There was a flurry of subprime related securities lawsuit dismissal motion activity at the end of last week, and although in some cases the motions were granted and in other instances large parts of the cases were dismissed, in several instances enough of the cases survived for the plaintiffs to tally the rulings in the win column. Among the cases where the plaintiffs retained enough to live for another day were at least one high profile case and another interesting auction rate investor case.

 

Fannie Mae: In a September 30, 2010 order (here), Southern District of New York Judge Paul A. Crotty granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ ’34 Act claims in the Fannie Mae subprime-related securities class action lawsuit. (In a November 29, 2009 order, here, Judge Crotty had previously granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under the ’33 Act).

 

The plaintiffs’ ’34 Act claims involved three principal allegations: (1) that the defendants had misrepresented Fannie’s exposure to subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets and related risks; (2) that the defendants had misrepresented the quality of Fannie’s internal risk controls (3) that Fannie had filed materially inaccurate financial statements.

 

Judge Crotty granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss both as to the allegations that Fannie had misrepresented its subprime and Alt-A exposure and as to the allegations that Fannie has filed inaccurate financial statements. However, Judge Crotty denied the dismissal motions of the company itself, its CEO and its Chief Risk Officer, with respect to the allegations that the defendants had misrepresented the quality of Fannie’s internal controls.

 

In granting the motions to dismiss as to allegations concerning Fannie’s exposure to subprime and Alt-A mortgages, Judge Crotty ruled that Fannie’s public filings contained cautionary language that warned investors about the risks of Fannie’s subprime and Alt-A investments. He also held that the plaintiffs had failed to explain why the defendants’ statements regarding Fannie’s subprime and Alt-A investments were false. Finally, he held that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that the defendants had acted with scienter in making statements about Fannie’s subprime and Alt-A exposure.

 

In granting the motions to dismiss as to the allegations that Fannie filed inaccurate financial statements, Judge Crotty held that the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to establish that Fannie’s financial statements were false at the time they were issued. Judge Crotty also noted that Fannie’s regulators had never claimed that Fannie had committed any GAAP violations and had never asked for restatements of any of Fannie’s financial statements for the class period, but at the same time reported repeatedly that Fannie was adequately capitalized.

 

In denying the motions to dismiss as to the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants had misrepresented the quality of Fannie’s internal risk controls, Judge Crotty relied heavily upon three emails that had gone between the company’s Chief Risk Officer and its CEO. In these emails, the Chief Risk Officer complained, among other things, that the company "was not even close to having the proper control processes for credit, market and operational risk."

 

Judge Crotty said that these statements "show that Fannie may have been saying one thing while believing another" and are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. However, because the plaintiffs had not shown that two of the other individual defendants were aware of the emails, Judge Crotty granted these two defendants’ motions to dismiss, while denying the dismissal motions of the company, its CEO and the Chief Risk Officer.

 

Perrigo Company: As discussed here, the auction rate securities lawsuit filed against Perrrigo and certain of its directors and offices did not involve the usual allegations that an auction rate securities seller had misrepresented the securities in connection with the securities’ sale; rather, Perrigo was an auction rate securities investor, and the plaintiffs, Perrigo shareholders, alleged that the defendants had misrepresented the company’s own investment exposure to auction rate securities.

 

Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that during a period in 2008 and early 2009, the company failed to write down the value of its auction rate securities investments, and also failed to acknowledge publicly that it has purchased its auction rate securities from Lehman Brothers, and was therefore not going to benefit from the same kind of redemption as had other auction rate securities investors who had purchased their securities from, for example, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and UBS. On February 3, 2009, the company reported that it had incurred a significant charge related to the write down of the auction rate securities and also revealed the Lehman connection.

 

In his September 30, 2010 order (here) denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss, Southern District of New York Judge Thomas Griesa had that the "plaintiffs argue persuasively that the identical factors that caused Perrigo to drastically write down the value of the ARS on February 3, 2009 – increased credit and liquidity risks – were operative and evident to defendants at the time they issued the November 6, 2008 statements." Judge Griesa also found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged materiality, scienter and loss causation.

 

WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates: In a September 28, 2010 order (here), Western District of Washington Judge Marsha Pechman granted in part and denied in part the dismissal motions in the securities class action lawsuit that had been brought by investors who had purchased interests in certain Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass-Through Trusts. The defendants in the case included Washington Mutual and certain of its subsidiaries, as well as certain officers of the subsidiaries who had signed the offering documents, and the rating agencies which had provided credit ratings for the investments.

 

Judge Pechman first ruled that the named plaintiffs lacked standing to assert claims with respect to 25 of the 36 offerings at issue because the plaintiffs had not purchased securities in connection with those 25 offerings. In addition, Judge Pechman also dismissed allegations as to three other offerings as time-barred.

 

With respect to the remaining offerings, Judge Pechman found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged misrepresentation in connection with the offering documents’ statements about the underwriting guidelines used in connection with the origination of the underlying mortgages. She observed that "in essence, Plaintiffs allege the underwriting guidelines ceased to exist," adding that "the absence of underwriting standards could make the identified statements misleading."

 

However, she held that the plaintiffs had not alleged actionable misrepresentations with respect to the offering documents’ statements about appraisals and loan to value ratio, noting that the "allegations on this issue are simply too conclusory." With respect to the alleged failure to disclose the credit ratings alleged conflict of interest, she concluded that "because reasonable investors knew that the rating agencies were paid by the issuers, the alleged misrepresentation is immaterial.

 

Judge Pechman also rejected the defendants’ arguments that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged economic loss, since the plaintiffs have not alleged that they failed to receive an income stream from the certificates. Judge Pechman said that plaintiffs allegations "give rise to the inference that the value of the security is much less that the purchase price," and the "mere fact that Plaintiffs may have difficulty substantiating the exact nature of their loss in an illiquid market does not necessitate dismissal."

 

Oppenheimer Auction Rate Securities: In a September 29, 2010 order (here), Judge Loretta Preska granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the auction rate securities lawsuit that had been brought against Oppenheimer Holdings and one of its subsidiaries. The Oppenheimer lawsuit is one of the conventional auction rate securities lawsuits, in that it had been brought by auction rate securities buyers against the firm that sold them the investments.

 

The plaintiffs contend that in connection with their purchase of the securities they had been misled about the nature and safety of the securities as well as the nature and operation of the market for the securities. The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the failure of the auction rate securities market in February 2008, they are stuck holding illiquid securities for which there is no market.

 

In granting the motions to dismiss, Judge Preska found that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged scienter. Specifically, she found that the plaintiffs allegations of motive and opportunity were insufficient and that the alleged circumstantial evidence of scienter were also insufficient.

 

Among other things, Judge Preska found that the inference of scienter that plaintiffs urged "is not at least as strong as the inference that Oppenheimer negligently or carelessly provided insufficient training to its financial advisors and was merely negligent in not detecting and disclosing the imminent market collapse." The "more compelling inference" is that "Oppenheimer did not predict that all broker dealers would withdraw from the ARS market en masse."

 

Countrywide Asset-Backed Certificates Trust: In a mortgage-backed asset securities case that was not brought as a class action, on September 28, 2009 Judge Kevin Castel granted the motion of defendants Countrywide Home Loans and related entities, as well as certain Countrywide directors and officers, brought by two individual investors who had purchased mortgage backed securities from Countrywide. A copy of the order can be found here.

