Securities lawsuit filings remained elevated during the first half of 2008. The 105 new securities lawsuit filings during the first six months of 2008 were more than 50% higher than the number of new securities lawsuit filings (69) in the first six months of 2007. (Please refer to the note below regarding my lawsuit filing “count”, which may differ from some other published tallies).

 

The 204 new securities lawsuit filings during the 12-month period from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008 is 15% higher than the 176 filings for the full year 2007 and also represents a 65% increase compared to the 123 filings during the 12-month period from July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2007. The 204 new securities lawsuit filings during the 12-month period ending on June 30, 2008 is the highest 12-month total since the period July 2004 through June 2005, during which 228 lawsuits were filed.

 

The 105 lawsuits filed during the first half of 2008 projects to a year-end total of 210 securities lawsuit filings, meaning that the filing rate is above the post-PSLRA filing average. According to Cornerstone Research, here, the annual average number of securities class action lawsuits during the period from 1996 to 2006 was 194.

 

A year end total of 210 filings would also represent the highest annual total since 2004, when 237 securities lawsuits were filed. (Because my YTD lawsuit count omits a number of lawsuits, for reasons discussed below, my YTD tally and my year-end projection may be lower the numbers that may appear in other published sources.)

 

The most significant factor in the elevated securities filing activity is the number of new lawsuits associated with the subprime and credit crisis. 58 of the first half filings (about 55%) of the first half securities lawsuit filings are subprime or credit crisis related. As reflected on my running tally of the securities class action lawsuits, which may be accessed here, the total number of subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits, including those filed in 2007 as well as those filed in 2008, now stands at 98. (Please refer to the note below regarding the recent revisions to my subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit tally.)

 

Only 46 of the 105 first-half securities lawsuit filings were not subprime or credit crisis-related, meaning that the subprime related litigation unquestionably was a driving factor in the elevated securities lawsuit filing levels (although one might also speculate that other filings are down because the plaintiffs’ securities’ bar is preoccupied with the still emerging subprime litigation).

 

The subprime and credit crisis filings show no sign of abating. Of the 58 subprime lawsuits filed in the first half of 2008, 29 – exactly half– were filed in the second quarter, including eleven in June alone. This continued steady filing level suggests that the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave will continue during the second half of 2008.

 

An analysis of the first half filings by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code confirms the foregoing conclusions. Although the companies sued in the first half of 2008 represented 56 different SIC Code categories, fully 62 of the lawsuits (or about 59% of the first half filings) were filed against companies in the 6000 SIC Code series (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate). The two most prominent SIC Code categories were SIC Code 6021 (National Commercial Banks), which had 17 lawsuits, and SIC Code 6211 (Security Broker Dealers), which had 14 lawsuits. No other single SIC Code category outside the 6000 SIC Code series had more than three lawsuits. (Please refer to the note below regarding SIC Code categorization.)

 

These statistics underscore an important point about the subprime and credit crisis related litigation. That is, with a couple of arguable exceptions, the subprime and credit crisis related litigation wave really has not spread beyond the financial sector. Although I have long speculated (most recently here) that the credit crisis litigation might hit nonfinancial companies, by and large that has not yet happened, at least not to any significant degree.

 

One consequence of the predominance of the subprime and credit crisis related litigation is that many of the first half lawsuits involved nontraditional plaintiffs and defendants. The traditional or conventional securities lawsuit to which I refer here involves a securities class action lawsuit brought by public company shareholders against the company and its directors and officers. This traditional type of securities lawsuit may sometimes include other third party defendants such as the company’s auditors or the company’s offering underwriters.

 

But many of the first half lawsuits involve plaintiffs other than public company shareholders. For example, among the first half filings were 17 auction rate securities lawsuits, in which the plaintiffs were not public company shareholders, but rather auction rate securities investors who were suing the broker dealers or financial institutions that sold them the instruments. (The securities issuers were not usually targeted in these lawsuits.) Refer here for my prior discussion of the auction rate securities lawsuits.

 

Similarly, the multiple securities lawsuits brought by mortgage-backed securities investors against the financial institutions that created the instruments also do not involve traditional shareholder plaintiffs. In addition, as I discussed here, the plaintiffs lawyers have chosen to bring many of these lawsuits against the securitizers in state court, to be be removed subsequently by the defendants to federal court. So the first half 2008 filing total is also noteworthy for its inclusion of a number of state-court initiated lawsuits.

 

The credit crisis litigation wave has also hit a number of nontraditional defendants. Rather than targeting just public company defendants, the plaintiffs in many of these lawsuits targeted, for example, hedge funds (refer here) and mutual funds (refer here). The presence of these nontraditional defendants sometimes pose some tough questions at the margins about whether or not a specific lawsuit should be included in the lawsuit count, as discussed further below.

 

It is probably worth noting that in addition to the lawsuits from the current credit crisis-related litigation wave, the first half filings also included two options backdating-related securities lawsuits filings.

 

Companies domiciled outside the United States were sued in 19 of the first half new securities lawsuit filings, representing 12 different countries, including four each from Canada and from Switzerland.

 

The lawsuits filed against domestic companies included corporate defendants from 27 different states, with the largest number from New York (22 lawsuits) and California (11 lawsuits).

 

The lawsuits were filed in 26 different U.S. district courts, but by far the largest number were filed in the Southern District of New York, where 43 (or about 41%) of the 105 lawsuits were filed. Other courts with a significant number of filings included the District of Massachusetts (11 lawsuits), the Northern District of Illinois (8 lawsuits), the Central District of California (5 lawsuits) and the Northern District of California (5 lawsuits).

 

A Note about “Counting” Lawsuits: As noted above, the presence of nontraditional plaintiffs and defendants, as well as the emergence of state court and other nontraditional filings, raises many hard questions about what to include in the lawsuit count. These factors by themselves create significant potential for different lawsuit counts.

 

In addition, the pattern of much of this litigation also poses some “counting” challenges. A couple of examples will illustrate the problem

 

Lehman Brothers (or at least one of its officers) was first sued in February 2008 in the Northern District of Illinois. That lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed. A second Northern District of Illinois lawsuit involving Lehman Brothers was filed in April 2008. Then a separate lawsuit was filed in the Southern District of New York in June 2008. I have only counted this litigation once, as has, for example, the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (as shown here).

 

By contrast, Falcon Strategies, a Citigroup-affiliated hedge fund, was sued in a securities lawsuit in April 2008, in federal court in Florida. That lawsuit was later voluntarily dismissed. (Refer here). Then the fund was sued in May 2008 in federal court in New York in a tender offer-related securities lawsuit (refer here) I could see counting this litigation once, but the Stanford website has counted each lawsuit separately and so have I.

 

But while I am in accord with the Stanford website to that extent, I could not agree with the Stanford site on some other specifics. For example, one of the lawsuits on their list is the Safeco litigation (refer here). The Safeco lawsuit is a merger objection suit. I have never counted these kinds of lawsuits in my tallies; were this lawsuit to be included, a whole raft of other merger objection litigation would also arguably have to be included. In my opinion, this lawsuit should not be counted in the securities lawsuit tally, but reasonable minds clearly could differ.

 

Similarly, the 2008 lawsuit involving Heartland Resources (about which refer here) contains allegations that the defendants improperly failed to register certain limited partnership interests. Alleged violations of the obligation to register securities seem to me to be fundamentally different than a lawsuit for securities law damages based on alleged misrepresentations or omissions relating to publicly traded securities. Reasonable minds could differ on this issue as well, but to my mind this kind of lawsuit should not “count.” This analysis applies not just to the Heartland Resources lawsuit, but also to the lawsuits involving Maximum Financial Group (refer here) and WCI Communities (refer here).

