Regular readers know that a recurring theme on this blog is the increasing prevalence of civil litigation following on in the wake of FCPA enforcement actions (refer for example here.) In the latest example of the phenomenon, on May 14, 2009, the Policemen and Firemen Retirement System of the City of Detroit has filed a derivative lawsuit in Texas (Harris County) District Court against Halliburton Company and KBR as nominal defendants, and against the companies’ present and former directors and officers, to recover civil damages, inter alia, in connection with the companies’ recent high-profile FCPA enforcement settlements.

 

By way of background, and as reflected here, on February 11, 2009, KBR and Halliburton agreed to pay $177 million in disgorgement in connection with SEC charges that KBR subsidiary Kelly Brown & Root LLC bribed Nigerian officials over a 10-year period in violation of the FCPA. In addition, Kelly Brown & Root agreed to pay $402 million to settle parallel criminal charges. Halliburton’s press release regarding the settlement can be found here.

 

The recently filed Texas civil action seeks "to hold Defendants responsible for the reign of terror their reckless failure to monitor the Companies’ internal controls permitted to take place at the Companies."

 

The plaintiffs’ Petition alleges that "the Companies were permitted to engage in conduct so notorious that the name ‘Halliburton’ has become virtually synonymous with corruption, just as Enron became the poster-child for fraud."

 

The complaint further alleges that KBR and its employees and agents "engaged in a course of conduct that includes bribery, gang rape, human trafficking, illegal operations in Iran, mishandling of toxic materials, and systemic overbilling."

 

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants were either complicit with or lacked oversight over these actions.

 

The increasing likelihood of civil litigation following on after an FCPA enforcement action, of which the new Texas lawsuit is but one example, represents a growing liability exposure for directors and officers of public companies and for their insurers. The fines and penalties in the underlying enforcement action would not be covered under the typical D&O insurance policy, although many of the costs of defending against allegations could well be covered. However, the costs of defense and in all likelihood any settlement of the follow-on civil litigation would be covered under most D&O policies. As a result, as I have discussed in prior posts, these kinds of lawsuits could represent a growing area of exposure for D&O insurers.

 

An AmLaw.com article regarding the lawsuit can be found here. A May 15, 2009 Bloomberg article regarding the lawsuit can be found here.

 

In a pair of separate rulings late last week, district court judges took on the plaintiffs’ allegations in a couple of high profile lawsuits arising out of the subprime meltdown. The courts’ rulings make it clear that the plaintiffs’ allegations in these cases will be highly scrutinized, but that (in one of the two cases) the judicial hurdles are not entirely insurmountable.

 

First, in a May 15, 2009 ruling in the Washington Mutual Securities Class Action, Western District of Washington Judge Marsha Pechman granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs’ ‘34 Act allegations, with leave to amend. She also granted the motion with respect to certain of the plaintiffs’ ’33 Act allegations, also with leave to amend, but she denied the motions to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs’ ’33 Act allegations concerning the company’s October 2007 securities offering.

 

In granting the motions with respect to the ’34 claims, Judge Pechman was sharply critical of the clarity and organization of the plaintiffs’ consolidated class action complaint. She characterized the complaint as “verbose and disordered” and states that the plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the elements of the claim are “spread disjointedly” throughout the complaint, as a result of which the complaint “never offers a cohesive presentation of the required elements for securities fraud for each defendant.” Judge Pechman refers to the complaint as embodying “puzzle pleading.”

 

The opinion recounts that two days prior to oral argument on the dismissal motions, Judge Pechman had directed plaintiffs’ counsel to address the alleged misleading statements of each of the defendants and to connect the statement to the allegations allegedly showing that the defendant knew the statements were false. At the hearing, the opinion recounts, plaintiffs’ counsel “indicated that the relevant allegations were too numerous to identify even in three hours of argument.”

 

This response to her concerns clearly raised Judge Pechman’s ire; she said that she “remains mystified at counsel’s failure to allege cohesive claims, submit helpful briefing or prepare a response to the Court’s inquiry in advance of oral argument.” She added that counsel “cannot expect the Court to engage in the necessary analysis when counsel is not prepared to do so.” She added that if counsel is “unable to rectify the problems identified in this Order when they file the amended Complaint, the Court may be obligated to review whether counsel can adequately represent the proposed class.”

 

Given the attention-grabbing nature of Judge Pechman’s rebuke on the plaintiffs’ ’34 Act allegations, it might easily be overlooked that she denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss regarding plaintiffs’ ’33 Act claims relating to the company’s October 2007 securities offering. Judge Pechman specifically found that plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to the October 2007 offering were sufficient.

 

However, Judge Pechman granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss as to the company’s three offerings in August 2006, September 2006 and December 2007, because the plaintiff class lacked standing with respect to those offerings. The court allowed the plaintiffs’ leave to name additional plaintiffs to obtain standing as to the three other offerings. The court deferred consideration of the plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to these three offerings awaiting the plaintiffs’ efforts to establish standing. The court’s rulings with respect to the October 2007 offering raises the prospect that if the plaintiffs are able to establish standing, their ’33 Act allegations regarding these other offerings may also survive.

 

Though plaintiffs’ counsel cannot be happy with their rough treatment in Judge Pechman’s order, at least a portion of their complaint survive the motion to dismiss, and they now have the opportunity to try to amend the complaint to address the court’s concerns.

 

I have in any event added the May 15 ruling in the WaMu case to my table of subprime and credit crisis related dismissal motions grants and denials, which can be accessed here.

 

Andrew Longstreth’s May 18, 2009 Law.com article regaring the WaMu decision can be found here.

 

Cleveland Subprime Nuisance Case Dismissed: In a decision also dated May 15, 2009, Northern District of Ohio Judge Sara Lioi granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in a case in which the City of Cleveland sought to hold 21 investment banks liable under Ohio nuisance law in connection with the banks’ securitization of subprime mortgages. The complaint alleged that the banks (which had not originated the mortgages) had facilitated the making of loans to subprime borrowers who could not afford the debt. After the borrowers defaulted, the lenders foreclosed. The city sought to hold the banks liable for its burdens and costs in maintaining the foreclosed properties.

