The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

According to papers filed in the Southern District of New York on August 3, 2012, the parties to the Tronox securities litigation have agreed to settle the case for a total of $37 million. As I noted at the time that this suit was first filed back in July 2009 (here), the case, which alleged that the defendants had misrepresented Tronox’s environmental liabilities when the company was spun out of Kerr-McGee and thereafter, involved a host of recurring and interesting issues.

 

A copy of the parties’ stipulation of settlement can be found here. The settlement agreement is subject to court approval.

 

As discussed in greater detail here, the action was filed on behalf of those who purchased certain securities  of Tronox, Inc. between November 25, 2005 and January 12, 2009. The plaintiffs named as defendants certain former directors and officers of Tronox, as well as Kerr-McGee Corporation, Andarko Petroleum Corporation and certain Kerr-McGee executives.

 

As reflected in the their amended consolidated complaint (here), the plaintiffs alleged that Tronox’s IPO was a “scheme orchestrated by Defendant Kerr-McGee to foist the vast majority of its enormous environmental remediation and related tort liabilities, accumulated over decades, onto Tronox, so that Kerr-McGee could thereafter present itself for sale.” The plan, which allegedly involved spinning Tronox out as a separate company in an initial public offering, “reaped massive and almost immediate benefits when, on August 10, 2006, Defendant Anadarko acquired Kerr-McGee for $18 billion in cash and assumption of debt purportedly free and clear of any obligation for what had become, as of that date, Tronox’s environmental remediation and tort liabilities.”

 

The plaintiffs’ case survived, in whole or in part, multiple motions to dismiss, and following mediation, the parties agree to settle the lawsuit. As reflected in the parties’ stipulation of settlement, the $37 settlement consists of the following: Anadarko, Kerr-McGee and the Kerr-McGee director and officer defendants “shall pay, or shall cause their insurance carriers to pay $21,000,000”; the former Tronox individual director and officer defendants “shall cause their insurance carriers to pay $14,000,000”; and Tronox’s auditor, Ernst & Young, “shall pay $2,000,000.”

 

As I noted at the time the case was first filed, one of the interesting things about this case is that it presents the clear example of a securities claim based upon disclosures relating to environmental liabilities. The possibility of this kind of claim is often a key concern at the time of D&O insurance policy placement, as the question often arises whether the standard policy’s pollution exclusion will preclude coverage for a securities claim based on environmentally-related disclosures. As this case demonstrates, it is critically important for the standard pollution exclusion to be revised to carve back coverage for securities claims and derivative claims based on environmental disclosures. (It is probably worth noting that many of the modern Excess Side A DIC insurance policies often have no environmental or pollution exclusion, which could well have been relevant here, given that by the time these suits were filed, Tronox was in bankruptcy.).

 

Another interesting thing about this case is that it involved three corporate entity defendants (Tronox, Kerr-McGee, and Anadarko), but the securities of only one of the three, Tronox. The issue here has to do with the definition of the term Securities Claim in the standard D&O policy. In many policies, the term is defined to refer to any claim based upon the purchase or sale of the securities of the Insured Entity itself. The question here would be whether or not a claim involving the purchase or sale of Tronox’s securities would constitute a “securities claim” under the Kerr-McGee’s and Anadarko’s policies. Of course, the individual Kerr-McGee directors and officers would be entitled to coverage whether or not the lawsuit represented a “securities claim” within the meaning of the term; this question has to do with whether or not there would be coverage under the policies for the entities themselves.

 

In the end, it appears that the portion of the settlement pertaining to the liabilities of the former Tronox director and officer defendants is to be covered by insurance, and the portion relating to the liabilities of the Kerr-McGee director and officer defendants, as well as Kerr-McGee and Anadarko themselves, would be funded in whole or in part by insurance. This outcome suggests that in the course of negotiations these issues, if actually involved in this case, were worked out or compromised in the course of the settlement negotiations.

 

As I previously observed, the allegations in the underlying complaints are noteworthy because they represent specific examples of what I have previously identified (most recently here) as the growing disclosure risks public companies face regarding their environmental liabilities. Although more recently I have emphasized the growing risks surrounding climate change related issues, as this case demonstrates, the disclosure risks also include the risks associated with more conventional environmental liability exposures. The case also underscores the importance of addressing at the time of policy placement the possibility of securities claims arising based on environmental disclosures.

 

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On February 2, 2010, the SEC published its interpretive release providing guidance to public companies on the SEC’s existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate change. The release can be found here. A February 4, 2010 memo from the Gibson Dunn law firm analyzing the SEC’s release can be found here.

 

While the interpretive release take pains to emphasize that it only clarifies existing obligations, the release nevertheless represents the Commission’s clearest statement about expectations for public company’s climate change disclosures. The release’s specificity and its reliance on requirements that have themselves previously been cited in suits pertaining to more traditional environmental disclosures raise the question whether suits pertaining to climate change-related disclosure may be next.

 

The release cites several existing disclosure rules that it says required public companies to provide disclosures regarding climate change, including Items 101, 103 and 303 (among others) in Regulation S-K.

 

The release also identifies four topics that could require climate change-related disclosures, including: the impact of climate change legislation and regulation; the impact of international climate change accords; indirect consequences of climate change regulation or business trends; and the physical impacts of climate change.

 

Public companies will now have to accommodate their disclosure practices to the SEC’s guidance. While the SEC claimed only to be clarifying existing requirements, the practical reality is that many companies will now have to reconsider their disclosure process and practices, and, in many cases, alter the content of their disclosures.

 

With the SEC’s clarification of the disclosure requirements comes the opportunity for claimants or even for the SEC itself to later allege that a company’s climate change disclosures fell short of requirements. By way of illustration of how these claims might arise, it is worth considering that the very disclosure provisions with respect to which the SEC provided its climate change guidance have previously served as reference points in claims alleging misrepresentations or omissions of more traditional environmental liabilities and exposures.

 

For example, as I noted in a prior post (here), the SEC has in the recent past brought disclosure-related enforcement actions against reporting companies for alleged failures to observe existing environmental reporting requirements.

 

Nor are these types of claims limited solely to regulatory enforcement actions; investors have also brought damages actions relating to alleged misrepresentations or omissions regarding environmental issues. For example, as I noted in a recent post here, shareholders of Tronox Corporations recently filed a securities class action lawsuit against the company and certain of its directors and offices, as well as the company’s corporate predecessors in interest, based upon the company’s alleged failure to disclose the true nature of its environmental and tort liabilities.

 

There may be a temptation to view climate change related considerations as remote and distant future concerns, but as I noted in a recent post here, climate change related issues are already a practical component of current business conduct, for example, in the M&A context.

 

Just as disclosure obligations regarding traditional environmental concerns have given rise to disclosure-related enforcement actions and even shareholder litigation, the newly clarified expectations regarding climate change disclosures seem likely to create a context out of which similar actions may arise in the future.

 

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With the United Nations Climate Change Conference set to begin December 7, 2009 in Copenhagen, activists and observers are dialing up the volume both with calls for reform and with updated reports of the projected risks that global warming threatens. Among the long-standing initiatives advocates are now seeking to advance is the petition before the SEC calling for the adoption of climate change disclosure requirements.

 

These renewed calls for disclosure reform, as well as the release of additional data regarding insurance industry exposure to climate change, are clearly intended to coincide with the upcoming UN conference. One question, however, is how much recent email revelations of climate change researchers’ practices will affect the current dialog.

 

First, with respect to climate change disclosures, on November 23, 2009, a coalition of twenty public pension funds, public officials and environmental groups filed a "Supplemental Petition on Interpretive Guidance" (here) renewing their call for the SEC to "act promptly to clarify that existing disclosure requirements apply to climate change." Background regarding the group’s initial September 2007 petition can be found here.

