On March 31, 2008, Cornerstone Research released its review and analysis of 2007 securities class action settlements. Cornerstone’s press release can be found here and the full report can be found here. The Cornerstone Report differs in certain particulars from the previously released NERA Economic Consulting report (about which refer here), but the two reports are directionally consistent.

Cornerstone’s press release emphasizes that the aggregate dollar value of all settlements was down 60% compared to 2006, but the full report emphasizes that, when the four largest settlements are removed from the analysis, the aggregate value of all settlements in 2007 exceeded all prior years except the unprecedented year of 2006.

The full report also highlights that the median securities class action settlement reached an all-time high of $9.0 million in 2007, compared to a median of $6.9 million for the years 1996 through 2006. The increase in the median settlement in 2007 is “partly due to the fact that the percentage of cases settling for $10-20 million increased substantially from prior years.” On the other hand, the number of settlements in excess of $100 million declined from 14 in 2006 to only nine in 2007.

According to the Cornerstone report, the average securities class action settlement fell from $105 million in 2006 (excluding the Enron settlement) to $62.7 million in 2007. But the 2007 average still exceeded the average of $54.7 million for the years 1996 through 2006.

The Cornerstone report examines the factors affecting settlement amounts and concludes that the presence of institutional investors lead plaintiffs and the existence of parallel shareholders’ derivative lawsuits both tend to have an upward effect on settlement values.

The press release quotes Stanford Law Professor Joseph Grundfest as saying that “it seems clear that the aggregate dollar value of settlements over the next two or three years is likely to decline significantly because the inventory of large cases in the pipeline just isn’t there. The interesting open question is whether the subprime crisis will cause an uptick in securities fraud settlement activity that might, given the settlement cycles in the litigation industry, only become apparent three to five years from now.”

The differences between the analysis in the Cornerstone and NERA Economic Consulting reports appears to be due at least in part to the different methods the two studies used to categorize settlements by settlement year, with one report categorizing the settlements by the year in which the settlement was announced and the other report categorizing the settlement by the year in which it was approved.

As the markets for various types of subprime-related assets have seized up, many companies find themselves faced with complicated issues concerning asset valuation and disclosure. These issues have in turn both subjected companies to the possibility of litigation and encouraged investors to target the entities and institutions that sold them the assets in the first place. The extent of the asset valuation and disclosure issues suggests that the turmoil, and the ensuing litigation, will continue to spread.

One example where the valuation and disclosure issues have already led to litigation involves the securities class action lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on March 28, 2008 against MoneyGram International and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ press release can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

The complaint against Moneygram relates to the company’s January 14, 2008 press release (here) in which the company stated that it had completed its valuation of its investment portfolio as of November 30, 2007, as a result of which the company said that it had “experienced net unrealized losses of $571 million from September 30, 2007, bringing cumulative net unrealized losses to $860 million.” The company also announced that it has commenced a process to “realign is portfolio away from asset-backed securities,” as a result of which it had realized in January a loss of $200 million on asset sales of $1.3 billion.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release, the complaint alleges that the defendants “concealed from the investing public” that:

(a) the Company lacked requisite internal controls to ensure that the reserves for the Company’s investments in asset-backed securities were adequate, and, as a result, the Company’s projections and reported results issued during the Class Period were based upon defective assumptions and/or manipulated facts; and (b) the Company concealed the extent of its potential losses arising from its exposure to asset-backed securities containing uncollectible debt.

The prospect of securities litigation arising from asset valuation and disclosure issues is a potentially very substantial problem, because so many companies are facing these same kinds of issues due to asset-backed securities in their investment portfolio. Similarly, companies holding auction rate securities are facing particularly challenging valuation and disclosure issues, and as I have previously noted (most recently here), these challenges are not limited to companies in the financial sector, but indeed are widely dispersed throughout the economy. For example, a March 28, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled “’Auction Rates’ Clip Tech Firms’ Profits” (here) discusses the financial impacts that a variety of technology companies are facing because of the companies’ inability to convert their auction rate securities holdings into cash.

One measure of the depth of the problems arising from the failure of the auction rate securities market is that it is not just companies whose balance sheets are under pressure. Many households and individuals are also now about to recognize their own personal balance sheet hits due to the auction rate problem. According to a March 29, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled “UBS Plans Auction-Rate Price Cut” (here), UBS is going to lower the values of the auction rate securities held by its customers. The reduced values, which will be based on computer models and “will range from a few percentage points to more than 20%” will be reflected on their customers’ forthcoming statements.

As I have previously noted (most recently here), investors have already filed a number of class action lawsuits against the companies that sold them auction rate securities, and on March 27, 2007, Citibank became the latest to be sued in a securities class action on behalf of investors for its sale of auction rate securities (see press release here and complaint here). The reduction of the carrying values of auction rate securities on investors’ statements will likely further bestir investors and could lead to even more litigation. But making no adjustments could create a different set of issues and lead to greater problems later.

The question of how best to reflect the valuation of assets for which there is no current market is one that potentially affect participants at all levels of the economy. And while there undoubtedly will be more lawsuits on behalf of investors against the companies that sold them the auction rate securities, a potentially greater litigation threat may arise from shareholders who may contend they were misled about a company’s balance sheet exposure to these kinds of assets. There could well be a great deal of litigation in which it is alleged, as asserted in the complaint in the MoneyGram case, that a company failed to disclose the “extent of its potential losses arising from its exposure to asset-backed securities containing uncollectible debt.”

The extent of the problem shall be revealed in the fullness of time. But meanwhile the subprime-related securities class action litigation still continues to accumulate. With the addition of the MoneyGram and Citigroup lawsuits, my running tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits (which can be accessed here) now stands at 61, 23 of which have been filed in 2008, and seven of which are filed on behalf of auction rate investors against the companies who sold them the securities.

As I have noted in prior posts (most recently here), due to increasing average claims severity and escalating defense expense, excess D & O insurance is an increasingly important factor in the resolution of claims involving directors and officers of public companies. The greater involvement of excess D & O insurance has also meant an increasing number of claims disputes involving excess D & O insurers.

A recurring issue has been the question of the excess carrier’s obligations when the primary carrier has paid less than its full policy limits as a result of a compromise with the primary carrier. A March 25, 2008 opinion (here) by California’s intermediate appellate court held, that given the policy language involved, an excess D & O insurance policy was not triggered where the underlying insurer neither paid nor was obligated to pay its full policy limit of liability.

For the policy period March 15, 1999 through March 15, 2000, Qualcomm had $40 million of D & O insurance, structured with a primary layer of $20 million and an excess “follow form” layer of $20 million above the primary $20 million. During the policy period, Qualcomm employees and former employees brought lawsuits asserting rights to unvested company stock options. Qualcomm later settled these lawsuits and sought reimbursement from its D & O insurers for its defense expense and the settlement amounts.