 

My prior post criticizing the City of Cleveland for filing the lawsuit can be found here.

 

Judge Lioi granted the defendants motions to dismiss on four grounds: that the claims were preempted by Ohio law regulating mortgage lending; that the claim was barred by the “economic loss rule”; that the allegations failed to demonstrate that securitizing subprime loans constituted an “unreasonable interference with a public right”; and that the allegations were not sufficient to satisfy causation requirements – that is, the securitizers’ conduct had caused the City’s problems.

 

The opinion is interesting in a number of respect, perhaps first and foremost in connection with Judge Lioi’s holding that the securitizers’ conduct could not be deemed a public nuisance because the City had not alleged that the defendants had violated any laws. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Lioi extensively reviewed the panoply of governmental laws and regulations regarding mortgages, which she said were “specifically aimed at encouraging lending to traditionally underserved segments of the population.” From this Judge Lioi discerned a “picture” of “express governmental encouragement of the type of lending that forms the basis of the City’s claim.”

 

In holding that the banks can’t be liable for conduct that not only is not illegal but that the government expressly encouraged, Judge Lioi may implicitly be suggesting the true source of the City’s woes. It was, after all, governmental policy, for these kinds of loans to be made.

 

Judge Lioi’s extensive review (at pages 32 and 33 of the opinion) of the myriad of intervening causes that led to the City’s very real problems emphatically underscores the essentially foolishness of trying to hold the investment banks liable for the problems the City is facing because of its heavy load of foreclosed properties. As Judge Lioi observed, the “confluence of events certainly was no small problem given the large volume of foreclosures in Cleveland and the city’s budgetary constraints but under no circumstance can it be described as having been directly caused by Defendants’ conduct.”

 

A May 15, 2009 memorandum from the Skadden law firm analyzing Judge Lioi’s opinion can be found here. Plaintiffs’ counsel reportedly already has filed a notice of appeal.

 

Special thanks to Robert Rapp of the Calfee Halter law firm for providing a copy of Judge Lioi’s opinion.

 

Update: Readers may recall my recent post (here) about the questions surrounding the $9.3 million that was unaccounted for from the settlement of a settlement class action lawsuit. One of the plaintiffs’ lawyer, Gene Cauley, had asserted his rights under the Fifth Amendment at a April 20, 2009 hearing at which the court sought to establish the whereabouts of the money.

 

In a May 18, 2009 post (here), the WSJ.com blog reports that Cauley has now agreed to plead guilty to criminal charges and has also submitted a filing to the Arkansas Supreme Court in which he has agree to give up his law license. Unfortunately, the money itself is not yet accounted for, and according to statements of Cauley’s attorney cited in the blog post, may prove difficult to recover. 

 

As the early returns have slowly accumulated for the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, the question has arisen (refer here for example) whether or not these cases are faring poorly, in light of the numerous dismissal motions that have been granted thus far. Many of these dismissals have been granted, however, with leave to amend. And now at least one case in which a dismissal was granted with leave amend has survived a renewed motion to dismiss, suggesting that at least in the cases where dismissals were granted with leave to amend, it may be premature to write off the plaintiffs’ prospects.

 

As noted in a prior post (here), on December 11, 2008, Southern District of Florida Judge Ursula Ungaro granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, with leave to amend, in the BankAtlantic Bancorp subprime-related securities class action lawsuit. Judge Ungaro granted the motion on the ground that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendants acted with scienter in making the alleged misrepresentations and omissions.

 

On January 12, 2009, the plaintiff filed a first amended consolidated complaint (here), and the defendants’ renewed their motion to dismiss.

 

In a May 11, 2009 ruling (here), Judge Ungaro found that the amended complaint "cures the most pertinent deficiencies" that she had found in the earlier complaint. Thus, whereas the earlier complaint relied on confidential witnesses "about whom the Court knew nothing," and on allegations that were "vague and [that] failed to show what each of the individual defendants’ knew," Judge Ungaro found that the amended complaint "contains sufficient information regarding these confidential witnesses, including their employment duties, whether they were employed during the Class Period, and how they obtained direct knowledge of the facts they were reporting."

 

Judge Ungaro further found that the amended complaint "clearly states" how the individual defendants were reckless in not knowing the alleged misrepresentations regarding the bank’s lending practices.

 

Judge Ungar considered the defendants’ arguments for the court to consider competing inferences that might be drawn from the plaintiff’s allegations. Noting that the inferences of scienter "need not be irrefutable," she found that the facts alleged gave rise to a strong inference of scienter because the amended complaint "includes specific facts demonstrating that [the defendants] knew or were severely reckless in not knowing of the Company’s risk exposure, which was greater than they disclosed to investors."
 

 

With respect to defendants’ argument that the bank’s woes were due to the "deterioration in the real estate market," Judge Ungar said "whether or not Defendants’ alternative causation theory bars Plaintiff’s claim for damages is a question for another day."

 

Noting that the "pleading requirements under the PSLRA are stringent but are not insurmountable," Judge Ungaro concluded that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the Defendants were "extremely reckless" in the company’s disclosure about the bank’s commercial loans, and so defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss was denied.

 

The amended complaint’s survival is most significant because it comes after the initial motion to dismiss had been granted, raising the possibility that even if the plaintiffs whose original complaints fails to survive dismissal motions may yet be able to file an amended complaint that can overcome the court’s concerns. It may be premature to count out the plaintiffs in the various other cases where initial motions to dismiss have been granted with leave to amend.

 

Judge Ungaro’s denial of the renewed motion to dismiss is also interesting because this case, perhaps by contrast to some other cases (such as the Countrywide and New Century cases) where dismissal motions have been denied, does not involve some of the more dramatic allegations involved in those other cases. For example, by contrast to the Countrywide case, allegations of insider trading were not a significant consideration in Judge Ungaro’s denial of the motion to dismiss in this case.

 

Plaintiffs’ lawyers may well find Judge Ungaro’s opinion as a positive development. Perhaps if the allegations in this case are sufficient, other cases may yet survive motions to dismiss as well. This impression is underscored by the fact that Judge Ungaro was not deterred by the general downturn in the real estate market or the economy.

