It was possible to overlook it amongst the flurry of high profile opinions the Supreme Court released on the final day of the 2009 court term, but on June 28, 2010 the Court granted yet another petition for writ of certiorari in a case arising under the securities laws. Although the case arises out of the specific context of a mutual fund market timing case, it raises fundamental issues about who may be a "primary violator" under the securities laws. The Court seems poised to delve yet again into critical issues under the federal securities laws.

　

Background

Janus Capital Group (JCG) is the holding company for a family of mutual funds. Janus Capital Management (JCM) is the funds’ investment advisor. In November 2003, JCG investors filed a complaint in the District of Maryland alleging that the two firms were responsible for misleading statements in the certain funds’ prospectuses. The allegedly misleading statements represented that the funds’ managers did not permit, and took active measure to prevent, "market timing" of the funds. The investors claim they lost money when market timing practices JCG and JCM allegedly authorized were made public.

 

In 2004, JCM reached a settlement with the SEC in connection with the market timing allegations in which the firm paid a disgorgement of $50 million and an additional $50 million in civil penalties. Information regarding the settlement can be found here.

 

The district court dismissed the shareholders suit in May 2007. The shareholders appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In a May 7, 2009 opinion (here), the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that the shareholders had adequately stated a claim under the securities laws. The defendants’ filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on June 28, 2010.

 

Issues Involved

As the Supreme Court itself recently affirmed in its Stoneridge case (about which refer here), there is no private action for aiding and abetting liability under the federal securities laws. Accordingly, the defendants can be liable if at all if they are "primary violators," that is, if they are directly responsible for the allegedly wrongful conduct. The Janus entities contend that as mere service entities for the actual funds, they cannot be held primarily liable.

 

The plaintiffs argue that JCM was not a "mere service provider" contending that the firm handles all of the funds’ operations, "including preparation, filing, and dissemination of the Fund prospectuses and prospectus statements" and that all of the funds’ officers were executives at the advisor. The investors contend that they had every reason to believe that the Fund prospectus statements were JCM’s work.

 

The Fourth Circuit ruled that "a service provider can be held primarily liable in a private securities fraud action for ‘helping’ or ‘participating’ in another company’s misstatements." The Fourth Circuit’s ruling is at odds with the decisions of other Circuit courts. Some courts hold that only someone that "makes" a statement and has it attributed to him can be held liable as a primary violator. Other courts, similarly to the Fourth Circuit, have held that someone that "substantially participates" in the activities that led to the creation of the allegedly misleading statement can be held liable as a primary violator, even if the statement is not attributed to him or her.

 

Discussion

Though this case nominally is just about whether or not a service provider can be held liable, fundamentally it is about who can be held liable as a primary violator. A bright line test would limit primary violator liability to those who speak or who have statements attributed to them. However, a broader "substantial participation" test would substantially widen the scope of persons who potentially could be held liable. The scope of liability could potentially extend to a wide range of persons who are involved in the preparation of public statements, including, for example, potentially even the issuers’ attorneys and accountants.

 

Indeed, at some level, this "substantial participation" test starts to sound a lot like the "aiding and abetting liability" that the Supreme Court had rejected in connection with private lawsuits in the Stoneridge case. That may, in fact, be why the Supreme Court took up the case – not just to reconcile an apparent split in the Circuits, but to align the principles of primary violator liability with those of the secondary violator jurisprudence. In a June 29, 2009 Am Law Litigation Daily article (here), Susan Beck furhter develops these issues relating to the tension between the Fourth Circuit’s standard and the case law relating to secondary liabiltiy.

 

I have absolutely no way of knowing how this case ultimately will turn out, and indeed the case has yet to be fully briefed or argued. But if I were a betting man, I would bet that the principles on which the Fourth Circuit based its decision are unlikely to survive Supreme Court scrutiny. (I could also be wrong, which is why I don’t gamble.)

 

It is worth noting that the Court suddenly seems particularly keen to take up securities cases. As I recently noted here while discussing the Court’s cert grant in the Matrixx Intiaitves case, there was a time when the Court would go many terms without taking up any securities cases. For several years now, the Supreme Court has taken up one or two securities cases. The Court’s increased interest in securities cases make great blog fodder, but it also creates the potential for disruptive alterations of the settled litigation landscape.

 

The Court’s sudden heightened interest in securities cases must be particularly unnerving for plaintiffs’ lawyers as the Court, with its current lineup, has generally proven to be less than entirely plaintiff friendly. There is some considerable risk that the Janus case will provide yet another opportunity for the Court to deliver an opinion the plaintiffs’ bar finds unhelpful.

 

In any event, the Supreme Court will now have two potentially significant securities cases on its docket next term. I really do find it surprising, given this blog’s topical focus, how often I find myself writing about Supreme Court-related issues –especially lately. I never expected that. I do find it all very fascinating though

 

Special thanks to the several readers who sent me links and other materials about this case. Special thanks to the SCOTUS Wiki blog (here) for links to some of the key documents to which I linked above.

 

Surprising Stuff Under the Hood of the Financial Reform Act: In recent posts (most recently here) I noted the possibility that the Supreme Court’s decision in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case could well trigger Congressional action, particularly with respect to the SEC’s authority over conduct in the U.S. even if the transaction occurred outside the U.S.

 

An alert reader who clearly has a lot of patience managed to sift through the thousands of pages of the Conference Committee version of the financial reform bill (the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act," which can be found here), and he reports (and my review of the Bill confirms) that the Conference Bill actually addresses the extraterritorial question.

 

First, Section 929P(b) authorizes an action brought by the Commission, inter alia, based on "conduct within the United States in furtherance of the violation," in effect allowing the Commission to take enforcement action based on conduct in the U.S. even if the transaction took place outside the U.S. (if all the provision’s conditions are met).

 

Second, Section 929Y, entitled "Study of Extraterritoral Private Rights of Action," directs the Commission to study whether private rights of action should be allowed on the same basis as authorized for the Commission in Section 929P(b). The provision directs the Commission to deliver the report to Congress within 18 months of the statute’s enactment.

 

In other words, if the Bill is enacted in its current form, the Commission will have the ability to bring cases involving foreign companies and even involving transactions outside the U.S., if the conduct meets the standards defined in the provision, and the Commission will study and report to Congress on whether private claimants should have the same right.

 

Very special thanks to the alert reader who found these provisions and pointed them out to me.

 

Bank Shot: Regular readers know I have been reporting frequently on the possibility of litigation arising in the wake of the wave of failed banks. The July 2010 issue of U.S. Banker has an article entitled "First the Failures, Then the Lawsuits" (here) which takes a very interesting look at this possibility.

