I am pleased to be able to print below a guest post from my friend and industry colleagueDonna Ferrara. Donna is Senior Vice President and Managing Director, Management Liability Practice Group, at Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. As Donna indicates, this guest post is the result of an email exchange between Donna and myself following one of my recent blog posts about to a recent coverage decision. Because I recognized the depth of Donna’s feelings about the need for professionalism in the insurance claims process, I invited her to submit a guest post on the topic, which she has done and which I have set out below.

 

I want to emphasize that I welcome proposed guest posts from responsible commentators throughout the industry. I also encourage readers who have reactions to Donna’s guest post to please add their thoughts using the blog’s comment function. Here is Donna’s guest post:

　

After I posted a comment on Kevin’s blog, he asked if I would write about the need for professionalism in our business. The following is my opinion and does not reflect that of my employer or colleagues. In the interest of full disclosure, I currently work for a major insurance broker. In the past, I have represented both insurers and insureds, which provides, I believe, an unusual point of view.

 

First, this is not a sniveling request for a return to the days of elaborately false good manners and courtly lawyering, if there ever were such a time.

 

Rather, this is an unscientific discussion of how civil – or Rational – behavior is good business.

 

Navigating the arcane world of D&O insurance requires a fairly high level of expertise. One would hope that this would be matched by a high level of professionalism and respect, but that is not always the case.

 

Rationally, D&O disputes should not create feelings of betrayal and personal peril. Unlike criminal or civil rights cases, the ultimate issue is money. Yet often disputes are ratcheted to an emotional level more appropriate for armed combat.

 

Recently, I looked at cases in which D&O coverage disputes had been litigated to appeals courts, an expensive and unusual event. Most litigation settles long before there is anything to appeal. At Kevin’s request, I am not including the names or identifying information of the litigants. I have no knowledge of the cases reviewed, beyond what is publically available.

 

In each case, someone was pressing an argument which was, at best, difficult. For example, in one case, a carrier asserted that even if a court ordered a litigant to pay plaintiffs’ costs, that litigant was not "legally obligated to pay" those costs. In another, the insured argued that the policy provided coverage for investigations of the corporation, although the policy limited such coverage to individuals. In a third, the parties claimed that a provision which provided only defense coverage actually provided no coverage (in the carrier’s view) or full defense and indemnity (in the insured’s view).

 

Unsurprisingly, these arguments did not succeed. After the parties had expended substantial legal fees, appeals courts found, in effect, that the policies said what they said.

 

Why did the parties fight so hard to reach what should have been an obvious conclusion?

 

The reason may be found in the pleadings and motion practice.

 

In each case, there was a substantial amount of money at stake, but probably not a "bet the company" sum for either party. Still, the dockets reveal extensive and vitriolic communications between the parties and their respective counsel. Carriers complained that their advice had been ignored. Insureds claimed deception and bad faith. Both sides bickered over discovery. Sanctions were demanded. The exhibits to the pleadings included emails and letters demonstrating that animosity had been the tone of the parties’ relationship from the beginning.

 

In short, the litigants subscribed to the Tough theory of business and litigation.

 

Probably the parties felt that the sums involved justified their mutually Tough stance. Possibly, they felt that "It was the Principle" – although, again, the issue was really only money. In any case, being Tough virtually assured that they would end up in court, yet in none of these cases did one side succeed completely.

 

Rationally, the parties might have realized that courts are poor places to make difficult arguments. Courts are not equipped to make decisions based on business considerations. With few exceptions, judges were litigators in their past lives. They come from an adversarial background and are limited to deciding specific issues. They cannot make compromises or force settlements (at least not overtly). Every issue has to be reviewed. At the end of the process, there has to be a "winner" and a "loser" on every point, even if no one actually "wins" the entire case.

 

Moreover, most judges have more cases than they can handle. Aggressive tactics slow the docket, annoying judges and magistrates. True, Tough tactics mean more money for lawyers who bill on an hourly basis. Clients, however, resent high legal fees that are not accompanied by clear success (and even those that are).

 

I suspect that, at the end of the cases reviewed, no one felt victorious or vindicated.

 

In a Rational world, the parties in this litigation would have met before a claim had even been made. The contract would have been openly discussed. There would be a Rational presumption that good coverage costs more than poor coverage, that no insurer wants to accept unlimited risk and that the insured would want the policy to respond as its words – and advertising – indicated it would.

 

It is unlikely this discussion ever took place.

 

D&O insurance is sold in a market where price is often the primary, if not the sole, consideration and that price is set by competition, not by risk.

 

Underwriters, pressured to write business, tweak their forms, but price according to what other carriers charge. Because D&O claims are historically infrequent, but relatively severe, claims handlers do not have the chance to manage and pay many claims. Insureds demand the broadest possible coverage, for the lowest cost – a Bentley for the price of a bicycle. Brokers are in the middle, often an untenable situation. They must be seen as Tough, or risk losing the business.

 

Lawyers may exacerbate the situation: Often both client and lawyer perceive attorneys as the "hired gun". As a brash young attorney once said, "If my clients wanted to make nice, they would have called a florist." D&O is especially fertile ground for disputes: policy language varies and insurance is governed by the state law. Whatever position a party takes can find support somewhere.

 

The present economic climate increases the pressure on everyone: "bad" results can have bad personal consequences. Carriers’ personnel may be fired, lawyers dismissed and brokers replaced. Rationality may be perceived as weakness or lack of commitment.

 

Rather than suggest that the other side may have merit, parties feel compelled to press every point against equally committed adversaries.

 

In my own experience, there can and should be a Rational approach to D&O issues. While difficult and even counterintuitive, it is possible for insurers and insureds to listen to each other, discuss differences and come to appropriate business decisions. Everyone should know that their position had been heard. Lawyers can recognize that their clients might benefit more from compromise than scorched earth. Although we are bound to be advocates for our clients, we can and should be counselors as well.

 

This is just good business.

 

In the cases discussed, it is easy to imagine that the relationships among the litigants were damaged irreparably. The insureds were unlikely to ever purchase insurance from the carriers again, but the brokers and lawyers may have lost their clients as well.

 

I am not so naïve as to envision a world in which carriers and their insureds are "partners", in the sense that they will both benefit from the same outcome. While I passionately serve my clients, I know that insurance is a business of trading services for money. As with any business, rational, civil behavior can be mutually beneficial.　

　

In resolution of a securities case that at one time had actually been dismissed and that even after being revived was substantially narrowed based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Morrison decision, the parties to the Credit Suisse subprime-related securities class action lawsuit have reached a settlement by which the company has agreed to pay the plaintiff class $70 million. A copy of the parties’ March 10, 2010 settlement agreement can be found here. The settlement is subject to court approval.

 

As reported in greater detail here, the plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in this action in April 2008. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had made material misrepresentations about the company’s asset valuation system, its internal controls (which allegedly allowed unauthorized placement of high risk mortgage-backed assets in client accounts), and its own exposure to losses related to subprime mortgages. Credit Suisse is domiciled in Switzerland. Its shares trade on several securities exchanges outside the U.S. and its ADRs trade on the NYSE.

 

In an October 5, 2009 order (here), Southern District of New York Judge Victor Marrero granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, having concluded based on pre-Morrison standards that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of claimants who reside outside the U.S. and who had purchased their shares on foreign exchanges (so-called f-cubed claimants). The complaint had not identified the domicile of some other named plaintiffs, but Judge Marrero dismissed their claims as well.

 

Thereafter, the plaintiffs amended their complaint and the defendants renewed their motions to dismiss. As discussed here, on February 11, 2010, Judge Marrero held that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint was sufficient to overcome the initial defects and he allowed the case to go forward as to plaintiff shareholders who had purchased Credit Suisse ADRs on the NYSE and as to U.S.-based shareholders who had purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock Exchange. However, he also ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs that resided outside the U.S. and that had purchased their shares outside the U.S.

 

In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank case. The defendants in the Credit Suisse case moved to dismiss the claims by Americans who bought their Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss exchange – that is, the so-called "f-squared" claims. In a July 27, 2010 opinion, Judge Marrero ruled that Morrison also precludes the f-squared claims. As discussed here, Judge Marrero was the first to hold that under Morrison applied to preclude f-squared as well as f-cubed claims.