 

The plaintiffs, who had purchased over $540 million of the securities in their initial offerings, alleged that the offering documents contained material misrepresentations regarding the underlying loans, regarding the underwriting guidelines used in connection with the origination of the underlying loans; as well as regarding the selection and servicing of the underlying loans.

 

Judge Castel noted at the outset that this is the unusual case where the plaintiffs acknowledge that they knew that the underlying loans were "risky" and that the borrowers were "credit-blemished," but claim that they were misled because the loans were riskier than they were led to believe.

 

Judge Castle concluded both that the plaintiffs had insufficiently alleged misrepresentation and that the plaintiffs had insufficiently alleged scienter.

 

Discussion

In one sense, these dismissal motion rulings described above just represent a random selection of rulings as the courts continue to grind through the mountain of pending subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits. However I have some observations about this group of rulings.

 

First, though some subprime cases are dismissed outright and there are many other cases where substantial parts of the cases have been knocked out, in a substantial number of these cases the plaintiffs are either prevailing on the dismissal motions or at least managing to scrape out just enough to live to see another day. Thus for example in both the Fannie Mae and WaMu cases discussed above, even though huge parts of the cases were dismissed, enough remains for the plaintiffs to be able to continue to fight and to try to work toward an eventual payday.

 

Second, among the cases surviving in whole or in part are many of the highest profile cases. The Fannie Mae case is just the latest illustration of this, following close on the heels of the dismissal motion survival of the AIG case (refer here) and the Merrill Lynch/BofA merger case (refer here). This follow along with many of the other high profile cases such as the Countrywide, New Century and Washington Mutual. subprime related securities suits. The point is that while many of the subprime cases may have been dismissed along the way, the biggest, highest-profile cases are generally going forward.

 

Third, as the cases grind through, some important issues are being worked out. Thus, for example, as suggested in the Oppenheimer case, courts are now working through the merits of the auction rate securities cases. Up to this point, many of the auction rate securities cases that had been dismissed were based on mootness grounds, based on the defendants’ entry into regulatory settlements that more or less made plaintiffs whole. In Oppenheimer, the court addressed the merits of the plaintiffs’ allegations and found the allegations to be insufficient.

 

The Oppenheimer ruling is not the first auction rate securities lawsuit dismissal on the merits (refer for example here with respect to the Merrill Lynch auction rate securities case) but it does represent another instance suggesting that the plaintiffs in these auction securities cases are not doing particularly well.

 

By contrast, in the Perrigo case, the court found the plaintiffs’ allegations against Perrigo as an auction rate securities investor to be sufficient. The claimants in other cases against auction rate investors have not been as successful – refer for example here with respect to the dismissal motion grant in the securities suit brought against Mind M.T.I. Even though the plaintiffs’ record in these auction rate investor cases may be mixed, the Perrigo case at least shows that plaintiffs are overcoming initial pleading hurdles in at least some of these cases.

 

Finally, and notwithstanding the cases where the plaintiffs did manage to overcome the dismissal motion phase at least in part, there are still a number of cases where the defendants are succeeding in getting the cases dismissed, as evidenced in the Countrywide and Oppenheimer cases discussed above.

 

I have in any event added these decisions to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

 

Many thanks to the several readers who forwarded copies of these decisions to me.

 

New securities class action lawsuit filings in the third quarter of 2010 remained below longer term historical averages, although consistent with filing levels in more recent quarters. There were 39 new securities class action lawsuits filed in the third quarter, bringing the 2010 YTD total number of new filings to 125, as of September 30, 2010.

 

The 125 new filings through the end of the third quarter compares with the 129 that were filed in the first three quarters of 2009, and implies a total of about 166 by year end 2010 (compared to 169 in 2009). The implied 2010 total is well below the annual average of 197 new securities class action lawsuits filed during the period 1996 to 2008.

 

Though the overall 2010 YTD filings levels remain below historical levels, new filings did turn up slightly in September 2010, when there were 21 new securities class action lawsuits filed, the highest monthly number of filings since 2008.

 

New filings against companies in the financial services sector remain an important component of new securities class action lawsuits. During the third quarter there were eight new filings in the 6000 SIC Code series (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), and an additional three new filings involving firms without SIC Codes but that are financially related. These eleven total new filings against financially related firms represented about 28% of third quarter filings.

 

Subprime and credit crisis related securities class action lawsuits continue to be filed in the third quarter of 2010. Seven, or about 18%, of the third quarter filings were subprime or credit crisis-related.

 

While filings against financially related companies continue to predominate as they have since 2007, there were a number of other areas of concentration in the third quarter as well. As I have noted elsewhere, there was a proliferation of filings in the third quarter against for-profit education companies. A total of six for-profit educational companies were sued in the third quarter.

 

In addition, as has been the case over time, new filings against life sciences companies was also an important part of the third quarter filings. There were a total of seven new filings against companies in the life sciences sector, including four against companies in the 2834 SIC Code category (pharmaceutical preparations). .

 

For the first three quarters of 2010, there have been 26 new securities lawsuits filed against companies in the 6000 SIC Code series and another 15 against financially-related companies without SIC codes, for a total of 41 new lawsuits against financial companies, or about one third of all 2010 filings. 22 (or about 17.5%) of all 2010 filings have been subprime or credit crisis-related.

 

Filings against life sciences companies have also been a significant component of 2010 YTD filings. There have been 19 new securities lawsuits filed against companies in the life sciences industry, including 13 against companies in the 2834 and 2835 SIC Code categories. (SIC Code 2835 include in vitro and in vitro diagnostic substances).

 

There have been ten new securities class action lawsuits filed this year against foreign-domiciled companies, or about eight percent of the total. Interestingly, there have been four new securities class action lawsuits filed against foreign-domiciled companies since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.

 

Of the 125 YTD filings, 17 (or about 13.6%) represented so-called "belated filings" – that is, cases in which the filing date came more than a year after the proposed class period cutoff date. Though there have been a significant number of these belated filings this year, the number of these filings has slowed as the year has progressed. Only four of these 17 belated cases have been filed since June 30, 2010.

 

Apple Turnover: You may have missed it this past week, but the parties to the long-running Apple Computer options backdating-related securities class action lawsuit have reached a settlement, as reflected in their September 28, 2010 memorandum in support of their settlement stipulation. The Apple case is one of the last of the 39 options backdating related securities class action lawsuits to finally be resolved.

 

The Apple settlement incorporates a rather unusual feature. On the one hand, the parties have agreed to settle the case for two conventional settlement terms — a payment of $14 million in cash for the benefit of the plaintiff class and the company’s agreement to adopt certain corporate governance reforms. But in addition, the company has agreed to make payments totaling $2.5 million to 12 educational institutions’ corporate governance programs.

 

These payments work out to approximately $208,333 for each of the twelve institutions. The memorandum in support of the parties’ settlement stipulation reports that the lead plaintiff selected the twelve institutions "after conducting a review of corporate governance programs nationally."

 

While these corporate governance programs undoubtedly represent worthy causes, you do have to wonder about this settlement feature, which arguably provides no benefit either to members of the class or to current Apple shareholders. It also raises questions about compelled corporate philanthropy at shareholders’ expense.

 

I have in any event added the Apple settlement to my running table of options backdating related case resolutions, which can be accessed here.