 

As described in their November 23, 2009 press release (here), the group has renewed its call for climate change disclosure reform because of the "spate of recent regulatory, legislative and scientific developments – including the Environmental Protection Agency’s new mandatory greenhouse gas reporting rule – and the new economic opportunities that dramatically change the landscape of corporate climate change disclosure."

 

In a separate development, a November 23, 2009 report issued jointly by Allianz and the World Wildlife Fund entitled "Major Tipping Point in the Earth’s Climate System and Consequences for the Insurance Sector" (here) asserts that rising sea levels due to global warming could put trillion of dollars of U.S. assets at risk. Among other things, the report states that the planet’s atmosphere is close to dangerous atmospheric thresholds or "tipping points" that could cause dire environmental and economic consequences. The World Wildlife Fund’s November 23, 2009 press release regarding the report can be found here.

 

In addition to rising sea levels, the report also cites three additional "tipping points" that likely to have an impact: an increasingly arid climate in California; disturbances in the summer monsoon in India and Nepal; and reduction to the Amazon rainforest due to drought.

 

At the same time, the upcoming Copenhagen conference is clearly creating pressure for governmental action, as suggested by the announcements last week that both Chinese and U.S. officials will arrive at the conference with various country-level carbon emissions goals (as discussed here).

 

This same pressure could increase the likelihood of implementation of reforms such as the proposed climate change disclosure requirements, as these types of initiatives afford governmental officials the opportunity to show they are taking actions without at the same time requiring theme to address proposals that could directly affect economic activity or that could prove politically more controversial.

 

However, one wild card that has been played in the midst of all of these developments is the recent revelation of email communications amongst climate change researchers. These emails have been portrayed as suggesting that the researchers manipulated data to support their findings of climate change and that they suppressed contrary points of view. The question arises of how much these disclosures will undermine the perception of trustworthiness of the scientific conclusions on which so much of the current dialog is premised.

 

One example of the way in which the email revelations can affect perceptions is the joint Allianz/WWF report described above. Two of the three individual authors of the report are affiliated with the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change at the University of East Anglia, which is the institution form which the hacked emails were obtained. While the report’s authors’ affiliations would hardly have occasioned comment previously, now these institutional associations will inevitably raise the question whether the report and its conclusions reflect trustworthy and objective scientific analysis, or something else.

 

Climate change skeptics and reform opponents are already attempting to seize on the email disclosures to try to suggest that, due to the damage to the perception of trustworthiness of the climate change science, reform initiatives are doomed.

 

There is no doubt that the email disclosures have affected the dialog. At the same time, events such as the upcoming Copenhagen conference carry their own inertial dynamic. President Obama’s commitment to address the conference certainly will reinforce this dynamic. In this context, reform initiatives, such as the proposed climate change disclosure application, could acquire a certain inevitability. That is certainly the hope of the initiative’s proponents.

 

The prospect for increased climate change-related disclosure requirements, and the continuing agitation of climate change activists, will put increased pressure on public companies to address climate change issues in their public filings. As I recently noted (here), investor interest in climate change-related disclosures, along with the effects of voluntary initiatives (such as the NAIC’s climate change disclosure project, about which refer here), may separately create their own independent pressures for corporate climate change disclosures.

 

As these disclosure expectations become more generalized, the possibility of investor litigation relating to climate change disclosure also increases. As I recently noted (here), litigation developments in other areas of the law have moved the possibility of climate change-related disclosure litigation one step closer.

 

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While I have long predicted (refer here) the possibility of litigation against directors and officers of public companies concerning global climate change-related disclosures, to date the lawsuits have not materialized. Which is not to say that there have not been relevant developments – to the contrary, there have been many, as discussed below. There just haven’t been any disclosure lawsuits.

 

However, recent case law developments in the Second and Fifth Circuits, though relating to an entirely different area of the law, suggest that there may be a new environment for climate change-related lawsuits, as a result of which climate change disclosure lawsuits have moved one step closer.

 

 

The Recent Decisions

 

As summarized in an October 29, 2009 memorandum entitled “Judicial Climate for ‘Global Warming’ Claims Getting Worse?” (here) by Theodore Howard and Jeremiah Galus of the Wiley Rein law firm, the two recent case law developments are the Second Circuit’s September 21, 2009 decision in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. (here) and the Fifth Circuit’s October 16, 2009 decision in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (here).

 

 

In each of these cases, a variety of claimants asserted claims based on nuisance and other tort theories against a variety of utilities and energy related companies, claiming that the defendants’ carbon emissions had caused (or increased) the plaintiffs’ claimed harm. The claimants in the Comer case are victims of Hurricane Katrina, who basically claim the defendants’ activities exacerbated the hurricane damage. In each case, the district court held the plaintiffs’ claims could not surmount initial justiciability and standing hurdles.

 

 

However, in both cases, the appellate courts determined that the plaintiffs did have standing to assert their claims and held that their claims do not present non-justiciable political questions.

As the law firm memo notes, these rulings “may have removed significant hurdles from the paths of plaintiffs seeking to hold corporate emitters of greenhouse gases liable for harms allegedly caused by global warming.” But though the decisions “may signal a shift in the way courts view tort-based global warming claims,” it is “still too early to project the decisions’ significance.”

 

 

Among other considerations the memo notes as suggesting that the decisions’ significance ultimately may be reduced is the fact that at least one district court case already has expressly declined to follow the Second Circuit’s analysis in the American Electric Power case. The memo also notes that the “plaintiffs undoubtedly still face the potentially insurmountable task of proving how and to what extent a particular corporation’s contribution to global warming proximately caused a particular plaintiffs’ injuries.”

 

 

For these reasons, the memo notes, it “remains to be seen” whether the cases “pose a serious risk of liability exposure for corporate defendants,” but the corporations – and their insurers – “should be paying close attention to further developments in these cases.”

 

 

Discussion

 

On at least one level – and arguably on all levels – these developments have little to do with the possibility of claims against corporate directors and officers for climate change-related disclosures. These lawsuits raise claims only on tort and nuisance theories. Moreover, it does, as the law firm memo notes “remain to be seen” whether these cases will result in any liability even on those claims.

 

 

Nevertheless, I believe these cases represent potentially significant developments with respect to the possibility of climate change disclosure litigation. First, as the memo notes, these cases “may signal a shift in the way in which the federal courts view tort-related global warming claims.” The extent to which judicial perspectives have been changed and to which hurdles have been removed may not be limited just to the context of tort-related cases.

 

 

The context within which all climate change related cases are considered may have changed, particularly to the extent these courts “newfound willingness” to consider these cases is, as the memo suggests, “derived from a perceived failure on the part of the legislative and executive branches to address the issue.” If prospective plaintiffs believe that climate change-related claims may be more likely to receive a receptive hearing, they may be encouraged to bring further claims, whether based on tort or based on other theories.

 

 

Some readers may regard my generalization of these tort case developments to the world of D&O claims as analytically unwarranted, and they may be right. However, I think this recent case decisions are most properly viewed as the just the latest in a series of developments that have brought the climate change debate ever closer to the courts.

 

 

The first development in this chain was the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA (about which refer here). The chain continued with New York AG Andrew Cuomo’s climate change disclosure subpoenas to several utilities, which resulted in several of the utilities agreeing to certain disclosure principles (refer here). There have been several other extensions of the chain, including the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ promulgation of climate change disclosure principles for insurance companies, as well as the EPA’s April 2009 endangerment finding (about which refer here). Similarly, there have been a variety of Congressional and other initiatives toward mandating climate change related disclosures (refer here).

 

 

These appellate decisions are just the latest event in this continuing chain of developments. In addition,  there are other reasons why I think we can expect to see disclosure related litigation. Among other things, the pattern for the kind of disclosure related case that may yet arise is already established. As I noted in a recent post (here), there is already a pattern for disclosure-related cases based on alleged misrepresentations or omissions related to environmental liabilities and contingent litigation exposures.