 

In any event, I have added Judge Ungaro’s latest opinion to my running tally of settlements, dismissal and dismissal motion denials in the subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits, which can be accessed here.

 

Special thanks to Chris Keller at the Labaton Sucharow law firm for providing me with a copy of Judge Ungaro’s latest opinion. The Labaton Sucharow represents the plaintiff in the BankAtlantic case.

 

Should He Stay or Should He Go?: In the recent Household Financial securities lawsuit jury trial (about which refer here), among the individual defendants who were found to have acted recklessly in making public disclosures was Household director William Aldinger. As a result, Aldinger not only faces the prospect of having to pay monetary damages; he also faces further questions about his continued service on other corporate boards.

 

As reflected in a May 12, 2009 Chicago Tribune article (here), Aldinger serves on the board of four other publicly traded companies: Illinois Tool Works; AT&T; Charles Schwab Corp.; and KKR Financial Holdings LLC. As the article notes, "the verdict raises the question of whether Aldinger should have to resign from the boards."

 

This is uncharted territory in many ways, because so few securities lawsuits actually go to trial. While the verdict does not "automatically disqualify" Aldinger from continued service on the other boards, according to one expert cited in the Tribune article, it certainly puts the boards of those other organizations in a difficult position. The article quotes governance commentator Nell Minow as suggesting that Aldinger should resign and save those other companies from embarrassment and shareholder scrutiny.

 

Aldinger had been CEO of Household prior to its 2003 acquisition by HSBC.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for the link to the Tribune article.

 

Speaker’s Corner: On Thursday May 14, 2009, I will be in Los Angeles for the Professional Liabiltiy Underwriting Society Southern California Chapter eductional event. I will be participating as a panelist on a sesion discussion the State of the Insurance Market. Further information about the session can be found here. If you are attending the event, I hope you will make a point of greeting me and introducing yourself. 

 

One byproducts of the turmoil that has swept over insurance giant AIG has been a cascade of litigation. But even before the company’s latest woes, it was locked in a series of hotly contested legal battles with its former Chairman and CEO, Maurice Greenberg. The latest front in this ongoing war apparently is a fight over the proceeds of the company’s primary D&O insurance policy, as a result of which the D&O insurer has now initiated an interpleader action to sort out whose claims to the policy proceeds should prevail.

 

As reflected in the complaint (here) that the insurer filed on May 8, 2009 in the Southern District of New York, the insurer issued a $15 million primary D&O insurance policy over a $10 million self-insured retention for the policy period May 24, 2004 through May 25, 2005. As the D&O insurer’s complaint notes, "AIG is at the center of a firestorm," as a result of which the company and its present and former directors and officers are the targets of numerous lawsuits. (The lawsuits themselves are not specified in the D&O insurer’s complaint.)

 

But as the insurer’s complaint observes, "even before the current issues at AIG became front page news, a very public split" occurred between AIG and Greenberg, as a result of which the company and Greenberg have "taken strongly adversarial positions" in the various lawsuits that have accumulated against AIG. Both AIG and Greenberg and his related entities have expended significant sums in their defense of the underlying litigation, and both AIG, on the one hand, and Greenberg and his related entities, on the other hand, have demanded that the D&O insurer advance to them the proceeds of the D&O policy, presenting the insurer with "competing adverse demands to the proceeds of the Policy."

 

According to the complaint, AIG was advancing Greenberg’s defense expenses until mid-2007, after which Greenberg’s defense expenses were advance by his various related entities. The D&O insurer’s complaint alleges that the defense expenses that AIG has incurred on Greenberg’s behalf and on behalf of other individual defendants in the underlying litigation exceed both the D&O policy’s $10 million self-insured retention and its $15 million limit of liability.

 

The D&O insurer’s complaint is filed in the form of an interpleader action under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Using this procedure, the insurer is basically disclaiming any right or interest in the policy proceeds, and tendering them to the court, for the court to sort out the competing interests to the policy proceeds.

 

The precipitating event that triggered the initiation of the interpleader action was the attempt by Greenberg to pursue arbitration, in reliance on the arbitration clause in the D&O insurance policy. While the policy does provide for arbitration, Greenberg did not join AIG as a party to the arbitration, while at the same time purporting on his own to select an arbitrator. The D&O insurer is concerned both that AIG must be a party to the arbitration, and that the Policy reserves to AIG rather than to individual insureds the right to select the arbitrator.

 

In light of this separate arbitration proceeding, the D&O insurer’s recently filed complaint seeks, in addition to interpleader, a judicial declaration whether or not Greenberg is entitled to use the arbitration procedure under the policy, and if so whether AIG is a necessary party to the arbitration, as well as whether or not AIG has the right under the policy to select the arbitrator. The D&O insurer also seeks a judicial declaration of the appropriate disposition of the policy proceeds pending the outcome of the arbitration.

 

Obviously one of the things that makes this new action interesting is the high profile of the litigants involved. But the case is also interesting as an illustration of the kinds of problems that can arise between current and former directors and officers – clearly, the disputes can even include vehement disagreement over the proper allocation and distribution of D&O insurance proceeds.

 

The arbitration dispute also demonstrates some the shortcomings that can arise in the application of arbitration provisions in a D&O insurance policy. The sequence of events here not only raises questions about who can initiate arbitration, but also who has what rights in the event of an arbitration. Individual insureds might well be concerned to learn that their company could reserve the exclusive right to select arbitrators in any dispute in which the individuals might become involved with the D&O insurer. (These issues illustrate one reason why I have always thought that the preferred approach to alternative dispute resolution clauses in an insurance policy is for the specified procedures to be at the option of the aggrieved insured, rather than mandatory.)

 

Another interesting note in this dispute is that it relates to a D&O insurance policy that incepted in 2004. Obviously, the hottest parts of the "firestorm" in which AIG is now engulfed arose well after the policy period for the policy that is in dispute in this case, raising the question of how many (if any) other policy years’ of coverage have been triggered by the various lawsuits in which AIG is involved. How many of the various lawsuits "relate back" to this policy year, and how many triggered policies that were in force in subsequent policy periods? The total amount of insurance potentially in play depends on the outcome of this question.

