The $277.5 million jury verdict in the Apollo Group securities lawsuit caused a great sensation at the time it was returned in January 2008 (as discussed here). The verdict heartened plaintiffs’ attorneys and it served as a counterweight to the defense verdict in the virtually contemporaneous JDSU Uniphase securities lawsuit trial (which is discussed here).

But on August 4, 2008, Judge James Teilborg of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona entered an order (here) granting the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, based on his finding that the trial testimony did not support the jury’s finding of loss causation. Judge Teilborg’s order vacated the judgment and entered judgment in defendants’ favor.

The Apollo Group securities lawsuit involved alleged misrepresentations and omissions relating to a February 6, 2004 “Program Review” in which a Department of Education representative discussed the company’ potential violation of DoE rules. News of the allegations in the Program Review first became public on September 14, 2004, but the company’s share price did not react. Apollo’s share price fell significantly on September 21, 2004, when a securities analyst issued a report (the “Flynn reports”) expressing concern about the company’s possible exposure to future regulatory issues.

Judge Teilborg had held in connection with the parties’ pre-trial cross-motions for summary judgment that the issue whether the Flynn reports constituted “corrective disclosure” sufficient to support a finding of loss causation was a question for the jury

In its post-trial motion, Apollo argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding that the Flynn reports represented “corrective disclosure,” because they did not contain any new fraud-revealing information. Judge Teilborg found that “the evidence at trial undercut all bases on which [the plaintiff] claimed the Flynn reports were corrective.”

Accordingly, the court concluded that although the plaintiff “demonstrated that Apollo misled the markets in various ways concerning the DoE program review,” the plaintiff “failed to prove that Apollo’s actions caused investors to suffer harm.” The court therefore concluded that “Apollo is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Judge Teilborg then went on to consider conditionally Apollo’s motion for a new trial, as a precaution against the possibility that the appellate court could reverse the grant of judgment as a matter of law. He found that “none of the reasons cited by Apollo warrant a new trial in the case” and so the court conditionally denied Apollo’s motion for a new trial.

The possibility of significant post-trial developments in the Apollo case is something I expressly suggested at the time of the jury verdict, and, indeed the case still has a great deal farther to run procedurally, with additional opportunities for even further developments in the case.

In the interim, the post-trial disposition in the Apollo Group case alters the mix of securities lawsuit trial outcomes. According to data from the Securities Litigation Watch (here), six post-PSLRA cases (including Apollo Group) have gone to verdict, with three of the verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and three in favor of defendants, although on November 26, 2007, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the defense verdicts in the Thane International case (about which refer here). With the vacatur of the plaintiff’s verdict in the Apollo Group case, the securities lawsuit jury verdict scoreboard now stands evenly distributed, three each for plaintiffs and defendants – subject to further procedural developments.

As for the significance of this development, it may be hard to say definitively until all proceedings are complete, but the verdict’s vacatur can’t be encouraging for plaintiffs’ lawyers. This development together with the defense verdict in the JDS Uniphase trial would seem to argue pretty compellingly in favor of avoiding jury trials and seeking pretrial resolution

One practical significance of the vacatur of the Apollo jury verdict is that it removes any suggestion that the jury’s verdict represents a finding of fraud sufficient to trigger the fraud exclusion in the company’s D&O insurance policy. This undoubtedly represents significant relief to the company and the other defendants, in addition to the sense of vindication the company likely feels following the court’s ruling.

The company’s August 5, 2008 press release about the Judge Teilborg’s ruling can be found here. A detailed summary of the Apollo Group securities case, including links to pleadings, can be found here.

Even though the current subprime litigation wave seemingly has swept the prior scandal into the past, lawsuits based on options backdating allegtions stubbornly continue to come in. Within recent days, plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed two new options backdating-related derivative lawsuits. The options backdating scandal may now be well over two years along, but it continues to generate new litigation activity and controversy.

 

First, as described in an August 1, 2008 article in the Seattle Intelligencer (here), on July 17, 2008, a shareholder filed a lawsuit in King County (Wash.) Superior Court on behalf of Costco Wholesale Corp. against 20 of its current and former directors and officers. According to the article, the suit seeks “unspecified financial damages and internal company reforms.” A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

Second, as discussed in a July 30, 2008 Kansas City Star article (here), on July 29, 2008, a shareholder of Epiq Systems filed an options backdating-related shareholders derivative lawsuit on the company’s behalf against nine current and former directors and officers. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

The Epiq complaint alleges that the company “has secretly backdated millions of options to its top officers and directors for nearly a decade, reporting false financial statements and issuing false proxies to shareholders.”

 

With the addition of these two most recent lawsuits, my current tally of the total number of options backdating-related derivative lawsuits now stands at 168. The number of options backdating-related securities class action lawsuits stands at 39, including two new lawsuits filed in 2008. My updated list of the options backdating-related lawsuits can be found here.

 

Regular readers know that I have also been tracking options backdating-related case dispositions and settlements (here). Though the list of dispositions and settlements is now quite lengthy, the reality is that the vast majority of the options backdating cases are yet to be resolved. The fact that so many remain unresolved, together with the fact that new lawsuits continue to be filed, suggest that it will be quite some time before all of the options-backdating litigation is finally put to rest.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for the link to the Epiq article and for information about the Costco case.