 

The parties then initiated a mediation process that resulted in the settlement agreement filed with the court on March 10.

　

The settlement agreement has a number of interesting features. First, the settlement agreement specifies that following the settlement’s preliminary approval Credit Suisse "and/or its insurers" will cause the payment of the $70 million settlement fund to the escrow agent. The settlement agreement itself does not specify how much of the settlement ultimately is to be borne by Credit Suisse’s insurers. The use of the word "or" in the phrase "or its insurers" suggests that the insurers contribution could possibly be as much as the entire $70 million, but there is simply no way to tell for sure from the face of the settlement document. However, the clear suggestion is that at least some portion of the settlement is to be paid by Credit Suisse’s insurers.

　

Second, even though Judge Marrero dismissed out the Americans who bought their Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss exchange, the proposed settlement class consists not only of all purchasers who acquired Credit Suisse ADRs on the U.S. Exchange, but also "all U.S. Residents who purchased [Credit Suisse] securities on the Swiss Stock Exchange during the class period." Clearly, plaintiffs counsel was not prepared to concede – at least for settlement purposes – that Judge Marrero’s ruling on this issue was correct.

　

However, it appears that the Judge Marrero’s ruling dismissing out the f-squared claimants was taken into account in the settlement. The Americans who bought Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss exchange will enjoy only a limited recover compared to the ADR purchasers. 90% of the net settlement amount is to go to settlement class members who purchased ADRs on the NYSE, and 10% is to go to the U.S. shareholders who purchased common shares on the Swiss exchange. (ADR holders will receive $1.38 per share and the U.S. shareholders will or 13 cents a share..)

　

As Alison Frankel points out in her March 11, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article about the Credit Suisse settlement (here), the settlement split between the ADR holders and the U.S. common shareholders is similar to the settlement split in the recent $125 million Satyam settlement (about which refer here) in which the ADS holders were to receive $1.38 a share and common shareholders were to receive 6 cents a share.

　

Third, although the settlement agreement itself does not specify the amount of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, the accompanying settlement papers discloses that the plaintiffs’ counsel intends to move the court and seek attorneys’ fees "not to exceed 27-1/2 percent of the settlement proceeds" plus $350,000 in expenses. If the plaintiffs’ counsel were to receive the full 27.5 percent amount, that would translate into a fee award of $19.25 million.

　

Beyond its specific features, the settlement is also interesting for what it represents. For starters, it is represents one of the few settlements so far of the more that 230 subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuits that accumulated during the period 2007 to 2010. By my count, the Credit Suisse settlement represents only the 19th settlement of a credit crisis securities suit overall and only the second such settlement so far in 2011.

　

As Cornerstone Research discussed in its recently released study of 2010 securities class action lawsuit settlements (refer here), the credit crisis cases have "settled at a slower rate than traditional cases." Though many of these cases have been dismissed, others have survived dismissal motions. (And some, like the Credit Suisse case itself, were initially dismissed but survived renewed dismissal motions.) As I have noted elsewhere there is a backlog of unresolved credit crisis lawsuits. Though these cases are in many instances still working their way through the system, more of these cases will be moving toward settlement in the months ahead.

 

The size of the Credit Suisse settlement is also noteworthy. The $70 million settlement amount makes the case the fifth largest credit crisis securities suit settlement so far. Many of the credit crisis lawsuit settlements have been large – the Cornerstone study shows that the average and median credit crisis settlements have run substantially higher than the average and median settlements of securities suits generally. The suggestion is that the aggregate costs of all of these settlements could represent a very substantial figure, a possibility that, among other things, could have important implications for the D&O insurance industry.

 

Break in the Action: The D&O Diary’s publication schedule will be intermittent for the next two weeks. The normal publication schedule will resume on March 28, 2011.　

　

On March 7, 2011, in the latest development in a long-running securities suit that is among the few securities class action lawsuits to go to trial and that had previously resulted in a $277.5 verdict in plaintiffs’ favor, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Apollo Group’s petition for writ of certiorari. As a result, the ruling of the Ninth Circuit reinstating the jury’s verdict will now stand. In addition, as a result of the decision to decline taking up the case, the interesting and arguably important issues the cert petition raised will now not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

 

As detailed in greater length here, plaintiffs filed the suit after the company’s share price declined following the disclosure of a U.S. Department of Education report alleging that the company had violated DOE rules. On September 7, 2004, the company agreed to pay $9.8 million to settle the allegations. News of the settlement first became public on September 14, 2004, but the company’s share price did not actually decline until September 21, 2004, when a securities analyst issued a report expressing concern about the company’s possible exposure to future regulatory issues.

　

On January 16, 2008, a civil jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff class on all counts, awarding damages of $277.5 million. Under the verdict, Apollo is responsible for 60 percent of the plaintiffs’ losses, former Apollo CEO Tony Nelson is responsible for 30 percent, and former CFO Kenda Gonzales is responsible for 10 percent. The jury verdict is discussed at greater length here.

　

As discussed in greater length here, on August 4, 2008, Judge James Teilborg of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona entered an order (here) granting the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, based on his finding that the trial testimony did not support the jury’s finding of loss causation. Judge Teilborg’s order vacated the judgment and entered judgment in defendants’ favor.

 

In its post-trial motion, Apollo argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding that the analyst reports represented "corrective disclosure," because they did not contain any new fraud-revealing information. Judge Teilborg found that "the evidence at trial undercut all bases on which [the plaintiff] claimed the (analyst) reports were corrective."　

 

Accordingly, the court concluded that although the plaintiff "demonstrated that Apollo misled the markets in various ways concerning the DoE program review," the plaintiff "failed to prove that Apollo’s actions caused investors to suffer harm." The court therefore concluded that "Apollo is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

 

In a June 23, 2010 opinion (here), a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the district court "erred in granting Apollo judgment as a matter of law." The opinion states that "the jury could have reasonably found that the (analyst) reports following various newspaper articles were ‘corrective disclosures’ providing additional or more authoritative fraud-related information that deflated the stock price."

　

The Ninth Circuit further held that Apollo is not entitled to a new trial and that there is no basis for remittitur (reduction of the verdict). The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with "instructions that the district court enter judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict." The company filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.

　

The basis for the company’s cert petition was basically that if the efficient market hypothesis means anything, then the information about the DoE investigation was fully incorporated into the company’s share price when the news first hit the market on September 14. Either the market did not efficiently incorporate this information, in which case the market for the company’s stock is not efficient and the plaintiffs ought not to be able to rely on the fraud on the market theory to establish reliance, or the market is efficient and the company’s share price simply did not decline at the time of the corrective disclosure.

　

In a June 28, 2010 guest post on this blog (here), noted securities litigation defense attorney Tower Snow of the Howard Rice law firm articulated the inherent tension between these two positions as follows:

　

The courts can’t rely on the efficient market theory for purposes of creating a rebuttable presumption of reliance for purposes of class certification and then ignore its underpinnings for purposes of evaluating loss causation. Either one embraces the theory or one does not. If one embraces it, then once it is established that the prior disclosures revealed the truth about the allegedly misstated or omitted information, there is nothing left for the jury to decide. The later disclosure, by definition, cannot be corrective, as the market already had absorbed the information. Here, the "corrective" disclosure came out seven days after the information had been previously released. Seven days is an eternity in the financial markets.

　

As discussed in March 2011 memo from the Jones Day law firm discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s cert denial in the Apollo Group case (here), the Circuits are split on the question of how soon after a corrective disclosure a stock price decline must occur in order for the loss causation requirement to be satisfied. At least two Circuits – the Second and the Third – have held that the claimant must show that the market immediately reacted. At least three Circuits – the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth – have head that the price decline may occur weeks or even months after the initial corrective disclosure.

　

In light of the Supreme Court’s refusal to take up the Apollo Group case, this split in the Circuits will remain unresolved. Moreover, the relatively plaintiff friendly standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit remains standing in that Circuit, where so many securities class action lawsuits are filed.

 

Finally, the Supreme Court’s cert denial means that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the Apollo Group case stands. The Ninth Circuit had remanded the case for "entry of judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict." In other words, the Supreme Court’s cert denial means that the plaintiffs’ verdict in one of the very rare securities cases to go to trial will stand.