Qualcomm ultimately reached a compromise with its primary D & O insurer, whereby Qualcomm gave the primary insurer a full policy release in exchange for the primary carrier’s payment of $16 million. Even with this $16 million payment, however, Qualcomm still had unreimbursed defense expense of $3.6 million and also had an additional unreimbursed $9 million in settlement expense.

In October 2006, Qualcomm sued its excess D & O insurer for breach of contract and declaratory relief, seeking compensatory damages as well as a judicial declaration that the excess carrier was obligated to indemnify Qualcomm for more than $9 million in unreimbursed expenses. The excess carrier contended, among other things, that the underlying policy had not been “exhausted” as required by the excess policy. The excess policy’s exhaustion clause provided that the excess carrier “shall be liable only after the insurers under each of the Underlying policies have paid or have been held liable to pay the full amount of the Underlying Limit of Liability.”

The trial court sustained the excess carrier’s demurrer (in effect, granted the carrier’s motion to dimiss) without leave to amend on the grounds that the excess policy had not been triggered, and Qualcomm appealed.

On appeal, Qualcomm argued that an excess carrier was liable for losses exceeding the actual limits of underlying primary insurance, even where the primary carrier settled for less than the actual policy limit. Qualcomm also argued that denying excess coverage in the circumstances presented would be contrary to public policy because such a denial would work a forfeiture, provide a windfall to the excess carrier, and encourage litigation by discouraging settlement.

The court of appeals declined “to reach a broad holding on public policy considerations” and instead concluded that “the literal policy language in this case governs.” The court said that the excess policy was not triggered because Qualcomm’s pleadings “establish that the primary insurer neither paid the ‘full amount’ of the liability limit nor had it become legally obligated to pay the full amount of the primary limit.” The court said that

the exhaustion clause here compels us to conclude that the parties expressly agreed that [the primary carrier] was required to pay (or be legally obligated to pay) no less than $20 million as a condition of [the excess carrier’s] liability. Because [the primary carrier] did not so pay, [the excess carrier’s obligations] did not arise.

The Qualcomm decision is consistent with the 2007 decision in the Comerica case, about which I wrote here, and which the Qualcomm court said presented “factual circumstances almost identical to those present in this case." This developing line of case authority has important implications both for the claims resolution and for the insurance acquisition processes.

Let me say at the outset that I am not attempting to criticize the position taken by the excess carrier in the Qualcomm case. Given the court’s ruling, it would be difficult to suggest that the carrier’s legal position was not well founded, and I do not propose to do so here.

In general, however, a claims outcome where a policyholder is stuck with millions of dollars of unexpectedly uninsured claims, after having funded a coverage gap as a result of a compromise with the primary insurer, and after having paid substantial insurance premiums, is highly undesirable from the policyholder’s perspective. Indeed, everyone involved in the D & O insurance industry, including ultimately even excess D & O insurers, has an interest in avoiding claims outcomes where policyholders gets “stuck,” as the value component of the insurance equation—the very thing that insurers’ sell – depends on the policyholders’ not getting “stuck.”

By the same token, the industry could be doing its customers and itself a service by keeping track of claims activity that produces adverse policyholder outcomes, whether it is a primary carrier that is hotboxing the policyholder into making a compromise or an excess carrier that is refusing to play along. Our industry could be improved were it to keep track of the carriers whose claims decisions result in policyholders getting “stuck” – by keeping track the industry might ensure that claims decisions involve not only detached legal analysis but also due consideration of the concrete business assumptions on which our industry ultimately depends.

At a minimum, it is increasingly clear that policyholders should consider only global compromises, involving all insurers, as any other arrangement could leave the policyholder exposed.

The Qualcomm decision has lessons for the policy acquisition process as well. The outcome in the Qualcomm case was a direct reflection of the excess policy’s exhaustion trigger language. While alternative language was not generally available at the time Qualcomm placed the D & O program involved in that case, many excess D & O carriers now offer exhaustion trigger language that reduces the restrictions on the kinds of payments that could trigger the excess carrier’s payment obligation. Indeed, many policies recognize payment by the policyholder as satisfying the underlying limit. The need for these issues to be address in the insurance placement process underscores the need to have skilled insurance professionals involved in the D & O insurance acquisition process.

Special thanks to John McCarrick of the Edward Angell Palmer & Dodge law firm for providing me with a copy of the Qualcomm decision. I should add that the views expressed in this post are solely my own.

In a sweeping 581-page report (here), the examiner appointed in connection with the New Century Financial Corporation bankruptcy found that New Century “engaged in a number of significant improper and imprudent practices related to its loan originations” that “created a ticking time bomb that detonated in 2007.”

Bankruptcy examiner Michael J. Missal issued his report as part of the investigation he undertook at the request of New Century’s bankruptcy trustee to examine “any and all accounting and financial statement irregularities, errors and misstatements.” The report is dated February 29, 2008, but it was unsealed on March 26, 2008 at the request of former New Century Employees.

The examiner’s report concludes that New Century “had a brazen obsession with increasing loan originations, without due regard to the risks associate with that business strategy.” The report also concludes that New Century “engaged in at least seven wide-ranging accounting practices in 2005 and 2006” that “resulted in material misstatements of the Company’s financial statements.” The examiner did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that New Century engaged in earnings management or manipulation “although its accounting irregularities almost always resulted in increased earnings.”

The report also states that New Century’s outside accounting firm, KPMG, “contributed to certain of these accounting and financial reporting deficiencies by enabling them to persist and, in some instances, precipitating the Company’s departure from applicable accounting standards.”

The report states that as a result of New Century’s accounting failures New Century understated its repurchase reserve in the third quarter of 2006 by 100%, and reported a quarterly profit of $63.5 million when it should have reported a loss.” In addition, the accounting errors resulted in the payment of performance bonuses to key executives in 2005 “that were at least 300% more than they should have been.” New Century also made “a number of false and misleading statements in its public filings, press releases and other communications.”

Based on his investigation, the examiner believes that “several causes of action may be available to the estate.” First, the report concludes that the estate may be able to assert causes of action against KPMG for “professional negligence and negligent misrepresentations.” Second, the estate may be able to assert causes of action against former officers “to recover certain of the bonuses… that were tied, directly or indirectly, to the incorrect financial statements.” These causes of action, the report states, “could seek million of dollars of recoveries.”

The examiner also considered whether the company’s former officials breached their fiduciary duties, and whether the estate has possible claims against the officials. The report notes that any assertion of these claims would have “strong defenses to overcome, particularly the business judgment rule and statutory and other limitations.”