 

 

Moreover, there is an extensive network of activists who are politically motivated to bring these kinds of claims. Andrew Cuomo was attempting to appeal directly to this network when he filed the disclosure-related subpoenas against the utilities, and there are countless others whose political agenda would be served by similar initiative, including litigation. As the chain of developments outlined above continues to lengthen, these motivated actors, who already have demonstrated their willingness to pursue litigation to advance their goals, may well target concerned players concerning their climate change-related disclosure.

 

 

I know from prior communications with readers that there is some significant skepticism about the prospect for climate change-related disclosure litigation any time soon. These skeptics could well be right, since there that kind of litigation is unlikely to arise in the absence of a significant share price decline from a company’s disclosure of some climate change or greenhouse gas emission related issue. But I still think the possibility of these kinds of claims arising is merely a question of when, not if. (Some people I am sure assume I am afflicted with some unbreakable curse that compels me to make these predictions at least once every quarter.)

 

 

A Couple of Securities Class Action Settlement Notes: The long-running securities class action lawsuit involving Adams Golf and certain of its directors and officers has finally settled. The case, which was went all the way through discovery and which suffered from delays owing to judicial vacancies,  was first filed in June 1999 and related to the company's July 1998 IPO. More details about the case can be found here.

 

 

According to the company's November 3, 2009 press release (here), the settlement provides for a payment to the plaintiff class of $16.5 million, of which Adams Golf itself has agreed to contribute $5 million.

 

 

Readers of this blog may be interested in the statement in the press release that Adams was "forced" to contribute the $5 million "because one of its former insurers refused to contribute to teh settlement based on the alleged late notice of the claim." The press release states that Adams has commenced coverage litigation against the former insurer and against its former insurance broker. The settlement requires Adams to pay the class action plaintiffs the first $1.25 million of any recovery, net of fees and expenses, that Adams recovers in the ongoing litigation with the former insurer and former broker. Further details about the settlement and the coverage litigation can be found on Adams Golf's November 3, 2009 filing on Form 8-K (here).

 

 

In a separate development, in a November 3, 2009 press release (here), Quest Software announced that it has settled the options backdating related  securities class action lawsuit that had been filed against the company and certain of its directors and officers. The case settled for $29.4 million. Background regarding the case can be found here. I have added the Quest Software settlement to my running tally of options backdating related settlements, which can be found here.

 

 

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for providing the information about the Quest settlement.

 

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 On June 26, 2009, when the U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, it set the stage for changes that could have a direct effect on corporate financial results. The Act has now moved to the Senate, where it could face significant hurdles. But strong White House support for the initiative and pressures from looming regulatory changes suggest that some form of climate related requirements will ultimately be enacted, with significant implications for companies’ carbon-related risk disclosures.

 

As reflected in a July 8, 2009 CFO.com article entitled "Clearing the Air on Carbon Disclosures" (here), the cap and trade system currently under Congressional consideration "contains the makings of a new asset class for affected companies" in the form of carbon emissions allowances. The likely corporate trading in these allowances could have a material effect on reported financial results – the CFO.com article cites analyses suggesting that carbon costs "could depress earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization by 5.5% for the S&P 500."

 

These potential financial impacts will, as the article comments, "likely cause investors to demand more information about carbon-related risk."

 

According to a June 2009 report from PricewaterhouseCoopers Transaction Services Division entitled "Capitalizing on a Climate of Change" (here), as the financial impacts of climate change issues rise, "investors, stakeholders and regulators will demand greater transparency and comparability of companies’ financial information."

 

As reflected in M&A examples cited in the PwC report, this process is already well underway. The report refers to Porsche’s recent bid to acquire a majority stake in Volkswagen, which, the report claims, was motivated in part by Porsche’s desire to "offset its fleet’s high emissions with the more efficient and low emissions VW line."

 

The PwC report suggests that "climate change considerations will likely be a key consideration in M&A activity" and that in more and more deals, "the potential impacts of climate change on earnings, cash flow, and target valuation, as well as any opportunities for cost reduction through synergies, will have to be thoroughly evaluated."

 

The likelihood that these kinds of considerations will become increasingly critical does not depend alone on whether or not Congress ultimately enacts a climate change bill; regulatory developments at the EPA and elsewhere could drive climate change related mandates, as disclosed at greater length in a prior post, here. Indeed, the likelihood that regulators will act if Congress does not is one of the strongest motivations for Congress to find a way to put something together rather than to cede field to regulators.

 

According to the PwC report, in light of these considerations, "companies should begin planning today for the elevated status this issue now commands." Climate change issues are likely to become increasingly material, and companies that fail to adapt could risk "penalties, less profitability and damaged reputations." as well as "missed opportunities for growth."

 

The disclosure-centered nature of many of these potential risks creates a context within which litigation could well arise. To cite one example from the PwC report, investors may become increasingly attentive to M&A-related climate change exposures, the presence or absence of which could significantly affect deal valuations. Whenever there is an opportunity for investors to later contend they were misled or not fully informed, there is a danger of possible litigation.

 

The current predominance of issues relating to the global financial crisis may make these climate change related issues seem relatively remote and unimportant. But the possibility of claims based on carbon-related disclosures is only a matter of when, not if.

 

For that reason, in my view, the constituencies that will be scrutinizing carbon-related disclosures includes not only investors and regulators, but will also include D&O underwriters. As best practices in this area develop, D&O underwriters will necessarily develop their own sense of what disclosure practices suffice. Just as there are risks for companies that fail to adapt to the climate change related issues, there will be risks for D&O underwriters as well.

 

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The recent Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposal to find that greenhouse gases "contribute to air pollution that may endanger public health or welfare" is just the latest in a series of actions and events suggesting that climate change related issues could affect a large number of companies, in a variety of ways, including most specifically with respect to at least some companies’ disclosure obligations. These trends could have important implications for potential liability exposures of directors and officers of public companies.

 

On April 17, 2009, the EPA released a proposed "endangerment finding" with respect to six greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide). The EPA’s April 17 press release can be found here and a summary of the proposal can be found here. Under the EPA’s proposed finding (which can be found here), the EPA is proposing that the six gases "threaten the public health and welfare of current and future generations." The EPA also proposes to find that motor vehicle emission of these gases "contribute to concentrations of these key greenhouse gases and hence to the threat of climate change."

 

The proposed endangerment finding was promulgated in response to the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA (discussed at length here). The EPA’s proposed finding, which is now in its public comment period, does not itself include any specific regulatory action or requirements. However, if the proposed finding is adopted, regulatory and even legislative action seems probable, especially given the politics and inclinations of the current President and Congress. Indeed, the adoption of the proposed finding could motivate legislators to act preemptively, to try to avert regulatory provisions they might find unacceptable.

 

The potential scope of any future regulatory or legislative action can be gauged by the specific observations in the EPA’s proposed endangerment finding. That is, the proposed finding not only concludes that climate change "impacts human health in several ways" (such as increased threat of catastrophic weather activity or harm to water and other natural resources), but also that the effects of climate change will have a "disproportionate impact" on certain vulnerable segments of the populations, such as the very poor, the elderly and those already in poor health.

 

The EPA’s report also includes the suggestion that climate change has "serious natural security concerns" based on the instability that could follow in the wake of "increasing scarcity of resources."

 

With these kinds of concerns as a starting point, the potential for any ensuing regulatory or legislative activity to have a disruptive impact on many industries and companies seems high. Indeed, if the risk assessments in the EPA’s findings are anywhere near accurate, the climate change itself, independent of any governmental action, could have a disruptive impact on many industries and companies.

 

Many of the industries and companies likeliest to be affected already are under pressure to anticipate these changes and assess their possible future impact.