 

The Supreme Court’s cert denial was disclosed with little fanfare, as part of a long list of other rulings at the same time. Looking at the Apollo Group cert denial among the list of rulings might convey the impression that this is no big deal. But actually it is a little surprising. The U.S. Supreme Court has shown an active willingness to take up securities cases, having taken numerous cases up in each of the last few terms. And part of the willingness to take up these cases seemed to involve persistent hostility against securities suits in general. The opportunity to trim a plaintiffs’ victory and to resolve a circuit split certainly seemed to suggest the possibility that the Supreme Court might well grant the cert petition.

 

In any event, with the cert petition denial, the plaintiffs’ trial victory in this case appears as if it will stand. Even with the recent dramatic narrowing of the plaintiffs’ class in the Vivendi case, the plaintiffs overall are on a bit of a roll when it comes to securities lawsuit trials. The last three securities cases to go to trial (the Homestore case, refer here; the BankAtlantic case, refer here; and the Vivendi case, refer here) have all resulted in plaintiffs’ verdicts.

　

Trials in these cases are extremely rare, and these recent developments involve a very small percentage of all securities cases. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs’ bar undoubtedly will find this sequence of events, including the cert petition denial in the Apollo Group, to represent heartening developments.  Even with the cert denial in the Apollo Group case, however, there are still a couple of securities cases still pending before the court this term — the Matrixx Initiative case (refer here) and the Janus Capital Group case (refer here) — and it remains to be seen how plaintiffs will fare in those cases.　

　

　

Though the average dollar value of securities class action settlements approved in 2010 declined slightly compared to 2009, the median settlement amount reached record levels, according to Cornerstone Research’s annual 2010 Securities Class Action Settlement Study. Cornerstone’s March 10, 2010 press release about the study can be found here, and the study itself can be found here.

 

Largely as a result of the decline in the number of mega-settlements, the average securities class action lawsuit settlement approved in 2010 declined to $36.3 million, compared to S37.2 million in 2009. Both of these figures are well the 1996-2009 average settlement of $54.8 million. Even if the post-Reform Act settlement average is "normalized" by excluding the top-three settlements during that era, the 2010 average is still below the adjusted 1996-2009 average of $38.8. (All historical averages are adjusted for inflation.)

 

The median average class action lawsuit settlement approved in 2010 increased to $11.3 million from a 2009 median of $8.0 million. This 40% increase represents the largest single year increase in the median settlement in the last ten years.

 

The sizeable gap between the averages and medians is a reflection of the presence of a few significant larger settlements During the post-Reform Act era, more than half of the securities class actions have settled for less than $10 million, about 80% have settled for under $25 million.. Only 7 percent of cases have settled for more than $100 million. Thus, "while large settlements tend to receive substantial attention, they tend to occur infrequently."

 

The Cornerstone study reports the number of securities class action lawsuit settlements approved during 2010 is the lowest in ten years. The "more likely cause" for this decline is combination of the substantial drop in the number of new securities class action lawsuit settlements and the fact that the credit-crisis suits have taken longer to settle. The average time to settlement for cases settled in 2010 was 4.1 years, compared to 3.9 years for the cases settled in 2009.

 

Obviously, the most significant factor with respect to the overall size of securities suit settlements is the overall amount of investor losses (although the proportionate relationship between the size of the settlement and the size of investor losses decreases as the size of "plaintiff-style" damages increases.)

 

There are a number of other lawsuit features that present statistically significant differences in the size of the settlements. First, cases involving accounting allegations are resolved with larger settlements than cases without accounting allegations. For example, cases involving a restatement settled during the 1996-2010 period settled for 3.9% of "plaintiff-style" damages, but cases without a restatement settled for 3.1% of those amounts. In addition, filings that do not involve accounting allegations are more likely to be dismissed than filings with accounting allegations.

 

The report goes on to observe that the increased complexity of cases involving accounting allegations means these cases may take longer to resolve, which may be a factor contributing to the increased interval between the filing date and the settlement date observed over time.

 

Second, the presence of public pension plans as lead plaintiffs is associated with higher settlements as well. Though this observation could be explained by these investors choosing to participate in stronger cases, the study reports that even controlling for observable factors that affect settlement amounts, "the presence of a public pension plan as a lead plaintiff is still associated with a statistically significant increase in settlement size."

 

Other lawsuit features that are associated with statistically significant settlement amounts are the presence of Section 11 and/or Section 12(a)(2) claims; the presence of a remedy of a corresponding SEC action; and the presence of companion derivative claims. On the latter point, the report notes that class actions accompanied by derivative actions tend to be associated with other factors important to settlement amounts, such as accounting allegations, the presence of related SEC action and the involvement of public pension fund plaintiffs.

 

The credit crisis cases have settled more slowly than "traditional cases." There have also been relatively few settlements of these cases to date, as well. Of the credit crisis cases that have settled so far, they have tended to settle for larger amounts (median settlements of $31.3 million and average settlements of $103.1 million) but for lower percentage of estimated "plaintiff-style" damages (3.2% on average compared to 4.9% for all cases). My compilation of all credit-crisis settlements can be accessed here.

 

Some readers may note slight variations between the averages and median settlement figures reported in the Cornerstone report compared to those reported elsewhere. Thought there are differences, the figures are directionally consistent. The differences may be due to a combination of timing and methodology. The Cornerstone report designates the settlement year as the year in which the hearing to approve the settlement was held. Cases involving multiple settlements are reflected in the year of the most recent partial settlement (subject to certain additional considerations).

 

Though all of the report’s findings are interesting and important and the report is well worth reading at length and in full, for me the most significant finding is the report’s conclusion about the dramatic increase in the size of the median settlement. Averages can be driven by outliers, but medians are more reflective of the overall direction of settlements in general.

 

The rapid increase in the median settlement amount has important implications for corporate insurance buyers as well as for their insurers, particularly at a time when costs of defense are also escalating rapidly. For buyers, the rising median settlement amount clearly has important implications for purposes of limits selection and limits adequacy. I think the unmistakable conclusion is that the questions of limits adequacy may now involve larger levels of insurance than may have been the case in the past.

 

For insurers, and particularly those insurers who more typically are involved in the excess layers, the rising median may have important implications for likely loss experiences. The clear implication is that higher attaching excess layers are increasingly likely to be called upon to participate in case resolution, particularly in light of rising costs of defense. Losses are likelier to push up into higher layers.

 

For the second time, a court has given investors leave to proceed and also certified a plaintiff class in a secondary market misrepresentations claim under the revised Ontario Securities Act. In an order dated March 1, 2011, Ontario Superior Court Justice Wolfram Tausendfreund granted leave to investors to proceed against Arctic Glacier Income Fund, its trustees and related entities and executives. A copy of Justice Tausendfreund’s order can be found here.

 

As discussed at length here, effective in 2005, Ontario revised its securities laws (in legislative provisions now generally referred to as Bill 198) potentially making it easier for disappointed investors to bring actions for civil liability against directors and officers of public companies for alleged secondary market misrepresentations.

 

Section 138.8 (1) of the revised Ontario Securities Act specifies, however, that a liability action cannot be commenced "without leave of court granted upon motion with notice to each defendant." The court is to grant leave only "where it is satisfied" that the action "is being brought in good faith" and there is a "reasonable　possibility" the plaintiff will prevail at trial.

 

In a "landmark" December 2009 ruling, discussed here, Ontario Superior Court Justice Katherine van Rensberg granted plaintiffs in the Imax securities class action lawsuit leave to proceed with their claims. Justice van Rensberg also granted the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a global class in that case. In a February 2011 order (discussed here), another Superior Court Justice denied the defendants’ motion for leave to appeal Justice van Rensberg’s rulings.

 

The March 1 ruling involved an action brought by investors who had purchased shares of the Arctic Glacier Income Fund. The Income Fund is an unincorporated mutual fund trust that is a reporting issuer in ten Canadian provinces. Interests in the Income Fund trade on the Toronto stock exchange. The Income Fund’s sole assets are shares of Arctic Glacier Inc., a corporation organized under Alberta law. The company and its wholly owned subsidiary, Arctic Glacier International, provide packaged ice to consumers in Canada and the United States.

