According to an adage from the Internet’s early days, information wants to be free. These days, the free Internet is being challenged. Many sites have recently imposed pay walls or otherwise started to charge visitors.

 

Here at The D&O Diary, we are about to celebrate our seventh anniversary of providing information and commentary free of charge to readers around the world. Every now and then a concerned reader will ask, with furrowed brow, “You aren’t going to start charging me to visit your site are you?” Not to worry. For a lot of reasons, we are not about to start charging. The D&O Diary always has been and always will be free.

 

We are committed to keeping this site free because we think of our readers as our partners. In fact, we are so grateful for this sense of partnership that we would like to give our readers a token of our appreciation.

 

We would like readers who are interested to have one of our limited-edition designer coffee mugs, pictured above. Just to be clear, the price of the mug, like the price of visiting this site, is free.

 

If you email me at dandodiary@gmail.com and provide me with your name, address and e-mail address, I will mail you a mug. For free. (I promise that I will not use your information for any reason other than sending you the mug and for communicating with you about it. I will not share your information with anyone.)

 

That’s right. I am offering to mail you a D&O Diary coffee mug — for free.

 

There’s just one little catch.

 

If I send you a mug, you agree that you will take a picture of the mug and send me the picture along with a 250-300 word description of the circumstances behind the picture. I will publish the best pictures and descriptions on this site – “best” meaning the most creative and imaginative.

 

What kinds of pictures and descriptions might readers send in? I don’t know. I have confidence that this blog’s resourceful readers, inspired by the experience of receiving a free D&O Diary coffee mug, will demonstrate unparalleled levels of ingenuity and inventiveness.

 

To get everyone started, here is an illustration of what a picture and description might look like.

 

In this picture, I am standing at the Ledges Overlook in the Cuyahoga Valley National Park, near Peninsula, Ohio. Yes, there is a National Park in Ohio, located less than 30 minutes from The D&O Diary’s world headquarters. By the way, the park, the headquarters, and in fact the entire state of Ohio are all located in the Eastern Time Zone. This picture was taken by Mrs. D&O Diary. Later, the two of us christened our new mugs with a ‘00 vintage bottle of Château Smith Haut Lafîtte. I purchased the bottle at the Chateau –which is located in the Graves wine region south of Bordeaux –when I traveled there with several industry colleagues in May 2004. (Right now, several old friends are smiling and nodding at the recollection of a great trip.) When I purchased the bottle, the wine steward fixed me with a cold look, shook her finger in my face and said, “Attention! Do not drink for ten years!” I am not sure whether she meant ten years from the grape harvest or ten years from the day I bought the bottle, but either way I think she would approve of our enjoyment of the wine as the inaugural beverage served in our new mugs.

 

More Pictures and an Afterword

 

“Information wants to be free/and so does The D&O Diary.” This is the Free Stamp, a Claus Oldenburg sculpture located on a bluff in downtown Cleveland next to City Hall and overlooking Lake Erie.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cleveland Rocks, Baby. The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame is one of Cleveland’s many beautiful buildings. I know that some of you, at this very moment, can hardly resist the urge to shout, “Play Freebird!”—because “free” is good.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cleveland may be known for its harsh winters, but the truth is that Cleveland has four distinct seasons. And after a long winter, spring is a glorious thing. Here is a picture of springtime at Horseshoe Lake, in Shaker Heights, Ohio. While it is true that no one can do anything about the weather, the weather is, undeniably, free.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Do you know what the price of admission is for the Cuyahoga Valley National Park? You guessed it – free.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Afterword:  I hope that you are already thinking about the pictures you will take when you get your mug. Please let me know if you would like me to send you one. Due to my upcoming business travel, it will be a few days before I can actually send out the mugs. The first batch will go out around the middle of May. When you send in your pictures and descriptions, please send pictures in the JPEG format. Send the descriptions as a Word document without text formating (that is, no bold face, italics or underlining — the  formatting doesn’t translate well into the blogging software). I look forward to seeing what everyone comes up with.

 

Disputes over notice of claim requirements usually involve questions about the timing or content of the notice. A recent notice dispute involving UnitedHealth Group raised neither questions of timing or content; rather, the dispute involved the question of “to whom” the notice must be sent. In an April 25, 2013 opinion (here), District of Minnesota Judge Patrick J. Schlitz, applying Minnesota law, held that in order to satisfy the notice of claim requirements in an excess  insurance policy, the notice had to be sent to the insurer’s claims department as specified in the policy. Because the policyholder had failed to establish a genuine issue of fact whether the claims department had received the notice of claim, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the excess insurer.

 

The dispute over the adequacy of notice arose in the context of a protracted and procedurally complicated action in which UnitedHealth is seeking insurance coverage from its insurers for a series of claims in which the company was involved between December 1998 and December 2000. The company’s primary insurance policy has been exhausted by payment of loss and the company has settled with five of its excess insurers. Four excess insurers remain as defendants.

 

In his April 25 order, Judge Schlitz considered a number of different motions in the continuing coverage litigation, including the motion for summary judgment of one of the remaining excess insurers, based on its assertion that it had not been provided notice of a claim known as the AMA claim. The AMA claim later settled for $350 million.

 

The notice provision in the excess insurer’s policy specified that:

 

It consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood and agreed that notice hereunder shall be given in writing to [the excess insurer], Financial Services Claims Department, 175 Water Street, New York, New York 10038 (herewritten the “Insurer”)

(a) The Company or the Insureds shall, as a condition precedent to the obligations of the Insurer under this policy give written notice to the Insurer as soon as practicable during the Policy Period, or during the Extended Reporting Period (if applicable), or [sic] any claim made against the Insureds.

 

According to the court’s opinion, the parties agreed that UnitedHealth had not provided written notice of claim sent to the specified address. UnitedHealth nevertheless argued that it had satisfied the notice requirements because it had “substantially complied” with the provisions. Judge Schlitz agreed with UnitedHealth that because Minnesota law “generally disfavors technical and narrow objections to the existence of coverage, especially when it comes to matters of notice,” substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy a “to whom” notice requirement. But, he added, “substantial compliance requires notice that is substantial.”

 

Judge Schlitz disagreed with UnitedHealth that the “to whom” requirement is satisfied if the company “provides any kind of notice to any kind of agent” of the excess insurer.  He found that under the policy’s provisions, the notice requirement “has not been substantially complied with unless the Claims Department received notice of claim – somehow, from someone — during the policy period.” He added that if an agent of the insurer becomes aware of a claim “but the agent does not work in the Claims Department and does not notify the Claims Department of the claim, then there has not been substantial compliance with the ‘to whom’ requirement.” Judge Schlitz reasoned in that regard that:

 

“Compiance” with a provision of an insurance policy should not be deemed “substantial” if doing so would defeat the very purpose of the provision. And the very purpose of a “to whom” requirement – its entire reason for existing – is to ensure that notice is provided not just to the insurance company, but to a particular part of the insurance company. A large insurance company has a legitimate reason to require that notice of claim be given to a particular person or department with the company, rather than to any of the company’s thousands of employees and agents scattered around the globe. Otherwise, there is a substantial danger that the “notice” will not be recognized as such and will not serve its function.