 

Advisen’s Third Quarter Litigation Overview: On October 15, 2010 at 11:00 a.m. EDT, I will be participating in an Advisen webinar reviewing the Third Quarter Securities Litigation. Other participants include Scott Meyer from ACE, Adam Savett of Claims Compensation Bureau, and Dave Bradford of Advisen. The session will review Advisen’s analysis of third quarter 2010 Securities litigation and settlements and discuss the larger implications for underwriters, brokers and risk managers. Information about the free webinar, including registration instructions, can be found here.

 

So the U.S. Supreme Court held in Morrison that the investors who purchased their shares of a non-U.S. company on a foreign exchange cannot pursue claims under the Exchange Act, but securityholders who purchased American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in the U.S. can still seek damages under the Exchange Act, right? Not according to a September 29, 2010 decision by Southern District of New York Judge Richard Berman in the Société Générale subprime-related securities class action lawsuit.

 

The defendants did not even raise the argument, and it may comes as somewhat of a surprise to some observers, but Judge Berman held, applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison (about which refer here), that not even domestic purchases of SocGen’s ADRs can assert claims under the Exchange Act. As a result, Judge Berman wound up dismissing the entire case, and not just the claims of investors who purchased their SocGen shares on foreign exchanges.

 

As discussed below, if the Exchange Act does not even apply to domestic transactions in ADRs, the question that immediately arises as to who is left that might be able to assert Exchange Act claims against non-U.S. companies. The answer in many cases may be – well, nobody.

 

Background and Decisions

Investors had sued the French bank and certain of its directors and officers in 2008 following the revelations of Jérôme Kerviel 4.9 billion euro trading losses and the bank’s disclosures of its own losses from subprime mortgage related investments.

 

After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morrison, the defendants in the SocGen case had moved to dismiss the claims of two the three named plaintiffs. Both of the two were U.S. residents who had purchased their securities outside the U.S. Judge Berman quickly disposed of these claims, ruling (in reliance on, among other post-Morrison cases, the Credit Suisse case and the Alstom decision, about which refer here and here respectively) that the Exchange Act does not reach claims of such so-called "f-squared claimants."

 

Judge Berman didn’t stop there, but went on to consider the applicability of the Exchange Act to the claims of the third named plaintiff, UFCW, which had purchased ADRs over the counter in the United States. Even though the defendants had not even themselves raised the question, Judge Berman decided sua sponte that Morrison precludes UFCW’s claims as well.

 

In reaching this conclusion, Judge Berman said:

 

…even though Defendants do not argue that UFCW’s claims should be dismissed under Morrison, the Court concludes that the Exchange Act is inapplicable to UFCW’s ADR transactions. That is, the Court finds that because "[t]rade in ADRs is considered ‘predominantly a foreign securities transaction,’ Section 10(b) is inapplicable. An ADR ‘represents one or more shares of a foreign stock or a fraction of a share." Accordingly, UFCW’s claims are also dismissed.

 

Discussion

Judge Berman’s decision seemingly does not depend on the fact that UFCW purchased its ADRs over the counter, rather than on an exchange. His logic instead depends on the fact that what UFCW purchased were ADRs, the acquisition of which, he held, represents a fundamentally foreign transaction. — which appears to suggest that Judge Berman would apply the same analysis even to ADRs purchased on an exchange.

 

It is fair to say that Judge Berman’s ruling is unexpected Not even the defendants in the case saw it coming. I think it also raises several questions.

 

First, Judge Berman’s analysis seems to depend on his rather brief review of what an ADR is and the nature of the transaction involved in a domestic ADR purchase. This seems to me like an issue that would have benefitted from full briefing by all parties. Certainly before any other court chooses whether or not to follow Judge Berman, a comprehensive examination of the relation of the purpose and uses of ADRs would seem to be indicated.

 

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Judge Berman’s analysis of whether or not the Exchange Act applies to UFCW’s ADRs arguably would have benefitted from more detailed consideration of whether the UFCW’s ADR purchases are "domestic transactions in other securities" to which the Exchange Act applies under the second prong of the Morrison standard.

 

Third, Judge Berman’s conclusion seemingly put domestic ADR transactions in an odd category about which it may be asked – which jurisdiction’s laws apply to these transactions if not U.S. law?. Are ADR purchases transactions without a country? (Or to put it in a less contentious frame, what jurisdiction’s securities laws make more sense than those of the U.S. to apply to ADR transactions in the U.S.)?

 

To the extent it is (if ever) conclusively established that the Exchange Act does not even reach domestic ADR transactions, that holding would represent a significant blow to the U.S. securities class action plaintiffs’ bar, as it would eliminate in many instances all or virtually all of the claims that had seemed to be left after Morrison.

 

If domestic purchasers of ADRs cannot assert claims under the Exchange Act, there would be very few if any holders of securities of many foreign domiciled companies who could assert Exchange Act claims. One wonders whether Judge Berman’s holding could spell the end (or virtual elimination) of many of the current securities cases pending against foreign companies – not only cases such as Vivendi, where plaintiffs won a jury verdict on the issue of liability, but also in more recently filed cases such as those initiated against BP and Toyota.

 

Not only would that seem to dramatically narrow, if not eliminate, what claims seemed to remain against foreign domiciled companies in the wake of Morrison, but it could drastically limit opportunities for security holders of non-U.S. companies to file future lawsuits under the Exchange Act.

 

The Morrison decision itself was a surprise, now Judge Berman seems to have compounded that surprise by taking Morrison in a completely unexpected direction. Of course, where it will all lead remains to be seen. I think more will be heard on the issues Judge Berman has raised.

 

I have in any event added the SocGen decision to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis related lawsuit dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.  Special thanks to a loyal reader for supplying a copy of the SocGen decision.

 

In a September 27, 2010 order (here), Judge Laura Taylor Swain denied the dismissal motions in the subprime-related securities class action lawsuit pending against AIG, certain of its former directors and officers, its accountant and its offering underwriters. Andrew Longstreth’s September 27 Am Law Litigation Daily article about the decision can be found here.

 

AIG, of course, was rescued from collapse only by a massive government bailout. Following the bailout, the company’s share price plummeted and securities class action litigation ensued. As discussed in detail here, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the securities laws through various disclosures and omissions related to the company’s securities lending program and its credit default swap portfolio.

 

Both the credit default swap portfolio and the securities lending program entailed exposures to subprime mortgages. In many instances, the CDSs were placed in connection with securities backed by subprime mortgages. In the securities lending business, the cash received in exchange for the loaned securities was invested in mortgage-backed securities. Additional collateral requirements for these transactions triggered by the subprime mortgage meltdown led to the government bailout. The plaintiffs contend that these exposures were not adequately disclosed. The defendants moved to dismiss.

 

In her September 27 opinion denying the dismissal motions, Judge Swain held that the plaintiffs’ allegations were "adequate to plead material misrepresentations and omissions on the part of AIG," particularly with respect to the company’s exposure through its CDS portfolio to subprime mortgages.

 

Judge Swain rejected the defendants’ contention that the allegedly misleading statements were forward-looking statements protected by the bespeaks caution doctrine, observing that "generic risk disclosures are inadequate to shield defendants from liability for failing to disclose known specific risks" and that "statements of opinion and predictions may be actionable if they are worded as guarantees or supported by specific statements of fact." Judge Swain cited in particular the defendants’ alleged failure to disclose a litany "of hard facts critical to appreciating the magnitude of the risks described."

 

With respect to scienter, Judge Swain, after reciting a list of adverse undisclosed facts and developments allegedly known to defendants, concluded that the plaintiffs had "satisfied their burden of alleging facts giving rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent," adding that "no opposing inference is more compelling."