 

In March 2008, the Income Fund announced that it had become aware of an U.S. Department of Justice antitrust investigation involving the packaged ice industry. In 2009, Arctic International pleaded guilty to a criminal, anticompetitive conspiracy in the U.S. In the plea agreement, Arctic International agreed to pay a US$9 million fine and admitted that it had participated in a conspiracy to suppress competition in the packaged ice business in Michigan between 2001 and 2007. Following the announcement of the investigation, Income Fund’s unit price declined. The plaintiffs initiated an action alleging that they had been misled in connection with the company’s alleged legal and regulatory compliance programs.

 

As required under the revised Ontario Securities Laws, the plaintiffs moved for leave to proceed. In order to determine whether or not the plaintiffs had met the statutory requirement in order to obtain leave – that is, that "there is a reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved at trial in favor of the plaintiff" – Justice Tausendfreund followed the analysis of Justice van Rensberg in the Imax case with respect to the requirements to meet this standard. After noting that he saw no reason to depart from her analysis, Justice Tausendfreund said that "the applicable standard is more than a mere possibility of success, but is a lower standard than a probability."

 

Justice Tausendfreund concluded that the plaintiffs had met this "leave test" under Section 138.8 and granted them leave to pursue statutory claims for misrepresentation in the secondary market. He also granted the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class of all investors who had purchased the Income Fund units during the class period, declining the defendants’ request to narrow the class.

 

The significance of Justice Tausendfreund’s ruling is that now a second set of plaintiffs has been granted leave to proceed with a claim for secondary market misrepresentations under the revised Ontario Securities Laws. In addition, Justice Tausendfreund, like Justice van Rensberg in the Imax case, found that the showing required to satisfy the "leave test" is relatively low.

 

It would is possible to overgeneralize from just these two cases, but at least so far that the plaintiffs have been relatively successful in overcoming the initial procedural hurdles in pursing secondary market misrepresentation claims under the revised Ontario Securities Act.

 

In addition, the plaintiffs have also succeeded in having a broad class certified as well. The certification of a global class in the Imax case may be of greater significance, given that Imax shared traded on both the Toronto and New York stock exchanges, whereas the Arctic Glacial Income Fund shares traded only on the Toronto exchange. But nevertheless, the relatively low initial threshold for leave and the courts’ willingness to certify broad classes are positive developments for the plaintiffs in these cases, and may make the remedies available under the revised Ontario Securities Act more attractive to other claimants.

 

An interesting and detailed March 8, 2011 analysis of the Arctic Glacier decision by the Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt law firm can be found here. The law firm memo raises a number of interesting questions about the decision, particularly with respect to the class certificaiton ruling. A March 4, 2011 Globe and Mail article about the recent ruling can be found here.

 

We Are All One: In her fascinating article in the March 7, 2011 issue of The New Yorker entitled "The View from the Stands" (here) about soccer in Turkey, Elif Batuman reported the following comments of one fan of the Beşiktaş team about the team and its followers (who are known as Çarşi):

 

He characterized Beşiktaş as the team of the unexpected, the team of underdogs, and talked about Çarşi’s slogans, which are unveiled on giant banners during matches. “We are all Black,” proclaimed one banner, after rival fans had made references to the race of the French-Senegalese Beşiktaş star Pascal Nouma. When [competitior] Fenerbahçe disparaged a Beşiktaş manager whose father had been a janitor, there were banners saying “We Are All Janitors.” And when an international committee of astronomers removed Pluto from the list of planets Çarşi took up the cause: “We Are All Pluto.”

 

 

Among the questions that followed in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Morrison v. National Australia Bank decision has been whether and to what extent plaintiffs’ lawyers will resort to courts outside the U.S. to pursue securities claims on behalf of investors who purchased the defendant company’s shares outside the U.S. The action recently filed in the Netherlands on behalf of non-U.S. investors in Fortis presents shows that plaintiffs’ lawyers will be pursuing these claims.

 

A recent announcement involving prior Dutch settlements underscores that efforts to obtain recoveries outside the U.S. on behalf of non-U.S. investors have actually been underway for some time. The settlements show how parallel (or at least sequential) proceedings can resolve the claims of both U.S. and non-U.S. investors, respectively. These procedures, which have been used before in the same way, may afford a means by which all investors – including even non-U.S. investors – potentially may obtain recoveries, notwithstanding the constraints of Morrison.

 

On March 3, 2011, the Stichting Converium Securities Compensation Foundation issued a Hearing Announcement in connection with the settlements totaling $58.4 million on behalf of investors who purchased shares of Converium Holding AG between January 7, and September 2, 2004 and who did not purchase their shares on a U.S. exchange and who were not residents of the U.S. at the time they purchased their shares. The hearing, to be held on October 3, 2011 in the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, will determine whether or not the settlements will be held binding.

 

The Non-U.S. investor proceedings in the Netherlands follow the settlement of related proceedings the U.S. As discussed at length here, Converium investors first filed a securities class action in the Southern District of New York in October 2004. The plaintiffs alleged Converium and certain of its officers and directors, as well its corporate parent, Zurich Financial Services, had made misleading statements about Converium’s financial condition, including the adequacy of its loss reserves for its North American business during the class period. (Converium had spun out of Zurich in a 2001 IPO.)

 

In 2007, while the U.S. case was pending, SCOR Holding (Switzerland) acquired the voting rights of Converium pursuant to a tender offer.

 

In rulings dated March 6 and March 19, 2008 (refer here and here, respectively) Judge Denise Cote, applying pre-Morrison standards for determining the reach of the U.S. Securities laws, certified a class consisting of all persons who purchased Converium American Depositary Shares on the NYSE, and all U.S residents who purchased their Converium Shares on a non-U.S. exchange. Excluded from the class were investors who had purchased their shares on any non-U.S. exchange who were not U.S. residents at the time of their purchased.

 

The U.S. action ultimately settled for a total of $84.6 million, consisting of $75 million from SCOR and $9.6 million from Zurich. The Southern District of New York approved this settlement and entered final judgment on December 22, 2008.

 

As detailed here, in July 2010, two groups acting on behalf of the non-U.S. Converium investors entered settlement agreements with Scor and Zurich. The total amount of the two settlements is $58.4 million, of which $40 million is to come from SCOR and $18.4 million is to come from Zurich. The SCOR settlement agreement can be found here and the Zurich settlement agreement can be found here. The two groups acting on the investors’ behalf were Stichting Converium Securities Compensation Foundation, Dutch foundation formed for the purpose of seeking recoveries on behalf of the Non-U.S. Converium investors. Dutch investors in particular were represented by Vereniging VEB NCVB.

 

Pursuant to the Dutch Collective Settlement of Mass Damages Claims Act (known as WCAM), enacted in 2005, the parties then petitioned the Amsterdam Court of Appeals for approval of the settlement. An English translation of the parties’ petition, as amended, can be found here. The Act basically allows parties to seek court approval for collective settlement of mass actions entered for the benefit of class members who do not opt out.

 

On November 12, 2010, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals entered a provisional judgment acknowledging its right to recognize the settlements and scheduling a hearing for interested parties to appear and present their arguments with respect to the petition. Interestingly, the November 12 order specifically references the U.S. Supreme Court’s Morrison decision and the impact the decision has on the ability of Non-U.S. investors to pursue securities claims in U.S. courts. The hearing to determine whether the settlement agreements will be binding will take place on October 3, 2011.

 

These settlements represent the latest occasion when the new Dutch procedures have been used to reach settlements on behalf of non-U.S. investors in connection with securities claims that were also the subject of U.S. securities class action lawsuit claims and settlements.

 

The first and highest profile of these prior settlements was the $381 million settlement on behalf of non-U.S. Royal Dutch Shell investors. As discussed here, in May 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals approved the settlement and authorized payment to Non-U.S. investors. The Dutch settlement followed an earlier settlement of a parallel U.S. securities class action lawsuit settlement on behalf of U.S. investors and arising out of the same factual allegations.

 

The Royal Dutch and the Converium settlements illustrate possible means by which, even in the wake of Morrison, non-U.S. investors can obtain recoveries for their investment losses. As plaintiffs’ attorneys cast about for alternatives for non-U.S. investors to pursue in the wake of Morrison, the use of settlements under the Dutch procedures may provide a possible remedy.

