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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE)	Case No. CV 12-03448 DDP (CWx)
COMPANY AS RECEIVER FOR)	
FIRST BANK OF BEVERLY HILLS,)	ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO DISMISS
)	
Plaintiff,)	[Dkt. Nos. 31, 33, 35, & 37]
)	
v.)	
)	
LARRY B. FAIGIN, CRAIG)	
KOLASINSKI, ERIC ROSA,)	
ANNETTE VECCHIO, HOWARD)	
AMSTER, WILLIAM D. KING,)	
STEPHEN GLENNON, ROBERT)	
KANNER, KATHLEEN KELLOGG AND)	
JOHN LANNAN,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
)	
_____)	

Presently before the court are Motions to Dismiss by Defendants Howard Amster, William D. King, Stephen Glennon, Robert Kanner, and Kathleen Kellogg (collectively "Director Defendants"); Annette Vecchio, Craig Kolasinski, and Eric Rosa (collectively "Officer Defendants"); John Lannan, who also joins the Outside Director's Motion as to the Second and Third Claims for Relief; and Larry B. Faigin, who joins the Director Defendants' Motion and the Officer Defendants' Motion. Having considered the parties's

1 submissions and heard oral argument, the court adopts the following
2 order.

3 **I. Background**

4 The Federal Deposit Insurance Company ("FDIC") as Receiver for
5 the First Bank of Beverly Hills ("FBBH") is asserting claims
6 against Defendants in an amount no less than \$100.6 million for
7 losses incurred on nine "acquisition, development, and
8 construction" and "commercial real estate" loans. (Compl. ¶¶ 1,
9 11.) Defendants are former directors and officers of FBBH.
10 Kolasinski, Rosa, and Vecchio were officers. Amster, King,
11 Glennon, Kanner, Kellogg, and Lannan were directors. Faigin was
12 director, officer, and Chief Executive Officer.

13 FBBH opened as Girard Savings and Loan Association in 1979.
14 In 1997, it became a stock savings bank regulated by the Office of
15 Thrift Supervision and changed its name to First Bank of Beverly
16 Hills. In 2005, FBBH became a state chartered commercial bank
17 regulated by the California Department of Financial Institutions,
18 and the FDIC became FBBH's primary regulator. (Id. ¶ 12.) At that
19 time, the Bank was operating out of branches in Beverly Hills and
20 in Calabasas. (Id. ¶ 13.) FBBH originally focused on making loans
21 of \$5 million or less secured by stable income-producing
22 properties. In 2006 the Board began to move into acquisition,
23 development, and construction loans and into commercial real estate
24 loans. (Id. ¶ 15.) Those types of loans were riskier, but no
25 measures were taken to improve underwriting or strengthen FBBH's
26 capital position. (Id. ¶ 16.) At the same time, quarterly
27 dividend payments were being approved to FBBH's parent company
28 Beverly Hills Bancorp. (Id. ¶ 17.) On April 24, 2009, the

1 California Department of Financial Institutions closed FBBH and
2 appointed the FDIC as receiver. (Id. ¶ 18.)

3 This action concerns nine loans made in 2006 and 2007. The
4 FDIC alleges that all nine loans were deficient for ignoring
5 discrepancies in financial evaluations and in analyses of project
6 financials and appraisals, excessive LTV ratios, and prohibited
7 reliance on due diligence of participant banks. (Id. ¶ 54.) Some
8 of the alleged deficiencies in these loans are the following:

9 With respect to the Monteverde/Hawkbyrn loan: Relying on
10 outdated financials and an outdated appraisal, ignoring a loan to
11 value ratio of 100% and severe flood control issues, and entering
12 into the participation when the loan was set to mature one month
13 after approval without questioning why the loan was not being paid
14 off at maturity. (Id. ¶¶ 61, 63, 66.)

15 With respect to the Otay loan: Ignoring that the guarantor's
16 financials were inflated and that the loan transaction was a "flip"
17 that permitted the principals of the borrower to sell the property
18 back to themselves at a price higher than the actual value, thereby
19 using the proceeds of the loan to make a quick profit and taking
20 equity out of the project before it was completed. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 69.)

21 With respect to the Schaeffer loan: Approving a loan on a
22 nursing home, which was specifically prohibited by the Loan Policy,
23 and relying on guarantors' net worth as a source of repayment
24 although that net worth was over \$5 million less than the Bank's
25 portion of the Loan. (Id. ¶¶ 75, 76.)

26 With respect to the Vineyard South loan: Failing to address
27 the fact that the housing project was being built right on top of
28 the San Andreas Fault. (Id. ¶¶ 86, 88.)