 

Thoughts About Crisis Longevity: It is worth contemplating the likely long duration of the options backdating phenomenon in the context of the current subprime and credit crisis litigation wave. The subprime and credit crisis problems are so much more pervasive and so much more serious, and it likely that the related litigation will continue to emerge for months and perhaps years to come. It may be correspondingly even longer before the full dimensions of the subprime-related litigation wave can be fully assessed.

 

Indeed, in the Financial Times August 3, 2008 first anniversary retrospective of the subprime crisis (here), the paper specifially notes, "A year later, there is still no sign of an end to these problems. Instead, the sense of pressure on western banks has risen so high that by some measures this is now the worst financial crisis seen in the west for 70 years."

 

We may have options backdating litigation around for quite a while yet, but we will be living with the consequences of the subprime crisis for years to come.

 

Cross-Eyed Bear: When the history of the subprime crisis is finally written, the collapse of Bear Stearns will be a key part of the narrative. By the same token, the litigation involving Bear Stearns will also be a key part of the litigation history. The amount of litigation involving Bear Stearns is massive, but an August 4, 2008 Fortune article helpfully provides a comprehensive list and overview, here.

 

As the article correctly notes, "fortunately for former senior Bear executives like Jimmy Cayne, Alan Greenberg and Alan Schwartz, J.P. Morgan Chase agreed to indemnify Bear’s officers and directors for six years against these lawsuits."

 

Really Big Box Stores: I was surprised to learn, while writing this post, that Costco is as big of a company as it is. The companies’ current market capitalization is approximately $27 billion, with annual sales (2007) of $64 billion.

 

By most measures, those statistics would qualify Costco as a big company. But its competitor big box retailer Wal-Mart Stores manages to make Costco look modest by comparison. Wal-Mart’s current market cap is $230 billion and its 2007 sales were $378 billion.

 

If Wal-Mart were a country, and if its revenue were supposed to be equivalent to GDP, Wal-Mart would be the 25th largest economy in the world (according to the rankings of the International Monetary Fund, here) —  larger than Saudi Arabia, Austria or Greece. Or as big as Kuwait, New Zealand and Algeria combined. That’s big.

 

If you are still straining to comprehend how big Wal-Mart truly is, you may want to check out this amazing animation video (here) depicting the efflorescence of Wal-Mart stores across a map of the United States. Wal-Mart is amazing, this video simply makes that fact easier to grasp.  

 

A very special hat tip to Tom Kirkendall at the Houston’s Clear Thinkers blog (here) for the link to the cool Wal-Mart growth video. Kirkendall’s site also links to this very cool BBC video (here) tracking electronically the balletic conduct of commerce in the British Isles.

It remains to be seen whether the current economic turmoil will result in significant additional bank failures. But if history is any guide, to the extent that there are further bank failures, there likely will also be follow-on lawsuits in which the regulators pursue claims against the failed institutions’ former directors and officers. As these claims emerge, there may also be disputed issues regarding the applicability of the failed institutions’ D&O insurance policies.

 

As I noted in a recent post (here), among the issues that may arise is the applicability of the regulatory exclusion. In addition, another issue that may arise relates to the potential applicability of the so-called “insured v. insured” exclusion found in most D&O insurance policies.

 

The “insured v. insured” exclusion typically precludes coverage for claims by or on behalf of the insured corporation, its affiliates or directors and officers against other insured persons. Over the years, the standard exclusion has been modified to provide coverage carve-backs for certain types of claims for which coverage would otherwise be precluded, such as derivative claims and employment practices claims.

 

During the S&L crisis in the late 80s and early 90s, the federal banking regulators actively pursued claims against the failed institutions’ former officials. As described in a July 29, 2008 memorandum from the Latham & Watkins law firm entitled “The ‘Insured v. Insured’ Exclusion in D&O Policies” (here), many of these regulator claims implicated the insured v. insured exclusion.

 

As the law firm’s memorandum explains, in many instances the regulators were able to argue successfully that the exclusion should not apply to preclude coverage for their claims, because the lawsuits were not the “collusive” type disputes for which the exclusion historically was meant to preclude coverage. However, as the memorandum also notes, there were cases in which the exclusion was held to bar coverage for the regulators’ claims, on the grounds that the regulator was in effect “standing in the shoes” of the failed institution.

 

The memorandum correctly points out that the “insured v. insured” exclusion is “heavily litigated” and “continues to be at the heart of many coverage disputes.” There are a number of reasons why coverage disputes involving the exclusion are so frequent.

 

First, over the years, the scope of persons insured under the typical D&O policy has expanded – for example, to include “employees” within the definition of insured persons for purposes of securities claims. In addition, many companies for their own reasons have sought to schedule additional named insureds to the policy by endorsement. While these policy extensions may be desirable from the policyholder’s perspective, problems can arise later if the extensions are not also coordinated with the language and operation of the “insured v. insured” exclusion.

 

Second, companies may take on forms or structures that raise fundamental questions about who is an insured under the policy. For example, insolvent companies may continue in business as a debtor-in-possession or may have its activities taken over by a receiver. These and other situations have raised and continue to raise a myriad of contentious questions about the scope and applicability of the insured v. insured exclusion.

 

Third, in many lawsuits, the plaintiffs’ claims may be based on information or assistance provided by former company officials. The former officials’ involvement may run afoul of the wording in the typical insured v. insured exclusion, which specifies that for claims to be covered they must be “instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of” any insured person.

