Individuals serving as corporate officers take on significant potential liability exposures in the performance of their duties. As a result, most companies provide their officers with advancement, indemnification, and insurance protection for liabilities incurred while acting as corporate officers. However, it is not always clear who is an “officer” for purposes of claiming the benefits
As I discussed in a post last week, on March 20, 2018 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) did not eliminate state courts’ concurrent jurisdiction to hear liability lawsuits alleging only violations of the Securities Act of 1933. In the following guest post, Boris Feldman and Ignacio Salceda of the Wilson Sonsini law firm review the court’s decision and consider what may be next for claimants and for companies. A version of this article previously was published on Law 360. I would like to thank Boris and Ignacio for their willingness to allow me to publish their article as a guest post on this site. I welcome guest post submissions from responsible authors on topics of interest to this blog’s readers. Please contact me directly if you would like to submit a guest post. Here is Boris’s and Ignacio’s article.
Continue Reading Guest Post: After Cyan — Some Prognostications
One of the more interesting recent developments in the world of corporate and securities litigation has been the litigation reform bylaw movement. Among the types of bylaws with which various companies have experimented are the forum selection bylaws (now permitted by statute in Delaware) and fee-shifting bylaws (now prohibited in Delaware for stock corporations, as discussed here). Yet another type of litigation reform bylaw that has attracted attention is the minimum stake to sue bylaw, which requires shareholder claimants to show that the represent a specified interest of the company’s ownership interest in order to be able to pursue a class or derivative claim.
Continue Reading Lawsuit Challenging Minimum Stake to Sue Bylaw Dismissed
One of the more significant recent developments in the corporate and securities litigation arena has been the emergence of the debate over fee-shifting bylaws following the Delaware Supreme Court’s May 2014 decision in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund. Draft proposed legislation is now being considered by the Delaware legislature that would address
Earlier this year, after the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of fee-shifting bylaws in the case of ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund (as discussed here), a legislative initiative quickly emerged to restrict the case’s holding to Delaware non-stock companies. However, the initiative proved to be controversial, and the legislative proposal
Many companies provide advancement, indemnification and insurance benefits and protection for their officers and directors. However, it is not always clear who is an “officer” for purposes of claiming the benefits and protection. The long-running and high-profile saga of Sergey Aleynikov, the former Goldman Sachs computer programmer and company Vice President accused of stealing proprietary
Following the Delaware Chancery Court’s June 2013 ruling upholding the facial validity of the bylaw of Chevron Corporation designating Delaware as the exclusive forum for intra-corporate disputes, the adoption of forum selection bylaws has become mainstream. But while a number of companies have now adopted forum selection bylaws, the circumstances surrounding the adoption by
The Delaware Supreme Court stirred up quite a bit of controversy earlier this year in the ATP Tours, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund case when it upheld the facial validity of a fee-shifting by law. The bylaw provided that an unsuccessful shareholder claimant in intracorporate litigation would have to pay his or her adversaries’ cost
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For many years, business groups and corporate representatives have tried to reform shareholder litigation through legislation and case law development, with mixed success. However, in more recent years an interesting new initiative has emerged – the attempt to achieve litigation reform through amendments to corporate bylaws. This effort received a significant boost last year when
As I noted in a recent post (here), in response to a recent Delaware Supreme Court decision upholding the facial validity of fee-shifting bylaws, proposed legislation was introduced in the Delaware General Assembly to limit the Supreme Court’s ruling and to restrict the ability of Delaware corporations to utilize their bylaws to shift