duty to monitor

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At this point, there is nearly universal agreement that artificial intelligence (AI) is (or at least will be) transformative. It is also clear that as companies struggle to adapt to the new technology, they also face a host of challenges, including disclosure and regulatory risks, and the related risk of litigation. As a result, AI poses an exceptionally difficult set of circumstances for corporate directors, as discussed in an August 14, 2024, Wall Street Journal article entitled “Why AI Risks Are Keeping Board Members Up at Night” (here). As the article makes clear, while many directors recognize the importance of getting a handle on AI and how it might affect their companies, they are struggling to find the right approach even as AI-related questions become more pervasive.Continue Reading Boards of Directors and AI-Related Concerns

For many years, Delaware’s courts emphasized that duty of oversight claims (often known as Caremark claims) are “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” However, in a line of cases beginning with the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, Delaware courts have sustained various plaintiffs’ assertion of breaches of the duty of oversight. This in turn encouraged more claimants to file duty of oversight claims, a development that clearly has alarmed the Delaware courts. The more recent result has been a series of cases in which the Delaware Chancery Court has emphatically shot down would-be duty of oversight claims.

The latest of these decisions is a ruling in a case involving the directors of Centene Corporation, in which Vice Chancellor Morgan Zurn granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of the duty of oversight claims against the Centene board, in an opinion that emphasizes the high bar for Caremark liability. A copy of the July 12, 2024, opinion in Bricklayers Pension Fund of Western Pennsylvania v. Brinkley can be found here. A July 15, 2024, Memo from the Fried Frank law firm about the court’s ruling can be found here.  Continue Reading Del. Chancery Court Rejects Oversight Breach Claims Against Centene’s Board

In a January 25, 2023, opinion in the McDonald’s case that has become known as McDonald’s I, Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis Laster held, as discussed in detail here, that liability for breach of the duty of oversight can extend to corporate officers as well as to directors. While there have been subsequent cases that have raised breach of the duty of oversight claims against officers, there have been no published decisions analyzing the duty of oversight as pertains to officers — that is, until now.

In a short December 14, 2023, opinion that emphasizes the high bar for oversight claims against officers, Vice Chancellor Lori Will dismissed claims that the personal transportation device company Segway brought against its former President. VC Will expressly rejected any suggestion that the standard to plead an oversight breach claim against a corporate officer is any lower than the high standards applicable to oversight claims against directors. A copy of VC Will’s opinion can be found here.Continue Reading Delaware Court: High Barrier for Oversight Claims Against Officers

As readers of this blog know, there have been important case law developments in Delaware concerning boards’ duty of oversight. In the following guest post, the authors review the key recent developments and consider the practical implications for boards. The authors of this paper are: Sebastian M. Alia, Deputy General Counsel, Hudson Insurance Group; H. Stephen Grace, Ph.D., President, H.S. Grace & Company, Inc.: Alvin H. Fenichel, CPA, Senior Advisor, H.S. Grace & Company, Inc.; and Joseph P. Monteleone, Esq., Partner, Weber Gallagher. A version of this article previously was published in the ACC Docket. I would like to thank the authors for allowing me to publish their articles on this site. I welcome guest post submissions from responsible authors on topics of interest to this blog’s readers. Please contact me directly if you would like to submit a guest post. Here is the authors’ article.
Continue Reading Guest Post: How To Structure a Board to Oversee Mission-Critical Activities

Earlier this year, in Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court underscored that boards that fail to establish oversight procedures for their company’s mission critical functions can be held liable for breach of their Caremark duties. In an October 1, 2019 decision in the Clovis Oncology Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court provided further perspective on directors’ potential liability for breaches of the duty of oversight. The Chancery court held, citing Marchand,  that boards not only must be able to show that they have made good faith efforts to implement an oversight system, but that also that they monitor the system – particularly when a company operates in a highly regulated industry.  The Chancery Court’s October 1, 2019 decision in the Clovis Oncology Derivative Litigation can be found here.
Continue Reading Caremark Duties Include Duty Not Only to Establish Oversight Processes but Also to Monitor Them

sup ct 5ERISA plan fiduciaries have a continuing duty to monitor selected plan investments and to remove imprudent investment selections, according to the U.S. Supreme Court’s unanimous May 18, 2015 opinion in Tibble v. Edison International. Although the Court affirmed the fiduciary duty to monitor, it otherwise left the development of the duty’s contours to be delineated…