 

The question whether a former official’s litigation involvement falls within one of these precluded categories is a frequent source of contentious coverage disputes. (Refer here for discussion of a recent case involving these issues.) In order to try to reduce the opportunities for these types of disputes, many carriers will now agree upon request to add wording providing that the exclusion will not apply in the event of the involvement of former officials whose departure was more than a specified amount of time before (typically, four years).

 

As the Latham & Watkins memorandum discusses, one of the issues frequently disputed in these cases is whether the underlying claim must be “collusive” in order for the exclusion to be triggered. As the Latham & Watkins memo explains, the exclusion’s original intent was to bar coverage for collusive claims. However, not all courts have required collusion for the exclusion to be applied (refer, for example, here), although there are many jurisdictions in which collusion has been held to be required.

 

The importance of the “insured v. insured” exclusion and the opportunities to revise the standard wording to reduce the exclusion’s preclusive effect highlights the importance of addressing these basic wording issues at the time the policy is purchased. As the Latham & Watkins memorandum notes, each company “should seek the assistance of an insurance broker to attempt to limit the exclusion’s breadth.” The potential significance of these issues underscores the need for companies to enlist the assistance of an experienced and knowledgeable broker in their acquisition of D&O insurance.

 

Duties of Outside Directors Under Delaware Law: As noted by the ever-vigilant Francis Pileggi on his Delaware and Commercial Litigation Blog (here), on July 29, 2008, the Delaware Chancery Court issued an opinion in the Ryan v Lyondell Chemical Company case (opinion here) that has important implications for the duties and potential liabilities of outside directors in the merger and acquisition context.

 

The court held that the outside directors were not entitled to summary judgments and would have to stand trial for their role in the sale of the company, as Pileggi notes, “despite selling the company to the only known buyer for a substantial premium.”

 

As explained in the opinion, when the Lyondell board received the offer, it delegated much of the negotiations to the company’s Chairman and CEO; never conducted a “market check to determine whether a better price could be obtained; agreed to a deal that included protective rights, including a “no-shop provision.” Moreover, “the whole deal was considered, negotiated, and approved by the Board in less than seven days.”

 

The Chancery Court held that the Board could not invoke the exculpatory provisions under the company’s charter and the Delaware Code because “the Board’s apparent failure to make any effort to comply with the teachings of Revlon and its progeny implicates the directors’ good faith and, thus, their duty of loyalty, thereby, at least for the moment, depriving them of the benefit of the exculpatory charter provision.”

 

Pileggi’s post does an admirable job explaining the implications of the decision. Further valuable analysis of the decision can be found on the Legal Profession Blog (here).

 

Monster Settlement, Dude: As reflected in its July 31, 2008 press release (here), Monster Worldwide has reached a settlement in the options backdating related securities action lawsuit pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers. As reflected in the press release, the settlement consists of “a payment to the class by the defendants of $47.5 million in full settlement of the claims asserted in the securities class action. The Company’s cost is anticipated to be approximately $25 million (net of insurance and contribution from another defendant).”

 

The Monster settlement is only the latest of the options backdating related securities class action settlements. A full list of settlements and case dispositions in the options backdating related litigation can be accessed here.

 

A WSJ.com Law Blog post describing the Monster settlement (and containing a nice link to The D&O Diary) can be found here.

 

The Securities Litigation Watch blog as updated its detailed analysis of the options backdating securities class action lawsuits, which can be found here.

That sure didn’t take long.

 

GT Solar International completed its $500 million IPO on July 23, 2008. Then on August 1, 2008, a mere seven trading days later, the plaintiffs’ lawyers initiated a purported securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire against the company and certain of its directors and officers, as well as the offering underwriters.

 

A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers August 1 press release can be found here. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

According to the press release, the proceeds of the IPO went to GT Solar Holdings, which in turn “intended to use the net proceeds … to make a distribution to its shareholders.” The press release also states that:

on July 25, 2008, before the market opened, LDK Solar Co., LTD (“LDK”), GT Solar’s largest customer, issued a press release announcing that it had signed a contract to purchase production equipment from one of GT Solar’s competitors. On this news, GT Solar’s stock price declined to as low as $9.30 per share before closing at $12.59 per share on July 25, 2008, losing 13% of its value in its second day of trading.

According to the complaint, the Registration Statement failed to disclose the true extent of the risks surrounding the Company’s relationship with LDK, including the fact that the Company was at imminent risk of losing out on a contract for future orders from LDK due to delays in shipping production equipment to LDK.

For whatever it may be worth, GT Solar’s amended filing on Form S-1 (here) did disclose the company’s dependence on a very few customers and consequent vulnerability (although there is no specific mention of any particular or imminent issues with LDK Solar); the risk factors in the company’s filing states:

We currently depend on a small number of customers in any given fiscal year for a substantial part of our sales and revenue.