 

However, as Luke Green noted in a recent detailed post on the Risk Metrics Group Insights blog (here), there are a number of limitations on the usefulness of this Dutch procedure for investors seeking recoveries. First, only court authorized representatives can pursue claims on behalf of investors, and representatives cannot seek damages. Rather, the Dutch courts can only certify the class and approve out of court settlements. Green also notes that absent a chance in EU regulations, the class representative may have difficulty enforcing the settlement outside the Netherlands. A detailed discussion of the potential conflict between the Dutch Act and the laws of other jurisdictions can be found here.

 

In the circumstances where there is no prior U.S.-based settlement or U.S. action to provide both leverage and a path to settlement, the non-U.S. investors will have to try another approach – as was the case for the Fortis investors who recently filed an action in the Netherlands in which they seek to assert claims on behalf of investors who affirmatively joined the action. Of course, it remains to be seen how successful that approach will be.

 

In the meantime, it seems probable that investors will continue in the wake of Morrison to explore jurisdictional alternatives, in the Netherlands and elsewhere. As I recently noted (here), Canada could represent yet another alternative, at least to the extent the recent Ontario court certification of a global class in the Imax securities class action proves to represent the potential reach and applicability of the Ontario securities laws. Developments in yet other jurisdictions could present additional possibilities.

 

In any event, it is probably worth noting that post-Morrison, the class certified in the U.S. action would not have included the U.S. residents who purchased their Converium shares outside the U.S. Following Morrison, several district courts have ruled (e.g., refer here) that the claims of these so-called "f-squared" investors are outside the ambit of the U.S. securities laws. These investors would essentially be in the same boat with the non-U.S. investors who purchased their shares outside the U.S.

　

Is the SEC Targeting Outside Directors?: A March 3, 2011 memo from the Haynes and Boone law firm entitled "SEC Enforcement: Spolighting Outside Directors" (here) takes a look at a recent SEC enforcement action that specifically targeted outside directors for their allegedly failure to fulfill their responsibilities as Board member at a company that engaged in fraudulent misconduct.

 

The memo suggests that although the specific case involved "egregious" misconduct, the SEC’s actions signal "a new willingness to prosecute those directors who disregard or neglect their duties." The memo suggests a number of lessons from the case, including in particular that outside directors must respond to "red flags."

 

Another Sarbanes-Oxley Clawback Action: In a separate March 3, 2011 action (here), the SEC also entered a negotiated settlement with the former CEO of Beazer Homes, in which the CEO agreed to reimburse the company $6.4 million in cash and also various company securities the CEO had received as part of his incentive bonus compensation during 2006. The SEC alleged that the company had filed fraudulent financial statements during the period for which the CEO had been awarded the bonus compensation.

 

The SEC had asserted its right to compel the return (or to "clawback") the bonus compensation under Section 304 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Under Section 304, it is not necessary for the individual target to have participated or even to have been aware of the conduct resulting in the company’s misstatement. The Beazer Homes CEO neither admitted nor denied the SEC allegations.

 

This is not the first time the SEC has used Section 304 to clawback compensation. As noted here, the SEC has previously sought to clawback compensation from the CEO of CSK Auto. The SEC also previously entered a clawback settlement with the CEO of Diebold (refer here).

 

As I noted in a prior post (here), these kinds of clawback actions present a host of complex D&O coverage issues. In any event, we are likelier to see more clawback actions in the future, in light of the expanded clawback requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act.

 

Academy Awards Retrospective: In the academy awards ceremony last week, The King’s Speech carried away a host of trophies. And perhaps appropriately so. It is an entertaining movie with excellent acting. And as I noted in an earlier post when I saw it, the movie made excellent use of music.

 

But I agree with Joe Queenan’s February 20, 2011 column in the Wall Street Journal. For all of its finery and as good as it is, The King’s Speech is a formulaic movie. As at least one Internet reviewer before me has observed, it is The Karate Kid with a British accent and better costumes. Take nothing away from Colin Firth, who was excellent, but were it not for our general enchantment with British royalty, this movie would not likely have swept the statuettes.

 

For my money, True Grit was the best movie of the year. If you saw the movie, you will recall the dreamlike sequence after Rooster Cogburn rescues Mattie and races through the night on horseback to try to get her medical attention. An absolute stunning visual sequence that was all the more remarkable because you didn’t notice it until you thought about it later.

 

Not only that, but Haille Steinfeld deserved the Oscar for best supporting actress. Anyone who can portray a 14 year old hung upside down in a cave filled with a decaying corpse and poisonous snakes and manage to convey simultaneously both terror and a sense of self-control has to win the award. And if you really want to appreciate how fantastic Haille Steinfeld was as the most recent version of Mattie, you should see how Kim Darby in the same role in the older version absolutely killed the movie. (I ask you, how could anyone play Mattie as a whiny simp?)

 

I am sure that like me many viewers enjoyed the unusual characters, odd but amusing dialog and unexpected plot of True Grit. The recent version of the movie more faithfully reproduced the feel of the novel on which the movie was based. Charles Portis wrote book. I know this because Portis wrote another book which I would argue is one of the funniest books out there.

 

Ten years after he wrote True Grit, Portis published The Dog of the South, which is the story Ray Midge’s headlong plunge from Little Rock into Mexico and then Belize. Midge is chasing his friend, Dupree, who ran off with Midge’s wife and took his car. And Midge wants his car back. It would be hard to quickly summarize Midge’s meandering quest and the oddball assortment of characters he encounters. The book is full of curious observations and busted bicycle wheel conversations that somehow make sense and are always funny (albeit often incorrect politically). Here’s a short excerpt to give a flavor of the book:

 

In South Texas I saw three interesting things. The first was a tiny girl, maybe ten years old, driving a 1965 Cadillac. She wasn’t going very fast, because I passed her, but still she was cruising right along, with her head tilted back and her mouth open and her little hands gripping the wheel

 

Then I saw an old man walking up the median strip pulling a wooden cross behind him. It was mounted on something like a golf cart with two-spoked wheels. I slowed down to read the hand-lettered sign on his chest. "Jacksonville Fla or Bust."

 

I had never been to Jacksonville but I knew it was the home of the Gator Bowl and I had heard it was a boom town, taking in an entire county or some such thing. It seemed like an odd destination for a religious pilgrim. Penance maybe for some terrible sin, or some bargain he had worked out with God, or maybe just a crazed hiker. I waved and called out to him, wishing him luck, but he was intent on his marching and had no time for idle greetings. His step was brisk and I was convinced he wouldn’t bust.

 

The third interesting thing was a convoy of stake-bed trucks all piled high with loose watermelons and cantaloupes. I was amazed. I couldn’t believe that the bottom ones weren’t being crushed under all that weight, exploding and spraying hazardous melon juice onto the highway. One of nature’s tricks with curved surfaces. Topology! I had never made it that far in my mathematics and engineering studies, and I knew now that I never would, just as I knew that I would never be a navy pilot or a Treasury agent. I made a B in Statics but I was failing in Dynamics when I withdrew from the field. The course I liked best was one called Strength of Materials. Everybody else hated it because of all the tables we had to memorize but I loved it. I had once tried to explain to Dupree how things fell apart from being pulled and compressed and twisted and bent and sheared but he wouldn’t listen. Whenever that kind of thing came up, he would always say – boast, the way those people do – that he had no head for figures and couldn’t do things with his hands, slyly suggesting the presence of finer qualities.　

　

In the fifth FDIC lawsuit against former directors and officers of failed banks as part of the current bank wave, on March 1, 2011, the FDIC as receiver for the failed Corn Belt Bank and Trust Company filed suit in the Central District of Illinois federal court against four former officer and directors of the bank, seeking to recover losses of at least $10.4 million.. A copy of the FDIC’s latest complaint can be found here.

 

According to the Complaint, examiners began criticizing the bank’s lending practices as early as 2003. The Complaint alleged that between 2003 and 2008 the bank "failed to address recurring criticisms by examiners regarding imprudent lending practices," and April 2, 2007, the bank entered a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with examiners. In November 2008, after the bank failed to comply with the MOU, the FDIC issued a cease and desist order. The bank ultimately failed on February 13, 2009.

 

The lawsuit itself is failed against the four members of the bank’s loan committee. These four individuals include the bank’s CEO, its chief lending officer and two outside directors. The complaint alleges that the four defendants "failed to adequately inform themselves of the relevant risks and acted recklessly in approving one or more of five high-risk commercial loans."