 

It is also worth noting that the interpleader complaint described above involves only the primary policy in AIG’s D&O insurance program for the policy period 2004-05. AIG undoubtedly carried significant additional amounts of insurance (i.e., excess insurance) during that same policy period. While the excess insurers in the program may be indifferent whether the primary policy is exhausted in payment of AIG’s or Greenberg’s defense expenses, once the primary policy is exhausted, the dispute between AIG and Greenberg will just move up to the first level excess carrier, and so on up the ladder.

 

So it is obviously important to the excess insurers to know how the present dispute is resolved, because the outcome potentially could dictate the excess carriers’ rights, obligations and interests.

 

One final point that the many claimants in the various lawsuits pending against AIG and its present and former directors and officers may well want to note is that the deluge of litigation in which AIG is involved is rapidly depleting whatever amounts of insurance may remain. At some point, the insurance could well be exhausted even just by defense expense alone, leaving only the assets of the now nationalized entity as the primary source of funds out of which to try to extract a settlement or judgment – putting the claimants’ interests in direct conflict with those of U.S. taxpayers.

 

The theoretical possibility that these claimants might be able to recover from the individual defendants out of the individuals’ own assets must be tempered by the awareness that these individuals, although once wealthy, had most of their net worth tied up in AIG stock. My point here is that well-advised claimants might want to focus on trying to figure out how to maneuver cases toward settlement as soon as possible with the least possible additional defense expense. Not that I have a dog in this particular fight, I’m just saying …

 

Bloomberg reporter Thom Weidlich has a May 11, 2009 article about the interpleader action, here.

 

Mayday, Mayday!: Readers may be interested to know that Hank Greenberg just celebrated his 85th birthday on May 4. Everyone here at The D&O Diary wishes Hank a belated Happy Birthday.

 

And speaking of May anniversaries, with a May 24 inception and expiration date for the insurance policy at issue in this dispute, is it possible that the AIG D&O insurance program is up for renewal once again in just a few days?

 

Pertinent to the possibility of an impending AIG D&O insurance renewal during the month of May, I note that, according to Wikipedia (here), the universal distress signal "mayday" is a derivation of the French expression "m’aider," short for "venez m’aider," meaning "(you) come help me."

 

By now, it is well-established that the recent heightened securities lawsuit filing activity has been largely concentrated in the financial sector. However, litigation involving companies in other sectors has by no means gone away. In addition, recent filings suggest that while the plaintiffs’ lawyers have been concentrating on the financial sector, a backlog of actions against other companies may have been piling up, and that the plaintiffs’ lawyers are now getting around to working off the backlog by initiating long-deferred cases against companies outside the financial sector.

 

The most recent example of this apparently postponed activity against nonfinancial companies involved the online auction company, Bidz.com. As reflected in their May 7, 2009 press release (here), plaintiffs’ counsel has initiated a securities class action in the Central District of California against the company and one if its officers. Though the case was just launched this past week, the purported class period runs from August 13, 2007 to November 26, 2007. That is, the proposed class period ends more than a year and half before the case was filed.

 

The Bidz.com action joins several other recently filed securities class action lawsuits filed against nonfinancial companies where the end of the proposed class period is well before the date on which the cases were first filed.

 

For example, the securities class action first filed in the Southern District of New York on April 28, 2009 against fashion apparel company Liz Claiborne and certain of its directors and officers (about which refer here) has a proposed class period of February 28, 2007 through April 30, 2007. The proposed class period end is nearly two full years prior to the date on which the action was finally commenced.

 

In addition, in the securities action first filed on April 14, 2009 in the Southern District of New York against Coach, Inc., the fashion accessory and leather goods company, the class period proposed runs from January 23, 2007 to October 22, 2007 (refer here for background about the case).

 

These cases join other securities suits filed earlier this year against nonfinancial companies in which the filing date came considerably after the proposed class period end. The Sprint Nextel action (here), first filed on March 10, 2009, has a proposed class period of October 26, 2006 through February 27, 2008. The Rackable Systems case (here), first filed on January 16, 2009, has a proposed class period of October 30, 2006 through April 4, 2007.

 

At one level, there may be nothing remarkable about the timing of these actions’ filings, given the applicable statute of limitation (refer here), which allows actions to be brought up to two years after the discovery of the alleged fraud. These lawsuits are in that sense by no means "stale."

 

But as a practical matter, it is noteworthy that these lawsuits are only now arising, in some cases as much as nearly two years after the supposed revelation of the underlying events. Particularly when these cases are viewed collectively, there is a definite suggestion that these cases may have been deferred while plaintiffs’ lawyers were preoccupied with other things.

 

All of which raises the possibility that while the plaintiffs’ lawyers were caught up in the litigation frenzy concentrated in the financial sectors following the subprime meltdown and the credit crisis, they were also building up a backlog of deferred cases against other companies, to which they are now finally getting around.

 

Of course, this flurry of apparently belated activity against nonfinancial companies could be purely coincidental. Time will tell. The challenge in the interim for D&O underwriters is that the perennial problem of assessing the continuing litigation risk for a company that had some adverse news some time ago may be even trickier now. It is always difficult to know for sure when a company that has had a problem is "out of the woods," and with the possibility that plaintiffs’ lawyers may now be working off a backlog, this assessment may be dicier than ever.

 

The suggestion that plaintiffs’ lawyers may be working off a backlog of cases against nonfinancial companies raises the possibility that the focus of securities litigation activity in coming months may shift to companies outside the financial sector. And as I recently noted (here), the mounting number of corporate bankruptcies may also drive litigation activity outside the financial sectors. Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not these apparent trends will continue to emerge. But the prospect for increased securities litigation involving nonfinancial companies is certainly one of the critical issues to watch as the year progresses.

 

Climate Change and D&O Issues: Regular readers know that I have in the past written extensively (more recently here) about the possibility of a growing D&O exposure arising from climate change-related disclosure issues. My good friend Carol Zacharias, General Counsel of ACE Professional Risks, has written an article published in the Spring 2009 issue of The John Liner Review entitled "Climate Change is Heating Up D&O Liability" (here) that provides a comprehensive overview of the topic, including a review of related litigation that has already arisen.

