Leading off the second day of the annual Stanford Directors’ College at Stanford Law School in Palo Alto, California was a keynote address from Delaware Chancellor Leo Strine. Strine is surprisingly outspoken and his presentation was lively and interesting.

 

The centerpiece of his presentation was a discussion of the lessons for directors based on the cases he has seen over the years. As a preliminary matter, and actually throughout his discussion of these issues, he emphasized that it is very rare that outside directors are actually held individually liable. He pointed out that, for example, cops, teachers and doctors are held liable much more frequently. But even if an outside director’s chance of being held liable is low, the chance of “looking like a chump” or that you have “failed your mission” is very high if you don’t watch out for certain things.

 

First, from the outset, the director should understand his or her role. In particular, if the director is unable or unwilling to make a decision adverse to management, they should not be in the position. The director also needs to understand the business, how it makes money and its principal risks. The director can’t be voting on things he or she does not understand. Where people tend to get in the most trouble is when they fail to do the work to understand the company and the specifics of the issues on which they are voting.

 

Second, conflicts of interest cause most of the worst trouble. Making sure that there aren’t interested parties involved in the object of board attention is critical. Along those lines it is vital that the board members remain independent, which can be compromised over time if a director’s relationship with the manager. The director needs to be sure that they he or she is still able to be adverse to management when that is what the situation requires.

 

Third, a very specific danger arises when directors are insufficiently skeptical of M&A activity originating within the company itself, particularly through a management buyout brought up when the company is otherwise not for sale or in play. Strine said that this is not the way a company should operate. If a CEO thinks there is a strategic move the company ought to be making, then the directors should be advised and guide the process. The CEO should not be taking advantage of inside information and tampering with employees and enlisting the company’s outside advisors in the interest of a management initiated buyout. (Stine was quite emphatic when he described the problem with this type of situation.)

 

Fourth, one the CEO’s key roles is preparing for management succession. Strine said that if the CEO has been in office three years and there is not a designated successor, the CEO has failed in one of his or her key roles. One of the most important jobs for the CEO is the “build the bench.” Strine cited the example of Johnson & Johnson, which has been a very successful company for decades with a succession of CEOs (all of whom who have been very low profile) that have continued to move the company forward.

 

In response to a question, Strine discussed the massive fee award he granted to the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ in the Southern Peru case. As discussed here, that case had resulted in an award of $1.263 billion, which with interest, approach nearly $2 billion. Strine awarded fees of $285 million, which he defended saying, the only reason the plaintiffs received the massive judgment in the case was the efforts of the plaintiffs’ lawyers. He said that he has much more trouble with cases like the disclosure-only merger objection suit settlement, where the plaintiffs’ lawyers wind up walking away with a $400,000 fee award.

 

The real problem is not a case where plaintiffs’ attorneys produce real value. If the plaintiffs has “delivered something really beneficial, they should be rewarded accordingly.” Rather, the problem is that there are too many incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring suits where the only beneficiaries are the attorneys. We have, Strine said, an “excess of litigation” that “has no meaningful societal benefit.” Strine commented that the extra costs associated with this litigation have caused the cost of capital for American companies to rise.

 

Strine rejected the suggestion that the Delaware courts might be managing fee awards because of a competition from other states’ courts. Strine stressed that Delaware’s courts are not “trying to attract litigation.” Just the same, he took care to question the effort of other states to try to develop specialized business courts. You can, he said, file suits in “goofy place” and what you will wind up with is corporate law that is “junk.” The movement to form specialized business courts has been “problematic” because all too often those courts have “become places where you can forum shop.” His view is that all courts, by their own account are “overburdened.” That being the case, Strine contends, the each court should “stay in its own lane.” When something is appropriately “in someone else’s lane, then let them do it.”

 

On Monday evening, the keynote speaker at dinner was the CEO of Netflix, Reed Hastings. Hastings also serves on the boards of Microsoft and Facebook. Hastings focused his discussion on the role of the board at very large publicly traded companies, taking pains to emphasize that he was not discussing the boards’ roles at smaller public companies, private companies or at non-profits.

 

Hastings said several times that for the board of a large publicly traded company “the fundamental job is to replace and compensate the CEO.” Where the company has the resources to hire outside consultants as needed, it is not the board’s role to offer counsel or advice. He was dismissive of new directors who come in and try to  “add value” by offering advice. He contends that board members offering advice creates a conflict of interest, because management might feel obliged to follow the advice even if it is poor and if the advice turns out to be mistaken, there is no accountability for the board member.

 

It is fair to say that Hastings remarks drew a very lively response from the audience. He emphasized in responses to questions from the audience that he was only talking the largest public companies, not other types of companies that might need the board’s involvement and guidance. He also said that he was not talking about companies in special circumstances where the situation might require the board to become much more involved. The interaction between Hastings and the audience might have been one of the high points of the conference for me. The audience was engaged in the discussion and Hastings was animated and articulate in discussing his position.

 

Hastings did tell one story from earlier in his career that is worth repeating here. He told the story to emphasize that a CEO must have both leadership qualities and a strategic vision. He said that when he first started working as a young software designer, he kept unusual hours and often had used coffee mugs strewn around his cubicle. He noticed that every few days the coffee mugs would appear on his desk, cleaned. He assumed the janitorial staff was cleaning the mugs. But one morning he arrived at the office at 4 am, and found the company’s CEO in the kitchen, cleaning Hastings’ coffee mugs. The CEO explained that he felt that Hastings did such great work, it was the least the CEO could do for him. Hasting said that this incident made him feel such deep personal loyalty to the CEO that Hastings would have “followed him to the ends of the earth” – which, Hastings said, is where the CEO led the company. It isn’t enough, Hastings said to be able to create a loyal work force, you also have to have a strategic vision.

 

For the record, Hastings did acknowledge that the whole Netflix pricing change was a mistake for which he took responsibility.

 

The D&O Diary is on assignment this week at The Stanford Directors’ College at the Stanford Law School in Palo Alto, California. As always, the conference is well-attended (it is, in fact, sold out, as usual) and the agenda is full of timely topics and interesting speakers.

 

The conference began on Sunday evening with opening keynote speech from Robert Greifeld, the CEO of the NASDAQ OMX group. NASDAQ is one of the event’s sponsors, and Greifeld joked  with conference co-Chair Joseph Grundfest that next year his firm would increase its sponsorship level so that he would not have to speak at the conference — a line that drew a knowing laugh from an audience that was all too familiar with the public discussion of the possible involvement of NASDAQ in the problems that surrounded the recent Faacebook IPO.

 

To Greifeld’s credit, he did not run from the topic of the Facebook IPO, and in fact it was the first issue he addressed. He acknowledged that a “design flaw” in NASDAQ’s IPO process allowed problems to come into the early trading, particularly with respect to the timing of order cancellations. He acknowledged that there may have been some “overconfidence” and even “arrogance” in the team that was running the IPO process because they were relying on procedures and routines that had been used in 480 IPOs over the course of several years without a problem.

 

In retrospect, Greifeld said, the pre-offering testing was not rigorous enough. He said that the company has tremendous pride in its technology group, but that perhaps the business unit because too “subservient” to the technology group, as a result of which, there was “not enough business judgment” in the process. He said that the company has reached out for external help from IBM to examine the trading process from an outside perspective. IBM will report at the end of July.

 

As for whether the events surrounding the Facebook IPO will undermine the market for IPOs generally, Greifeld acknowledged their may be some short run effects. However, he added, he expects that over time, IPOs will track the overall market. Over the medium and long term, the markets will mirror GDP growth in the economy, because the markets are tied to the fundamental economic health of the economy.

 

He did observe that the equity markets have had issues since 2008, as since that time there has been a “steady flow” of money from equity investments to fixed income investments – even though in the current interest rate environment, fixed income investments are effectively paying zero return. This, he notes, is not good news for the equity markets.

 

He added that the markets are now “fundamentally different” than they were ten years ago. They are much more fragmented with many more trading platforms, which has produced beneficial competition but has also led to fragmentation. These developments, and other recent developments such as dark pools and high frequency trading, are more beneficial to larger cap companies, because it can help to ensure that the spreads on trading in their securities are tight. For other companies, these developments are bad, and can affect the market liquidity in trading for their shares.

 

Today’s sessions began with a Keynote Presentation from Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz, the founders and general partners of venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz. Andreessen is well known as the founder of early Internet browser company Netscape and Horowitz was the co-founder of Opsware (formerly Loudcloud). Their presentation was in a Q&A format, and one question they received provoked a particularly interesting answer.

 

In response to a question about how a Board should prepare a company for an IPO, Andreessen’s initial response was that the company should first consider every other possibility other than going public. He emphasized that the IPO process and the life for a company post-IPO has changed so much in recent years, that now a company completing an IPO is immediately surrounded by a host of constituencies all of which are prepared to try to extract a “pound of flesh” from the company. If the company has to go public, Andreessen would prefer that the company remains a “controlled” company – that is, subject to control by the founder. He explained that the way for investors to make money on technology investments is for the investors to pick a founder, like a Jeff Bezos, Sergey Brin or Michael Dell, and to make a long-term commitment to them to try to achieve their goals for the enterprise.

 

He went on to say that a faulty premise has emerged around corporate governance, in that there is now a perception that corporate governance ought to operate on basic principles of democracy, particularly as embodied on the “one man, one vote” principle. From Andreessen’s perspective, democracy is not the correct model. According to Andreessen, the correct analogy is the military, and specifically, war. In a wartime environment, politicians cede control to the military commanders so that they can deploy assets and take initiative necessary to “take the hill.” The objectives are more likely to be met if the founders retain control.