In each fiscal year, we depend on a small number of customers for a substantial part of our sales and revenue. For example, in the fiscal year ended March 31, 2006 (on a combined basis), three customers accounted for 64% of our revenue; in the fiscal year ended March 31, 2007, three customers accounted for 70% of our revenue; and in the fiscal year ended March 31, 2008, one customer accounted for 62% of our revenue. In addition, as of March 31, 2008, we had a $1.3 billion order backlog, of which $769 million was attributable to three customers. As a result, the default in payment by any of our major customers, the loss of existing orders or lack of new orders in a specific financial period, or a change in the product acceptance schedule by such customers in a specific financial period, could significantly reduce our revenues and have a material adverse effect on our financial condition, results of operations, business and/or prospects. We anticipate that our dependence on a limited number of customers in any given fiscal year will continue for the foreseeable future. There is a risk that existing customers will elect not to do business with us in the future or will experience financial difficulties. Furthermore, many of our customers are at an early stage and many are dependent on the equity capital markets to finance their purchase of our products. As a result, these customers could experience financial difficulties and become unable to fulfill their contracts with us. There is also a risk that our customers will attempt to impose new or additional requirements on us that reduce the profitability of those customers for us. If we do not develop relationships with new customers, we may not be able to increase, or even maintain, our revenue, and our financial condition, results of operations, business and/or prospects may be materially adversely affected.

The lawsuit on the seventh trading day after GT Solar’s debut may represent some dubious kind of a record. Even Vonage Holding Company made it ten trading days before it was hit with a securities lawsuit (refer here for a more detailed discussion of the Vonage lawsuit). Indeed, Refco, which arguably represents the extreme example of an IPO flame out, was not hit with its first securities suit (about which refer here) until two full months after the company’s ill-fated IPO.

 

Historically, IPO companies have been more susceptible to securities lawsuits than the population of public companies as a whole. By my count, there have already been eleven securities lawsuits in 2008 alleging misrepresentations or omissions in connection with the defendant company’s IPO, even though 2008 has been an historically low year for IPO activity (although most of these eleven lawsuits relate to companies that completed their IPOs in 2007). Indeed, as I noted in my year-end analysis of the 2007 securities lawsuits (here), 29 of the 172 new securities lawsuits in 2007 were filed against IPO companies.

 

Because of IPO companies’ heightened susceptibility to securities lawsuits, a public company’s age (in terms of time since the company’s IPO) is one of the most important factors D&O underwriters consider in underwriting and pricing public company risks. The sudden turbulence GT Global has encountered certainly highlights the reason for that emphasis.

 

For a more detailed discussion of the considerations that D&O underwriters take into account in underwriting public company risk, refer here.

Two developments involving major European companies illustrate both the challenges and uncertain progress of global efforts to combat corruption.

 

First, on July 29, 2008, Siemens announced (here) that its Supervisory Board has resolved to claim damages from ten former members of the company’s Managing Board executive committee, including two former CEOs and a former CFO. The claims are “based on breaches of their organizational and supervisory duties in view of the accusations of illegal business practices and extensive bribery that occurred in the course of international business transactions and the resulting financial burdens to the company.”

 

The former executives will be “invited to respond to the claims before legal action is taken.” A July 30, 2008 Financial Times article describing the Siemens board action can be found here.

 

Second, in a July 30, 2008 opinion (here), the U.K. House of Lords overturned the April 10, 2008 ruling of the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court that the decision of the Serious Frauds Office Director to discontinue the investigation of possible corrupt activity involving BAE Systems was unlawful. (My prior post discussing the April 10 decision at length can be found here.)

 

The discontinued SFO investigation involved possible bribery in connection with the Al Yamamah arms contract between BAE Systems and the Saudi government. As detailed in the House of Lords opinion, the investigation proceeded despite Saudi resistance until investigators’ attempt to subpoena certain Saudi account information from Swiss banks led to direct threats that the Saudis would withhold cooperation with British antiterrorism efforts. Among other things, the threats included the explicit possibility that “British lives on British streets were at risk.”

 

In reaching its conclusion that the SFO director properly exercised his discretion to discontinue the investigation, the senior law lord, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, wrote:

The Director was confronted by an ugly and obviously unwelcome threat. He had to decide what, if anything, he should do….The issue in these proceedings is not whether the decision was right or wrong, nor whether the Divisional Court or the House agrees with it, but whether it was a decision which the Director was lawfully entitled to make….In the opinion of the House the Director’s decision was one he was lawfully entitled to make. It may be doubted whether a responsible decision-maker would, on the facts before the Director, have decided otherwise.

Baroness Hale of Richmond added in a concurring opinion that “it is extremely distasteful that an independent public official should feel himself obliged to give way to threats of any sort….Although I wish the world were a better place where honest and conscientious public servants were not put in impossible situations such as this, I agree that his decision was lawful.”

 

A July 30, 2008 article in The Guardian (here) describing the House of Lords opinion quotes counsel for the SFO as saying that “the SFO director was convinced that Saudi Arabia wasn’t bluffing.”

 

These significant developments have important implications both for companies and for continuing efforts to enforce anticorruption provisions.

 

First, the decision of the Siemens Supervisory board to pursue claims against the company’s former officials underscores the growing threat, which I have discussed at length in prior posts (most recently here), of follow-on civil litigation arising out of anticorruption enforcement activity. Although Siemens officials already are the target of a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit in the U.S., the Supervisory Board’s decision to take up claims against the former officials highlights the potential seriousness of the civil litigation threat.

 

The House of Lords decision also has great significance and represents an outcome that can only be regretted. To be sure, if it is assumed that the Saudi threats were serious (that is, if they were in fact not bluffing) then the threat to British lives justifies the decision to discontinue the investigation as well as the House of Lords opinion. Nevertheless, the capitulation to a threat of this kind represents a subordination of the rule of law to forces of a kind and character that should have no role in free societies.

 

The BAE Systems case clearly tested the limits of what any government might be willing to risk in resisting corruption. The implication of the decision to terminate the investigation is that if corrupt forces are sufficiently rich and powerful, they have nothing to fear from the force of law, and that anticorruption laws are enforceable only against those too weak or powerless to resist.