1 With respect to the River East loan: Approving refinancing of
2 \$25.4 million in senior debt with no primary repayment source of
3 the loan, and failing to clarify parking rights, which would
4 significantly affect the value of the property. (Id. ¶¶ 92, 96.)

5 With respect to the AHCB loan: After requiring \$10 million in
6 hard purchase contracts prior to funding, ignoring the very
7 condition they themselves implemented to mitigate risky pre-
8 approving funding of \$3.8 million of the loan prior to the receipt
9 of any executed purchase contracts. (Id. ¶ 101.)

10 With respect to the Las Vegas 215 loan: Approving the loan
11 based upon an allegedly imminent, but ultimately non-existent
12 "verbal agreement" for sale. (Id. ¶ 110.)

13 With respect to the Las Vegas Mobil 18 loan: Approving the
14 loan based upon a hypothetical appraisal of the subject land only,
15 when the property was not vacant, but had a mobile home park
16 operating on the site, income from which was insufficient to
17 service the loan. (Id. ¶¶ 116, 117.)

18 With respect to the Acacia Investors loan: Failing to follow
19 up on the Phase I Site Assessment, which would have revealed severe
20 restrictions on development of the property due to the Endangered
21 Species Act, and failing to assess the impact on the project of the
22 owner having to build a necessary bridge and road. (Id. ¶¶ 130-
23 134.)

24 All Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss. All Defendants
25 contend that the action should be dismissed because the Complaint
26 depends on documents not attached to it, because it does not give
27 notice as to which Defendants are being sued for which acts as
28 Required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 8, and because

1 FRCP 10 requires that each loan be pleaded as a separate count.
2 The Director Defendants also argue that they are protected from
3 claims of breach of fiduciary duty by the business judgment rule
4 and the exculpatory clause in their contract; that the FDIC has not
5 stated a claim for gross negligence; and that the third claim for
6 relief (for breach of fiduciary duty) is duplicative of the gross
7 negligence claim. The Officer Defendants argue that they are also
8 protected by the business judgment rule from claims of breach of
9 fiduciary duty; that the FDIC has not stated a claim for gross
10 negligence; and that the breach of fiduciary duty claim is
11 duplicative of the simple negligence claim. Defendant Faigin joins
12 the Motions of the both Director and Officer Defendants. Defendant
13 Lannan joins the Director Defendants' Motion and also moves to
14 dismiss the negligence claim, arguing that he is protected by the
15 business judgment rule.

16 **II. Legal Standard**

17 A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
18 12(b)(6) when it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as
19 true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
20 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When considering a
21 Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must "accept as true all allegations
22 of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most
23 favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447
24 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint need not include "detailed
25 factual allegations," it must offer "more than an unadorned,
26 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
27 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a
28

1 statement of a legal conclusion "are not entitled to the assumption
2 of truth." Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely
3 offers "labels and conclusions," a "formulaic recitation of the
4 elements," or "naked assertions" will not be sufficient to state a
5 claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and
6 internal quotation marks omitted).

7 "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
8 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
9 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 664.
10 Plaintiffs must allege "plausible grounds to infer" that their
11 claims rise "above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at
12 555-56. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
13 for relief" is a "context-specific" task, requiring "the reviewing
14 court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal,
15 556 U.S. at 679.

16 **III. Discussion**

17 **A. 2006 FDIC Report of Examination ("2006 ROE") and Bank Loan** 18 **Policy**

19 The Director Defendants, joined by the Officer Defendants,
20 assert that the FDIC's Complaint "hinges on its characterization
21 and selective excerpting of two documents: the Bank's Loan Policy
22 and the 2006 ROE." (Dir. Mot. at 7.) They assert that FDIC agreed
23 to provide the 2006 ROE "pursuant to an appropriate protective
24 order but only on the condition that the Director Defendants not
25 challenge the FDIC-R's withholding of the Loan Policy," a condition
26 which was unacceptable to the Director Defendants. (Dir. Mot. at 9
27 n.10.) According to the Director Defendants, the 2006 ROE and
28 Bank's Loan Policy are essential to the Complaint, and they ask the

1 court to dismiss the Complaint or strike the portions of the
2 Complaint that rely on those documents. (Dir. Mot. at 10, Dir.
3 Reply at 2.) Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint because it
4 depends on but does not attach the two documents. Defendants do
5 not have access to the documents, and therefore cannot attach them
6 to their Motion.

