclosed that he was also a director of SIB.

 

Judge Atlas found that "in none of the three underlying lawsuits are there allegations against Winter in his capacity as a member of SIB’s Board or in any capacity other than an employee of BMB." She found that the allegations against him are based on professional services Winter provided in his capacity as a BMB employee and that the insurer owed him a duty to defend.

 

Discussion

High-profile cases, particularly those charged with headline grabbing fraud allegations, can sometimes be difficult from an insurance perspective. Insurers may well feel that the kinds of things alleged are not the kinds of things for which they undertook to provide insurance. On the other hand, at the outset of a case, the allegations are as yet unproven. And the defendants dragged into a high profile cases need to be able to defend themselves.

 

There may or may not ultimately be indemnity coverage under the policy for the claims against BMB and Winter. But in the meantime, the defendants – who are insureds under the policy – face very serious allegations for which they would likely have trouble defending themselves if there were no insurance available. Unfortunately, in addition to having to defend themselves against very serious allegations in the underlying cases, they also had to deal with a lawsuit brought against them by the insurer from whom they were hoping to obtain a defense.

 

As Judge Atlas found, the complaint contained allegations that potentially come within the policy’s coverage, and so the insurer was obliged to provide a defense. If the defendants (and their insurer) are fortunate, their defense will succeed and the need to address the indemnity issues will never arise.

　

In an earlier post (here), I discussed legislation that Senator Arlen Specter introduced in July 2009 to legislatively overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stoneridge and allow private actions for aiding and abetting liability. Though this proposed legislation is a matter for serious concern, there was always the possibility that given everything that Congress has on its plate, this particular initiative might not make the cut.

 

There is, however, some significant likelihood that some form of financial reform legislation eventually will be enacted into law. Indeed, as discussed here, the House of Representatives has already passed its version of financial reform legislation.

 

The Senate has yet to act, but among the leading proposed Senate financial reform bills under consideration is Senator Chris Dodd’s proposed "Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009" (here).

 

As noted in a January 4, 2009 memo by K. Stewart Evans, Jr. of the Pepper Hamilton law firm (here), the bill contains a provision "hidden on page 795 of 1,136" that amends the ’34 Act to provide liability for any person that "knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance" to a person whose conduct violates the securities laws. Evans notes further that the provision would impose liability without the claimant having to even prove that reliance on the secondary actors’ statements.

 

My concerns about the possible imposition of aiding and abetting liability are reflected in my prior post. Evans has his own concerns, arguing that the proposed amendment would be "dangerous and destructive to American business."

 

But regardless of the merits of the proposal, the fact that it proposed amendment creating private aiding and abetting liability is no longer just its own free-floating suggestion, but has now been incorporated into a comprehensive piece of financial reform legislation does seem to suggest that the proposal could be that much closer to being enacted into law.

 

Of course, there is still a long way to go before we know whether or not the Senate will get around to enacting any financial reform legislation, much less what form that legislation might ultimately take. In addition, any bill passed by the Senate would have to be reconciled with the House’s bill, so what might finally emerge is at the point anybody’s guess.

 

But all of that said, the incorporation of the aiding and abetting provision into Dodd’s proposed Senate bill does seem to suggest the possibility that the aiding and abetting initiative will not simply fall by the wayside as the proposed legislation goes forward. Rather, at this point it looks like somebody is going to have to affirmatively knock the proposal out to prevent it from remaining in.

 

Dismissal of BAE Bribery Civil Suit Affirmed: As I have noted in prior posts (most recently here), allegations of bribery in connection with BAE’s fighter aircraft contract with Saudi Arabia – and in particular the UK’s election not to investigate the allegations due to national security concerns — not only have proven highly controversial, but also has generated follow on civil litigation.

 

As discussed in a recent post on the FCPA Blog (here), on December 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the derivative lawsuit that had been filed against BAE, as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and offices Judge Edwards, writing for the court found that under the 1843 English case of Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 E.R. 189, "the company, not a shareholder, is the proper plaintiff in a suit seeking redress for wrongs allegedly committed against the company."  The court further found that the BAE case did not come within any exceptions to the rule.

 

And Speaking of U.S. Lawsuits Against Foreign Companies: According to a January 6, 2010 Law.com article by Andrew Longstreth (here), the three-month long securities class action jury trial against Vivendi and certain of its directors and officers is drawing to a close. According to the article, the parties are now completing their closing statements, and the case will be submitted to the jury later this week.

 

Look for A Lot More Cases Like This in 2010: Though thecomplaint was actually filed in the Northern District of Georgia on December 31, 2009, the plaintiffs’ lawyer press release is dated January 4, 2010, and the investor lawsuit involving a failed bank make prefigure many more lawsuits of the same kind in the months ahead in 2010.