 

I have illustrated this analysis in detail here first to show how tricky this whole "counting" exercise is, and second to explain why there may be differences between my tallies and some others that may be published, including for example any lawsuit count based on the Stanford website. That does not mean that I think mine is right and the others are wrong – as I have stressed throughout, reasonable minds could differ on many of the specifics. The most important thing is that the various analyses are directionally consistent, which undoubtedly is and will be the case. The marginal differences are relatively unimportant.

 

A Note about SIC Code Categorization: As discussed above, the first half 2008 lawsuits include some filed against nonconventional defendants, including some, like hedge funds and mutual funds, that have not been assigned to an SIC Code category. In addition, many of the lawsuits included a host of related entity defendants.

 

Where the list of defendants includes a public company, I have used the public company’s SIC Code, even if it is not the primary defendant. Similarly, where a fund defendant is affiliated with a public company, I have used the public company’s SIC Code.

 

Nevertheless, there were a total of three of the lawsuits filed in the first half where I was unable to assign any SIC Code. These cases primarily involve mutual fund defendants.

 

A Note about the Subprime Lawsuit Tally: Regular readers know that I have been maintaining a running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits (which may accessed here). Readers that have been monitoring the list closely over time may have been somewhat surprised by the credit crisis lawsuit numbers I have used in this mid-year analysis. These numbers may appear suddenly larger than more recent tallies.

 

The reason for this adjustment is that as part of this mid-year review, I undertook a comprehensive audit of my lawsuit lists, and, in particular I conducted a cross-comparison with the Stanford website and a number of other sources.

 

As a result of this process, I added several items to my list of subprime securities lawsuits. Some of these additions were required because I had simply omitted certain items (where, for example, I was aware of the lawsuit but had simply neglected to add it to the list). Some of the additions were the result of recategorization, some simply new additions. All of these additions are highlighted in red in my updated list, which can be accessed here.

 

Break in the Action: The D&O Diary will slowing down in the next few days and will resume its normal publication schedule during the week of July 7.

Eastern cultures ascribe events to destiny, fate, or “karma.” But in our culture we demand to know who is to blame. The Zeitgeist of America’s blame culture apparently has decreed that Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, the former Bear Stearns fund managers, are to be the first level scapegoats for the subprime crisis. The “perp walk” to which they were subjected last week – why? Whatever happened to the presumption of innocence?—is now a standard component of the American blame ritual.

 

But a review of the charges against them does raise some concerns. Indeed, many observers have already questioned the proceedings.

 

A number of commentators have observed that Cioffi and Tannin’s alleged misrepresentations were no different than those of many others on Wall Street. Indeed, both Bloomberg’s Caroline Baum (here) and Professor Peter Henning of the White Collar Crime Prof blog (here) see little difference between Cioffi and Tannin’s statements about the Bear funds and the remarks of Bear Stearn’s CEO Alan Scwartz two days before the company’s collapse that “our liquidity position has not changed.” Professor Ribstein, on his Ideoblog (here), suggests that the difference between Cioffi and Tannin on the one hand, and Schwarz on the other, is that Cioffi and Tannin made the mistake of being hedge fund managers rather than corporate executives (“the bad luck of their chosen line of work”)

 

Some commentators even question the culpability of the two individuals’ alleged misrepresentations. As Professor Henning notes:

A false hope that the hedge funds would pull through, no matter how misguided, can be a defense to a fraud charge. Showing that Cioffi and Tannin were of two minds, or conflicted about where the market was headed, does not mean that the statements to investors were part of a fraudulent scheme.

Professor Henning goes on to observe:

As a Wall Street case, the charges seem a bit thin to me. Hedge fund managers are essentially salesmen, touting their wares in much the same way that the man in the used car lot has a great deal for you….The fact that Wall Street salesmen talked out of both sides of their mouths is nothing new.

Professor Henning also questions the significance of Cioffi’s withdrawl of $2 million from one of the funds, noting that “withdrawing your own money is not the type of theft one expects to see in a fraud case.”

 

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece today (here), former prosecutor Robert Mintz suggests that the duo’s biggest mistake was failing first – “these two were among the first to see their funds implode and that, perhaps more than any other reason, is why they now find themselves facing the prospect of significant jail time.”

 

These observations are all interesting and might (perhaps under different circumstances) suggest that the government could face an uphill battle. However, the circumstances demand a burnt offering and that is why Cioffi and Tannin were dragged into the public square. A burnt offering we shall have.

 

There is one additional element of the indictment that has not received as much attention that may be worth noting here. That is, as discussed in the U.S. Attorney’s June 19, 2008 press release (here), one element of the indictment relates to a possible cover up. The press release states that, after the SEC had requested the production of documents and materials in Summer 2007, Tannin’s “tablet computer” and Cioff’s “notebook” apparently “went missing."

 

One of the ineradicable lessons from the Watergate era is that the evasion will get you even if the underlying conduct does not. (Just ask Martha Stewart.) If the government can show that the defendants did inappropriately dispose of their technological devices as part of an evasion, the cover-up charges could loom a great deal larger.

 

And while the commentators may question the criminal indictment, they recognize that the alleged misconduct might support civil liability. Indeed, Professor Ribstein acknowledges that while “not a criminal case,” this “sort of case is suited for a civil fraud claim.” It has been somewhat overshadowed by the criminal indictment, but the SEC did in fact file a civil enforcement proceeding against Cioffi and Tannin at the same time as the indictment.

 

The SEC enforcement action (as described in the SEC’s June 19, 2008 Litigation Release, here), contains additional allegations against the two, including for example, that they “misrepresented the funds’ deteriorating condition and the level of investor redemption requests in order to bring in new money and keep existing investors and institutional counterparties from withdrawing money.” Among other things, the SEC alleges that Cioffi and Tannin “misrepresented their funds’ investment in subprime mortgage-backed securities.” It is alleged that the funds’ monthly performance summaries described the exposure as from 6 to 8 percent, when it supposedly later emerged that the “total subprime exposure – direct and indirect—was approximately 60 percent.”

 

The SEC seeks “permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement of all illegal profits plus prejudgment interest, and the imposition of civil monetary penalties.” But as serious as are these proposed sanctions, they still pale by comparison to the threat of incarceration the individuals face as a result of the criminal indictment.

 

As the U.S. Attorney’s press release states, “if convicted of securities fraud, Cioffi and Tannin face maximum sentences of 20 years imprisonment. If convicted of conspiracy, they each face a maximum sentence of five years.”

 

All of which leads to the final question. As Robert Mintz asked in his Journal op-ed piece today, “are we attempting to criminalize conduct primarily based upon the fact that we now know that the investing decisions led to a bad end?”

 

UPDATE: Professor Jay Brown has a paritcularly good post today on these same themes on his Race to the Bottom blog (here). Among other things, Professor Brown says that "this matter should be left to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the private investors…It should not be left to the criminal authorities."

 

Just the Thing: Even more American than the instinct to blame is the propensity for someone to try and profit off of another’s misfortune. And in that spirit, readers may be interested to know that a Ralph Cioffi signed Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Christmas Card is available (here) on eBay. As of the time of this blog post, the current bid was $81.

 

Sometimes I feel like the entire world is nothing more than abstraction of the old comic strip, The Strange World of Mr. Mum.

A June 18, 2008 opinion (here) by Judge Gerald Lynch in the coverage litigation between former Refco directors and officers and one of the company’s excess D&O insurers presents a veritable conflagration of policy application issues, including perennial questions concerning warranties, severability, and imputation, as well as a host of related issues arising from the policy procurement process itself.

 

Background: In the year preceding Refco’s ill-fated August 2005 IPO, Refco had maintained a $30 million D&O liability insurance program (the 2004-2005 program). In connection with its IPO, Refco obtained a total of $70 million of D&O insurance for the period from August 11, 2005 to August 11, 2006 (the 2005-2006 program). Both programs were arranged in multiple layers, with a primary carrier and several excess carriers.