7 "Ordinarily, a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
8 12(b)(6) is addressed to the four corners of the complaint without
9 consideration of other documents or facts outside of the
10 complaint." Haskell v. Time, Inc., 857 F.Supp. 1392, 1396
11 (E.D.Cal. 1994). "In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may
12 generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings,
13 exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to
14 judicial notice. However, in order to prevent plaintiffs from
15 surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by deliberately omitting documents
16 upon which their claims are based, a court may consider a writing
17 referenced in a complaint but not explicitly incorporated therein
18 if the complaint relies on the document and its authenticity is
19 unquestioned." Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir.
20 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

21 The FDIC concedes that "written instruments may be considered
22 on a motion to dismiss when the allegations are essential to and
23 underlie the conduct at issue." (Opp. to Dir. Mot. at 26 n.8.)
24 However, the FDIC asserts that the issue of the action is not false
25 or misleading statements in the documents but the conduct of the
26 directors. "The ROE only serves to corroborate the Director
27 Defendants' actionable conduct. Put another way, even if the ROE
28 did not exist, the acts of the Director Defendants, as alleged in

1 the complaint, would survive." (Opp. to Dir. Mot. at 27.) The FDIC
2 also points out that the ROE was not written at the time of the
3 approval of seven of the nine loans, and that therefore it cannot
4 be the basis for Defendants' actionable conduct. (Opp. to Dir.
5 Mot. at 27.) Finally, the FDIC notes that the Complaint cites at
6 least 50 documents. (Opp. to Dir. Mot. at 25.)

7 The court finds that although the Complaint frequently
8 references the 2006 ROE, the number of references alone does not
9 make that document essential to the Complaint. The FDIC has
10 grounded its allegations in prima facie deficiencies in the loans
11 presented to the Director Defendants for approval. Such
12 deficiencies may be corroborated by the 2006 ROE but do not derive
13 from it. Therefore, the court must consider only the four corners
14 of the Complaint, and Defendants' lack of access to the documents
15 is not a basis on which to dismiss the Complaint or strike the
16 portions of the Complaint that refer to these documents. The
17 references to the documents serve to corroborate Defendants'
18 actionable conduct.

19 **B. Rules 8 and 10**

20 All Defendants argue that the Complaint is deficient because
21 it does not give notice as to which defendants are being sued for
22 doing what as to which loans, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
23 Procedure 8. It "gives little guidance as to the specific
24 negligent acts at issue" and "does not indicate which defendants
25 supposedly committed which allegedly negligent acts with respect to
26 which loans." (Off. Mot. at 28.)

27 The FDIC responds that it "has pled specific facts as to each
28 individual Defendant and their participation in the management of

1 the Bank and the approval of each loan" and that "To the extent
2 that the Complaint does plead collectively, the pleadings refer to
3 instances where Defendants acted together, failed to take
4 appropriate action together . . . , voted together, approved
5 documents and loans together, and each was equally complicit."
6 (Opp. to Off. Mot. at 22-23.)

7 The court agrees with the FDIC. The Complaint indicates the
8 dates that each defendant served as an officer or director.
9 (Compl. ¶¶ 20-29.) It also indicates which loans were approved
10 during each Defendant's tenure and how each Defendant voted on the
11 loan. (Id. ¶ 57.) The Complaint also explains the specific
12 deficiencies of each loan. (Id. ¶¶ 60-138.) The Complaint thus
13 sufficiently alleges with respect to each defendant "the basic
14 questions: who, did what, to whom (or with whom), where, and when."
15 Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008).

16 The cases cited by Defendants involved allegations with far
17 less specificity than the allegations of this Complaint. In
18 Fennell v. Gregory, 414 F. App'x 32, 35 (9th Cir. 2011), in which
19 the plaintiff alleged First and Fourteenth Amendment violations by
20 various Attorneys General, the Ninth Circuit held that "Fennell's
21 Complaint lacks factual particularity regarding the personal
22 involvement and conduct of the individual Attorneys General."
23 Here, in contrast, there is sufficient factual particularity
24 regarding each Defendant and each allegedly deficient loan;
25 although the Complaint frequently pleads in the collective, that
26 collective is always defined and the action - approving the loan -
27 is always a genuinely collective action. This is not a case where
28 the Complaint fails "to say which wrongs were committed by which

1 defendants." McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996).
2 The Complaint states the wrongs, many of which were collective, and
3 identifies which Defendants were involved in committing each wrong.
4 Defendants thus have sufficient notice of the allegations against
5 them.

6 The court also finds that Rule 10 does not require the FDIC to
7 plead each loan as a separate count. Rule 10(b) states that "[i]f
8 doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
9 transaction or occurrence - and each defense other than a denial -
10 must be stated in a separate count or defense." Fed. R. Civ. P.
11 10(b). Such a structure, here, would likely involve significant
12 repetition of the claims for relief making the Complaint unwieldy
13 without promoting clarity.