 

Judge Schlitz added that “The Court can conceive of no reason why an insurer … should not be able to protect itself by requiring that notice be given to a particular person or department. And enforcing such a requirement does not place an onerous burden on an insured – particularly an insured such as United, which is itself a huge and sophisticated insurance company, and which has no excuse for failing to send notice of the AMA claim to the Claims Department, as [the excess insurer’s] policy clearly required United to do.” He concluded that in order for UnitedHealth to show that it substantially complied with the notice requirement, it must show that notice of the AMA claim was received by the Claims Department during the policy period.

 

Judge Schlitz then reviewed the various ways in which UnitedHealth claimed that it had provided notice of the claim. UnitedHealth argued that the AMA claim had been noticed in a monthly loss run report that the company’s broker supplied to the excess insurer and that the loss run report also was attached to UnitedHealth’s renewal insurance application. However, while Judge Schlitz found that there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that someone at the excess insurer received the loss runs, there was no evidence that that the loss runs were provided to the claims department.

 

And while the AMA claim apparently was discussed at a meeting in connection with UnitedHealth’s  insurance renewal, there was no evidence that anyone from the excess insurer’s claims department had attended the meeting. Judge Schlitz specifically concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that the excess insurer’s claims department had received information about the AMA claims from the underwriting department.

 

Judge Schlitz also rejected UnitedHealth’s argument that because it had provided notice of claim to the primary insurer that is owned by the same insurance holding company as the excess insurer asserting the notice defense that the notice requirements had been satisfied.

 

Because UnitedHealth had “failed to show that there is a genuine issue of fact about whether the Claims Department received notice of the AMA claim during the policy period,” Judge Schlitz granted the excess insurer’s motion for summary judgment.

 

Discussion

Judge Schlitz’s conclusion that an insurance notice requirement is not satisfied unless it can be shown that notice has been given to the specific department identified in the notice provision is a cautionary tale for practitioners in this area. In the press of day to day business, it would be far too easy for a notice to be sent to the right company but to a person, location or address other than the one specified in the policy. The clear lesson is that everyone involved in the process of providing notice of claim to needs to help to ensure that notice is sent not just to the correct insurer but also to the correct location – and to the correct location for each of the insurers in an insurance program. The case also underscores the value of having processes to require and obtain acknowledgement of receipt of notice of claim as well.

 

UnitedHealth’s apparent failure to provide the requisite notice of claim here is a little bit of a mystery. The claim was obviously very serious (or, at a minimum, it became very serious). It is clear from the Court’s opinion that the primary insurer on UnitedHealth’s insurance program was provided with the notice of claim required under its policy. It isn’t explained in the opinion how it came about the notice of claim had been sent to the prmary insurer (and apparentlyto other excess insurers as well) but not to the excess insurer involved in this motion. The court’s reference to the monthly loss runs is a reminder that UnitedHealth is a big, complex company that apparently became involved in a number of claims. The suggestion is that in the hubbub the notice of the AMA claim to this excess insurer somehow slipped through the cracks. Reading between the lines, there may also have been a confusion of or breakdown in responsibilities among the varaious process participants.

 

There is one aspect of this opinion that I find interesting. There is nothing in Judge Schlitz’s opinion to suggest that the excess insurer was prejudiced in any way by the absence of compliance with the policy’s notice provisions. At least as presented in the court’s opinion, it does not appear that the excess insurer argued that its interests had been prejudiced. The court was concerned only with the question whether or not the policyholder had satisfied the procedural requirements stated in the policy. There is no sense in the opinion of a consideration of a “no harm, no foul” point of view. .

 

The arguably harsh outcome of this dispute might be more comfortable if the analysis had been accompanied by some suggestion that UnitedHealth’s failure to satisfy the procedural requirements had somehow caused a problem for the excess insurer with reference to the AMA claim. Here’s my concern. Some  insurers try to enforce their policies’ notice requirements as if the implementation of the provions were a game of “Mother May I?” On some occasions, some insurers brandish supposed notice issues as if, as a result of the supposed notice defect, they have won the game because the policyholder failed to say “Mother May !?” D&O insurers are of course fully entitled to expect compliance with policy requirements. However, reasonable business considerations should temper the enforcement of the requirements.

 

Judge Schlitz commented that it was fair to strictly enforce the requirements of the notice provision against a large sophisticated company like UnitedHealth. Whether or not that is true, my concern is that the same analysis as he is applying to a big sophisticated company like UnitedHealth could also be applied to a company that isn’t as big or sophisticated.

 

In all fairness, however, it should be noted that isn’t a case where a notice of claim as such was sent to the wrong address or the wrong department. Notwithstanding UnitedHealth’s arguments, it looks as if for whatever reason, there really was not a notice of claim as such sent to any address or department. Without that, UnitedHealth was left to argue that various fragments of informatoin about the claim could be shown to have filtered through a complex pattern of interaction between the company and the excess insurer. That was aloways going to present some difficulties for UnitedHealth. The company was not in the best position it could have been in on these issues. 

 

As I said at the outset, this case is a cautionary tale for all of us working in this business. The lesson for all of us is to try to make sure that the notice of claim both goes to the specific address stated in the policy and that it goes to all of the insurers.

 

Ninth Circuit Reverses District Court Holding That E&O Insurance Policy Exclusion Precluded Coverage: On April 26, 2012, in a terse, unpublished four-page decision, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of an insurance coverage action that Ticketmaster had filed against its error and omissions insurer. A copy of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion can be found here.

 

The errors and omissions insurance policy provided liability coverage for Ticketmaster for claims arising from the performance or the failure to perform professional services. The policy contained an exclusion, Exclusion E, specifying that the policy does not apply to any claim “based on or arising out of … any dispute involving fees, expenses or costs paid to or charged by the Insured.”

Ticketmaster was sued in a putative class action brought by ticketholders alleging that the company had made false representations regarding UPS delivery fees and order-processing charges for ticket events. Ticketmaster sought to have its E&O insurer defend it in the ticketholder claims. The insurer declined based on Exclusion E. Ticketmaster sued the insurer for breach of contract and bad faith. The district court granted the insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleading. Ticketmaster appealed.

 

In its April 26 opinion, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, holding that Exclusion E is “reasonably susceptible of at least two meanings, particularly in light of the Policy’s other 27 exclusions, and is thus ambiguous.” The appellate court identified the two possible meanings: “(i) Exclusion E may refer narrowly to a dispute regarding the monetary amount paid to or charged by Ticketmaster for uncontested services, or (ii) more generally, Exclusion E may refer to any dispute regarding a fee or charge for professional services, including a dispute regarding the relationship between services and the fees charged.”

 

The appellate court said that the E&O insurer had failed to carry its burden of showing that the second interpretation is the only reasonable one. The court noted that there are at least some allegations in the ticketholders’ action that do not involve the amount charged for uncontested services, such as the allegation that Ticketmaster performed no services in exchange for its order-processing charge. This allegation, the court said, did not dispute the amount charged but rather the relationship between any fee at all and the services provided. This dispute would be precluded by interpretation (ii) of Exclusion E but not interpretation (i).

 

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the complaint, including Ticketmaster’s bad faith allegations.

 

FDIC Files Another Failed Bank Lawsuit and Two More Bank Fail: On April 26, 2013, the FDIC filed yet another lawsuit in its against the directors and officers of a failed bank. In its complaint (here), the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver of the failed Frontier Bank of Everett, Washington, has asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against twelve former directors and officers of the bank. The bank failed on April 20, 2010, so the FDIC filed its action just before the three-year statute of limitations expired.

