

COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP
One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000, San Francisco, California 94104-5500
415.391.4800 • Fax 415.989.1663

1 REES F. MORGAN (State Bar No. 229899)
ANDREW SCHALKWYK (State Bar No. 287170)
2 COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP
One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000
3 San Francisco, California 94104-5500
Telephone: 415.391.4800
4 Facsimile: 415.989.1663
Email: ef-rfm@cpdb.com
5 ef-aps@cpdb.com

6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
7 RISING TIDE I, LLC; RISING TIDE II, LLC

8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
9 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
10

11 RISING TIDE I, LLC; RISING TIDE II, LLC,

12 Plaintiffs,

13 v.

14 MICHAEL FITZSIMMONS; PETER LAI;
15 CHRIS G. POWER; PETER J. GOETTNER;
16 CHRISTIAN BORCHER; ERNEST D. DEL;
17 MARC S. YI; JAMES C. PETERS; SOUHEIL
S. BADRAN; AND DAVID COWAN,

18 Defendants.

Case No.

COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

19
20 Plaintiffs Rising Tide I, LLC; and Rising Tide II, LLC, (collectively "Rising Tide" or
21 "Plaintiffs") by and through their undersigned attorneys, for their complaint against defendants
22 Michael Fitzsimmons, Peter Lai, Chris G. Power, Peter J. Goettner, Christian Borchner, Ernest D.
23 Del, Marc S. Yi, James C. Peters, Souheil S. Badran, and David Cowan (collectively
24 "Defendants") allege as follows:
25

26 **INTRODUCTION**

27 1. Plaintiffs purchased or otherwise acquired securities in Delivery Agent, Inc.
28 ("Delivery Agent" or the "Company") as a result of material misrepresentations and/or omissions

1 made by Defendants, including as directors and/or officers of Delivery Agent. This civil action is
2 brought pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §
3 78j(b), the "Exchange Act") and SEC Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). Plaintiffs also assert
4 claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

5 2. Delivery Agent is in the television-commerce space, known as "t-commerce."
6 Delivery Agent claimed that it had developed proprietary technology to connect television viewers
7 to the products they see on TV and the companies that offer those products. Delivery Agent
8 claimed that, using this proprietary technology, viewers could immediately purchase from their
9 "smart televisions" products they saw on television, or interact further with various companies by
10 accessing special features, using the television's remote control or other smart device.

11 3. From at least March 2014 through and including March 2016, Delivery Agent
12 issued and sold securities to investors, including Plaintiffs, in the form of preferred stock, stock
13 warrants, and convertible promissory notes, all with the represented goal of covering the
14 Company's short term negative cash flow ("burn rate") until it had achieved both positive cash
15 flow from operations and an Initial Public Offering ("IPO"). Defendants consistently and
16 repeatedly represented that the IPO was "imminent."

17 4. At all times relevant, Delivery Agent claimed through its officers and/or directors
18 that Delivery Agent's technology worked, that it had been proven to be accepted by and used in
19 market tests, and was proprietary. Relying on those representations, Plaintiffs purchased
20 approximately \$17 million in securities from Delivery Agent from September 2014 through and
21 including March 2016.

22 5. In actuality, Defendants were aware of, and misrepresented and/or concealed,
23 highly damaging information about the proprietary nature of Delivery Agent's core technology, the
24 functionality of its products, the success of important market tests, the trustworthiness of its most
25 senior executives, and events that made a successful IPO impossible. Specifically:

- 26 a. Delivery Agent's officers and directors failed to timely disclose to Plaintiffs
27 that a high profile demonstration of its technology in a television
28 commercial during the February 2014 Super Bowl was a complete failure
because viewers were unable to use Delivery Agent's technology to
purchase products featured in the commercial from their TVs;

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- b. Compounding this failure, Delivery Agent's officers and directors also did not timely disclose that Defendant Michael Fitzsimmons ("Fitzsimmons"), Delivery Agent's CEO, had directed Delivery Agent officers and others to purchase the products in the Super Bowl commercial once it became clear that the test run of the Company's technology had failed, and subsequently disseminated false and fabricated sales reports claiming that consumers had purchased the merchandise and that the Super Bowl advertising campaign was a success, when it was actually an abject failure;
- c. Defendants failed to timely disclose that, as a result of the Super Bowl advertisement fraud perpetrated by Fitzsimmons and others, Delivery Agent's then-auditor (the "Auditor") informed Delivery Agent that it could no longer rely on the representations of certain senior officers in its audits of the company's books, which led Delivery Agent to fire the Auditor and all but ensure that Delivery Agent could never complete an IPO and become a publicly traded company;
- d. Defendants affirmatively misrepresented the rationale for replacing the Auditor, stating falsely that the auditor change resulted from a disagreement over revenue recognition, and continued to claim that an IPO was imminent even after going public became a practical impossibility; and
- e. Defendants represented that Delivery Agent's technology functioned successfully and was proprietary, claims that were false and/or misleading.

6. In furtherance of its fraudulent scheme, Delivery Agent's officers and directors continued raising cash through securities offerings even though Delivery Agent's officers and directors knew that the Super Bowl advertisement failure and subsequent corporate cover-up were material to a reasonable investor's decision-making and all but ensured that Delivery Agent could never sell stock to the public in an IPO.

7. As a result of the events surrounding the 2014 Super Bowl test-run failure and cover-up, and the omissions and/or false and misleading statements made by Delivery Agent's officers and/or directors, Delivery Agent never went public. Without a public offering and without functioning, proprietary technology, Delivery Agent was unable to attract a buyer or raise more cash, leading Delivery Agent to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in September 2016.

8. As a result, Plaintiffs' securities are now worthless.

THE PARTIES

9. Rising Tide I, LLC ("RTI") is a Delaware limited liability corporation which purchased securities from Delivery Agent.

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1 10. Rising Tide II, LLC ("RTII") is a Delaware limited liability corporation which
2 purchased securities from Delivery Agent.

3 11. Defendant Fitzsimmons was at all times relevant Delivery Agent's Chief Executive
4 Officer and a member of Delivery Agent's Board of Directors. Plaintiffs are informed and believe,
5 and on that basis allege, that Fitzsimmons was at all times relevant a resident of California.

6 12. Defendant Peter Lai ("Lai") was at all times relevant Delivery Agent's President
7 and Chief Operating Officer until approximately January 2015 and thereafter was Delivery
8 Agent's President of Ecommerce. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that
9 Lai was at all times relevant a resident of California.

10 13. Defendant Chris G. Power ("Power") was at all times relevant a member of
11 Delivery Agent's Board of Directors and the Chairman of the Audit Committee. Plaintiffs are
12 informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Power was at all times relevant a resident of
13 Colorado.

14 14. Defendant Peter J. Goettner ("Goettner") was at all times relevant a member of
15 Delivery Agent's Board of Directors, a member of the Audit Committee, and a member of the
16 Nominating and Governance Committee. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis
17 allege, that Goettner was at all times relevant a resident of California.

18 15. Defendant Christian Borchner ("Borchner") was at all times relevant a member of
19 Delivery Agent's Board of Directors, a member of the Audit Committee, and Chairman of the
20 Nominating and Governance Committee. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis
21 allege, that Borchner was at all times relevant a resident of California.

22 16. Defendant Ernest D. Del ("Del") was at all times relevant a member of Delivery
23 Agent's Board of Directors. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Del
24 was at all times relevant a resident of California.