 

Finally, Judge Swain also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on loss causation grounds. The defendants had argued that AIG’s stock price decline was "attributable to the decline experienced in the stock market generally, and in the financial services sector specifically." Judge Swain found that "the sharp drop in AIG’s stock price in response to certain corrective disclosures, and the relationship between the risks allegedly concealed and the risks that subsequently materialized, are sufficient to overcome the argument at the pleading stages" – although she added that the defendants ultimately may be able to prove that "some or all" of plaintiffs’ losses are "attributable to forces other than AIG."

 

Finally, Judge Swain held that the plaintiffs had standing to assert Section 11 claims, and that the Section 11 claims were timely, because, Judge Swain concluded, the plaintiffs were not on "inquiry notice" of possible misrepresentations until the September 2008 bailout. Judge Swain also denied the motions to dismiss the Section 11 claims against the offering underwriter defendants and AIG’s outside auditor.

 

Discussion

The AIG lawsuit is one of the highest profile cases filed as part of the subprime litigation wave. Given the magnitude and causes of the company’s losses, its near collapse, and the massive size of the government bailout, it may come as no surprise that this particular case managed to get passed the initial pleading hurdles.

 

But now that the case is going forward, the question arises of where the case ultimately will lead given the U.S. taxpayer’s stake in the company. Even if the company’s D&O insurance program is not substantially eroded by defense fees alone, the remaining insurance is unlikely to represent a significant percentage of the claimed losses of the plaintiff class. The underwriter defendants and auditor might be expected (at least by plaintiffs) to contribute substantially toward the case resolution, but the banks’ financial health is not what it once was.

 

All factors considered, especially the political peril associated with a significant taxpayer funded contribution toward settlement, there are certain questions about the ultimate resolution of this case.

 

The dismissal denial in the AIG case, coming close on the heels of the dismissal motion denial in the Sallie Mae case, does serve as a reminder that there are subprime-related lawsuits that are going to survive the initial motions stage, particularly those involving higher profile companies.

 

In any event, I have added the AIG opinion to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis lawsuit dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

 

Where are the Criminal Prosecutions?: As I noted in a recent post (here), members of Congress are asking why there have been so few criminal prosecutions in the wake of the subprime meltdown. Wayne State Law School Professor Peter Henning has an interesting September 27, 2010 column on the Dealbook blog (here) discussing these issues and presenting his theories on the reasons why there haven’t been more criminal cases.

 

NYSE Corporate Governance Commission Report: In yesterday’s post, the link to the NYSE Corporate Governance Commission’s report was faulty. I have now corrected the link. Readers who wanted the report but were unable to access it due to the faulty link can refer here for a copy of the report. I apologize for the faulty link (now corrected) in yesterday’s post.

 

NYSE Commission on Corporate Governance: On September 23, 2010, the NYSE Commission on Corporate Governance issued a report (here) following a two year review of governance issues and considerations. The Commission, chaired by Larry Sonsini of the Wilson Sonsini law firm, included more than two dozen members representing a broad range of constituencies, and its report presents an interesting and thoughtful review of the issues and statement of principles. The NYSE’s September 23, 2010 press release concerning the report can be found here.

 

The report’s centerpiece is its statement of ten principles of corporate governance, but in addition to distilling its analysis down to these ten principles, the report also helpfully reviews the history of events leading up to is report, including the recent history of corporate governance reform. In explaining its ten principles, the report states the Commission’s belief that "the respective roles of boards, management and shareholders needed greater understanding," and the principles primary focus is the respective roles of each of these three groups.

 

The board’s role, according to the report, is "to steer the corporation towards policies supporting long-term sustainable growth in shareholder value." While noting that other factors may affect long-term shareholder value, the report states (significantly in my view) that "shareholders have the right and responsibility to hold a board accountable for its performance in achieving long-term sustainable growth in shareholder value."

 

The report notes the critical role of management in establishing proper corporate governance, emphasizing that "successful governance depends heavily upon honest, competent, industrious managers." The report also noted that "constructive tension" between the board and management, if properly modulated, may be a characteristic of good corporate governance.

 

With respect to shareholders, the report takes a firm stand against short-termism. The report notes that investors have a responsibility to vote their shares in a "thoughtful manner." In a couple of different places, the report also expresses concern about the possibility of investors’ over-reliance on proxy advisory firms, noting that the decision to rely on advisory firms "does not relieve institutions from discharging their responsibility to vote constructively, thoughtfully and in alignment with the interests" of their clients.

 

The report is interesting, relatively brief and worth reading in its full length. Hat tip to the CorporateCounsel.net blog for the link to the report.

 

Norwegian Bank Files Individual Securities Suit Against Citibank: Citigroup may have settle the subprime-related enforcement action and even managed to get the court to accept the $75 million settlement (even if with certain provisos), but a separate subprime-related securities class action lawsuit on behalf of Citigroup investors remains pending. Despite the continuing existence of the class action, Norges Bank, which manages investments for the $450 billion Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, has now filed its own securities lawsuit, seeking separately to recover for the fund’s losses.

 

According to Victor Li’s September 24, 2010 Am Law Litigation Daily article (here), Norges filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York against Citigroup and 20 of its current and former directors and officers (including its current CEO, Vikram Pandit). The complaint alleges that because of the defendants’ misrepresentations about the company’s subprime exposure, Norges purchased Citi shares at inflated prices from January 2007 to January 2009. The bank claims it paid over $2 billion for the shares and claims to have lost over $835 million.

 

There are a number of interesting aspects to this case. The first is that the bank concluded that notwithstanding the existence of the shareholder class action lawsuit, its interests were better served by proceeding separately from the class. The other thing about the lawsuit is the sheer size of the claimed losses – its losses alone are far greater than the collective investor losses in most securities class action lawsuits.

 

The massive size of Norges’s claimed losses explains its desire to pursue litigation, but the initiation of a separate suit can only be explained either by Norges’s assumption that it will fare better separately than within the class, or perhaps that it will pay lower fees – or perhaps both.

 

The Norges lawsuit follows on the heals of the separate opt-out lawsuit filed against Merrill Lynch on behalf of the New York pension funds, about which I commented here. The phenomenon of large institutional investors electing to pursue their own claims was a characteristic of many of the lawsuits arising from the corporate scandals during the last decade. Though these kinds of cases had seemed to have died down for a while, the New York lawsuit against Merrill and the Norges suit suggest that the individual lawsuits may be back – and that large institutional investors may be considering them in preference to class actions.

 

The seeming rise of this phenomenon has been a matter of significant discussion and some concern, as the prospect of multiple individual lawsuits could overwhelm the putative procedural advantages and effectiveness of the class action process.

 

The magnitude of Norges Bank’s claimed losses may be sufficiently unusual to raise a question whether there may be other investors similarly motivate to pursue separate lawsuits – there simply are going to be few individual investors in few circumstance with losses of that magnitude. Of course, there is always the possibility of smaller investors with smaller losses getting into the act, which they might do if they too believe they will fare better separately rather than within the class.

 

The prospect for other investors to conclude that their interests are better served through an individual action is a prospect that could pose a host of challenges and represents a "worrisome trend," as I have previously discussed here.

 

My previous post discussing the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund can be found here.

 

More Credit Union Troubles: On September 24, 2010, the National Credit Union Administration announced a series of moves, including the seizure of three wholesale credit unions, as part of an overall effort to shore up the country’s credit union industry. The move also included the creation of a $30 billion guarantee to backstop the credit union industry in an effort to stave off further losses. The Wall Street Journal’s September 25, 2010 front page article about the NCUA’s actions can be found here.