 

Along with her many interesting observations, Zacharias concludes that "the question is no longer whether there will be actions arising out of how a company and its leadership assess, quantify, and disclose climate change risks, but rather how extensive the litigation will be and when it will be lodged against directors and officers."

 

Hat tip to Mason Power at MAPO Online (here) for the link to the article.

 

Several of the lawyers for the plaintiffs in the Bisys Group securities lawsuit are concerned with the whereabouts of more than $9 million from the $65.8 fund established in connection with the settlement of the case.

 

As reflected in the transcript of the April 20, 2009 hearing before Southern District of New York Judge Jed Rakoff (here), in response to a question from the court about the missing $9.3 million, counsel for plaintiffs’ attorney Gene Cauley (sole signatory on the settlement fund escrow account) reported that “the funds are presently unavailable to be delivered,” and when asked why, counsel responded by saying that “if I go into anymore detail, I think I might violate a privilege against self-incrimination.”

In response, Judge Rakoff said that “it appears not unlikely… that Mr. Cauley may have committed a crime or several crimes” and that “he may have committed disbarrable conduct in one or many ways.” Judge Rakoff also said that he was drawing the inference from Cauley’s taking the Fifth that “Mr. Cauley has either misappropriated or otherwise misallocated these funds” and that because of that possibility, Rakoff “asked the U.S. Attorney to have someone here today.” There was in fact an AUSA in the courtroom at the hearing, and Rakoff observed that “I trust there will be a prompt investigation of this matter by the U.S. Attorney’s office.”

When the Bisys Group litigation settled in October 2006, Cauley’s former law firm, Cauley Bowman Carney & Williams, was a co-lead counsel in the case and appointed as custodian for the settlement fund. Cauley was designated as sole signatory on the escrow account in which the funds were deposited.

Rakoff had ordered distribution of the settlement funds to the class plaintiffs through a class action settlement administrator, AB Data. The class funds were to be provided to administrator in a series of payments, the last of which, in the amount of $9.3 million, was to have taken place on April 2, 2009. Apparently Cauley advised A.B. Data that the funds for the April 2 installment were invested in a 90-day Treasury bill and that the funds would be available by April 8. However, the $9.3  million is yet to be provided to A.B. Data.

On April 15, several of the lawyers from Cauley’s former firm, now part of a firm called Carney Williams, faxed Rakoff a letter advising him of the situation. Though Rakoff was out of the country at the time, he directed his law clerk to convene a joint conference call, in which Cauley apparently declined to participate. Rakoff then issued an order requiring Cauley’s appearance at the April 20 hearing.

At the April 20 hearing, Rakoff ordered the funds that have been deposited so far with the settlement administrator to be distributed to the plaintiff class.

In a WSJ.com Law Blog post about these remarkable circumstances here, Cauley’s counsel is quoted as stating with respect to the missing $9.3 million that Cauley is “working to be able to find the money and to pay it in 90 days.” The lawyer also said that Cauley “expects to make everyone 100% whole.”

Judge Rakoff closed the April 20 hearing with a brief peroration reflecting on the unusual circumstances in the Bisys Group case: “When I hear people cracking lawyer jokes, I always take umbrage and point out that the profession of Lincoln, the profession of Madison and Jefferson often represents the highest ideals in our society. But recent events give me pause about how true that is.”

Cauley was the subject of a past, somewhat colorful WSJ.com Law Blog post (here), which makes for even more interesting reading in light of these more recent circumstances.

Special thanks to a loyal reader who also forwarded me a copy of the hearing transcript.

On May 7, 2009, a jury in the Northern District of Illinois entered a mixed verdict finding in plaintiffs’ favor on several counts in the Household International securities fraud securities class action lawsuit, a long-running case with overtones of the current subprime meltdown. Background regarding the case can be found here.

 

The verdict form the jury entered (which can be found here) is quite complex and very detailed. The jurors were asked to make specific findings with respect to 40 allegedly false and misleading statements. The jury found in favor of the defendants with respect to 23 of the statements. However, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to 17 of the statements. Table A to the verdict form identifies and assigns a number to each of the 40 statements.

 

As detailed in by Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here), the jury found that all four defendants acted recklessly with respect to the 16 statements on which the jury found in favor of plaintiffs. In addition, with respect to an additional statement (Statement No. 14), two defendants (Household and former Chairman and CEO William Aldinger) were found to have acted knowingly, one defendant (Gary Gilmore, the former Vice-Chair of Consumer Lending was found to have acted recklessly, and one defendant (David Schoenholz, the former CFO and COO) was found not liable.

 

 

With respect to the recklessly misleading statements, the jury assigned 55% of the responsibility to Household; 20% to Aldinger; 20% to Schoenholz; and 10% to Gilmer.

 

 

The jury found that from March 23, 2001 (the date of Statement No. 14, with respect to which two of the defendants were found to have acted knowingly), the allegedly misleading statements inflated Household’s share price by as much as $23.94.As the class period progressed, however, the amount of inflation the jury found changed; it ranged between $23.94 a share and negative $4.66 a share. (Negative share inflation is a puzzling concept that I am sure will have to be sorted out at a later date.)

 

 

The available record does not explain how these findings will translate into damages. However, as discussed in press coverage at the time the trial commenced (here), the case was bifurcated with liability issues to be tried first and damages to be tried later if necessary. Apparently there will be further proceedings, based on the jury’s findings in the initial phase, the fix the amount of damages.

 

 

Significance for Current Subprime Cases?: The verdict in the Household case arguably has significance with respect to many of the cases filed in connection with the current subprime litigation wave. Even though the Household case was initially filed in 2002, it involved allegations in connection with representations about residential real estate lending practices.

 

In their complaint, the plaintiffs had alleged that during the class period, the defendants concealed that Household "was engaged in a massive predatory lending scheme." The plaintiffs had alleged that Household "engaged in widespread abuse of its customers through a variety of illegal sales practices and improper lending techniques." Household also reported "false statistics" that were intended to "give the appearance that the credit quality of Household’s borrowers was more favorable that it actually was." The plaintiffs allege that the "defendants’ scheme" allowed them "to artificially inflate the Company’s financial and operational results."