 

In connection with placement of the 2004-2005 program, Refco completed the primary carrier’s insurance application (the “Application”). In addition, one of the excess insurers (and the ultimate litigant in the coverage dispute) required that the company submit a Warranty Letter on behalf of all insureds, affirming that no person for whom the insurance was proposed is “cognizant of any fact, circumstance, situation, act, error or omissions which … might afford grounds for any Claim.”

 

The Warranty Letter, submitted to the excess carrier on January 21, 2005, was signed by Phillip Bennett, Refco’s CEO. It later was revealed that Refco had an undisclosed $430 million receivable due from an entity Bennett controlled. The company subsequently collapsed, and Bennett, among other has pled guilty to an array of criminal offenses.  

 

At least as appears from the June 18 opinion, there were no additional applications or warranties in connection with the placement of the 2005-2006 program.

 

Following Refco’s October 2005 collapse, the company’s directors and officers were the target of extensive litigation, for which they sought defense expense coverage under the 2005-2006 program. The primary and first layer excess carriers advanced their entire limits (totaling $17.5 million) in payment of defense expense, subject to repayment of it is determined that there is no coverage under the policies.

 

The Coverage Denial:

The second level excess insurer, by letter dated March 6, 2006, denied coverage for the claims under its 2005-2006 policies. As the basis for its denial, the second level excess insurer relied on the representations in the Warranty letter and Refco’s failure to answer question 12(b) on the primary carrier’s Application (which asked whether any proposed insured was “aware of any fact, circumstance or situation” that might give rise to a claim).

 

The second level excess insurer also relied on a “Knowledge Exclusion” that was included in the insurer’s policy when issued in March 2006 (which was at or about the same time as the insurer issue its coverage denial). The Knowledge Exclusion essentially provides that the second level excess insurer is not liable for any loss (including defense expense) “in connection with any claim arising out of, based upon or attributable to any claim, fact or circumstance disclosed or required to be disclosed” in Question 12(b) of the Application.

 

The Coverage Litigation:

In May 2007, the second level excess insurer initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking a judicial declaration of noncoverage under its 2005-2006 policy, largely for reasons enumerated in its March 2006 denial letter. Several of the individual Refco officers and directors filed an answer and counterclaim, among other things seeking an injunction compelling the second level insurer to advance defense fees. The bankruptcy court entered an order in October 2007 requiring the insurer to advance defense expense, which the insurer has now done, as a result of which its $10 million limit is now depleted.

 

The second level excess carrier refilled its declaratory judgment complaint in federal district court, again seeking a judicial declaration of noncoverage. The individuals refilled their counterclaims, seeking a determination of coverage. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, which were the subject of the June 18 opinion.

 

The June 18 Opinion

In reviewing the court’s rulings, it is important to note that the summary judgment motions were filed pre-discovery. This unusual procedural posture was a critical factor in the court’s decisions process, as the court, pursuant to established authority, was reluctant to interject merits-based rulings where further discovery might provide additional factual context.

 

The insureds argued that the Warranty Letter had been submitted in connection with the placement of the 2004-2005 program and therefore was not a part of the second level carrier’s 2005-2006 policy. The insurer for its part argued that the Warranty Letter did relate to the placement of the 2005-2006 policy and that in any event it relied on the Warranty Letter when making underwriting decisions in connection with the 2005-2006 policy. The insurer submitted an affidavit from its underwriter in support of its assertions. Judge Lynch concluded that “genuine issues of material fact abound as to whether the Warranty Letter is properly part of the 2005-2006 [policy].”

 

The insureds further argued that in any event, the applicable “severability provision” bars the insurer from imputing Bennett’s knowledge to the other insureds and therefore the Warranty Letter could not serve as a basis to deny coverage to them. The severability provision was contained in an Endorsement to the Primary Policy. The insurer argued that the severability provision restricted the imputation of knowledge exclusively to statements in the primary insurer’s Application, and therefore it had no bearing on the second level excess insurer’s ability to rely on the Warranty Letter, which was not part of the Application. Judge Lynch agreed, and he therefore denied the insureds’ summary judgment motion based on the application severability provision.

 

Judge Lynch similarly rejected the second level excess insurer’s attempt to rely on Bennett’s failure Question 12(b) on the Application. Judge Lynch found that the insurer’s issuance of its 2005-2006 policy without challenging the omission of an answer to Question 12(b) was a waiver of any objection to coverage on that basis.

 

With respect to the second level excess carrier’s attempt to rely on the so-called Knowledge Exclusion to deny coverage, the insureds argued that the insurer’s coverage binder had not listed the Knowledge Exclusion as an endorsement that was to be added to the policy, nor had the company’s broker authorized the addition of the Knowledge Exclusion. The insureds argued that the insurer had “unilaterally changed the terms of the 2005-2006 [policy] after learning of the events that would give rise to a claim.”

 

The insurer countered that the company’s broker had authorized the addition of the exclusion. The insureds contended this response “fundamentally misconstrues” the meaning of the broker’s communications. These arguments clearly reflect the detailed particulars and disputed meaning of communications between the broker and the underwriter, which Judge Lynch found suffices to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on the issue.

 

The insureds further arged that the severability of exclusions language in the primary policy precluded application of the Knowledge Exclusion to them. They argued that even if Bennett’s knowledge triggered the exclusion, the excluded state of mind could not be imputed to them. Judge Lynch found that the severability of exclusions provision in the primary policy applied only to the exclusions in the primary policy, and not to the Knowledge Exclusion which was found only in the second level excess insurer’s policy.

 

Discussion:

The court’s opinion does not represent a definitive conclusion either for or against coverage under the policy. Indeed, at its most basic level, the court’s opinion merely represents a determination to allow discovery as a prelude to a later merits-based determination.

 

But the opinion raises too many questions about the potential availability to insurers of coverage defenses, and about the limitations of insureds’ policy protections, for the opinion not to raise a host of concerns. The concerns fall into two basic categories – that is, the concerns that are substantive and the concerns that are procedural.

 

The substantive concerns are numerous and relate to many of highest profile issues in the D&O insurance arena, including the use, applicability and duration of warranties and warranty letters; the extent of protection afforded to “innocent insureds” by severability provisions (including both application severability and exclusion severability); and the extent to which insureds may (or may not) be able rely on policy protections in the primary policy to preclude the assertion of policy defenses by an excess insurer.

 

The procedural concerns are perhaps equally significant for practitioners in the field. Judge Lynch’s opinion underscores the potential importance of communications between broker and underwriter and is a reminder of the opportunities for and dangers of ambiguities in communications (or, as the insureds would argue, supposed ambiguities). Perhaps these issues will get sorted out in later decisions in the case, but current state of play in the case raises troubling concerns about the pitfalls of the policy procurement process while providing little guidance (except by negative inference) about how those pitfalls might be avoided in the future.

 

There may yet be further ruling in the case that will clarify the issues. But the opinion nevertheless highlights that many of the issues the industry has been struggling with for the last decade – including in particular severability and imputation issues – remain very much alive and continue to pose significant concerns, and indeed may have edges that have not previously been addressed or even contemplated.

 

Two final observations about the case. The first is that the parties appear to have exhausted at least $27.5 million of the $70 million tower on defense expense alone, which is yet another reminder of the extraordinary expense involved in catastrophic type claims (a topic I discussed in a recent post, here).

 

The other observation is that yet again a critical D&O coverage decision has arisen in a case involving defenses raised by a follow-form excess insurer (see my prior comments on this issue here). The issues involved here underscore the myriad of difficulties that potentially can arise as losses escalate through a multilayer program. I do not mean to suggest any views one way or the other about the merits of the excess carrier’s positions in this case. Indeed, given the circumstances involved in this claim, it is unsurprising that the insurers might raise questions. Nevertheless, the specific issues in dispute suggest a level of flex in the interplay between the primary and excess layers that many policyholders would find disconcerting.

 

Special thanks to Michael Early for sending along a copy of the opinion. I hasten to add that the views and opinions expressed in this post are exclusively my own.