 

Wholesale credit unions provide back office services to retail credit unions. Since March 2009, bad investments in mortgage-backed securities have resulting in the government takeover of five of the country’s 27 wholesale credit unions.

 

At least one of these wholesale credit union failures has resulted in a civil action by the NCUA against former directors and officers of the failed institution. As discussed here, on August 31, 2010, the NCUA initiated an action against former directors and officers of Western Corporate Federal Credit Union of San Dimas, California.

 

It is unclear from the NCUA’s latest announcement and actions whether the NCUA might pursue additional lawsuits against the directors and officers of other failed institutions. However, it is clear that the same kinds of difficulties that have beset the commercial banking sector are also troubling the credit union industry as well, and these troubles at a minimum additional may mean regulatory seizures and also present at least the possibility of further claims.

 

Finally, the NCUA’s moves are a reminder that two full years out from the most tumultuous moment of the credit crisis, the reverberations continue to vex the financial services industry.

 

Layoffs Mean More Job Bias and Disability Claims: According to Nathan Koppel’s September 24, 2010 Wall Street Journal article (here), layoffs arising from the economic downturn are resulting in a "rising number of claims" that companies "illegally fired workers on account of age, race, gender or medical condition." Among other things, the article cites EEOC statistics showing that for the six months ended April 30, 2010, more that 70,000 people had filed claims alleging job discrimination, which represents a 60% increase in bias claims compared to the same period a year earlier.

 

The article also notes that companies are also facing "a rising tide of disability claims," noting that more than 21,000 people filed disability claims last year, which represented a 10% increase over the prior year and a 20% increase over 2007. The article notes the difficulties financial troubled companies may face trying to accommodate disabled employees.

 

In a September 24, 2010 order (here), Southern District of New York William Pauley denied the dismissal motions of Sallie Mae and its former CEO, Albert Lord, but granted the dismissal motion of CFO (and later CEO), Charles Andrews, in the credit crisis-related securities suit against Sallie Mae first filed in 2008. The decision is interesting in a number of respects, particularly concerning scienter issues.

 

Sallie Mae is one of the country’s largest providers of student loans. The complaint, which Judge Pauley described as "a behemoth" containing "labyrinthine allegations," alleges that in a series of statements in 2007, the defendants misled the market about Sallie Mae’s financial performance for the purpose of inflating its share price.

 

Among other things, the company was attempting during this same period to complete a planned merger with J.C. Flowers, an investment firm, in a transaction that ultimately was not consummated and that resulted in separate litigation (later settled) between the company and Flowers.

 

The complaint alleges that during the class period, the company lowered its borrowing criteria to increase its portfolio of lower quality but higher margin private loans; hid defaults by changing its forbearance policy; and inflated profits through inadequate loan loss reserves. The defendants moved to dismiss. My prior post about the lawsuit can be found here.

 

In his September 24 order, Judge Pauley denied the motion to dismiss as to Lord and the company, but he granted the motion to dismissal as to Andrews.

 

Judge Pauley first concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged falsity. The defendants had argued that the plaintiffs had not alleged particularized facts sufficient to establish the falsity of the loan loss reserves. However, Judge Pauley observed, the plaintiffs primary challenge to the accuracy reserves, made in reliance on the testimony of confidential witnesses, was that Sallie Mae had not accurately reported its loan default rate (which in turn led to insufficient loan loss reserves). Judge Pauley held that "given the error in the default rate metric and its impact on Sallie Mae’s other financial reports, such allegations are sufficient to plead falsity."

 

In concluding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged scienter with respect to Lord and Sallie Mae, Judge Pauley noted three reasons on which plaintiffs relied which, "considered together," are "sufficiently concrete to give rise to an inference" that Lord and Sallie Mae "possessed the intent to defraud shareholders." The three reasons were the Flowers transaction, Lord’s stock sales, and certain equity forward contracts.

 

Judge Pauley found that Lord had financial incentives to try to complete the Flowers transaction, because upon completion of the deal he would have received a $225 million cash payment and been free to exercise options at above market prices. In addition, Judge Pauley found that, in order to keep merger prospects alive, Lord also had an incentive to keep the company’s share price above the trigger in its equity forward contracts, because had the price gone below the trigger, the company would have been required to repurchase about $2.2 billion in shares, which "would have torpedoed the merger and Lord’s payout."

 

Judge Pauley also found that Lord made "unusual" stock sales in February, August and December 2007. The December sales, which took place two days after the Flowers transaction collapsed, and which represented a "liquidation of 97% of his Sallie Mae holdings," were "unusual for a corporate officer by any measure."

 

Lord had offered explanations for his stock sales – the August sales allegedly "were necessary to pay the exercise price of expiring options and associated taxes" and the December sale was "necessary to satisfy a margin call" – but with respect to Lord’s exculpatory explanations, Judge Pauley said "these facts remain in dispute."

 

By contrast, Judge Pauley found that the allegation of scienter as to Andrews were insufficient. Andrews not only had sold no shares but the defendants alleged he had acquired shares.

 

Lord’s incentives to complete the Flowers transaction clearly influence Pauley’s decision. The insider sales alone seem less determinative, as the timing of his sales seemed less than profit maximizing. For example, his December sale, the one he contends was triggered by a margin call, came two days after the Flowers deal collapse). This sale seems inconsistent with the theory that it represented the culmination of a fraudulent scheme.

 

In other words, it was the presence of the unusual and case specific circumstance of the Flowers deal that in large part explains this case’s survival of the dismissal motions.

 

I have in any event added the Sallie Mae case to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the Sallie Mae opinion.

 

Behemoth and Labyrinth: When Judge Pauley described the plaintiffs’ complaint as a "behemoth," he was invoking a literary reference with rather startling associations. According to Wikepedia, the word "behemoth" first appeared in the book of Job, which says the following about the beast:

15 Behold now the behemoth that I have made with you; he eats grass like cattle.
16 Behold now his strength is in his loins and his power is in the navel of his belly.
17 His tail hardens like a cedar; the sinews of his thighs are knit together.
18 His limbs are as strong as copper, his bones as a load of iron.
19 His is the first of God’s ways; [only] his Maker can draw His sword [against him].
20 For the mountains bear food for him, and all the beasts of the field play there.
21 Does he lie under the shadows, in the cover of the reeds and the swamp
22 Do the shadows cover him as his shadow? Do the willows of the brook surround him?
23 Behold, he plunders the river, and [he] does not harden; he trusts that he will draw the Jordan into his mouth.
24 With His eyes He will take him; with snares He will puncture his nostrils.

  

Judge Pauley also described the plaintiffs’ allegations as "labyrinthine," presuamably in reference to the Labyrinth from Greek mythology. According to Wikipedia (here), the Labyrinth’s elaborate structure was "designed and built by the legendary artificer Daedalus for King Minos of Crete at Knossos. Its function was to hold the Minotaur, a creature that was half man and half bull and was eventually killed by the Athenian hero Theseus. Daedalus had made the Labyrinth so cunningly that he himself could barely escape it after he built it. Theseus was aided by Ariadne, who provided him with a skein of thread, literally the "clew", or "clue", so he could find his way out again."

 

Geez, no wonder the complaint survived the dismissal motion.