 

In its June 2008 Progress Report (which I discuss here), Transparency International noted that antibribery enforcement is “critical in draining the supply of bribe money that distorts public decision making in some of the world’s poorest states, with disastrous consequences for the decision making.” The outcome of the BAE Systems case suggests that it is not only in the world’s poorest countries that corrupt activity disrupts the processes of an ordered society.

 

The FCPA Blog has a post discussing the House of Lords opinion here. The FCPA Blog notes that the U.S authorities are continuing their investigation of the BAE Systems sales to Saudi Arabia.

 

Finally, and to bring this discussion full circle, the BAE Systems investigation is also the subject of follow on civil litigation, as discussed at greater length here.

Following close on the heels of the Cornerstone mid-year report released earlier in the day, on July 29, 2008, NERA Economic Consulting also released its mid-year 2008 securities class action report entitled “2008 Trends: Subprime and Auction Rate Cases Continue to Drive Filings, and Large Settlements Keep Averages High” (here). A copy of the July 29 press release describing the NERA Report can be found here.

 

The NERA Report differs in its numerical particulars from the Cornerstone Report, but the two reports are at least directionally consistent. The NERA Report is also directionally consistent with my own mid-year securities litigation study, which can be found here.

 

According to the NERA Report, there were 139 securities lawsuits filed in the first half of 2008 (by way of comparison, Cornerstone has the number at 110). Based on NERA’s analysis, the 2008 filings are on pace to reach almost 280 (compared to Cornerstone’s estimate of 220). The NERA Report, like prior mid-year reports concludes that the increased pace of filing activity is largely driven by the current subprime and credit crisis-related litigation.

 

The NERA Report also concludes that market volatility is positively correlated with the number of securities class action filings, and the “if market volatility is higher during a quarter, controlling for market returns, filings are likely to be higher in the same quarter.”

 

The NERA Report also notes that “the probability of a suit rises with the size of the price decline: whereas only 9% of drops of 20-30% are followed by a shareholder class action within three months, almost 31% of drops of 40% or more are followed by a filing within that time frame.”

 

Taking into account the settlements over $1 billion, the average settlement in the first half of the year remained around $30 million, but excluding the $1 billion settlements reduces the average first half settlement to around $10 million. The median settlement in the first half of 2008 was $6.2 million. Both the average and median are below similar figures for recent years.

 

However, the Report also notes that the investor losses associated with the recently filed lawsuits were substantially higher than the median for cases settled in the 2005-2007 time frame, suggesting that the 2008 cases (largely driven by the subprime-related cases) potentially could result in much larger settlements.

 

The Report also contains interesting and detailed information regarding the 21 cases that have gone to trial since the enactment of the PSLRA.

 

The NERA Report is quite detailed and very interesting, and contains numerous other useful observations beyond those summarized here.

 

The material divergence in lawsuit count between the NERA Report and the Cornerstone Report (and for that matter between the NERA Report and my own mid-year analysis) is a cause of concern for anyone interested in a precise understanding of the current lawsuit trends. In my own mid-year analysis of the 2008 securities lawsuit filings, I noted some of the reasons why “counting” lawsuits is particularly difficult in the current environment, and some of those factors undoubtedly are at work here.

 

But these foreseeable difficulties notwithstanding, the divergence in the numbers is disconcerting. Because so many observers depend on these respectable sources to understand securities litigation developments, it is troublesome when the sources disagree so widely. If these industry sources are unwilling to make their lawsuit lists publicly available, it would be helpful if these sources would at least identify their sorting criteria. I know from my own experience that there are a lot of decisions that must be made about which lawsuits should be included and which should be kept out. At least with the benefit of these sorting criteria, we could try to understand the differences.

 

In the past, it has always been sufficient for me to recognize the numerical differences between different reports while noting their directional consistency. But the difference in count between the two leading reports of 29 lawsuits is a material difference. The differences in their respective year-end projections are even more dramatic. Differences of this degree not only cause problems for industry participants and observers. Without suggesting one way or another where the issues may be, at some level, questions regarding consistency and even reliability start coming into the picture.

 

I welcome comments from responsible sources on the issues surrounding the diverging lawsuit counts. There could be significant value in a public discussion of these issues and I would be particulary interested in adding comments to this post from the respective research groups that track this information.

On July 29, 2008, Cornerstone Research and the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse released their mid-year 2008 report on securities litigation, entitled “Securities Class Action Filings: 2008 Mid-Year Assessment” (here). A July 29, 2008 press release describing the Report can be found here.

 

Although the Cornerstone Report differs in some details, it is otherwise entirely consistent with my own mid-year 2008 securities lawsuit filing report (which can be found here). Consistent with the observatoins in my prior report, the Cornerstone Report observes that securities filings in the first half of 2008 “continued the rebound that started in the second half of 2007.”

 

The Cornerstone Report states that there were 110 securities class action filings in the first half of 2008, which projects to an annualized total of 220. A year end total of 220 lawsuits would represent a 27.2 percent increase over 2007 and a 14.6 percent increase over the annual average for the 11 years ending in 2007.

 

The Report also notes that over half of the 2008 first-half filings (58) were driven by subprime and credit crisis-related allegations. Of these, 17 were related to auction rate securities.