 

The article reports that the FDIC "has begun laying the groundwork for potentially years of lawsuits against senior executives and directors it claims may have been responsible for their bank’s collapse." The article notes that the FDIC has sent "hundreds of demand letters," which the article describes as "the necessary first steps in assessing accountability."

 

Among other things, the article reflects a dispute over who the FDIC is targeting with the demand letters. On the one hand, the article quotes the executive director of the American Association of Bank Directors as saying that the "where there’s money to go after," the FDIC is pursuing the claim, "whether there is a good case or not." On the other hand, the article quotes an agency attorney as saying "How far we go depends on the facts and circumstances of each case…If … there’s nothing there, then we close out the investigation."

 

The article points out that while the FDIC has not filed any director or officer lawsuits during the current crisis, "but observers say that will likely change soon," particularly in light of the three-year statute of limitation. One attorney is quoted as saying we may start to see the suits in 2011 with more in 2012.

 

The article quotes an agency official as saying that the purpose of the demand letters "is simply to preserve insurance," adding that "we try to make enough of a preliminary investigation to make sure that when we send the letter we’re sending it to the right people and we have a basis for the claim."

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending a link to the article.

One of the recurring D&O insurance coverage issues is the question of excess D&O insurers’ obligations when the underlying insurers have paid less than their full policy limits as a result of a compromise between the underlying insurers and the policyholder.

 

In the latest of a growing line of recent cases examining these issues, Judge Wayne Anderson of the Northern District of Illinois, in a June 22, 2010 opinion applying Illinois law, held that the "plain language" of the excess D&O insurance policies at issue required the actual payments of full policy limits in covered claims before the insureds could access the excess insurance.

 

Background

During the relevant period, Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation carried a total of $50 million in D&O insurance arranged in five layers of $10 million each, between a primary insurer and four excess insurers. Bally and certain of its directors and officers were named as defendants in a securities class action lawsuit (about which refer here) in connection with which Bally incurred $33 million in defense expenses, for which Bally sought coverage under from its D&O insurers.

 

The primary insurer initiated an action in the Northern District of Illinois seeking a judicial declaration of noncoverage. Bally joined the excess insurers to the action as third-party defendants. Ultimately the primary insurer and the first and second level excess insurers reached a compromise by which they agreed to contribute a total of $19.5 million toward Bally’s defense expenses. The first level excess insurer settled for $8 million, $2 million less than its full policy limit. The second level excess insurer settled for $1.5 million.

 

The third and fourth level excess insurers refused to settle or otherwise contribute toward Bally’s defense expense. These two excess insures argued that the conditions precedent to coverage in their excess insurance policies had not been triggered. In making this argument, the third level excess insurer relied on its policy’s language that its payment obligations are triggered "only after the insurers of the Underlying Policies shall have paid, in the applicable legal currency, the full amount of the Underlying Limit." The fourth level excess insurer relied on language in its policy specifying that its payment obligations apply "only after all Underlying Insurance has been exhausted by payment of the total underlying limit of insurance."

 

The Court’s June 22 Opinion

In his June 22 opinion, Judge Anderson granted the third and fourth level excess insurers’ motions for summary judgment, finding that the plain language of their policies requires that the underlying insurers each "make actual payments of $10 million each in covered claims before Insureds can access coverage provided by the Third and Fourth Layer Excess Policies."

 

The insureds had argued that the third and fourth level excess policies were "ambiguous" as to whether the underlying policies had to make actual payment of a full $10 million each to trigger the top level excess carriers’ coverage. The insureds argued that the third and fourth level excess carriers had contracted to pay claims in excess of specified levels "regardless of who makes payment for covered claims" below those levels.

 

Judge Anderson considered the case law on which the insureds relied, particularly the 1928 Second Circuit decision in Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.. In examining this line of cases, Judge Anderson concluded that "if an excess insurance policy ambiguously defines exhaustion, as in Zeig, courts generally find that settlement with an underlying insurer exhausts the underlying policies." However, Judge Anderson went on, "in cases where the policy language clearly defines exhaustion, the courts tend to enforce the policy as written."

 

Judge Anderson went on to find that the third and fourth level excess policies clearly defined how the underlying insurance must be exhausted prior to the insureds accessing coverage. Accordingly, and because the underlying insurance had not been exhausted by the underlying insurers’ payment of covered loss, Judge Anderson granted summary judgment in the third and fourth excess insurers’ favor.

 

Discussion

As a result of rising settlement levels and escalating defense costs, excess D&O insurance has become increasingly important in D&O claims resolutions. As more and more claims get pushed into the excess layers, more and more questions are arising, including this recurring question of whether the excess carriers’ payment obligations are triggered when the policyholder has compromised with the underlying carriers.

 

Judge Anderson’s holding in the Bally Total Fitness case joins a line of several recent cases in which courts have similarly held that, given the excess policy language at issue, the excess carriers’ payment obligation were not triggered when the underlying carriers paid less than their full policy limits as a result of a compromise with the policyholder. These recent cases include the July 2007 Eastern District of Michigan decision in the Comerica case (about which refer here) and the March 2008 California intermediate appellate court decision in the Qualcomm case (about which refer here).

 

The outcome of these various coverage disputes is a direct reflection of the excess policy language involved, and in particular the language specifying what is required in order for excess insurers’ payment obligations to be triggered. These cases underscore the critical importance of the language describing the payment trigger in the excess policy.

 

In recent months, and in large part as a reaction to these cases, excess carriers increasingly have been willing to provide language that allows the excess carriers’ payment obligations to be triggered regardless whether the underlying amounts were paid by the underlying insurer or by the insured. (I note as an aside that this language was not generally available at the time that Bally Total Fitness purchased the D&O insurance at issue in this case.)

 

The potential importance of the excess insurance payment trigger language, and the availability of language alternatives in the current insurance marketplace, in turn underscores the importance for policyholders of involving a knowledgeable and experienced D&O insurance broker in their acquisition of D&O insurance. The presence of the most favorable excess trigger language, among many other critically important policy language issues, could make a significant difference in the availability of coverage in the event of a claim.

 

Speedy Justice: According to Judge Wayne Anderson’s official biography (here), the Judge is the co-holder of the record for the 100-yard dash at Harvard University, from which he graduated in 1967.