 

The FDIC alleges that the defendants breached their duties to the bank by “causing the Bank to violate its own policies and prudent, safe and sound banking practices” in connection with the approval of at least eleven loans between March 2007 and April 2008. The FDIC sees to recover damages “in excess of $46 million.”  An April 26, 2013 Puget Sound Business Journal article regarding the FDIC’s new Frontier Bank lawsuit can be found here.

 

Not only did the FDIC file the lawsuit against the former Frontier Bank directors and officers, but the agency also took over as receiver of two more failed banks on Friday. The two banks are the Douglas County Bank of Douglasville, Georgia and the Parkway Bank of Lenior, North Carolina. Between January 1, 2013 and April 20, 2013, there were only five bank failures total,  but just in the last two weeks there have now been five more, for a total of ten so far during 2013. As I recently noted, though it has seemed as if the bank failure wave had just about played itself out, it now appears that there may yet be more bank failures yet to come.

 

With the failing of the latest lawsuit, the FDIC has now filed a total of 57 lawsuits against the former directors and officers of failed banks, including 13 so far this year alone. As I discussed here, it seems likely there will be more to come, as well.

 

Speakers’ Corner: On Tuesday, April 30, 2013, I will be participating in Advisen’s Quarterly D&O Claims Trends Webinar. In this free webinar, which will take place at 11:00 am EDT, I will be participating on a panel with Paul Ferrillo of the Weil Gotshal law firm, David Murray of AIG, and Jim Blinn of Advisen. The panel will discuss claims trends and developments during the first quarter of 2013. Registration information for the webinar can be found here.

 

The Wall Street Journal is reporting again on the alleged misuse of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. In its latest article on the topic, the newspaper examines what an SEC spokesman called an “exotic permutation” on the use of trading plans – that is, outside directors’ use of trading plans to allow investment funds they own or manage to trade in company shares.

 

In a November 2012 article entitled “Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock” (here), the Journal took a look at the way corporate officers’ use of trading plans facilitated profitable trades in their company stock.   The newspaper’s analyzed thousands of trades by executives. Among other things, the newspaper found numerous instances where executives, trading in company shares pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 plans, managed to extract trading profits just before bad news sent share prices down or to capture gains with purchases executed just before unexpected good news.

 

In an April 24, 2013 article entitled “Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans” (here) the Journal examined trades by outside directors pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 plans. The Journal found that directors’ use of the plans has jumped; the newspaper identified 2.210 nonexecutive directors who reported using the plans to sell stock since 2006. The Journal found that rather than use the plans to sell a fraction of their shares at regular intervals, “some directors use the plans to sell heavily in a short time.”

 

The Journal found that from 2006 through 2011, nearly a quarter of nonexecutive directors with trading plans sold more stock in one month under the plans than in the surrounding two years. Some used their plans “to unload all or the bulk of an investment fund’s holding in a company, in a spate of selling.

 

The article includes a detailed discussion of the share sales of a director of one specific company. The director had joined the company’s board when two funds managed by his private equity firm had invested in the company. Under a plan established in November 2011, one of the two funds sold 83% of its holdings in a series of trades during every trading day between January 3, 2011 and February 1, 2012. The trades during that period constituted 25% of the stock’s trading volume. Six days after the last trade, the company announced disappointing financial results and the company’s share price slumped. The article describes in detail the complaints of one of the company’s shareholders to the director and to company management about the trades. The article also reports the director’s explanation that the fund sold the shares in order to address a debt issue and that the private equity firm’s other fund had not sold any of its shares.

 

The use of trading plans by directors as a means to facilitate their investment funds’ trades in company shares was not really what the SEC had in mind when it promulgated the rule. An SEC spokesman quoted in the latest Journal article conceded that the Rule did not prohibit directors from using the plans to allow outside investment funds to trade shares, but added that the use of plans in this way also “wasn’t specifically contemplated.” The SEC spokesman described the use of plans in this way as an “exotic permutation.”

 

Insider trading has been an enforcement focus of the SEC and of the DoJ for some time now. So it came as no surprise after the initial Journal article late last year that the question of possible misuse of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans sparked interest with regulators. The SEC launched investigations in connection with trading activities at several of the companies mentioned in the prior Journal article.

 

The more recent Journal article notes that the plans “have drawn the attention of law enforcement” and reports that prosecutors have urged compliance executives “to be vigilant about trading by directors who also run investment funds.” Given the SEC”s interest in the examining the issues mentioned the prior Journal article, it seems likely that the SEC also will look into the use of trading plans described in the more recent article as well.

 

There is more than a small amount of irony in these concerns about Rule 10b5-1 plans. The Rule was established more than a decade ago to allow executives (whose wealth often is entirely locked up in company shares) to trade in the company’s stock without incurring possible liability under the securities laws.

 

There are in fact a number of cases in which courts have held that the inference of scienter that might otherwise arise from insider sales is rebutted when the sales were executed pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 trading plans. Refer here and here for a discussion of recent cases where defendants were able to rely on the Rule 10b5-1 trading plan in order to have the securities claims against them dismissed.

 

There is no doubt that these various allegations involving insider trading plans have put the plans in a negative light. However, as discussed here, a well-designed and well-executed plan can still provide substantial liability protection by allowing insiders to trade in their holdings of company stock without incurring securities liability exposure. Notwithstanding these recent developments, a well-designed Rule 10b5-1 plan remains an important part of securities litigation loss prevention.

 

There have been a number of law firm memos recently advocating the use of Rule 10b5-1 plans and providing points on proper implementation of the plans in light of the recent questions that have been raised about the plans. For example, the Covington & Burling law firm recent published a memo entitled “Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans: Avoiding the Heat” (here). The Wilson Sonsini’s March 2013 memo entitled “Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans: Considerations in Light of Increased Scrutiny” notes that “the aggressive use (or misuse) of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans is likely to become a significant area of focus for regulatory enforcement and securities lass action plaintiffs” and suggests steps companies can take to avoid problems.

 

Whistleblower information may be one of the SEC’s “most effective weapons in its new enforcement arsenal,” but the agency’s whistleblower program “faces challenges on many fronts,” according to an April 23, 2013 New York Times Dealbook article entitled “Hazy Future for Thriving S.E.C. Whistle-Blower Effort” (here). As evidence of the whistleblower program’s promise that article cites several “previously undisclosed” enforcement actions that whistleblower information have triggered or aided. Yet due to several potential obstacles and impediments, the future of the program may, according to one source cited in the article “hang in the balance right now.”

 

For its part, the agency says that it has “ramped up” its staffing and the program has “gained momentum.” As evidence of the value the program has already delivered, the article cites the agency’s investigation of Knight Capital. The SEC was already investigating problems the trading company was having following the company’s bungled installation of new trading software. The investigation had been narrow until a whistleblower came forward and “the agency was able to shift gears and expand the investigation.”

 

According to the article, with the help of a whistleblower, the agency’s investigation of the Oppenheimer’s investment firm’s alleged overstatement of the performance of a private equity fund resulted in a fine of nearly $3 million.