 

The Report also notes that “market capitalization losses for defendant firms associated with filings in the first half of 2008 were higher than the average semiannual loss in the eleven preceding years,” and rival “the historical highs seen in 2000-02.” These market capitalization losses may well drive the value of future settlements in these recently filed securities lawsuits.

 

The Report also contains analysis suggesting that the so-called filing lull that prevailed from mid-2005 to mid-2007 “was partly due to a strong stock market with low volatility,” and that the more recently increased filing level was associated with increased volatility.

 

While the Cornerstone Report reflects analysis regarding the apparent connection between stock market volatility and securities lawsuit filings, the most recent Report omits analysis that appeared in Cornerstone’s mid-year 2007 report suggesting that the reduced filings during the period mid-2005 to mid-2007 was due to a “permanent shift” to a lower securities class action lawsuit filing level. As I noted at the time (refer here), I regarded the low stock market volatility as a much likelier explanation than any permanent behavioral shift as an explanation for the reduced filing levels.  

 

The Ultimate Solution to Stock Trader Misconduct: According to a July 27, 2008 Reuters report (here) , “A Chinese court upheld the death sentence of a former securities trader charged with embezzling 97.56 million yuan ($14.31 million).”

 

Hat tip to Kelly Rehyer for the link to the Reuters report.

A June 5, 2008 proposal by the Financial Accounting Standards Board that could require public companies to disclosure more about their litigation risks is generating a storm of controversy. As discussed in Zusha Elinson’s June 24, 2008 Law.com article entitled "GC’s Bristle at Proposed Disclosure Rules" (here), under the proposed revision to FASB Statement No. 5 (which can be found here), "the threshold for reporting potential loss from a lawsuit would be lowered from ‘probable’ to anything but ‘remote.’" Companies would have to "estimate just how much legal threats might cost and the likely outcome" and "disclose more details about the underlying litigation and the reasoning behind their predictions."

 

As discussed at length in in the Point of Law blog (here), there are a number of concerns about these proposed changes. Among other things, they are concerned that the new rules could force companies to lay out their litigation strategies for opponents to see; potentially waive the attorney client privilege; and even lead to more securities fraud cases if litigation turns out worse than estimated.

 

It certainly doesn’t take much creativity to imagine circumstances in which a company that finds itself the unfortunate recipient of an unexpected runaway jury verdict subsequently gets hit with a follow on securities lawsuit filed by plaintiffs’ lawyers alleging on behalf of shareholders that the company failed to disclose its true exposure to the underlying litigation.

 

Similarly, it is easy to imagine companies eager to avoid this litigation threat finding themselves challenged to produce defensive disclosure that does not simultaneously compromise their litigation position or their settlement negotiation strategy.

 

An additional concern that might challenge companies faced with the new disclosure requirements would arise from questions surrounding available insurance coverage in connection with the litigation. Companies involved in serious litigation sometimes find themselves unable to establish what amount of its legal expense and even settlement or judgment amounts might be covered by insurance.

 

Since the ultimate financial impact on the company from litigation could well depend on as yet incomplete negotiations with their insurers, the estimate of the financial impact from the litigation could be particularly uncertain. Indeed, compelling disclosure under these circumstances might not only compromise their position in the underlying litigation but it could potentially compromise their position with respect to their insurers as well.

 

The comment period for the proposed revision closes on August 8.

 

Additional concerns regarding the proposed new rules are noted on Professor Larry Ribstein’s Ideoblog (here).

 

Special thanks to Walter Olson at the Point of Law blog (here) for providing links to the proposed revised rules.

 Trade Marks: There are innumerable examples in William J. Bernstein’s entertaining new book “A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World” (here) demonstrating that the world was “flat” long before its more recent evocation. I found the following a particularly interesting example:

On September 5, 1833, the American clipper Tuscany appeared at the mouth of India’s Hooghly River, took on a river pilot, and headed upstream to Calcutta. The news of its arrival was swiftly relayed upriver, throwing that city, whose name is synonymous with sweltering heat, into a state of excitement. The Tuscany carried a new and priceless cargo: more than a hundred tons of crystal-clear New England ice.

What makes this such a compelling example of the "flattening" of the world is what happened after the overseas introduction of this highly desirable but locally unavailable product:

The first heavy, inefficient steam-driven mechanical refrigerators, produced by dozens of inventors under numerous patents, were used in fixed ice-making plants far from natural ice sources –in the Caribbean, south of the Mason-Dixon Line, in West Coast cities, and particularly in the Argentinean and Australian meatpacking plants. Tudor’s Calcutta trade, which grew steadily more profitable for nearly half a century following his initial delivery in 1833, came to an abrupt end a few years after the opening of the city’s first artificial ice plant in 1878.

The elimination of the Calcutta ice trade may well have devastated the New England ice producers at the time. But in the end, the overall benefits of innovation and increased trade opportunities far outweighed the consequences from the loss of the long-forgotten ice trading monopoly. Changing needs, transport costs, and technological innovation continue to alter existing trade patterns, producing winners and losers at every turn.

 

Because sudden change can devastate beneficiaries of existing arrangements, the need to protect the status quo can sometimes seem necessary and even urgent. Bernstein’s book shows not only that trading societies have faced these problems repeatedly throughout human history, but how societies that have accepted and faced these problems have prospered.

 

A good short review of Bernstein’s book can be found here.