25 17. Defendant Marc S. Yi ("Yi") was at all times relevant a member of Delivery
26 Agent's Board of Directors and a member of the Nominating and Governance Committee.
27 Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Yi was at all times relevant a
28 resident of California.

1 18. Defendant James C. Peters ("Peters") was at all times relevant a member of
2 Delivery Agent's Board of Directors and Delivery Agent's Chief Operating Officer beginning
3 January 7, 2015. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Peters was at all
4 times relevant a resident of California.

5 19. Defendant Souheil S. Badran ("Badran") was at all times relevant a member of
6 Delivery Agent's Board of Directors. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege,
7 that Badran was at all times relevant a resident of Wisconsin.

8 20. Defendant David Cowan ("Cowan") was at all times relevant a partner at Bessemer
9 Venture Partners. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Cowan was at
10 all times relevant a resident of California.

11 21. Fitzsimmons, Lai, Power, Goettner, Borchert, Del, Yi, Peters, Badran, and Cowan
12 are herein referred to collectively as "the Defendants." Fitzsimmons, Power, Goettner, Borchert,
13 Del, Yi, Peters, and Badran are at times referred to collectively as "the Director Defendants."

14 22. The Defendants, because of their positions in and involvement with Delivery
15 Agent, had the power and authority to control the content of any of Delivery Agent's securities
16 offerings. Because of their positions in Delivery Agent and their access to the facts recited in this
17 Complaint, the Defendants knew that the securities offerings and related statements that are the
18 subject of this Complaint contained material omissions of fact that were required to be disclosed
19 and/or contained false and misleading statements. The Defendants made or caused to be made
20 those false or misleading statements and omissions. The Defendants are thus liable for the
21 omissions and false statements pleaded in this Complaint.

22 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

23 23. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 27 of the Exchange
24 Act and Section 1331 of Title 28, United States Code. The claims asserted herein arise under
25 Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.

26 24. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims asserted herein,
27 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Further, there is complete diversity and the amount in controversy
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1 exceeds the jurisdictional amount, and thus this action is also subject to the Court's diversity
2 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1332.

3 25. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the
4 securities that are the subject of this lawsuit, and the alleged omissions of material fact, as well as
5 the false and misleading statements, were made in or issued from this District. In addition, upon
6 information and belief, at least one Defendant is a resident in this District.

7 26. A substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to this action occurred in
8 San Francisco, California. This action should therefore be assigned to the San Francisco Division
9 pursuant to Civil Local Rules 3-2(c) and (d).

10 **ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS**

11 27. Delivery Agent is a "t-commerce," or television-commerce, company founded in
12 2005 that claimed to be able to connect TV viewers to the products they see on their smart
13 televisions. The core of Delivery Agent's business was a purportedly proprietary technology that
14 allowed a TV viewer directly and immediately to purchase goods, such as an article of clothing
15 appearing in a TV commercial or worn by an actor in a TV show, using a smart television's remote
16 control, a mobile device, social media, or the Internet.

17 28. From 2014 to 2016 Delivery Agent sold various types of securities to Plaintiffs and
18 other investors purportedly to raise funds in anticipation of an IPO. Plaintiffs purchased Series F
19 Preferred Stock, Series G Preferred Stock, Stock Warrants, and Convertible Promissory Notes
20 (collectively, the "Securities") from Delivery Agent.

21 29. Preferred stock is a security that gives the holder certain rights superior to those
22 who own common stock. The Series F and Series G Preferred Stock sold by Delivery Agent to
23 Plaintiffs are securities.

24 30. A Stock Warrant is a security that allows the holder of the warrant to buy stock of
25 the underlying company at a fixed price during a fixed time period. The Stock Warrants sold by
26 Delivery Agent to Plaintiffs are securities.

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1 31. A Convertible Promissory Note is a debt instrument that is convertible into equity
2 securities upon the occurrence of certain defined events. The Convertible Promissory Notes sold
3 by Delivery Agent to Plaintiffs are securities.

4 32. Delivery Agent sold the Securities to Plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation
5 D of the Securities Act of 1933, which exempts certain securities from registration. Securities
6 offerings under Rule 506 are commonly referred to as "private placements."

7 33. Plaintiffs purchased securities totaling approximately \$17,000,000 as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Security</u>	<u>RTI</u>	<u>RTII</u>	<u>Shares</u>	<u>Total</u>
9/24/14	Series F Preferred Stock	\$10,000,150		11,009,578 ¹	
4/20/15	Series G Preferred Stock		\$2,500,050	3,300,330 ²	
7/21/15	Convertible Note		\$3,500,000		
3/30/16	Convertible Notes	\$651, 805			
					\$16,652,005

16 34. All of the Securities were issued by Delivery Agent pursuant to a vote of the Board
17 of Directors.

18 35. The Series F Preferred Stock offerings were approved by a vote of Delivery Agent's
19 Board of Directors on or about March 14, 2014.

20 36. The Series G Preferred Stock, Warrants and Convertible Promissory Note offerings
21 were approved by a vote of Delivery Agent's Board of Directors subsequent to the Series F
22 Preferred Stock offerings.

25 _____
26 ¹ Included in RTI's purchase were three sets of Series F warrants totaling \$150.

27 ² Included in RTII's purchase was a Series G warrant for \$50.

1 **I. Plaintiffs' Introduction To Delivery Agent**

2 37. In or about late 2013 and early 2014, Plaintiffs began considering an investment in
3 Delivery Agent. On January 12, 2014, Plaintiffs received from the Company a "Management
4 Presentation" about the Company, dated September 13, 2013. The presentation described
5 Delivery Agent's "[p]roprietary, scalable technology platform" and its "proprietary data engine,"
6 stating that its "[p]roprietary platform enables consumers to buy through web, mobile, TV and
7 social." The Management Presentation stated that Delivery Agent allowed viewers to "[e]ngage
8 with live TV programming and purchase directly from the TV screen." The presentation also
9 described Delivery's Agent's plans for a "pre-IPO" funding round to "fund operations and general
10 corporate purposes" for "IPO readiness." It touted Delivery Agent's "[h]ighly experienced
11 management team, with strong history of innovation and industry leadership."

12 **II. Before Plaintiffs' Initial Investment In Delivery Agent, The Company's First Major**
13 **Test Run Failed Miserably, A Disaster That Management Covered Up**

14 38. As Plaintiffs were assessing their initial investment in Delivery Agent, the
15 Company was preparing for, and promoting, a high-profile, first-time test of its technology. One
16 of Delivery Agent's customers, H&M, had partnered with the Company to support a Super Bowl
17 XLVIII commercial featuring international soccer star David Beckham's H&M clothing line.
18 H&M had purchased air time for a commercial during the game, and Delivery Agent's technology
19 was supposed to allow viewers to purchase the advertised H&M clothing directly through their
20 smart televisions. Roughly 600 pieces of H&M merchandise had been reserved for the Delivery
21 Agent test run.

22 39. The Super Bowl advertising campaign for H&M was a critical test for the
23 Company and received significant publicity in the weeks leading up to the Super Bowl. The
24 Company itself issued numerous statements promoting the Super Bowl campaign, lauding the
25 interactive advertisement for H&M as a first-of-a-kind. On January 6, 2014, the Company issued
26 a press release proclaiming that the Super Bowl campaign would "change the course of the
27 television advertising industry [because] H&M will utilize Delivery Agent's t-commerce platform
28 to shop-enable their 30-second Super Bowl XLVIII ad featuring David Beckham." The press

1 release further stated that “[c]onsumers tuned into Super Bowl XLVIII . . . will have the
2 opportunity to use their remote control to engage with the advertising content and opt-in to
3 purchase products as they view the new Spring collection of David Beckham Bodywear.” The
4 release explained that “H&M is the first retailer to launch a fully enabled t-commerce advertising
5 campaign.”