14 **C. Motion of Director Defendants**

15 The Complaint makes claims for relief against the Director
16 Defendants for gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

17 **1. Business Judgment Rule**

18 Director Defendants argue that they are protected from claims
19 of breach of fiduciary duty by the business judgment rule.
20 "California Corporations Code § 309 codifies California's business
21 judgment rule. The general purpose of the business judgment rule
22 is to afford directors broad discretion in making corporate
23 decisions and to allow these decisions to be made without judicial
24 second-guessing in hindsight." FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040,
25 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotation marks
26 omitted).¹ "The California business judgment rule is intended to

27
28 ¹ The relationship between the business judgment rule and §
(continued...)

1 protect a director from liability for a mistake in business
2 judgment which is made in good faith and in what he or she believes
3 to be the best interest of the corporation, where no conflict of
4 interest exists." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks
5 omitted). "The rule establishes a presumption that directors'
6 decisions are based on sound business judgment, and it prohibits
7 courts from interfering in business decisions made by the directors
8 in good faith and in the absence of a conflict of interest." Berg
9 & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle, 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1045. The
10 rule does not protect a director "where there is a conflict of
11 interest, fraud, oppression, or corruption," nor does it protect "a
12 director who has wholly abdicated his corporate responsibility,
13 closing his or her eyes to corporate affairs." Castetter, 184 F.3d
14 at 1046.

15 The court finds that the FDIC has pleaded facts sufficient to
16 overcome the business judgment rule. First, the FDIC has stated a
17 claim for the directors receiving improper personal benefits,
18

19 ¹(...continued)
20 309 is somewhat complex. While a plain reading of § 309 does
21 suggest, as the FDIC argues, that a director may be held liable if
22 the director does not meet a standard of reasonable care, i.e. is
23 negligent, such a reading would mean that § 309 abolishes the
24 business judgment rule by making a director always liable for
25 negligence. See 1 Harold Marsh, Jr., et al., Marsh's California
26 Corporation Law 11-26-11-27 (4th Ed. 2012). California courts
27 appear to agree that § 309 codified rather than abolished the
28 business judgment rule. See, e.g., Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208
Cal.App.3d 1250, 1264 (1989)(citations omitted)("Section 309
codifies California's business judgment rule. Section 309
incorporates the concept of a director's immunity from liability
for an honest mistake of business judgment with the concept of a
director's obligation of reasonable diligence in the performance of
his or her duties.") Thus, the business judgment rule applies when
the director fails to meet a standard of reasonable care (i.e., is
negligent), but not "where there is a conflict of interest, fraud,
oppression, or corruption" or where a director has "wholly
abdicated his corporate responsibility."

1 which, if true, may deprive them of the protection of the business
2 judgment rule.

3 Additionally, the FDIC has stated a claim for the directors'
4 abdication of corporate responsibility. Although § 309 allows
5 directors to "rely on information, opinions, reports or statements,
6 including financial statements and other financial data" provided
7 by certain authorized parties, this reliance is authorized only "so
8 long as, in any such case, the director acts in good faith, after
9 reasonable inquiry when the need therefor is indicated by the
10 circumstance and without knowledge that would cause such reliance
11 to be unwarranted." Cal. Corp. Code § 309.

12 Here, the FDIC alleges that the directors approved loans so
13 facially deficient that they made reliance upon them unwarranted.
14 See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 61 ("The FBBH Credit Memo . . . showed that the
15 Approving Dependents relied on outdated corporate financials, which
16 were dated as of December 31, 2004, outdated financials of the
17 principal of the borrower, which were dated as of September 2005,
18 and an outdated 2004 appraisal."); ¶ 68 ("at the time of the CTB
19 deal, the Principals created a new entity to buy the land,
20 essentially from themselves, at a price higher than both the
21 appraisal's 'as is' value and prospective value for finished lots.
22 This fact, which was contained in the CTB Credit Memo given to the
23 Approving Defendants, and altered the Approving Defendants that the
24 Principals 'flipped' the property at an inflated sales price, was
25 not addressed by the Approving Defendants, and no further due
26 diligence on this issue was requested by the Approving Defendants
27 or conducted by FBBH underwriters."); and ¶ 85 ("The FBBH Credit
28 Memo, given to the Approving Defendants, stated that construction

1 was 60% complete but that 72% of the loan proceeds had been
2 disbursed, while the CTB Due Diligence Synopsis of August 27, 2006,
3 which Defendants received, described construction as 90%
4 complete."). These allegations, taken as true, state a claim for
5 abdication of corporate responsibility.

