Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

The Cornerstone report notes the following findings:

1. Cornerstone reports that there were 166 securities class action lawsuit filings in 2007, which represents a 43% increase over the 116 filings in 2006. The 2007 yearly total is, however, 14 percent below the average for the ten-year period ending in December 2006.
2. Stock market volatility is important in explaining the number of filings. The increase in filings in the second half of 2007 coincided with an increase in volatility in the U.S. stock market from the historically low levels that prevailed in 2006 and the first half of 2007.
3. Securities lawsuit filings as a percentage of the total number of publicly traded companies increased in 2007. 2.19% of publicly traded companies were sued in securities lawsuits in 207, compared to only 1.57% in 2006, and by contrast to the 2.27% ten-year average from 1997-2006.
4. For cases filed in 2007, the drop in market capitalization both from the beginning to the end of the class period and from the class period high to the end of the class period increased, largely driven by several large case filings in the fourth quarter of 2007.
5. Of the 2,646 cases in Cornerstone's database, 81 percent have been resolved. Of the resolved cases, 41 percent were dismissed and 59 percent settled. For the cases filed from 1996 to 2001, almost all of which have been resolved, the median time to resolution is 33 months. The median time to dismissal is 25 months, and the median time to settlement is 36 months. Cases with larger shareholder losses are likely to take longer to resolve.
6. The Finance sector had the largest amount of litigation activity, with 47 Finance cases in 2007, driven by the subprime crisis.
7. The top three Circuits in terms of the number of 2007 filings were the Second Circuit, with 58 filings; the Ninth Circuit, with 39 filings; and the Eleventh Circuit, with 18 filings.
8. Cornerstone counted 32 cases attributable to the subprime crisis (by contrast to my own count of 34 cases, here). The report notes that the subprime filings reflect a shift in emphasis from allegations related to traditional income statement line items to allegations related to balance sheet components.

In attempting to discern the significance of the 2007 filing levels, the Cornerstone report revisits the analytic framework Cornerstone first postulated in its mid-year 2007 report (here). The mid-year report raised two alternative theories for the lull in litigation activity from mid-2005 to mid-2007, the "less fraud" hypothesis and the "lower volatility" hypothesis. The "less fraud" theory, associated with Stanford Law Professor Joseph Grundfest, involved the theory that as a result of corporate reforms, there is less fraud and hence less litigation. (Professor Grundfest went further and speculated that perhaps, as a result of the reforms, there had been a "permanent shift" to a lower litigation level.) The "lower volatility" theory noted that the period of lower litigation activity coincided with historically low stock market volatility, and speculated that litigation activity might return to historical norms if volatility returned.

The year-end Cornerstone report expressly attributes the increased litigation activity in the second-half of 2007 to the heightened level of stock market volatility during that period. Nevertheless, the report also states that "the 'less fraud' theory suggests a significant and permanent shift in the class action landscape" that is "not inconsistent with the recent increase in filing." The report finds this possibility because of the significant amount of 2007 litigation activity that was directly associated with the subprime crisis, which the Cornerstone report describes as "a likely 'one time' event," that "may not be indicative of future filing activity."

To support this analysis, the report suggests that there is an identifiable "core litigation rate," which is a statistical construct based on historical filings from which "one time events" like "backdating, subprime cases [and] IPO Allocation filings are excluded." Using this construct, the report finds that "litigation activity remains well below historical norms." Professor Grundfest describes this "core litigation rate" as "the litigation rate observed net of one-time systemic shocks."

I cannot disagree with the report's overall conclusion that more data is needed before the "less fraud" hypothesis can be conclusively rejected. Indeed, only time will tell. But for a number of reasons, I disagree with the Cornerstone Report's analysis of the 2007 filings, and in particular with the report's conclusions about the significance of the 2007 filing activity.

First, the Cornerstone report treats the 2007 subprime litigation activity as if it consists of a single, uniform phenomenon, limited in scope and duration. But my own view is that even though the subprime meltdown is still relatively recent, the litigation activity has already evolved into a highly diverse set of circumstances, lawsuits and litigants. As I detail at greater length here, the subprime litigation wave already involves a wide variety of kinds of companies and allegations. Moreover, it is likely to continue to evolve in the months ahead. To isolate the subprime cases as if they represent a narrow or contained phenomenon minimizes the potential of the ongoing subprime litigation wave to drive litigation activity for months and perhaps years to come, and disregards the very real possibility that the wave will expand to encompass a far wider variety of litigants and allegations.

Second, even if the subprime litigation wave can fairly be characterized as a "one-time" event, that is hardly sufficient to marginalize its continuing significance. The fact is the world of D & O liability has experienced a steady progression of "one time events" in recent years -- the bursting of the Internet bubble, the telecom crash, the IPO Allocation cases, the corporate scandals, the options backdating cases, and now the subprime crisis. Indeed, the joke among D & O insurance industry professionals at the recent PLUS International Conference was that subprime is "just a one time event" - the joke being that in the D & O industry, there is a one time event every year, and that results are driven by the constant recurrence of supposed "one time events." When one time events become the norm, they are not extraneous, they are the very essence of the risk exposure.

The reality is that the claims experience in the D & O arena is characterized by a succession of one time events. Indeed, no D & O insurance manager who wished to retain his credibility with senior insurance company management would attempt to try to marginalize the subprime litigation wave by describing it as a one time event, simply because there have been too many supposed one time events in recent years for the phrase to retain any meaning. D & O claims are and for years have been driven by these kinds of events. There perhaps may be a statistical construct by which to postulate a "core litigation rate," but the construct would be disregarded by insurance professionals as lacking credibility and unlikely to provide adequate predictive power to describe likely future events. The practical reality is that it must be assumed that there will always be one time events - not as unusual occurrences, but in the ordinary course.