　

　

In a June 28, 2010 decision (here), the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board case. This case had been widely followed because the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

 

The petitioners prevailed before the Supreme Court, and a majority of the Court held that restrictions on the removal of PCAOB board members were unconstitutional, but the Court declined to hold either that the Sarbanes Oxley Act itself or the PCAOB are unconstitutional. The net effect is that Sarbanes-Oxley remains fully operational, other than the provisions governing the removal of PCAOB members.

 

Background

This case arises out of a dispute involving a small Nevada accounting firm, Beckstead and Watts. In September 2005, the PCAOB disclosed that it was investigating the firm and that it had found "deficiencies" eight of sixteen of the firm’s audits. In response, the firm sued the PCAOB and the federal government, seeking an order blocking the PCAOB from taking any further action. The firm was joined in the action by the Free Enterprise Fund, which according to its website, is a nonprofit advocacy group "dedicated to fighting the so-called Sarbanes-Oxley law."

 

The plaintiffs contended that in creating the PCAOB in the Sarbanes Oxley Act, Congress set up a private corporation that exercised governmental authority. The plaintiffs argued that this arrangement and in particular SOX’s statutory provision for the SEC’s appointment of the PCAOB’s five members, and more particularly specifying that the members can only be removed by the Commission for just cause, contravened the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution by conferring wide-ranging executive power on Board members without subjecting them to Presidential control.

 

In a March 21, 2007 decision, Judge James Robertson of the District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, and on August 22, 2008, the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal. The Circuit Court later denied an en banc review, and the plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which the Court granted.

 

An excellent summary of the background regarding the case and the parties’ arguments can be found on the SCOTUSWiki site, here. My prior post about the case can be found here.

 

The Supreme Court’s Opinion

In a 5-4 majority opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court focused on the Sarbanes Oxley’s Act’s provisions for the removal of the PCAOB members. The removal provision provides that members can only be removed by the SEC Commissioners for good cause shown and then only pursuant to rigorous procedural requirements. The Court said the arrangement "not only protects Board members from removal except for good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether that good cause exists."

 

The result of what the Court described as "a second level of tenure protection," in the form of the procedural requirements, is that the Commission "cannot remove a Board member at will" and the President therefore "cannot hold the Commission fully accountable." This arrangement, the majority found, is "contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President." The majority opinion added:

 

By granting the Board executive power without the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed – as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts. The Act’s restrictions are incompatible with the Constitution’s separation of powers.

 

However, having found a provision of Sarbanes Oxley Act to be unconstitutional, the majority drew back from finding either the entire Act or the PCAOB itself to be unconstitutional. The Court found that the "unconstitutional tenure provisions are severable from the remainder of the statute" and that even if board removal provisions violate the Constitution, the "existence of the Board does not." The Act itself "remains fully operative as a law with these tenure restrictions excised," since the "remaining provisions are "not incapable of functioning independently."

 

The majority opinion reversed the Court of Appeals opinion in part and remanded the case for further proceedings.

 

A dissenting opinion written by Justice Breyer asserted that the removal provisions violated no separation of power principles and contended that the majority’s ruling "threatens to disrupt severely the fair and efficient administration of the laws" because it is inconsistent with the structure of many administrative agencies.

 

Discussion

Though the majority found a portion of the Sarbanes Oxley Act to be unconstitutional, its holding was about as limited and as nondisruptive (at least as to the continued operation of the Act) as might be hoped for, given the finding of constitutionality. Certainly the finding that Act remains otherwise fully operational fell well short of the plaintiffs’ objective so trying to have the entire Act set aside.

 

Indeed the relief provided seems like pretty weak beer. The majority said only that "petitioners are not entitled to broad injunctive relief against the Board’s continued operations. But they are entitled to declaratory relief sufficient to ensure that the reporting requirements and auditing standards to which they are subject will be enforced only by a constitutional agency accountable to the Executive."

 

The Court’s refusal to declare the entire Act unconstitutional, despite finding one part to be unconstitutional, might have surprised and disappointed some advocates and Court watchers, who, as discussed here, had contended that the absence from the Act of a "savings clause" preserving the rest of the statute if one part was disallowed, should have required the entire Act to be found improper. The Court clearly strained to avoid this result, relying on prudential and precedential principles to steer clear of a disruptive result that arguably might otherwise have been required by absence of a statutory savings clause.

 

As the Conglomerate blog commented, the majority opinion "illustrated how to hold an agency to be unconstitutional without really doing anything important at all." CFO.com quotes one commentator as saying that the decision against the PCAOB "was about as gentle a finding as you could expect." The Volokh Conspiracy blog said "The Court drew a line in the sand to safeguard executive power and ensure greater accountability, but did so without picking much of a fight."

 

The net effect of the Court’s holding is that the SEC now may remove the PCAOB board members at will, rather than having to go through the removal procedures that had been defined in the Sarbanes Oxley Act. The SEC issued a statement after the opinion was published in which the SEC said that "the Act ‘remains fully operative as a law’ with the for-cause restrictions excised, leaving the members of the PCAOB subject to removal by the Commission without restriction. The opinion does not call into question any action taken by the PCAOB since its inception." 

 

Professor Stephen Bainbridge has an interesting commentary on his eponymous blog (here) commenting that he is "unpersuaded" by the majority opinion, agreeing with the dissent that there is nothing about the effective result of the Court’s ruling that actually validates the President’s actual right or authority to oversee the PCAOB.

　

In a nice piece of ironic timing, the Court released its opinion in the case on the first day of the Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan. The Court’s ruling represents a defeat for Kagan, who as Solicitor General had argued the case for the government. (A transcript of the oral argument in the case can be found here.)

 

As I discussed in a recent post, on June 23, 2010, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion reinstating the $277.5 million jury verdict in the Apollo Group securities class action lawsuit. In my post discussing the opinion, I included some observations about the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and the likely future course of the Apollo Group case, as well as about the current state of play on post-PSLRA jury trials in securities class action lawsuits in general.

 

Over the weekend, Tower Snow of the Howard Rice law firm sent me a note commenting on my observations. Because I think Tower makes a number of interesting points, I asked his permission to reproduce his observations on this blog. Tower very graciously gave me permission, and the text of his email is reproduced in indented text below.

　

Although I rarely disagree with what you post on the blog, I do disagree with the conclusions you draw re where the Apollo case is heading.

　

The Ninth Circuit reversed based on the concept that the market may have failed to appreciate the significance of earlier disclosures and that any earlier disclosures may not have been of sufficient intensity and credibility for the market to understand them. Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the jury could properly conclude that the disclosure at issue was "corrective."  These are alien concepts to economists and the efficient market theory.