 

Horpwitz discussed a number of topics that he has previously addressed on his blog, Ben’s Blog. In particular, he discussed the difficulty for a yoind company to try to function with outside managers who are brought in from the outside for their management knowledge but who lack the institutional history and tribal knowedge of the entrepreneur found. In his view, it is easier to teack the entrepreneurial founder the basic principles of management than it is to try to teach the professional manager the firm history and tribal knowledge.

 

The conference continues to run though Tuesday, and I hope to be able to continue to report while I am here. On Tuesday, I will be participating in a session at the conference on the topic of Indemnification and D&O Insurance with my good friends Priya Cherian Huskins of the Woodruff Sawyer insurance brokerage firm, and Chris Warrior of Beazley. The complete program guide for the conference can be found here.

 

In a harsh June 21, 2012 opinion (here), Southern District of New York Judge Paul A. Crotty rejected the motion to dismiss of Goldman Sachs and three individual defendants in the securities class action lawsuit pertaining to the infamous “built to fail” Abacus CDO transaction and other ill-fated deals. Judge Crotty did, however, grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss with regard to the plaintiffs’ claims based on the company’s failure to disclose its receipt of a Wells Notice.

 

What makes the decision interesting, besides the sharpness of the Judge’s tone, is that in order to establish that Goldman’s alleged misstatements and omissions about its business ethics and conflicts of interest practices and policies are actionable, the plaintiffs relied on Goldman’s misstatements and alleged fraudulent conduct in connection with the Abacus transaction and three other CDO deals. Judge Crotty found that Goldman’s alleged conduct and statements in connection with the CDO deals made the statements to Goldman’s shareholders about its business practices and ethics materially misleading.

The order is also interesting because of the weight Judge Crotty gives to admissions Goldman made in the Consent it entered in its July 2010 agreement to settle the enforcement action the SEC had filed against Goldman about the Abacus transaction. As described here, in the Consent, in which Goldman neither admitted nor denied liability, the company “acknowledges” that the Abacus marketing materials “contained incomplete information” and that it was a “mistake” for the materials to state that the Abacus CDO reference portfolio was selected by ACA Management without disclosing the role of short-interest investor Paulson & Co. or that Paulson’s interests were adverse to those of the Abacus CDO investors.

These concessions fell short of an admission of fraud, but as Jan Wolfe notes in a June 22, 2012 Am Law Litigation Daily article about Judge Crotty’s decision (here), “if Goldman and its lawyers thought that this linguistic compromise would help it avoid trouble in shareholder suits, it turns out they were wrong.”

In addition to the Abacus transaction, the plaintiffs’ conflict of interest allegations also are based on three other CDO transactions – Hudson, Anderson and Timberwolf. With respect to the Hudson transaction, the plaintiffs allege that Goldman had said its interests were aligned with those of CDO investors based on a $6 million equity investment, while omitting that it also had a 100% short position at the time, representing a $2 billion interest.

With respect to the Anderson CDO transaction, Goldman stated that it would hold up to 50% of the equity tranche, worth $21 million, but omitted its $135 million short position. And with respect to the Timberwolf transaction, Goldman stated that it was purchasing 50% of the equity tranche, but failed to disclose that it was the largest source of assets in the structure and held a 36% short position in the CDO.

The plaintiffs claim that Goldman’s conduct, discloses and omissions with respect to these CDO transactions made a number of the company’s disclosures  to shareholders about its conflicts of interest policies and procedures and its commitment to legal compliance and ethics (including its commitment to “integrity” and “honesty”) materially misleading.

The defendants argued that these statements are non-actionable statements of opinion, puffery or merely corporate mismanagement. Judge Crotty called these arguments “Orwellian,” adding that:

Words such as “honesty”, “integrity”, and “fair-dealing” so not mean what they say; they do not set standards; they are mere shibboleths. If Goldman’s claim that “honesty” and “integrity” are mere puffery, the world of finance may be in more trouble than we recognize.

Judge Crotty concluded that Goldman’s conduct and disclosures in connection with the four CDO transactions “made its disclosures to its own shareholders, concerning its business practices, materially misleading,” adding that given “Goldman’s fraudulent acts, it could not have genuinely believed its statements” about its business practices and ethics. Goldman should not be able to “pass off” its “repeated assertions” as “mere puffery.” Moreover, Goldman’s “allegedly manipulative, deceitful and fraudulent conduct” in hiding its conflicts of interests in the four CDO transactions “takes the Plaintiffs’ claim beyond mere mismanagement.”

On the issue of scienter, Judge Crotty specifically relied on Goldman’s concessions in the SEC settlement, among other things, including internal emails. He noted that Goldman clearly played an active role in the Abacus asset selection process: “How else could Goldman admit that it was a ‘mistake’ not to have disclosed such information.” Crotty found that “given Goldman’s practice of making material misrepresentations to third-party investors, Goldman knew or should have known” that its statements about its conflicts of interest practices and business ethics “were inaccurate and incomplete.”

Judge Crotty also concluded that scienter allegations as to each of the individual defendants were sufficient, as each of them “actively monitored” Goldman subprime deals and assets and each knew that Goldman was “trying to purge those assets from its books and stay on the short side.”

Judge Crotty did, however, dismiss plaintiffs’ claims that Goldman had misled its shareholders by failing to disclose its receipt of a Wells Notice, noting that because a Wells Notice “indicates not litigation but only the desire of the Enforcement staff to move forward,” and therefore is a “contingency” that need “not be disclosed.” He also found that the plaintiffs’ had not shown that the company’s nondisclosure of the Wells Notice made the company’s prior disclosures about “ongoing governmental investigations” materially misleading.

Discussion

Judge Crotty’s opinion clearly quells any suggestion that Goldman’s SEC settlement – in which it made a number of admissions – offers an alternative to the “neither admit nor deny” SEC settlement approach which has proven so controversial. A frequent justification for the “neither admit nor deny” approach is that defendants can’t admit liability in an SEC settlement for fear the admissions will be used against them in related shareholder litigation. Some (including even Judge Jed Rakoff, who has been so critical of the neither admit nor deny settlements) had suggested that the Goldman settlement — in which the company admitted no fraud but only mistakes – offered a middle ground.

However Judge Crotty found that Goldman’s attempts to argue in support of its motion to dismiss the share holder suit that it had neither admitted nor denied liability in the SEC settlement were “eviscerated” by the company’s concession that it had made a “mistake” in not disclosing Paulson’s role in the Abacus transaction. The fact that the plaintiffs were able to rely on the company’s SEC settlement concessions, and that the concessions also entered directly into Judge Crotty’s analysis of both misrepresentation and scienter issues, eliminates the Goldman settlement approach as an enforcement action settlement alternative that other defendants might be able to accept.

It is interesting that so many of the misstatements or omissions on which the shareholder plaintiffs rely were not made directly to shareholders themselves, but rather were made to CDO investors. The misleading omission in statements to the CDO investors were relied upon to show that statements that were made to Goldman shareholders about the company’s business practices and ethics were misleading.

There is a particularly harsh aspect to Judge Crotty’s decision, in that the statements to shareholders to  which he referred in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss were the company’s statements about it business ethics and integrity. What makes this particularly troubling is that his assessment that these statements were misleading was not based – as would usually be the case at this stage of the proceedings – on plaintiffs’ mere unproven allegations. Judge Crotty’s conclusions were based, at least in part, on the company’s own admissions.

Goldman likely recognized long ago that this case might well survive a motion to dismiss. (The company wouldn’t have agreed to pay over half a billion dollars to settle the SEC enforcement action if it didn’t recognize that there were serious problems with the Abacus transaction, and in addition the separate state court fraud action brought by the bond insurer on the Abacus transaction had previously survived a dismissal motion.) Nevertheless, Judge Crotty’s opinion, and in particular the harshness of its tone, has to represent an unwelcome and troubling development.

One final note has to do with Judge Crotty’s ruling with regard to the Wells Notice nondisclosure allegations. The question of whether the receipt of a Wells Notice must be disclosed is frequently debated, and many companies, out of an abundance of caution, will disclose it. Judge Crotty’s conclusion that a Wells Notice represents a “contingency” that need not be disclosed will clearly be relevant for companies considering whether nor not they must disclose receipt of a Wells Notice, and may lead more companies to withhold disclosure of receipt of a Wells Notice.

I have in any event added the Goldman decision to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

Professor Peter Henning has an interesting post about the Goldman decision on the Dealbook blog (here).

Is the Business Judgment Rule Available as a Defense for Corporate Officers: One of the questions that is receiving close scrutiny in the litigation the FDIC has filed against former directors ad officers of failed banks as part of the current wave of bank failures is whether or not corporate officers – as opposed to corporate directors – can rely on the business judgment rule as a defense to claims of ordinary negligence. As discussed here, at least one court has held under Georgia law that officers can rely on the business judgment rule to preclude claims for ordinary negligence.

