As I have noted on this site, for the last several years (going back at least to 2021, and arguably even further than that), one of the significant factors contributing to securities class action lawsuit filings has been the number of SPAC-related securities suits. In the latest sign that the trend of SPAC-related securities suit filings is continuing, on August 23, 2023, a plaintiff shareholder filed a securities suit in the Southern District of Florida against medical payments collection firm MSP Recovery and certain of its executives, as well as against the directors and officers of the SPAC into which the company merged in 2022. A copy of the plaintiff’s complaint can be found here. PLEASE ALSO SEE THE UPDATE, below.
Continue Reading SPAC-Related Securities Suit Filed Against Medical Payments Recovery Firm
In an interesting and unusual development, the victims’ trust that was created as part of the Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) bankruptcy has reached an agreement to settle the trust’s assigned claims against PG&E’s directors and officers for $117 million. According to the parties’ settlement agreement, the settlement is to be funded entirely with proceeds from PG&E’s D&O insurance program. As discussed below, there are a number of interesting aspects and implications to this settlement A copy of the Fire Victim’s Trust’s September 29, 2022 press release about the settlement can be found 
In a series of opinions beginning with the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Marchand v. Barnhill, Delaware courts have sustained a number of so-called “Caremark” claims based on the defendant board members’ breach of their duty of oversight. The courts have denied motions to dismiss in cases where the boards failed to act despite “red flags” alerting them to problems. But what happens if the “red flag” that alerts the board to a problem is a litigation demand letter submitted by a prospective claimant seeking to have the board take up litigation because of problems identified in the letter? In an interesting and troubling May 24, 2022 decision, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster sustained a claim based on these kinds of allegations, accepting what he called a “novel theory” with “admitted trepidation.” Though Laster sought in his opinion to contain some the more “disquieting” implications of this ruling, there is now at least a theoretical basis on which future prospective claimants could argue that a board’s rejection of a litigation demand letter could itself give rise to a separate breach of fiduciary duty claim.
As I have 
In January of this year, when the Delaware Chancery Court sustained the Delaware state court direct action filed against the directors and officers of the SPAC that had acquired MultiPlan Corp., I 
The “economic structure” of SPACs creates an ‘inherent conflict” between the SPAC sponsor and the SPAC’s public shareholders, according to a new paper from two leading law professors. The conflict arises from the SPAC sponsor’s financial interest in completing a merger even if the merger is not value-creating, which may conflict with the shareholders’ interest in redeeming their shares if they believe that the proposed merger is disadvantageous. Because of the potential conflict, it is critical that the SPAC’s board independently reviews the proposed merger and inform shareholders about the merger with appropriate candor. However, if the board members’ compensation aligns their interests with those of the sponsor, the sponsor’s conflict could extend to the directors themselves – a circumstance the paper’s authors call the “epitome of bad governance.”
As I have noted in prior posts (most recently