　

There is a vast universe of economic studies and literature which incontrovertibly shows that the financial markets are incredibly efficient (and sophisticated) and absorb and properly evaluate new information entering the markets in a matter of minutes. There is no respected economic literature which supports the idea that markets sometimes "fail to appreciate the significance" of negative information or that markets may be misled by disclosures because they are not of sufficient "intensity or credibility" to be fully understood. To the contrary, all the studies conclude the opposite.

　

The courts can’t rely on the efficient market theory for purposes of creating a rebuttable presumption of reliance for purposes of class certification and then ignore its underpinnings for purposes of evaluating loss causation. Either one embraces the theory or one does not. If one embraces it, then once it is established that the prior disclosures revealed the truth about the allegedly misstated or omitted information, there is nothing left for the jury to decide. The later disclosure, by definition, cannot be corrective, as the market already had absorbed the information. Here, the "corrective" disclosure came out seven days after the information had been previously released. Seven days is an eternity in the financial markets.

　

The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue because it had not heard the evidence. When it did, the court properly concluded that the "corrective" disclosure was old news. It was, and it could not under well established economic doctrine have caused plaintiffs’ losses. The district court got it right.　

　

This case has a good chance of eventually making its way to the Supreme Court. If it does so, the defendants will win. Loss causation is too important an issue, and the lower courts are all over the map in applying the efficient market doctrine in different contexts. Either the efficient market theory has to be embraced and applied consistently, as economists apply it, or it should be thrown out.

　

For what it is worth, I also come to a different conclusion re Post-PSLRA trial results. Although your win/loss numbers are correct, when one takes into account post plaintiff-verdict settlements and plaintiff verdicts in the context of the damages sought, plaintiffs have done very poorly. What the trials show is that juries view investing as a high risk game, they hold investors accountable for their actions and losses, and they are not inclined when seeing individual officers and directors– absent very compelling evidence — to easily conclude that  they engaged in fraud. Couple these dynamics with plaintiffs’ fear of post-trial adverse rulings, the dangers of appeals, the time delays, and a host of other factors, and it becomes apparent that even a plaintiff "win" often turns into a loss. I personally doubt whether either the Apollo or Vivendi verdict will survive.　

 

I would like to express my thanks to Tower for taking the time to send a detailed commentary and for his willingness to allow me to reproduce it here. I welcome submissions from responsible persons who are interested in proposing guest posts for publication on this blog. I am in any event always interested in hearing what readers think.

　

It was obvious from the first reading that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank represents a sweeping victory for the defendants. As I noted in my initial post after the decision came down, the Court’s holding that plaintiffs can’t pursue fraud claims for securities purchased on foreign exchanges will have a significant impact both on pending cases and on future filings.

 

On further reflection, it seems the case could have even more significant implications.

 

First, with respect to pending cases, it is worth noting that Vivendi itself believes, as I suggested in my prior post, that National Australia Bank ruling has significant implications concerning the jury verdict entered against the company in January 2010. Indeed, Vivendi issued a June 25, 2010 press release (here), in which it said that the company is "very satisfied" with the decision, commenting further that the Court’s ruling is "totally in line with the position defended all along by the Group in the American and French Courts."

 

According to prior press reports (here), as many as two-thirds of Vivendi’s investors live in France, and undoubtedly many of them, as well as many of Vivendi’s other investors that reside outside the United States, likely bought their shares on securities exchanges outside the United States. Under the transactional test the Court enunciated in the National Australia Bank decision, investors who bought their share on non-U.S. exchanges cannot pursue a claim under U.S. securities laws. It seems likely that the class of persons entitled to claim injury in the Vivendi case necessarily will be dramatically narrowed.

 

There are many other pending cases that are likely to be similarly affected. In a June 25, 2010 AmLaw Litigation Daily article (here), Andrew Longstreth examines the likely impact of the National Australia Bank case on the securities class action litigation filed under U.S. securities law against BP and certain of its directors and officers. BP’s common shares trade on the London Stock Exchange, and though many investors likely bought American Depositary Receipts for BP on U.S. exchanges, many of its shareholders more likely bought their shares in the U.K. (The AmLaw article notes that 28% of BP’s equity is in ADRs, so those shares are unlikely to be affected by the Supreme Court’s recent decision.)

 

Other cases that are likely to be affected by the Supreme Court’s decision include the action brought against Porsche, which was sued in January 2010 by short sellers of Volkswagen stock who claimed Porsche secretly cornered the market in Volkswagen shares but denied that it intended to acquire Volkswagen. According to a June 25, 2010 Bloomberg article (here) discussing the impact of the National Australia Bank decision on the Porsche case, the plaintiffs claims in the case are likely reduced only to "causes of action based on low-volume American depositary shares."

 

A number of foreign-domiciled companies that have been the target of securities class action litigation under U.S. securities laws filed amicus briefs in the National Australia Bank case; the cases filed against many of these companies, including EADS and Alstom, seem likely to be substantially affect by the Court’s holding.

 

Other recently filed cases also seem likely to be affected, including the cases recently filed against Toyota,

 

Securities suits against foreign companies have in recent years been a significant part of overall securities lawsuit filings in recent years. For example, 24 (or 12.7%) of the 2009 securities lawsuit filings involved companies that are domiciled outside the United States. In 2008, there were 34 foreign domiciled companies sued in securities class action lawsuit, or about 15% of all filings that year.

　

Not all of these securities suits are necessarily going to be affected by the National Australia Bank case. For example, the lawsuit filed earlier this year against Nokia was at the very outset brought only on behalf of investors who bought their American Depositary Shares in the company on U.S. exchanges. Similarly the lawsuit filed late last year against Siemens was brought solely on behalf of purchasers of the company’s American Depositary Receipt shares.

 

The fact that cases against foreign companies with securities trading on U.S. exchanges may still be susceptible to securities class action litigation in U.S. court because their securities trade on U.S. exchanges could well discourage some overseas companies from having their shares trade here.

While there will still be circumstance even after National Australia Bank in which securities suits in U.S. courts against foreign-domiciled companies will still be filed and will still go forward, it seems probable that many other cases that might have been filed in the past will now simply go unfiled, at least in the U.S — particularly in those cases where the foreign companies do not have significant numbers of ADRs or other securities trading on U.S. exchanges.

 

Given what a significant percentage of total U.S.-based securities class action filings these actions against foreign companies have become in recent years, the reduction in these filings could mean a material reduction in the overall level of securities class action filings (although please see my comments below about some other possibilities for U.S.-based litigation.)