However, as California attorney Jon Joseph wrote in his April 11, 2012 guest post on this blog (here), courts applying California law on the issue and considering whether corporate officers as well as directors can rely on the business judgment rule have split on the issue. The ruling in the FDIC lawsuit against former IndyMac CEO that Perry could not rely on the business judgment rule is on interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

Because of this mixed case law, the June 7, 2012 ruling in the FDIC’s lawsuit against certain former officers of County Bank of Merced, California is of interest. In the decisions, which can be found here, Eastern District of California Judge Lawrence O’Neill held that the defendant officers cannot rely on the statutorily codified business judgment rule under California Corporations Code Section 309, because the statute by its terms refers only to officers not directors.

However, with respect to the defendant officers’ efforts to rely on the common law business judgment rule, Judge O’Neill also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss — but not on the basis that they could not rely on the business judgment rule; rather, he said only that “the business judgment rule is an affirmative defense which involves factual issues to preclude its application to dismiss the complaint’s claims.”

While Judge O’Neill did find that the defendants’ entitlement to rely on the common law business judgment rule is a factual issue, what he did not say is that the defendants were not entitled to rely on it as a matter of law. Which can be interpreted to suggest at least by negative inference that there is a common law business judgment rule separate and apart from the statutory provision, and defendants can rely on the common law rule, if they can establish as a factual matter that the qualify for the rule’s protection.

Hat tip to Alan Makins, who had a post about the ruling in the County Bank case in his California Corporate & Securities Law Blog, here.

Beginning in 2010 and accelerating in 2011, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a wave of securities class action lawsuits against U.S.-listed Chinese companies, many of which obtained their U.S. listings via reverse merger. These cases have been making their way through the courts, and some have now reached the settlement stage. The settlements seem to share more in common  than the involvement of U.S.-listed Chinese companies – the settlements are also relatively modest.

 

The latest of these cases to settle is the lawsuit involving Orient Paper and certain of its directors and officers. According to the company’s June 21, 2012 press release, the parties to the suit have agreed to settle the case “in exchange for a $2 million payment from the Company’s insurer.” The settlement is subject to court approval.

 

As I discussed in a post at the time (refer here), the Orient Paper case was the first of the of the Chinese reverse merger company securities suits to survive a motion to dismiss. On July 20, 2012, Central District of California Judge Valerie Baker Fairbanks denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

 

The Orient Paper case is not the first of this group of securities suits filed against U.S.-listed Chinese companies to settle. For example, on March 15, 2012, the parties to the securities suit involving Tongxin International filed a settlement stipulation in the Central District of California indicating that they had settled the case for $3 million. The Tonxin settlement will be funded by the company’s insurer.

 

An earlier securities suit involving a U.S. listed Chinese company China Shenghguo Pharmaceutical Holdings, filed back in 2008, settled in 2010 for $800,000. According to the parties’ settlement stipulation (here), $600,000 of the settlement amount is to be funded by the company’s insurer, with the remainder to be funded by the company.

 

You probably noticed that these three settlements have something in common. They not only all three involve U.S.-listed Chinese companies, but all three of the settlements are relatively small. (By way of comparison, Cornerstone Research reports that the median of all securities class action settlements through 2010 was $8.1 million.)

 

The relatively small size of the settlements might be a reflection of the merits or of the companies’ relatively small size. I suspect a different factor. In my experience, U.S.-listed Chinese companies generally carry very low D&O insurance limits. The low limit levels mean that when these companies are sued, defense expenses alone could quickly deplete a significant percentage of the total amount of insurance, leaving little remaining with which to try to settle the case. The relatively low level of these settlements and the fact that all three settlements were settled in whole or in substantial part with insurance funds suggests to me that something like that may have happened here.

 

In 2010 and 2011, when the plaintiffs’ lawyers flooded the courts with these securities suits against U.S.-listed Chinese companies, I wondered at the time why the plaintiffs’ lawyers found these cases so attractive. Even though the factual allegations were in some cases quite sensational, they were always going to be difficult cases to pursue. Service of process on the individual defendants alone would in many cases pose significant challenges. Discovery will also pose substantial challenges, including not just the absence of reliable procedures to effect discovery in China, but also the problems associated with distances, language distances and cultural differences. The plaintiffs in these cases may also face barriers getting a class certified (about which refer here).

 

But even beyond these procedural difficulties, there was always this fundamental problem that in the end there might be very little insurance money out of which to try to collect any settlement or judgment. Given the modest size of these settlements, the attorneys’ fee awards are or will likely be small as well. Small enough to make you wonder how these cases could be worthwhile for the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Of course, going in, they almost certainly had no way of knowing about the lower insurance levels that the Chinese companies often carry.

 

I have made this point before –about the relative unattractiveness of these cases for the plaintiffs’ firms – to others in the insurance industry, which provoked the response that perhaps the real targets in these cases are the investment banks, lawyers and accountants who advised these companies and who helped them obtain their U.S. listings. It may be that these outside professionals may represent attractive targets, but with the limitations on the reach of the securities laws to those who are not primary violators, these cases against the outside professionals pose their own sets of issues.

 

There are many more of these cases against U.S.-listed Chinese companies yet to be resolved. Some of course will be dismissed but the ones that survive the motions to dismiss will likely move toward settlement. As these cases progress, perhaps there will be more sizable settlements and the smaller settlements discussed above will look like early outliers. However, my suspicion is that the relatively low levels of D&O insurance that many of these companies carry will mean that many of the settlements will be similarly diminutive.

 

Special thanks to the several readers who sent me copies of the Orient Paper settlement press release.

 

Every Now and Then I Read a Headline and Say—What?: Like this June 21, 2012 New Scientist article: “Tiny Human Liver Grows Inside Mouse’s Head” (here).

 

Matt is Back! And He’s Still Dancing!: My all-time favorite video is the classic Where the Hell is Matt Video (here). The simplicity of the concept is pure genius. The video consists of short clips of Matt, dancing. In places all over the world, with hundreds and hundreds of people. The background music is awesome too.

 

The great news is that Matt is still dancing. And even better, he has made a new video. It just came out on June 20, 2012. It is every bit as fun as his prior videos. You have to watch it. (Sorry about the commercial at the beginning, it is short). I would like to add a special shout out to my Cleveland friends, you look fine dancing around the “Free” Stamp.” I hope everyone enjoys this video as much as I did.

 

 

Along with everyone else in the professional liability insurance industry , I was fascinated by the news that my good friend David Bell, with whom I served on the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) Board of Trustees, was leaving Bernuda and  his position at  Allied World Assurance Company Holdings, to return to Montana, where he would be taking up a position as President and Chief Operating Officer of ALPS Corporation, a Montana-based lawyers’ professional liability insurance to over 12,500 attorneys nationwide.

 

I was so intrigued by the news of David’s move that I communicated with him to see if he would be willing to be interviewed for this site about the reasons for his move and about his plans and objectives going forward. I am pleased to report that David accepted, and the interview is reproduced below.

 

Until May 1st, David was the Chief Operating Officer of Allied World Assurance Corporation, AG (NYSE: AWH) a position he held for more than four years. Prior to that David was one of the founding executives at AWAC, where he had worked since its formation in 2002 as the SVP and Global Professional Lines Manager. Prior to that David had been both an Executive Protection Manager and in External Affairs with the Chubb Corporation.

 

Over the course of his career, David has served in a number of leadership positions in the Professional Liability Society, serving as its President in 2008-09 and as a Trustee from 2004-08. David is also a cofounder – along with John McCarrick – of Grateful Nation Montana, a first-of-its-kind in the country public private partnership that provides tutoring, mentoring and a full college scholarship for every child of a Montana solider killed in action (KIA) in Iraq or Afghanistan. Montana has the highest KIA rate per capita of any state in the nation. He serves on the board of The Mansfield Center, which promotes a better understanding of Asia, and of U.S. relations with Asia. He has also presented to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), focusing on expropriation and kidnap/ransom in Asia and the Middle East

 

My interview with David follows. My questions appear in italics and David’s answers are indented and in plan type. I would like to thank David for his willingness to participate in this interview, for the frankness of his answers, and for his willingness to allow me to print the interview here.

 

Why did you decide to move from Bermuda to Montana?

 

I think the best way to articulate it is to say that I feel I am following my own “path”. I really do believe that there is a unique path available for each of us to choose whether or not to pursue. Call it fate, or spiritual inspiration (perhaps both), but whatever the name, it subtly illuminates each of our paths;, often running counter to the direction society says we should go. I believe that one has to listen carefully for it and be willing to look at a possible future through a lens that doesn’t necessarily correlate “success” with money or influence. My path pointed west and it was time for me to take my own leap of faith.

 

You were COO Of a $3 billion market cap publicly traded international insurance company, but you traded that in to become the President and COO of a relatively small risk retention group based in Missoula, Montana. How have your reconciled the ambition that put you into a senior role at Allied World at such a relatively young age with the decision to move to Montana in this new role?

 

It certainly was not an easy decision. Steady, increasing success can create its own inertia, and I candidly found it difficult to walk away from a successful career with a great company. That said, there is more to life. I left a wonderful career opportunity, talented colleagues and many friends to join an equally great, albeit much smaller, company. But make no mistake about it: that decision comes at a very real monetary and reputational price. But for me it’s absolutely the right decision. I’ve come back to Montana, a state I’ve loved since I first arrived here as a college freshman, and where I hope to make an impact in ways both inside and outside of our industry.

 

I am certain from the decisions I have made in my own career that there are personal reasons behind your decision to return to Montana, in the form of life lessons that have guided your decisions about your career and your family. What were the life lessons that guided your thinking and how did they affect your decision-making?