 

The most recent effort to mandate these kinds of assessments is the disclosure requirement adopted on March 17, 2009 by the National Association of Insurance Examiners (NAIC). The NAIC’s March 17 press release can be found here and further background regarding the NAIC’s disclosure initiative can be found here.

 

The NAIC’s new disclosure requirements specify that no later than May 1, 2010, all insurance companies with annual premiums over $500 million must complete a Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey. The Survey is designed to require the insurers to disclose "the financial risks they face from climate change, as well as the actions the companies are taking to respond to those risks."

 

Under the NAIC’s mandate, insurers will be required to report on "how they are altering their risk-management and catastrophe-risk modeling in light of the challenges posed by climate change." Insurers must also report on "steps they are taking to engage and educate policymakers and policyholders on the risk of climate change," as well as "whether and how they are changing their investment strategies." As discussed below, the requirement for insurers to disclose how they are "engaging and educating" policymakers and policyholders could be the bridge that extends the NAIC’s initiative to many other industries.

 

Another industry under pressure to analyze and assess climate change impacts is the utilities industry. As discussed (here), in August 2008, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo reached the first of several regulatory settlements with utilities companies, in which the settling companies agreed "to disclose financial risks that climate change poses to investors."

 

Among other things, the settling utilities have undertaken to disclose risks associated with probable future climate change regulation; climate change related litigation; and the physical impacts of climate change. In his press release relating to the first of these settlements, Cuomo expressly stated that he expected these companies’ disclosure undertakings to "establish a standard."

 

The insurance and utilities industries may be the most likely industries but they are far from the only industries that potentially will be affected by climate change regulation and the physical impacts of climate change. Other obvious possibilities include auto manufacturing; oil and gas extraction, production and distribution; transportation and shipping; mining; agriculture; tourism; and forestry.

 

But the comprehensive nature of climate change suggests that the potential impacts will not be restricted just to these more obvious industries; the regulatory and the physical impacts of climate change are likely to extend to any business that is engaged in manufacturing; owns or operates vehicles; owns or operates buildings or other physical facilities; or has any other process or activity that has carbon outputs.

 

In other works, the impacts could well reach every company and enterprise. This assessment may seem overly dramatic, but at a minimum it seems likely that the kinds of disclosure requirements now facing insurance companies and the utilities industry could come to be expected of many other companies. As Cuomo said in connection with the settlement described above, he expects that the disclosure requirements will "establish a standard."

 

Whether these changes will actually take place remains to be seen. But whether or not they ultimately happen, the prudent course would seem to be to anticipate that they will. Which leads to the point referenced above, about the prospect that insurers could wind up driving change for many other companies.

 

That is, with insurers themselves obliged to start reporting next May among other things on what steps they are taking to engage and educate policymakers and policyholders on climate change, one possibility is that insurers could take the lead in communicating the message that prudent companies should assume that these changes are coming. Insures could wind up spurring their policyholders to undertake the same kind of risk assessment and disclosure that Cuomo is requiring in the regulatory settlements with the utilities.

 

Specifically, it seems possible that D&O insurers, in order to fulfill their own disclosure obligations under the NAIC’s mandate (and to look proactive while doing so) could undertake to "educate" their policyholders about the need to assess both the possible regulatory and physical impacts of climate change on their operations and financial condition, and to disclose those assessments to investors, as a way to manage a variety of climate change related risks.

 

In any event, whether or not insurers actually take that step, well-advised companies may independently conclude on their own that given the possible regulatory and physical impacts of climate change, risk assessment and disclosure is simply prudent.

 

One of the lurking dangers when a single issue predominates, as the global financial crisis recently has, is that all other concerns may seem trivial and unimportant by comparison. For many companies, especially those outside the insurance and utilities industries, climate change issues may now seem subordinate and remote to the point of irrelevance. But when we finally emerge from the current crisis, we may find that the climate change risks loom larger than ever and are more important than anyone now imagines.

 

This is not the first time I have raised these climate change related issues (refer for example here). I know there are those who think I am alarmist about this issue, and I suppose the skeptics could be right. However, even the most hardened cynic will have to acknowledge that, given the EPA’s recent pronouncement and given the current political environment in Washington, regulatory and even legislative activity seems likely, which is clearly a risk, trend or uncertainly that prudent companies will be assessing and disclosing.

 

And allow yourself for a moment to consider the possibility that the risk assessments in the EPA report could actually come to pass. At a minimum, if these things are possible, shouldn’t companies also be assessing the possible impact of climate change on their operations and financial condition?

 

Many companies today might conclude that there will be time enough tomorrow to deal with tomorrow’s problems. That was exactly the logic that led Detroit to keep grinding out SUVs and Hummers for the last twenty years, when more forward-looking competitors were already capturing market share by making hybrid vehicles. Just as Detroit’s past leaders are now criticized for their lack of vision, so too may other corporate leaders who now defer on these issues find themselves later under siege for failing to look ahead and anticipate the changes and problems just ahead.

 

Somehow, on Earth Day, these issues seemed particularly important for me. And for my kids.

 

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In order to assign responsibility in connection with the enforcement of public welfare objectives, courts have developed the "responsible corporate officer doctrine," which in recent years has been applied with increasing frequency in environmental enforcement. A California appellate court recently applied the doctrine to enforce civil liability on the officers of a family run business. The case, and indeed the doctrine itself, raise important concerns about the potential liability of directors and officers.

 

Background

John and Ned Roscoe were officers, directors and shareholders of a family company that had a underground storage tank. The tank leaked 3,000 gallons of gasoline. A company employee notified the county and hired a consultant to clean up the leak. However, as the appellate court later put it, cleanup "did not proceed timely and adequately," and though regulators sent multiple notices to the company, no one from the company "attempted to make sure the problems were addressed."

 

The county filed a civil lawsuit against the Roscoes and their family company for failure to remediate and to file certain reports as required by law. Following a bench trial, the court found the Roscoes and their company jointly and severally liable for $2.4 million in "civil penalties."

 

The trial court specifically found that the Roscoes had "overall authority" for the company, could have remediated the problems, but did not "exercise their responsibilities and power to use all objectively possible means" to remedy the problem. The Roscoes appealed.

 

The Appellate Ruling

In a December 26, 2008 opinion (here), the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District applied the "responsible corporate officer doctrine" and affirmed the trial court.

 

As the appellate court noted, the responsible corporate officer doctrine was developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1943 case of United States v. Dotterweich, to hold corporate officers in responsible positions of authority personally (and in that case, criminally) liable for violating strict liability statutes protecting the public welfare.

 

Though the Dotterweich case involved a criminal proceeding, the California court in Roscoe applied the doctrine to uphold the imposition of civil liability. The Roscoe court described the doctrine as "a common law theory of liability separate from piercing the corporate veil or imposing personal liability of direct participation in tortious conduct."

 

The appellate court in the Roscoe case held that the trial court properly applied the doctrine to the Roscoes because they had "overall authority," they "could have prevented or remedied promptly the problem," and because they did not "exercise their responsibilities and power to use all objectively possible means" to remedy the problem.

 

Discussion

Typically, the corporate veil doctrine would shield corporate officers or shareholders from direct personal liability for legal violations of the corporation, consistent with long-developed notions of the distinct and separate legal identity involved with the corporate form.

 

But the "responsible corporate officer doctrine" expands the power of government to impose liability on individuals, seemingly in disregard of the corporate form, and apparently without requirement of participation in the wrongful conduct or even the requirement of a culpable state of mind, in the name of protecting public health and welfare.

 

I understand from reviewing a variety of articles online (refer for example here) that there arguably may be nothing new about the California court’s invocation of the responsible corporate officer doctrine. It apparently has been applied in any number of states (refer for example here) and seems to be most frequently used in connection with environmental enforcement actions.