　　

News reports about the September 22, 2010 Senate Banking Committee hearing regarding the SEC have focused on the provocative statements by SEC Inspector General H. David Katz. Among other things, Katz suggested that a Texas-based SEC official quashed the investigation of allegations regarding Stanford Financial Group, allowing the Stanford-related Ponzi scheme to continue. Katz also suggested that the SEC times its initiation of its enforcement action against Goldman Sachs to draw attention away from the Inspector General’s report critical of its Stanford-related failures. (Katz’s written testimony, which focuses primarily on the Stanford-related issues, can be found here.)

 

But along with the headline-grabbing commentary on the SEC’s processes, there was also other commentary and information at the Hearing suggesting the possibility of future regulatory and enforcement actions against corporate and banking figures in response to the global financial crisis.

 

First, at least according to press reports, the hearing seemed to reflect political expectations, in the wake of the financial crisis, for regulators to pursue actions against corporate officials. For example, the September 23, 2010 Wall Street Journal quotes Delaware Senator Edward Kaufman as having observed at the hearing that "we have seen very little in the way of senior officers or boardroom-level prosecutions of the people on Wall Street who brought this country to the brink of financial ruin. Why is that?"

 

Second, the same Journal article quotes the deputy inspector general of the FDIC as saying that the FDIC is investigating 227 banks.

 

There undoubtedly will be further fallout from the SEC Inspector General’s report about the SEC’s handling of the Stanford investigation. But amid those details, the larger picture should not be overlooked. That is, we remain in an atmosphere of recrimination that includes a political expectation that government officials should pursue action against corporate executives in connection with the financial crisis. In this atmosphere, because of the political pressures, it seems probable that government officials will feel obliged to bring claims and pursue actions.

 

And while these government actions might take any number of forms, one area where regulatory and enforcement action seems probably is in the banking arena. Just as during the S&L crisis, the FDIC pursued numerous claims in response to political pressure, the FDIC may well feel the same kind of pressure in the current circumstances, and may pursue claims as a result.

 

All of which is a reminder that larger forces may drive claims against corporate and banking officials, possibly for years to come.

 

In a series of posts, I have been exploring the "nuts and bolts" of D&O insurance. In this post, the fifth in the series, I examine D&O insurance issues of particular concern to private companies. Both the potential liability exposures and the available insurance solutions for private companies and their directors and officers are quite a bit different than for public companies.

 

Why Should Private Companies Buy D&O Insurance?

Most public companies don’t need to be persuaded that their company needs D&O insurance. Public company executives generally understand that D&O insurance is an indispensible prerequisite for a company whose securities are publicly traded.

 

However, the view among at least some private company managers is different. These officials, particularly those at very closely held companies, feel they are unlikely to need the insurance because, they believe, they are unlikely to ever have a D&O lawsuit. In my experience, just about every company that has ever had a claim was quite sure, before the claim arrived, that they would never have a claim. Executives who have survived a claim know better; too many company officials find out the hard way that when they recognize they need the insurance after all, it is too late. The fact is, the right time to buy the insurance is when you think you don’t need it.

 

Many of those who resist the need for D&O insurance are affiliated with companies that have only a very small number of shareholders. These company executives look at the ownership structure and conclude their company could never have a D&O claim. This perspective overlooks the fact that the plaintiffs in D&O claim include a much broader array of claimants than just shareholders. D&O claims plaintiffs also include customers, vendors, competitors, suppliers, regulators, creditors and a host of others. In our litigious age, just about anybody is a prospective claimant.

 

And when a company has claim, expenses mount quickly. Even frivolous suits can be expensive to defend and resolve. At the same time, the cost of insurance to protect private companies against D&O claims is relatively low. Indeed, the incremental costs of private company D&O insurance, on top of the company’s employment practices liability insurance (and no entity should do business in this country without EPL insurance) is relatively slight.

 

For the relatively low cost, private company D&O insurance buyers obtain coverage that is quite broad. Private company D&O insurance policies are materially broader than D&O insurance for public companies. In particular, the entity coverage under a private company D&O policy is significantly broader than the entity coverage under public company D&O insurance policies. The entity coverage in public company D&O insurance policies is generally limited just to securities claims. However, private company D&O policies contain no such limitation, so the private company D&O insurance policy provides significant balance sheet protection for the insured entities.

 

Because the private company D&O insurance policies provide broad coverage at relatively low cost it should be a part of every private company’s risk management portfolio – not just private companies with a broad ownership base.

 

Combined or Separate Limits?

A recent D&O insurance innovation is the development of modular management liability policies. These permit various management liability coverages to be combined in a single policy. The typical modular policy consists of a declarations page (identifying the limits of liability and the policy period, and so on), a general terms and conditions section applicable to all of the separate coverage parts, and then separate coverage parts for each of the various management liability coverages (such as D&O, EPL, Fiduciary, Crime, etc).

 

These modular policies have become quite popular. They do have certain advantages. The first is that the policies simplify the management liability insurance acquisition process by reducing what would otherwise be a series of discrete transactions into a single insurance transaction. The modular structure also ensures that the various coverages are coordinated, which could be important in the event of a claim the straddles several coverages.

 

The modular structure does present questions with respect to the limits of liability. Many buyers, attracted by the convenience of multiple coverages combined in a single policy are also attracted by the possibility of combining the limits of liability for the various coverages into a single, combines aggregate limit, under which a claim payment under any of the various coverages would reduce the amount of insurance remaining for a separate claim under any of the coverages.

 

There is no doubt that combining the limits of liability into a single aggregate limit affords costs savings for the buyer. For some insurance buyers, particularly very small enterprises, the cost saving consideration justifies the decision to structure the insurance into a single aggregate limit.

 

For most other enterprises, however, the combination of all of the coverages into a single limit may be a poor choice. A combined limit presents the possibility that a prior claim might reduce the amount of insurance available for a later, more serious claim. The fact is that when things go wrong, multiple problems can arise at once.

 

My greatest concern is that a prior unrelated claim against the company might leave company executives with insufficient remaining insurance to protect them if a separate claim later arises against them as individuals. This concern is particularly applicable in the bankruptcy context, in which company indemnification is unavailable. The executives could be left without insurance or with insufficient insurance at the time when they need it most.

 

I am Old School on this issue. I have a bias in favor of separate limits for the separate coverages, because I believe that there should be a fund of insurance available to protect the individual executives, without a concern that entity claims might drain the insurance away. Of course, as noted above, cost considerations may nevertheless dictate that some small enterprises will purchase combined limits. But most insurance buyers should not allow relatively small premium differences to drive important insurance decisions, potentially leaving the company with insurance that might not afford sufficient protection with the hour of need arises.

 

Duty to Defend or Duty to Indemnify?

Public company D&O insurance is written on reimbursement basis, based on the insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured company for its defense expenses and claim resolution costs. Under this duty to indemnify type of coverage, the insureds select their defense counsel, subject to the insurer’s consent, and the insureds control the claim. The insurer reimburses the insureds for these costs.

 

Private Company D&O insurance is also often written on a duty to indemnify basis. In addition, however, private company D&O insurance is also sometimes written on a duty to defend basis, under which the insurer selects the defense counsel and controls the defense. Many private company D&O insurance carriers offer their prospective insureds the choice of whether or not the coverage will be written on a duty to indemnify or a duty to defend basis.

 

There are certain advantages to the duty to defend structure. The first is ease of administration. Under the duty to defend coverage, the carrier appoints defense counsel and takes care of managing the claim. The policyholder doesn’t have to deal with legal bills and so on. This can be particularly helpful for smaller and more routine claims. In addition, the counsel the carrier selects often are experienced with these kinds of claims, which can also contribute to smoother claims resolution.