While the examiner’s conclusions may (and undoubtedly will) be the subject of substantial debate, the report’s analysis of the company’s loan origination practices and accounting shortcomings is remarkably detailed. The sheer sweep and magnitude of the report and the depth of its detail could make New Century the poster child for the excesses of the subprime lending boom, evoking inevitable comparisons with Enron as the byword for an entire era. Indeed, the report suggests a number of echoes from that earlier period, including in particular the accounting firm’s supposed complicity in the company’s alleged excesses.

The fallout from the subprime meltdown will continue to accumulate in the months and years to come, but the New Century bankruptcy examiner’s report may represent the first installment on the history of the era.

A March 26, 2008 Bloomberg.com article discussing the examiner’s report can be found here. A March 27, 2008 Wall Street Journal article discussing the report can be found here.

Subprime litigation may be all the rage, but the consolidated IPO Laddering case is back in the news, a seemingly distant reverberation from a long-gone era that may nonetheless still vex the same investment banks caught up in the current subprime crisis. The consolidated Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation is going forward in the district court after the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of class certification (refer here regarding the Second Circuit’s reversal). On remand back to the district court, the plaintiffs have amended their Master Allegations and Complaints in the six focus cases, and the defendants moved to dismiss.

In a March 26, 2008 opinion (here), Judge Shira Scheindlin substantially denied the defendants’ motion to dimiss and also made is unmistakably clear that the litigation is going forward.

Judge Scheindlin’s rulings in the March 26 opinion are largely consistent with her prior rulings in the case, and, indeed, in significant parts of her opinion she simply repeats her prior ruling and states “I see no reason to reconsider this decision.” However, in two particular areas, intervening Supreme Court case law required Judge Scheindlin to reassess her prior analysis. Judge Scheindlin made it clear that the intervening case law did not change her view of the case.

First, Judge Scheindlin reexamined the plaintiffs’ scienter allegations in light of the Tellabs decision. The plaintiffs assert two separate claims under Section 10(b). One is asserted solely against the Underwriter defendants and is based on alleged market manipulation (based on the alleged tie-in arrangement that required IPO share buyers to purchase additional shares at higher prices). The other Section 10(b) claim is asserted against all defendants and alleges misrepresentations and omissions regarding the alleged manipulation scheme.

With respect to the market manipulation claim, Judge Scheindler reaffirmed her prior ruling, reiterating that the alleged conduct was so obviously manipulative that “it could not have been done inadvertently,” and therefore the inference of scienter was at least as compelling as the competing inference.

With respect to the misrepresentation allegations, Judge Scheindlin focused on the allegation that the issuer defendants’ officers and directors allegedly held shares that were inflated by the price manipulation. She viewed this consideration with the fact that each of the issuer defendants used “inflated shares as currency” to acquire target companies, as well as the fact that two of the issuer companies (from among the six focus companies) “raised additional capital through secondary offerings.” Judge Scheindlin said that “when these and other allegations against each issuer are viewed as a whole, they are sufficient to plead scienter in each case.”

Judge Scheindlin also reconsidered her prior ruling on the issue of loss causation, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Dura case. Judge Scheindlin found that the intervening case law does “not support a reversal of my earlier decision.” Judge Scheindlin said

the misstatement and omissions concealed the alleged market manipulation that caused plaintiffs’ losses, and without such misstatements and omissions, plaintiffs’ losses could not have occurred. Further, plaintiffs’ losses are those that could be expected to result from the concealment of the market manipulation scheme. Plaintiffs have thus pled loss causation.

Judge Scheindlin did grant the defendants’ dismissal motion on two narrow grounds. First, consistent with her prior rulings in the case, she dismissed claims brought under Section 11 by those plaintiffs who sold their securities for a price in excess of the initial offering price. Second, she dismissed certain plaintiffs who purchased their shares outside the previously certified class period.

And so the Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation will grind on, a vestige of an earlier time and place, its significance seemingly eclipsed by more recent and more momentous events. Yet the collective litigation nonetheless remains significant. Its sheer bulk and scale makes the prospect of any definitive global resolution challenging, a prospect even further complicated by the Second Circuit’s class certification ruling. The current circumstances make future course of the litigation seem even more uncertain.

I welcome readers thoughts on the immediate procedural direction likely in the litigation, as well as any views about where the litigation ultimately is headed.

Special thanks to Edward Carleton of the Boundas Skarzynski Walsh & Black law firm for providing a copy of the March 26 opinion.

Add Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley to the growing list of companies that have been sued in securities class action lawsuits by investors for allegedly deceptive representation in connection with the sale of auction rate securities. According to the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ March 25, 2008 press release (here), the plaintiffs’ have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Merrill Lynch and its asset management company on behalf of investors who purchased auction rate securities from Merrill Lynch between March 25, 2003 and February 13, 2008.  A copy of the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, Merrill Lynch “offered and sold auction rate securities to the public as highly liquid cash-management vehicles and as suitable alternatives to money market mutual funds.” The complaint alleges that Merrill Lynch failed to disclose that  

(1) the auction rate securities were not cash alternatives, like money market funds, but were instead, complex, long-term financial instruments with 30 year maturity dates, or longer; (2) the auction rate securities were only liquid at the time of sale because Merrill Lynch and other broker-dealers were artificially supporting and manipulating the auction rate market to maintain the appearance of liquidity and stability; (3) Merrill Lynch and other broker-dealers routinely intervened in auctions for their own benefit, to set rates and prevent all-hold auctions and failed auctions; and (4) Merrill Lynch continued to market auction rate securities as liquid investments after it had determined that it and other broker dealers were likely to withdraw their support for the periodic auctions and that a “freeze” of the market for auction rate securities would result.

According to news reports (here), plaintiffs also filed a separate but substantially similar lawsuit against Morgan Stanley, raising more or less the same allegations on behalf of a class of investors who purchased auction rate securities from Morgan Stanley during the same class period as proposed in the Merrill Lynch lawsuit. I have not located the Morgan Stanley complaint itself, but will add a link when I get a copy.

UPDATE: A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ March 25, 2008 press release announcing the Morgan Stanley auction rate securities lawsuit can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

These two new lawsuits join a group of similar lawsuits, all filed by the same law firm on behalf of auction rate securities investors, against Deutsche Bank, Wachovia, TD Ameritrade and UBS. The law firm’s webpage describing these various lawsuits can be found here.

With the addition of these two new subprime-related securities class action lawsuits, my running tally of subprime related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here, now stands at 59, of which 21 have been filed in 2008. Two of these 59 represent lawsuits brought on behalf of investors against mortgage-backed asset securitizers, six are class action lawsuits on behalf of auction rate securities investors, two are brought on behalf of mutual fund investors, and the remaining 49 of which are brought on behalf of public company shareholders.