 

My recent post discussing whether Phillip Bennett’s use of the D&O insurance proceeds was an appropriate factor in his criminal sentencing can be found here. My prior post regarding the D&O insurance implications of Bennett’s cooperation with the class action plaintiffs can be found here.

 

What Awaits Those Who Spurn Berkshire: A June 25, 2008 Bloomberg article (here) reports that while recently addressing a group of Toronto business executives, Warren Buffett was asked what makes people want to sell their companies to Berkshire. Buffett reportedly said that he tells a prospective seller to think of their company as a work of art:

You can sell it to Berkshire and we’ll put it in the Metropolitan Museum; it’ll have a wing all by itself; it’ll be there forever. Or you can sell it to some porn shop operator, and he’ll take the painting and he’ll make the boobs a little bigger and he’ll stick it in the window, and some other guy will come along in a raincoat, and he’ll buy it.

And Finally: If you have not yet seen this amazing catch by the Fresno Grizzlies’ ball girl, you have to watch this video. It is truly marvelous. [UPDATE: I have to add that a reader advised me that the video may be a hoax, refer here — alas. It is still an awsome video.]

In prior posts, I have examined the increasing importance of anticorruption efforts and their significance for purposes of corporate governance. But a recent report by a global watchdog group suggests that not all governments are actively enforcing their anticorruption commitments, with potentially serious consequences for the developing world.

 

Transparency International describes itself as a “global civil society organization leading the fight against corruption.” Among other things, the group issues an annual progress report on the enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials.

 

On June 24, 2008, the group issued its 2008 Progress Report (here), which states that there has been a “dangerous stalemate on enforcement” and that “less than half” of the OECD Convention signatories “are living up to their commitments.” The report further states that while there has been “significant enforcement by 16 governments,” there is “little or no enforcement by 18 governments.”

 

The watchdog group is particularly worried about the “mixed message” that these uneven enforcement efforts may be sending. One commentator for the group is quoted as saying that “strong enforcement action against Siemens signaled to German business that foreign bribery will no longer be tolerated. But the backtracking of other countries, including the UK’s termination of an investigation into BAE Systems’ deals in Saudi Arabia, reinforces doubts about government commitment to enforce the Convention.”

 

The report leave no doubt about the importance of anticompetitive enforcement; as the report states, “compliance by signatory states is critical in draining the supply of bribe money that distorts public decision making in some of the world’s poorest states, with disastrous consequences for their citizens.”

 

My most recent post discussing the BAE Systems investigation can be found here, and my most recent post discussing the Siemens investigation can be found here.

 

Hat tip to the SOX First blog (here) for the link to the Transparency International report.

 

Siemens might not only have problems with the anticorruption laws, but also with its complexion, according to a June 24, 2008 Financial Times article reporting on comments from Siemens’ current head, in an article entitled "Siemens is ‘too white, German and male’" (here).

 

Another Options Backdating Securities Class Action Settlement: On June 24, 2008, Brooks Automation announced (here) that it had settled the securities class action lawsuit that was pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the lawsuit had previously been denied, as I discussed in a prior post, here. The case settled for $7.75 million dollars, all of which is to be paid by the company’s liability insurance carrier.

 

In any event, I have added the Brooks Automation settlement to my table of options backdating-related lawsuit dismissals, denials and settlements, which can be accessed here.

 

“Aggregator” Standing: Ordinarily this blog would not pause to comment on a “justiciability” case, at least one outside the context of directors and officers liability. But we found some of the commentary about the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 23, 2008 decision in Sprint Communications v. APCC Services (here) particularly interesting, and we thought we would pass it along for the benefit of those readers as interested as we are in procedural and jurisdictional matters.

 

George Washington University Law Professor Jon Siegel has a post on his blog Law Prof on the Loose (here) discussing the decision and the question whether “aggregators” who compiled the claims of payphone operators against long-distance carriers can demonstrate a sufficient injury to have standing to sue. The Supreme Court decided that they do. Siegel’s post does an interesting and humorous job explaining the case, the issues, and the decision, and he also explores the interplay between the majority and dissenting opinions. Read and enjoy.

 

Attention Deficit: We all suffered through those undergrad classes that seemed like they would never end, but the Chronicle of Higher Education has a June 20, 2008 article entitled “Short and Sweet: Technology Shrinks the Lecture”(here) reporting that after all these years, academia may finally be doing something about it.

 

Apparently, many Profs who have made their living droning on and on have finally seen themselves on video, as part of the effort to put their lectures on line. Appropriately enough, the experience seems to have been a wake-up call for many professors. As one Prof observed, “You wanted to kill yourself after about 20 minutes.” (I am not sure, but I think that particular Prof may have taught my Econ 101 class.)

 

So as part of their transition to online teaching, many professors are breaking their sessions into 20-minute segments. I guess the 20 minute time frame was selected to minimize the number of boredom-induced suicides.

 

At least some of the professors have managed to make the mental leap: “Shorter may work better in the classroom, too.” Tragically, this breakthrough comes too late to benefit the current generation, but at least our children and grandchildren can hope for a better tomorrow.

Last week, Towers Perrin released its report of the firm’s 2007 Survey of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Purchasing Trends, which can be accessed here. The firm’s annual survey report is widely read throughout the D&O insurance industry, and is generally viewed as an important information resource. Every year, the survey report is full of interesting observations, and this year’s version is no exception. The report merits reading at length and in full.

 

But while the survey report is widely read, I don’t know if the survey’s limitations are always fully understood or appreciated.

 

The report itself expressly acknowledges that it is based on a “self-selecting non-probability sample” The significance of this fact is briefly explained in the final two sentences at the bottom of the report’s preface page, where the report states that:

A non-probability sample is one in which respondents choose – or are selected – to participate. Such a sample is therefore not random. Because not all potential respondents are equally likely to participate, survey biases must be considered when interpreting results.

It is this latter point – that is, that “survey biases” must be considered when interpreting the survey’s results – that is all too often overlooked when the survey’s results are cited.

 

Let me just say that in referring to “bias” here, I am not in any way criticizing the report or its authors. The word “bias” as commonly understood has a negative connotation, but in this context, the word bias simply represents a mathematical property. But while the word bias should not suggest any negative connotations here, it should also be understood that, as stated in Wikipedia (here), “a biased sample causes problems because any statistic computed from that sample has the potential to be consistently erroneous.”

 

The survey results that most clearly reflect the sample bias are in the report’s discussion of what it calls “broker rankings.” As a footnote makes clear, the table relates solely to retail brokers, and does not contain any information about wholesale brokers. But even with respect to retail brokers, the table on which the “ranking” is based shows that over 88% of the survey responses relate to just four brokerages. Nor are these four survey-dominant brokerages the nationwide industry giants – to the contrary, these four participants would more accurately be described as strong regional players with an important presence in their respective geographic regions. The three largest nationwide industry giants meanwhile are represented collectively in only about 1.2% of responses.

 

My observations here should not in any way be taken as a criticism of these four survey-predominating brokerages. I will stipulate that they are in fact strong and significant industry participants. But no informed person actually thinks they are the four largest D&O brokers in the country. They are undeniably the leading firms in getting their clients to complete the Towers Perrin survey. Again, no criticism here; I salute their enterprising spirit in achieving this result. However, no one should confuse the survey “ranking” with an actual market share ranking.

 

I emphasize this aspect of the survey report because the bias in the broker participation population has pervasive effects throughout the entire report. For example, the four survey-predominant brokerages all have portfolios that are heavily weighted toward the technology and life sciences industries. Not too surprisingly, therefore, the two industry groups most heavily represented among both public and private company survey participants are “Technology” and “Biotechnology & Pharmaceuticals.” These two industry groups together represent about half of both public and private company survey participants.