The intervening subprime meltdown makes it seem longer ago than it really was, but it was only a short time ago that regulatory reform was a very hot topic (as noted, for example, here). Dramatic intervening events have advanced other priorities. Indeed, efforts to increase rather than reduce financial markets regulation seem to be the current fashion.

 

Many of the same people whom only a short time ago were pleading that overregulation was harming U.S. financial markets’ global competitiveness are now clamoring for increased regulation. As former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt noted in a March 21, 2008 Wall Street Journal op-ed piece entitled “Regulatory Underkill” (here), it is “ironic” now that the “most eminent voices in the business community” were “fixated on questionable measures of financial health” even while “the seeds of today’s market turmoil were being nourished not by regulatory excess, but by fundamental failures in oversight at almost every level.”

 

Even thought the climate unquestionably has changed, on July 24, 2008 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform released yet another call for reform, particularly with respect to securities class action litigation. The Institute’s Report, which is entitled “Securities Class Action Litigation: The Problems, its Impact and the Path to Reform,” can be found here. The Institute’s July 24 press release can be found here.

 

Among other things, the Report decries the “culture of abusive class actions” that is “eroding the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets at a time when the face perhaps their greatest threat from foreign competition.”

 

The Report is interesting and it is effective in summarizing the excesses and abuses of the current U.S. securities litigation system. The Report also contains some useful proposals. In particular, the Report focuses on the potential of abuses of a “pay to play” system where public officials responsible for public pension funds solicit campaign contributions from plaintiffs’ firms that are later selected to act as the pension funds’ litigation counsel. The Report advocates passage of the currently pending “Securities Litigation Attorney Accountability and Transparency Act” (H.R. 5463) to eliminate pay-to-play conflicts and other suspicious connections between attorneys and elected officials.

 

The Report also advocates a number of procedural reforms, including taking steps to ensure greater coordination between public and private enforcement, and enacting provisions to allow defendants whose motions to dismiss are denied to take immediate interlocutory appeals.

 

Overall, the Report’s recommendations are useful. There unquestionably is value in examining these issues, and the current litigation system unquestionably suffers from excesses and abuses. I question whether any of these kinds of reform proposals are likely to gain much traction in the current environment.

 

I also think that any reform initiative should also acknowledge several important additional considerations. The first is that our securities enforcement approach presumes active private litigation. As the Supreme Court noted in its 2007 Tellabs opinion, “meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions.” While there unquestionably are excesses and abuses in the current system, any reform attempt should also acknowledge private securities litigation’s important role.

 

The other important consideration relates to the fundamental question of U.S. competitiveness in the global economy. Ultimately, the greatest advantage that the U.S. markets historically have enjoyed is their reputation for integrity. As Arthur Levitt wrote in the op-ed piece cited above,

Ultimately, those who were so concerned with Wall Street’s competitiveness need to realize that the true competitive advantage of America’s capital markets has long been their high quality. With that quality in doubt, leaders and policy makers need to put their ideological fixations aside and commit themselves to giving investors the levels of transparency and accountability they deserve and expect from the world’s strongest markets.

It may well be useful and even important to consider ways to improve our system of private securities litigation. But it is also critically important that any reform proposal appropriately take into account the very things that have historically given the U.S. markets their strength — that is, their reputation for transparency and integrity, a reputation that U.S. financial markets already have much work to do to rehabilitate. Somehow, these rehabilitation efforts seem higher priority now than proposals for securities class action reform, no matter how meritorious.

 

Special thanks to several loyal readers for forwarding a link to the Institute’s Report.

 

More Credit Crisis Litigation: In prior posts (most recently here), I have detailed that the current litigation wave has spread far beyond the subprime lending arena where it first originated. A recently filed lawsuit underscores the extent of this spread.

 

As detailed in the plaintiffs’ counsel’s July 25, 2008 press release (here), plaintiff shareholders have filed a purported securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against CIT Group and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

CIT is a commercial and consumer finance company whose share price fell in March 2008 after reports circulated about the possibility that the company would have to charge off loans made to students of Silver State Helicopter, which had filed for bankruptcy. The complaint alleges that the defendants made false statements about the company’s financial condition, and specifically that “CIT’s public financial statements failed to account for tens of millions of dollars in loans to [Silver State], which were highly unlikely to be repaid and should have been written off.”

 

These have been prior lawsuits as part of the current credit crisis litigation wave that have involved student loans. For example, both Sallie Mae (refer here) and The First Marblehead Corporation (refer here) previously have been sued in securities lawsuits arising from troubled student loans. Whether or not there will be further lawsuits relating to student loans, there undoubtedly will be further litigation involving other types of credit as the current economic turmoil unfolds.

 

In any event, I have added the CIT Group lawsuit to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis related litigation, which can be accessed here. With the addition of the CIT Group lawsuit, the current tally of subprime and credit-crisis related securities lawsuits now stands at 102, of which 62 have been filed in 2008.

 

Break in the Action: The D&O Diary will be on a reduced publication schedule for the next week. The D&O Diary will resume its normal schedule during the week of August 4th.

The recent news (here) that federal regulators had seized IndyMac Bank in one of the largest bank failures in history brought back memories from the late 80’s and early 90’s, when numerous financial institutions around the country met a similar fate. The litigation surrounding the financial institutions’ collapse kept legions of lawyers profitably employed for years, including your humble correspondent.

 

Among the many types of cases litigated in that era were D&O insurance coverage disputes, and in particular, disputes involving the applicability of the so-called “regulatory exclusion.” The regulatory exclusion typically precludes coverage for claims brought by any governmental, quasi-governmental, or self-regulatory agency.