Subprime Litigation Wave Hits Regions: Birmingham, Alabama-based Regions Financial Corporation has been hit with a couple of different subprime-related lawsuits as the subprime wave continues to spread beyond New York, California, and Florida, the states where the subprime litigation originally was concentrated.

First, according to a March 25, 2008 Birmingham News article (here), the Catholic Medical Mission Board, a Regions shareholder, has filed a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit against Regions, as nominal defendant, and certain Regions directors and officers, alleging that the defendants failed to disclose the extent of Regions’ lending exposure to residential homebuilders, which permitted company insiders to sell their shares in company stock at inflated prices. According to the news report, the complaint alleges that "Regions Financial’s stock was artificially inflated because the defendants directed the company to hide the true extent of its subprime exposure.’

The derivative complaint (which can be found here) asserts claims for breach of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate assets, unjust enrichment, and breach of Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act.

Second, Regions has also been hit with a lawsuit filed under ERISA on behalf of its participants in the Regions defined contribution plan. A copy of the complaint can be found here. The complaint alleges that the offered plan participants Regions stock and investment options in Regions Morgan Keegan funds “when it was imprudent to do so.” The complaint also alleges that the investment in Regions stock and the Regions Morgan Keegan funds was maintained “when it was no longer prudent to do so.”  The complaint alleges that the defendants knew or should have known that these investments were imprudent because of Regions and the funds heavy investment in or vulnerability to subprime mortgage investments, loans and securities. The complaint also alleges that the defendants failed to communicate the risks of investing in the plan and also failed to communicate conflicts of interest.

As noted on my running tally of subprime related litigation (which can be accessed here), with the addition of the Regions ERISA litigation, my running tally of subprime-related ERISA lawsuits now stands at 11.

I have not been keeping a running tally of subprime-related derivative litigation (basically because the primarily state court oriented litigation is hard to track), but there has been substantial subprime related derivative litigation, involving, among others, Bear Stearns, American International Group, and Countrywide.

Special thanks to alert reader Rob Lichenstein for the links to the two Regions lawsuits and the Birmingham News article.

About the Bear Stearns Deal: If as I do you find many of the articles discussing the updated Bear Stearns deal confusing, you will want to read a couple of interesting posts on the Conglomerate blog, that provide insight into a couple of points about the revised deal that have received significant press attention.

First, there has been a great deal of discussion in the press about the possibility that the improved buyout offer may have resulted in part from drafting errors in the initial deal documents. BYU law professor Gordon Smith deconstructs this issue in a detailed Conglomerate blog post here (here), with helpful citations and cross-references to other blogs. Smith’s analysis of the differences between the original and the revised deal documents raise some interesting questions about what J.P. Morgan seems to have sought by offering revised terms. Bottom line, in exchange for the improved merger price, J.P. Morgan has eliminated the provisions that would have kept the deal open for a full year, and also obtained a 39.5% ownership interest as a means to try to ensure that the deal is concluded.

Second, and with respect to that 39.5% ownership interest transfer, Smith has a separate post on Conglomerate (here), that explores the Delaware case law behind the 39.5% interest and the limitations on share transfers to lock in shareholder merger approvals. As Professor Smith’s post notes, there is no automatic cutoff under Delaware law whereby a company can sell up to 40% of itself without shareholder approval, and suggestions to that effect in the mainstream media are “what is known in the law biz as ‘wrong.’” Practitioners have evolved the 40% rule of thumb, but “none of this has been tested in court.”

More About the FCPA: Regular readers know that I have frequently commented (most recently here) on the growing importance of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement proceedings and follow on civil litigation. Two recent publications provide significant additional information on this topic.

First, a March 25, 2008 Law.com article entitled “Today, No Bribe is Too Small” (here), takes a look at the expanding reach of enforcement activities. As the title suggests, the article looks at some seemingly small corrupt transactions that have attracted regulatory attention. The article states that “it seems that no bribe is too small to earn the attention of the department.” The article also focuses on regulatory actions that have been taken by middlemen and third party contractors, and how those seemingly remote actors’ actions have come back to haunt the sponsoring company.

Second, in a much more detailed look at recent FCPA enforcement activity, Porter Wright attorney Tom Gorman has recently posted a running series on the issues involved in recent FCPA regulatory actions on his SEC Actions blog. The most recent post can be found here. Taken collectively, these posts present an excellent overview of the current state of FCPA regulatory actions.

Finally, readers who recall my recent post (here) about the civil litigation arising from potentially problematic activities involving Alcoa’s operations in Bahrain will be interested to note that the U.S. Department of Justice has initiated a criminal investigation of the activities, and in that connection has asked for the entry of stay in the civil proceedings,  as discussed in a March 21, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled “U.S. Opens Alcoa Bribery Probe” (here).

The subprime litigation wave is growing in amplitude and volume, as four companies have found themselves the targets of a total of five new subprime-related securities class action lawsuits, joining the now quite lengthy list of companies that have been swept up in the wave. With the addition of these five new securities lawsuits, as well as the numeous other suits filed in just the last few days, it appears that the subprime litigation wave is building dangerous momentum

Wachovia:  The first of these new lawsuits was actually filed back on January 31, 2008, against Wachovia Corporation , certain of its officers and directors, a related Wachovia unit that issued certain securities involved in the lawsuit, and the offering underwriters that underwrote Wachovia’s May 2007 preferred securities offering. (As noted further below, Wachovia was also named in a separate securities lawsuit relating to auction rate securities).

The Wachovia lawsuit flew under the radar screen at the time that it was filed because the plaintiffs’ lawyers chose to file the lawsuit in New York Supreme Court (Nassau County), though the defendants have removed the action under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). A copy of the removal petition, to which the initial complaint is attached, can be found here.

The complaint assert claims based on allegedly false and misleading statements in the registration and prospectus issued in connection with Wachovia’s $750 million May 2007 offering of preferred securities. The complaint alleges that the registration statement failed to disclose that Wachovia’s "portfolio of collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") contained billions of dollars worth of impaired and risky securities, many of which were backed by subprime mortgage loans." The complaint also alleges that the defendants failed to "properly account for highly leveraged loans such as mortgage securities." Finally, the complaint alleges that the complaint failed to disclose that Wachovia was "heavily involved in option adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)…that would become toxic (for both Wachovia and the borrowers) once house prices stopped increasing at a rapid rate."