 

 A pastor at a church my wife and I attended years ago gave a great sermon about “joy”. He compared “true joy” to just being “happy,” especially in the context of how the word “happiness” is commonly defined these days. I couldn’t do his comparison justice in a few lines but I have to tell you that his sermon spoke to me in a powerful way that has stayed with me for all these years. The direct answer to your question, though, is that my life lesson is about trying to stay on my own path toward true joy and awareness; being always conscious and careful about who (or what) it is that I serve.

 

Your move is not only a big chance for you but for family as well. I know that you and your wife Brittany have two small children. What do you think the effect of this move will be on your family and why?

 

Kids are resilient and that has certainly proven to be true for my two young children in the short time since we’ve been back in Montana. Trent and Ivey instantly adapted happily to their new life here. I marvel at that gift: I grew up with a single mom and never lived in the same place for more than four years while growing up. My wife is just the opposite: Brittany is a fourth-generation Montanan who was raised on a Montana ranch her whole life, so we bring very different perspectives from our respective upbringings. In many ways, Bermuda was an easier place for me to live given my upbringing. Bermuda is a transient place by nature. During the years I lived there, people seem to be constantly moving on and off the Island. But here’s where it’s really different: when one leaves Bermuda it’s not like leaving a neighborhood you can later go back and visit, and where everything has stayed the same — except for your departure. As I think about it, life in Bermuda is more like a point-in-time: defined by one’s friends that happen to have stopped in Bermuda on their career journey at the same time you stopped there on yours. We developed great friendships in Bermuda, and many of them will stay lifelong friends –wherever in the world we – or they — are. I have no doubt, though, that when we next visit Bermuda, it will feel like a very different place.

 

Bermuda has changed significantly since you first arrived there in 2002. What were the biggest changes during your time there, and what changes do you see in the years ahead?

 

In my opinion the biggest change to Bermuda between 2002 and 2012 has created its biggest challenge going forward. In 2002 the Island began struggling to keep up with and manage the infrastructure strain created when significant amounts of capital and guest workers flooded the Island during the post-9/11 hard market. Over the next several years, Bermuda expanded its infrastructure it relied more heavily on various elements of that outside capital to fund and support that growth, and it became more dependent on the expectation of permanent outside capital. But, alas, economists tell us that capital moves where it can be deployed most efficiently (and where it feels most welcome), and other offshore jurisdictions have made a compelling case for several companies to move their base of operations away from Bermuda in recent years. I expect that trend to continue in the future. So Bermuda has some real challenges these days, some visible to the visitor and/or macro economist, but others more subtle while equally important. All of these challenges will need to be addressed in the years ahead by the Bermudian government in conjunction with the sources of outside capital. The ability to address these challenges head-on will make a tremendous difference to Bermudians and ex-pats alike — all who call the Island home.

 

What advice would you give to others in our industry who are thinking about taking a position with an insurer, reinsurer or broker in Bermuda?

 

Bermuda can add a fantastic dimension to an insurance career. It’s one of very few places where large company professionals rotate through regularly, and where those professionals are much more accessible and visible – especially in comparison to New York or other insurance markets. I strongly believe that two of the most important ingredients for success in our industry are technical competency and relationships: these are what comprise your personal brand. Both can be achieved to greater career success over time in Bermuda. By the same token, notwithstanding its tropical appeal, Bermuda is not a place where insurance professionals can kick back and relax. It’s a small marketplace where everyone knows everyone else.   So it’s critically important to work at and maintain a strong work ethic, a reputation for integrity, and strong professional relationships if one wants to make the most of a Bermuda work experience.

 

We have all seen a lot of changes in the professional liability insurance industry over the past few years. What do you think are the most important changes in the industry since you first joined, and what do you see for the industry in the years ahead?

 

One of the most important changes I’ve seen over the years has been big companies retreating from robust entry-level training programs. Some of this training has been picked up by PLUS and other organizations, and I certainly understand that it is a challenge for companies administering in-house training to quantify with any certainty the return on the training investment. But I worry about any drop-off in technical competency among the newest generation of professional liability underwriters and brokers. That would hurt our business in almost every way possible. Our industry is becoming even more complex, and we should all be very concerned about the prospect of an underwriting environment where risks are taken that aren’t clearly understood, and where underwriting companies simply follow the decisions of other underwriters because they lack the technical skills or experience to conduct their own risk/reward analysis.   I would favor a comprehensive -back- to-basics educational and training commitment for new folks pursuing a career in professional liability. The great news is that our industry is full of experienced professionals who already have demonstrated – through PLUS and other educational outlets – their willingness to share their insights and experience with the upcoming generation of professionals.

 

What advice would you have for someone just starting out in the professional liability insurance industry?

 

I would say the following: find someone in the industry who really understands technical language and who has witnessed the carnage of loss examples. Stay close to that person and learn from their experience and history. Otherwise, history will surely repeat itself – for you.

 

I know that throughout your career, you’ve devoted considerable time and energy away from work to support organizations and causes, including your service as a trustee and officer of PLUS, your role as a founding member of the Grateful Nation Montana charity, and your participation in numerous charity efforts. What are your motivations for these activities and why are they important to you? How have you been able to reconcile all of these activities with the demands of your various jobs? How do these activities fit into your longer-term career goals?

 

I was blessed with many things growing up — although financial security and a traditional family structure weren’t among them. So I don’t take either financial security or a traditional family home life for granted. To the contrary, I feel blessed every day to have my family around me. As a corollary to that thought, I believe that once blessed with resources – family support, monetary and otherwise, we have an obligation to extend ourselves for others who are less fortunate. I suppose the main driver for me (and for Brittany too), certainly with respect to Grateful Nation Montana, is the admiration and respect we have for both those brave men and women serving in our military, and for their families back at home who provide the primary emotional support for our warriors serving in the most dangerous places in the world.   Through our work with Grateful Nation Montana, Brittany and I have been privileged to walk a small part of a very tough journey with a parent, sibling, spouse or child of a soldier who has just been killed in action. It’s been a humbling and special gift to be invited into that circle of grief and healing. It’s a circle where outsiders are not often welcome. Brittany and I often marvel at the strength and courage of these family members, and how our experiences with them make us better people because of these interactions.

 

In many of your outside activities, you have teamed up with your alma mater, the University of Montana. What is it about the school that gives this University such a prominent role in your philanthropic and Foundation activities?

 

I have had a unique opportunity to build a strong, mutual trust relationship with UM over the past several years. I believe they know I will execute on part whenever we partner on an initiative, and that gives them confidence in me as partner. With that greater level of confidence, I notice that UM now seems to move in a more progressive, less bureaucratic, way on our joint initiatives. Together we have been able things that neither of us could have accomplished independently. My proof of concept? There is now a large, moving war memorial to Montana’s fallen soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars now situated prominently on the main campus of a public state university. I can’t imagine that happening anywhere else besides the University of Montana.

 

 Now that you are your family are off in Montana, will we ever see you again?

 

Of course!, I am hoping to make Montana and ALPS into a destination for quality professional liability insurance.

 

On June 18, 2012, in an opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito for a 5-4 majority, the U.S. Supreme Court held that pharmaceutical sales representatives are not entitled to overtime pay. The question before the Court was whether or not the sales reps were employed “in the capacity as outside salesmen” and therefore within an exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)  from the overtime pay requirements. Because wage and hour disputes are a growing area of employment related litigation, the Court’s opinion is potentially significant. It also has a number of other interesting features, as discussed below.  

 

The Court’s opinion in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham can be found here.

 

The plaintiffs are two pharmaceutical sales representatives who were employed by  the defendant pharmaceutical company (which does business as GlaxoSmithKline) for about four years. During that time they worked about 50 to 70 hours a week. About 40 hours were devoted to field work, visiting doctors, with the rest of the time spent on office work (email, etc.). The purpose of their office visits was, as the Court put it, “obtain a nonbinding commitment from the physician to prescribe [defendant’s] drugs.” The plaintiffs “were well compensated for their efforts,” earning over $70,000 annually, in base and incentive compensation. They were not paid overtime when they worked more than 40 hours per week.

 

The plaintiffs filed an action in federal court alleging that their employer violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime. The company argued that because the plaintiffs were employed “in the capacity of outside salesmen” they were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. The district court entered summary judgment in the company’s favor. The plaintiffs them filed a motion with the court to alter or amend its motion, arguing that the district court failed to give appropriate deference to a Department of Labor interpretation of the FLSA regulation, which the plaintiffs contended supported their overtime claim. The district court rejected this argument and denied the motion.

 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, agreeing that the Department of Labor’s interpretation was not entitled to controlling deference. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion conflicted with opinion out of the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the circuit split.

 

In both the Second and Ninth Circuit, the Department of Labor had submitted amicus briefs arguing that pharmaceutical sales representatives were not exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements. The DOL took the same position before the U.S. Supreme Court, although its reasoning changed on the point of what kind of activity makes something a “sale.”

 

 In taking up this case, one of the issues the Supreme Court had to decide is whether the agency’s interpretation was entitled to “controlling deference.” The Supreme Court held that the agency’s interpretation was not entitled to controlling deference, in part because the position the agency took in the appellate courts diverged from decades of the agency’s prior position on the question of whether or not pharmaceutical sales representatives were exempt from the overtime requirements. The Court went on to state that it found the DOL’s interpretation “quite unpersuasive” and that it conflicted with relevant language in the FLSA itself.