 

The lawsuit arises out of the failure of Haven Trust Bancorp, whose operating banking subsidiary was taken over by the FDIC on December 12, 2008. On February 23, 2009, the holding company filed for bankruptcy. The defendants include certain former officers of the holding company and the bank. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants misrepresented the bank’s financial condition and lending practices in order to induce the plaintiff investors to invest in the holding company. The plaintiffs assert claims under the federal securities laws, Georgia securities laws, as well as certain common law claims.

 

 In light of the 140 banks that failed during 2009, there undoubtedly will be more claims like this to come, both filed on behalf of investors and on behalf of the FDIC as receiver of the failed institutions.

 

Among perennial D&O insurance issues are questions whether policy coverage is available for defense expenses incurred in connection with investigative costs, subpoenas and the costs associated with special litigation committees. A December 30, 2009 decision in the coverage lawsuit brought by MBIA against its D&O insurers considered all of these recurring issues, and reached some interesting decisions.

 

Background

For the policy period February 15, 2004 to August 15, 2005, MBIA carried $30 million of D&O insurance, arranged in a primary layer of $15 million and an additional $15 million layer of excess insurance.

 

In 2001, prior to the policy period, the SEC had issued an Order Directing Private Investigation in connection with certain of MBIA’s loss mitigation insurance products. In November and December 2004, the SEC issues subpoenas to MBIA concerning "nontraditional products." The New York Attorney General also issued subpoenas in November and December 2003 regarding nontraditional products. Both the SEC and the NYAG issues additional subpoenas in March 2005. In spring 2005, MBIA, because of concerns about the cumulative impact in the marketplace, asked regulators to forbear from issuing additional subpoenas and agreed to comply voluntarily with informal document requests.

 

In October 2005, MBIA submitted an offer of settlement to the SEC in connection with certain specific transactions. In the offer of settlement, MBIA undertook to retain an independent consultant to review MBIA’s accounting for the transactions. In January 2007, the SEC entered a Cease and Desist Order and the NYAG entered an Assurance of Discontinuance, both of which documents largely incorporated the company’s prior offer of settlement. Thereafter the company hired a consultant to undertake the proposed review.

 

In additional to these regulatory investigations, the company, as nominal defendant, was also sued in two derivative lawsuits, as a result of which the company organized a Special Litigation Committee. An outside law firm "represented the SLC," and according to MBIA, also "represented MBIA through its representation of the SLC." The derivative lawsuits were later dismissed.

 

MBIA claimed that it has spent $29.5 million in defending or responding to the regulatory investigations and the follow-on litigation. The primary insurer had reimbursed $6.4 million but disputed that it was obliged to reimburse other amount incurred. MBIA filed an action against the two insurers alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration that the insurers were obligated to reimburse the company for legal fees and other costs associated with the regulatory investigations and the derivative actions. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

 

The December 30 Ruling

The defendant insurance companies had disputed coverage for the investigative items, in part of the grounds that the matters in connection with which the defense costs were incurred were not "securities claims" within the meaning of the primary policy.

 

The primary policy defined a "securities claim as "a formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document" that "in whole or in part, is based upon, arises from or is in consequence of the purchase or sale of, or offer to purchase or sell, any securities issued by" the company.

 

In his December 30 Order, Southern District of New York Judge Richard M. Berman reviewed each category of defense expense separately.

 

Judge Berman first considered the defendants’ arguments that there was no coverage for fees incurred in responding to the NYAG’s subpoenas because the subpoenas were not a proceeding commenced by the filing of an "order or similar document." Judge Berman first found that the subpoena, which literally "commanded" compliance, was an "order" within the "common understanding" of "an ordinary businessman." He found further than even if it were not an "order" it was "sufficiently a ‘similar document’ that triggers coverage under the policy."

 

Judge Berman then considered the certain aspects of the SEC’s investigation, which the defendant insurers contended pertained to "traditional reinsurance" rather loss mitigation products. The defendants argued that the SEC’s 2001 Order Directing Private Investigation pertained only to the investigation of loss mitigation products, and so the SEC’s investigation of traditional reinsurance transactions was not pursuant to an "order."

 

Judge Berman rejected this argument among other reasons on the grounds that "Defendants have offered no persuasive evidence to support their argument that the SEC ran a series of concurrent investigations."

 

The defendant insurers also argued that the NYAG’s oral requests for documents pertaining to traditional reinsurance transactions were not pursuant to an "order." Judge Berman found that "defendants point to no persuasive evidence to suggest that the NYAG’s request for documents" relating to the reinsurance transactions "were part of separate investigations."