The complaint alleges claims only under the ’33 Act, and expressly asserts that the state court has concurrent jurisdiction under Section 22 of the ’33 Act in connection with plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff in the Wachovia law suit seems to be pursuing the same state court strategy that I discussed at length in my prior post (here) analyzing the class action securities lawsuits that investors have filed against the securitizers who created mortgage backed assets. Significantly, the Coughlin Stoia firm is involved in both those cases and the Wachovia case. Given the sophistication of the firm involved, one must assume that these state court filings are part of a conscious strategy on the firm’s part.

Though defendants have removed the Wachovia case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, it remains to be seen whether or not the plaintiffs will be able to have the case remanded to state court. As I noted here, the plaintiffs in the Luther v. Countrywide case, a ’33 Act class action lawsuit filed against mortgage backed asset securitizers, succeeded in having their case remanded back to state court. The court in Luther case concluded that concurrent jurisdiction provisions in the ’33 Act prohibit the state court’s case’s removal to federal court.

My theory on these state court lawsuits has been that the plaintiffs intend to argue that the provisions of the PSLRA to not apply to their state court ’33 Act lawsuits. The fact that the plaintiffs’ lawyers issued no press release at the time they filed the complaint tends to reinforce this impression. But regardless of their theory they seem to be making a comprehensive effort to bring these cases in state court. The involvement of state courts in these lawsuits will be very interesting to watch.

Lehman Brothers: On February 22, 2008, a Lehman Brothers shareholder filed a purported securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that Lehman Brothers made certain misrepresentations or omissions about its exposure to subprime mortgages during the class period from September 13, 2006 through July 30, 2007. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

There are a variety of very odd things about this lawsuit, and almost all of these odd features repeat the same odd attributes of the subprime-related securities class action lawsuit was previously filed against Morgan Stanley, as I discussed in my prior post here.

The first odd feature about this lawsuit is that it does not name the company, its directors or its senior managers as defendants in the lawsuit. The sole named defendant is the company’s Chief Financial Officer, yet no misrepresentations or omissions are attributed directly to him. The allegations against the CFO are attributed solely to his position within the company. There are no allegations that the CFO sold shares of stock. It is not particularly clear why the CFO should be named as defendant while other officials are not.

The allegations regarding the alleged misrepresentations are sparse, and are essentially limited to a few occasions when the company supposedly downplayed its exposure to subprime mortgages. The class period ends at an odd time, too; the class period end is not in January 2008, when the company said that it has lost $5.9 billion on its mortgage related positions, but on July 30, 2007, when an equity analyst downgraded the company.

The named plaintiff is also an odd representative for the purported class. Though the class period purports to run from September 13, 2006 to July 30, 2007, the named plaintiff did not even buy his shares until July 15, 2007, making him an unlikely representative for a class of that duration. Moreover, the complaint itself refers to events and statements at or about the same time that the plaintiff bought his stock which surely raised questions about subprime-related exposures in general and subprime exposures at Lehman brothers in particular.

The plaintiff also chose to file his complaint in the Northern District of Illinois, though Lehman’s headquarters are in Manhattan.

But regardless of the complaint’s numerous anomalies, the complaint does represent a subprime-related securities class action lawsuit, and so, as noted further below, I have added it to my running tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits.

Schwab: On March 18, 2008, plaintiffs filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the Schwab Corporation, certain of its directors and officers, and as well as the underwriter and investement adviser associated with two Schwab YieldPlus Funds. The lawsuit is filed on behalf of investors who purchased Schwab YieldPlus Investor Funds Investor Shares and Schwab YieldPlus Funds Select Shares during the period March 17, 2005 through March 18, 2008. A copy of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s press release can be found here.

The complaint alleges that the defendants issued untrue statements regarding the lack of diversification of the funds and the extent of the funds’ exposure to subprime-backed securities. The complaint alleges that while the funds advertised themselves as a safe alternative to money market funds, they were in fact critically exposed because more than 50 percent of the funds assets were invested in the mortgage industry. The plaintiffs allege that the funds have lost over 18 percent of their value since mid-2007 and 11 percent since January 2, 2008. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated Section 11 of the ’33 Act based in misrepresentations in the funds’ offering documents.

The Schwab funds are actually the second mutual funds to be sued in connection with the subprime crisis; as discussed here, the earlier lawsuit involved Morgan Keegan.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for copies of the Wachovia and Lehman Brothers complaints.

More Auction Rate Securities Litigation: As readers may recall, in an earlier post (here), I speculated that lawsuits related to  auction rate securities may represent the next wave in subprime securities litigation. Last week, I noted (here) the securities class action lawsuit that had been brought against Deutsche Bank on behalf of auction rate securities investors. Auction rate securities investors have now filed two additional securities class action lawsuits, one involving Wachovia, and the other involving TD Ameritrade.

With respect to TD Ameritrade, the plaintiffs filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of persons who purchased auction rate securities from TD Ameritrade and an affiliate between March 19 2003 and February 13, 2008 and who continued to hold the securities. A copy of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ March 19, 2008 press release can be found here, and a copy of the complaint can be found here

The complaint alleges that the defendants failed to disclose:

(1) the auction rate securities were not cash alternatives, like money market funds, but were instead, complex, long-term financial instruments with 30 year maturity dates, or longer; (2) the auction rate securities were only liquid at the time of sale because TD Ameritrade and other broker-dealers were artificially supporting and manipulating the auction rate market to maintain the appearance of liquidity and stability; (3) TD Ameritrade and other broker-dealers routinely intervened in auctions for their own benefit, to set rates and prevent all-hold auctions and failed auctions; and (4) TD Ameritrade continued to market auction rate securities as liquid investments after it had determined that it and other broker dealers were likely to withdraw their support for the periodic auctions and that a "freeze" of the market for auction rate securities would result.

With respect to Wachovia, the plaintiffs filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of all investors who purchased auction rate securities from Wachovia and an affiliate between March 19, 2003 and February 13, 2008 and who continue to hold the securities. A copy of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s March 19, 2008 press release can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here. The allegations against Wachovia are substantially similar to the allegations against TD Ameritrade.

An additional lawsuit has been brought on behalf of an investor in auction rate securities, although in this case it is an individual action rather than a class action. On March 18, 2008, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western Disrict of Texas against Wells Fargo and Wells Fargo Investments, alleging that the defendants violated the securities laws and breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the plaintiffs’ purchase of $2 million of auction rate market preferred shares. A copy of the complaint can be found here. (Hat tip to Courthouse News Service for a copy of the complaint.)

The plaintiffs contend that the Wells Fargo investment adviser referred to the securities as "bonds" that were "represented to be without risk." The plaintiffs claim that the defendants said that the securities could be redeemed on 7 days notice, but that when the plaintiffs sought to redeem the securities on March 11, 2008, they were told that no market exists for the securities. The complaint seeks recovery of $2 million plus punitive damages.