 

Having concluded that it would not give the agency’s interpretation controlling deference, the Court turned to the FLSA for its own interpretation. Based on its review, the majority concluded that the “most reasonable interpretation” is that the plaintiff’s qualify as outside salesmen within the meaning of the statute and are therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement.

 

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. He agreed with the majority that the DOL’s interpretation was not entitled to controlling deference. However, he contended that the pharmaceutical sales representatives were not exempt salesmen, because, as he put it ”unless we give the words of the statute and regulations some special meaning,” the sales representatives duty is not to make a sale, but at most to “convince a doctor to prescribe a drug for a particular kind of patient.” A sale, if it takes place at all, takes place at the pharmacy, or perhaps when the pharmacy purchases the drugs from distributors. Because there was no “sale” the representatives are not salesmen, and they are not exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements.

 

Discussion

For several years, wage and hour suits have been one of the fastest growing areas of employment-related claims. Among reasons for the growth in the number of these claims are the efforts of the employment law plaintiffs’ bar to try to extend the laws’ reach to higher paid positions, as this case appears to be an example.

 

At one level, this rruling in this case relates only to pharmaceutical sales representatives, or pharmaceutical detailers as they are sometimes called. That is no small thing,even if it is just limited to them. According to the opinion, there are over 90,000 pharma sales reps in the US. Not only that, but in January, Novartis agreed to pay $90 million to settle the class action overtime pay claims of its sales reps (refer here).

 

Indirectly the case may have a broader impact, particularly in the part of the majority opinion in which the court explores the reasons for the FLSA’s overtime exemption for outside salespersons. The court emphasis on the fact that exempt employees usually earn salaries well above minimum wage and are involved in the kind of work that is difficult to standardize and therefore hard to spread to other workers, among other things, could be highly relevant in the event of overtime claims by other types of sales and marketing personnel.

 

By the same token, the Court’s refusal to give the DOL controlling deference could make it harder for regulatory agencies to change their regulatory interpretations without given affected industries a chance to be heard, or merely because there has been a change in administrations. There would certainly seem to be less interest among regulatory agencies to try to regulate by way of amicus briefs.

 

The Court’s emphasis on the exemption’s application to higher compensated workers is particularly interesting. Indeed, after reiterating that the two plaintiffs make over $70,000 a year, Justice Alito states that the plaintiffs are “hardly the kind of employees that the FLSA was intended to protect.” The phrase sounds like a warning against efforts to try to extend the FLSA to more highly compensated workers and may therefore prove highly relevant given recent wage and hour claims trends. 

 

The Court also emphasized that it had been the DOL’s consistent position for decades that pharmaceutical detailers were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement. According to Justice Alito, the first time the agency took the position that the detailers were not exempt was in an amicus brief the agency filed with the Second Circuit in 2009. It seems to me that Justice Alito’s emphasis of the date was deliberate. 2009 was of course the year when the current administration came into office — the date suggests that the new administration threw out years of consistent practice in the area, on which the pharmaceutical companies had come to rely.

 

The inferential association of the agency’s position with the current administration might be interpreted as the explanation of the way the Court split on this issue, with the Justices appointed by Republican Presidents on one side, and the Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents on the other. There’s only one problem with that theory. Justice Breyer’s dissent actually agrees with the majority opinion that the agency’s interpretation is not entitled to controlling deference. That is, his opinion is not simply agreeing with the current administration’s position. Rather, in his view the work of the pharmaceutical detailers was not really the work of outside salesman, and so therefore they are not exempt and are entitled to overtime pay. Basically, the way it works out is that the conservative judges favor a narrower scope for the overtime pay requirement, and the liberal justices favor a broader applicability of the overtime pay requirement.

 

It is pretty clear that one mistake the DOL made was in trying to change its explanation for its position on the application of overtime pay requirements to pharmaceutical detailers. Both the majority and the dissent cited that as among the reasons not to give the agency’s interpretation controlling deference. In retrospect, the agency’s decision to try to change its explanation looks like a poor tactical judgment. Even if they decided the prior explanation was less persuasive, the agency would have been better off sticking with the original explanation.

 

In a June 18, 2012 memo about the decision (here), the Mayer Brown law firm noted that the conclusion of both the majority and the dissent that the agency was not entitled to controlling deference “could have broader significance for other regulated industries” because it “could limit the ability of agencies to adopt regulatory interpretations that impose unexpected liability on regulated entities.”

 

From the perspective of the insurance marketplace, a narrower application of the overtime pay requirement would be more desirable. Of course, the carriers are not responsible for the payment of unpaid wages in overtime pay cases. But many employment practices liability policies are written with sub-limited coverage (usually in the range of $100,000 to $250,000) for wage and hour claim defense costs. Wage and hour claims involving more highly compensated employees are more expensive to defend, because there is more at stake and are therefore harder to resolve. To the extent this decision discourages efforts to expand overtime pay requirements to higher compensated employees, it could reduce the carriers’ wage and hour expense burden.

 

Opinion Day at the Supreme Court: Maybe the specter of something like the following is the reason why the Court won’t allow cameras in the Court:

 

Chief Justice Roberts: Thank you, Samuel, for that great performance on behalf of the Stalwart Republican Quintet. I for one certainly enjoyed that rousing rendition of “Don’t Cry for me Detailers, You Make a Bundle Anyway.” And now with a dissenting opinion, it’s that veteran performer, Southpaw Steve, accompanied by the Liberal Lady Justices Trio. Take it away, Steve.

 

Justice Breyer: Thank you, thank you very much. As I always say, a Supreme Court audience is the greatest audience in the world. You know, I just flew in from the Court’s left wing, and boy, are my arms tired. Ha Ha! Um, is this thing on? (Tap, tap). OK, well, this morning we are going to perform the classic tune “All We Are Saying Is Give Detailers OT.” Ready, ladies? Uh-one and-a two, and here we go…

 

I Don’t Speak the Language, But I Think He is Trying to Tell Us That Portugal Scored: I want to share a great link with you, but first, here’s a question. What do Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy have in common? If you said, they are all at the heart of the Eurozone crisis, you have not been monitoring current events closely enough. The correct answer is that those four countries’ national teams have qualified for the quarterfinals of the Euro 2102 soccer championship. Another quarterfinal qualifier is Germany. Which raises the possibility that the countries have the opportunity to solve the whole Eurocrisis on the playing field. Of course, the Czech Republic, France and England – the other three quarterfinal qualifiers — might also have something to say, at least about the tournament. The quarterfinal schedule can be found here.

 

Speaking of Portugal, if you have not yet heard it, you should drop everything you are doing right now – RIGHT NOW, I MEAN IT — and listen to this Portuguese announcer’s call of Christiano Ronaldo’s second goal in Portugal’s 2-1win Sunday over The Netherlands. The goal not only guaranteed Portugal’s qualification for the quarterfinals, but it also ensured that The Netherlands, which played in the World Cup finals just two years ago and in Euro 2012 fielded a lineup that looked like an all-star team, would be going home without winning or drawing a game in the group stages.

 

And by the way, in case you missed the article in yesterday’s WSJ, it turns out that not only is Ronaldo among the best players in the world but he is also the hardest working man in sport, anywhere, period. He logged more playing time on the field in the past year than any other non-goalie athlete. He also appears to be one of the most durable. And he is one of the key reasons that Portugal is still around and will be taken very seriously in the next round.

 

Besides the Dutch, another team that is probably surprised to find itself going home is Russia. They were clearly playing for a draw Saturday night against Greece, which would have been sufficient for Russia to move on to the next round. But Greece snuck a quick goal at the very last tick of the clock in the first half when Russia’s guard was down, and Russia could not recover. Russia probably still can’t believe the whole thing. They are going home, yet the Czech Republic, whom Russia demolished by the score of 4-1 on June 8th, is advancing to the next round. (As Arsene Wenger, the coach for Arsenal in the English Premier league, and who is French, might say with a Gallic shrug: “Zat ees football.”)

 

Spain, the defending Euro and World Cup Champions, clearly remain the favorite to win. (Indeed, some have argued that Spain’s current squad is the greatest team ever, in any sport.) But I have to say, not one but two players were offside for Spain’s lone goal Monday night in the final group stage game against Croatia. I make no predictions, but, you know, Germany played their group stage games damn well.  

 

In its final group stage game on Tuesday, England was also the beneficiary of an incredible blown call. In the second half of their game against Ukraine, England player John Terry’s clearance kick was clearly too late, the Ukraine shot clearly having gone over the goal line. But the referee’s assistant, who was after all right there, said it was not a goal. England of course will point out that Ukraine was offside on the play, so there shouldn’t have been a goal anyway  (actually, in England they would say that Ukraine were offside but that particular usage has always sounded stilted to me).

 

The team that has the most to answer for is France. Sure, France qualified for the quarterfinals. But in their last game of the group stages against a Sweden side that had already been eliminated, France played poorly. The French team did not actually go on strike, the way they literally did at the World Cup in 2010, but they might as well have, losing to a spirited Sweden side, 0-2. For their efforts, or lack thereof, France draws Spain as their opponent in the next round. They play on Saturday, in Donetsk.

 

I Would Have Thought it Was Sufficient To Argue for a Change That Buckeye Fans Are Insufferable: I am not making this up. According to a report on Deadspin, an Ohio man wants to have the Buckeye removed as Ohio’s State Tree because it is bisexual, having both male and female reproductive organs. Having such a tree as the state tree is, according to the man’s letter to the Findlay (Ohio) Courier, “flaunting the Holy Bible.” The Deadspin article notes that this would be pitch perfect satire — if it were in fact satire. If is not satire, well, it is just depressing.