6 The court finds that the FDIC has pleaded facts sufficient to
7 overcome the business judgment rule.

8 **2. Exculpatory Clause**

9 Defendants also argue that they are not liable for breach of
10 fiduciary duty because FBBH's Articles of Incorporation contained
11 an exculpatory clause, under which the "liability of the directors
12 of the Corporation for monetary damages shall be eliminated to the
13 fullest extent permissible under California law." (Request for
14 Judicial Notice in Support of Dir. Mot., Exh. A, ("Exculpatory
15 Clause").) However, under California law, such exculpatory clauses
16 "may not eliminate or limit the liability of directors" in certain
17 situations, most relevant here,

18 (ii) for acts or omissions that a director believes to be
19 contrary to the best interests of the corporation or its
20 shareholders or that involve the absence of good faith on
21 the part of the director,

22 (iii) for any transaction from which a director derived
23 an improper personal benefit,

24 (iv) for acts or omissions that show a reckless disregard
25 for the director's duty to the corporation or its
26 shareholders in circumstances in which the director was
27 aware, or should have been aware, in the ordinary course
28 of performing a director's duties, of a risk of serious

1 injury to the corporation or its shareholders,
2 (v) for acts or omissions that constitute an unexcused
3 pattern of inattention that amounts to an abdication of
4 the director's duty to the corporation or its
5 shareholders.

6 Cal. Corp. Code § 204(a)(10).

7 The FDIC maintains that the Complaint alleges facts sufficient
8 to trigger the § 204 exceptions and render the Exculpatory Clause
9 invalid.

10 The Complaint alleges that Director Defendants received an
11 improper personal benefit in the Complaint in, for instance, ¶ 9
12 ("By approving the Loss Loans despite their myriad obvious
13 deficiencies, the Defendants lined their own pockets when FBBH
14 dividends, boosted by false profits on large problematic loans that
15 were unlikely to be repaid, were upstreamed to the Bank's parent
16 company -- of which numerous Defendants were shareholders."); ¶ 37
17 ("During the 2006 examination, Faigin informed examiners that he
18 would recommend that the Bank cease making cash dividend payments
19 to BHBC for 2007, a recommendation with which the examiners agreed.
20 In spite of this, the directors approved quarterly dividends
21 totally \$9.6 million in 2007, which amounted to 563.38% of the
22 Bank's net operating income. Several voting directors were large
23 shareholders in BHBC, collectively owning approximately 23% of
24 outstanding shares."); and ¶ 53 ("The CTB loans were part of a
25 \$117.1 million package of eight loan participations with CTB that
26 Rosa, who was CTB's CCO at the time, had referred to Lannan.
27 Lannan voted to approve the purchase of the CTB loan
28 participations, despite the fact that he stood to benefit

1 personally from the approval of the loans. In fact, Lannan
2 received a \$75,000 referral fee from the Bank for referring the
3 participations to the Bank. FBBH hired Rosa immediately after the
4 Board approved the CTB participations.").

5 The court finds that the FDIC has stated a claim under (iii)
6 with the allegations that the Directors approved loans from which
7 they stood personally to benefit and were shareholders in companies
8 that profited from the allegedly facially deficient loans. The
9 Director Defendants argue that none of these actions indicate
10 improper personal benefit. While that may ultimately turn out to
11 be the case, the FDIC has stated a claim for such an improper
12 benefit. Whether that claim holds up is a question for the fact-
13 finder.

14 The court also finds that the FDIC has alleged facts
15 sufficient to trigger (iv) and (v).² FDIC has pleaded facts
16 amounting to "reckless disregard" under (iv) in allegations such as
17 ¶ 2 ("Defendants recklessly implemented an unsustainable business
18 model pursuing rapid asset growth concentrated in large high-risk
19 loans without having adequate loan underwriting policies and
20 practices to manage the risk."), and ¶¶ 36-38 (failing to address
21 serious criticism of the Bank's lending and funding policies
22 leveled in the 2006 ROE), and ¶¶ 61, 63, 64, 72, 76-79
23 (disregarding clear deficiencies in Credit Memos regarding various
24 loans). These same facts state a claim for an "unexcused pattern

25 ² The parties have not provided, and the court has not
26 discovered, any California or federal interpretations of "reckless
27 disregard" or "unexcused pattern of inattention." These two
28 exceptions to the statute allowing an exculpatory clause are
exclusive to California and not found in the Delaware statute that
served as a model or in comparable legislation of any other state.
Marsh's Cal. Corp. Law, 4th Ed. § 11-04 at 11-44.1.

1 of inattention that amounts to an abdication of duty."³

2 For these reasons, the court finds that the FDIC has pleaded
3 sufficient facts to establish that the Exculpatory Clause may be
4 bypassed under § 204.