 

In the third quarter of 2002, the company took a $600 million charge and restated its financial statements for the preceding eight years, and in October 2002, the company announced that it had entered into a $484 regulatory settlement regarding its lending practices. On November 14, 2002, the company announced that it was to be acquired by HSBC Holdings. (In recent months, HSBC’s results have been significantly affected by losses in the subprime mortgage portfolio it acquired in the Household deal and its chairman has publicly admitted that "with the benefit of hindsight, this is an acquisition that we wish we had not undertaken.")

 

Securities Lawsuit Trials Are Very Rare: Trials in subprime related securities class action lawsuits are extremely rare. According to data compiled by the Securities Litigation Watch (here), only 21 cases have gone to trial since the PSLRA was enacted in 1995. Only seven of those 21 cases involved conduct that occurred after the PSLRA’s enactment.

 

Two recent high profile securities class action trials involved JDS Uniphase and Apollo Group. As noted here, on November 27, 2007, the jury in the JDS Uniphase trial returned a defense verdict. The Apollo Group trial initially resulted in a January 2008 plaintiffs’ verdict and an award of $277.5 million in damages, but as detailed here, on August 4, 2008, the judge granted the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, which set aside the jury verdict. A detailed discussion of the two cases can be found here.

 

Not only are verdicts susceptible to post-trial motions, but they are also susceptible to reversal on appeal, as happened in connection with the defense verdict in the Thane International case, where the Ninth Circuit overturned the jury verdict on appeal and ordered a new trial (about which refer here). The retrial in the Thane case resulted in a defense verdict.

 

With the inclusion of the Household International verdict and adjusting for the post-trial motion in the Apollo Group case and the post-appeal verdict in Thane, the scoreboard for the seven post-PSLRA trials – as adjusted for post-trial proceedings–  now stands at three wins for the plaintiffs and four for the defendants.

 

Analysis: While there are further procedures yet to go, the verdict in the Household case nevertheless represents a significant development. The subprime overtones in the case and the defendants’ connection to financial giant HSBC guarantee that the verdict will be very high profile, and it could well cast a shadow over the many other more recently filed cases where questionable lending practices are involved. It is unlikely that many other litigants will be encouraged to push their cases to trial, but the settlement potentially could influence settlement discussions in the other cases.

 

The way that plaintiffs might try to use the Household verdict in the current litigation can be clearly discerned in the statement from Patrick Coughlin, whose firm Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins represented the plaintiffs in the Household case. Coughlin states that “The jury’s verdict is a victory for the million of Americans suffering as a result of deceptive predatory lending practices and a victory for all investors fighting for greater corporate transparency, honesty and integrity. “

 

Andrew Longstreth of AmLaw Daily has a May 7, 2009 article about the Household verdict, here.

 

Securities Litigation Update: On Friday May 8, 2009, I will be participating in a webinar sponsored by Advisen in which Advisen’s finding regarding 1Q09 securities lawsuit filings will be discussed. The hour-long webinar, which is free, will begin at Noon EDT. Registration for the webinar is available here. Advisen’s report on first quarter filings can be accessed here.

 

Though the subprime and credit crisis-related securities litigation wave is now well into its third year, relatively few of the cases have yet settled or otherwise finally been resolved. However, the parties to one of the securities lawsuits filed in the earliest stages of the litigation wave have announced that they have settled the case, in a development that potentially may have significance for the many other pending cases.

 

On May 5, 2009, Beazer Homes announced (here) the settlement of the securities lawsuit that had been filed in the Northern District of Georgia in March 2007 against the company and certain of its directors and officers. In the settlement, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice and release all claims against the defendants in exchange for the payment of $30.5 million. According to the press release, the settlement is to be “funded from insurance proceeds” on behalf of the Company and the individual defendants and “there will be no financial contribution by the Company.” The settlement agreement is subject to court approval.

 

 

As reflected in the May 5, 2009 memorandum the plaintiffs’ filed in support of their request for judicial approval of the settlement (here), the settlement apparently also applies to the company’s auditor, Deloitte and Touche, which had been named as a defendant in the case.

 

 

Beazer Homes is a residential home builder that also provided home loan and mortgage finance services to home buyers. As reflected at greater length here, in quick succession in March 2007, the company announced the resignation of its CFO and that the company had received inquiries regarding its mortgage lending practices. The company’s share price declined and plaintiffs filed several securities class action lawsuits. On May 12, 2008, Beazer restated its financial statements for the previous nine years.

 

 

As reflected in their amended complaint, the plaintiffs’ alleged that the audit committee of the company’s board concluded that the company’s mortgage practice violated certain federal and/or state origination requirements and also discovered accounting and financial reporting errors or irregularities that required restatement because of improper accumulation of reserves, improper revenue recognition and other accounting and financial misstatements. The plaintiffs allege that the company’s disclosures during the class period had misled investors about the company’s origination practices and financial condition.

 

 

Relatively few of the many subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits filed to date have yet been settled or otherwise resolved to date. (A complete list of the subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements, dismissals, and dismissal motion denials can be accessed here.) The outsized Merrill Lynch settlement (about which refer here) is noteworthy for its sheer size, but otherwise may have relatively little to say about many of the other pending cases that involve relatively smaller companies, and relatively smaller investment losses. In this context then, the Beazer Homes settlement may be significant for a number of reasons.

 

 

First, the case appears to have been settled before the court had ruled on the plaintiffs’ motions to dismiss. Particular cases may settle for any number of reasons, so that fact that the Beazer Homes case settled prior to the dismissal motion ruling may or may not imply anything about other cases – but nevertheless, the settlement prior to dismissal motion ruling does at least raise the possibility for other cases. Along those lines it should be noted that the memorandum the plaintiffs filed in support of their request for settlement approval reports that the parties settled the case as a result of mediation in April 2009, while the dismissal motions were fully briefed by not yet argued.

 

 

The Beazer Homes case is also significant because it represents a substantial settlement funded entirely with proceeds of the company’s insurance. If the number of aggregate dollars required to resolve the many other pending subprime and credit cases is extrapolated out from the Beazer settlement, the implied resulting figure – even allowing for the likelihood that a substantial number of the cases will be dismissed – is potentially huge. There have in fact been some noteworthy estimates of the likely aggregate cost to the insurance industry required to resolve all of these cases; whether or not these estimates ultimately prove accurate, the Beazer settlement suggests at least for now that the final resolution of these cases could in the aggregate required some truly impressive sums from insurers.