 

My friend and former law partner Chuck Hadden would want me to point out that the Ohio man should have said “flouting the Holy Bible” not “flaunting the Holy Bible.”

 

Things That Were in my Childhood Home That Are Not in my Current Home:

 

Whole milk

A popcorn popper

Waxed paper and Freezer Paper

Wooden tennis rackets

A Sears catalog

Pipe cleaners

Typewriter ribbon

A skate key

A coffee percolator

Green Stamps

Calamine lotion

Evening newspapers

A slide rule

Encyclopedia Britannica

Margarine

Camera film – and  Film Cameras

Ashtrays

Parakeets

Tang

Plastic  record adpaters (so that 45 RPM records can play on a 33 RPM turntable spindle)

Hot water bottles

Airplane glue 

 

 

 

 

  

Things That Are in my Current Home That Were Not in my Childhood Home:

 

Bagels

A Rabbit corkscrew

Butter

SPF 45 sunscreen

Chopsticks

Cilantro

Recycle bins

Lacrosse sticks

Quinoa

Zip-lock bags

Bicycle helmets

Anti-bacterial soap

Suitcases with wheels

A golf club with a club head as big as a toaster

Color comics in the weekday newspaper

Velcro

Soy milk

Open-on-the-bottom condiment containers

Pesto

Blue corn tortilla chips

Erythromycin

 

Readers are cordially invited to suggest their own items for these lists, using the blog’s comment feature.  

Our legal system is one of our society’s crowning achievements. But for all of its grandeur, our legal system is not without its flaws. Among other things, our system encourages litigiousness that all too often involves frivolous suits and lawyers’-fee driven litigation, including the recent phenomenon of multi-jurisdiction derivative litigation driven by plaintiffs’ lawyers competing to get control of the dispute in order to try to capture the fee.

 

Two separate opinions this past week – one out of the Seventh Circuit and one from the Delaware Court of Chancery – harshly criticized these kinds of practices. Both of the opinions were entered in shareholders’ derivative lawsuits, too. Though both of the cases are sharply critical of fee-driven plaintiffs’ lawyers’ practices, only one of the cases resulted in the dismissal of the suit. Interestingly, in the Delaware case, owing to the Court’s disdain for the practices of “fast-filing” plaintiffs’ firms in parallel California proceedings, the Delaware case will be going forward.

 

The Allergan Case in Delaware

In September 2010, Allergan pled guilty to a criminal misdemeanor for misbranding its Botox product and paid a total of $600 million in civil and criminal fines. Various plaintiffs’ firms filed multiple derivative suits both in federal court in California and in Delaware. The California cases went forward more quickly, while in Delaware, at least one of the plaintiffs sought to pursue a books and records action against the company, in order to obtain further information pertinent to the company’s board. The Delaware plaintiff used the information and documentation to amend its complaint. The California plaintiffs ultimately also obtained the same information and documentation and supplemented their complaint as well.

 

The defendants moved to dismiss the California action on the ground that the plaintiffs had not made a demand on the Allergan board to pursue the claims, nor had they established demand futility. The California court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The defendants then sought to have the Delaware action dismissed, arguing that the collateral estoppel effect of the California dismissal was preclusive of the demand futility issue.

 

In a massive and muscular June 11, 2012 opinion (here), Delaware Chancery Court Vice Chancellor Travis Laster firmly rejected the suggestion that the California court’s prior ruling compelled him to dismiss the Delaware action. He relied on two grounds in rejecting the argument that the California judgment is preclusive; first, he found that the California judgment was preclusive only as to the individual California shareholder plaintiffs, and second, he found that the California plaintiff did not adequately represent Allergan.

 

Both of these lines of analysis are interesting and so I discuss both below, but it is the inadequate representation issue that is the main interest to this blog post.

 

Vice Chancellor Laster first held that question of whether or not pre-suit demand is futile is controlled by the internal affairs doctrine and therefore governed by the law of the state of incorporation – in this case, Delaware. It should not, he said, be governed by potentially different rules across “twelve different circuits, fifty states and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the other territories.”

 

He held further that under Delaware law a shareholder seeking to pursue a derivative claim on behalf of a corporation represents only his own individual interest until it is established that he has the right to pursue the claim. Because the California plaintiff was found not to have the right to pursue the claim, the California court’s judgment is preclusive only the California plaintiff alone, not on all other shareholders or the corporation (that is, the California plaintiff is not in “privity” with the other shareholders).

 

As an independent basis for rejecting the preclusive effect of the California judgment, Laster held that the California plaintiffs did not adequately represent Allergan. In concluding that the California plaintiff had not provided adequate representation, Laster launched a lengthy disquisition of the motivations and actions of the specialized plaintiffs’ shareholder bar and the specific actions taken on this case.

 

These specialized firms face a competitive environment where they often can only control the case and capture the fee if they are the first-to-file. The first-filed rule “incentivizes the plaintiffs’ lawyers to file as fast as possible in an effort to gain control of the litigation.” These firms, facing first-to-file pressure “rationally eschew conducting investigations and making books and records demands, fearing that any delay would enable to gain control of the litigation.” As he put it, “No role, no result, no fee.”

 

For the “fast-filing lawyers” their lawsuit “has the dynamic of a lottery ticket,” since in most cases their hastily prepared complaint will risk dismissal. However “in the rare case, fate may bless the fast-filer with something implicating the board,” which will make the case likelier to survive the motion to dismiss and improve the settlement value of the case exponentially.

 

 “A fast-filer” can “readily build a portfolio of cases in the hope that one will hit.” Filing a derivative claim “is relatively cheap” and search costs are minimal. Indeed, derivative plaintiffs “often piggyback on the efforts of other specialized plaintiffs’ firms.” The lawyer’s “most difficult task will be finding a suitable plaintiff.’

 

The “first-to-file” regime “disserves stockholder interests across multiple dimensions.” It prevents plaintiffs’ lawyers from “acting optimally” and “forces defendants to respond to multiple complaints in multiple jurisdictions” but at the same time gives defendants litigation advantages, because the hastily filed complaints are more likely to be dismissed. Noting Delaware’s courts’ resistance to the first-to-file regime, Laster commented that “a state that ritualistically favored defendants might embrace such a regime, but Delaware has a long history of striving to balance the interests of stockholders and managers to craft an efficient corporation.”

 

Laster found that the California proceedings demonstrate all of the shortcomings with the race-to the courthouse phenomenon:

 

By leaping to litigate without first conducting a meaningful investigation, the California plaintiffs’ firms failed to fulfill the fiduciary duties they voluntarily assumed as derivative action plaintiffs. Rather than seeking to benefit Allergan, they sought to benefit themselves by rushing to gain control of a case that could be harvested for legal fees. In doing so, the fast-filing plaintiffs failed to provide adequate representation.

 

Moreover, the California plaintiff’s shortcomings were not later redeemed when the California plaintiff belatedly asked for and received the fruits of the Delaware plaintiff’s books and records action. Laster concluded that “rather than representing the best interests of the corporation, the California plaintiffs sought to maximize the potential returns of the specialized law firms who filed the suit on their behalf.”

 

Having rejected the defendants’ suggestion that the California court’s determination was preclusive on the issue of demand futility, Laster then went on and rejected the basis on which the California court had determined that demand was futile. He said that he found the California court’s analysis “unpersuasive.” He concluded that the Delaware plaintiffs, pleading with the benefit of the results of their books and records action, had established that demand was excused as futile. 

 

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision in the Sears Case

Following the 2005 merger of Kmart and Sears, the merged company board included two individual directors who also served on the boards of other companies that competed with Sears. Two Sears shareholders filed a derivative lawsuit alleging that the two directors’ interlocking directorships violated the Clayton Act. Sears moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not made a pre-suit litigation demand on the Sears board. Northern District of Illinois Judge Ronald Guzman denied the motion to dismiss. Faced with the prospect for further litigation, Sears agreed to a settlement of the case that consisted of agreements for one of the two directors to step down and for the defendants not to object to the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee request of $925,000.

 

Sears shareholder Theodore Frank moved to intervene in the case in order to object to the settlement. Judge Guzman denied Frank’s request to intervene. Frank appealed the denial of his request to intervene. In a June 13, 2012 opinion written by Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook for a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit (here), the appellate court ruled that Frank’s motion to intervene had been improperly denied. That determination would seem to represent all that the appellate court was called upon to do. But the Court did not stop there; it went on to add a few choice words about the case (and perhaps about the District Court as well).

 

The district court’s reason for denying Frank’s motion to intervene, the Seventh Circuit said, is “unsound.” The district court denied the motion because the existing plaintiffs adequately represented Frank’s interests. But as the Seventh Circuit said, “that the plaintiffs say they have the other investors’ interests at hear does not make it so.” The Seventh Circuit emphasized that its case decisions encourage liberal allowance of intervention.

 

“We could,” the Court said, “stop at this point and leave the parties to slug it out In the district court.” But, “this litigation is so feeble that it is best to end it immediately.” The only goal of this suit “appears to be fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyers.” It is “impossible to see how the investors could gain from it – and therefore impossible to see how Sears’ directors could be said to violate their fiduciary duty by declining to pursue it.” The court went on to note how unlikely it is that a consumer or regulator would pursue any claim based on the interlocking directorates.