 

The article also details an enforcement action that resulted in the first whistleblower bounty payment under the Dodd Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions. According to the article, Dee Stone, an outside consultant to China Voice Holding Corp, received a whistleblower bounty of $46,000 (so far) for providing documents showing that the company was operating a Ponzi scheme. (Refer here for more about this award, which was the first and is so far the only award under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty program). The identity of the whistleblower and the subject of her whistleblower report had not previously been disclosed.

 

But though the program has had its successes, the SEC has also encountered obstacles from companies. Some companies have “drafted policies compelling their staffs to report fraud internally,” while other companies require employees to “attest annually that they never witnessed any fraud, a certification that could be used to discredit employees who later blew the whistle.”

 

The article also notes that companies have been accused of retaliating against whistleblowers. The article cites the September 2012 complaint that James Nordgaard filed in the Southern District of New York against his employer, Paradigm Capital Management and related entities, as well as against its founder and President, in which Nordgaard alleged that his employer retaliated against him after he notified the employer that he had reported what he believed to be illegal activities to the SEC.

 

In his complaint, a copy of which can be found here, Nordgaard sought to recover damages for retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Act. Nordgaard alleged that after he made his report, he was stripped of trading duties and “constructively terminated.” Initially, the company sought to have the dispute submitted to arbitration. In December 2012, Nordgaard voluntarily withdrew his complaint.

 

Discussion

Even though the article highlights the successes that the whistleblower program has already produced, the article nevertheless also suggests that company efforts may undermine the program or limits its usefulness. It may be true that some companies may succeed in diverting would be whistleblowers to internal programs, but even that could still be useful as long as the whistleblower’s reports are not swept under the rug but are dealt with.

 

And while company retaliation could well deter whistleblowing, the specific example of company retaliation that the article notes suggests that retaliation could be as big of a problem for the retaliating company than for the employee, given the retaliation protection available to whistleblowers under the Dodd-Frank Act.

 

The fact is that during the first full fiscal year of the whistleblower’s operation, the SEC received 3,001 whistleblower reports (as discussed in the agency’s 2012 annual whistleblower report, a copy of which can be found here). And while that number may be, as an unnamed source in the article suggests, “somewhat exaggerated,” it is clear that the SEC is receiving a very substantial number of whistleblower reports – and that is despite the deterrent efforts of some companies noted in the article.

 

The agency has at this point made only a single whistleblower bounty award. As the agency makes further awards and as those awards attract publicity, would-be whistleblowers will likely be even further motivated to come forward. As a plaintiffs’ law firm noted in a press release earlier this week, whistleblower awards provide “a reason for taking a risk.” (And it should not be overlooked that the plaintiffs’ bar clearly sees the development of a whistleblower practice as a growth opportunity. The efforts of the plaintiffs’ bar may not by itself be sufficient to cancel out the efforts of companies to try to deter whistleblowers but it does at a minimum represent a countervailing force.)

 

My take is that though companies may be taking steps to avert whistleblower problems, the whistleblower program ultimately will prove, as the article suggests, to be “one of the most effective weapons in the new enforcement arsenal.”

 

As I have said previously on this blog, if 2012 was the year in which the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program finally got off the ground, 2013 will likely be the year when the program picks up serious momentum. It seems likely  that – notwithstanding the impediments noted in the Times article — we will not only see increased enforcement activity as a result of whistleblowers’ tips, but that we will see increased numbers of whistleblowers’ bounty awards, as well as the possibility of increased private civil litigation following in the wake of the enforcement actions.

 

Smaller companies increasingly are the subject of data breaches  and those smaller companies “are the number-one target of cyber-espionage attackers,” according to a recent study detailed in a April 24, 2013 CFO.com article entitled “Should You Consider Cyber Insurance?” (here). Smaller companies increasingly are the subject of cyber attacks due to “inadequate security infrastructure for protecting financial information, customer data and intellectual property.”

 

As the cyber threats “become more pervasive,” smaller businesses are “taking out insurance policies designed to bolster their protection form the potentially crippling costs that can accompany data breaches and other cyber attacks.” Take up for this product is, according to the article, particularly strong for companies in the high-technology, financial services and health-care industries. As the article explains, these policies may be particularly valuable for smaller companies that lack the resources to undertake as robust of a preventive program as a larger company might.

 

As the article explains, the policies provide both first-party coverage (such as notification costs) and also protect against third party liability claims (such as lawsuits for damages). In a serious incident, this insurance protection, according to one commentator quoted in the article “can sometimes be a life-or-death issue for smaller companies.” The policies also cover forensic IT examinations to determine how a breach occurred and some policies even provide for public relations services to mitigate negative publicity. Again, these services could be particularly valuable for a smaller company that may not have sufficient crisis management resources available.

 

This type of insurance is of course no substitute for proactive cybersecurity risk management, “such as sound data-protection protocols and employee education.” In any event, as part of the application process, the insurance company will want reassurance that these kinds of efforts and protocols are in place. The insurance provides company owners and managers reassurance that the company will be able to weather the storm if problems do emerge.

 

According to the article, as news about cyber breaches become increasingly common, more and more companies will conclude that the cost-benefit analysis weighs in favor or purchasing this type of insurance.

 

In what the plaintiffs’ lawyers claim to be the largest derivative lawsuit settlement ever, the parties to the News Corp. shareholder derivative litigation have agreed to settle the consolidated cases for $139 million. The company also agreed to tighten oversight of the company’s operations and to establish a whistleblower hotline, as well as other corporate therapeutics. The cash portion of the settlement is to be funded entirely by D&O insurance. The settlement is subject to court approval.

 

The parties’ April 17, 2013 memorandum of understanding regarding the settlement can be found here. The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ April 22, 2013 press release in which, among other things, the plaintiffs’ lawyers state that the settlement is “the largest cash derivative settlement on record” can be found here. The lead plaintiffs’ press release can be found here. As reflected in the press releases as well as is stated in the many media reports about the settlement (refer for example, here), the entire cash portion of the $139 million settlement is to be funded by D&O insurance.

 

The first of the lawsuits against the News Corp. board was filed in Delaware Chancery Court in March 2011, asserting claims in connection with the company’s $675 million acquisition of Shine Group, Ltd., a U.K.-based television production company owned by Elizabeth Murdoch, daughter of News Corp. Chairman Rupert Murdoch. Elizabeth Murdoch allegedly made $250 million in the acquisition.. Later complaints expanded on claims relating to the Shine Group acquisition and  added extensive additional claims seeking to hold the company’s directors accountable for the scandal surrounding the company’s use and attempted cover-up of illegal reporting tactics of some News Corp. journalists in the U.K. The various cases were later consolidated in the Delaware Chancery Court.

.

In their Third Amended Consolidated Complaint (here), the plaintiffs alleged that the company’s board’s oversight of the company’s affairs represented a “textbook example of failed corporate governance and domination by a controlling shareholder.” The complaint alleges that for years “the Board has condoned Murdoch’s habitual use of News Corp. to pursue his quest for power, control and political gain and to enrich himself and his family members, at the Company’s and its public shareholders’ expense.” The complaint alleges that the ongoing scandals have not only harmed the company’s reputation and cost it millions of defense costs and other expenses, but also that the company’s share price is artificially depressed because of the negative association of the company with Murdoch.

 

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated amended complaint. The parties argued the motion to dismiss on September 19, 2012 (refer here). While the dismissal motion was pending, the parties engaged in mediation that ultimately resulted in settlement.