 

Another advantage of duty to defend coverage is that, in general, if any part of the claim is covered, the insurer must defend the entire claim, even those parts of the claim that are not covered. This unified defense avoids what can be a recurring problem under a duty to indemnify policy when a claim encompasses both covered and uncovered matters; in that circumstance under a duty to indemnify policy, the defense costs must be allocated between the covered and uncovered matters and the insurer reimburses only the defense expenses associated with the covered matters (often only a percentage of total defense expenses). The process of determining the allocation can be contentious and disruptive at a time when the insured and the insurer ought to be trying to work together to resolve the claim.

　

But despite these advantages of the duty to defend coverage, there may be times when duty to defend coverage is not the best choice. In particular, many policyholders are not comfortable having the insurer’s counsel defending a claim. This may be particularly true with more serious and more sophisticated litigation, which some insureds feel are outside the capabilities of some insurer-selected defense counsel. Also, although the topic involves issues far beyond the scope of this blog post, a host of issues arise when the insurer is defending a claim subject to a reservation of rights to deny coverage for any settlements or judgments.

 

There are no absolute answers to the question whether the D&O coverage should be written on a duty to defend or a duty to indemnify basis. It is a question each insurance buyer must decide in consultation with their insurance adviser.

 

One innovation the D&O insurance industry has introduced in recent years is an optional duty to defend policy, which gives the policyholder the option of tendering the claim defense to the carrier at the outset of the claim. The advantage of this arrangement is that it allows the policyholder to let the carrier handle the smaller or more routine matters, while allowing the company to select its own counsel and manage its defense on more significant matters or matters of greater concern to the company.

 

Public Offering Exclusion

The critical distinction between private and public companies is that public companies have publicly traded securities and private companies do not. Private company D&O insurers do not intend to cover exposures arising from the issuance or subsequent trading of publicly traded securities, and so private company policies typically have a public offering exclusion.

 

One particular concern with this exclusion is that it should not be written so broadly that it would preclude coverage for claims arising from pre-IPO activities. If a company is preparing to go public, the company and its senior executives undertake a variety of activities that may create potential liability exposures. If the company ultimately goes public, the public company D&O insurance policy, put in place on the offering date, should pick up coverage for all claims arising from the offering related activities. However, if the company does not complete the offering and claims result, or if offering activity claims arise prior to the offering date, then private company policy is the one that will respond to the claims.

 

Because of the heightened claims exposure associated with pre-offering activities, it is critically important that the public offering exclusion is worded in a way to afford coverage for these kinds of claims. Unfortunately, this is an area where there is a significant and serious lack of uniformity in available wordings, and many of the wordings available are not well-designed to provide the full extent of coverage needed. For example, many carriers, in an attempt to address this concern, will include a so-called "roadshow carve back" from the securities offering exclusion. These wordings, while helpful, are not sufficient to address all of the potential pre-IPO exposures, because pre-offering problems might arise that have nothing to do with the roadshow.

 

The concerns arising in connection with coverage for pre-IPO activities is a good illustration of the unavoidable fact that even with respect just to private company D&O, it is critically important for insurance buyers to associate knowledgeable and experienced insurance advisors in the insurance acquisition process. Otherwise the insured could wind up with D&O insurance coverage that is not well suited to the company’s needs and exposures, and that does not reflect the best coverage available in the marketplace.

　

Readers who would like to read the prior posts in this series about the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance should refer here:　

　

 

Executive Protection: Indemnification and D&O Insurance – The Basics　

 

　

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance – The Insuring Agreement

　

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance—The Policyholder’s Obligations

　

D&O Insurance: Executive Protection – The Policy Application

　

 

 

When the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling earlier this year in the Merck case pertaining to the question of what triggers the running of the statute of limitations in securities cases, there was some speculation that the decision might encourage an influx of cases involving events from the distant past. There really have not been that many cases that seemed to have been filed in reliance on Merck — at least not until now.

 

A case filed late last week, in which the class period cutoff date is over three years past, seems to represent a pretty clear example of a filing made in reliance on Merck, and may suggest both the kinds of filings that Merck may encourage and also the problems these cases may present.

 

Just to review, in its April 2010 decision in Merck, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for cases under Section 10(b) is not triggered until the claimants have, or with reasonable diligence could have had, knowledge of the facts constituting the violation, including in particular facts constituting scienter.

 

According to their September 17, 2010 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers’ have filed an action in the District of Idaho against PCS Eduventures!.com, its CEO and its former CFO. Though the complaint (a copy of which can be found here) was only just filed last week, the lawsuit purports to be filed on behalf of investors who purchased the companies’ shares between March 28, 2007 and August 5, 2007 – a period that ends more than three years before the complaint was filed.

 

The gist of the complaint is that on March 28, 2007, the company announced that it had entered a license agreement with its Mideast distributor, PCS Middle East, for a fixed license fee of $7.15 million. However, the complaint alleges that PCS Middle East did not have the ability to pay the fee without first entering a contract with the Saudi Arabian government. PCS did not have a contract with Saudi Arabia, and the complaint alleges that "PCS officers knew there was no contract."

 

The reason that the class period cuts off in August 2007 is that on August 15, 2007, after several months worth of disclosures about the Saudi arrangement or reflecting the revenue from the arrangement, the company issued an "update" clarifying that while the company had relied on their Mideast distributor’s assurances that a contract was "imminent," in fact, the company was "unable to confirm a timeframe or other specifics regarding any such contract" and the company’s managers "do not know when our Company will be called upon to participate in the initiative through our independent licensee."

 

The complaint anticipates the statute of limitations issue by alleging that "it was not until August 26, 2010, when the SEC instituted a civil action against PCS and others, did [sic] any reasonable investor could have reasonably suspected that Defendants’ misstatements about its purported $7.5 million sales contract were made with scienter."

 

The SEC’s August 30, 2010 press release regarding its enforcement action can be found here and the SEC’s amended enforcement complaint against PCS and its CEO and former CFO can be found here.

 

According to the SEC’s complaint, in March 2007, the company’s Mideast representative had been promising the Saudi contract for months, at a time when the company also faced the looming possibility of missing its EBIDTA requirements in one of its loan covenants. The SEC alleges that the company concocted the license fee arrangement with its Mideast distributor as a way to come up with revenue to satisfy the EBITDA requirement.

 

The company booked the fee as revenue in March 2007, even though the distributor could not pay the fee until there was a Saudi contract. The SEC alleges that the company’s officers "knew there was no contract with Saudi Arabia." The SEC also alleges that in the absence of the contract, the company lacked an appropriate basis to recognize the fee as revenue, a fact of which the SEC also alleges company management was aware.

 

Discussion

Because the investor complaint was filed more that three years after the August 2007 "update," the complaint would appear to be untimely, unless the plaintiffs succeed in persuading the court that the statute of limitations was not triggered until the SEC filed its complaint more than three years later, in August 2010.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Merck that the statute of limitations is not triggered until the claimant has knowledge of the facts constituting the violation, including the facts constituting scienter. The plaintiffs expressly allege in their complaint that until the SEC initiated its enforcement action, they were unaware of the facts constituting scienter – that is, that the PCS officials knew all along there was no Saudi contract.