 

The fact that investors who bought shares on foreign exchanges can no longer access U.S. courts clearly creates a problem these investors. As the filing levels described above demonstrate, these investors increasingly had come to rely on the U.S processes and remedies as a way to seek redress when they felt they had been misled, at least where the alleged fraud involved U.S-based conduct.

 

Indeed, numerous foreign institutional investors had filed amicus briefs in the National Australia Bank case (refer for example here), arguing that "both foreign and domestic investors alike rely on American Law to ensure that corporations doing business in America are not tainted by fraud."

 

Now that these investors can no longer "rely on American Law" in many instances, these investors will have to consider their alternatives. One possibility is that these investors will increasingly rely on remedies in their own country. Without access to U.S. courts, these and similarly situated investors may find action in their domestic courts more attractive.

 

For that matter, without access to U.S remedies and processes, investors in foreign countries may press for the implantation of legal reforms in their home countries to permit them better means of attempting to recoup losses based on alleged fraud.

 

Of course, resourceful plaintiffs’ lawyers in this country are now highly motivated to try to find ways around the National Australia Bank decision. Some possible ways it might be circumvented include filing individual lawsuits in state court under state law, and filing federal court class actions alleging state law violations. Claimants in these kinds of cases arguably may face the same hurdles of trying to show that the relevant law provides remedies regarding securities transactions on foreign exchanges, but the existence of U.S.-based fraudulent conduct potentially could provide a sufficient basis for relief under many legal theories, even if not under the federal securities laws.

 

Another possibility is that the foreign institutional investors and others may seek legislative change in the U.S. in order to establish a new statutory basis for relief in U.S. courts for investors who bought shares overseas, at least where there is U.S.-based conduct involved in the alleged fraud. As I pointed out in my prior post, legislative initiatives in the current Congress proposed to do that very thing.

 

As Luke Green points out in his post on the Risk Metrics Securities Litigation blog (here), the National Australia Bank case does not carve out an exception for the SEC and the DoJ, and there may be considerable interest providing statutory means for these agencies to pursue remedies for U.S.-based fraudulent conduct even if in connection with transactions on foreign exchanges. (Green also has a number of other interesting thoughts and comments about the decision.)

 

UPDATE: An alert reader points out that in the Conference Committee of the financial reform bill (called "The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act", here ) there are provisions addressing these questions of extraterritoriality. First, Section 929P(b) authorizes an action brought by the Commission based on a statutorily defined conduct and effects test. Second, Section 929Y directs the Commission to study whether private rights of action should be allowed on the same basis as authorized for the Commission in 929P(b). The Commission is to report to Congress within 18 months of the statute’s enactment.

 

The bottom line is that National Australia Bank is an important decision that will have a number of significant impacts, some immediately and some in the months and years to come. Some of the impacts are obvious and apparent now, and some will only become apparent over time.

 

The National Australia Bank case does underscore how significant it is when the U.S. Supreme Court decides to take up a securities case. Each occasion represents a context within very significant changes in the interpretation or application of the U.S. securities laws potentially could occur, as proved to be the case here. Full consideration of this possibility makes it all the more interesting and potentially significant that the Supreme Court recently agreed to hear the Matrixx Initiative securities suit. This development raises the possibility for even further landscape altering case law from the U.S. Supreme Court in its next term.

 

It’s Not Over Yet, Folks: While it is not too early to start looking ahead to the Supreme Court’s next term, it is also worth noting that this current term is not yet complete, as the Court has yet to issue decisions in four high profile cases. As noted on the WSJ.com Law Blog (here), these four decisions are likely to be issued on Monday, June 28, 2010.

 

Among the four cases yet to be decided is Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, which will address the question whether it was appropriate for Congress to give authority to the SEC to name the members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The case raises basic questions about the separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches and potentially could address the question of the constitutionality of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.

 

Depending on how the Court rules, this case could potentially be very significant, particularly if the Court reaches the constitutionality question. As the WSJ.com Law Blog comments, "If the justices agree that the accounting board isn’t constitutional, it could force Congress to revisit Sarbanes-Oxley, or at least the portion of it that creates the accounting board. It could also call into question other independent agencies and how they appoint members of similar boards."

 

More World Cup Notes:

1. A tip of the hat to the Ghanians, who played with speed, skill and opportunism and did what they had to do to win an exhausting, exciting game.

 

2. A final salute to the Americans, too, who played all four of their games with heart and class and who are going home simply because there is a limit to how many times a team can come from behind. Landon Donovan’s winning goal in extra time last Wednesday against Algeria is one of the great moments of this World Cup.

 

3. England’s fans have to be beside themselves over Frank Lampard’s disallowed goal late in the first half of their game against Germany. On the other hand, as unjust as the disallowance was, England pretty much got beat, by a clearly better team. .

 

4. The Mexicans have a legitimate gripe about Argentina’s first goal on Sunday. Carlos Tevez was clearly offsides. However, poor officiating had nothing to do with the total defensive breakdown that allowed Gonzalo Higuain’s goal for Argentina’s second score, and the Argentiines’ third goal was a magnificent strike from Tevez. The Germany/Argentina game next week should be terrific.

 

5. If, as seems likely at this point, FIFA spends the next four years trying to figure out how to improve  the offciating at the next World Cup, I hope they will also take a hard look at ways to better enforce the rules against embellishment. Too many players seem more inclined to flop than to play. It really is revolting.

 

6. The French don’t have to worry about anybody disrespecting them, because there’s really no need — the French have done such a masterful job of it themselves. The Irish can be excused for any pleasure they might be taking from the French team’s embarrassment.

 

In a long-awaited ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court on June 24, 2010 issued an opinion affirming dismissal of the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case. Among other things, the Court’s opinion will limit securities claims by investors who bought their shares on foreign exchanges. This ruling could have a dramatic impact on many pending cases as well as on future filings.

 

Background

NAB is Australia’s largest bank. Its shares trade on securities exchanges in Australia, London, Tokyo and New Zealand. Its American Depositary Receipts trade on the New York Stock Exchange. NAB has a mortgage servicing subsidiary, HomeSide, based in Florida. In 2001, NAB disclosed that it was taking a significant write-down due to a recalculation of the amortized valuating of HomeSide’s mortgage servicing rights. Following this announcement, the price of NAB’s shares and ADRs declined, and investors filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York.

 

The claim was initially brought by four plaintiffs. One of the four purported to represent domestic purchasers of NAB’s securities. The three other plaintiffs bought their shares abroad and sought to represent a class of non-U.S. purchasers. Background regarding the case can be found here.　