 

The plaintiffs’ lawyers claim that this is the largest cash shareholders’ derivative settlement ever, and I am certainly in no position to dispute that. I have been tracking derivative suit settlements for years. There have been several shareholder derivative suit settlements that were nearly as large as the News Corp. settlement but as far as I can tell none that were quite as big:

 

  • The El Paso/Kinder Morgan merger-related derivative suit settled in September 2012 for $110 million (refer here)

.

  • In 2005, the Oracle derivative suit settled based on the payment by Oracle CEO Larry Ellison of a total of $122 million (refer here and here).

 

  • In September 2009, the parties to the Broadcom Corp. options backdating-related shareholders’ derivative suit agreed to settle the case, as to most but not all of the defendants, for the D&O insurers’ agreement to pay $118 million (as discussed here).

 

  • In September 2008, the parties to the 2002 AIG shareholders’ derivative lawsuit agreed to settle the case for a payment of $115 million (of which $85.5 million was to paid by D&O insurance) in what was touted at the time as the largest Delaware Chancery Court derivative lawsuit settlement (about which refer here).

 

These settlements are all dwarfed by the  $2.876 billion judgment entered in June 2009 against Richard Scrushy in the HealthSouth shareholders’ derivative lawsuit in Jefferson County (Alabama) Circuit Court, but that astronomical judgment represents its own peculiar point of reference, like some odd parallel universe. It also was of course a judgment following trial rather than a settlement.

 

Another peculiar point of reference is the $1.262 billion judgment that Chancellor Leo Strine entered in October 2011 the Southern Peru Copper Corporation Shareholder Derivative Litigation (about which refer here). That case also represents its own form of litigation reality, and it too represents a derivative suit judgment following trial, rather than a settlement.

 

Another derivative lawsuit resolution that is worth considering in the context of the “largest ever” question is the December 2007 settlement of the UnitedHealth Group options backdating-related derivative lawsuit. As discussed here, the lawsuit settled for a total nominal value of approximately $900 million. However, while the press reports at the time described the settlement as the largest derivative settlement ever, the value contributed to the settlement consisted of the surrender by the individual defendants of certain rights, interests and stock option awards, not cash value in that amount.

 

Aside from the question of the News Corp. derivative suit settlement’s sheer size, there is also the fact that the settlement was funded entirely by D&O insurance. Given the amount of the settlement, the settlement costs undoubtedly were distributed across the several carriers that participated in News Corp.’s D&O insurance program. This large settlement not only represents a serious and unwelcome development for the specific carriers involved but it also represents a potentially unwelcome event for the D&O insurance industry in general, for what it might represent as far as the severity potential of shareholders’ derivative litigation.

 

In the past, going back ten years or so, shareholders’ derivative suits typically did not present the possibility of significant cash payouts for D&O insurers, at least in terms of settlements or judgments. The cases did present the possibility of significant defense expense and also of the possibility of having to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, but by and large there was usually not a cash settlement component. As the significant examples above show, that has clearly changed in more recent years.

 

This trend gained particular momentum with the options backdating scandal. Many of the options backdating cases were filed as derivative suits rather than as securities class action lawsuits (largely because the options backdating disclosures did not always result in the kinds of significant share price declines required to support a securities class action lawsuit). Many of the options backdating cases settlements included a cash component, and as illustrated by the Broadcom case mentioned above, some of the options backdating derivative suit settlements included very substantial cash components

.

The inclusion of a significant cash component has also been a feature of the settlements of some of the merger objection suits that have been filed as part of the current upsurge in M&A-related lawsuit that have been filed in recent years, as illustrated by the El Paso settlement mentioned above.

 

This upsurge in the number of derivative suit settlements that include a significant cash component can only be viewed with alarm by the D&O insurance industry. For many years, D&O insurers have considered that their significant severity exposure consisted of securities class action lawsuits. The undeniable reality is that in at least some circumstances, derivative suits increasingly represent a severity risk as well. And the settlement amounts themselves represent only part of the D&O insurers’ loss costs. The D&O insurers also incur millions and possibly tens of million of defense cost expense in these derivative suits. I can only imagine that in the News Corp. derivative suit, for example, that the cumulative defense expense was in the millions of dollars.

 

An even more concerning aspect of the rise of significant cash settlements in derivative cases for D&O insurers is that these settlement amounts represent so-called “A Side” losses. That is, the losses are paid out under the portion or the D&O insurance policy that provide insurance for nonindemnifiable loss. A derivative suit settlement obviously is not indemnifiable, because if it were to be indemnified, the company’s would make the indemnity payment to itself. For the “traditional” D&O insurance carriers, there is perhaps no particular pain associated with the fact that the loss is paid under the “Side A” portion of the policy, as opposed the other policy coverage (that is, the “Side B” or “Side C” coverage that are more typically called into play). But these days many companies carry –in addition to their traditional D&O insurance that includes all three coverages (that is, they include Sides A, B and C coverage) — additional layers of excess Side A insurance.

 

This excess Side A insurance would not be available to provide funding for, say, a securities class action lawsuit, at least if the corporate defendant were solvent, because the settlement of a securities class action lawsuit is an indemnifiable loss to which coverages B and C might apply but to which coverage A does not apply. However, the Side A coverage does apply to a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit settlement because the settlement amount represents a nonindemnifiable loss. So while a jumbo securities class action settlement typically would not trigger coverage under an Excess Side A policy, a jumbo derivative settlement would trigger the Excess Side A policies.

 

The question for the carriers providing this type of excess Side A insurance is whether or not the premiums they are getting are adequate to compensate them for the risks of the kinds of losses associated with large cash shareholders derivative settlements. By and large, the carriers providing this insurance consider that their most significant exposure is related to claims in the insolvency context. But as this settlement and the Broadcom settlement mentioned above demonstrate, it is also possible that the Side A insurance can be implicated in a jumbo derivative settlement as well as in a settlement in the insolvency context.

 

The increasing risk of this type of settlement represents a significant challenge for all D&O insurers, but particularly for those D&O insurers concentrating on providing Excess Side A insurance. Those insurers will have to ask how they are to underwrite the risks associated with these kinds of exposures, and how they are to make certain that their premiums adequately compensate them for the risk.

 

Dan Fisher has an interesting April 22, 2012 article in Forbes (here) discussing the questions associated with the funding of this type of settlement exclusively through D&O insurance.

 

Finally, as Alison Frankel points out in an April 22, 2013 post on her On the Case blog (here), the News Corp. settlement includes what she describes as an “historic concession”: in the settlement, News Corp. agreed “to disclose its campaign and political action committee contributions to shareholders and its lobbying and Super PAC spending to the board.” Frankel quotes sources to the effect that the News Corp. case represents the first time that a derivative lawsuit has been used as a vehicle to obtain enhanced disclosure of corporate political spending.

.

What are the factors that affect the timing of securities class action lawsuit dismissals and that affect the timing and size of securities suit settlements? These are the questions examined in an April 2012 PLUS Journal article entitled “When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle and For How Much? An Update” (here) by Stanford Law School Professor Michael Klausner and his colleagues Jason Hogland and Matthew Goforth. In this article, the authors update their earlier research on these same questions.