 

Obviously, this heavy concentration of survey participants in just these two industry groups does not correspond to the economy as a whole. But this industry concentration – which is a direct result of the concentration of the survey population in the portfolios of a small handful of brokerages – has very significant ramifications for the report’s other findings. The report itself expressly recognizes this in the portion where it discusses the distribution of survey respondents’ primary insurance among the various leading carriers. The report’s analysis recognizes that the distribution of primary insurers is directly affected by the industry distribution, and the report examines this effect in detail.

 

But while the report examines in the impact of the survey population industry distribution on the distribution of business among primary insurers, the report does not elsewhere make this analysis. For example, the report does not similarly consider whether or not the industry concentration is relevant to the distribution of business among excess carriers, nor does it consider the possible impact of the concentration of the survey population on the other findings in the report.

 

I emphasize these points because I think they show a couple of important things. First, not only is the survey population concentrated into the portfolios of just a small handful of brokers, but this concentration has important implications for the rest of the report. It clearly affects, for example, the industry concentration of the survey population, which in turn affects the reported distribution of primary insurance among the various carriers.

 

These apparent effects raise the question whether the concentration of the survey population has similar effects on the other areas examined in the survey report. While the impact of the population concentration is most self-evident in the industry distribution, it is more difficult to tell from the report whether the other components of the report’s findings are similarly affected by the survey population’s concentration in the portfolios of just a very small handful of brokers.

 

It is a fair observation that Towers Perrin makes survey involvement available to all industry participants, not just the four survey-predominant firms. It is also a fair observation that if survey involvement were more widespread, many of the concerns noted above might be alleviated. But what has happened is that a few brokerage firms have clearly made their clients’ participation in the survey a top priority, while other brokerage firms have obviously decided to take a different approach, for reasons that one might speculate are related.

 

None of this is meant as a criticism of Towers Perrin, which should be saluted for performing the survey and distributing the survey report without charge. Moreover, Towers Perrin itself acknowledges that there may be biases arising from the survey population distribution. So I don’t mean to criticize Towers Perrin, or anyone else for that matter. Rather, my analysis here is presented as a petition to all industry participants that in using the survey data, they should explicitly recognize and acknowledge the sample bias limitations inherent in the report. In particular, no one should try to make the survey results represent anything more than they actually do, particularly with respect to the concentrations noted above.

 

The Option Backdating Case Resolution Scorecard: Over at the Securities Litigation Watch, Adam Savett has prepared an updated options backdating case resolution scorecard, which can be accessed here. Savett has a number of interesting observations about case dismissals and the speed of case resolution. The D&O Diary’s own scorecard of options backdating lawsuit dismissals, denials and settlement can be accessed here.

If the facts don’t fit, you must remit. That seems to be the view of an increasing number of companies, as they have adopted provisions requiring repayment of executive compensation found to have been based on incorrect financial statements.

The concept of compensation clawbacks was actually built into the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Section 304 requires CFOs and CEOs to reimburse their companies for incentive compensation and stock sales profits if the financial statements for that year are restated and the restatement is due to “misconduct.”

According to a June 2008 report (here) from the Corporate Library, an increasing number of companies have adopted their own clawback provisions, “either as part of the rules of an incentive plan, as governance policy, or simply as a board statement of intent.”

In its prior 2003 review, the Corporate Library had found that just 14 companies had adopted clawback provisions. But in its June 2008 survey, the report found that 295 of the 2,121 companies examined had “disclosed the adoption and implementation of a clawback provision of one kind or another.”

The survey found that the provisions vary from company to company, but could generally be classified as either “performance based” (if the provision applies to all executives who received an incentive payment of some kind based on incorrect financial) and “fraud based” (if it applies only to those executives who have engaged in fraudulent activity or misconduct that has caused a restatement). The survey found that 44.4% of the clawback provisions were “fraud-based” and 39% were “performance based.” An additional 16.6% of the provisions could not be classified.

The report cites several examples of the clawback provisions and even notes one example, involving Warnaco, in which a clawback has already occurred. The company reported in this year’s proxy statement (here, see page 21) that its compensation committee had cut the incentive pay for three executives in 2006 by a total of $120,000. The reduction occurred after the company restated its 2005 financial results due to certain accounting errors and irregularities.

These kinds of provisions have the support of various governance groups. As the June 8, 2008 New York Times stated in an article discussing the Corporate Library report (here), “why should executives keep compensation if it is discovered later that benchmarks were unmet?”

Not only do these kinds of provisions address basic principles of pay equity; they may also have a deterrent effect as well. Indeed, a June 4, 2008 CFO.com article entitled “Clawbacks Claw Their Way Into Corporate Strategy” (here), comments that “the emergence of clawbacks could be one factor in the recent decline in the number of financial restatements.” (For further background regarding the declining number of restatements, refer here.)

The possibility of a compensation clawback is not the only consequences that could affect executives at restating companies. A March 2008 study by Juan Manual Sanchez and Adi Masli of the University of Arkansas Sam M. Walton School of Business, Denton Collins of Texas Tech University, and Austin Reitenga of the University of Alabama entitled “Earnings Restatements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers” (here) found not only that companies restating earnings “have higher rates of involuntary CFO turnover,” but that CFOs of restating companies “face stiff labor market penalties.”

The authors looked at 167 restating companies and then matched them with a control company of comparable industry, size and age. The authors looked for instances where CFOs left the restating company within two years of the restatement. They then tracked the CFOs for four years to determine their subsequent employment.

The authors found “higher CFO turnover rates following restatements in both the pre- and post-SOX periods, which implies that governance mechanisms served to identify and discipline CFOs implicated in the restatements in both periods.”

The authors also found that “former CFOs of restatement firms are less likely to find a position with a job title that is comparable to their prior CFO position, less likely to find employment in a publicly traded company, or less likely to find a comparable position in a public firm.”

Finally, the authors found that “executives terminated in the post-SOX period appear to suffer greater reputational/labor-market penalties compared to the pre-SOX period, suggesting that firms are less willing in the post-SOX period to hire a former CFO with a tarnished reputation. This appears to be consistent with the intent of the legislation to increase executive accountability.”

With all the disincentives for bad behavior, one might optimistically hope that the sins of the past will not recur. Unfortunately, certain aspects of the current credit crisis arguably belie that hope. Nevertheless, one useful takeaway from this analysis is that the presence of corporate clawbacks could provide a deterrent for bad behavior, and could be a positive risk assessment factor.

Hat tip to the CFO.com for the reference to the academics research paper about career consequences for CFOs of restating companies.

Update on a Backdating Settlement That Went Awry: In a prior post (here), I discussed the recent opinion in which Judge Alsup used harsh language in rejecting the Zoran options backdating-related derivative lawsuit settlement. Among other things, Judge Zoran questioned the parties’ representations of the settlement’s value, and questioned the absence of any cash payment to the corporation.

According to a June 9, 2008 Forbes article entitled “Fee Fixers” (here), “it turns out that Alsup was on to something.” According to the article, on May 29, the lawyers resubmitted the settlement, but this time, the settlement included $3.4 million in cash, $3 million from Zoran’s insurance company and $395,000 from Zoran’s CEO and another executive. The article noted that “for having done such a good job,” the plaintiffs’ lawyers “have requested $1.5 million in fees and expenses, $300,000 more that the first time around.”

According to the company’s June 12, 2008 press release (here), Judge Alsup has granted preliminary approval to the settlement. The rejiggered settlement may have passed judicial muster. But let’s be explicit about what the sequence of events really consists of.  Basically, and other than with respect to the $395,000 payment, the insurance company is being asked to pony up the additional $3 million, and undoubtedly will also be called upon to pay the additional increment in the plaintiffs’ fees, as well as all of the additional defense expense incurred after the first settlement cratered. Perhaps there is nothing remarkable in all of this. But at some point, you really do start to wonder about the social utility of all of this activity. It is enough to make anybody cynical.