 

On October 25, 2006, the District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. The District Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign claimants claim. The court dismissed the domestic plaintiff’s action for failure to state a claim because the domestic plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered damages. The three foreign plaintiffs appealed. The domestic plaintiff’s claim was not before the Second Circuit, and so the appellate court was exclusively concerned with the jurisdictional issue.

 

As discussed at greater length here, on October 23, 2008, the Second Circuit ruled (here) that U.S. courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of foreign claimants in that case who bought their NAB shares on a foreign exchange and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. The Second Circuit found that the U.S. based conduct was not sufficient to support jurisdiction under the Circuit’s long-standing two-part test measuring whether there were sufficient domestic actions or effect to support jurisdiction. The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari.

 

The Supreme Court’s Opinion

In an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding, but overturned decades of jurisprudence on the question of the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. securities laws, holding that the U.S. securities laws do not apply extraterritorially.

 

The opinion opens with a recitation of the "longstanding principle of American law" that "when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none." The opinion notes that despite this presumption, the Second Circuit over the course of many years developed an extensive body of case law intended to "discern" when Congress would have wanted the statute to apply. The opinion notes that "the Second Circuit never put forward a textual or even extratextual basis for these tests."

 

The opinion completely rejected this entire body of case law and the two-part test on which the Second Circuit had relied in this case, noting that "the results of this judicial-speculation-made-law – diving what Congress would have wanted if it had thought the situation before the court –demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects."

 

The majority opinion rejected the arguments of the claimants and of the Solicitor General (that would be Solicitor General Elena Kagan, the current Court nominee) that the securities laws contained statutory support for extraterritorial application, finding that "there is no clear indication in the Exchange Act that Section 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not."

 

The opinion also specifically rejected the argument that the domestic conduct was sufficient to support jurisdiction, observing that "it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States."

 

What matters is not where alleged deceptive conduct occurred but where the securities were purchased:

 

The focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the deception originated but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States. Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered."

 

Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that "only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which Section 10(b) applies."

 

The Court also noted another reason for rejecting a standard that would allow jurisdiction for securities cases solely on the basis that the deceptive conduct took place in the U.S. That is, "some fear that [the U.S.] has become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for lawyer representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets."

 

Because this case "involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners who still have live claims occurred outside the United States" the Petitioners have "failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted" and the Court therefore affirmed the dismissal.

 

Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in part in the opinion and concurring in the judgment, saying in effect it was sufficient for him that the securities involved in this case were not purchased in the U.S.

 

Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion, joining in the judgment, by rejecting the majority’s "transaction test." He would not have rejected the Second Circuit’s two-prong test, saying that the Second Circuit has "refined its test over several decades and dozens of cases, with the tacit approval of Congress and the Commission and with the general assent of its sister Circuits."

 

Justice Sotomayor did not take part in the case.

 

Discussion

The Supreme Court’s opinion in the NAB case seems to put an end to the so-called "f-cubed" cases – that is, claims brought in U.S. courts under U.S. securities laws by foreign domiciled claimants who bought their share in foreign companies on foreign exchanges. Indeed, the opinion seems to sound the death knell for any would-be claimants under the U.S. securities laws who bought their shares on foreign exchanges.

 

The opinion would seem to have very significant implications for the many pending cases in which the claims of claimants who bought shares on foreign exchanges are involved. Among other very high profile cases, the Vivendi case, which involved primarily foreign domiciled claimants and recently resulted in a plaintiff’s verdict, would seem to be subject to substantial reconsideration in light of this opinion. (UPDATE: At least one reader has raised the question whether the Court’s holding will or even can be applied retroactively. to damages suffered before and purchases made before. I am not sure general prohibitions on retroactive application apply here, as this decision is about the basic reach of the securities laws, but I thought it was worth noting this question here.)

 

The Supreme Court’s transactional test would also seem to suggest that we have seen the end of filings in U.S. court against foreign companies, except those whose shares are traded on U.S. securities exchanges. (UPDATE: One reader has noted that the "except" clause in the prior sentence does raise the question about whether there might still be jurisdiction over "f-squared" cases, that is those that involve either foreign domiciled companies and foreign investors who bought their shares on U.S. exchanges, or foreign domiciled companies and U.S. investors who bought their shares on foreign exchanges. The first of these two categories seems to meet the test of the NAB case, the second category is a more interesting question. In any event these kinds of issues will have to be sorted out in lower courts in the wake of the NAB decision.)

 

My concern with that possibility is that it could lead foreign companies to decide not to list their shares on U.S. exchanges, or to delist their shares, as a way to avoid the burden and expense of U.S.-based litigation exposure.

 

It is entirely possible that this entire debate will now shift to Congress. Indeed, during the current Congressional term, there were specific proposals to incorporate a version of the two-prong test directly in the securities laws. While these proposals had been languishing, it is possible that the NAB opinion could give these proposals new life.

 

While Congress might now reconsider these proposals, one portion of the NAB opinion might weigh against these kinds of statutory revisions. The majority opinion specifically refers to the arguments of many foreign countries in amicus briefs that the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws would result in "interference with foreign securities regulation." These concerns and the requirements of comity, which are detailed in the majority opinion, could well weigh against the legislative reform.

 

But in any event, the Supreme Court’s opinion in the NAB case must now be applied in the lower courts. There are dozens of cases pending in the lower courts involving claimants who purchased their shares on foreign exchanges. These claimants will now be scrambling to try to establish some basis for their cases to be preserved notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in the NAB case. However, it seems probable that the foreign purchasers’ claims are likely to be dismissed. This will have significant implications for Vivendi and many other pending cases.

 

Andrew Longstreth’s June 24, 2010 Am Law Litigation Daily artice about the decision can be found here.

 

Many thanks to the several loyal readers who send me copies of the Supreme Court’s opinion.

 

　

In a terse June 23, 2010 ruling (here), the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s post-trial ruling that set aside the $277.5 million jury verdict in the Apollo Group securities class action lawsuit, and remanded the case for "entry of judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict."

 

Background

Apollo Group is the parent of the University of Phoenix (UOP), the largest for-profit provider of higher education in the United States. According to the plaintiff’s amended complaint (here), in 2003, two former UOP employees filed a False Claims Act action against UOP alleging that UOP received U.S. Department of Education funding in violation of laws specifying the way company educational recruiters may be compensated.

 

The Department of Education initiated an investigation of the issues raised in the False Claims Act action, and on February 5, 2004, a Department of Education employee issued a "Program Review Report" that accused UOP of violating the Department of Education rules with respect to education employees’ compensation. The plaintiff in the securities case alleges that the violations in the report could have resulted in the limitation or termination of Department of Education funding to UOP.