6 40. The press release specifically and repeatedly quoted Fitzsimmons. He described
7 the H&M campaign as “a game-changer for the advertising industry With the upcoming
8 launch of the t-commerce-enabled H&M Super Bowl XLVIII ad, we are collectively redefining
9 the power and effectiveness of television advertising. Years ago, the world talked about the
10 potential associated with buying Jennifer Aniston’s sweater. H&M, in an industry first, will now
11 realize that potential by making their Super Bowl XLVIII ad *actionable and directly*
12 *measurable*.” (Emphasis added.)

13 41. Articles in Variety, on January 5, 2014, and AdAge, on January 6, 2014, described
14 how Delivery Agent's technology would appear in the televised Super Bowl commercial the
15 following month as a “technology first.” The articles further detailed how TV viewers would be
16 able to use their televisions' remote control to purchase items from David Beckham's clothing line
17 from H&M.

18 42. Delivery Agent released another press release on January 31, 2014 again touting
19 the upcoming Super Bowl commercial for H&M. Fitzsimmons is quoted in this press release
20 stating that the Super Bowl is “an important day for marketers to deliver and leverage their
21 investment in media in a meaningful way. [Delivery Agent’s] part of the equation is to connect the
22 viewer with the products seen on TV and provide robust analytics that combine viewership data
23 with purchase data. We believe this Super Bowl will be a watershed event for the marketers we’re
24 engaged with.” The press release further provided that the Super Bowl would involve “the launch
25 of the first fully enabled t-commerce advertising campaign powered by Delivery Agent.”

26 43. Delivery Agent’s deployment of this important technology for the first time, during
27 such a high profile event, was clearly a significant moment for the Company. The Company's
28 senior management closely monitored it in real time. During and immediately after the

1 commercial aired, it became apparent to Delivery Agent that the campaign was a flop. Most
2 viewers could not or did not make purchases using Delivery Agent's technology. This important
3 and much publicized test of Delivery Agent's technology had failed spectacularly.

4 44. As the high-profile test of the Company's technology and market feasibility
5 unraveled, Delivery Agent's senior management, including Fitzsimmons, the CEO and founder of
6 Delivery Agent, instructed Delivery Agent employees to purchase the H&M merchandise
7 themselves. Within hours of the airing of the commercial, 585 of the 600 pieces of the H&M
8 merchandise available for sale through the Super Bowl campaign had been purchased by Delivery
9 Agent employees.

10 45. Delivery Agent's deceit did not stop there. Its officers, including Fitzsimmons, then
11 misrepresented the Super Bowl campaign as a success, including by affirmatively stating that the
12 purchases had been made by the general public and not by Delivery Agent employees. Delivery
13 Agent's CEO and the then-current President and COO emailed H&M with news that Delivery
14 Agent had sold almost all of the merchandise within a very short period of time after the
15 commercial aired. They made no mention of the fact that Delivery Agent's technology had failed
16 and that almost all of the merchandise had actually been bought by Delivery Agent personnel to
17 hide that failure.

18 46. The Company also issued misleading statements to the public and potential
19 investors. The day after the Super Bowl, on February 3, 2014, Delivery Agent published a press
20 release trumpeting the success of the Super Bowl commercial and its technology. Despite the
21 debacle of the previous day, Fitzsimmons said that "H&M kicked-off a great campaign during
22 Super Bowl XLVIII to promote their David Beckham Bodywear Collection. That same campaign
23 kicked-off a new paradigm for advertising, fundamentally changing the discipline by making
24 television advertising actionable and measurable." The press release stated further that the "H&M
25 campaign is the first of its kind to leverage t-commerce technology to provide a mechanism for
26 viewers to engage and transact directly from a commercial." These statements were false and
27 misleading. The H&M Super Bowl advertisement was not a success – it had failed miserably.

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1 47. Not all of Delivery Agent's officers played along with the cover-up, however. A
2 few days after Super Bowl XLVIII, a whistleblower (the "Whistleblower") came forward to the
3 Company's Auditor. Among other things, the Whistleblower told the Auditor that:

- 4 a. The Super Bowl H&M campaign had failed because TV viewers were
5 unable to buy items from David Beckham's H&M clothing line through
6 their TVs;
- 7 b. Fitzsimmons directed high-ranking Delivery Agent officers to purchase the
8 items featured in the TV commercial to give the appearance that Delivery
9 Agent's technology had worked, when it had not; and
- c. False and fabricated sales reports touting the Super Bowl advertisement as a
 success were generated and disseminated to third-parties by Delivery Agent
 and its officers and directors.

10 48. The Auditor subsequently informed Delivery Agent's Audit Committee of the
11 allegations.

12 49. The Audit Committee did not immediately address the issue, and the Company's
13 management continued to proclaim to investors that Delivery Agent was a success, highlighting
14 the supposedly positive H&M Super Bowl campaign as a key example. On February 6, for
15 example, a representative of Plaintiffs spoke with both Fitzsimmons and an investment banker for
16 Delivery Agent to further explore a possible first investment in the Company. Both Fitzsimmons
17 and the banker described Delivery Agent as poised for success, including by way of an IPO
18 planned for later that year, and referred specifically to the Super Bowl campaign as emblematic of
19 that success. The banker then provided, via interstate commerce, Plaintiffs' representative with an
20 "Executive Summary of Delivery Agent" and a term sheet for the Series F investment, which
21 Defendants had prepared, approved and/or authorized. The Executive Summary described "[t]he
22 Company's proprietary software" and stated that Delivery Agent was "planning to go public in
23 April 2014" but was seeking a "pre-IPO round to fund its key growth initiatives," including "IPO
24 readiness." In his email, the banker also stressed that the Series F investment was Delivery
25 Agent's "pre-IPO financing."

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1 50. Also on February 6, Delivery Agent sent Plaintiffs' representative the Business
2 Section of Delivery Agent's draft Form S-1 (the "February 6, 2014 Draft S-1"),³ which Defendants
3 had prepared and/or approved for the Company's purportedly imminent IPO and to share with
4 investors. The February 6, 2014 S-1 included the false representation that "*during Super Bowl*
5 *XLVIII viewers of H&M's Super Bowl ad featuring David Beckham, were able to buy the*
6 *clothing featured in the ad directly from their remote control on an enabled TV.*" (Emphasis
7 added.) The February 6, 2014 Draft S-1 also described Delivery Agent's technology as a
8 "proprietary omni-screen technology platform" and an "integrated proprietary technology
9 platform." Indeed, Delivery Agent listed "[a]dvanced proprietary technology" as one of its
10 "Competitive Strengths." The February 6, 2014 Draft S-1 concluded, "Our solutions leverage
11 proprietary technologies and data to enable real-time transactions, engagements and optimizations
12 across devices and platforms."

13 51. Between February 13 and February 22, 2014, Fitzsimmons spoke with Plaintiffs'
14 representative another five times. He again represented that the Company utilized proprietary
15 technology that gave it an advantage in the market place. He also described the Super Bowl
16 commercial as a success, making no mention whatsoever of the technical issues encountered
17 during that test run nor, of course, that the Company had engaged in a cover-up to hide the failure.
18 Fitzsimmons instead told Plaintiffs' representative that the financing sought by Delivery Agent
19 was the final round of pre-IPO financing and was needed only to bridge a short-term negative cash
20 flow in anticipation of the IPO. The Company, he said, was on course for an IPO before the end
21 of 2014.

