Why There Aren't Any Investor Lawsuits Yet Over the Olympus Accounting Scandal

For those of you who like me have been watching in disbelief as the accounting scandal engulfing Olympus Corp. has slowly unfolded like a slow-motion train wreck, I am sure you have many questions, but one that occurs to me in particular to ask is – why haven’t there been any lawsuits yet? After all, the company has lost over 70% of its market capitalization value (representing more than $6.4 billion) since the scandal first came to light in mid-October.

 

Not only that, but after weeks of denial, on November 8, 2011, the company admitted in a press release (here) that “it has been discovered that the Company had been engaging in deferring the posting of losses on investment securities, etc. since around the 1990s,” and that the fees the company paid to advisors in connection with three business acquisitions “had been, by means such as going through multiple funds, used in part to resolve unresolved losses on investment securities, etc., by such deferral in the posting of these losses.” The company also separately announces on November 8, 2011 (here) that its board had voted to dismiss a company officer whom the company said in a press release “was found to be involved in such deferral in posting of the losses.” In addition, the company also announced that its Standing Corporate Auditor had resigned.

 

A few facts start to fill in the explanation of why there have been no lawsuits yet, despite all of these circumstances and revelations, and despite the magnitude of the drop in the company’s market capitalization.

 

First, the company’s shares trade on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. While American Depositary Receipts trade on the Pink Sheets in the U.S., those securities, according to Jonathan Stempel’s November 9, 2011 Reuters article entitled “Olympus Investors May Find Courthouse Door Closed” (here), represent only about one percent of the company’s float, and no single investor has as much as even $1 million of the ADRs.

 

With the vast preponderance of the company’s shares trading on the Tokyo exchange, only a very small number of Olympus investors, representing a very small share of the company’s pre-loss market capitalization, would be able to assert claims in U.S. court under U.S. law, in light of the “transaction” test first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in its June 2010 holding in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case (about which refer here). Under the Morrison holding, the U.S. securities laws simply do not apply with respect to the transactions in which those investors who bought their Olympus shares on the Tokyo exchange.

 

The investors might try to sue Olympus and its directors and officers in U.S. court under Japanese law, but that does not really seem like a realistic alternative. Toyota’s investors tried to assert  Japanese securities law claims in their securities class action lawsuit filed in the wake of that company’s sudden acceleration scandal. As discussed here, in July 2011, Central District of California Judge Dale Fischer rejected the argument that she had jurisdiction over the Toyota shareholders’ Japanese law securities claims. Among other things, she said that the requirements of comity strongly militated against her exercising jurisdiction over the Toyota shareholders’ Japanese law claims. 

 

While the Olympus shareholders might well consider the possibility of pursuing the claims under Japanese law in Japan, the problem they have is that Japan’s courts do not have a class action procedure like that in the U.S., and as the Reuters article linked above discusses, there may be questions about how damages would be calculated under Japanese law. (That said, prior corporate scandals in Japan have triggered securities litigation in that country, as discussed here.)

 

One alternative gambit the Olympus shareholder might try in order to be able to pursue claims in the U.S. is to try to assert claims under the law of one of the U.S. states. That is a maneuver the shareholder plaintiffs are trying to pull off in the BP shareholder litigation arising out of the Gulf oil spill, as discussed in Alison Frankel’s November 9, 2011 article on Thomson Reuters News and Insight about the BP case. But as Frankel discusses, this effort to try to assert class claims under state securities class is fraught with difficulties.

 

With all of these difficulties, we may not see any shareholder litigation arising out the Olympus scandal any time soon. In the meantime, though, there is a growing list of questions about this increasingly bizarre story, such as – what were the investment losses that the company was trying to mask, and how big were they? Exactly how were the merger transactions used to mask those losses? Are there other losses that have not been disclosed or were there other transactions used to mask those or other losses? Are there other inflated assets that have to be written off? Who among the company’s management were aware of these accounting maneuvers?

 

This is one of the more striking stories to come along in a long time, both in terms of the scale and the duration of the coverup, as well as the complexity of the means of the deception. It seems likely that whether or not there ultimately is any shareholder litigation, that there will (or should be) some type of regulatory action. (Refer here for the strory about the Tokyo Metropolitan Police investigation of the scandal.)

 

In any event, this case surely is another reminder of the impact of the Morrison decision. There is no doubt that if all of this had come up before Morrison, there would have been a raft of lawsuits in U.S court against Olympus and its directors and officers about all of this.

 

And speaking of the breadth of Morrison’s impact, Victor Li has a very interesting November 9, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article (here), describing how the lawyers for Aloca have successfully moved to reopen the bribery case brought against the company by Aluminum Bahrain, after the case had been administratively stayed to allow a criminal probe to go forward. The company recently sought to reopen the case in order to be able to move to dismiss it under Morrison. The company will now have a chance to try to have the claims, which are based on RICO, dismissed. (For more background about the Alcoa case, refer here.)