 

It is “an abuse of the legal system to cram unnecessary litigation down the throats of firms whose directors serve on multiple boards, and then use the high costs of antitrust suits to extort settlements (including undeserved attorneys’ fees) from the targets.”

 

In short, the Court said, “the suit serves no goal other than to move money from the corporate treasury to the attorney’s coffers, while depriving Sears of directors whom its investors have freely elected.”

 

Discussion

In both of these two decisions, the courts criticized derivative actions motivated by plaintiffs’ attorneys’ desire to collect a legal fee but otherwise to the detriment of the company involved. To the extent the views expressed in these opinions represent an evolving judicial view of how some plaintiffs’ firms are conducting business, they could represent a troubling threat to the business model of at least certain parts of the plaintiffs’ bar

 

But though there are similarities of perception and expression between these two cases, there are some very important differences between the two cases as well.  For example, as a result of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the Sears case, which was to have continued to go forward in the district court (owing to the fact that the proposed settlement had for unrelated reasons come apart), will now not be going forward. By contrast, owing to Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion, the Allergan case, which seemed like it was over as a result of the California court’s opinion, will now be going forward in Delaware.

 

The Seventh Circuit was concerned that the district court had allowed a fee-driven frivolous suit to go forward (and it certainly does seem as if its opinion in the Sears case is a very carefully aimed slap at the district court); Vice Chancellor Laster seems concerned that as a result of inadequate actions of fee-driven plaintiffs’ lawyers proceeding in another jurisdiction, a potentially meritorious case was being threatened with being shut down.

 

The key may be Laster’s insight that the hastily prepared “first to file” complaints actually benefit the defendants, as the cobbled together complaints are easier to get dismissed – which is what happened in California. Laster also seemed troubled that the Delaware plaintiffs, who were in his court and who had proceeded deliberately, could have deprived of the benefit of their labors owing to the hasty actions of the inadequately prepared California plaintiff.

 

An important context for Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion is the ongoing problem of multi-jurisdiction litigation and the jurisdictional competition that has ensued. Laster seems to have just about had it with courts in other jurisdictions presuming to interpret and apply Delaware corporate law and making a mess of it. You can imaging him shaking his head in disgust as he notes, first, the plaintiffs’ lawyers rushing to file actions in other jurisdiction’s court and making a hash of it, and then the courts in those other jurisdictions making a further mess of the situation.

 

It will not be lost on any plaintiffs’ lawyers in the room that the outcome of Laster’s opinion is that a case that appeared dead will now be going forward. It is as if to say to the plaintiffs’ bar, go ahead, rush off to those other courts and file your actions if you want, maybe the lottery ticket will produce a winner. But take your time and prepare appropriately, and file your suit in Delaware, and you will receive a full and fair hearing. Laster expressly contrasts Delaware with a (supposedly hypothetical) state “that ritualistically favored defendants.” Delaware, he said, “has a long history of striving to balance the interests of stockholders and managers to craft an efficient corporation law.” The message to the plaintiffs ‘ bar seems to be that Delaware’s courts are open for business – and its courts are not going to be put off by competing litigants pushing ahead on other courts.

 

Maybe I am reading too much into Judge Laster’s opinion. But it sure seems like there are some things for defendants to worry about here. Not just the fact that the case is going forward after being dismissed in California. It is this case, taken in combination with other developments – such as the massive plaintiffs’ award in the Southern Peru case—that seemingly would give corporate defendants cause for concern. The question for defendants is what to make of these developments and what they might mean as Delaware tries to protect its turf in the jurisdictional competition.

 

There is still the problem of the lack of recognition given to the California court’s ruling on the demand futility issue. As Alison Frankel said in her June 12, 2002 article in her On The Case blog (here) discussing Laster’s ruling, Laster’s collateral estoppel analysis could prove to be “very controversial.” The principles of judicial efficiency militate very heavily in favor of a presumption that issues are decided only once. Anything that seemingly gives litigants a second bite at the apple flies in the face of these principles.

 

The prospects of multiple, competing demand futility determinations is potentially troubling. Multi-jurisdiction litigation may be the result of the actions of a competitive, fee driven plaintiffs’ bar, but it is not going to go away any time soon. It is already a serious problem. But if courts stop giving effect to determinations made in other courts, the problems of multi-jurisdiction litigation could get a whole lot worse.

 

All of that said, it is very encouraging to see courts actively worrying about problems caused by frivolous and fee-driven litigation. If these opinions do represent an evolving judicial perception about the motivations driving certain kinds and categories of litigation, the environment for that type of litigation has become decidedly more hostile. And as Justice Laster’s opinion shows, eliminating the abuses would be a good thing not just for defendants, but also for plaintiffs that proceed responsibly.

 

In the latest of what is now a lengthening line of cases, on June 12, 2012, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, applying Illinois law, ruled in a coverage case brought by JPMorgan Chase that owing to settlements by underlying carriers in a professional liability insurance program, excess insurers in the program have no payment obligation because conditions precedent to coverage under the excess carriers’ policies had not been met. As discussed below, this case presents an interesting twist on the usual set of circumstances involved in these kinds of coverage disputes. A copy of the June 12 opinion can be found here.

 

Background

Though this coverage action was initiated by JP Morgan, the insurance coverage at issue was procured by Bank One, which later merged into JP Morgan. For the policy period October 1, 2002 through October 1, 2003, Bank One had procured a total of $175 million of bankers’ professional liability insurance and securities action claim coverage. The insurance was structured in a program of eight layers, consisting of a primary layer and seven excess layers.

 

In November 2002, actions were brought against Bank One and certain of its affiliates in connection with their roles as indenture trustees of certain notes issued by various NPF entities. After it acquired Bank One, JP Morgan settled the NPF actions for a total of $718 million and sought coverage under the Bank One insurance program for a portion of the settlement amount.

 

Prior to initiating the coverage suit against the carriers in the Bank One insurance program, JP Morgan settled with the sixth level excess carrier for $17 million. The sixth level excess carrier’s policy provided excess insurance coverage of $15 million in excess of $140 million. However, the $17 million insurance settlement with this sixth level excess carrier covered both the carrier’s liability under the Bank One program and claims under a separate policy the same carrier’s affiliate company issued under a different insurance program. There was no allocation of the $17 million insurance settlement among the carrier’s various policies

 

After initiating the coverage lawsuit, JP Morgan entered a separate $17 million settlement with the third level excess carrier. This separate insurance settlement covered both the third level excess carrier’s liability under the Bank One program as well as a separate claim under a separate insurance policy the carrier had issued.

 

Following these developments, the excess carriers in the fourth, fifth, and seventh excess insurance layers moved for summary judgment in the coverage action, arguing that as a result of the settlement with the third level excess carrier (and in the case of the seventh level excess carrier, the settlement with the sixth level excess carrier), conditions precedent to coverage under their respective policies had not been fulfilled, particularly with respect to their policies’ requirement that the underlying layers should be exhausted by payment of loss.

 

In a May 31, 2011 opinion, the New York (New York County) Supreme Court granted the excess carriers’ motions for summary judgment. JP Morgan appealed.

 

The June 12 Opinion

A June 12, 2012 opinion written by Judge Leland DeGrasse for a five-judge panel off the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department and applying Illinois law,  affirmed the lower Court’s summary judgment rulings.

 

Focusing first on the fourth level excess carrier’s position, the appellate court noted that the carrier’s excess policy provide that “liability for any Loss shall attach to [the carrier] only after the Primary and Underling Excess Insurers shall have duly admitted liability and shall have paid the full amount of their respective liability.” The court noted that the “plain language of this attachment provision” requires both the underlying insurers’ admission of liability and the payment of the full amount of their limits, as “conditions precedent” to the carrier’s liability.

 

The appellate court agreed with the fourth level excess carrier that neither of conditions precedent had been met. The first condition was not met because the third level excess carrier’s settlement agreement with JP Morgan specifically provided that the agreement “shall not constitute, or be construed as, an admission of liability.” Moreover, the court noted, there is “no way to determine that [the third level excess carrier] paid the full amount” under its excess policy in the Bank One tower, because the settlement agreement “provided for no allocation” of the $17 million insurance settlement payment between the two policies that the carrier had issued and that were part of the insurance settlement.

 

For similar reasons, the court further concluded that conditions precedent in the fifth and seventh level carriers’ policies had not been met either. Relying on the Northern District of Illinois’s 2010 opinion in the Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. case (about which refer here) and the Fifth Circuit’s 2011 opinion in Citigroup case (about which refer here), the court concluded that the lower court had “properly granted summary judgment” because JP Morgan’s settlements with the third and sixth level excess carriers “preclude any determination” whether the settling excess insurers’ policy limits were exhausted as required by the excess policies of the carriers that had moved for summary judgment, “because there was there was no allocation of settlement between the two underlying carriers.”

 

The appellate court also rejected JP Morgan’s efforts to rely on the venerable second circuit opinion in Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. The appellate court here said that the Second Circuit’s unwillingness in Zeig to allow the excess carrier to evade payment when an underlying carrier had settled for less than full policy limits had been dependent on a finding of an ambiguity in the excess policy at issue in that case. The appellate court found no ambiguity in the excess policies of the carriers that had moved for summary judgment here, making the present case distinguishable from Zeig. The appellate court also questioned, in reliance on the Bally Total Fitness case, whether Zeig was contrary to applicable Illinois precedent.