 

In the competitive underwriting environment that has prevailed in recent years, the regulatory exclusions has become an infrequent part of financial institutions’ D&O insurance policies, a development that has seemed unremarkable as the prior failed bank era has receded into the past. However, with the dramatic news of IndyMac’s regulatory seizure, and the consequent concern that further financial institutions failures may lie ahead (refer here), the issues surrounding the regulatory exclusion could once again become relevant.

 

Undoubtedly in response to these very issues, on July 21, 2008, the Latham & Watkins law firm issues a memorandum entitled “D&O Policies – Regulatory Exclusions” (here). The memorandum briefly reviews the issues that were debated concerning the regulatory exclusion in the last era of failed banks.

 

Among other things, the memorandum correctly recollects that it was not just the insured persons who disputed the regulatory exclusion’s applicability, but it was the governmental agencies as well. The agencies “fought regulatory exclusions clauses using mainly public policy arguments” because the exclusions “impair the ability of the government to seek redress in the situation of a failed bank.”

 

The memorandum notes that the courts found that the “freedom to contract overrode the government agency’s right” to bring claims against individuals. The courts also found that it would not have been against public policy for banks to purchase no D&O insurance at all, so therefore “excluding optional coverage in certain situations would clearly not fall against public policy.”

 

The government also tried to argue that the exclusions were ambiguous. But the courts read the exclusions broadly and in the context of the policy as a whole, and on the basis did not find them to be ambiguous. The courts found that the exclusions applied whether the government was pursuing claims as a regulator or as a liquidator, and regardless whether then government actually brought or was merely maintaining the claims.

 

It remains to be seen whether or not there will in fact be further financial institution failures, and if there are, whether the regulators will pursue claims against the failed institutions’ former management. Even if the government does pursue these kinds of claims, it is relatively unlikely that many of the institutions current policies contain a regulatory exclusion that would preclude coverage for these claims.

 

But the spate of bad news that banks have reported in recent days is a vivid reminder of the challenging circumstances that banks face. D&O underwriters are monitoring these developments with mounting anxiety. As conditions continue to deteriorate, and in particular if there are any further significant financial institution failures, D&O insurers relatively benign approach to the regulatory exclusion could change. The regulatory exclusion could once again become a more common part of D&O coverage for some financial institutions.

 

Of course, all of these things will be revealed in the fullness of time. But the IndyMac bank failure sure does have a familiar ring to it. As Mark Twain famously said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” Along those lines, the current circumstances could start to sound more and more like the prior era of failed banks, and it could involve many of same endings.

 

Oy, Canada: The subprime litigation wave has been sweeping the U.S. for now well over a year. But now the wave finally seems to have spread to our neighbors to the north.

 

On July 23, 2008, a Canadian law firm announced (here) that it had launched a securities class action lawsuit in the Ontario Court of Justice against the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and certain of its directors and officers.

 

According to the press release, the Complaint alleges that:

CIBC misrepresented the magnitude and level of risk associated with its U.S. subprime residential mortgage investments. In particular, CIBC represented during the class period that its total exposure in USSRMM investments, including both hedged and unhedged investments, was "not a major issue" when, in fact, the bank had exposure to billions of dollars of losses, as was only subsequently disclosed.

Further, CIBC failed to disclose that one of its principal hedge counterparties, ACA Financial, was woefully undercapitalized with an asset to guarantee ratio of "1-180" and was far from able to provide any meaningful hedge protection to the bank’s USSRMM investments

CIBC had previously been named as a defendant in a U.S. securities class action lawsuit (as detailed here), but that prior lawsuit involved investments and disclosures by CIBC’s MFS family of mutual funds, and did not relate to CIBC’s own disclosures or activities.

 

In addition to CIBC, another Canadian company, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), was also previously named as a defendant in a U.S.-based securities class action lawsuit (refer here), but that lawsuit relates to the sales of auction rate securities by RBC’s affiliate, RBC Dain Rauscher, and does not relate to RBS’s own disclosures or activities.

 

So far as I am aware, the recent lawsuit filed against CIBC in the Ontario Court of Justice represents the first subprime-related securities class action lawsuit to be filed against a Canadian company for the company’s own disclosures or activities.

 

A July 23, 2008 Bloomberg article describing the CIBC lawsuit can be found here.

 

UPDATE: In response to my comment above about Canadian subprime litigation, Ari Karoly of NERA Economic Consulting sent along the following observation: "I wanted to point out that the FMF capital class action which settled last year (refer here) was a class action brought against a US company in Canadian courts with respect to alleged misrepresentations made by FMF regarding subprime exposure and risks. You were technically correct because FMF was a US company which traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, but I still wanted to bring that case to your attention."

Now We Know Where the Airline Industry Found Its Service Model:  According to a complaint filed on July 18, 2008 in the Hamilton County (Tenn.) Circuit Court (here), when a resident of the Shallowford Trace luxury apartment homes complained of being unable to find a parking place, an employee of the apartment company put a gun between the resident’s eyes and stated “You f***ing b**ch, I’ll blow your f***ing brains all over this concrete” and also “Please give me a reason. I’ve got a permit. I’ll blow your brains out.”

The permit makes everything nice and legal. You wouldn’t want someone without a permit putting a gun between your eyes.

Hat tip to Courthouse News (here) for the Shallowford complaint.