Hat tip to the 10b5-Daily (here) for the link to the Forbes article. Special thanks to Zusha Ellinson of The Recorder for the link to the Zoran press release.

In a prior post (here), I commented on former Refco CEO Phillip Bennett’s extraordinary cooperation with the Refco class action plaintiffs, following his entry of a guilty plea in the criminal case against him. As might have been anticipated, Bennett is hoping that his cooperation with the class plaintiffs, as well as the Bankruptcy Trustee, will win him leniency in his June 19, 2008 criminal sentencing. The government opposes leniency, arguing in reliance upon, among other things, Bennett’s acceptance of D&O insurance proceeds to pay his defense expenses.

 

In February 2008, Bennett entered a guilty plea, without a plea agreement, to all 20 counts against him, including conspiracy, securities fraud, filing of false statements, wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering and lying to Refco’s auditors. He faces a statutory maximum of 315 years’ imprisonment.

 

In Bennett’s June 1, 2008 sentencing memorandum (here), which was made public on June 12, his lawyers urged the judge to impose a sentence “for a term of years well short of the remainder of Mr. Bennett’s life.” His lawyers cited, among other reasons supposedly warranting leniency, that Bennett has “offered his cooperation to both the Litigation Trustee of the Refco Estate and the Refco Civil Class Action Plaintiffs, in their efforts to return hundreds of dollars to those who lost money in the Refco bankruptcy.” His lawyers further argued that his cooperation in those cases is “an indication of the extent to which Mr. Bennett has sought to make amends for the harm he has caused, and further reason to impose a sentence well below an actual or de facto term of life in prison.”

 

In its June 6, 2008 response (here), also made public on June 12, the government urged that “given the duration and intensity of the fraud, Bennett should receive no leniency.” In urging the maximum, the government pulled out all rhetorical stops; the government argued:

Bennett’s willful frauds on Refco’s investors, purchasers, customers, counterparties, banks, the public and others resulted in countless victims being defrauded of billions of dollars, causing uncompensated losses, even after the dissolution of Refco’s assets and large legal settlements of well over $1.5 billion, and of course drove Refco into bankruptcy. The defendant’s criminal conduct, motivated by greed that drove him to lie and scheme in ways previously unimaginable, brought him wealth that has scarcely been seen before in a … fraud case, launching Bennett into the rarefied air of a billionaire. In terms of scope, length, sophistication, harm, and criminal benefit, Bennett stands on a plateau of criminality that frankly makes comparisons difficult. Accordingly, the Government respectfully submits that an appropriately stiff term of imprisonment, consistent with the sentences imposed in the similar cases discussed above, should be imposed in order to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just and fair punishment, and deter potential corporate criminals.

In this same vein, the government showed little respect for Bennett’s plea for leniency made in reliance on his cooperation with the civil claimants (or at least “some” of the civil claimants, as the government emphasizes). The government said only that while the Court is not prohibited from considering such putative cooperation, “that does not mean that the Court necessarily should give the defendant credit for such cooperation.”

 

Among other reasons why it contends Bennett should received no leniency, the government specifically argued that “rather than limit the impact of his fraud, he knowingly accepted millions of dollars from Refco’s directors and officers insurance (the premiums for which, of course, were paid with fraud proceeds) to pay his legal bills, money that Bennett knew he had no right to claim.” The government added in a footnote that Bennett was also aware that in light of the government’s asset forfeiture case “there would be no money left to repay the insurance company upon his conviction. In substance, at the same time that Bennett was supposedly accepting full responsibility for his actions, he was in fact, taking millions of dollars from insurance companies under false pretenses. Notably, Bennett has not offered to cooperate with these civil litigants.”

 

Bennett may well deserve the maximum sentence as a result of his wrongdoing. The government may persuasively argue that Bennett only belatedly acknowledged his guilt, and that his late-arriving contrition ought not to be the basis of leniency, particularly where the delay exacerbated the harm he caused. But I wonder about the government’s attempt to bootstrap this argument by citing Bennett’s use of the D&O insurance proceeds to finance his defense.  

 

Let me just say as a preliminary matter that in expressing the views below, I am expressing no opinions about the carriers’ rights or interests. I am unfamiliar with the specifics of Refco’s D&O insurance coverage and none of the opinions below should be taken as opinion about Refco’s carriers’ coverage positions in this case. The carriers certainly  have their own grievances based on these circumstances, but I am not addressing those grievances here.  My opinions here relate solely to the government’s arguments against leniency based on Bennett’s use of the D&O policy proceeds.

 

My first concern with the government’s argument is the general principle it represents. The government may be justified in arguing that Bennett knew all along that his conduct was fraudulent. But take the principle on which the government seeks to rely outside the context of this specific case. Defending against a criminal charge is extraordinarily expensive, and one of the purposes of D&O insurance is to provide for the advancement of post-indictment criminal defense expense. For many criminally accused corporate officials, particularly those whose former company is bankrupt, the D&O insurance may be their only means of defending themselves. An insured forced to rely on this last line of defense should not be have to be concerned that accepting these contractual rights will put them at hazard that it might later be used against them if they ultimately face a criminal sentencing.

 

My second concern is that the circumstances Bennett’s case presents arguably are a product of the structure of D&O policies. The policies of course preclude coverage for loss based on criminal misconduct. But at the same time, the policies provide for the advancement of post-indictment criminal defense expense, subject only to an unsecured obligation to repay in the event a coverage preclusion is triggered.

 

In the course of events, it is inevitable that some insurance proceeds will be advanced in defense of insureds whose guilt is later established. The carrier can then seek to recover the advanced expense, which the insured is obliged to repay. But as an unsecured creditor, the carrier may not be able to recoup its costs in many instances. Bennett may well have known he would never be able to repay the amounts advanced, but I suspect that most criminal defendants know that, if called upon, they too could never hope to repay the amounts advanced in their defense. If awareness of an inability to repay is bar to seeking leniency, the ability to seek leniency would be unavailable to many corporate criminal defendants.

 

Carriers could refuse to cover criminal defense expenses or require more security before advancing criminal defense expense. Of course, any carrier trying to do either of these things would sell no more policies. D&O policies are structured as they are because that is what the marketplace requires for the policies to be commercially competitive. Presumably the carriers believe they are adequately compensated for the risks inherent in the structure.

 

The government may well be justified overall in arguing that Bennett should receive the maximum sentence. But I wonder: should an insurance outcome made possible as a result of the requirements of commercial competition really serve as a factor in the length of someone’s criminal sentence?

 

I suspect that some readers may have strong views on this topic. I hope readers will be willing to publish their views using the blog’s comment feature.

 

Hat tip to the White Collar Crime Prof Blog (here) for the links to the sentencing memoranda.

 

Speakers’ Corner: On June 17, 2008, I will be in Quebec City at the spring meeting of the Casualty Actuarial Society, speaking on a panel entitled “Subprime Issues for D&O.” The conference sessions agenda can be found here. My fellow panelists include Stephanie Plancich of NERA Economic Consulting and David Bradford of Advisen.

Lots has been written, even on The D&O Diary (most recently here), about the way the world is adjusting to investors’ growing desire to hold management accountable. At the same time, U.S. courts have proven increasingly reluctant to project the remedies available under its securities laws into situations where there is an insufficient connection to the U.S. (as discussed here).

 

But the lawsuit filed on June 12, 2008 against the European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. (EADS) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York takes all of that and puts in into a truly interesting and potentially combustible mix   – the plaintiffs are U.S. citizens, but they exclusively bought their shares in this foreign-domiciled company outside the U.S. The company’s shares do not trade on any U.S. exchange.

 

The company and the individual defendants, all current and former directors and officers of EADS, are domiciled outside the U.S. EADS is a Netherlands company with its principle place of business in The Netherlands. This is a company that is foreign to the U.S. in every sense of the word and only the investor plaintiffs themselves have any connection to the U.S.