 

The five loans, all of which were made between 2005 and 2007 and all of which related to the long-haul trucking business, allegedly were "improperly underwritten and extended 100 percent financing to out of state, start-up businesses, and were primarily secured by rapidly depreciating semi-tractors." The complaint further alleges that the CEO and Chief Loan officer unilaterally funded the fifth of the five loans after the loan committee tabled its approval, and they failed to unsure that the loans were properly administered.

 

The complaint alleges that the defendants’ alleged conduct was "particularly egregious" because they approved one or more of the five loans "after Bank examiners repeatedly warned the Bank that it suffered from weak loan administration, and that it was facing risks posed by out of area lending, high loan-to-value ("LTV") loans, and excessive exposure to loan concentrations within its loan portfolio." All five of the loans at issue allegedly shared these characteristics.

 

The complaint alleges gross negligence under FIRREA and negligence under Illinois law against the four individuals for approving the loans. The complaint also specifically alleges gross negligence under FIRREA and negligence under Illinois law against the former CEO and the former chief lending officer in connection with the approval of the fifth of the five loans. Finally, the complaint alleges gross negligence under FIRREA and negligence under Illinois law against the former CEO and former chief lending officer for failing to properly administer the loans and for failing to protect the bank’s security interest in the collateral.

 

The FDIC’s complaint against the four former Corn Belt officials is just the fifth complaint filed so far as part of the current bank wave, and first since the FDIC filed two complaint’s the same day in January 2011. It is the second of the five to be filed against officials of a failed bank that had been based in Illinois. The complaint is interesting because it not only names the two bank officers as defendants, but it also names two outside directors who had served on the bank’s loan committee, as well.

 

Like the four prior lawsuits the FDIC filed as part of the current wave of bank failures, this lawsuit was filed over a year after the institution itself failed. Although the FDIC’s motivations can only be inferred, it appears that what may have provoked this suit is what the FDIC attempted to describe as the defendant’s "particularly egregious" conduct of having approved these particularly loans in the fact of examiners’ warning about loans sharing the characteristics of the five loans at issue.

 

In the Professional Liability Litigation page on the FDIC’s website (here), the FDIC has said, as of its last update, that it has approved lawsuits against a total of 130 individuals. The four previous lawsuits that had been filed named a total of 35 individuals as defendants. With the addition of the four individuals named as defendants on the Corn Belt lawsuit, a total of 39 individuals have now been named as defendants, suggesting that lawsuits to be filed against 91 additional individuals remain pending. Of court, the total number of individuals against who lawsuits have been authorized is likely to continue to grow as well.

 

My table of the lawsuits the FDIC has filed against former directors and officers of failed banks as part of the current failed bank wave can be accessed here.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for alerting me to the Corn Belt lawsuit.

　

　

A frequent component of derivative litigation resolution is an award to the plaintiffs of the fees and expenses the plaintiffs incurred in pursuing the suit. A contentious, recurring question is whether D&O insurance covers fee awards to derivative litigation plaintiffs. This issue received a through going over in a February 17, 2011 opinion from a five judge panel of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.

 

In the opinion (here), a three-judge majority held, over the dissent of two judges, that a $8.8 million derivative plaintiffs’ fee award was covered under Loral Space & Communications D&O insurance policy, but all five judges held unanimously that the D&O policy did not cover the separate $10.7 million awarded for plaintiffs’ fees in a related action seeking damages for breach of fiduciary duty.

 

Background

The coverage suit arises out of litigation filed after Loral agreed to enter a financing transaction with MHR Fund Management. In the transaction, MHR agreed to provide Loral $300 million in exchange for convertible preferred stock Loral was to issue to MHR.

 

Two lawsuits ensure. First, a BlackRock fund filed a shareholders’ derivative action seeking to rescind the deal. Second, Highland Crusader Offshore Partners filed a damages action. Both actions alleged Loral had breached its fiduciary duty because the value to MHR of the proposed deal allegedly far exceeded $300 million.

 

The cases were consolidated. Following a trial, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded that the transaction was unfair to Loral, and reformed the deal terms so that MHR would receive nonvoting common stock rather than convertible preferred stock. The court awarded no damages and made no findings of fault.

 

Concluding that the plaintiffs’ actions had produced a substantial benefit for Loral, and applying the corporate benefit doctrine, the Court entered a fee award to BlackRock of $8.8 million and entered a fee award to Highland of $10.7 million. Loral paid these amounts and then sought coverage under its D&O insurance policy for the payments.

 

Loral’s D&O insurer denied coverage and commenced an action seeking a judicial declaration that their policy did not cover the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee awards. The trial court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in Loral’s favor. The insurers appealed.

 

The February 18 Order

On appeal, the insurers argued that the Highland fee award was not covered because the Highland action for damages was not a "securities claim" and therefore there was no coverage under the policy for any amount related to that action. The insurers argued that the BlackRock fee award was not covered because the BlackRock litigation produced a benefit for Loral and therefore the fee award did not represent covered "Loss since it was a cost the company incurred as part of procuring the benefit.

 

The five-judge panel unanimously agreed that there was no coverage for the $10.7 million Highland fee award, because the Highland damages action was neither a derivative suit nor did it allege violation of any securities law, and therefore it did not represent a securities claim as was required to bring the claim within the Policy’s coverage.

 

The panel split badly on the question whether or not the fee award in the BlackRock derivative action was covered under the D&O policy. The three-judge majority concluded that it was. Its reasoning turned it part on the policy’s definition of "Loss," which provides that "Loss" includes "damages, judgments, settlements or other amounts (including punitive or exemplary damages where insurable by law) and Defense Expenses in excess of the Retention that the Insured is legally obligated to pay."

 

The majority rejected the insurers’ argument that because the derivative suit produced a benefit for Loral, Loral had not suffered a "Loss." The majority perceived this argument as essentially a suggestion that the fee award should be offset against the nonmonetary benefit Loral received as a result of the restructured transaction. The majority found that while Loral received a benefit in that it no longer suffered the detriment that would have followed from the transaction as originally structured "it does not follow that Loral actually made a tangible profit."

 

The attorneys’ fee award, the majority found, "constitutes damages" and representing "other amounts" that Loral has become "legally obligated to pay" and therefore comes within the Policy’s definition of "Loss." The majority also noted that the Policy expressly covers derivative lawsuits and that "to declare that Loral has no coverage for derivative plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees would deprive Loral of the coverage for derivative lawsuits that it paid for and expected to receive."

 

The dissent objected to the majority’s conclusion about the derivative fee award. First, the dissent argued that the "legally obligated to pay" language in the definition of Loss followed and referred to "the Retention," not to "other amounts."

 

The dissent also argued that in order for the derivative fee award to be covered, it would have to represent "an actual loss, not an expense or the cost of doing business." The dissent reasoned that in this case, Loral "did not sustain a loss but rather benefitted from the judgment."

 

A fee award a derivative suit, the dissent observed, represents "the equitable entitlement of the successful derivative plaintiff to recover the expenses of his/her attorneys’ fees from all the shareholders of the corporation on whose behalf the suit was brought." The dissent observed that "if not spreading the cost of attorneys’ fees sounds in unjust enrichment, the obvious corollary is that shifting the cost to shareholders as a group cannot be characterized as a loss."

 

Discussion

The insurers in this case did not come away empty, as the appellate court unanimously agreed that because there was no coverage under the policy for the Highland damages claim, the $10.7 million Highland fee award was not covered under the Policy.

 

This holding was not preordained as at least one court has recently held that a fee award can represents damage for which there can be coverage under a D&O policy even if there is no coverage under the policy for the underlying litigation. In a February 9, 2010 ruling (here), the District of Minnesota held that a derivative lawsuit fee award represented "damages" and could be covered under a D&O insurance policy even where the underlying claim itself was not covered under the policy.

 

With respect to the question of coverage for the BlackRock derivative fee award, the insurers did manage to persuade two of three judges that because of the nature of the outcome of the underlying case and the nature of the derivative fee award, the award did not represent a loss to Loral and therefore is not covered under the policy.