 

MBIA had also sought reimbursement for its costs incurred in connection with the independent consultant. Judge Berman found that there was no coverage under the policy for the costs associated with the independent consultant because MBIA "did not permit Defendants to effectively associate with it" because it did not inform the insurers about the independent consultant (and arguably did not get the insurers consent to agree to the independent consultant) "until at least ten months after it had committed to retaining" the independent consultant.

 

Finally, Judge Berman found that there was coverage under the policy for the fees incurred by counsel for the special litigation committee. MBIA had argued that the law firm had represented MBIA through its representation of the SLC. The carriers argued that the SLC was, by definition, independent, and therefore its counsel could not have represented the company.

 

In rejecting the insurers’ arguments, Judge Berman found that the SLC’s counsel had appeared as counsel for MBIA in the derivative actions and had filed pleading in the actions on behalf of MBIA. But even assuming that the law firm represented only the SLC, Judge Berman found there would still be coverage, because the SLC was composed of individual members of MBIA’s board who were acting pursuant to delegated authority from the board. Judge Berman noted that "the SLC could readily reach independent decisions without being independent of [MBIA]."

 

Discussion

The questions whether the kinds of defense fees in dispute in this case will be covered is often going to be a factor both of the policy language at issue and the specific facts involved. To a certain extent, Judge Berman’s decision may simply be a reflection with a very distinctive set of facts. In particular, it is a rather unusual feature of this set of circumstances that all of the disputed legal fees were incurred after the SEC had entered a formal order of investigation. Given that, it seems as if the only remaining dispute was whether or not the other investigative actions of the regulators were or were not related to the Order.

 

Judge Berman’s finding of coverage for the SLC legal counsel’s expense may also be a reflection of the fact that the law firm also entered an appearance on the company’s behalf in the derivative suit. These circumstances are not always present in connection with disputes over SLC’s counsel’s fees (although that fact certainly does not answer the question of the SLC’s counsel’s fees incurred prior to making an appearance in the derivative suit.)

 

But even though the decision may be a reflection of the particular facts involved, Judge Berman’s ruling nevertheless is significant as an example where a court found coverage for fees incurred with regulatory subpoenas, oral document requests, and special litigation counsel fees.

 

In particular, Judge Berman’s finding that, at least under these circumstances, the policy covered oral document requests and that the policy would have covered the SLC counsel’s defense even if it had not been counsel of record for the company in the derivative suit are particularly noteworthy.

 

Judge Berman’s finding the policy covered the SLC counsel’s expense because the SLC, though independent, was a committee of the Board operating pursuant to the Board’s delegated authority, is particularly noteworthy, and may represent a basis on which other insureds may seek to argue for coverage for SLC counsel fees.

 

This interesting case combines a number of frequently disputed issues. I expect that many readers may have reactions to this ruling and I would be very interested in hearing readers’ thoughts.

 

Securities class action lawsuit filings were "down sharply" according to the annual study of securities class action litigation released jointly today by the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse and Cornerstone Research. The full report can be found here and the January 5, 2010 press release accompanying the report can be found here.

 

According to the study, which found that there were a total of 169 securities class action lawsuit filings through December 21, 2009, the 2009 filings were both 24% below the 223 filings in 2008 and 14% below the annual average of 197 filings during the years 1997 through 2008.

 

The Stanford study reports a lower lawsuit count than previously published studies of the 2009 securities lawsuit filings, including the prior report of NERA Economic Consulting (refer here) as well as my own prior analysis (refer here). I discuss these differences below.

 

The relative decline in the number of lawsuit filings in 2009 compared to prior years, according to the Stanford report, is attributable in part to the decline in subprime and credit crisis related filings. Among other things, the report notes that there were only 17 subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits in the second half of 2009.

 

The press release accompanying the report also quotes Dr. John Gould of Cornerstone Research as saying that the observed decline is consistent with the decline in stock market volatility during 2009, noting that after increasing during the preceding two years, volatility declined both in the first and second halves of 2009.

 

The study also details the large number of filings that were characterized by "a substantial lag between the end of the class period and the filing" date, a phenomenon about which I written extensively in the past (most recently here). The report notes that the percentage of filings with a lag of more than a year has increased steadily from 5% in 2005 to a historical high of 18% in 2009.

 

According to the study, historically, class action lawsuit with longer filing lags "have been dismissed at a higher rate than class actions with shorter filings lags," at a rate of 55% for the one-year lag filings versus 42% for filings with a lag between one year and six months, and 36% with a lag of less than six months.