 

In order to examine these issues, the authors examined the 652 securities class action lawsuits filed between 2006 and 2010. Of the 652 cases, 119 (18%) are ongoing, 257 (40%) have settled, 206 (32%) have been dismissed with prejudice, and 74 (11%) have been voluntarily dropped. Disregarding amounts paid in settlement by third parties (such as offering underwriters), of the cases from this period that settled, the mean settlement amount is $36 million and the median is $9 million.

 

The authors followed the progression of these cases through the motion to dismiss stage. They found that, among other things, as a result of a combination of dismissal motion rulings, voluntary withdrawls and settlements reached before a dismissal motion ruling, over half of all securities class action lawsuits “end well before discovery and before even a second complaint is filed.”

 

In 25% percent of cases, the motion to dismiss is granted with prejudice, on average within 19 months of the date on which the complaints were first filed. An additional 9% of cases were voluntarily dropped before the dismissal motion was heard, and another four percent were dropped after the motion to dismiss was granted without prejudice. Thus, a total of 38% of cases “ended relatively quickly and painlessly for defendants.”

 

In addition, another 13% of cases settled before the motion to dismiss was heard and another 2% of cases settled after the court granted a motion to dismiss without prejudice but before the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. These cases “entailed costs to defendants and their insurers, but they did not involve extended litigation.”

 

In 34% of cases, the court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, of which 85% of plaintiffs filed a second complaint. The outcome of the second complaint cases roughly parallels the outcomes at the first complaint stage. On average about 30 months passed between the initial filing and the resolution of these second complaint stages. Only five percent of cases reached the third complaint stage, and even fewer involve subsequent complaints. The authors conclude that “relatively few cases entail the filing of a second, third or later consolidated complaint.”

 

Of all cases that are ultimately dismissed with prejudice, 66% are dismissed at the first complaint stage, 28% are dismissed at the second complaint stage, and 6% are dismissed at the third complaint stage. (Only one case was dismissed at the fourth complaint stage and one was dismissed at the fifth complaint stage.)

 

Certain factors clearly affect the likelihood of dismissal. For example, when a securities suit involves a parallel SEC enforcement action, the class action was dismissed in only 12% of cases. Cases that involved restatements “were dismissed less frequently than cases that involve non-restatement accounting issues, which in turn were dismissed less frequently than are non-accounting cases.”

 

In looking at the timing of settlement, the authors categorized the procedural stages of the cases as early pleading (that is, up through the first dismissal motion ruling), later pleading (involving the pleading stages following the first ruling but before the final determination), and discovery (involving the period after the dismissal motion has finally been denied). Forty three percent of settlements occur in the early or late pleading stage, that is while there is still a possibility of dismissal. Just under 60% of settlements occur in the discovery stage, some shortly after the motion to dismiss is denied.

 

For cases that settle after the motion to dismiss is denied, the time it takes the cases to settle ranges from one month to 46 months, but the mean length of time for a case to settle after the dismissal motion is denied is 16 months.

 

The authors found that settlement size is related to settlement timing. Settlement size increases as the cases move through the early pleading stage to the discovery stage. The mean settlement for cases that settle in the discovery stage is over $60 million, while the mean settlement of cases that settle in the early pleading stages is less than $20 million.

 

However, though the settlements tend to grow larger as the cases progress, the settlements as a percentage of shareholder losses decline as the cases advance through the various stages. The authors attribute this seeming contradiction to company size, as larger companies tend to settle later than smaller companies. Though cases involving larger companies settle for larger amounts in terms of absolute numbers of dollars, smaller companies tend to settle for a larger fraction of shareholder losses.

 

The authors concluded by noting that their findings in this latest updated study are consistent with the finding in their prior study, which had focused on cases filed between 2000 and 2004. The authors note that “it appears that the forces shaping the patterns of dismissal and settlement over the past decade have remained stable.”

 

The SEC’s conflicts minerals disclosure rules, promulgated as required under provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, became effective on January 1, 2013, requiring companies to make their first conflict minerals disclosures on or before May 31, 2014 for the 2013 reporting year, as I detailed in a recent post. But though it is widely recognized that the conflicts minerals disclosure requirements impose challenging compliance requirements on reporting companies, many companies have yet to commence their efforts to be prepared for the reporting deadline. In addition, there is some suggestion that the very existence of the requirements may be having the perverse effect of exacerbating the conditions that the disclosure requirements were intended to address.

 

The conflict mineral disclosure requirements are intended to identify the use in manufactured products of certain specified minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo and adjacent countries. The four specific conflict minerals are tin, tantalite, tungsten and gold (the so-called 3TGs). The minerals are found in many high tech products. For example, tantalite is an essential part of most cellphones. The countries covered by the disclosure rules are, in addition to the DRC, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (the “Covered Countries”)

 

On a positive note, some companies are in fact undertaking aggressive efforts to try to be able to determine whether its parts suppliers on rely on conflicts minerals. For example, as described in an April 15, 2013 post on the New York Times Bits blog (here), Hewlett-Packard has identified ore smelters around the world that are identified with its products in order to enable its part suppliers to ensure that their minerals were not obtained from conflict zones. (H-P’s April 15, 2013 announcement regarding the ore smelters can be found here.) H-P intends to rely on a third-party to audit the smelters documentation as a way to monitor the possible presence of conflicts minerals.

 

However, a recent article in the Wall Street Journal suggests how difficult it may be for companies to rely on documentation to monitor their parts suppliers’ compliance. In an April 14, 2013 article entitled “Inside Congo’s Link in the Gold Chain” (here), the Journal showed how easily smugglers are able to obtain false documentation for gold smuggled out of the DRC. Smuggler networks ferry gold out of the DRC to neighboring counties (such as Uganda or the South Sudan), where it is recertified and then flown to key entry points around the Middle East (particularly Dubai). As the Journal notes, “the faint paper trail disappears as soon as it arrives in Dubai.” In Dubai, the smuggled minerals are mixed into scrap bars, which are then sold for cash or smuggled into other countries.

 

Even worse, these highly profitable smuggling operations may be a direct result of the new disclosure requirements.  The disclosure requirements are built on the belief that if minerals’ source of origin is identified and disclosed, buyers can avoid minerals from the conflict regions. Because the flow of minerals is helping to finance the conflict within the DRC, the hope is that reducing the global market for the minerals will create incentives for peace there. However, as the Journal article shows, “the opportunities for illicit gains only increased” after Congress created the disclosure requirements with the Dodd-Frank Act. The smugglers’ potential profits are significantly boosted because the new disclosure requirements have “squeezed the legitimate market for the Congolese minerals.” Perversely, the requirements could actually increase the profits available for those trading in the conflict minerals.

 

Just to add to the confusion, the SEC’s conflicts minerals disclosure rules have been challenged in the courts. As I discussed previously, on October 19, 2012, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia requesting that the SEC’s rule be set aside in whole or in part. The challenge remains pending.

 

As if that were not enough, the situation could be even further complicated with the introduction of additional conflicts minerals rules from other countries and organizations. For example, Canada and the European Union are both considering new disclosure requirements that may differ from the U.S. requirements. The requirements under consideration in Canada could be broad than those in the U.S. and could include additional countries and minerals, raising the possibility of overlapping yet inconsistent rules, which has the potential to create confusion and inefficiencies.