Finally, as I have documented elsewhere (here and here), subprime litigation is only one of a number of important factors driving the recently increased litigation activity. Even without the subprime cases, the uptick in litigation activity is significant.

To be sure, only time will tell whether the increased litigation activity in the second-half of 2007 is indicative of future activity levels. But as I previously stated (here), I think there is already a sufficient basis upon which to declare that the two-year lull in securities lawsuit filings is over, and to state that there does not appear to have been a "permanent shift" to lower securities lawsuit filing levels.

The first of the 2007 year-end securities class action reports has already appeared (refer here), with others soon to follow. As I have noted elsewhere (most recently here), the most important securities trend during 2007 was the return of lawsuit filing activity to historical levels, after a two-year lull. But there were numerous other important securities lawsuit trends in 2007, as discussed below.

First, a word about data. My observations about the 2007 securities lawsuits are based on my own tally of the 172 securities lawsuits, which I derived from publicly available data plus information from readers. My tally differs from the numbers that appeared in NERA Economic Consulting's 2007 year-end report (here). NERA counted 198 securities lawsuits through mid-December, and projected 207 lawsuits by year-end. The projected number was not borne out, but NERA's actual year-end number around 200 is materially higher than my own count of 172. NERA undoubtedly has superior data; readers should be aware that I have used my own data for purposes of this post.

The year-end tally of 172 new securities class action lawsuits includes 103 new securities lawsuits that were first filed in the second-half of 2007. This half-year total is virtually identical to the six-month average of 101 that Cornerstone Research noted in its mid-year 2007 securities litigation report (here) for the period from the second half of 1996 through the first half of 2005. In addition, the year-end total of 172 lawsuits represents an increase of 56 cases over the 2006 year-end total of 116, an increase of 48 per cent.

The companies named in securities lawsuits in 2007 represent 80 different Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code categories. In a year in which subprime lawsuits were such a significant factor (refer here for my analysis of the 2007 subprime lawsuits), it is hardly surprising that one of the SIC Code categories with the highest number of new lawsuits is SIC Code 6798 (Real Estate Investment Trusts), which had 14 new lawsuits. But SIC Code 2834 (Pharmaceutical Preparations) also had 14 new lawsuits, which is entirely consistent with my frequent observation that while subprime lawsuits are an important part of the 2007 securities lawsuit trends, the subprime lawsuits represent only one of several important trends.

Other SIC Code categories that had significant activity unrelated to the subprime mess include SIC Code category 3674 (Semiconductors), which had seven lawsuits; SIC Code category 3663 (Radio and Telephone Equipment), which had six lawsuits; SIC Code category 7372 (Prepackaged Software), which had five lawsuits; and SIC Code category 4899 (Communications Services) which also had five lawsuits.

26 of the 172 securities lawsuits that were filed in 2007 involved companies domiciled outside the United States. These 26 companies are based in 12 different countries, including China (seven companies); Switzerland (three companies); Bermuda, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Israel and the U.K (each of which had two companies each); and Germany, South Korea, Sweden and Taiwan (each of which had one company each). My detailed analsysis of the securities lawsuits involving Chinese companies can be found here.

Many of the 2007 securities lawsuits involved allegations of misrepresentations in connection with the defendant company's IPO within twelve months of the lawsuit. 29 of the 172 new lawsuits involved IPO allegations. Interestingly, 20 of the 29 lawsuits against IPO companies were filed in the second-half of 2007, which suggests that an increase in the number of cases involving IPO companies was an important part of the increased level of securities litigation activity in the second-half of 2007. In addition, nine of the 29 IPO company lawsuits involved foreign-domiciled companies, so the level of IPO-related activity and the level of foreign-domiciled company activity appears to be correlated to a certain extent.

The 2007 securities lawsuits were filed in 52 different federal district courts. By far the largest numbers of lawsuits were filed in the Southern District of New York, where a whopping 52 of the 172 lawsuits (or about 30%) were filed. The court with the next highest total, the Central District of California, had only 18. Indeed, if the lawsuits filed in the Central, Southern and Northern Districts of California are combined, the total of 32 cases is still far short of the S.D.N.Y. total.

The high number of filings in the S.D.N.Y. is in part attributable to the number of financial services companies that have been sued in Manhattan as a result of the subprime mess. But another important factor in the number of S.D.N.Y. lawsuits is the significant number of lawsuits against foreign domiciled companies. 21 of the 26 foreign-domiciled companies sued in securities lawsuits in 2007 were sued in the S.D.N.Y.

Other courts that had a significant number of securities lawsuits in 2007 include the Southern District of Florida (10); Eastern District of Pennsylvania (6); Northern District of Texas (5); and the Western District of Washington (5).

I have noted elsewhere (here) the significance of the number of 2007 securities lawsuits. Another important attribute of the 2007 securities lawsuits is their diversity. More specifically, the increase in 2007 securities litigation activity clearly was driven by a number of factors, not just the litigation activity surrounding the subprime meltdown. Indeed, even if the 34 subprime-related lawsuits (listed here) were withdrawn from the 2007 total, the resulting 138 lawsuits would still represent a material increase over the 116 lawsuits that were filed in 2006. The fact that there were significant numbers of cases aggregated in categories completely isolated from subprime-related issues demonstrates that the story of the renewed securities litigation activity involves far more than just the subprime meltdown.

Finally, one of the other many factors contributing to the renewed level of securities lawsuit activity in 2007 is the outbreak of lawsuits arising from busted buyouts, which I discuss at greater lenghth here.