 

Indeed, the doctrine is embodied in the statutory wording of several fundamental federal environmental statues and has now found its way into the environmental statutes of many states that modeled the statutory scheme on the federal laws. I understand from conversations with an environmental attorney (I happen to be married to one) that this is a recognized and well-established doctrine in environmental law.

 

That the doctrine may have a lengthy pedigree behind it does not make it any less troubling to me. The idea that liability could be imposed on an individual for corporate misconduct, in apparent disregard of the corporate form and without even a requirement for a culpable state of mind, seems inconsistent with my (perhaps not fully informed) assumptions about the way the law ought to work.

 

To my mind, this doctrine seems to impose liability for nothing more than a person’s status. The word "responsible" in the responsible corporate officer doctrine’s name does not mean that the individual was responsible for the misconduct, but only that the individual was responsible for the corporation.

 

The California court did specify prerequisites that could circumscribe the doctrine’s application; that is, the court indicated that "there must be a nexus between the individual’s position and the violation in question such that the individual could have influenced the corporate actions" and that "the individual’s actions or inactions facilitated the violations." But while these requirements could constrain the doctrine’s application, they also seem to relate more to an individual’s position or status, rather than the individual’s actual state of mind or even direct culpability.

 

It appears that other courts have considered knowledge of the violation a prerequisite to the imposition of liability based on the responsible corporate officer doctrine, which to me seems like a minimal requirement for the doctrine’s application to be consistent with traditional notions of justice and fair play.

 

In any event, the typical directors and officers liability insurance policy would not likely respond to provide indemnification for these kinds of awards, for at least two reasons. The first is that most policies contain a broad form pollution exclusion. The second is that most policies will not cover fines and penalties.

 

While the typical D&O policy would not cover these kinds of penalties, I can imagine an argument that there should be insurance for these kinds of exposures. The fines are imposed on individuals essentially because they occupied a corporate office – that is, by reason of their status, seemingly without regard to actual fault. (It may well be that there are separate environmental liability insurance policies available in the marketplace that are designed to respond to these very exposures, an issue on which I invite readers’ comments and observations.)

 

A public policy advocate might well argue that individuals should have to pay these amounts out of their own resources, in order that the liability threat will deter future violations and motivate compliance. These kinds of arguments seem most compelling to someone who is secure in the knowledge that they will never have to worry about having liability imposed on them for conduct of which they might have been completely unaware.

 

A January 14, 2009 memorandum from Foley & Lardner law firm discussing the Roscoe case can be found here.

 

Special thanks to Damien Brew for providing a copy of the Roscoe opinion. I hasten to add that the views expressed in this post are exclusively my own.

 

Climate Change Disclosure: In prior posts, I have noted a variety of developments that are increasing pressure on publicly traded companies to increase their disclosure on climate change related issues. For example, I noted here the Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure filed with the SEC on September 18, 2007 by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) and others. In another post (here), I discussed the settlements that Xcel Energy and others reached with the New York Attorney General regarding climate change risk disclosure.

 

These developments raise the question whether these and other circumstances have changed public companies' disclosure practices regarding climate change issues. In a January 15, 2009 memorandum (here), the McGuire Woods law firm reports the results of its survey of the of the 2008 10-K filings of approximately 350 companies in order to determine the state of SEC disclosure practices regarding climate change.

 

What the law firm found was that "very few companies made any type of 10-K disclosure regarding [greenhouse gas, or GHG] emissions or climate change." Only 42 of 350 companies reviewed, about 12.2% made any disclosure whatsoever regarding GHG emissions or climate change. Unsurprisingly, the largest concentration of companies making some disclosure on these issues was among utility companies, particularly large utilities. Of the 26 non-utility companies making some disclosures, the next largest concentrations were in the energy and industrial sectors.

 

The memorandum observes that "very few companies outside the energy and utilities industries made any type of GHG emissions or climate change-related disclosures" in 2008. The memo goes on to predict, however, that "this state of affairs is likely to change in 2009," as a result of the change in administration and the changing political climate, as well as changing regulator and investor expectations.

 

The report concludes that "each company that does not currently provided GHG or climate change disclosures will need to carefully evaluate whether that is a reasonable approach given the kinds of risks, and opportunities, that GHG and climate change issues present." The report ends by noting that "we expect the number of public companies that make GHG and climate change disclosures in their SEC reports will increase in 2009."

 

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A recurring D&O insurance coverage concern involves the question whether the standard pollution exclusion typically found in most D&O policies could preclude coverage for a securities lawsuit alleging pollution-related misrepresentations or omissions. An August 15, 2008 opinion (here) by a New Jersey intermediate appellate court addressed this issue squarely.

 

The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division per curiam opinion affirmed a trial court determination, in a coverage case arising out of a securities class action lawsuit alleging misrepresentation of contingent asbestos liabilities, that the "alleged pollution at issue was too attenuated from the damages arising from the alleged misrepresentations to trigger the pollution exclusion."

 

Background

The underlying case arose out of a series of complex corporate recapitalization, reorganization and merger transactions, as result of which Sealed Air Corporation acquired certain assets and liabilities previously held by W.R. Grace. In post-transaction statements, Sealed Air made representations concerning its contingent liability for asbestos-related claims retained by a spun-off subsidiary.

 

As a result of asbestos liability lawsuits against the spun-off subsidiary, the subsidiary sought bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court later determined that the corporate reorganization transaction represented a fraudulent conveyance. After the fraudulent conveyance ruling became public, Sealed Air’s stock price plunged.

 

Sealed Air shareholders initiated a securities class action lawsuit against the company and its directors and officers. Background regarding the securities lawsuit can be found here. The company sought coverage for its litigation costs from its D&O insurer. The D&O insurer denied coverage in reliance upon the pollution exclusion in its policy. The pollution exclusion precludes coverage, in pertinent part, for loss "based on, arising out of, or in any way involving: (a) the actual or threatened discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or disposal of Pollutants."

 

Sealed Air filed a declaratory judgment action against the insurer. Following a trial in the coverage action, the trial court entered judgment in the company’s favor, requiring the insurer to advance the company’s securities litigation defense expense. The insurer appealed.

 

The Appellate Ruling

On appeal, the insurer argued that the exclusion should be "given a literal reading," contending that "the language and effect of the Policy’s pollution exclusion is clear and unambiguous." Sealed Air, for its part, argued that "the alleged loss to shareholders arises out of the allegedly misleading financial statements, not from air-borne pollutants." The company contended that because "the alleged damages arise from securities misrepresentation and not traditional environmental pollution," the policy provides coverage.

 

The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division found that "the language of the policy at issue precludes [the insurer] from disclaiming based on the pollution exclusion." The court said that "it is clear to us that the gravamen of the securities holders’ complaint has its root in securities fraud and misrepresentation, not pollution." The Court found that the pollution on which the insurer sought to rely "is too attenuated from the damages sought and the legal grounds supporting such alleged damages."

 

The appellate court specifically addressed the insurer’s argument that the broad preamble to the exclusion, precluding coverage for loss "based on, arising out of, or in any way involving" excluded pollution. The appellate court concluded that the damages sought in the securities lawsuit were neither "based on" nor "arising out of" excluded pollution. In concluding that the "in any way involving" wording similarly did not trigger the exclusion, the appellate court noted:

Read together with the surrounding words, "based on" and "arising out of," in the context of the pollution exclusion clause, "in any way involving" requires a more direct causal relationship between the pollution and the harm. [The insurer’s] interpretation of the pollution exclusion is too broad, unfair and contrary to the reasonable expectations of the insured.

The appellate court concluded that the "plain and ordinary language of the policy, as well as the reasonable expectations of the insured," prevent the insurer from precluding coverage.