On September 7, 2004, Apollo agreed to pay the Department of Education $9.8 million to settle the program review. The settlement agreement (a copy of which can be found here) specified that Apollo’s entry into the agreement did not constitute an admission of wrongdoing or liability. News of the allegations in the Department of Education report first became public on September 14, 2004. The price of Apollo’s stock fell significantly on September 21, 2004, when a securities analyst issued a report expressing concern about the company’s possible exposure to future regulatory issues. Plaintiff shareholders subsequently initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the District of Arizona.

 

On January 16, 2008, a civil jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff class on all counts, awarding damages of $277.5 million. Under the verdict, Apollo is responsible for 60 percent of the plaintiffs’ losses, former Apollo CEO Tony Nelson is responsible for 30 percent, and former CFO Kenda Gonzales is responsible for 10 percent. The jury verdict is discussed at greater length here.

 

As discussed in greater length here, on August 4, 2008, Judge James Teilborg of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona entered an order (here) granting the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, based on his finding that the trial testimony did not support the jury’s finding of loss causation. Judge Teilborg’s order vacated the judgment and entered judgment in defendants’ favor.

　

Judge Teilborg had held in connection with the parties’ pre-trial cross-motions for summary judgment that the issue whether the analyst reports constituted "corrective disclosure" sufficient to support a finding of loss causation was a question for the jury.

 

In its post-trial motion, Apollo argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding that the analyst reports represented "corrective disclosure," because they did not contain any new fraud-revealing information. Judge Teilborg found that "the evidence at trial undercut all bases on which [the plaintiff] claimed the (analyst) reports were corrective."

 

Accordingly, the court concluded that although the plaintiff "demonstrated that Apollo misled the markets in various ways concerning the DoE program review," the plaintiff "failed to prove that Apollo’s actions caused investors to suffer harm." The court therefore concluded that "Apollo is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

 

The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion

In its June 23, 2010 opinion, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the district court "erred in granting Apollo judgment as a matter of law." The opinion states that "the jury could have reasonably found that the (analyst) reports following various newspaper articles were ‘corrective disclosures’ providing additional or more authoritative fraud-related information that deflated the stock price."

 

The Ninth Circuit further held that Apollo is not entitled to a new trial and that there is no basis for remittitur (reduction of the verdict). The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with "instructions that the district court enter judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict."

　

Discussion

Given the procedural development of this case so far, there may be no reason to assume that the June 23 ruling by the three-judge panel represents the case’s final stage. The defendants undoubtedly will seek rehearing and/or rehearing en banc, and given the stakes involved, the defendants may well seek Supreme Court review. However, the likelihood of the defendants obtaining rehearing or rehearing en banc, much less convincing the Supreme Court to take up the case, seems like a remote possibility. The defendants may continue to agitate, but they may be running out of options.

 

With the reinstatement of the plaintiffs’ verdict in this case, and the entry of the jury verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor in the Vivendi case, the securities class action jury trial scoreboard is looking more favorable to plaintiffs.

 

According to data included in the 2009 NERA year-end securities litigation study (about which refer here), and adjusted for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Apollo Group and for the verdict in Vivendi, the securities lawsuit jury verdict scoreboard shows as follow: since the enactment of the PSLRA, there have been 23 securities class action lawsuit that have gone to trial, of which 16 have gone all the way to verdict. Of those 16 cases, nine have resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs in whole or in part, and six have gone in favor of the defendants.

 

Data from Adam Savett of the Claims Compensation Bureau (here) show that there have now been nine cases filed post-PSLRA involving conduct occurring after the enactment of the PSLRA that have resulted in jury verdicts or bench decisions at trial. Of these nine, five have gone for the plaintiffs and four have gone for defendants.

 

Plaintiffs have to be heartened by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the Apollo Group case. But notwithstanding this development, and for many reasons, trials in securities lawsuits still are likely to remain extremely rare.

 

A June 23, 2010 Bloomberg article by Thom Weidlich and Emily Heller about the Ninth Circuit’s opinion can be found here.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.

 

Self-Restraint:  I considered captoning this post "Apollo — "Oh No!" but thought better of it.

　

While many courts are showing a greater willingness to grant motions to dismiss in subprime-related securities class action lawsuits, some cases are surviving dismissal motions and others are settling for hundreds of millions of dollars, as a result of which the "watchword is uncertainty until a more consistent and predictable pattern emerges," according to a recent study.

 

In a June 2010 report entitled "Subprime Class Actions Revisited," Jonathan Eisenberg of the Skadden law firm examines 14 new subprime-related securities lawsuit rulings issued during the first five months of 2010. This report updates Eisenberg’s prior analysis of 16 dismissal motion rulings entered in 2009.

 

Eisenberg’s overall conclusions are that "courts are showing more evidence of subprime fatigue and a greater willingness to grant motions to dismiss even in cases that do not require proof of scienter," but while "recent trends have been more favorable for defendants, the results are by no means one-sided, and the final chapters of the subprime class action story have yet to be written."

 

Eisenberg notes that, by contrast to his earlier study, "more than half of the recent dismissals occurred in non-scienter Securities Act claims." Eisenberg also notes that courts continue to dismiss many of the Section 10(b) claims asserted in the subprime securities class action, "principally, but not exclusively, on the ground that the allegations of scienter are inadequate." Court has also found a number of the allegedly fraudulent statements immaterial as a matter of law.

　

With respect to the cases that have survived dismissal motions, the basis "overwhelmingly" are allegations related to "declining underwriting standards." In light of the numbers of cases that have survived the dismissal motions, as well as the significant dollar figures involved in some of the settlements, "while the story in the aggregate is positive for defendants, much risk remains in these cases." Overall, Eisenberg finds that he has "not found a single factor that explains the outcomes across all cases."

 

My running tally, listing (with links) dismissal motions rulings and settlements in all subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits, can be accessed here. All of the decisions referenced in Eisenberg’s article are listed with links in my tally.

 

One interesting aspect of Eisenberg’s paper is with respect to his discussion of the difficulties plaintiffs face in trying to allege that defendants were "slow to recognize the enormity of the subprime crisis." He recites data from Bloomberg’s tally of subprime-related write downs showing that "less than three-tenths of one percent of the more than $1.75 trillion of global write-downs between 2007 and 2009 occurred prior to the third quarter of 2007." The rest occurred incrementally from the third quarter from the 2009.

 

Eisenberg suggests these data show that Judges "are and should be skeptical of the types of claims that could be made against virtually any financial institution that was late to recognize the damages ultimately inflicted by the subprim tsunami."