22 52. On February 20, 2014, Fitzsimmons shared another version of Delivery Agent's
23 draft S-1 (the "February 20, 2014 Draft S-1"), which also was prepared and/or approved by the
24 Defendants to be provided to investors. The February 20, 2014 Draft S-1 again trumpeted the
25

26 ³ A Form S-1 is a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") required of
27 companies that intend to carry out an IPO. Form S-1 is also known as the registration statement.
28

1 Super Bowl Campaign as a success, stating that viewers "were able to buy the clothing featured in
2 the ad directly from their remote control on an enabled TV." It did not mention that the Super
3 Bowl campaign for H&M had actually been a technical and market failure, nor that Defendants
4 had engaged in a scheme to cover-up that failure.

5 53. As these false and misleading statements were being disseminated, the Audit
6 Committee of the Board – then comprised of Defendants Power, Goettner, and Borchert – was
7 conducting an internal investigation into the Whistleblower's allegations. The Audit Committee's
8 investigation largely substantiated all of the allegations of the Whistleblower, finding that
9 consumers had been unwilling or unable to purchase H&M merchandise through the Super Bowl
10 commercial; Fitzsimmons had directed Delivery Agent personnel to purchase the merchandise in
11 order to make the H&M commercial appear successful; and Delivery Agent officers had
12 subsequently misrepresented that the merchandise had been purchased by consumers. The Audit
13 Committee shared its findings with the Auditor on or about March 14, 2014.

14 54. The Series F closing materials – which were prepared, reviewed and/or approved
15 by Defendants and sent in interstate commerce to Plaintiffs on or about March 18, 2014 – did not
16 list any of these material issues in its Schedule of Exceptions.

17 **A. The Auditor's Reaction to Delivery Agent's Investigation**

18 55. After delivering the results of the Audit Committee's investigation to the Auditor,
19 the Board of Directors essentially whitewashed the failure of the Delivery Agent Super Bowl
20 campaign for H&M and management's behavior, concluding that the cover-up was not material
21 "from a financial standpoint."

22 56. The Auditor rejected Defendants' attempt to gloss over a material breach of ethics
23 by senior corporate officers. In the Auditor's view, its ability to rely upon those officers was over,
24 and with it the willingness of the Auditor to provide the accounting and auditing functions
25 necessary to issue audit opinions in connection with an IPO also ended. The Auditor concluded in
26 writing that it was "not willing to rely on the representations" of Delivery Agent management
27 involved in the Super Bowl debacle "for purposes of [the Auditor's] previously-completed audit"
28 of Delivery Agent's consolidated financial statements.

1 57. The Auditor further informed Delivery Agent that it would not be able to reissue its
2 previously issued audit report or continue with the December 31, 2013 audit it was then
3 conducting if the persons involved in fabricating data also were involved with accounting, or
4 internal controls, or assumed any financial role at Delivery Agent, even if they were merely in a
5 position to influence those in such roles.

6 58. The Auditor also informed Delivery Agent that to complete its audit for the year
7 ended December 31, 2013, it would need to significantly expand the scope of its previously
8 completed 2012 audit and the incomplete 2013 audit to determine if any Delivery Agent personnel
9 inappropriately influenced the accounting or financial reporting.

10 59. Defendant Power, the Chairman of the Audit Committee, discussed the Auditor's
11 position with the Auditor. After that discussion, it was apparent that the Auditor would not roll
12 over and adopt the conclusions of Delivery Agent's own investigation.

13 60. The response of the Board of Directors was unanimous. It terminated the Auditor
14 on July 29, 2014. Delivery Agent formally dismissed the Auditor as its independent auditor on
15 August 4, 2014.

16 61. The obvious consequence of the termination of the Auditor was that Delivery
17 Agent could not complete an IPO. By terminating the Auditor, Delivery Agent triggered an
18 obligation under the federal securities laws for the company to explain the circumstances and
19 bases for terminating the Auditor. That explanation, known as Item 304 of Regulation S-K, is
20 required of all companies that intend to go public. Under Item 304, Delivery Agent would be
21 obligated to disclose to the SEC and all potential IPO investors that its Super Bowl campaign for
22 H&M had failed, that senior management then engaged in a cover-up, and that the Auditor had
23 refused to continue working with the Company because it did not believe senior management
24 could be trusted to provide reliable financial reporting. Even worse for Delivery Agent, the law
25 governing Item 304 disclosures requires that the company request a letter from the dismissed
26 auditor stating its agreement or disagreement with the Item 304 disclosure, which itself would be
27 filed as an exhibit to its filings. Both Item 304 and the Auditor's response are reviewed by the
28 SEC prior to an IPO.

1 62. All of the foregoing facts were material to any reasonable investor engaged in
2 making a decision to invest or not invest in Delivery Agent.

3 63. The Defendants either directly concealed from Plaintiffs these facts or participated
4 in encouraging the additional investments in Delivery Agent knowing that these facts were being
5 concealed.

6 64. Had Plaintiffs known that the Super Bowl demonstration was a failure, that the
7 Auditor had been terminated because it refused to go along with the fraud and declined to accept
8 the representations of managers who participated in it, or had Plaintiffs learned that these
9 circumstances effectively eliminated any possibility of an IPO, Plaintiffs would never have
10 purchased the Securities.

11 **B. Even As It Feuded With The Auditor, Defendants Continued To Solicit**
12 **Investments With Misleading Statements About Delivery Agent's Past Success**
13 **And Future Potential**

14 65. As Delivery Agent's spat with its Auditor over the implications of the failed Super
15 Bowl campaign boiled over in the summer of 2014 – culminating in the Company's firing of the
16 Auditor on July 29, 2014 – Defendants continued to solicit Plaintiffs' investment in the Company
17 by way of misleading and false statements.

18 66. Plaintiffs' representative met repeatedly with Defendants Cowan and Borcher in
19 March and April 2014 to discuss investing in Delivery Agent. Both individuals represented one of
20 the largest investors in Delivery Agent. Borcher had been appointed by Cowan's investment firm
21 to represent that investor on the Board and served on the Board's Audit Committee, while Cowan
22 himself was intimately involved in the Company's affairs and frequently attended Board Meetings,
23 even though, on information and belief, he had no formal position at Delivery Agent. Each was
24 heavily involved in recruiting additional investments as the Company burned through capital in
25 2014.

26 67. Borcher, as a member of the Audit Committee, knew about the Super Bowl fiasco
27 in March and April 2014. Cowan, in addition to receiving updates from Borcher, attended
28 numerous Board meetings himself as a major investor in the Company. Yet each provided
glowing reports about the Company to Plaintiffs' representative – Cowan during phone calls on

1 March 12 and April 14, 2014, and Borchert in a call on June 11, 2014. During these conversations,
2 Cowan and Borchert encouraged further investment by Plaintiffs. Both repeatedly assured
3 Plaintiffs that Delivery Agent's IPO was imminent and that the Series F financing round was just
4 the final round of private fundraising needed by the Company to reach IPO.

5 68. These representations were false and misleading. Cowan and Borchert both knew
6 of the disastrous H&M Super Bowl commercial test run, as well as management's subsequent
7 cover-up and the escalating dispute with the Auditor. This information would be material to any
8 investor. By June 2014, both also knew that an IPO was almost certainly impossible in light of the
9 Auditor's position and the coming Item 304. But an IPO is precisely what they promised
10 Plaintiffs, and soon.