 

With all of the murkiness surrounding the situation, many companies are slow of the mark in getting ready to meet the new disclosure guidelines. As discussed in an April 16, 2013 Compliance Week article (here), a recent PwC survey determined that many company have “intentionally delayed” conflicts minerals compliance efforts. Though of course there are companies (such as H-P) that are actively working to be able to meet the initial disclosure mandates, many other companies are, according to the PwC study, are “playing the waiting game.” Nearly 17 percent of respondents in the PwC survey “haven’t done much or are waiting to see what happens” with the legal challenge. As noted by a PwC representative in the article, “waiting until the legal challenge is resolved to begin compliance efforts is a huge gamble and n unwise approach.” There is a real concern that “many companies are getting too late a start to adequately meet the May 2014 deadline.”

 

In short, the landscape surrounding the conflict minerals disclosure requirements is fraught with peril. On the one hand, companies taking a more passive approach run a significant risk of being unable to meet the initial disclosure deadline. On the other hand, murky and potentially changing or conflicting requirements make it difficult for the companies to proceed efficiently. And finally, the complex and uncertain circumstances surrounding the global distribution of conflict minerals present significant challenges for all of the process participants to make the source of origin determinations that underlie the disclosure requirements mandate.

 

In other words, there is a great deal of risk surrounding the new disclosure requirements. The murkiness and confusion surrounding the requirements and the challenging nature of the compliance obligations suggest that, unless the courts set the requirements aside, the conflicts mineral disclosure requirements will become an increasing source of concern as the first disclosure deadline approaches.

 

I expect that conflicts minerals disclosure is going to an increasingly important source of comment and concern in the months ahead.

 

The fallout from the ongoing banking crisis continues to emerge, with the arrival in recent days of still more bank failures and of even more FDIC lawsuits involving failed banks. Unfortunately, the hopes that that all of the bank failures might be safely behind us, or, as I recently suggested on this blog, the hopes that we might be in a “lull” in the failing of failed bank lawsuits, have been dashed. As developments this past week show, banks continue to fail and the FDIC is continuing to actively pursue litigation against the directors and officers of failed banks – and even against the failed bank’s outside professionals.

 

With respect to the bank failures, the FDIC announced on its website this past Friday night the closure of three more banks, two in Florida and one in Kentucky. The two Florida banks are the Chipola Community Bank of Marianna, Florida and the Heritage Bank of Northern Florida of Orange Park, Florida. The Kentucky bank is the First Federal Bank of Lexington, Kentucky. Prior to the closure of these three banks on Friday, there had only been a total of five bank closures so far during all of 2013, and only two since February 1, 2013. It really did seem as if the bank failure wave might finally have played itself out and that the banking crisis of the past few years had safely moved into the moping up phase. These three latest bank failures suggest that the banking failure wave may yet have further to go and that we could continue to see still more bank closures as the year unfolds.

 

With respect to the failed bank lawsuits, just this past Tuesday I had noted that pace of the FDIC’s new lawsuit filings seemed to have slowed. In the preceding month, the FDIC had filed just one new lawsuit and the agency had filed only four new lawsuits since February 1, 2013. However, I did also note that late April 2010 had been a particularly busy period for bank failures and that during late April 2013 nearly two dozen banks would be reaching the third anniversary of their closure date. (The FDIC typically files its failed bank lawsuits close to the third anniversary owing to statute of limitations considerations.)

 

As I anticipated might happen given the number of bank closures in April 2010, this past week the FDIC filed at least two new failed bank lawsuits in connection with two banks whose third year anniversary date fell just after the date on which the FDIC filed its complaints.

 

First, on April 15, 2013, the FDIC filed a lawsuit in its capacity as a receiver for the failed City Bank of Lynwood, Washington filed a complaint against the bank’s founder and former CEO and against a loan officer in the bank’s real estate department. City Bank failed on April 16, 2010, so the FDIC filed its complaint the day before the third anniversary of the bank’s closure. In its complaint, a copy of which can be found here, the FDIC asserted claims against the two defendants for negligence, gross negligence and for breaches of fiduciary duties for “approving, in violation of the City Bank Loan Policy and prudent, safe and sound lending practices, at least 26 loans between May 2005 ad October 2008.” The FDIC’s complaint seeks damages of “not less than $41 million.” An April 16, 2013 Seattle Times article about the lawsuit can be found here.

 

Second, and also on April 15, 2013, the FDIC in its capacity as receiver of the failed Riverside National Bank of Ft. Pierce, Florida, filed a complaint in the Southern District of Florida against eight former directors and officers of the failed bank. Riverside National Bank also failed on April 16, 2010, so again the FDIC took it right down to the wire, filing its complaint the day before the three year statute of limitations period expired. In its complaint, a copy of which can be found here, the FDIC seeks to recover “in excess of $8 million” in damages caused by the defendants’ alleged breaches of duties, gross negligence and negligence “based on defendants’ permitting an excessive number of poorly underwritten loans to be made that were secured solely or largely by the stock of [affiliates of the bank’s holding company].” Owing to the familiarity with the circumstances involving these affiliates, the defendants “had personal knowledge of the dangers inherent in such stock loans.” An April 17, 2013 South Florida Business Journal article about the lawsuit can be found here.

 

So after filing only two lawsuits between March 1, 2013 and April 12, 2013, the FDIC filed two new lawsuits in a single day on April 15, 2013. As I noted in my recent post, there were 22 bank failures during the period between April 16, 2010 and April 30, 2010. I speculated that this large group of bank failures in a compressed period in late April 2010 might produce a flurry of new lawsuit filings during the last two weeks of April 2013; the arrival of these two latest lawsuit bears out this supposition and suggests that we may see further suits in the next few days as the third anniversary of these various April 2010 bank closures approaches. In any event, the arrival of these two new suits puts to rest any suggestion of a “lull” in the filing of new failed bank lawsuits.

 

In addition to these two latest lawsuits against former directors and officers of failed banks, the FDIC has also recently filed a lawsuit against the outside law firm of a failed bank. On March 15, 2013, the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver for the failed Orion Bank of Naples Florida, filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida against the Nason Yeager Gerson White & Lioce law firm, and against two partners of the firm, Alan I. Armour II and Ryan P. Aiello. Orion Bank failed in November 2009. In its complaint, a copy of which can be found here, the FDIC alleges that the defendants “inexcusably failed to recognize a slew of glaring red flags.”

 

The complaint alleges that the bank had retained the firm in connection with certain loans to entities controlled by a local businessman, Francesco Mileto, a borrower who already owed the bank $43 million. The complaint alleges that by June 29, 2009, the date the new loans closed, the defendants “should have known that these loans were in fact the center of a conspiracy among the Bank’s officers to manipulate the Bank’s accounting, deceive the Bank’s Board of Directors … and illegally finance the purchase of stock in the Bank’s own holding company.” The “obvious red flags” did not dissuade the defendants from disbursing $26.5 million in violation of the terms and conditions of the loans and in violation of the law. The defendants’ allegedly “turned a blind eye to the Bank’s officers’ brazen disregard for the internal and legal constraints on their lending.” As a result, the bank allegedly sustained losses in excess of $31 million. The complaint asserts claims of legal malpractice, professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

 

According to a April 17, 2013 South Florida Business Journal article about the lawsuit, here, Mileto and Orion Bank’s former CEO have both previously been sentenced to prison for inflating the bank’s capital levels through a scheme to purchase bank stock using  the proceeds of loans from the bank. 