 

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the appellate court’s opinion is designated as "Not for Publication." Under Rule 1:36-3 of the New Jersey Rules of Court (here), "no unpublished opinions shall constitute precedent or be binding on any court." In addition, under the Rule, an unpublished opinion cannot be cited "unless the court and all other parties are served with a copy of the opinion and of all other relevant unpublished opinions known to counsel including those adverse to the position of the client."

 

While the appellate court’s opinion is therefore of no precedential authority and of only restricted persuasive potential, there are nonetheless lessons that can be derived from the case.

 

First, it should be noted that Sealed Air was able to establish its entitlement to coverage under the Policy for its defense expense incurred in defending against the securities litigation only after enduring a trial and subsequent appeal (and any other proceedings that the insurer may yet pursue in its attempt to deny coverage). It clearly is in the interest of any policyholders for their policy to clarify that the policy is intended to provide coverage for securities claims, even if the underlying misrepresentations alleged relate in some way to pollution.

 

In the current marketplace, many carriers will agree to provide a coverage carve back from the pollution exclusion specifying that the exclusion does not in any event apply to securities claims or to shareholders’ derivative actions.

 

In addition, in the current marketplace, many carriers will also agree to modify the exclusion’s preamble so that rather than the broad preamble wording found in Sealed Air’s policy, the preamble specifies that the exclusion applies only if the claim is "for" excluded pollution. This wording provides some measure of protection against carrier attempts to rely on remote connections between the actual claim against the insured persons and underlying facts involving pollution as a basis to deny coverage.

 

It should also be noted that certain of the so-called Side A/DIC policies available in the marketplace do not contain pollution exclusions. Depending on the coverage provided under these policies, the policies could potentially "drop down" and provide a measure of protection for individual defendants if the first line D&O insurer denies coverage for a claim based on the pollution exclusion.

 

One final note pertains to the underlying securities claim. I have previously commented (most recently here), about the possibility that growing social and political pressures relating to climate change issues could lead to climate change-related claims against directors and officers of publicly traded companies, particularly in connection with climate change-related disclosures. My views in this regard have met with some interest, but also with some skepticism.

 

The underlying securities lawsuit involved here demonstrates how shareholders might allege that a company did not fully disclose, for example, its contingent liabilities arising out of climate change-related issues. The Sealed Air case suggests (to me at least) how short the leap might be to these kinds of allegations. But the risk, however measured, underscores the need for the policy-wording issues identified above to be addressed.

 

An August 28, 2008 memorandum from the Wiley Rein law firm discussing the outcome of the Sealed Air coverage appellate decision can be found here.

 

Securities Docket: Bruce Carton of the Unusual Activity blog (here) has launched a new securities litigation news website called the Securities Docket (here). The Docket bills itself as a "globlal securities litigation and enforcement report." The first iteration is certainly visually attractive and full of a wide variety of interesting items. The Docket looks like it will be an interesting resource that we intend to monitor closely. Congrats to Bruce on getting the Docket launched.

 

WSJ RIP: Joe Nocera of the New York TImes has a post on his Talks Business blog (here) in which he mourns the death of the Wall Street Journal -- not the death of the newspaper itself, just its death as the repository of important business news. I have felt the same things that Nocera expresses for a while. The pre-Rupert Murdoch WSJ filled a valuable role that no one other paper (or other news source) plays. Now instead of a unique and indispensible source of business news, it is just one more source for stories about politics that have already been reported in any number of our media sources. I agree with Nocera --  I miss the old Journal a lot.

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In a development of potentially great significance for climate change disclosure and reporting issues, on August 27, 2008, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced (here) that Xcel Energy had entered a “binding and enforceable agreement” requiring the company “to disclose the financial risks that climate change poses to investors.” Xcel's announcement regarding the agreement can be found here.

 

The agreement follows Cuomo’s September 2007 subpoenas to Xcel and four other utilities companies. As I discussed in a post at the time (here), the subpoenas were directed to the companies’ disclosures to shareholders of the financial risks regarding global warming and climate change. In his August 27 press release, Cuomo stated that his investigations of the other four companies (AES Corporation, Dominion Resources, Dynegy and Peabody Energy) are “ongoing.”

 

 

In its agreement, Xcel has undertaken to “provide detailed disclosure of climate change and associated risks” in its annual SEC filing on Form 10-K. Specifically, Xcel will provide “an analysis of financial risks from climate chance,” focused among other things on: 1. “present and probably future climate change regulation”; 2. “climate-change related litigation”; and 3. “physical impacts of climate change.”

 

 

In addition, Xcel also committed to a “broad array of climate change disclosures” including current and projected future increases in carbon emissions (particularly from planned coal-fired plants); company strategies for reducing or managing its global warming and climate change emissions; and corporate governance actions related to climate change, “including whether environmental performance is incorporated into officer compensation.”

 

 

Although Xcel is the only company that is party to the agreement, Cuomo was very explicit in his press release that his believes that the Xcel agreement has managed to “establish a standard,” and third parties are quoted in his press release as saying that the agreement may have created “an enforceable model for climate change disclosure.”

 

 

Perhaps one might imagine that developments involving only Xcel are irrelevant for other companies. However, one could imagine that only by disregarding overwhelming contemporaneous evidence to the contrary. Among other things, Cuomo’s recent auction rate securities settlement, similarly announced to great fanfare, quickly became a model for regulatory settlements with other auction rate securities targets. For that reason, it must be anticipated that the other four companies Cuomo targeted with subpoenas will face enormous pressure to enter similar agreements.

 

 

The more interesting question is whether the Xcel agreement will have a broader impact, and influence disclosures at other companies – and not just in the utilities industry, but in manufacturing, transport, mining and energy production and distribution, agriculture, and even insurance. As I noted in my prior post, virtually contemporaneous with Cuomo’s subpoenas to these utilities, several public interest organizations had petitioned the SEC to adopt specific climate change reporting guidelines. It is entirely possible that the Xcel settlement will increase the pressure, from shareholders as well as from regulators, to disclose their own financial risks from global climate change.

 

 

As I have previously noted, the danger to publicly traded companies is not just that they may face greater disclosure obligations; the danger arises from the fact that companies undertaking greater disclosure commitments, whether voluntarily or as result of compulsion, may be exposed to later allegations that they engaged in “selective disclosure” or “omission” of unfavorable information. It may only be a matter of time before allegations of this type make their way into civil complaints.

 

 

To be sure, a lawsuit must not only allege misrepresentations or omissions, it must also allege causally related damages. In the absence of shareholder losses related to climate change disclosures, plaintiffs’ lawyers would have little incentive to pursue a climate change disclosure lawsuit. But as scrutiny of these issues increases, and as disclosure pressures mount, the opportunity for market moving announcements also increases. To put it another way, as disclosure expectations increase, so do disclosure risks.

 

 

I have previously asserted that directors and officers of public companies face growing climate change-related exposure. Though these views have been greeted with some interest, there has also been skepticism. Indeed, there have, in fact, as yet been no climate change disclosure related D&O claims.

 

 

However, there are too many politicians who see this topic as a way to enhance their stature. There are too many interest groups that are willing to use all means, including litigation, to advance their agenda. And, indeed, there may even be too many financial risks and uncertainties from the underlying issues. Sooner or later, these forces inevitably will come together in a lawsuit (or perhaps many lawsuits) seeking to hold companies and their directors and officers responsible.

 

 

As today’s announcement from the New York Attorney General’s office demonstrates, climate change already is an important governance and disclosure issue. A myriad of forces ensure that its importance will only increase.

 

 

An August 27, 2008 New York Times article discussing the Xcel agreement can be found here.

 

 

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In a recent post (here), I wrote about the September 18, 2007 petition submitted to the SEC by several environmental groups, seeking to persuade the SEC to institute rules requiring companies to assess and fully disclose their financial risks from climate change. These groups clearly want to use the SEC's disclosure requirements to pressure companies on climate change related issues. But while these groups want to increase companies' disclosure, existing disclosure requirements already require companies to make environmental disclosures (refer here), and the SEC has recently shown an increased willingness to police environmental financial disclosures and to hold corporate officials responsible for disclosure violations.