11 69. On or about May 12, 2014, Defendants also prepared and disseminated or caused to
12 be disseminated in interstate commerce certain written materials to Plaintiffs and others. Among
13 those written materials was a PowerPoint (the "PowerPoint") presentation describing Delivery
14 Agent and its technology.

15 70. Despite the spectacular failure of the H&M Super Bowl campaign three months
16 earlier, the PowerPoint prominently featured portions of the AdAge and Variety articles that had
17 been published in January 2014, which had described how Delivery Agent's technology would
18 appear in a televised Super Bowl commercial the following month. The PowerPoint also again
19 explicitly linked Delivery Agent's desire to raise capital to preparing for the impending IPO.
20 Under the heading "Capital Raise," the PowerPoint said that "Delivery Agent is seeking to raise
21 \$35 million in a pre-IPO round to fund its key growth initiatives." Under the heading "Use of
22 Proceeds," Delivery Agent listed the first item as "IPO readiness."

23 71. On or about June 18, 2014, Defendants prepared and/or approved yet another draft
24 S-1 statement and disseminated or caused a portion of it to be disseminated in interstate commerce
25 to potential investors, including to Plaintiffs (the "June 2014 Draft S-1"). The June 2014 Draft S-1
26 says, among other things, that Delivery Agent's "technology and relationships enable viewers to
27 engage with, and transact in response to television content anytime, anywhere and on any
28 connected device."

1 72. Defendants claimed in the June 2014 Draft S-1 that through Delivery Agent's "end-
2 to-end engagement and commerce solution, we handle the entire transaction process for our
3 partners on a white-label basis, enabling viewers to . . . purchase products seen on TV shows,
4 sporting events, commercials and infomercials." In 2013, Delivery Agent's technology "drove
5 more than 75 million viewer engagements with products and information from our partners'
6 content."

7 73. The June 2014 Draft S-1 goes on to identify five examples of "how viewers interact
8 and engage with television content" through Delivery Agent's "platform." The first example was
9 still the February 2014 Super Bowl campaign with H&M, stating that "during Super Bowl
10 XLVIII, viewers of H&M's Super Bowl advertisement featuring David Beckham *were able to buy*
11 *the clothing featured in the advertisement directly from their remote control on enabled TV's.*"
12 (Emphasis added).

13 74. In several places throughout the PowerPoint and the June 2014 Draft S-1,
14 Defendants claimed that Delivery Agent's technology was proprietary. For example, the June
15 2014 Draft S-1 described Delivery Agent's technology as its "proprietary omni-screen technology
16 platform" and an "integrated proprietary technology platform." Delivery Agent even listed
17 "[a]dvanced proprietary technology" as one of its "Competitive Strengths" in the June 2014 Draft
18 S-1. The June 2014 Draft S-1 further says, "Our solutions leverage proprietary technologies and
19 data to enable real-time transactions, engagements and optimizations across devices and
20 platforms." These statements were false and/or misleading because Defendants knew that the
21 Delivery Agent technology did not function properly, as illustrated by the Super Bowl failure, and
22 also that the technology was not in any meaningful sense proprietary.

23 75. In a Management Presentation also dated July 18, 2014, which was provided to
24 Plaintiffs and other investors and prepared, approved or authorized by Defendants, the Super Bowl
25 campaign continued to be lauded as a complete success. The Presentation stated that Delivery
26 Agent had "[l]aunched first shopping-enabled Super Bowl ad with H&M via Samsung Smart
27 TVs," which had "[r]einforced 1st mover advantage through 2014 Super Bowl campaign with
28

1 *H&M.*" (Emphasis added.) The Management Presentation also described Delivery Agent's
2 "[p]roprietary data engine" as a "[f]ully-tested, proprietary tech platform."

3 76. With Plaintiffs still unaware of the problems plaguing Delivery Agent, including
4 that the Board had just fired the Auditor, on August 11, 2014 Fitzsimmons exchanged emails with
5 Plaintiffs' representative regarding investment by Plaintiffs in the Company. Plaintiffs'
6 representative noted that the date for the Delivery Agent IPO had changed from July 2014 to
7 September 2014, and that it looked like that date would be pushed back even further. He asked
8 Fitzsimmons: "What is reason for this change and management's outlook for IPO in the future?"
9 In response, Fitzsimmons wrote, "We made a significant acquisition at the end of Q'2 (Music
10 Today). This was fully vetted with both Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank who jointly advised the
11 company to fully integrate and execute at least one quarter as a merged entity before going
12 public." Fitzsimmons then encouraged another investment by Plaintiffs in the Company, claiming
13 that Plaintiffs would have "2.0X upside protection in IPO."

14 77. These statements were false and misleading because the true reason for the delay in
15 the purported IPO was the failure of the H&M Super Bowl campaign, the failure of Delivery
16 Agent's technology, and the Company's dispute with and subsequent firing of the Auditor.
17 Fitzsimmons knew these statements were false and misleading, and intended that Plaintiffs would
18 rely on them.

19 78. On August 25, 2014, Defendants provided Plaintiffs with the next Series F
20 financing closing documents. Included in these materials was Exhibit F, the Schedule of
21 Exceptions, which this time noted only one thing: "The Company is in the process of changing
22 accountants from [the Auditor] to Grant Thornton."

23 79. In stating that Delivery Agent was merely "changing" accountants, the Schedule of
24 Exceptions was materially misleading because it failed to disclose that the Auditor had determined
25 that Company senior management was unreliable and refused to remain as auditor unless
26 management was terminated, and that the Company had fired the Auditor as a result. Nor did it
27 disclose that, as a result of the change in auditor, the Company would have to disclose before any
28 IPO the real reason for the change, including that the H&M Super Bowl campaign had failed, that

1 management tried to hide that failure, and that the Auditor would file a response to the Item 304
2 explaining its concerns with the Company's management team and Board as a result of the Super
3 Bowl campaign malfeasance. Defendants' failure to note any of this in the September 2014 Series
4 F closing documents is a glaring omission of information that would be material to any reasonable
5 investor.

6 80. In reliance on the above misrepresentations and misleading omissions, on
7 September 24, 2014 Plaintiff RTI invested \$10,000,150 in Delivery Agent by purchasing Series F
8 preferred shares. RTI would not have made this investment had it known that the Super Bowl
9 campaign failed; that senior members of the Delivery Agent management were involved in
10 creating fake sales reports about the campaign to hide the failure; that the Auditor therefore had
11 lost all trust and faith in Delivery Agent's senior management; that Delivery Agent's Board had
12 fired the Auditor when it refused to go along with the Company's whitewash of the Super Bowl ad
13 campaign failure and cover-up; and that the Auditor's firing meant that an IPO almost certainly
14 could not take place. RTI also would not have invested had it known that Delivery Agent's
15 technology neither worked nor was proprietary. But due to Defendant's misleading statements,
16 Plaintiffs had now invested over \$10 million in a company that, unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, was in
17 dire straits with no hope of the promised "imminent" IPO.

18 C. **Still More Misleading Statements Caused Plaintiffs To Make Further**
19 **Investments.**

20 81. On January 9, 2015, the Defendants disseminated or caused to be disseminated
21 through interstate commerce to Delivery Agent investors an updated draft S-1 that continued to
22 include the same statement falsely indicating that the February 2014 Super Bowl H&M
23 advertising test run was a success.

