Class actions are of course much more a feature of the litigation scene in the U.S. than in the U.K, but things have been changing in recent years. The most significant initial change in direction toward collective actions in the U.K. was the adoption several years ago of “opt-out” actions in the U.K. Competition Appeal Tribunal proceedings. More recently, through its courts’ use of group litigation orders (GLOs), there has been a “surge in mass claims” in the U.K., according to a recent law memo. The result has been, according to the October 13, 2025, memo from the Skadden law firm, a “dramatic transformation” over the past decade in the U.K. of its “collective redress landscape.” The memo, which is entitled “Class Actions by the Backdoor? The Evolving Landscape of Group Litigation in the U.K,” can be found here.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) Procedures

In 2015, the U.K. Parliament enacted The Consumer Rights Act of 2015, which represented a comprehensive overhaul of the U.K.’s consumer protection and unfair trade practices laws. Among many other changes, the Act introduced an “opt-out” collective action mechanism. In particular, the Act broadens the jurisdiction of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), including through the introduction of procedures for the tribunal to hear damages claims on an “opt-out” collective action basis. The Act also includes provisions for collective settlements and collective redress schemes. 

The volume of proceedings before the CAT since the introduction of the “opt out” mechanism has been extraordinary. According to the law firm memo, the CAT “has become one of the busiest courts in the country,” with a rapidly growing docket of collective proceedings. According to a recent report in The Times, approximately 60 collective proceedings are currently listed with the CAT in London. Over 20 collective actions have been certified, with certification pending in many other cases. The total value of pending claims exceeds £160 billion (about USD210 billion).

Earlier this year, the CAT entered judgment in the long-running competition proceeding pending against MasterCard. The tribunal approved the £200 million settlement (over the objection of the litigation funder involved).

Group Litigation Orders

While the rise of CAT collective proceedings has been extraordinary, the availability of the CAT’s procedural framework is limited to alleged competition law violations. However, the possibility of collective actions outside the CAT regime has separately advanced in recent year through the High Court’s use of group litigation orders (GLOs) and joint claims. According to the law firm memo, these proceedings, which the memo calls “backdoor” class actions, often attract litigation funders, due to the possibility of aggregated damages.

 Thus, though the CAT regime is the only formal “opt-out” class action mechanism in the U.K, “group litigation is thriving through alternative routes.” According to the law firm memo, the High Court issued sixteen GLOs between 2001 and 2024. (Just an aside, the memo is a little confusing on the GLO statistics, as immediately after the memo says there were 16 GLOs between 2001 and 2024, it also says there were “125 in all since 2001.”). These collective actions involve, for example, proceedings relating to the Volkswagen dieselgate scandal and the Fundão dam collapse in Brazil.

The problem with this state of affairs, according to the law firm memo, is that it permits collective actions to proceed without “key protections against abuse,” such as initial certification requirements, suitability assessments by class representatives, and judicial scrutiny of funding arrangements. The result, the memo says, is “a system where mass claims can proceed with less oversight, raising concerns about unmeritorious or speculative claims, inconsistent outcomes and the potential for disproportionate costs and burdens on defendants.”

The memo observes the current state of affairs in the U.K. may be “more risky for defendants than the U.S.” as the U.S. class action system at least has certain procedural guardrails, such as early motions to dismiss and strict class certification standards. The U.K.’s GLO regime, when combined with third-party litigation funding, can “expose defendants to massive, complex, and expense claims with less scope for early dismissal opportunities.”

The memo observes that claimants and their lawyers, financed by litigation funds who are drawn to these kinds of collective proceedings, are “increasingly creative, seeking to expand the scope of class actions beyond competition law.” The memo cites other legal areas such as environmental claims, securities fraud, data privacy, and even “greenwashing” allegations. Defendants have tried to respond through a variety of strategies, including challenging the suitability of the class representatives, contesting funding arrangements, and pushing for early resolution or dismissal.

The upshot, according to the memo is that the U.K.’s group litigation landscape is “at a crossroads.” As claimants, their attorneys, and the litigation funders continue to innovate and expand the scope of mass claims, “the line between formal class actions and ‘backdoor’ group litigation is increasingly blurred.” There are already movements afoot to review the litigation funding regime. For defendants, “the risks are real and growing,” which will require both new strategies and a close watch on regulatory developments. What is likely next is a phase of reform that “will determine whether the U.K. can balance access to justice with the need to protect against abuse and ensure fair outcomes for all parties.”

Discussion

It could be argued that these developments should not come as a surprise. As long ago as 2019, I was raising on these pages the question of whether the U.K. was in a “new class actions era.”  It has indeed been a frequent observation on this site that an increasing number of jurisdictions, including for example the U.K. and the E.U., are inching their way towards the allowance of various class action procedures.

A number of factors are driving this movement toward the availability of collective action mechanisms. One key factor is, as noted in the law firm memo, the role of litigation funding, which is providing the necessary financing for this type of litigation.

Another factor not mentioned in the law firm memo is the role of U.S. plaintiff law firms. The movement toward collective action litigation reflects to a certain extent the increasing presence in Europe and elsewhere of US plaintiff law firms (which I have seen first-hand with my own eyes) having the particular expertise in pursuing class actions in the U.S. These firms are working closely with litigation funding firms to build “books” of claimants, using mass media and social media advertisements. In some cases, the firms are seeking to build on the success of claims in the US, seeking to export case theories and arguments directly to the UK and the EU on behalf of claimants in those jurisdictions. 

There is another, perhaps more important reason for the movement toward collective action proceedings, and that is that the availability of a group action mechanism is an increasingly necessary attribute of a complex global economy.

The fact is that complex economies require sophisticated tools to allow large numbers of related claims to be addressed and resolved efficiently. There is also a sense that the absence of these kinds of efficient mechanisms can be detrimental to consumers and other claimants. Indeed, a large driver in the move toward the adoption in the EU of collective redress mechanisms was the VW dieselgate scandal, in which US-based claimants quickly received compensation while German and other EU claimants found themselves struggling to obtain redress. 

But while the goal of efficiency and arguably even fairness may argue in favor of the adoption of collective redress mechanisms, those of us with long experience in the U.S. know that the availability of these procedural mechanisms can produce excesses as well. In some instances, class actions in the U.S. can prove to be hideously expensive for companies to defend, in ways that put economic pressure on companies to settle contrary to the merits of the dispute. The mechanisms can sometimes lead to out-of-balance outcomes, where the attorneys reap sizeable fees while harmed claimants receive little compensation. The test for the UK, the EU, and other jurisdictions as they try to adopt collective procedural mechanisms will be whether they can realize the efficiencies the collective mechanisms afford without creating the opportunities for excess.

I will say this as a long-time observer whose observational perch includes an extensive opportunity to watch developments both within and outside the U.S. that probably the single most important thing I have observed over the years has been the increasing rise of collective action mechanisms outside the U.S.

When I first started traveling outside the U.S. for professional meetings years ago, I was often the only American in the room. I became accustomed to hearing the U.S. class action procedures being vilified as excessive and distortive. The funny thing that has happened over time is that while the U.S. class action system is still ritualistically condemned, the tools and processes that many countries are adopting increasingly look like – or at least resemble in many of the key details – the U.S. class action system. Of course important differences remain. But the fact is that an increasing number of jurisdictions have found it necessary to adopt and implement mechanisms that allow for collective redress for large numbers of claimants. I expect that this evolutionary process will continue to develop in the months and years ahead.