 

The narrowness of split between the majority and the dissent on this issue suggests that this dispute is far from resolved. Even just in this case, there seems a substantial likelihood for further appellate proceedings in the New York Court of Appeals. And in general, given the close split, the underlying issue is likely to continue to be debated in other cases.

 

The carriers assert their position on these issues with conviction. Policyholders find the insurers’ rationale on this issue obscure and unpersuasive (those are among the milder adjectives, actually) – although obviously the insurers were able to persuade two judges of the appellate court of their position, so clearly there is something to their position on this issue.

 

The danger for all involved is that this issue will continue to come up over and over again. A colleague in the industry suggested to me in a note about the Loral case that eventually this issue may have to be addressed in the policy, along the lines of the way the industry developed a policy solution to the contentious issue that Section 11 settlements were not covered under the Policy. The way the industry addressed that issue is that it became standard to include in public company D&O policies language stating that the insurer would not take the position that a settlement of a ’33 Act case was not covered under the Policy. Perhaps, the colleague suggested, the industry will adopt a similar approach on this derivative lawsuit fee award issue.

 

I am interested in readers’ thoughts on these issues. I hope readers will add their observations to this post, using the blog’s comment feature.

 

Many thanks to the several readers who sent me a copy of the Loral decision.

 

I am Word Power: In a column in the February 28, 2011 issue of The New Yorker entitled "Who Am I" (here), Demetri Martin wrote "I am bravery. I am courage. I am valor. I am daring. I am holding a thesaurus."

 

Securities lawsuits rarely go to trial, but on February 24, 2011, just three months after the last securities suit trial concluded, a Central District of California rendered a verdict on behalf of plaintiffs against the sole trial defendant, the former CEO of the defunct Homestore company. The jury found that the defendant, Stuart H. Wolff, had violated the federal securities laws in connection with a series of statements the company made in 2001.

 

A copy of the jury verdict form can be found here. The court’s trial minutes for jury verdict can be found here. The February 25, 2011 press release about the verdict from the lead plaintiff, the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), can be found here.

 

As detailed further here, investors first filed a securities class action lawsuit against the company and certain of its directors and officers in December 2001. CalSTRS was named as lead plaintiff in March 2002. Subsequent amended complaints named additional defendants, including the company’s auditor and certain other outside companies and entities.

 

Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that the company had engaged in a scheme to create a circular flow of money through a series of roundtrip financial transactions whereby money flowed from Homestore to outside firms and then back to Homestore. Through these transactions, the company allegedly was able to represent itself as a successful and growing company. The company was later forced to restate more than $120 million in revenue.

 

During the course of the long and complicated procedural history of this case, a number of the defendants were dismissed out of the case, while other defendants, including the company itself, certain individual defendants, and the company’s outside auditor, entered into a series of settlements with the plaintiffs. On January 25, 2011, a civil jury trial commenced against the sole remaining defendant in the case – Stuart H. Wolff, the company’s former Chairman and CEO.

 

The jury returned its verdict on February 24, 2011. The Special Jury Verdict Form is very detailed and somewhat challenging to interpret. Basically, it appears that of the 22 allegedly misleading company statements on which the plaintiffs relied, the jury concluded ten were materially misleading. Of these, the jury found that Wolff was involved in the preparation of five of the statements, and that his involvement in those statements was knowing or reckless.

 

The jury also found with respect to four additional knowing or reckless misrepresentations that Wolff was responsible for the person making the statement, and therefore with respect to those four statements Wolff was subject to control person liability.

 

With respect to the question of damages, the jury found that a number of other company officials as well as Wolff were responsible, but in each case Wolff’s responsibility was 50% or greater. The jury also calculated the per share price inflation that resulted from each misrepresentation for which Wolff was responsible, in several cases calculating the inflation four places to the right of the decimal.

 

In its press release, CalSTRS said only that "the exact amount of damages is being calculated."

 

In some respects, the outcome of this jury trial may come as no surprise. In April 2010, Wolff was sentenced to four and a half years in prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud in connection with the company’s allegedly deceptive financial reporting. Wolff is incarcerated in the federal penitentiary in Lompoc, California, although he was transferred to facilities in Los Angles for the recent civil trial.

 

In addition, in December 2010, Wolff reached an $11.9 million agreement with the SEC, settling allegations that he had inflated the company’s reported revenues. As part of that settlement, Wolff did not admit to the SEC’s securities fraud allegations.

 

In light of these prior developments, the recent jury verdict may not be that surprising. But what is surprising is that the case went all the way to a jury trial at all. Trials in securities class action lawsuits are exceedingly rare, although there have been a rash of jury verdicts in recent months.

 

According to data compiled by Adam Savett, the Director of Securities Class Actions at the Claims Compensation Bureau, prior to the recent verdict against Wolff in the Homestore case, there had been a total of ten securities class action lawsuits filed after the 1996 enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and involving post-PSLRA conduct that have gone to all the way through to jury verdict. In other words, the verdict against Wolff is just the eleventh verdict in a post-PSLRA securities class action lawsuit.

　

With the plaintiffs’ verdict against Wolff in the Homestore case, the securities class action jury verdict scoreboard (taking into account post-verdict proceedings and reflecting only the current status of post-verdict proceedings) is as follows: Plaintiffs 7, Defendants 4. (The scoreboard is subject to revision pending the outcome of additional proceedings in several of the cases.)

 

These numbers convey how rare securities lawsuit trials are. It is worth noting that the verdict in the Homestore case is the third in just thirteen months, coming as it does just three months after the verdict in the BankAtlantic case (about which refer here) and thirteen months after the verdict in the Vivendi case (refer here). My friends in the plaintiffs’ bar will undoubtedly be quick to point out that all three of these cases resulted in verdicts for the plaintiffs as well.

　

The histories of prior securities cases that have gone to trial show that verdicts in these cases are subject to extensive post-trial procedures. Indeed, just last week the Court in the Vivendi case entered an order substantially narrowing the scope (and value) of the plaintiffs’ verdict in that case. In all likelihood, there will be further developments in the Homestore case, particularly given the case’s long procedural history.

 

In addition to the prospect for post-trial procedural developments, the parties to the Homestore case also face a rather daunting challenge of trying to interpret and calculate the effect of the jury’s findings on damages. The combination the jury’s findings about Wolff’s proportionate level of responsibility and of its findings about the respective levels of per-share price inflation will require, in order to arrive at a precise dollar figure for damages, mathematical calculations approaching in terms of complexity the formulae used for calculating planetary motions.

 

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On February 26, 2011, Berkshire Hathaway issued Chairman Warren Buffett’s much-anticipated annual letter to the company’s shareholders (here). Although aficionados of Buffett’s letters will not be disappointed, this year’s letter is largely focused on Berkshire’s performance and has fewer excursions into larger topics than in past years. (Full disclosure: I own BRK.B shares, although not as many as I wish I did.)

 

Overview

Perhaps even more than in prior years, the 2010 letter sets out a detailed analysis of Berkshire’s long-term performance, opening with a detailed review of Berkshire’s history compared to that of the S&P 500. (Interestingly enough, Berkshire failed to outperform the S&P 500 for the last two years in a row, the first time in Berkshire’s history that has happened.) Buffett then moved on to a review of Berkshire’s performance during 2010. Although Buffett addresses Berkshire’s investment performance, his devotes greater space to detailing the annual performance of Berkshire’s operating companies.

 

Because Berkshire often is perceived essentially as an insurance holding company, he takes considerable pains to highlight the relative performance of Berkshire’s noninsurance businesses, particularly Burlington Northern Santa Fe, for which Berkshire paid about $27 billion last February in the company’s largest ever acquisition. Buffett called the railroad’s performance "the highlight of 2010" and commented that it is working out "even better" than expected. The railroad generated operating earnings of $4.5 billion and net earnings of $2.5 billion.

 

With respect to the company’s insurance businesses, Buffett returns to several themes that will be familiar to those who have followed his letters over the years.

 

First, he emphasizes how elusive underwriting profitability has been for many insurers. Though Berkshire’s insurance businesses have, Buffett emphasizes, produced "an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years" and an underwriting gain of $17 billion during that period, underwriting profitability "is not an outcome to be expected of the P/C industry as a whole." (He compares, by way of example, Berkshire’s $17 billion of underwriting profit over the last 8 years to State Farm’s more than $20 billion underwriting loss during the same period.)

 

As a result, "the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue."