24 82. In March 2015, around the date Defendants had represented in October 2014 that
25 the Company would go public, Plaintiffs first learned of a "304 issue." Even then, Defendants did
26 not disclose the central, material facts. On March 10, 2015, Plaintiffs' representative sent an email
27 to Defendant Power, chair of the Audit Committee, asking why there had been a delay in
28 obtaining the 2012 and 2013 audits needed for the IPO and what else could delay the IPO. In

1 response, Power stated "The main delay driver was the treatment of the revenue on a gross versus
2 net basis. Since [Grant Thornton] was taking a position that was counter to that taken by [the
3 Auditor], they spent additional time within [Grant Thornton] to run it all the way up their chain of
4 command."

5 83. With respect to any further delays in the IPO, Power wrote that "I believe you are
6 now up to speed on the 304 issue with [the Auditor] that we are currently working through – there
7 is definite risk on that front but we are actively working it. He added that "[w]e are currently on
8 pace to receive the reports for all three years by the end of March which is in line with the current
9 late June IPO timeline."

10 84. Power had mentioned the "304 issue" to Plaintiffs shortly before this email, but he
11 misrepresented its nature. Power told Plaintiffs that the Item 304 related to certain internal
12 financial control issues the Auditor had identified in connection with the Company's former CFO.
13 Power led Plaintiffs to believe that while the Company would need to file an Item 304, the issue
14 was minor and would be easily resolved. Neither Power nor any other Defendant disclosed the
15 Super Bowl campaign failure, its cover-up, and the Auditor's complete lack of faith in
16 management.

17 85. Rather than make a complete and full disclosure of the Super Bowl advertising
18 failure and subsequent cover-up, Delivery Agent and the Defendants solicited new funding
19 through the sale of securities to Plaintiffs by falsely and fraudulently continuing to claim that
20 Delivery Agent's IPO was imminent.

21 86. On or about March 11, 2015, Delivery Agent released an investor update entitled
22 "Q1 2015 Mid Q Investor Update" (the "March 2015 Investor Update"). The March 2015 Investor
23 Update noted that the "IPO process [was] progressing with continued audit delays" but it did not
24 disclose the nature or severity of those "audit delays." The March 2015 Investor Update then
25 identified a "Need to solve immediate cash issue." It went on to say that Delivery Agent was
26 raising \$12 million in "Pre-IPO Bridge" funds.

27 87. On or about March 18, 2015 Plaintiffs' representative met with Defendant Borchert,
28 who informed him that Delivery Agent was still going to IPO but needed further short-term bridge

1 financing to reach the delayed IPO. Borchert did not provide the full reasons for the delay in
2 proceeding with the IPO, or that an IPO likely would never be possible as a result of the
3 Company's actions during and after the Super Bowl campaign.

4 88. Kept in the dark regarding the true (and devastating) nature of the "304 issue," RTII
5 invested \$2,500,050 in Delivery Agent's Series G Preferred Stock on April 20, 2015.

6 89. Plaintiffs' representative – now a Board member – repeatedly sought more
7 information regarding the "304 issue" over the summer of 2015. At an April 28, 2015 Board
8 meeting, Plaintiffs' representative requested a copy of the Draft Item 304 language being prepared
9 for the still "imminent" IPO. Fitzsimmons, with the other Defendants present, told Plaintiffs'
10 representative that the language was being kept confidential and that he would receive it in due
11 course. He also informed Plaintiffs' representative that, in any event, the Draft Item 304 language
12 was immaterial to the financial statements of the Company. Plaintiffs' representative followed up
13 with email requests for a copy of the Draft Item 304 language on May 8 and May 11, but again
14 was rebuffed.

15 90. Meanwhile, Defendants solicited even more funding over the summer of 2015. On
16 June 24, 2015, Defendants represented to Plaintiffs' representative that Delivery Agent faced a
17 severe cash shortage and that insiders like Plaintiffs needed to provide still more short-term bridge
18 financing for the Company to survive until its IPO.

19 91. In response to this request, and in reliance upon Defendants' continued assurance
20 that the Company's technology worked and that an IPO or acquisition was imminent, RTII
21 invested another \$3,500,000 in Delivery Agent via a convertible note on July 21, 2015.
22 Defendants knew their representations and assurances were false and intended Plaintiffs to rely
23 upon them in deciding to invest again in the supposedly short-term IPO bridge financing.

24 92. On the same day that RTII made its final investment – July 21, 2015 – Plaintiffs
25 finally received the Company's draft Item 304 language. The Company's language, prepared
26 and/or approved by Defendants, downplayed the Super Bowl advertising campaign failure and
27 subsequent acts by senior management to cover-up the failure. The draft Item 304 said, in relevant
28 part, only the following:

1 a. In February 2014, in connection with an interactive advertising campaign involving
2 [Delivery Agent's] technology, certain current and former employees, and members
3 of our senior management (including our current Chief Executive Officer, our
4 current President of eCommerce and our former head of interactive advertising)
5 instructed other employees to purchase, or make purchases themselves, of
6 merchandise that was offered for sale online as part of the interactive advertising
7 campaign on behalf of our advertising campaign partner. These purchases involved
8 merchandise owned by and held in inventory of the Company, were in the amount
9 of less than \$10,000, had no financial impact, and were never recorded in the
10 Company's books and records.

11 b. In addition, within two business days, it was determined that some of the
12 Company's current and former employees and members of our senior management
13 also prepared information, or were involved in or aware of the preparation of
14 information, that contained fabricated data regarding the performance of the
15 advertising campaign, including regarding the sales of merchandise during the
16 campaign. The fabricated data was provided to one of our advertising campaign
17 partners and certain other third parties. When our Chief Executive Officer learned
18 that the data had been fabricated, he retracted it from all recipients and instructed
19 them that the data should not be relied upon for any purposes. The Company
20 believes that the data was not relied upon by its advertising campaign partner or
21 any third party, and the Company maintains an ongoing business relationship with
22 this advertising campaign partner.

23 93. The Company sent the Draft Item 304 to the Auditor for its response. In an email
24 dated August 5, 2015, Fitzsimmons claimed that Delivery Agent would be able to file for an IPO
25 as soon as August 12th, "[a]ssuming [the Auditor] plays along"

26 94. But the Auditor did not play along. On August 16, 2015, Fitzsimmons told
27 Plaintiffs' representative that the Auditor's response to the Item 304 was a "major setback" that
28 may render Delivery Agent "unmarketable." Despite this email, Plaintiffs did not actually receive
the Auditor's draft response from the Company until August 21, 2015. The Auditor's draft
response to Delivery Agent's Draft Item 304 filing was highly critical of Delivery Agent's
portrayal of the record and its omission of several key facts. It provided far more information,
describing an intentional effort by Delivery Agent's most senior officers to conceal a catastrophic
failure of Delivery Agent's core technology, an effort to falsify and fabricate data to make that
failure appear like a success, and repeated attempts by Fitzsimmons to obstruct the internal and
external investigations into the Super Bowl fiasco.