5 3. Second Claim for Gross Negligence

6 In its second claim for relief, the FDIC seeks to hold the
7 Director Defendants personally liable for money damages under
8 Section 11(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended by
9 the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
10 1989 ("FIRREA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k). FIRREA section 1821(k) makes
11 directors and officers of banks liable for gross negligence.
12 Under FIRREA, "state law sets the standard of conduct as long as
13 the state standard (such as simple negligence) is stricter than
14 that of the federal statute." Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519 U.S. 213,
15 216 (1997). Even if the Exculpatory Clause applies, under FIRREA
16 Director Defendants would be liable if they breached the applicable
17 standard of care of gross negligence. FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d
18 532, 539-40 ("Section 1821(k) preempts these state laws to the
19 extent that they insulate officers and directors from liability for
20 gross negligence, because such laws directly conflict with its

21 _____
22 ³ Defendants assert that this requires a "total abdication" of
23 duty, but the case they cite, Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v.
24 Boyle, does not support that proposition. The Berg court noted
25 that "Berg suggests that it has pleaded total abdication by the
26 directors of their corporate responsibilities" but found that "the
27 mere fact of the assignment [an alternative to liquidation in
28 bankruptcy] and the failure by the directors to pursue Berg's
bankruptcy reorganization plan or some other unidentified
abdication of duty." Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle, 178
Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1047 (2009). In other words, the court did not
require Berg to plead a "total abdication of duty;" it found
instead that the facts pleaded by Berg did not amount to an
abdication of duty, despite Berg's assertion to the contrary.

1 grant of authority."). "'Gross negligence' long has been defined
2 in California and other jurisdictions as either a 'want of even
3 scant care' or 'an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
4 conduct.'" City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 4th
5 747, 754 (2007)(citation omitted).

6 The FDIC summarizes its allegations of gross negligence as
7 follows: "The Complaint contains allegations that . . .
8 [Defendants] approved nine facially deficient loans that bore an
9 unusually high risk of not being repaid, permitted loans to be made
10 without proper analysis of the borrowers' ability to repay, failed
11 to inform themselves about the risk posed by the loans prior to
12 approval, approved loans with terms inconsistent with the Bank's
13 Loan Policy, and failed to ensure the loans were underwritten in
14 accordance with sound banking principles." (Opp. to Dir. Mot. at
15 21.)

16 The Director Defendants maintain that they acted with due care
17 by "follow[ing] [the Bank's] established process in approving the
18 nine loans at issue, which involved review of substantial
19 information" and receiving Bank credit memoranda with "substantial
20 information on which the Director Defendants based their approvals
21 of the loans." (Dir. Mot. at 12-13.) They maintain that they did
22 not have a "duty of inquiry" to independently verify every aspect
23 of each loan. See Castetter, 184 F.3d at 1045. As a result,
24 Director Defendants argue, the FDIC has failed to state a claim not
25 only for gross negligence but for simple negligence.

26 California Corporations Code § 309 sets the standard of care
27 for a director and states that "a director shall be entitled to
28 rely on information, opinions, reports or statements [prepared by

1 certain parties] . . . so long as . . . the director acts in good
2 faith, after reasonable inquiry when the need therefor is indicated
3 by the circumstances and without knowledge that would cause such
4 reliance to be unwarranted." The FDIC argues that because the
5 loans were facially deficient, the Directors had a duty to
6 investigate. The Director Defendants respond that the loans were
7 not facially deficient and that some of the purported deficiencies
8 are based in documents that the FDIC-R does not allege were in the
9 possession of the Directors. (Dir. Mot. at 16.) They argue,
10 further, that the allegations in the Complaint amount to merely
11 "substantive disagreement" with the decision to issue the loans,
12 rather than gross negligence in the process of making loans.

13 If the documents provided to the Director Defendants are as
14 facially deficient as alleged in the Complaint, those documents
15 would trigger a duty to investigate because reliance upon them
16 would be unwarranted. Such misplaced reliance would properly be
17 considered as a failure of the Director Defendants' process of
18 decisionmaking rather than the substance of the decisions. "Courts
19 give deference to directors' decisions reached by a proper process,
20 and do not apply an objective reasonableness test in such a case to
21 examine the wisdom of the decision itself." Hill v. State Farm
22 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal. App. 4th 1438, 1493 (2008)(internal
23 quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). In Hill, the
24 "plaintiffs offered expert testimony to the effect that the Board's
25 decisions on dividends, rate reductions, and the surplus were wrong
26 on the merits" and the court found that "plaintiffs did not make a
27 showing that the Board's decisionmaking process was tainted by
28 fraud, oppression, illegality, or a similar purpose." Id. at 1494.