The SEC seems to have turned its attention on environmental financial disclosures and corporations and corporate executives should take special note of the heightened attention that the SEC is now giving to these disclosures. Although the SEC has not announced any new guidelines or initiatives, corporations and corporate executives should certainly be cognizant of the increased number of civil and criminal actions being brought by the SEC against corporations and officials who fail to observe existing environmental reporting requirements.

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In prior posts (refer here) and other publications (here), I have written about the growing potential exposure to directors and officers of publicly traded companies arising from global climate change concerns. My views have been met with some interest, but also with significant skepticism. But while there are admittedly as yet no D & O claims from climate change issues, several recent developments confirm my view that climate change-related issues represent a growing are of D & O exposure.

In its 2006 Form 10-K, Dominion made no disclosure of projected CO2 emissions from the proposed plant or its current plants. Further, Dominion did not attempt to evaluate or quantify the possible effects of future greenhouse gas regulations, or discuss their impact on the company. Dominion also did not present any strategies to reduce CO2 emissions, as new regulations would likely require. These omissions make it difficult for investors to make informed decisions.

Under federal and state laws and regulations, Dominion's disclosures to investors must be complete and not misleading. Selective disclosure of favorable information or omission of unfavorable information concerning climate change is misleading. Dominion cannot excuse its failure to provide disclosure and analysis by claiming there is insufficient information concerning known climate change trends and uncertainties. (Emphasis added.)

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In an earlier post (here), I wrote about global climate change and D & O risk. The potential challenge to D & O insurers from the risks and potential liabilities of global climate change is only a part of the full range of liability exposures the insurance industry potentially faces as a result of climate change. A May 2007 article by Christine Ross, Evan Mills and Sean Hecht entitled "Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change" (here) take a comprehensive look at the insurance industry's liability exposures arising from the causes and consequences of climate change.

The authors' premise is that the discussion of potential insurance consequences from climate change tends to focus on the property damage concerns of extreme weather events. Their article, by contrast, focuses on the "relatively subtle but equally important dimension of liability." The authors examine a broad range of potential liabilities and insurance coverages that could be implicated, including commercial general liability claims; product liability claims; environmental liability claims, professional liability claims; political liability claims; and others.

The authors' starting point is that "parties that disproportionately contribute to the impacts of climate change are not required through any statutory or regulatory scheme to internalize costs of these impacts." The externalized costs "are left of the victims to bear," based upon which, the authors observe, "applying tort law to climate change harm could be consistent with tort law's basic goals of reducing the societal costs of human activities, compensating those who are harmed unduly by these activites, and providing corrective justice." While substantial barriers could impede efforts to impose tort liability, the costs of defense alone will be burdensome on companies and their insurers.

In addition to attempts to redress climate change through litigation, other climate change initiatives are or will impact many companies. For example, investors have evinced an increasing desire to compel full disclosure of environmental liability risks. The article notes that "over the last seven proxy seasons, climate change resolutions filed by shareholders have increased from six in 2001 to a record forty-two filed in the first two months of 2007." The authors also specifically note that "shareholder resolutions were filed with four insurance companies during the 2007 proxy season ... requesting those companies to disclose strategy and actions on climate change." While in the past these kinds of resolutions would have arisen from special interest investor groups, now "some of America's most powerful institutional investors ...are becoming increasingly active in environmental and social issues."

The authors also note that several SEC regulations deal directly or indirectly with environmental risk disclosure, including Items 101 and 303 of Reg. S-K. The article does note that, at least in the past, there has been "lax enforcement" of these disclosure requirements, and that only five times in the last thirty years has the SEC taken action to enforce environmental liability disclosure. Moreover, the SEC "does not specifically require reporting on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change."

The authors assert that the growing awareness of the potential impact of climate change on companies' circumstances is increasing pressure on the companies to address these disclosure issues. The authors cite the 2006 SEC enforcement action (here) against Ashland Inc., where the SEC found that the company understated its environmental reserves by improperly reducing its remediation estimates. The authors state that this enforcement action may "be a signal of the SEC's increasing willingness to hold companies accountable for failure to adequately disclose material environmental risks." (Refer here for my prior post about the Ashland enforcement action.)

In addition, the authors further note that "failing to establish standards or to take proactive measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could expose companies to reputation and brand damage, as well as regulatory and litigation risk." Among the specific litigation risks, the authors note that "shareholder lawsuits could be focused on a company's performance suffering due to negligent planning by corporate directors for climate change risk." The authors also note that "ignoring climate change, or even worse, misrepresenting its risks can result in exposure to litigation risk."

The authors cite a study finding that 53% of the largest 500 publicly traded companies are doing "a poor job" describing climate change risks to investors, and "are thus at risk of shareholder lawsuits." The authors further note that insurers may be particularly vulnerable, since insurers in particular "have been reluctant to disclose their climate-related risks."

After comprehensively reviewing a wide variety of potential liability exposures, the authors move on to suggest a variety of risk management and mitigation strategies. The authors also call on financial services companies in general to incorporate environmental awareness into their portfolio strategies. The authors call on insurers in particular to "offer innovative products and services that maximize incentives for energy efficiency while minimizing risk." The authors cite, among other things, insurer initiated property loss mitigation efforts and pay-as-you-drive automobile insurance as examples of innovative insurance efforts "to take concrete actions that generate profits while maintaining insurability and protecting customers from extreme weather-related losses, as well as reducing greenhouse gas emissions."

The authors conclude by noting that:

The insurance industry, perhaps more than any other institution, has the power to set the stage for enduring and significant contributions to solving the problem of global climate change. In doing so, liability insurance considerations could prove to be as important as the more widely studied property insurance consequences of climate change.

As I discussed in my earlier post, global climate change is going to loom increasingly large, not least as a growing source of potential liability risk for companies and their directors and officers. Readers who are interesting in these topics will want to know about the free June 12, 2007 webinar entitled "Tackling Global Warming: Challenge for Boards and Their Advisors," co-sponsored by The CorporateCounsel.net and the National Council for Science and the Environment. Information about the webinar can be found here.

Readers interested in global climate change as an environmental phenomenon will be interested to read the June 7, 2007 Washington Post article entitled "Icy Island Warms to Climate Change" (here) discussing the wide-ranging impacts of climate change that Greenland and its inhabitants are already experiencing.

Hat tip to the Sox First blog (here) for the link to the climate change article.

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The U.S. Supreme Court's landmark April 2, 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA (here) may represent a turning point in the evolving governmental response to global warming. As discussed below, the decision itself and the regulatory, legislative and litigation consequences that will likely follow could have important implications for many publicly traded companies and their directors and officers, particularly companies in certain industries. These effects in turn could have important D & O insurance implications as well.

Let me acknowledge at the outset that a short time ago I would probably have had little patience with an article like this one. I cannot abide alarmists who try to turn peripheral concerns into major crises (see, for example, my prior post, here, decrying specious efforts to convert avian flu into a generalized corporate priority). But the Supreme Court's recent opinion, together with a confluence of other causes and concerns, persuades me that many companies no longer have the luxury of treating global warming as a peripheral concern.

The most important (but by no means the sole) factor in my revised view of this topic is the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Massachusetts v EPA. The Court held that the EPA had violated the Clean Air Act by improperly declining to regulate new-vehicle emissions standards to control carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to global warming. In and of itself, the Court's ruling is somewhat narrow. Indeed, the Court declined to reach the question whether or not the EPA must reach "an endangerment finding" requiring regulation of carbon dioxide emissions in new vehicles. The Court held only that the EPA had "offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change." The court remanded the matter to the lower court (and from there, to the EPA) with the direction that the EPA "must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute."