 

The study also notes that the lag filings are largely the work of the Coughlin Stoia law firm, which was "involved in 63% of the filings with lags longer than six months and 58% of filings with lags longer than a year." This activity levels compares to the firms involvement in 39% of all filings and 29 percent of filings with lags shorter than six months.

 

The press release quotes Stanford Law Professor Joseph Grundfest as saying, with respect to the lag filings, that the belated filings suggest that "plaintiffs are trying to fill the litigation pipeline by bringing older lawsuits that weren’t attractive enough to file while the firms were busy pursuing financial sector claims," adding that "these lawsuits are more likely to be dismissed and can therefore be characterized as lower quality claims" and that the filings may "reflect factors idiosyncratic to one large plaintiff firm’s strategy, and have little to do with larger market forces."

 

In addition to tracking the overall number of filings, the report also notes the number of lawsuits filed against unique issuers, which declined even more sharply than the overall number of filings. Thus, while the report found that overall filings declined by 24% between 2008 and 2009, the total number of unique issuers involved in securities lawsuits decreased by 32 percent. The difference in the attributable to the number of multiple filings against the same target, as well as the relatively large number of filings against private companies and other non-exchange traded entities.

 

The report further notes that of all exchange traded companies, 1.8 percent were defendants in federal securities class action lawsuits filed in 2009 compared to 2.6% in 2008 and compared to a 2.4% annual average for the 12 years ending December 2008.

 

The number of lawsuits against foreign issuers also declined in 2009, according to the study. After peaking at 16.4% of all filings in 2007, the percentage of filings against foreign issuers declined to 12.4% in 2009. The study attributes the relative decline to the falling off of the credit crisis lawsuits, because so many of the suits against foreign companies were related to the subprime and credit crisis.

 

Finally, the decline in 2009 credit crisis filings was also associated with a decline in market capitalization losses in 2009. The disclosure dollar loss attributable to 2009 class actions was $83 billion, a 62 percent decrease from 2008.

 

Some Thoughts about the Numbers: As noted above, the Stanford study’s 2009 lawsuit count varies from previously published figures, including my own. NERA reported 235 filings in 2009, and I reported 189 (I discuss the difference between my count and NERA’s in my prior post, here), compared to the 169 reported by Stanford.

 

I know that part of the explanation lies in the fact that the Stanford report cutoff at December 21, 2009, which meant that the Stanford study missed at least three more lawsuits filed before year end.

 

The Stanford study also counts multiple filings related to the same allegation against the same companies only once. This provides a partial explanation for the differences between the Stanford study and the NERA study, which separately counts separate actions in separate circuits unless and until the lawsuits are later consolidated.

 

Another difference between the studies may be the fact that the NERA study reported a projected year end number, as the result of an extrapolation from filings through mid-December. Though the Stanford study ended prior to year end, it did not incorporate any extrapolation for cases filed after the cutoff date and before year end.

 

All of these factors clearly are relevant but even collectively they don’t seem sufficient to explain the entire difference. Of course, another factor may simply be differences in information, but given that the plaintiffs’ lawyers put out press releases when they file lawsuits, the information differences likely account for only a small part of the differences in lawsuit counts.

 

All of this underscores a point that I made at length in connection with my own study of the 2009 filings, which is that readers would benefit enormously from knowing more about what protocols the various study publishers use when the are deciding what "counts."

 

The Stanford analysis is certainly easier to decode in this respect that other reports since the Stanford Clearinghouse publishes its list of lawsuits on its website — for free, which is a tremendous public service for which all of us should be grateful. But merely knowing which cases were put on the list does not tell us why those cases were included, nor does it tell us what other cases might have been omitted and why. (Indeed, the reason I continue to do my own count and analysis every year, even though Stanford publishes its own list for free on the web, is the uncertainty about what the list does and does not include.)

 

The Stanford report also gets high marks for stating right on its cover what it is included in its "research sample," which is very helpful and very commendable. But even taking this very explicit information into account, it still seems like there must be more going on that would explain the differences between the various reports.

 

Here are some illustrations of questions that would be helpful to know: Are securities lawsuits filed in state courts included? Are merger objection suits included? Are proxy solicitation misrepresentation cases included? How about lawsuits filed separately on behalf of equity shareholders and bondholders – one lawsuit or two? How about lawsuits that only allege state securities law violations? What kinds of cases are omitted from the count? What other sorting criteria are used?

 

The more of this type of information that readers are provided, the more helpful the published reports would be for readers. The approach that would be most helpful to readers would be for the reports to identify the way that their counting protocols differ from those used by other studies, in order to help readers understand the differences.