 

The reason for the industry’s poor performance, Buffett comments, is that too many insurers forget one of the critical insurance disciplines, which is "the willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained." The reasons for this recurring failure are that "the urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices."

 

Because so much of Buffett’s letter is a celebration of the company’s many success stories, it stands out when Buffett acknowledges a rare defeat. In this letter, Buffett acknowledges that from the perspective of its financial results, NetJets has been a "failure," and is Berkshire’s "only major business problem." Buffett does not acknowledge the many prior letters in which he had previously praised the company and its prior management. However, he does assert that under its new management, the company is turning around.

 

This Year’s Homily

Buffett’s letter would not be representative of type without an essay on broader topics. Though there is less of that in this year’s letter, Buffett still does manage to work in some commentary on the topic of "leverage," selecting as the text for his homily a letter his grandfather Earnest send to Buffett’s Uncle Fred in 1939.

 

Buffett notes that while debt usually can be refinanced, it sometimes happens that "maturities must actually be met by payment," for which "only cash will do the job." Credit, Buffett reflects, is "like oxygen" – that is, "when either is abundant, its presence goes unnoticed. When either is missing, that’s all that is noticed."

 

The lesson of all this for Berkshire is illustrated in Earnest’s letter to Uncle Fred, in which Earnest gave Fred and his wife $1,000 to hold as a safety reserve. (Earnest’s letter, reproduced at page 23 of the shareholder’s letter, is interesting in many ways, not least because of the immense wealth that Earnest’s grandson went on to accumulate later on.)

 

Taking the necessity for a "reserve" as an operating imperative, Buffett explains that Berkshire will always hold at least $10 billion in cash and customarily keep at least $20 billion at hand so that the company can "withstand unprecedented insurance losses" and can "quickly seize acquisition or investment opportunities, even during times of financial turmoil."

 

By conserving cash and avoiding leverage, as well as by retaining and reinvesting earnings, Berkshire has grown its net worth from $48 million to $157 billion in four decades. Though being so cautious about leverage has penalized the company’s returns, it "lets us sleep at night." And perhaps more importantly, "during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while other scramble for survival." Indeed it was this very circumstance that "allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008."

 

Those Telling Asides

Readers familiar with Buffett’s past letters will know that among his letters’ most rewarding features are his occasional asides, where he pauses to make humorous or aphoristic observation. There are fewer purely humorous asides in this year’s letter, but there are the usual share of aphorisms and anecdotes, as noted below.

 

First, Buffett is long on America’s prospects. Though conceding that Berkshire’s businesses will expand abroad, "an overwhelming part of their future investments will be at home," explaining that "money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America." He adds that the country’s "human potential" is "far from exhausted," observing that "the American system for unleashing that potential – a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War – remains alive and effective." Buffett note that "as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 194, America’s best days, according to Buffett, "lie ahead."

 

Second, in emphasizing the level of Berkshire’s directors’ stewardship commitment, Buffett stresses that "we do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well." (Though Buffett highlights this approach to D&O insurance as a corporate strength, don’t expect this practice to catch on widely. No other company can offer an indemnification commitment as substantial as Berkshire’s. Nor could any insurer make an insurance commitment as financially substantial as Berkshire’s indemnification undertaking. Buffett’s views on D&O insurance reflect a unique set of circumstances.)

 

Third, with respect to our country’s shared goal of home ownership, Buffett observes that "all things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks." (His two best investments were, he says, "wedding rings.") But the American dream can become "a nightmare if the buyer’s eyes are bigger than his wallet and if a lender – often protected by a government guarantee – facilitates his fancy." Our goal should not be to put families in the house of their dreams, "but rather to put them in a house they can afford."

 

Fourth, Buffett argues that net income is a "meaningless" number for Berkshire, because it is so susceptible to the timing of Berkshire’s realization of investment gains or losses. Buffett expresses "deep disgust" for the "game playing" some managers use to manipulate net income, "a practice that was rampant throughout corporate America in the 1990s and still persists, though it occurs less frequently and less blatantly than it used to."

 

Buffett urges Berkshire shareholders to "ignore our net income figure, suggesting that "operating earnings, despite having some shortcomings, are in general a reasonable guide as to how our businesses are doing."

 

Finally, Buffett takes on the Black-Scholes valuation method, arguing that it "produces wildly inappropriate values when applied to long-dated options." Its appeal of course is that the method "produces a precise number." But that precision is illusory, as it suggests values that are more appropriately estimated can be pinpointed with accuracy.

 

Buffett concludes that the practice of teaching Black-Scholes as "revealed truth" needs reexamination, particularly since "you can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option." What you need to know is "how to value a business."

 

Discussion

Buffett’s latest annual letter sounds many familiar themes. Indeed many of this year’s points of emphasis have appeared (in some cases, many times) in prior letters. I doubt there is a single Berkshire shareholder unfamiliar with the stories of Buffett’s initial investments in GEICO and the Berkshire Hathaway textile firm, which Buffett recounts again in this year’s letter. At times, the 2010 letter reads like a collection of Buffett classics.

 

Of course, what makes him Buffett is the extent to which he has across the years honored his conservative investment principles, as a result of which it is entirely appropriate that Buffett has once again rehearsed the lessons of his lifetime of investing.

 

But the annual letter is so anticipated because of the insights Buffett has expressed over the years about the economy, about the financial marketplace, and even about life. On that score, this year’s letter is a little disappointing. His criticism of the Black-Scholes method, for example, is modest compared, for example to his attack in his 2002 letter on derivative securities as "weapons of financial mass destruction" or his withering criticism in his 2006 letter of "the 2-and-20 crowd" of hedge fund managers.

 

One problem Buffett now has is that his company is getting so huge and diverse. Just summarizing the past year’s results of Berkshire’s increasingly numerous operating businesses is a much more space-consuming task than just a few years ago. (I was stuck by the number of apparently sizeable companies Buffett mentions in his letter that I have never even heard of, even though I have been a Berkshire shareholder for years and have followed the company closely. There are even more Berkshire companies, also quite sizeable, that Buffett never mentions.)

 

Indeed, one of the striking aspects of Buffett’s letter is the extent to which Berkshire’s various businesses have become integral components of American commerce. It is not just the diversity of companies Berkshire encompasses, it is the significance of the companies to the entire economy – for example, BNSF moves more freight than any other railroad, and Mid-America is the largest electrical supplier in three states.

 

In the end, Buffett can perhaps be excused if he comes off as a little repetitive. He has not only made himself and Berkshire’s shareholders wealthy, but he has also built an extraordinary company that survived the economic crisis, profited from the downturn, and emerged stronger than ever. His track record, underscored in the table in his letter comparing Berkshire’s and the S&P 500’s performance over five year intervals since the mid-60s, is striking.

 

If Buffett’s latest letter lacks the entertainment value of some prior letters, for Berkshire shareholders the letter more than makes up for that with the level of the company’s performance. Berkshire’s 2010 earnings of $13 billion were up 61% from the year before. At year end, the company had $38 billion in cash. Its businesses are generating about $1 billion a month in cash.

 

Yet Buffett, in typical fashion, emphasized that given the company’s size, it is unlikely to reproduce prior results. "The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance."

 

Buffett’s confidence in the future of America is reassuring. But the reference to the future inevitably leads to consideration of Berkshire’s own future, in light of Buffett’s age (80). Without acknowledging the issue directly, Buffett addresses the concern both in his lengthy discussion of the managers of various Berkshire businesses – particularly David Sokol, who is engineering the NetJets turnaround while managing Mid-American – and in his discussion of the thought process behind the selection of Todd Combs as an investment manager for Berkshire.

 

Berkshire, Buffett seems to be suggesting, will remain in good hands. Berkshire’s shareholders can hope that for the company as well as for our country, the future is bright.

 

Water Works In his interesting essay "How Skyscrapers Can Save the City" in the March 2011 issue of The Atlantic (here), Edward Glaeser observes that "One curse of the developing world is that governments take on too much and fail at their main responsibilities. A country that cannot provide clean water for its citizens should not be in the business of regulating film dialogue." It is also true that most governments that successfully provide clean water to all of their citizens don’t try to regulate film dialog. The provision of clean water could be the ultimate test of governmental efficacy as well as the key to political freedom.