 

If there were ever a case to test the outer limits for the availability of U.S. courts for remedies under the U.S. securities laws, this case would appear to be the one.

 

The plaintiffs’ attorneys’ June 12, 2008 press release can be found here. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

As described in the press release, the complaint alleges that

EADS falsely assured the investing public that it would overcome the technical problems in the production of the Company’s Airbus A380 commercial jets (“A380”) and it would be able to meet its year-end delivery deadlines. Moreover, the Company issued numerous positive statements which described the Company’s increasing financial performance. According to the complaint, these statements were materially false and misleading because they failed to disclose and misrepresented the following adverse facts, among others: (i) that the Company was experiencing insurmountable delays in the manufacture of the A380 commercial jet; (ii) that the Company would be required to compensate its customers for these delays through discounts and certain customers would likely be canceling their entire orders; and (iii) that, as a result of the foregoing, the Company’s ability to receive new contract awards from commercial airliners and its ability to reap future revenues at the levels that it was projecting would be in serious doubt.

On June 13, 2006, the Company announced that its Airbus subsidiary was having production problems with the A380 commercial jet, which would cause a significant delay in delivery to its customers. The Company also issued a profit warning beyond 2006 which was attributable to these delays and announced that it anticipated annual shortfalls of €500 million, without taking into account possible contract terminations from existing customers.

What makes this case interesting is not the specific factual allegations, which, at least by U.S. standards, are not all that remarkable. What makes this case interesting is the putative class on whose behalf the claim is brought. According to the press release, the lawsuit is brought on behalf of “U.S. citizens who purchased the publicly traded stock of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. (“EADS” or the “Company”) on the Frankfurt (Frankfurt: EAD.F), Madrid (Mercado Continuo: EAD.MC) and/or Paris (Paris: EAD.PA) stock exchanges between January 17, 2005 and June 13, 2006, inclusive.”

 

There are several noteworthy points about this class description. First and foremost, the plaintiffs’ lawyers do not purport to represent foreign investors who brought their shares abroad, so they are consciously avoiding the so-called f-cubed litigant problem (foreign domiciled investors who bought their shares in a foreign domiciled company on a foreign exchange). But the class description underscores the fact that this company’s shares were not traded on a U.S. exchange. They were only traded on foreign exchanges.

 

This class description raises, in a fairly dramatic way, the ultimate question of how broadly the remedies available under the U.S. securities laws should reach. Do they reach even to a foreign company whose shares do not trade at all in the U.S?

 

The traditional standards, looking to whether there was (or were) fraudulent conduct or the effects of fraudulent conduct in the U.S., might post significant hurdles for the court to exercise jurisdiction in this case, except that those standards were developed to aid court to determine whether or not to exercise jurisdiction on behalf of investors domiciled outside the U.S. Courts have generally not hesitated to exercise jurisdiction, even against foreign domiciled companies, on behalf of U.S. citizens. But will the court be willing to exercise jurisdiction against a foreign-domiciled company whose shares do not trade in the U.S.?

 

There may well be prior cases that raise this particular set of issues, and if so I hope readers will let me know. To my knowledge this is a new angle on the perennial set of jurisdictional questions surrounding securities claims against foreign domiciled companies. If the U.S. court were to exercise subject matter jurisdiction here, it would in effect represent a projection of U.S court jurisdiction and U.S. style securities litigation to any company anywhere, as long as there is a U.S.-based investor. Maybe a court here will go for that, but it seems like a stretch to me.

 

Is there any company anywhere in the world that does not have U.S.-based investors? Should the mere presence of those investors in the U.S. courts allow U.S courts to exercise jurisdiction over all those companies, no matter where they are located and where their shares trade?

 

Finally, there is also the issue of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants, and perhaps even over the corporate defendant. Have the defendants purposely availed themselves of the jurisdiction or otherwise established minimum contact with the forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction over them comports with traditional notions of substantial justice and due process?

 

There probably are also some very interesting questions here about the basic merits of the claim. But those questions may or may not ever matter. The first innings of this game are going to be the ones to watch. Make sure you have your beer and your hot dog and that you are in your seat for the national anthem, because this game is going to rock and roll from the very first pitch.

UPDATE: On June 13, 2008, a different plaintiffs’ firm apparently initiated a separate lawsuit against EADS on behalf of a different plaintiffs’ class. According to the firm’s press release (refer here), this newest lawsuit "seeks to recover damages on behalf of all U.S. and non-U.S. purchasers of the publicly traded securities of EADS during the Class Period." The new lawsuit also names as defendants Lagardere and Daimler AG, EADS’s largest shareholders. This second lawsuit presents faces even more significant jurisdictional barriers, since it purports to represent the so-called f-cubed claimants. Clearly these complaints are testing outer jurisdictional boundaries on the availability of remedies under the U.S. seecurities laws.

Earlier this week when I posted my list of subprime lawsuits dismissal motion grants and denials (here), I was hoping the publication would encourage readers to let me know about case dispositions of which I was previously unaware. My strategy worked, because a loyal reader who prefers anonymity responded to my post by alerting me to the May 19, 2008 opinion (here) in the subprime-related securities class action lawsuit involving Standard Pacific. Because the court’s opinion is particularly thorough, it merits a detailed review.

 

Standard Pacific is a California-based residential construction company that concentrated in recent years on the formerly go-go growth areas of California, Florida, Texas and Nevada. As s result of the residential real estate slump, the company’s sales activity declined in 2006 and 2007. Plaintiff shareholders initiated a securities class action lawsuit against two Standard Pacific executives in August 2007.

 

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misrepresented Standard Pacific’s ability to open new, successful communities; misled the public about the demand for Standard Pacific homes; and lied about the company’s ability to continue its historically strong earning growth. Further background regarding the lawsuit can be found here.

 

In a May 19, 2008 opinion, Judge Margaret M. Morrow of the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiffs’ 45 days’ leave to amend.

 

The defendants first argued that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to satisfy the PSLRA’s pleading requirements because it is a “classic example of prohibited puzzle-pleading,” in that it contains extensive block quotations from the company’s class period statements “without specifying the particular statements that are false and misleading.”

 

The plaintiffs sought to address this issue in their reply papers, but the court found that “the organization the plaintiffs offer in their opposition brief does not cure the deficiencies in the complaint. To the contrary, it highlights plaintiffs’ failures to plead defendants’ purportedly false and misleading statements with specificity as required by the PSLRA,” and accordingly the court granted the motion to dismiss, with leave to amend.

 

The defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled scienter. The plaintiffs alleged, based on the confidential witness information, that defendants misled investors because they continued to cite sales information in reliance on internal reports they supposedly knew to be inaccurate. Defendants contended that, to the contrary, they informed investors that the company was experiencing sales declines, and that “the crux of plaintiffs’ fraud claim is not that the defendants flatly misrepresented the company’s performance but that they were deliberately reckless because the failed to lower their projections enough.”

 

The court found that

the fact that defendants reduced earnings and home delivery guidance cuts against plaintiffs’ claim that defendants acted with fraudulent intent. As no facts are pled supporting an inference that defendants selected the level of reductions they announced fraudulently or with deliberate recklessness, the complaint suggests a plausible nonculpable explanation for defendants’ conduct…. Taken as a whole…plaintiffs’ allegations do not give rise to a “strong inference” that at the time they made the statements, defendants knew or should have known that the state of affairs was much worse than they had acknowledged publicly….In effect, by arguing that defendants’ predictions and forecasts were not low enough, plaintiffs improperly attempt to allege “fraud by hindsight.”

The court similarly rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to rely on the defendants’ certifications of the company’s SEC filings.

 

The dismissal, even though it is without prejudice, is still significant. First, the opinion is very detailed and thorough, which could carry some weight in other subprime securities cases, particularly the numerous other cases pending in the Central District of California.