 

One final thought about the Olympus case. For those who have been trying to think about where the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions might lead, it is worth thinking about the fact that the scandal began with the company’s CEO confronting the board. It does not take too much imagination to picture someone like him or another officer of a company subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction running to the SEC with this story. The bounty provisions under the Dodd-Frank Act certainly would in these circumstances present a hefty incentive for the prospective whistleblowers.

 

When They Ask Later How Europe Went Bankrupt: There’s a scene in Ernest Hemingway’s novel, The Sun Also Rises, where Bill Gorton, the New York  friend of the book’s main character, Jake Barnes, asks Jake’s rival, Mike Campbell, “How did you go bankrupt?” Campbell responds, “Two ways. Gradually and then suddenly.”

 

I thought of this exchange as I was reading an article in the October 29, 2011 issue of The Economist about the euro crisis. I think the likely timing of the “suddenly” part of the euro crisis might be discerned in this sentence in the article: “[i]n the next three years Italy and Spain will have to refinance about €1 trillion-worth of bonds, not counting additional borrowing to finance their deficits.”  A three-year time frame may sound more like "gradually" -- that is, unless bond investors start assessing how likely likely ithe refinancing really is. .

 

 

And Finally: How about a map of every McDonald's in the United States?  (Did you know that the furthest you can get from a McDonald's Restaurant in the Continental U.S. is 110 miles?) 

 

The Essential Lessons of the "Faithless Servant"

Accompanying the various print media stories this past week about the latest judicial developments involving jailed former Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski was the iconic photo of Kozlowski draping his arms over the shoulders of a couple of beauties at his wife’s infamous $2 million birthday bash on Sardinia.

 

There’s something about this photo that captures the ego-centric excessive essence of the era of corporate scandals. Maybe it’s the look of self-impressed arrogance on Koslowski’s face. It certainly is no surprise that the pictures and videos from the birthday party were a featured part of Kozlowski’s criminal trial.

 

The reproduction of the picture in connection with last week’s story highlights the fact that if you happen to have your arms around a couple of babes at a $2 million birthday bash on Sardinia paid for by persons to whom you owe a fiduciary duty, it is a really bad idea to allow pictures. (In fairness, at his criminal trial Kozlowski argued that the company paid only half of the cost of the event, which ostensibly also had some business-related purposes.)

 

The universality of this "no pictures" principle suggested to me that it might be worthwhile to assemble in one place all of the lessons that may be derived from the various corporate scandals over the years.

 

First, there is what I will call the Fabulous Fab Rule, which is that it is a really bad idea to write emails so provocative that they wind up reproduced above the fold on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.

 

Second, there’s the the Gen Re Executives Rule, which is that it is a good idea, if you discussing by telephone a transaction to recharacterize a public company’s reported financial results, to remember that all telephone calls at your Irish trading desk are recorded.

 

Third, there is the Smartest Guys in the Room Rule, which is that if an analyst is asking a probing question that targets sensitive issues (like the fact that Enron released its financial results without a cash flow statement or a balance sheet), it is a bad idea allowing yourself to be recorded referring to the analyst as an "asshole." (Actually, Skilling’s statement was "Well, thank you very much, we appreciate that …asshole.")

 

There undoubtedly are many other similar rules in the same vein that might be added to this list, and I encourage readers that have additional thought along these lines to add them to the list using this blog’s comment feature.

 

The Faithless Servant: The news stories this past week about Kozlowski related to the December 1, 2010 order by Southern District of New York Judge Thomas Griesa in the lawsuit Tyco filed against Kozlowski about the approximately $100 million of compensation that Kozlowski claims the company owes him under certain deferred compensation agreements. Tyco contended that the agreements were fraudulently induced or that the benefits were otherwise forfeit under New York’s "faithless service doctrine."

 

Based on the jury findings in the criminal trial, Judge Griesa concluded that under the faithless servant doctrine, Kozlowski must forfeit compensation and benefits earned during his period of disloyalty. Judge Griesa also concluded that various agreements entered during the period of Kozlowski’s disloyalty were fraudulently induced.

 

However, Judge Griesa also held that Kozlowski was entitled to trial on the question of his entitlement to benefits earned prior to the time at which the jury determined his disloyalty began. He also concluded that Tyco was not entitled to summary judgement on the company’s claim for contribution for legal expense incurred in defending lawsuits arising from Kozlowski’s breach of fiduciary duty.

 

The December 3, 2010 Wall Street Journal article about Judge Griesa’s ruling can be found here.

 

O.K., We Missed the Bridge Implosion, But You Don’t Get to See an Angry Troll Everyday: This video has quickly gone viral. From the WGN Morning News, here’s live local television in all of its glory:

 

Pressure for Action Against Corporate Officials

News reports about the September 22, 2010 Senate Banking Committee hearing regarding the SEC have focused on the provocative statements by SEC Inspector General H. David Katz. Among other things, Katz suggested that a Texas-based SEC official quashed the investigation of allegations regarding Stanford Financial Group, allowing the Stanford-related Ponzi scheme to continue. Katz also suggested that the SEC times its initiation of its enforcement action against Goldman Sachs to draw attention away from the Inspector General’s report critical of its Stanford-related failures. (Katz’s written testimony, which focuses primarily on the Stanford-related issues, can be found here.)