 

 

All of that said, there are some material attributes of the Beazer case that might suggest that its settlement may not necessarily be representative of what to expect from other subprime and credit crisis cases. The first is that the company’s own audit committee concluded that it had violated certain applicable mortgage origination laws. The second is that (at least according to the amended complaint) the company remains under investigation from governmental and regulatory authorities, including the SEC. These circumstances may distinguish Beazer from many of the other cases that have been drawn into the subprime and credit crisis litigation wave, and to that extent at least the settlement may or may not provide a useful indication of likely future settlements in other cases.

 

 

I have in any event added the Beazer Homes settlement to my list of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements and other case resolutions, which can be accessed here.

 

 

Delaware Amends Corporations Code to Address Indemnification and Advancement Concern: As I noted in an earlier post (here), in a March 2008 decision in the Schoon v. Troy case, the Delaware Chancery Court raised concerns when it held that a subsequent board may retroactively eliminate the advancement rights of a prior director.

 

 

As explained in the April 2009 issue of the Tressler, Soderstrom firm’s Special Lines Advisory (here, see page 3), the Delaware legislature has now amended Section 145 of the state’s General Corporation code to provide that “rights to indemnification may not be eliminated after the date an act giving rise to a claim takes place, unless a corporation’s indemnification provisions expressly preserve the right to retroactively eliminate the individual’s right to indemnification as permitted by the court in Schoon.“ The amendments are effective August 1, 2009.

 

 

Special thanks to my good friend Joe Monteleone for providing me with a copy of his firm’s memo.

 

 

Elliptically Speaking Awards (Euphemism Category): I might have considered this a bad parody if I had not seen for myself that this is an actual press release on the website of Nokia Siemens Networks. On November 11, 2008, the company announced (here) the following update on its “synergy-related headcount-adjustment goal.”

 

 

Nokia Siemens Networks has completed the preliminary planning process to identify the proposed remaining headcount reductions necessary to reach its previously announced synergy-related headcount adjustment goal. … To date, the company has achieved an adjustment of more than 6,000 employees and continues to expect a total synergy-related adjustment of approximately 9,000 employees. …Simon Beresford-Wylie, chief executive officer of Nokia Siemens Networks, [said] “With the successful completion of these plans, we will have the vast majority of the synergy-related headcount reductions completed and we can then start to put this chapter of our history behind us and focus on creating a world-class company.”

 

 

The proposed headcount adjustments are a result of merger-related synergies, including changes to the product portfolio; site optimization; streamlining of various functions; strategic, long-term R&D and workforce balancing; and other factors designed to build a competitive Nokia Siemens Networks. “We have now completed the preliminary planning necessary to identify the specific areas where we have additional synergy-related reduction needs,” said Bosco Novak, head of human resources at Nokia Siemens Networks. “It is our goal to engage constructively with employee representatives in Finland, Germany and other countries to quickly and fairly achieve these needed changes so we are able to remove the ongoing uncertainty that our employees have about synergy-related headcount reductions.”

 

 

Hat tip to Harper’s Magazine, which reproduced the press release in its May 2009 issue (here).

 

As the subprime meltdown has become a more generalized economic crisis, the adverse consequences have moved far beyond the residential real estate sector where the trouble first began. Until recently, however, the worst effects were concentrated in the financial sector. But as Chrysler’s recent bankruptcy filing shows, the turmoil is no longer limited to the finance sector alone. The infiltration of the credit crisis into the larger economy not only threatens a rise in bankruptcies, but could also include increased bankruptcy-related securities litigation, much of which may be outside the financial sector.

 

An indication of how these developments might arise can be seen in the securities class action lawsuit filed in the Northern District of Texas on April 30, 2009, against certain former officers of Idearc, Inc. A copy of the complaint can be found here. Idearc "manages and delivers print, online and wireless publishing and advertising services on multiple platforms," including yellow and white pages, online directories and search services. Idearc itself filed for protection under the U.S. bankruptcy laws on March 3, 2009, and so is not named as a defendant in the securities lawsuit.

 

The complaint alleges that in 2006 and 2007, the company had "touted" its credit and collection policies and procedures, which it claimed had resulted in a steady decline in its bad debts. However, the complaint alleges, during 2007, the company "relaxed" its credit policies "in order to increase the dollar amount" of reported revenue.

 

The complaint further alleges that the company, "by selling to non-creditworthy customers, effectively reported tens of millions of dollars of sales that it otherwise would not have reported while accumulated tens of million of dollars of uncollectible receivables." However, the complaint alleges, in mid-2008, the company admitted that it had relaxed its credit policies in 2007, and "began to write off these uncollectible receivables in a piecemeal fashion over several quarters."

 

The complaint alleges that by year end 2008, the company had written off $47 million of receivables, which among other things "materially contributed to the company’s need to file for bankruptcy protection." The complaint alleges that investors were misled by the company’s disclosures regarding its credit and collection policies and procedures as well as by the piecemeal revelation of its company’s growing problems with receivables collections and reserve for bad debts.

 

As the economy sours, many companies – including companies outside the financial sector, like Idearc – are likely to experience increasing difficulties realizing the anticipated benefits from customer, vendor or counterparty obligations. By the same token, reduced economic activity may render many companies unable to meet their own obligations to their creditors, suppliers and others.

 

As these problems accumulate, other companies will find it necessary to seek protection under the bankruptcy laws. The officers and directors of many of these bankrupt companies, like those at Idearc, may find themselves the target of a post-filing securities class action lawsuit. Another recent example of a post-filing bankruptcy lawsuit involves former directors and officers of MRU Holdings, about which I previously wrote here.

 

The increase of these kinds of bankruptcy related lawsuits may be the means by which the current wave of subprime and credit crisis-related litigation spreads outside the financial sector. In its recent quarterly report on securities litigation (here), Advisen suggested that "it is likely that the wave of subprime-related suits, and in particular suits filed against financial services companies, will crest in 2009." The report goes on to suggest that "as bankruptcies rise through the economy, hitting all sectors, and securities suits are filed as a consequence, suits filed will become more dispersed …broadly affecting all sectors."