 

Special thanks to Jon Eisenberg for providing a copy of his article.

　

As opening speaker on June 21, 2010 at the Stanford Law School Directors’ college, Southern District of New York Judge Jed Rakoff shared his views about Bank of America’s settlement of the SEC enforcement action, including some thoughts about why he approved the revised $150 million settlement of the case after he rejected the prior $33 proposed settlement. He also commented on what he hopes the significance of the sequence of events may be.

 

In August 2009, the SEC filed an enforcement action against Bank of America related to the events surrounding the company’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch. At the outset, the case related solely to omissions pertaining to the payment of bonuses at Merrill Lynch prior to the merger, although as later amended the action extended to omissions in the proxy materials relating to Merrill’s deteriorating financial condition after the merger was announced but prior to the shareholder vote.

 

In a harshly worded September 14, 2009 opinion (here), Judge Rakoff had rejected the parties initial $33 proposed settlement, finding that it did not meet the requisite standard for judicial approval, as it was "neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate." He challenged the very premise of the deal, which he said "proposes that shareholders who were the victims of the Bank’s alleged misconduct must now pay the penalty for the misconduct."

 

On February 4, 2010, the SEC announced a revised settlement of its amended enforcement action. Though the revised settlement substantially increased the cash value of the settlement, many observers at the time questioned whether the revised settlement addressed Rakoff’s numerous concerns with the initial pact. Yet Rakoff approved it, although "reluctantly."

 

In his speech at the Stanford Directors College, Judge Rakoff provided some explanation of the reasons he approved the revised deal. Among other things, he noted that the revised settlement included "specific prophylactic measures" regarding disclosures that had not been included in the initial proposal.

 

In addition, though the settlement funds would still ultimately come from Bank of America’s then-current shareholders, the funds under the revised settlement would go to Bank of America’s pre-merger shareholders, rather than to the SEC, as had been the arrangement under the initial settlement. Because about half of the post-merger shareholders had prior to the merger been Merrill Lynch shareholders, but only the pre-merger Bank of America shareholders would receive the settlement funds, the practical effect of the settlement was a "renegotiation" of the price of the merger deal.

 

Rakoff also mentioned that the day before the settlement was proposed, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo ("Hereinafter to be referred to as ‘The Candidate,’" Rakoff added) filed a state court action against Bank of America and two of its officers charging them with fraud (about which refer here). He said that "under the circumstances, he had no alternative but to examine" the material the AG had relied upon, as a result of which he concluded that the SEC’s "view of the facts was not unreasonable."

 

Rakoff added that he "really would have preferred that the case go to trial, as that would have provided an opportunity for a jury to determine what the facts were," but his role was not to determine his own preferences but rather to determine whether the proposed settlement was "fair, reasonable and adequate."

 

In commenting on what the significance of these events may be, Judge Rakoff noted that in the past SEC consent judgments have largely been free from "scrutiny" because of the generally "high regard" the judiciary has for the SEC and the "deference" the SEC is given as a result.

 

Judge Rakoff said he "harbors the hope" that the questions he raised about the Bank of America settlement may "encourage some of my colleagues in being more proactive in assessing other SEC consent judgments" as well as consent judgments in other cases. These kinds of efforts may or may not contribute to greater "efficiency" but they "will lead to greater justice."

 

In the opening keynote address on June 20, 2010 at the Stanford Directors’ College at Stanford Law School in Palo Alto, California, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro discussed the SEC’s "singular" mandate to address the needs of investors, noting the increasing challenges involved in "making sure the markets are fair and efficient."

 

Schapiro opened her speech discussing the ways that ways the agency is adopting its regulatory approach in light of rapidly changing technology. In particular, she addressed the events involved in and the consequences of the May 6, 2010 "flash crash" and the steps the agency is taking to "minimize chances it can ever happen again." Among other things, she steps the agency is taking to propose and implement "circuit breaker" rules to protect both the markets and investors from "clearly erroneous trades."

 

Schapiro also discussed the ways that technology has transformed trading activities, including for example the growth in ultra high speed trading activity. These developments and the increasing presence of dark pools trading, among other things, have led the agency to launch a series of initiatives, including new rules that would give the agency much faster and more complete access to information about trading activity.

 

Schapiro said that she appreciates the benefits and advantages that the various technological changes offer, particular those that "make markets more efficient, reduce costs, and increase liquidity." But, she added, "when these changes have the potential to destabilize markets without significantly contributing to key market functions, we believe they deserve a second look."

 

Schapiro then talked about the steps the agency has been taking as part of its mandate to protect the interests of "all investors, large and small." In later remarks during the Q&A, Schapiro underscored the importance to her and the agency of this aspect of the agency’s mission, noting that the SEC has to help investors, noting that "there is not another agency that works for the interests of investors."

 

Among other steps the agency is taking to try to advance its goals of helping investors is to reevaluate all existing corporate filing forms and disclosure requirements in order to consider what will be most meaningful to investors and what will "elicit better disclosure." She noted that these efforts may be slowed somewhat by the current financial reforms process and the likelihood of increased agency mandates will emerge from Congress, but the process to improve investor information will continue.

 

The final topic Schapiro addressed are the current reform initiatives, both within the agency and in Congress, with respect to corporate governance. She emphasized the SEC’s role is not to define what constitutes good governance, but rather to ensure that its requirements encourage "accountability and meaningful communication" about how the company is governed.

 

For example, the SEC’s role is not to mandate a particular board structure, but to ensure that investors know why a particular board structure was selected. She also emphasized that investors should have meaningful information about director candidates’ qualifications.

 

Among other specific governance issues Schapiro discussed were proxy disclosures and shareholder voting process issues. She enumerated a number of voting related issues that require further discussion, including, for example, the question whether proxy advisory firms should be subject to increasing SEC oversight and how to encourage retail investors voting participation.

 

Schapiro concluded by noting that while there agency faces many challenges, the "higher goal is a financial marketplace where investors invest capital in dynamic companies in a growing economy."

 

UPDATE: The text of Schapiro’s speech has now been posted online, here.

 

Speakers’ Corner: I am here at Stanford Law School for the conference as an interested member of the audience as well as member of the Directors’ College faculty. Tomorrow morning, I will be participating on a panel entitled "Personal Liability Risks, Indemnification and D&O Insurance." Joining me on the panel will be my good friends Priya Cherian Huskins of Woodruff Sawyer and Chris Warrior of Beazley. Though I have official responsibilities, I hope to be able to add post blog updates during the conference.