Some Observations and Tallies: Even for those that have been paying only intermittent attention, it is pretty clear that the pace of subprime-related litigation activity has picked up significantly over the last few days. Even without regard to these five new securities class action suits listed above, we had already seen a notable number of new subprime securities suits just in the last week, including for example, new lawsuits against SocGen, PMI Group, Deutsche Bank, and, most significantly, Bear Stearns. Adding these five new subprime-related securities class action lawsuits listed above to the list reinforces the impression that the litigation wave is gathering dangerous momentum, with the likelihood that even greater activity is yet to come.

With the addition of these new lawsuits to my running tally of subprime- related securities class action litigation, which can be accessed here, the current total of subprime securities lawsuits now stands at 56, of which 18 have been filed in 2008. Two of these 56 represent lawsuits by investors against mortgage backed asset securitizers, three are class action on behalf of investors in auction rate securities, and two relate to mutual funds, as noted above. The remaining 50 lawsuits were brought by shareholders of publicly traded companies.

More About Credit Default Swaps: In yet another prior post (here), I noted that problems arising from credit default swaps could be another source of litigation arising from the credit crisis. The March 20, 2008 Wall Street Journal is reporting (here) that Merrill Lynch has sued a unit of Security Capital Assurance, seeking to prevent SCA from avoiding its financial obligations to insure as much as $3.1 billion on seven credit default swaps.

In Bear Stearns’ March 16, 2008 announcement (here) of J.P. Morgan’s acquisition of the company, Alan Schwartz, Bear’s CEO, is quoted as saying that “this transaction represents the best outcome for all our constituencies based upon the current circumstances.” Apparently, a few of those constituencies take a different view.. In addition to the securities class action lawsuits and employees’ ERISA lawsuit noted in yesterday’s post, a Bear shareholder has also filed a New York state court lawsuit (complaint here) alleging that Bear and its senior officials breached their fiduciary duty to shareholders. (Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service for the complaint.)

The relatively short complaint, which bears certain indicia of having been prepared in haste, is not presented as a derivative lawsuit, but rather as a direct claim, and is filed as a class action on behalf of all Bear shareholders. Among other things, the complaint alleges that the company “allowed itself to be sold to the lowest bidder…at the lowest possible price,” which, the complaint alleges, “is far below Bear Stearns’ value.” The complaint quotes a statement from the Wall Street Journal that the deal constitutes a "fire sale."

Schwartz’s statement that the deal was the best for “all constituencies” is noteworthy for its seeming distinction from the usual formulation that it is the obligation of a corporation’s board to maximize the interests of the shareholders. In this context, the obligations to the shareholders are usually referenced as their Revlon duties, as noted on the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation blog (here). One constituency that was particularly interested in outcome of this transaction is composed of the federal regulators. Another constituency consists of Bear’s creditors and counterparties, whose anxieties apparently triggered the crisis that led to the company’s sale. These constituencies are likelier to agree with Schwartz’s characterization of the transaction.  

The constituency that consists of Bear’s shareholders, or at least the ones who have retained plaintiffs’ attorneys, see things differently. Whether or not Bear’s shareholders have a legal basis on which to protest under Delaware law is the subject of an interesting post by BYU law professor Gordon Smith on the Conglomerate blog (here). In the post, Smith refers to a prior Delaware case in which minority shareholders complained that the majority shareholder should have pursued bankruptcy rather than foreclosure (effectively, sale, as here). Smith concludes that because “there is no hint of self-dealing” in this instance, the board’s actions will be evaluated under the business judgment rule. Smith states that stockholders may be upset, “but Delaware corporate law will not come to the rescue.”

A number of other legal scholars added comments to Smith’s original post, and I recommend reading all of the comments, which are particularly interesting and thoughtful.

The Bear shareholders’ initiative to realize what they contend is (or was) Bear’s actual value may be frustrated by a quirk of Delaware law. As noted on the DealBook blog (here), because J.P. Morgan is offering stock, “there are no appraisal rights under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporate Law Code.” If it had been a cash deal, shareholders could have gone to Delaware court for a determination of the fair value of their stock. It is in a way too bad that they cannot, because that would have made for an interesting leagl proceeding – arguably right up there with defining the value of a “burned and hairy hand.” (Readers who do not recognize this allusion should refer to the video clip below.)

As the DealBook blog details, the merger agreement (which can be found here) has a number of other interesting features, including the fact that the deal has no material adverse change clause, so J.P. Morgan has no “out.” On the other hand, Bear Stearns apparently retains what is in effect a “put,” providing Bear the right, even if Bear’s shareholder vote down the transaction, to require J.P. Morgan to reenter negotiations. (This provision may suggest one of the reasons why Bear’s shares are trading so far above the merger price – for further thoughts about which refer here..)

Readers of this blog will also be interested to note that in Section 6.6 of the merger agreement, Bear Stearns’ directors and officers are entitled to six years of tail D & O coverage. (All of those insurance markets clamoring to provide the tail coverage should form an orderly line, please.). In addition, Bear’s directors and officers are given full indemnification from J.P. Morgan. I suspect these provisions, and especially the J.P. Morgan indemnity, were particularly attractive to the Bear Stearns senior officials involved in the negotiations. While one might suppose that the very attractiveness of the indemnity put the Bear Stearns officials in a potentially conflicted position (as the terms represented a form of consideration valuable to the officials but not to Bear’s shareholders), in the end the J.P. Morgan indemnity might prove quite valuable to Bear’s shareholders in a roundabout sort of way, if you follow my drift….

In any event, it may come as little surprise that the SEC is reportedly investigating trading ahead of Bear’s collapse last Friday. According to a March 18, 2008 Bloomberg.com article (here), “U.S. regulators are investigating whether traders illegally sought to force Bear Stearns Cos. shares into a tailspin last week by spreading false information about the firm’s finances.”

For its part, the SEC released today “Answers to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc.” (here), which, among other things explains the role of the SEC staff in the Bear Stearns/J.P. Morgan transaction.

More About Credit Default Swaps: In an earlier post (here), I wrote about the rising litigation threat from credit default swap transactions, particularly due to the growing counterparty risk. A March 17, 2008 Time.com article entitled “Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?” (here) takes a closer look at CDSs and concludes that the instruments “could soon become the eye of the credit hurricane.”

Among other things, the article notes that the market for these instruments exploded to $45 trillion in mid-2007 – by contrast to the mortgage market, which is “only” $7.1 trillion. The article details the conditions that have rattled the marketplace, and concludes that the “potential repercussions are far-reaching.”