 

The defendants undoubtedly will argue that the plaintiffs could have with reasonable diligence uncovered the facts constituting the violation, and indeed the company’s mealy-mouthed August 2007 "update," which uses a lot of words to explain the simple facts that there was no Saudi contract and there never had been a Saudi contract, should have set off some alarm bells.

 

The defendants will argue in particular that the August 2007 update specifically noted that the company had only been told that the Saudi contract was "imminent" and had been "unable to confirm the timeframe or other specifics regarding any such contract" – meaning that even back in March, when the company booked the fee revenue, the company lacked specifics regarding the contract, which suggests that the company lacked the minimum necessary to recognize the fee as revenue, and that the company clearly was as aware in March as it was in August that it lacked sufficient specifics to support recognition of the revenue.

 

It will be interesting to see how this case unfolds. At a minimum, the lawsuit’s filing does demonstrate the troublesome potential of the Merck decisions to encourage the pursuit of litigation over long-distant events.

 

The problem is that this possibility creates significant uncertainty about when events in the past so long gone that companies can be sure that they are "out of the woods" about past problems. This is also a serious problem for D&O insurance underwriters trying to assess the risk associated with companies that have had problems in the past. If cases like this one go forward, underwriters will be compelled to extend their scrutiny of a particular company far into the past, with no sure way of knowing how far back is far enough. This uncertainty poses a challenge for companies and underwriters alike.

 

One final question has to do with the SEC’s action. I am not sure of theory on which the SEC will show that its action was timely, a question that presents its own separate set of issues and that will have to be worked out as the enforcement action goes forward. I welcome readers thoughts on the statute of limitations issues.

 

More Bank Failures: In case you missed it, the past Friday evening after the close of business, the FDIC took control of six more banks, bringing the 2010 year to date total number of bank failures to 125. The 2010 pace of bank closures continues to run well ahead of the pace in 2009, when the FDIC closed 140 banks. Bank closure number 125 in 2009 did not occur until December.

 

Among the six banks closed this past Friday night were three more Georgia banks. Since January 1, 2008, there have been 44 bank failures in Georgia, the highest total for any state during that period. However, the 14 bank failures in Georgia so far in 2010 represent only the third highest state total this year, behind Florida (23) and Illinois (15).

 

The Coolest Time-Waster Website Ever: Check out the Global Genie. When you click on the "Shuffle" button, the site displays a Google Earth view of some random location somewhere on five continents (Antarctica and for some reason South America are not included). Each location is helpfully identified by an accompanying Google Map. The "Shuffle" button quickly becomes addictive.

 

On September 14, 2010, in another ruling that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank precludes claim by "f-squared" claimants – that is, U.S. residents who purchased shares of a Non-U.S. company on a foreign exchange – Southern District of New York Judge Victor Marrero dismissed the claims of investors who purchased their Alstom shares on the Euronext exchange from the long-running Alstom securities class action lawsuit. A copy of Judge Marrero’s opinion can be found here.

 

In reaching his conclusion, Judge Marrero rejected an argument that plaintiffs in Vivendi and other cases have raised to try to salvage claims of those who purchased their shares on foreign exchanges – that when non-U.S. companies have "listed" their shares on U.S. exchanges, investors who purchased their shares outside the U.S. can still assert securities claims under U.S. law in U.S. courts.

 

Background and Decision

Investors first sued Alstom and certain of its directors and officers in the U.S. in 2003. Discovery in the case in now complete and the parties face a November 12, 2010 deadline for filing summary judgment motions.

 

On July 29, 2010, two days after he issued his opinion precluding f-squared claimants’ claims in the Credit Suisse case (about which refer here), Judge Marrero directed the plaintiffs in the Alstom case to show cause why the "claims of plaintiffs who purchased their shares on foreign exchanges should not be dismissed."

 

The plaintiffs’ response, Judge Marrero noted, "went far beyond the limited direction of scope the court’s direction." In any event, Judge Marrero rejected both of the arguments on which the plaintiffs sought to rely.

 

First, Judge Marrero rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that because the Euronext purchases of Alstom shares had been "initiated" in the United States, they represented "domestic transactions" as required by Morrison. In rejecting this argument, Judge Marrero cited his own prior opinion in the Credit Suisse case.

 

Second, Judge Marrero also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that because Alstom shares are "listed" on the NYSE, the claims of purchasers who acquired their shares anywhere in the world are cognizable under the U.S. securities laws. Judge Marrero described this argument as a "selective and overly-technical reading of Morrison that ignores the larger point of the decision."

 

With respect to the specific portions of Morrison on which the plaintiffs sought to rely in making this argument, Judge Marrero said these excerpts "read in total context" compel a result contrary to that urged by plaintiffs. The Morrison opinion, Judge Marrero said, taken as a whole, "reveals a focus on where the securities transaction actually occurs," adding that the Morrison court was "concerned with the territorial location where the purchase or sale was executed."

 

Judge Marrero added that the conclusion "that the transactions themselves must occur on a domestic exchange to trigger application of Section 10(b) reflects the most natural and elementary reading of Morrison."

 

Finally, Judge Marrero rejected the plaintiffs’ suggestion that he should retain "supplemental jurisdiction" over the claims of the foreign purchasers and apply French law to their claims, noting that the case has been pending for seven years exclusively under U.S. law and "plaintiffs have not given any indication that the French claims were unavailable when they began this action and the Court is not now persuaded they should be allowed to press the reset button here."

 

Discussion

The second argument the plaintiffs raised – that is, because Alstom’s shares are "listed" on a U.S. exchange, the U.S. securities laws extend to transactions in the company’s shares taking place outside the U.S. – has been raised by plaintiffs in a number of pending securities cases involving non-U.S. companies. For example, and as detailed at length in a guest post on this blog (refer here), the Vivendi plaintiffs are relying on this argument to try to preserve their claims against foreign purchasers in that lawsuit.

 

According to Andrew Longstreth’s September 16, 2010 article in the Am Law Litigation Daily (here), Judge Marrero’s order in the Alstom case "appears to be the first decision to address the various plaintiffs’ "controversial interpretation" of Morrison.

 

Judge Marrero’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ listing argument is categorical. However, his ruling binds no other judges, not even other Southern District judges. Whether his interpretation of Morrison prevails in other cases before other judges remains to be seen.

 

In that regard, it is worth noting that though there are now two high-profile decisions holding that Morrison precludes the claims of "f-squared" claimants, both of the opinions were written by Judge Marrero – indeed, he even quoted his first opinion in the second one.

 

But though the plaintiffs’ lawyers in many other pending cases involving claimants who purchased their shares outside the U.S. may continue to limit Morrison’s effects in order to preserve those claims, the arguments look increasingly challenging.

 

The stakes involved in many of these cases are enormous. Indeed, the Am Law Litigation Daily article linked above quotes defense counsel in the Alstom case as saying that Judge Marrero’s decision "cuts the potential damages by 95 percent."

 

Looking retrospectively, some of the largest U.S. securities lawsuit settlements involving foreign companies likely would have worked out substantially differently were all claims based on overseas purchases precluded. For example, as reported in NERA’s Mid-Year 2010 securities litigation study, in the $1.1 billion Royal Ahold settlement (the seventh largest settlement of all time), 97.6% of all trading volume during the class period took place on foreign exchanges.

 

The elimination of these claims from U.S. securities suits not only potentially narrows the putative aggregate class damages dramatically in cases involving non-U.S. companies, but it also could make future cases against some non-U.S. companies substantially less attractive to plaintiffs’ counsel than they might have been in the past.