1 Instead, it "merely questions the decisions which the directors
2 made. This is exactly the type of second-guessing which the
3 business judgment rule was designed to preclude." Id. (internal
4 quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Here, in
5 contrast, the FDIC alleges not merely that the Director Defendants
6 made unwise decisions, but that their process was flawed insofar as
7 the alleged facial deficiencies in the loans did not trigger
8 further investigation as they should have. The FDIC also alleges
9 that the loans were approved in violation of the Bank's Loan
10 Policy, which further indicates that the allegations concern
11 decisionmaking procedures rather than substance.

12 Director Defendants assert that the decision-making process
13 alleged in the Complaint demonstrates at least "scant care" because
14 FBBH followed its established process in approving the loans at
15 issue and involved reviewing substantial information. They argue
16 that the allegations do not rebut the "'prima facie showing of good
17 faith and reasonable investigation [that] is established when a
18 majority of the board is comprised of outside directors and the
19 board' has received the advice of independent consultants."
20 Castetter, 184 F.3d at 1045 (quoting Katz v. Chevron Corp., 22 Cal.
21 App. 4th 1352, 1368-69 (1994)). The court finds that, taken as
22 true, the allegations that the Director Defendants approved and
23 failed reasonably to investigate facially deficient loans in
24 violation of FBBH's Loan Policy and sound banking principles are
25 sufficient to rebut the presumption of good faith and reasonable
26 investigation.

27 Director Defendants also argue that the FDIC has not pleaded a
28 causal connection between the alleged deficiencies and violations

1 and the FDIC's losses. The court disagrees. The Complaint alleges
2 that "[a]s a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' gross
3 negligence, the FDIC suffered damages in an amount to be proven at
4 trial, in excess of \$100.6 million." (Compl. ¶ 152.)

5 For these reasons, the court finds that, the FDIC has stated a
6 claim for gross negligence.

7 4. Duplication of Claims

8 The Director Defendants assert that the third claim for relief
9 (regarding breach of fiduciary duty) should be dismissed because it
10 is "entirely duplicative" of the gross negligence claim. (Dir.
11 Mot. at 30.) "Both claims are based on the approval of the same
12 nine loans, the same losses allegedly resulting from the approval
13 of those loans, and the same duty of care to the Bank." (Id.)

14 Under the Federal Rules, "[a] party may set out 2 or more
15 statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically,
16 either in a single count or defense or in separate ones. If a
17 party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if
18 any one of them is sufficient." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). This rule
19 embodies a "liberal pleading policy." Molsbergen v. U.S., 757 F.2d
20 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1985).

21 The Director Defendants cite Swartz v. KPMG, LLP in support of
22 the proposition that duplicative claims that add nothing should be
23 dismissed. 476 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2007). There, the Ninth Circuit
24 held that a claim seeking "a declaration of defendants' liability
25 for damages sought for his other causes of action" was "merely
26 duplicative." Id. at 766. In that case, however, the issue was
27 not only the repetition of the same facts and same plea for
28 damages, but rather the derivative nature of the cause of action,

1 which depends on the other causes of action to succeed at all.

2 Here, the claims regarding gross negligence and breach of
3 fiduciary duty share the same underlying facts, but either could
4 survive on its own. Director Defendants have not established any
5 prejudice to them, since the Complaint does not seek a double
6 recovery. To find that the FDIC must limit itself to one or the
7 other would constrict the "liberal pleading policy" of Rule 8 which
8 does not put any such limits on pleading in the alternative.

9 **D. Motion of Officer Defendants**

10 **1. Whether the BJR Applies to Officer Defendants**

11 **a. Choice of Law**

12 In determining the choice of law for actions against a
13 corporation, California courts have used the "internal affairs
14 doctrine." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 114
15 Cal. App. 4th 434, 434, 442-44, 446 (2003); Vaughn v. LJ Int'l
16 Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 213, 223 (2009). "The internal affairs
17 doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only
18 one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation's
19 internal affairs." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
20 The Supreme Court has stated that courts normally "look to the
21 State of a business' incorporation" to decide which law applies.
22 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 224 (1997). Atherton further
23 suggested that the state in which the "bank has its main office or
24 maintains its principal place of business" can be used as the state
25 of incorporation. Id. (citations omitted).