Those prone to concerns that we could be facing a period of significant economic adversity may be reassured that we have many safeguards in place that did not exist, for example, in 1929 and 1930. But, as the article concludes, none of these safeguards “are directly targeted at CDS.”

More About Foreign Litigants: In earlier posts (refer here), I have discussed the problem of foreign litigations who purchased their shares in foreign companies on foreign exchanges (the so-called “f-cubed” litigants) who are suing the foreign companies in U.S court under U.S. securities laws. In a recent post on the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here), Adam Savett takes a look at the recent decision in the Converium case, in which the court denied class certification to all putative class members who were neither U.S. citizens nor purchased shares on U.S. exchanges. As I noted on post discussing the recent U.S lawsuits filed against SocGen, it appears that the plaintiffs’ counsel in that case conformed their putative class to conform to the limitations adopted by the Converium court.

Break in the Action: The D & O Diary will be on a reduced publication schedule for the next few days. We will resume our normal publication schedule some time after March 25.

A Burned and Hairy Hand:: The reference above to “the value of a burned and hairy hand,” is an allusion to the standard Contracts law case of Hawkins v. McGee, a case made famous (or perhaps infamous) in the classic scene from the movie The Paper Chase. I suspect that few law students have actually endured anything like this famous scene (I actually enjoyed law school), but for some reason the scene has become an archetypical representation of the legal classroom. Here is Professor Kingsfield in all of his sadistic glory:

We knew it was coming but it sure got here fast. On March 17, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Bear Stearns and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release can be found here, and the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that during the class period between December 14, 2006 and March 14, 2008, defendants issued false and misleading statements, as a result of which “Bear Stearns stock traded at artificially inflated prices … reaching a high of $159.36 per share in April 2007.” The press release further states that:

In late June 2007, news about Bear Stearns’ risky hedge funds began to enter the market and its stock price began to fall. On March 10, 2008, information leaked into the market about Bear Stearns’ liquidity problems, causing the stock to drop to as low as $60.26 per share before closing at $62.30 per share. On March 13, 2008, news that Bear Stearns was forced to seek emergency financing from the Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan Chase hit the market and Bear Stearns stock fell to $30 per share. Then, on Sunday, March 16, 2008, it was announced that J.P. Morgan Chase was purchasing Bear Stearns for $2 per share. By midday on Monday, March 17, 2008, Bear Stearns stock had collapsed another 85% to $4.30 per share on volume of 75 million shares.

The press release states that the defendants’ statements during the class period “due to defendants’ failure to inform the market of the problems in the Company’s hedge funds due to the deteriorating subprime mortgage market, which would cause Bear Stearns to have to rescue the funds, cause the Company and its officers possible criminal liability and hurt the Company’s reputation.”

The principals at JP Morgan clearly anticipated this development. According to a March 17, 2008 Law.com article (here), JP Morgan is “setting aside $6 billion to cover potential litigation” as well as other transaction and severance costs arising out of JP Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns JP Morgan’s own March 16 press release (here) announcing the transaction does not mention any reserve or set aside for transaction expenses, but the March 18, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here) also says that “J.P. Morgan plans to set aside about $6 billion in reserves to cover the potential exposure and other costs.”

(Perhaps it is an idle thought but one does wonder why the $6 billion was not applied directly to the acquisition price. …)

Yet another possibility that may yet arise is that individual Bear Stearns investors might choose to pursue their own litigation separately. According to the March 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here), there are individual investors whose losses from the Bear Stearns collapse approach $1 billion. According to the March 18, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here), “billionaire investor Joseph Lewis, one of Bear Stearns’s biggest shareholders, with a 9.4% stake, rejected [J.P. Morgan’s] offer, saying it doesn’t represent the true value of Bear Stearns. Mr. Lewis, though a spokesman, said the offer ‘is derisory, and I do not believe that shareholders will approve it.’” Certainly individual losses of that magnitude, if nothing else, raise the possibility of their proceeding on their own rather than as part of a larger shareholder class.

Update: According to news reports (here), an action has also been filed against Bear Stearns and its executives on behalf of Bear Stearns employees alleging that they "breached their fiduciary duties to plan participants by allowing their retirement savings to be invested in the company’s stock despite knowing such an investment was imprudent."  The complaint alleges that the investment bank failed to disclose material adverse facts regarding its financial well-being, the potential consequences of its "substantial entrenchment in the subprime mortgage market," that the firm’s stock price was artificially inflated and heavy investment of retirement savings in company stock would inevitably result in significant losses to the plan and its participants.

Securities Suit Against Deutsche Bank for Auction Rate Securities: On March 17, 2008, a different plaintiffs’ firm launched a securities lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Deutsche Bank and its wholly owned broker–dealer subsidiary, on behalf of a class of persons who purchased auction rate securities from Deutsche Bank and the broker dealer between March 17, 2003 and February 13, 2008, inclusive (the “Class Period”), and who continued to hold such securities as of February 13, 2008. A copy of the plaintiffs’ counsels’ press release can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here. 

According to the press release, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the securities laws “by deceiving investors about the investment characteristics of auction rate securities and the auction market in which these securities traded.” The press release states that the defendants failed to disclose that:

(1) the auction rate securities were not cash alternatives, like money market funds, but were instead, complex, long-term financial instruments with 30 year maturity dates, or longer; (2) the auction rate securities were only liquid at the time of sale because Deutsche Bank and other broker-dealers were artificially supporting and manipulating the auction rate market to maintain the appearance of liquidity and stability; (3) Deutsche Bank and other broker-dealers routinely intervened in auctions for their own benefit, to set rates and prevent all-hold auctions and failed auctions; and (4) Deutsche Bank continued to market auction rate securities as liquid investments after it had determined that it and other broker dealers were likely to withdraw their support for the periodic auctions and that a “freeze” of the market for auction rate securities would result.

The auction rate securities purchasers’ lawsuit against Deutsche Bank is not the usual class action securities lawsuits brought against a publicly trade company by its own shareholders. The Deutsche Bank auction rate securities lawsuit is, however, subprime-related and it is a class action that alleges violations of the federal securities laws. For those reasons, I have added it to my running tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits, which can be found here. On a going forward basis, I will try to keep the parallel tallies too, taking into account the different kinds of litigation within the larger running tally.

With the addition of the Bear Stearns and Deutsche Bank securities lawsuits, the current tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits now stands at 51, twelve of which have been filed so far in 2008. Of these 51, two are securities lawsuits filed by mortgage–backed securities investors against the asset securitizers, and one (as noted above) was filed by purchasers of auction rate securities. The remaining 48 are more traditional securities class action lawsuits by public company shareholders.