95. The Auditor's draft response also made clear that several high-ranking corporate
officers purchased the vast majority of the items advertised during the Super Bowl and did so to

1 conceal the fact that Delivery Agent's technology had failed and that TV viewers were unable to
2 buy nearly any of the advertised items:

3 In February 2014, in connection with the first interactive advertising campaign to
4 market merchandise offered for sale online on behalf of one of the Company's
5 advertising partners on super bowl Sunday, certain current and former employees
6 of the Company, and certain members of the Company's senior management
7 (including the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the Company's current
8 President of eCommerce and the Company's former head of interactive
9 advertising), instructed other employees of the Company to purchase, or made
10 purchases themselves, of 585 of 600 pieces of the advertising partners' merchandise
11 that was offered for sale as part of the campaign. After receiving an update that
12 only 15 pieces of merchandise had been purchased hours into the super bowl, the
13 current CEO directed the former President and COO to 'buy all remaining'
14 merchandise.

15 Further, the CEO received an email during super bowl Sunday indicating the
16 advertising partners' representatives tried but could not access technology to
17 purchase their merchandise. The next day, the Chief Executive Officer agreed to
18 have the former President and COO email the advertising partner that they sold out
19 of all 1,100 pieces of merchandise (600 pieces of merchandise offered for sale and
20 500 pieces of the same merchandise available for giveaway). The same day, the
21 CEO emailed the Board communicating purchases of 711 pieces of their
22 advertising partners' merchandise (which unknown to the Board included the 585 of
23 600 merchandise pieces bought by employees directed to do so by the CEO and
24 other members of Senior Management and 139 of 500 merchandise pieces available
25 for the giveaway). Two days after the advertising campaign, the CEO gave an
26 update at a Board meeting communicating the advertising campaign was a great
27 success with no discussion of the technology problems encountered or the 585 of
28 600 pieces sold being acquired by Company personnel at the CEO's direction.

96. Upon information and belief, Defendant Lai is the "the former President and COO"
18 referenced in the Auditor's response above. Lai is also referred to as the "current President of
19 eCommerce" in the Draft Item 304.

97. The Auditor's response established that Fitzsimmons personally directed other
20 employees to make the purchases, that Fitzsimmons knew that the subsequent sales reports were
21 false, that the fabricated data was provided to an advertising partner, and that there was no
22 evidence that the fabricated data was withdrawn after it was disseminated:
23

24 We disagree with the implication in the third sentence in the fourth paragraph
25 where the Company's disclosure states that 'When our Chief Executive Officer was
26 advised that some of the data had been fabricated[.],' as he would have known that
27 data was fabricated in that it would either include employee purchases he directed
28 or included purchases to the advertising partner, Board of Directors and later a
potential investor or have required alteration to remove the effect of these and he
was made aware of the technology issues from the advertising partner. As
previously noted, subsequent to the conclusion of the campaign the Chief
Executive Officer reported to the Board that the campaign was a success, no

1 mention of him directing employees to make purchases or the inability of
2 advertising partners and some employees to access technology to purchase
merchandise was mentioned.

3 Further, we understand that the Audit Committee's external investigation team later
4 obtained evidence indicating that the CEO and others in Senior Management
5 directed the metrics to be altered further as 361 of 500 free units offered in the
6 campaign were not given away and sent the altered metrics to the advertiser and
7 potential investors. It was subsequently determined that some of the Company's
8 current and former employees and certain members of the Company's senior
9 management had prepared, or were aware of the preparation of, information that
10 contained fabricated data regarding the performance of the above-referenced
interactive advertising campaign, including fabricated data regarding the amount of
merchandise purchased during the campaign. The fabricated data was provided to
the advertising campaign partner and to certain other third parties at the direction of
the Chief Executive Officer and others in Senior Management. Days after the
campaign, the CEO sent a potential investor the same report sent to the advertising
partner originally and stated 'campaign massive success and is leading to an
extension[.]'

11 We disagree with the statement that 'When our Chief Executive Officer was
12 advised that some of the data had been fabricated, the data was promptly retracted
13 from the recipients[.]' The investigation found no evidence that such data was
14 retracted and our Partner was told such had not been prior to our termination. We
15 have no basis to agree or disagree as to what has been communicated since our
16 termination, or whether the fabricated data was relied upon by its advertising
17 campaign partner or any third party or if the Company maintains an ongoing
business relationship with this advertising campaign partner. We were told that that
the investigation found that at the time of the advertising campaign the CEO and
members of Senior Management's actions demonstrated that the success of the
super bowl Sunday advertising campaign from a technological feasibility
perspective was very important to the Board, advertising campaign partners and
potential investors at that time.

18 98. The Auditor went on to explain that the Draft Item 304 omitted that Fitzsimmons
19 improperly interfered with Delivery Agent's internal and external investigations into the Super
20 Bowl matter:

21 The allegation of fabricated data was brought to the attention of [the Auditor] by an
22 employee in senior management, and we in turn informed the Audit Committee
23 Chairman. Omitted from the Disclosure in fifth paragraph is that, the Audit
24 Committee investigated the matter, initially using internal resources however, the
25 internal investigation team experienced repeated interference from the Chief
Executive Officer. Despite clear communication from the Audit committee of who
was responsible for the investigation, the Chief Executive Officer wanted certain
individuals not to be a part of the internal investigation team, tried to influence the
scope of the investigation and caused there to be delays in conducting email and
other electronic searches.

26 Subsequently, the Audit Committee engaged an outside law firm to conduct an
27 independent investigation and prepare a report to the Audit Committee regarding its
28 findings. The scope of the Audit Committee's investigation was (a) to investigate
management's actions and conduct during the advertising campaign, and also

1 specifically (b) to investigate allegations of interference with the audit committee's
2 internal investigation by the Chief Executive Officer and Senior management.
3 Based upon the external investigation team, we understand that the Audit
4 Committee concluded that (a) the Chief Executive Officer acknowledged his
5 involvement in the purchase of products by employees along with other members
6 of Senior Management. While there was evidence indicating the Chief Executive
7 Officer's involvement in further manipulation of data provided to advertising
8 partners and others to make the employee purchases appear as though they had
9 come from customers the Audit Committee believes such was inconclusive.

6 However, the Audit Committee believed conclusive evidence indicated that certain
7 members of senior management and employees were found to have knowledge and
8 involvement in the further manipulation of the advertising data beyond the
9 purchase of products and initial reporting of those purchases and (iv) The Chief
10 Executive Officer made repeated attempts to influence the scope and composition
11 of the Audit Committee's original internal investigation prior to the Audit
12 Committee engaging an external investigation team and we were informed the CEO
13 even tried to influence the scope with the external investigation team.

10 99. Had RTII known of the full scope of Delivery Agent's actions during the H&M
11 Super Bowl campaign, the failure of that test run, the subsequent cover-up and the resulting
12 dispute with the Auditor, it would not have invested its money. Defendants made misleading
13 statements that concealed this information, or knowingly misrepresented the facts, and intended
14 that Plaintiffs would rely upon such statements, which Plaintiffs did.

15 **III. Plaintiff RTI Makes One Final, Specific Investment Based Upon Continued**
16 **Misrepresentations And In An Attempt To Salvage The Company.**

17 100. In late 2015 and early 2016, Defendants represented that the Company needed
18 more cash to survive as management was seeking to sell Delivery Agent or even still launch an
19 IPO, which if successful could have salvaged Plaintiffs' investments. To keep the Company afloat
20 as it looked for an exit and to protect the amounts already invested, Plaintiff RTI purchased a
21 \$651,805 convertible note from Delivery Agent on March 30, 2016.

22 101. But the Auditor never softened the substance of its response to Delivery Agent's
23 draft Item 304. As a direct and proximate result, the probability of an IPO was zero. Delivery
24 Agent also retained investment bankers to broker a sale of Delivery Agent. This exit plan failed as
25 well because, as Plaintiffs were shocked to learn, there were no buyers for Delivery Agent since
26 the Company had no meaningful intellectual property or ongoing valuable business.