 

The arrival of this lawsuit against the failed bank’s outside law firm is interesting. In many ways, the FDIC’s litigation approach during the current bank failure wave has been quite similar to the approach that the FDIC and the other banking regulatory agencies followed during the S&L Crisis. The one way the FDIC’s approach this time seemed to differ is that the last time around, the banking regulators had aggressively pursued the outside professionals that had advised the failed banks and the failed banks’ boards of directors. From my perspective, the FDIC has not been as aggressive in pursuing the FDIC’s outside professionals.

 

To be sure, there have been some noteworthy cases where the FDIC has filed claims against failed banks’ outside professionals. For example, as discussed here, in November 2012, the FDIC filed an action against PwC and Crowe Horvath, the former accountants for the failed Colonial Bank of Montgomery, Alabama. In addition, as discussed here, in the October 2011 lawsuit that the FDIC filed its capacity as receiver of the failed Mutual Bank of Harvey, Illinois, the FDIC’s complaint named as defendants not only certain former directors and officers of the bank, but also the bank’s outside General Counsel, who was also a director of the bank, and the General Counsel’s law firm.

 

But even though as these cases show there have been instances where the agency has pursued claims against failed banks’ former accountants or former lawyers, the FDIC has not as actively pursued claims against outside professionals as it did during the S&L crisis. The FDIC states on the professional liability lawsuit page on its website that, other than lawsuits involving the former directors and officers of failed banks, the agency has authorized an additional 51 lawsuits for “fidelity bond, insurance, attorney malpractice, appraiser malpractice, accounting malpractice, and RMBS claims.” The website does not specify from among these 51 additional authorized lawsuits how many relate specifically to attorney or accountant malpractice. The FDIC’s recent filing against the former outside law firm for the failed Orion Bank, as well as the prior two cases cited above, does show that at least in certain instances the FDIC does intend to pursue claims against failed banks’ outside attorneys and accountants.

 

In any event, with the FDIC’s filing of the latest two failed bank D&O lawsuits described above, the FDIC has now filed a total of 56 lawsuits against the former directors and officers of failed banks during the current bank failure wave, including 12 so far during 2013. The professional liability lawsuit page on the FDIC’s website states that as of April 12, 2013, the agency has authorized lawsuits against former directors and officers of in connection with 109 failed institutions, inclusive of the now 56 lawsuits involving 55 failed institutions that have already been filed. The gap between the number of suits authorized and the number filed suggests the possibility of as many as 53 additional lawsuits are yet to come. In addition, each month for the past several months, the FDIC has increased the number of lawsuits it has authorized, so the number of potential lawsuits in the pipeline likely is even greater than the current gap between the numbers of authorized and filed lawsuits suggests. In other words, it seems likely that we will continue to see the arrival of additional failed bank lawsuits in the weeks and months to come.

 

One final note. As I previously noted, in response to media pressure, the FDIC recently has added a new page to its website on which the agency has linked to settlement agreements that the agency has reached in connection with claims and lawsuits that agency has failed or asserted as part of the current bank failure wave. There is a lot of information in the settlement agreements to which the agency has linked on the page. As Joe Montelone notes in an interesting April 19, 2013 post on his blog, The D&O and E&O Monitor, the agency’s publication of these agreements on its website raises a number of interesting issues and presents some potential challenges for defendants and D&O insurers in other claims and lawsuits.

 

A Note to Readers: This past Wednesday, I added a new post about the $500 million settlement agreement that the parties reached in the Countrywide mortgage backed securities litigation. I composed and published the post while sitting in the boarding area at the Cleveland airport, waiting to board a delayed flight to Chicago (I spent quite a bit of time this past week sitting in airports waiting for various delayed flights). In my haste to publish the post before boarding the flight, I put the post up on my site with a typo in the blog post title – I referred to “Countrywide” as “Countywide.” I am grateful to a number of readers who caught the typo and who sent me notes about it. However, I have not corrected the error, for a very simple reason. If I were to make the change, the software running my blog would think I had added a new blog post, and would send out emails to all of my readers as if I had added a new post.

 

We all get too many emails. I don’t want to add to the burden by having a bunch of potentially confusing emails going out to all of my readers. Because I don’t want to burden everyone with a completely unnecessary email, I am just going to have to live with the typo. So – my apologies for the error, it is just one of the side effects of the way in which this blog is created, developed and maintained. I hope that readers can look at the typo and recognize that I am living with the embarrassment of the error rather than contributing to email pollution. My thanks to everyone who sent me notes about the typo. I always appreciate it when people help me out by spotting possible errors. In this instance, the error will have to stand uncorrected.

 

In what is the largest settlement so far of an mortgage-backed securities class action lawsuit filed as part of the subprime and credit-crisis securities litigation wave, the parties to the consolidated Countrywide mortgage-backed securities suit pending in the Central District of California have agreed to settle the litigation for $500 million. The settlement is subject to court approval. The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ April 17, 2013 press release describing the settlement can be found here.

 

The consolidated litigation that has been settled involves several different lawsuits and several different sets of claimants. Background regarding the litigation can be found here.  All of the claimants allege that they purchased mortgage-backed securities that had been issued by Countrywide prior to its acquisition by Bank of America, and that the offering documents accompanying the offering contained misrepresentations and omissions about the mortgages underlying the securities. Among other things, the claimants alleged that the defendants had misrepresented the underlying process that had been used in the origination of the mortgages and the creditworthiness of the mortgage borrowers.

 

This litigation has a long and complicated procedural history. Among other cases that are consolidated in this litigation is the Luther v. Countrywide case, which I have written about several times in the past, as pertains to questions of concurrent state court jurisdiction under Section 22 of the ’33 Act. (Refer here for the background of the Luther case and a discussion of the jurisdictional issues involved.)

 

Further complicating the attempts to settle the case is that during the pendency of the case, Central District of California Judge Marianne Pfaelzer entered several orders dismissing certain groups of claimants on standing and tolling issues. These dismissed claimants preserved rights to appeal these rulings. However, all of the claimants claims are settled through this settlement, including even those whose claims had been dismissed and who might have appealed the dismissal rulings.

 

According to Steve Toll of the Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll law firm, who is lead counsel for the class plaintiffs, a plan of allocation will have to be agreed to in order to apportion the settlement amount among the various groups of plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ lawyers will have to negotiate a proposed allocation amongst themselves and submit a plan of allocation when the settlement papers are submitted to the court.

 

The $500 million settlement is by far the largest settlement of a mortgage-backed securities class action lawsuit (MBS) as part of the current subprime and credit crisis litigation wave. The next largest MBS securities suit settlement is the December 2011 $315 million Merrill Lynch mortgage backed securities settlement, followed by the $125 million Wells Fargo mortgage backed securities suit settlement. There have of course been larger subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action settlements, led by the massive $2.43 billion BofA/Merrill Lynch merger settlement, among others. However, these other larger settlements did not relate to mortgage backed securities, which, as the procedural history of these cases show, posed a different set of hurdles for the prospective claimants. Overall, this settlement ranks as the sixth largest settlement among all subprime and credit crisis-related securities suit settlements, as shown by the settlement table that can be found here.

 

I have in any event added the Countrywide Mortgage Backed securities settlement to my running tally of settlements and other case resolutions of the subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits, which can be accessed here.