 

But along with the headline-grabbing commentary on the SEC’s processes, there was also other commentary and information at the Hearing suggesting the possibility of future regulatory and enforcement actions against corporate and banking figures in response to the global financial crisis.

 

First, at least according to press reports, the hearing seemed to reflect political expectations, in the wake of the financial crisis, for regulators to pursue actions against corporate officials. For example, the September 23, 2010 Wall Street Journal quotes Delaware Senator Edward Kaufman as having observed at the hearing that "we have seen very little in the way of senior officers or boardroom-level prosecutions of the people on Wall Street who brought this country to the brink of financial ruin. Why is that?"

 

Second, the same Journal article quotes the deputy inspector general of the FDIC as saying that the FDIC is investigating 227 banks.

 

There undoubtedly will be further fallout from the SEC Inspector General’s report about the SEC’s handling of the Stanford investigation. But amid those details, the larger picture should not be overlooked. That is, we remain in an atmosphere of recrimination that includes a political expectation that government officials should pursue action against corporate executives in connection with the financial crisis. In this atmosphere, because of the political pressures, it seems probable that government officials will feel obliged to bring claims and pursue actions.

 

And while these government actions might take any number of forms, one area where regulatory and enforcement action seems probably is in the banking arena. Just as during the S&L crisis, the FDIC pursued numerous claims in response to political pressure, the FDIC may well feel the same kind of pressure in the current circumstances, and may pursue claims as a result.

 

All of which is a reminder that larger forces may drive claims against corporate and banking officials, possibly for years to come.

 

Fresh Scandal for a New Year: The "Indian Enron"

2009 has barely just begun but the year’s first corporate scandal, which has quickly been dubbed the "Indian Enron," has already arrived. Your radar might not have picked this one up yet, but you may want to take a quick look at today’s news involving Indian information technology company Satyam Computer Services, Ltd.

 

As reported in articles on Bloomberg (here) and the New York Times website (here), Satyam’s Chairman, Ramalinga Raju, has sent a January 7, 2009 letter of resignation to the company’s Board of Directors, with copies the Bombay stock exchanges, in which he reveals, as the Times puts it, that "the company’s financial position had been massively inflated during the company’s expansion from a handful of employees into an outsourcing giant with 53,000 employees and operations in 66 countries."

 

It appears that as much as 53.6 billion rupees (or about $1.04 billion) in cash that the company reported as of the end of the second quarter that ended in September, was nonexistent. The company’s reported second quarter revenue was actually 21 billion rupees, rather than the reported 27 billion rupees.

 

The Chairman’s letter, which can be found here, is an absolutely extraordinary document.

 

With "deep regret and a tremendous burden," the Chairman details the specific balance sheet accounts that were inflated due to "non-existent cash." The letter further explains how the balance sheet "gap" came to exist – it is, the Chairman reports, "purely on account of inflated profits over a period of the last several years."

 

The letter states matter-of-factly that "what started as a marginal gap between the actual operating profit and one reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow over the years. It has attained unmanageable proportions as the size of the company operations grew." The letter goes on to describe how the company strained to maintain the gap over time." The letter further describes the company’s attempts to work out of its dilemma by merging with other companies, which the letter describes as the "last attempt to fill the fictitious assets with real ones." (The mergers fell through.)

 

It was, the letter says "like riding a tiger without knowing how to get off without being eaten."

 

In an apparent bid to exculpate himself, the Chairman notes that neither he nor the company’s Managing Director (or their spouses) sold any shares, nor have the taken "one rupee/dollar from the company" and they have not "benefitted in financial terms on account of the inflated results."

 

The Chairman graciously emphasizes that none of the past or present board members "had any knowledge of the situation in which the company is placed." After identifying each of these individuals by name, he states that none of them "were aware of the real situation as against the books of accounts."

 

The letter concludes with a description of the corrective actions the company will now take, an apology, and the Chairman’s resignation.

 

The company, whose name means "truth" in Sanskrit, trades its shares on the Bombay stock exchange and also has American Depository Receipts that trade on the New York Stock Exchange. Its shares also trade on the Euronext exchange.As of the close of trading on January 6, 2009, the company had a market capitalization of over $3 billion. However, the shares plunged 77% in trading on the Bombay exchange today.

 

The Times reports that the company is audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers.

 

According to a January 7, 2009 commentary on the Wall Street Journal’s website (here), Satyam’s scandal is already being called "India’s Enron." Perhaps that comparison was inevitable, but I think the scandal, particularly the Chairman’s extraordinary letter of confession, has overtones of the Madoff affair.

 

How long do you suppose it will be before a securities class action lawsuit is initiated in the U.S.?

 

UPDATE: The answer to this question is: less than one day. Plaintiffs' lawyers January 7, 2009 press release about their newly filed securities lawsuits agasint Satyam and certain of its directors and officers on behalf of purchasers of the American ADRs can be found here. The case was filed in the Southern District of New York.

FURTHER UPDATE: A copy of one of the Satyam complaints can be found here.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for supplying a copy of the Chairman’s letter.