1 102. Because it had been revealed that Defendants had misled investors who had
 2 previously provided Delivery Agent with capital to meet its burn rate, no additional investment
 3 occurred and Delivery Agent ran out of cash to operate the business.

4 103. On September 15, 2016, Delivery Agent filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of
 5 the Bankruptcy Code.

6 104. Plaintiffs' \$17 million investment in the Securities is now worthless.

7 **IV. Defendant's Omissions And Misrepresentations Caused Plaintiffs To Lose The Entire**
Value Of Their Investments

8 105. Plaintiffs' loss was caused by the misleading statements and omissions made by
 9 Defendants. The truth about the Super Bowl campaign, Delivery Agent's management's actions
 10 in the campaign and afterwards, the cover-up and dispute with the Auditor, and finally the lack of
 11 any significantly proprietary or otherwise valuable technology rendered Delivery Agent essentially
 12 worthless, causing Plaintiffs to lose the entire value of their investment.

13 **V. No Safe Harbor**

14 106. The statutory safe harbor provided for forward-looking statements under certain
 15 circumstances does not apply to any of the allegedly false statements and omissions pleaded in this
 16 Complaint because those statements and omissions are factual and relate to events in the past
 17 rather than forward-looking events.

18 107. None of the statements alleged herein are "forward-looking" statements and no
 19 such statement was identified as "forward looking" when it was made.

20 108. In the alternative, to the extent that the statutory safe harbor does apply, the
 21 Defendants are still liable under federal securities laws for any forward-looking statements
 22 because the speaker actually knew that the forward-looking statement was false, misleading, or
 23 omitted facts necessary to make statements previously made not materially false or misleading.

24 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**
 25 **(For Violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5**
Against All Defendants)

26 109. Plaintiffs incorporate ¶¶ 1 through 108 by reference.

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One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000, San Francisco, California 94104-5500
415.391.4800 • Fax 415.989.1663

1 110. This Count is asserted against all Defendants pursuant to Section 10b of the
2 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the SEC under 17 C.F.R. §
3 240.10b-5.

4 111. Defendants employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud.

5 112. Defendants failed to disclose material facts specified above that they had a duty to
6 disclose.

7 113. Defendants made or approved the false and misleading statements specified above,
8 which they knew were false and misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to
9 disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
10 circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

11 114. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means,
12 or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a
13 continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about Delivery Agent and
14 its IPO prospects, as described herein.

15 115. Defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions of
16 material facts set forth herein, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed to
17 ascertain and to disclose such facts, even though such facts were available to them. Such
18 Defendants' material misrepresentations and/or omissions were done knowingly and recklessly
19 and for the purpose and effect of concealing negative information about Delivery Agent, including
20 that it could not go public, as described herein.

21 116. Plaintiffs would not have purchased the Securities if they had been aware of the
22 material information omitted by Defendants and/or known the truth about the false and misleading
23 statements made by Defendants.

24 117. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs
25 suffered damages in that the actions that were the subject of Defendants' omissions and false
26 statements ensured that Delivery Agent could not go public and that Delivery Agent would have
27 no value to a prospective buyer.

28

1 118. Plaintiffs have suffered damages in that they paid \$16,652.005 million for the
2 Securities that are now worthless.

3 119. This action was filed within two years of discovery of the fraud and within five
4 years of Plaintiffs' purchases of the Securities.

5 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

6 **(For Violation of § 20(a) of the Exchange Act
Against All Defendants)**

7 120. Plaintiffs incorporate ¶¶ 1 through 119 by reference.

8 121. This Count is brought against the Defendants pursuant to Section 20(a) of the
9 Exchange Act.

10 122. The Defendants exercised their power and authority to engage in the wrongful acts
11 alleged herein. The Defendants were "controlling persons" of Delivery Agent within the meaning
12 of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In that capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct
13 alleged that caused Plaintiffs the damages alleged herein. Each of the Defendants, therefore, acted
14 as a controlling person of Delivery Agent.

15 123. By virtue of their high-level positions, their participation in and/or awareness of
16 Delivery Agent's operations, and their ability to influence and control Delivery Agent's operations
17 and business, including securities offerings, the Defendants had the ability and authority to
18 influence and control, and did influence and control, directly and indirectly, decision-making at
19 Delivery Agent, including the content of and dissemination of materials containing the statements
20 and omissions described herein in connection with the offer for sale and sale of the Securities.

21 124. Because of their senior positions at Delivery Agent and/or their direct personal
22 involvement in the matters described in the Complaint, Defendants had knowledge of the material
23 omissions of fact and false representations described in this Complaint before they were
24 disseminated to Plaintiffs and others.

25 125. As Delivery Agent's officers and/or directors, the Defendants had a duty to
26 disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Delivery Agent's business and
27 affairs.
28

COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP
One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000, San Francisco, California 94104-5500
415.391.4800 • Fax 415.989.1663

COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP
One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000, San Francisco, California 94104-5500
415.391.4800 • Fax 415.989.1663

1 statements made by Defendants. Plaintiffs' reliance on Defendants' misrepresentations and/or
2 misleading statements about the Company was a substantial factor in causing them harm.

3 133. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' wrongful conduct, Plaintiffs
4 suffered damages in that the actions that were the subject of Defendants' omissions and false
5 statements ensured that Delivery Agent could not go public and that Delivery Agent would have
6 no value to a prospective buyer.

7 134. Plaintiffs have suffered damages in that it paid \$16,652,005 for the Securities
8 which are now worthless.

9 135. The aforementioned conduct of Defendants was malicious, fraudulent, and
10 oppressive within the meaning of California Civil Code § 3294 and was undertaken with the
11 intention on the part of Defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of property, money, and/or legal rights and
12 constitutes conduct that is despicable, subjecting Plaintiffs to a cruel and unjust hardship in
13 conscious disregard to their rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages
14 according to proof.

15 136. This action was filed within three years of discovery of the fraud.

16 **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION**
17 **(Negligent Misrepresentation)**

18 137. Plaintiffs incorporate ¶¶ 1 through 136 by reference.

19 138. Defendants made or approved the false and misleading statements specified above,
20 in which they lacked reasonable grounds in believing the statements to be true.

21 139. Plaintiffs would not have purchased the Securities if they had been aware of the
22 material information omitted by Defendants and/or known the truth about the false and misleading
23 statements made by Defendants.

24 140. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' negligent conduct, Plaintiffs
25 suffered damages in that the actions that were the subject of Defendants' omissions and false
26 statements ensured that Delivery Agent could not go public and that Delivery Agent would have
27 no value to a prospective buyer.

28

COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP
One Montgomery Street, Suite 3000, San Francisco, California 94104-5500
415.391.4800 • Fax 415.989.1663

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141. Plaintiffs have suffered damages in that it paid \$16,652,005 for the Securities which are now worthless.

142. This action was filed within three years of discovery of the negligent misrepresentations.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully demands judgment in its favor and against Defendants as follows:

- A. Awarding plaintiff damages, including interest, in an amount to be determined at trial;
- B. Punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
- C. Awarding such equitable/injunctive or other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

DATED: March 8, 2017

COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP

By: /s/ Rees F. Morgan
Rees F. Morgan
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Rising Tide I, LLC; Rising Tide II, LLC