
As readers of this blog know, one of the vestiges of the SPAC frenzy that peaked in 2021 is a large volume of SPAC-related securities class action litigation; indeed, as I have recently noted, SPAC-related securities class action lawsuits continue to be filed. In addition to these federal court securities suits, prospective claimants with SPAC-related grievances have also filed Delaware state court breach of fiduciary duty actions, a form of litigation often referred to as “MultiPlan actions,” in reference to the MultiPlan lawsuit, which, as discussed here, was the first of these Delaware court actions to survive a motion to dismiss. Since the ruling in the MultiPlan case, plaintiffs have largely been successful in surviving dismissal motions in these kinds of cases.
However, as discussed in a June 2024 memo from the Skadden law firm (here), in May 2024, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the motion to dismiss in the SPAC-related direct action breach of fiduciary duty suit relating to Canoo Inc., a company that was the result of a 2020 merger with a publicly traded SPAC, Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV. According to the law firm memo, the Court’s ruling was the first opinion granting a motion to dismiss in a MultiPlan claim. As discussed below, the Court’s opinion reflects a number of interesting observations about the lawsuit and claims of this type. A copy of the Court’s May 31, 2024 opinion can be found here. Continue Reading Delaware Court Grants Dismissal Motion in SPAC Transaction Proxy Disclosure Case

The “economic structure” of SPACs creates an ‘inherent conflict” between the SPAC sponsor and the SPAC’s public shareholders, according to a new paper from two leading law professors. The conflict arises from the SPAC sponsor’s financial interest in completing a merger even if the merger is not value-creating, which may conflict with the shareholders’ interest in redeeming their shares if they believe that the proposed merger is disadvantageous. Because of the potential conflict, it is critical that the SPAC’s board independently reviews the proposed merger and inform shareholders about the merger with appropriate candor. However, if the board members’ compensation aligns their interests with those of the sponsor, the sponsor’s conflict could extend to the directors themselves – a circumstance the paper’s authors call the “epitome of bad governance.”