 

More Failed Banks: In what is now a standard weekend ritual, this past Friday evening the FDIC closed three more banks, bringing the year to date total number of failed banks to 32. The three banks closed this Friday night were: Silverton Bank of Atlanta, Georgia, which prior to its closure had assets of $4.1 billion, making it the fifth largest bank to fail since the beginning of 2008 (further details about the bank can be found here); Citizens Community Bank of Ridgewood, N.J. , which had assets of $45.1 million (refer here); and America West Bank of Layton, Utah, which had assets of $299.4 million (refer here).

 

Silverton is the sixth Georgia bank to be closed this year and the eleventh since January 1, 2008, the highest total for any state during either of those two periods.

 

In light of their relatively small size, both Citizens Community Bank and America West Bank qualify as community banks. As I recently noted (here), the 2009 bank failures have largely involved these kinds of smaller community banks. Indeed, 27 of the 32 banks that have failed so far this year have involved financial institutions below $1 billion in assets, which is one standard measure of community banks.

 

Silverton was quite a bit larger than these community banks, and it is also somewhat unusual in that Silverton did not take deposits from the general public or make loans to consumers. Silverton was a wholesale bank, providing services, according to the Wall Street Journal (here), to one in every five banks in the country. Silverton was known as the Bankers Bank until last year. Its customers, depositors and investors are all banks. Banks that had invested in Silverton will incur losses as a result of its failure, which could pose problems other banks.

 

The FDIC’s complete list of failed banks since October 2008 can be found here. The Wall Street Journal has a nifty interactive table of all the failed banks here, which can be sorted by name, closure date, asset and deposit size, and other factors. (The Journal’s list does not yet include Citizens Community Bank and America West Bank.)

 

Speakers’ Corner: On Monday, May 4, 2009, I will be in New Orleans at the spring meeting of the Casualty Actuarial Society, participating on a panel entitled "An Update on the Credit Crisis and Related Issues for D&O Insurers." The panel will be chaired by Joe Lebens of the Towers Perrin firm, and will include Stephanie Plancich from NERA Economic Consulting and David Bradford from Advisen. More information about the session and the conference can be found here.

 

Securities class action lawsuits filings are on pace to make 2009 the most active for securities class action filings in years, according to Advisen’s May 1, 2009 Securities Litigation Quarterly (here). According to the report, there were 67 securities class action lawsuits in the first quarter of 2009, up from 56 a year earlier. The first quarter filings represent an annualized filing rate of 268 securities class action lawsuits, which would not only represent a significant increase over 2008 but would even be greater that the "relatively litigious year of 2004."

 

My own analysis of the first quarter 2009 securities class action filings can be found here.

 

The overall purpose of the Advisen report is to analyze "securities lawsuits" in the first quarter of 2009. As used in the Advisen report, the term "securities lawsuits" refers not just "securities class action lawsuits," but also includes SEC enforcement actions, state court fiduciary duty cases, and even lawsuits filed in non-U.S. courts.

 

In addition, the report uses yet a different term – "securities fraud lawsuits" – as a subset of "securities lawsuits," to describe SEC enforcement proceedings and other regulatory actions.

 

So in the report "securities class action lawsuits" and "securities fraud lawsuits" are each separate and distinct subcategories of the larger category of "securities lawsuits."

 

According to the Advisen report, filings in the broadest category — "securities lawsuits" — were up significantly in the first quarter of 2009, with 169 of these actions, compared with only 125 in the fourth quarter of 2008, and 134 in the first quarter of 2008. These filings (which, again, represent a broader category than just "securities class action lawsuits") were significantly increased by Madoff-related lawsuit filings, which represented 30% of all the "securities lawsuits" in the first quarter. The report notes that "2009 might end up as a year with a heavy front-end load of lawsuits" due to the "flurry of Madoff-related cases" in the first quarter.

 

Using its own categorization, the report notes that fewer of the "securities cases" plaintiffs are filing are "securities class action lawsuits," and that plaintiffs increasingly have been filing securities lawsuits alleging common law torts, contract law violations, and breach of fiduciary duties." The report speculates that plaintiffs’ counsel may be pursing these alternatives in order to be able to proceed in state court and to avoid having their case consolidated with the larger class action suit.

 

With respect to "securities lawsuits" other than "securities class action lawsuits," the enforcement and regulatory actions that the report categorizes as "securities fraud lawsuits" accounted for 34 suits filed in the first quarter, up from 19 in fourth quarter of 2008, but down from 54 in third quarter of 2008. The "securities fraud lawsuits" filed in first quarter of 2009 represent an annualized filing rate136 cases, flat with 2008 but down from 175 in 2007.

 

Other types of "securities lawsuits" other than "securities class action lawsuits" filed in the first quarter of 2009 were: breach of fiduciary duties (26), collective actions in non-US courts (20), derivative shareholder actions and other derivative cases (14), and others (8).

 

The Advisen report notes that suits against financial firms dominated the "securities lawsuit" filings in the first quarter. The report notes that 117 out of the 169 "securities lawsuits" filed (or 69%) in the first quarter involved financial services firms (including insurance companies). These financial services claims fall in four basic groups: the Madoff-related claims; subprime and credit crisis-related claims; specialist improper trading claims; and Stanford Group-related claims.

 

With respect to the subprime and credit crisis-related claims, the report suggests that these claims "will crest in 2009," adding that "as bankruptcies rise through the economy, hitting all sectors, and securities suits are filed as a consequence, suits filed will become more dispersed…broadly affecting all sectors."

 

The report notes that many of the cases will not only potentially trigger D&O insurance policies, but "may also trigger coverage under errors and omissions (E&O) and fiduciary liability policies" which is true with respect to may of the Ponzi scheme cases as well as with to some of the subprime and credit crisis-related cases.

 

First Quarter Report Webinar: On Friday May 8, 2009, at Noon EDT, I will be joining David Bradford and Jim Blinn of Advisen for a free one-hour webinar to discuss the findings in the Advisen quarterly report and to discuss the implications for the liability insurance market. Registration for this free webinar is available here.