Bear Ironies and Morgan Echoes: Bear Stearns shareholders can be forgiven if they fail to appreciate it, but there is a certain irony that Bear Stearns was the bailout recipient last Friday. This weekend’s whirlwind meetings involving the Fed and the lions of Wall Street present an uncanny echo of the closed door meetings at the New York Fed on September 23 1998, when government officials and Wall Street bankers were struggling to avert the collapse of Long Term Capital Management that all feared might trigger global financial panic. As colorfully told in the prologue of Roger Lowenstein’s excellent book about LTCM, When Genius Failed (here), the government’s rescue efforts nearly aborted because one Wall Street bank refused to cooperate in the government’s rescue plan – none other than Bear Stearns, whose then CEO and current Chairman James Cayne refused to play along.

This past weekend’s events also harken back to an even earlier episode, one in which JP Morgan Chase’s founder and primary namesake played the central role. As described in Robert Bruner and Sean Carr’s readable recent book, The Panic of 1907 (here), a capital crisis that originated from a liquidity drain following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake culminated in October 1907 in runs on a series of New York banks. J.P. Morgan himself, in effect functioning as the central banker in the absence of any more formal institution, caused his firm to intervene to provide liquidity to the Trust Company of America, declaring, to his colleagues “This is the place to stop the trouble, then.”

A century later, his firm is once again playing a central role in an effort to avert a financial crisis, and while some may argue that an important difference is that in 1907 Morgan didn’t acquire any of the rescued banks, it is a fact that one of the steps Morgan took in 1907 was a U. S. Steel-led buyout of Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, a move claimed at the time was designed to avoid a collapse that could have undermined the stock market. The TCI & R rescue efforts, for which he and his firm were later criticized and subjected to a congressional investigation, ultimately proved to be good both for the Morgan firm as well as for the financial markets.

UPDATE: CFO.com has an excellent March 18, 2008 article entitled "J.P. Morgan Returns to Its Rescue Roots" (here) going into much greater detail about J.P. Morgan’s storied past.

One of the standard provisions of the typical D & O insurance policy is a clause requiring the insurer’s prior consent to settlement. This clause can be the source of tension between carriers and policyholders, and policyholders and their counsel sometimes view the clause as little more than an impediment. However, a March 13, 2008 opinion (here), the New York Court of Appeals makes it clear that policyholders who disregard the settlement consent requirements do so at peril to coverage under the D & O policy.

The insurance coverage dispute in the case arose out of the securities analyst/conflict of interest investigation that unfolded earlier in this decade. Among the investment banks targeted in investigation was Bear Stearns. On December 20, 2002, Bear Stearns entered a settlement in principle with the regulators in which it agreed to pay a total of $80 million, with $25 million allocated as a penalty, $25 million in disgorgements, $25 million for independent research, and $5 million for investor education.

On April 21, 2003, Bear Stearns executed a consent agreement in which it acceded to the entry of final judgment in the SEC’s pending enforcement proceeding. Bear Stearns also agreed to payment of the $80 million and explicitly agreed not to seek insurance coverage for the $25 million penalty.

Three days after executing the settlement agreement, Bear Stearns sent letters to its D & O carriers requesting the carriers’ consent to the settlement. Bear Stearns sought coverage for $45 million of the settlement (which represented the settlement amount, excluding the penalty, in excess of the policy’s $10 million self-insured retention). The insurers disclaimed coverage and initiated a declaratory judgment action.

In October 2003, the federal court presiding over the regulatory enforcement action entered judgment on the terms to which Bearn Stearns previously had agreed.

The insurers disputed coverage on a number of grounds, but because the Court of Appeals opinion addresses only the consent to settlement issue, that is the sole issue I discuss in this post.

Bear Stearns’ primary D & O insurance policy had a provision specifying that:

The Insured agrees not to settle any Claim, incur any Defense Costs or otherwise assume any contractual obligation or admit any liability with respect to any Claim in excessof a settlement authority threshold of $5,000,000 without the Insurer’s consent, which shall not be unreasonably withheld . . . The insurer shall not be liable for any settlement, Defense Costs, assumed obligation or admission to which it has not consented.

The New York Supreme Court (trial court) found that triable issues of fact existed whether Bear Stearns breached the consent to settlement clause. The Appellate Division modified the lower court’s opinion in certain other respects, but affirmed the Supreme Court on the consent to settlement issue. The Appellate Division then certified the case to the New York Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Justice Victoria A. Graffeo, held that “Bear Stearns breached [the consent] provision when it executed the April 2003 consent agreement before notifying the insurers or obtaining their approval.” The Court of Appeals said that it was “unpersuaded by the contention that a triable issue of fact exists because the federal court did not approve the settlement until it entered a final judgment in October 2003.”

Judge Graffeo specifically noted that

As a sophisticated business entity, Bear Stearns expressly agreed that the insurers would "not be liable" for any settlement in excess of $5 million entered into without their consent. Aware of this contingency in the policies, Bear Stearns nevertheless elected to finalize all outstanding settlement issues and executed a consent agreement before informing its carriers of the terms of the settlement. Bear Stearns therefore may not recover the settlement proceeds from the insurers.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Court and granted the carrier’s motion for summary judgment. Because of its ruling on the consent provision, the Court of Appeals did not reach the other issues on which the carriers disclaimed coverage.

There may well have been additional grounds that could also have precluded coverage here, but it is still an arresting development – and a cautionary tale – that the Court of Appeals precluded coverage altogether based solely on the failure to obtain advance consent to settlement. Significantly, the Court of Appeals enforced the consent provision without superimposing any requirement for the insurer to show that it was prejudiced in any way by the failure to obtain consent. The Court of Appeals focused strictly on the policy’s language.

Companies and their counsel sometimes regard the consent settlement requirement as if the language were merely precatory, or perhaps even as optional if they believe settlement circumstances suggest the need to press ahead without bringing the carrier into the loop. It is not an unprecedented development for a carrier to learn of a settlement only after the fact. But the Bear Stearns opinion provides unambiguous notice to companies and counsel that they disregard the policy’s advance consent requirement at peril of precluding coverage.

The larger lesson here is that the carrier should be kept in the loop. Indeed, the better practice, the one likeliest to produce the best claim outcomes, is for companies and their counsel to treat the carrier as a collaborative partner in the claims process. While there are unfortunate situations where the carrier does not respond appropriately, even in those situations the policyholder will be better off (for example, before a court if coverage litigation ensures) if the policyholder has consistently maintained professional and timely communications with the carrier.

And whatever else may be said, it is clear, at least in New York, that the D & O policy provision requiring the carrier’s advance consent to settlement means what it says, and policyholders should take care to comply with its requirements.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the New York Court of Appeals opinion.