 

Second, many of the other subprime complaints arguable share the “puzzle pleading” defect of the complaint in this case – all too often, the complaints in these subprime cases consist of block quotations from the defendants company’s disclosure documents, without direct connections specifying what about the disclosure the plaintiffs allege is false and misleading, and in what way the statements are false and misleading.

 

Third, many of the companies named in subprime securities lawsuits, like Standard Pacific, are accused not of failing to acknowledge problems but of failing to recognize the problems enough. To the extent other courts view these pleadings with the same level of skepticism as Judge Morrow, the complaints could face some formidable challenges at the motion to dismiss stage.

 

In any event, I have added the Standard Pacific opinion to the list of subprime lawsuit dismissal motion grants and denials. I hope other readers will let me know of any other subprime lawsuit dismissal motion rulings of which they are aware, so that the list can be as complete as possible.

 

Special thanks to the anonymous loyal reader for alerting me to the Standard Pacific opinion.

 

Another Option ARM Lawsuit: In a different post earlier this week (here), I noted the lawsuits that had been filed up to that point relating to Option ARM mortgages, and I suggested the likelihood that there would be further lawsuits relating to Option ARMs. In a quick confirmation of my prediction, on June 11, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Central District of California against IndyMac Bancorp and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ June 11 press release can be found here. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that

defendants issued materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business and financial results. Specifically, defendants downplayed and concealed IndyMac’s growing exposure to non-performing assets, particularly loans in its pay-option adjustable-rate mortgage (“Option ARM”) and homebuilder construction portfolios, and made numerous positive representations regarding the Company’s capital position to alleviate investors’ fears concerning the Company’s capital erosion. As a result of defendants’ false statements, IndyMac stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.

It is important to note that IndyMac had previously been sued in a subprime-related securities class action lawsuit, the background regarding which can be found here. In concluding that this latest lawsuit is sufficiently distinct from this prior lawsuit to represent a new lawsuit, I note the following: first, the class period of the prior lawsuit was May 4, 2006 to March 1, 2007, whereas the purported class period for the new lawsuit is from August 16, 2007 to May 12, 2008. In addition, the substantive allegations in the two lawsuits relate to different alleged misrepresentations. In particular, the prior lawsuit does not appear to relate to the companies representations regarding Options ARM mortgages or the company’s capital position.

 

Accordingly, I am recognizing this latest complaint as a new and separate filing. However, I encourage readers who may disagree to let me know of any circumstances that might militate in favor of a different conclusion.

 

I have added the new IndyMac lawsuit to my running tally of subprime and credit-crisis related securities lawsuits, which can be found here. With the addition of the new IndyMac lawsuit, the tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits now stands at 90, of which 50 have been filed in 2008.

 

Finally, it is worth noting that, as reflected in my list of subprime dismissal motions grants and denials referenced above that motion to dismiss have twice been granted with leave to amend in the prior IndyMac lawsuit.

 

More Subprime ERISA Lawsuits:  I have also added two subprime-related ERISA lawsuits to my running tally of subprime-related lawsuits.

 

First, in a June 11, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers announced that they had initiated a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York under ERISA against Wachovia Corporation and various of its officers and administrators. According to the press release, the defendants allegedly violated their duties to participants in the Wachovia Savings Plan by “continuing to invest in and hold Wachovia stock despite the fact that they knew or should have known that Wachovia was not properly reporting its financial condition and was not disclosing significant problems which had the effect of inflating the value of Company stock.”

 

Second, on May 9. 2008, plaintiffs’’ counsel initiated a lawsuit in the Western District of Tennessee on behalf of past and present employees of First Horizon National Corporation who participated in the First Horizon Savings Plan. A copy of the complaint can be found here. The complaint alleges that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty by requiring plan participants to invest in First Horizon shares, which the plaintiffs contend was “imprudent… because First Horizon was not fairly and accurately disclosing the risks and likely consequences of a number of its banking practices such that the Plan was purchasing shares of First Horizon Stock at an inflated price.” Among the undisclosed risks alleged is the company’s exposure to subprime and Alt-A mortgages.

 

I have added the Wachovia and First Horizon ERISA lawsuits to my running tally of subprime-related ERISA lawsuits, which can be found here. With the addition of the new ERISA lawsuit, the tally of subprime-related ERISA lawsuits now stands at 17

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for identifying the new ERISA lawsuits.

In prior posts (most recently here), I have discussed the fact that life sciences companies remain a favored target of the plaintiffs’ securities bar. A June 2008 memorandum by Michael Kichline and David Kotler of the Dechert law firm entitled “Dechert Survey of Securities Fraud Class Actions Brought Against Life Sciences Companies”  (here) takes a closer look at the 2007 life sciences securities lawsuits and concludes that “life sciences companies remain firmly in the crosshairs of the plaintiffs’ securities bar.”

 

The authors note that the 25 securities class action lawsuits filed in 2007 against life sciences companies represents a 64% increase over the 16 filed the preceding year, and also represents 14% of the 175 total securities lawsuits filed in 2007. (My own numerical analysis of the 2007 life sciences lawsuits, which can be found here, differs slightly, but only in the details, not the direction, and the difference undoubtedly is due to the narrow definition of “life sciences” I used in my analysis.)

 

The authors also have a number of interesting observations about the 2007 life sciences lawsuits, including the fact that “life sciences companies with the greatest market capital — more than $10 billion – were sued at the same rate as companies with less than $250 million.”

 

The authors also note that the securities lawsuit allegations against life sciences companies “continue to span the product life cycle” and that many of the companies sued 2007 were sued “based on information they communicated, or failed to communicate, to the public about a drug’s efficacy, safety, and/or the results of the FDA approval process.”

 

One particularly interesting observation in the study is that “research personnel were frequently named as defendants,” and specifically that in five cases, the plaintiffs alleged that because “key research personnel had a high level position with the company and access to internal information, they both knew and failed to disclose the alleged adverse non-public information.”

 

The authors predict that life sciences companies will continue to be the targets of securities fraud lawsuits, noting that “the structural factors that lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to target life sciences companies – volatile stock prices and a drug or device product life cycle fraught with potential for adverse and unpredictable events, such as a negative clinical trial result of FDA decisions – remain challenging, especially in the current stock market and regulatory environment.” The authors predict that plaintiffs’ counsel will continue to strive to find new theories. The authors cite as an example the likelihood that “more securities lawsuits will be premised on off-label communication or sales.”

 

The survey, which concludes with practical risk minimization suggestions, is quite good and merits reading at length and in full.

 

While I concur in all of the authors’ views, I think that in order to fully appreciate life sciences companies’ securities litigation exposure, it is important to consider not only the lawsuit filings, but also the case dispositions. Life sciences companies may be frequent lawsuit targets, but that does not mean that all or even most of the lawsuits are meritorious.

 

As I have noted in prior posts (most recently here), many of the securities lawsuits filed against life sciences companies are dismissed. Indeed, many of the large life sciences companies that have been targeted in securities suits in recent months – including, for example, Guidant, Pfizer and Astra Zeneca – have successfully managed to get the cases dismissed. And it is not just the larger companies that have prevailed; smaller companies, such as, for example, Micrus Endovascular (which recently prevailed on its motion to dismiss, about which refer here), have also prevailed on their dismissal motions.

 

To be sure, there have also been many settlements of life sciences securities lawsuits, some of which have been quite significant. But overall life sciences securities lawsuits have not always been as productive for the plaintiffs’ lawyers as might be suggested by the sheer numbers of filings.

 

I do agree that the volatility of life sciences companies’ share price and the companies’ susceptibility to product-driven dislocations will continue to attract the unwanted attention of the plaintiffs’ lawyers. The good news for these companies is that they have potentially effective defenses available and they may be able to use these defenses to stave off the litigation assault. The risk protection steps suggested in the authors’ memorandum are particularly good starting points for preparing these defenses.

 

Special thanks to David Kotler of the Dechert firm for providing me with a copy of the life sciences securities litigation survey.