While the Court's holding is narrow, there are two components of the Supreme Court's decision that are, however, very important. The first is the Court's holding that the injury of which Massachusetts complained in bringing the suit was sufficiently particularized for Massachusetts to have "standing" to bring its claim. The second is that greenhouse gas emissions are "pollutants" under the Clean Air Act. These elements, taken in the case's full political, economic and legal context, could mean that the decision will, in the words of the April 3, 2007 Washington Post article discussing the case (here), "serve as a turning point."

Among the most important reasons the decision may serve as a turning point is the plethora of lower court cases that had been held in abeyance pending the outcome of Massachusetts v. EPA. The most important of these other cases is the Mass v. EPA companion case in the D.C. Circuit, Coke Oven Environmental Task Force v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir., filed April 27, 2006) (refer here). Just as the Mass v. EPA case challenged the EPA's inaction on new mobile source (i.e., automobiles) greenhouse gas emissions, the Coke Oven case challenges the EPA's inaction on new stationary sources (i.e., utilities) greenhouse gas emissions. The Supreme Court's holding in the Mass v EPA case that greenhouse gases are indeed pollutants under the Clean Air Act is broadly applicable to both mobile and stationary sources. In other words, the EPA's regulatory response necessarily must carry implications for a broad range of industries. In addition to the Coke Oven case, other lower court cases on these and related issues were also held in abeyance, and will now go forward in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Mass v EPA.

In addition, a variety of state and federal cases either filed in the past or now pending have directly attacked the sources of greenhouse gas emissions (particularly automobile manufacturers and electric utilities) in several tort-based lawsuits, usually on public nuisance theories. The courts have largely dodged these cases in the past, invoking the principle that the claimants' allegations of generalized harm are insufficiently particularized to support a justiciable controversy. The Supreme Court's holding that Massachusetts had adequate standing to present a justiciable controversy could have a very significant impact on future courts' rulings on jurisdictional standing and justiciability criteria that must be satisfied for litigants to bring climate change-based cases. (An interesting commentary on the Supreme Court's standing holding can be found here.)

The Supreme Court's decision is only one of several important recent developments affecting these issues. The November 2006 election also dramatically changed the political landscape, and the Democratic majority in both houses of Congress has brought climate change to the top of the legislative agenda. Bills have already been introduced in both chambers to address climate change directly. While a congressional consensus on these issues may prove elusive, the states are in the meantime moving forward. California's landmark Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 is only one of several states' legislative initiatives in this area. A decision by the EPA to decline the Supreme Court's invitation to reconsider its decision not to regulate greenhouse gases could be the worst possible outcome for business, because it will spur Congress to action, and even barring that, invite action from the states, who are racing ahead of Washington on these issues. The Economist magazine has a good summary (here, subscription required) of the confluence of the legistaltive and regulatory forces on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions.

None of this has been lost on the business community. For example, on January 22, 2007, a coalition of ten companies joined several environmental groups to propose (refer here) a cap-and-trade program regarding greenhouse gas emissions.

All of these forces are likely to gain momentum in light of continuing developments, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's April 6, 2007 release of its latest report (here) on climate change impacts, raising even more alarming concerns regarding global climate change (about which, refer here).

The point here is not merely some generalized concern about the changing cultural, political, regulatory, legislative and litigation context. The point is that all of these changes represent particularized concerns for many public companies, affecting their disclosure obligations under Regulation S-K. Two provisions of Reg. S-K are particularly applicable here, Item 101 and Item 303.

Item 101(c)(1)(xii) requires companies to disclose current and anticipated "material effects" of compliance with environmental regulations:

Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material effects that compliance with Federal, State and local provisions which have been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment, may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries. The registrant shall disclose any material estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such further periods as the registrant may deem material.

As new EPA regulations and state mandates regarding greenhouse gas emissions accumulate, many companies may find themselves for the first time obliged to provide Item 101 environmental regulation impact disclosure, and other companies will be compelled to provide more extensive Item 101 disclosure than may have been the case in the past.

Item 303 requires companies to "describe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenue or income from continuing operations." There are an increasingly large number of increasingly important trends and uncertainties surrounding global climate change that will affect an increasingly greater number of companies, requiring these companies to adapt their Item 303 disclosure accordingly.

The type and range of financial consequences that might arise from global warming is a topic far beyond the scope of the blog format. A good summary of these topics can be found in the Association of British Insurers June 2005 report entitled "Financial Risks of Climate Change" (here). There is, in brief, no limit to the number of potential "risks, trends and uncertainties."

Because of these disclosure obligations, many public companies will face the increasing challenge of articulating the impact of global climate change regulation, legislation and litigation on their business and operations. Because of the extent of the impact (both probable and possible) and the prospect for developments that could have dramatically negative consequences for at least some companies, future shareholder litigation surrounding these disclosures necessarily must be anticipated. The various political, regulatory and litigation trends identified above will obviously affect companies in the automotive and energy generation businesses (and supporting industries), but emphatically not these companies alone. Other industries that seem likely to be affected include insurance, transportation, manufacturing, shipping, and other businesses whose operations have (or which could sustain) a substantial environmental impact, even if it is entirely localized. There are certainly other industries that are beyond my imaginative capacity to anticipate here.

In short, the public company disclosure obligations create a context within which it is prudent to assume that D & O claims may arise. To the extent claims do arise, the wording of applicable D & O policies could have an enormous impact on the availability of D & O insurance to defend and indemnify companies and their directors and officers.

D & O policies typically contain a pollution exclusion. I was surprised to observe, upon careful reading of several typical pollution exclusions for purposes of writing this post, that it is not obvious that the standard pollution exclusions were intended to pertain to greenhouse gas emissions or consequences arising therefrom. The term "pollutant" as used in many policies' exclusions simply may not encompass greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, there may be several arguments on which to contend that the standard pollution exclusion wording has no relation to greenhouse gas emissions or their environmental consequences. (Of course, whether or not such contentions would be persuasive to a court is a matter of pure conjecture, on which I do not opine.)

Nevertheless, assuming the exclusion would otherwise preclude coverage for claims pertaining to greenhouse gas emissions, the pollution exclusion in most D & O policies these days carves back coverage for derivative suits and shareholder claims. In light of the possible course of future litigation in this area, the wording of the pollution exclusion, and in particular the wording of the carve back for shareholder claims and derivative lawsuits, will be absolutely critical. The fact that this policy language must anticipate cases and claims of kind that may not have previously arisen underscores the importance of enlisting the assistance of skilled D & O insurance professionals in the D & O insurance transaction.

A good resource in this area is the article by J. Wylie Donald and Loly Garcia Tor of the McCarter & English law firm entitled "Climate Change and The D & O Pollution Exclusion" (here).

A good round up of blog commentary on the Massachusetts v. EPA case can be found here. A round up of press coverage about the case can be found here.

Connecticut Law School Conference: On Thursday April 12, 2007, I will be participating on a panel at a conference at the University of Connecticut Law School. The conference is entitled "D & O Insurance: Shareholder's Friend or Foe?" and the panel on which I am participating is entitled "Can Insurers Reduce Securities Litigation Risk?" Further information about the conference can be found here. Prior D & O Diary posts on the topic of D & O insurance and corporate governance can be found here and here.

Weather Central: If the rest of the world must learn to adapt to extreme weather as a result of climate change, they may want to spend a little time here in Cleveland. For the first time in recent memory we missed a White Christmas last year, but by God we are going to "enjoy" a White Easter this April. The rest of the country has no absolutely no idea how chilling is the phrase "The lake effect snow machine is engaged and stalled over the lakeshore." The old story about the Eskimos having dozens of words for "snow" undoubtedly is true, but kindred spirits here understand that almost all of the "snow words" would be unsuitable for a family-oriented blog.

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