 

Discussion

As I noted at the outset, this decision joins a growing list of cases that have found Zeig to be inapplicable and that have required as a trigger of coverage for excess insurance coverage that the limit of liability of the underlying insurance be exhausted by payment of loss. (A full list of the growing line of cases can be found in the Discussion section of my post pertaining to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in the Citigroup case, refer here.)

 

An interesting complication in this case was the fact that the two excess carriers that had reached settlements with JP Morgan had in each case settled the insurance dispute with JP Morgan for payment of amounts that were actually greater than the amount of their respective excess layers in the Bank One insurance program. In each of the two settlements, the involved carrier’s respective layers in the Bank One program were $15 million, and the amount of each insurance settlement was $17 million.

 

The complicating factor was that in each of these two settlements, the settlements had also involved the settlement of coverage under a second insurance policy, other than the carrier’s policy in the Bank One program. Because of the involvement of these separate policies and because of the absence of any allocation between the policies in the respective insurance settlements, there was no way (the appellate court found) to determine whether or not the insurance settlements had exhausted the applicable excess policies in the Bank One program.

 

Although it may be twenty-twenty hind sight, you can certainly see in retrospect how these insurance settlements could have been structured to avert the outcome here. Just to put this into perspective, the policy limits of the excess carriers who prevailed on summary judgment in the lower court and on appeal totaled $95 million.

 

It is probably worth adding that there is nothing that says that even if the excess carriers had not prevailed on this specific issue that there would have been coverage available under their respective excess policies. Indeed, it appears that, even though the various carriers on the third level through seventh level excess layers are now out of the case (either through settlement or through summary judgment), the carriers on the primary and first two excess layer levels all apparently remain in this case and all apparently are continuing to contest coverage.

 

While this list of case authority on the excess trigger issue is growing longer, it is important to keep in mind that the outcome of each of these cases was a direct reflection of the specific language of the excess policies at issue. These cases underscore the critical importance of the language describing the payment trigger in the excess policy. In recent years, and in large part as a reaction to these cases, excess carriers increasingly have been willing to provide language that allows the excess carriers’ payment obligations to be triggered regardless whether the underlying amounts were paid by the underlying insurer or by the insured. This language was not generally available in 2002 when Bank One purchased the insurance that was at issue here.

 

Increasingly larger settlement amounts and increasingly higher defense expenses are increasingly driving claims losses into the excess layers, and as a result these issues pertaining to the excess policies’ coverage triggers are also increasingly important. These cases underscore the critical importance of the specific wording used in the excess policies, which in turn highlights the need to have an experienced, knowledgeable insurance professional involved in the insurance placement process.

 

In a recent post on this blog (here), I commented on a May 29, 2012 Dealbook blog post entitled “Why S.E.C. Settlements Should Hold Senior Executives Liable” (here), which had been written by two University of Minnesota law professors, Claire Hill and Richard Painter. After my post appeared, I contacted Professors Hill and Painter to let them know about my post and to invite them to respond to my post if they would like. Professors Hill and Painter (who are pictured to the left) did, in fact, have some comments in response to my post, and I am pleased to be able to publish their comments below as a guest post.

 

I am very grateful to Professors Hill and Painter for their willingness to provide a detailed response to my post and for their willingness to allow me to publish their comments here. The Professors comments follow.

 

Senior executives in investment banks and other financial services firms make a lot of money a lot of the time.   Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JP Morgan, for example will receive total compensation of $23 million this year, even though JP Morgan has suffered a $2 billion (or more) loss incurred by an improvident and unsupervised trader known as the “London Whale.” MF Global’s board had approved an $8 million pay package for CEO Jon Corzine the year before MF Global collapsed, it having “lost” $1.6 billion in customer funds that were apparently comingled with its own. Senior executives at Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch “earned” similarly large pay packages in the years before those firms collapsed.

 

In a law review article, two op-eds in the New York Times dealbook section, here and here, and in a forthcoming book on the ethics of investment bankers, we express our concern that for too many senior executives in financial services, their work has become a game of “heads I win, tails you lose” played with investors and creditors, and, when there is a government bailout, with taxpayers. This we think is wrong – and it is not the way the banking game was always played.

 

We are not ivory tower academics who don’t like bankers (many of our friends and family members are bankers or have been bankers). We just think that bankers should play the game with some more of their own money. We also think that, if they did, they might play the game differently.

 

In the 1970s the largest investment banks – Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Salomon Brothers, Goldman Sachs and others — were general partnerships.   A firm’s capital belonged to the partners, so when they made an investment, or authorized a trader to take a position, they were investing their own money.  If the firm was socked with an SEC fine or civil judgment for violating the securities laws, the fine came out of the firm’s assets, which meant it came out of the partners’ pockets.   If the firm went bankrupt, the partners not only lost the investment they had in the firm, but they were personally liable for debts that the firm could not pay.

 

Investment banks took big risks in those days – but nowhere near the magnitude or risks that in 2008 caused three of the five largest investment banks in the United States – Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers – to fail.

 

The fact that these banks, as most all others these days, were operated not as partnerships but as corporations, with limited personal liability for their executives, has, we think, something to do with what happened.   Banking for them is a game of “heads I win, tails you lose.” 

 

To fix this we have proposed that the most senior bankers (those making more than $3 million) be asked in return to make a substantial portion of their personal assets (all except perhaps a few million dollars) available to pay the debts of the firm if it fails, and/or have a portion of their compensation be assessable stock that would be subject to a capital call if the firm becomes insolvent. More recently, we suggested (and one of us suggested two weeks ago in Congressional testimony) that senior executives of a financial institution be asked to pay, perhaps out of the bonus pool, a significant portion of any fine that the SEC or other regulator levies against the bank for illegal conduct.  This, we think, is fairer than imposing the entire cost of the fine on the bank’s shareholders, who had no role in the illegal conduct or responsibility for supervising the individuals who engaged in it.

 

None of what we propose has anything to do with collective guilt or finding of fault without due process, as has been implied in a well-written post by the host of this site. What we propose has to do with collective responsibility for the consequences – both good and bad – of corporate conduct in the financial services industry.   Financial services firms devote a very substantial portion of their revenues to salaries and bonuses (more than many other industries), something we do not in principle object to. We only suggest that when firms break the law, or lose so much money that they become insolvent, the persons responsible for managing those firms should bear a portion of the cost. Banks, shareholders and creditors, and society as a whole, would be better off if bankers went back to playing an honest game of “heads I win, tails I lose.”’ 

 

Why should bankers be treated differently than executives of other firms? Why shouldn’t they get the limited liability that executives at other incorporated firms have?  Financial services firms are different from other businesses in several respects including the fact that leverage ratios are high, financial assets such as derivative products are extremely hard to value, it is difficult for shareholders, creditors and regulators to assess risks that managers are taking, and senior managers are paid extremely well when their bets pay off.   Also, for creditors, other financial services firms and the economy as a whole, the repercussions from risks that bankers take can be enormous. The impact of financial managers’ risk taking turns on, among other things, the types of activities they and their firms engage in, their firms’ size, and the extent to which the firms are interconnected with one another and with other entities. High risk-taking may lead to a firm’s failure, but the firm has a good chance of being bailed out given its size and interconnectedness. The moral hazard – e.g. incentive for managers to take enormous risks – is very strong.

 

Although limited liability has advantages for raising capital and attracting talented employees, it sometimes has downsides. Bankers know this, and before they extend credit to riskier incorporated enterprises they often insist on personal guarantees from the principals. Bankers know that corporate borrowers whose managers have guaranteed corporate indebtedness will be managed more conservatively than corporate borrowers whose managers have not made personal guarantees.   Indeed, up until the 1980s, almost all of the largest investment banks operated as partnerships, with partners personally liable for firm debts.  Now, after 2008, we know that the greatest risk exposure that financial institutions face comes from imprudent decisions by persons in the executive suite who have every incentive to maximize short term profits and bonuses, but not enough incentive to avoid excessive legal and financial risk. 

 

Limited liability for officers of businesses is generally acceptable, but there are exceptions. Investment banks and most other financial services firms should be an exception. Solvency guarantees and partial payment of fines for illegal firm conduct by the most highly paid financial services executives are a reasonable quid pro quo for the enormous pay packages that they receive. 

 

******************************************************* 

Worth Reading: Here at The D&O Diary, we never rest from our task of making sure our readers are fulliy informed, and in is in that spirit that we pass along the following links for all of our readers.

 

First, in a excellent June 12, 2012 article on her On The Case blog (here)., Alison Frankel takes a detailed look at Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis Laster’s June 11, 2012 opinion in the Allergan derivative litigation, in which the Vice Chancellor, as Frankel puts it, "blasts first-to-file firms" in shareholder derivative and M&A litigation. It is a long-ish article but very much worth reading in full.

 

Second, Victor Li’s June 12, 2012 article on Am Law Litigation Daily (here) takes a look at the ruling entered Monday in the Western Distrcit of Pennyslvannia in the long-running RICO action brought in that court against Alcoa and others by Bahrain Aluminum BSC (Alba), in which Alba accuses the defendants of bribing Alba officials and other senior Bahrain government officials. As Li explains, Monday’s decision rejected the defendants’ attempt made in reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank to have the case dismissed.

 

Third, a June 11, 2012 Reuters article entitled "SEC Probes Hit a Wall in Uncooperative China" (here) takes a look at the problems that the SEC is having trying to investigate fraud allegations involving Chinese companies. According to the article, the SEC is finding that "cooperative cross-border investigations are completely foreign to China."