26 Here, First Bank of Beverly Hills ("FBBH") has been
27 incorporated and has its principle place of business in California.
28 (Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Dkt. No. 36-1, Ex. A

1 ("Articles of Incorporation").) FBBH is a wholly owned subsidiary
2 of Beverly Hills Bancorp, Inc. ("Bancorp"). Bancorp is
3 incorporated in Delaware. Defendant Officers argue that Bancorp and
4 Bank are so intertwined that Delaware law should apply. (Reply at
5 4-5.) They point out that Bancorp provided financial and managerial
6 strength for Bank and that several of Bank's officers and directors
7 were shareholders of Bancorp. (Id.) Further, they argue that by
8 Bancorp being incorporated in Delaware, Bancorp's shareholders
9 expressly determined that Delaware laws would govern. (Id.)

10 The court rejects this line of reasoning. First, only FBBH,
11 not Bancorp, is not a party to this action. Defendant Officers
12 have cited no case where a court has applied the law from the state
13 of a parent company's incorporation without that parent company
14 being a party to the action. Second, FBBH selected California as
15 its principal place of business. (RJN, Ex. A.) Its articles of
16 incorporation indicate that California law governs areas such as
17 liability and indemnification of agents. (Id.) Under the internal
18 affairs doctrine, the court finds that California law applies. See
19 FDIC v. Van Dellen, CV 10-4915 DSF (SHx), 2012 WL 4815159 (C.D.
20 Cal. Oct. 5, 2012).

21 **b. Whether the business judgment rule Extends to**
22 **Officers**

23 The Officer Defendants argue that even if California law
24 applies, corporate officers are shielded from liability by the
25 business judgment rule. Officer Defendants argue that the court
26 should apply the common law business judgment rule to officers as
27 well as directors. This claim is not supported by California law.
28 See, e.g., Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 1265

1 (1989) (holding that because the directors were "acting as officer
2 employees of the corporation . . . the business judgment rule
3 therefore should not apply."); FDIC v. Van Dellen, 2012 WL 4815159,
4 at *6 (holding that "California courts have not extended the rule
5 to officers and this [c]ourt declines to do so.").¹ Biren, cited
6 by Officer Defendants in support of the extension of the business
7 judgment rule to officers, concerned a director-officer who was
8 protected by the business judgment rule, but the court focused on
9 her status as a director rather than her dual status as director-
10 officer. See, e.g., Biren v. Equality Emergency Medical Group, 102
11 Cal. App. 4th 125, 138 (2002)("[Biren] was the director responsible
12 for billing matters. She believed it was her duty to promptly
13 change billing companies to protect the corporation. The trial
14 court could reasonably infer that she mistakenly believed it was in
15 the best interest of the corporation that she act with alacrity
16 because the other directors could not.") The court adopts the
17 reasoning of Judge Wright in FDIC v. Perry, CV-11-5561 ODW (MRWx),
18 2012 WL 589569 (C.D. Cal. 2012), which analyzes California court
19 decisions, statutory language, and legislative history and comes to
20 the conclusion that "[i]n light of the apparent lack of authority
21 and the California legislature's expressed intent not to include
22 corporate officers in codifying common law [business judgment
23 rule], this Court holds that [the business judgment rule] does not

24
25 ¹ Officer Defendants rely on Biren v. Equal. Emergency Med. Grp.,
26 102 Cal. App. 4th 125 (2002), which held that the business judgment
27 rule protected an officer-director acting in her capacity as the
28 company's chief executive officer. (Off. Mot. at 13:3-5.) However,
the Biren court's decision focuses on the protections afforded to
Biren by the BJR based on her status as a director. "[T]he
[business judgment] rule . . . protect[s] well-meaning directors who
are misinformed, misguided, and honestly mistaken." Id. at 137.

1 protect officers' corporate decisions." Id. at *4.

2 **2. Gross Negligence**

3 In the alternative, the FDIC brings a claim for gross
4 negligence under FIRREA § 1821(k) against the Officer Defendants.
5 The court agrees, and the FDIC does not dispute, that the FDIC may
6 bring either the negligence or the gross negligence claim against
7 Officer Defendants, not both. The Supreme Court held that state
8 law provides the standard of liability for suits under FIRREA §
9 1821(k) when, as here, the state law standard is more rigorous than
10 gross negligence. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 216 ("[S]tate law sets
11 the standard of conduct as long as the state standard (such as
12 simple negligence) is stricter than that of the federal statute.
13 The federal statute nonetheless sets a 'gross negligence' floor,
14 which applies as a substitute for state standards that are more
15 relaxed."). Since under state law the Officer Defendants are not
16 shielded by the business judgment rule, they are subject to
17 liability under FIRREA on a simple negligence theory. They cannot
18 also be subject to liability under FIRREA on a gross negligence
19 theory when a stricter state standard applies.

20 **3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty**

21 The Officer Defendants next argue that the court should strike
22 the breach of fiduciary duty claim because it is entirely
23 duplicative of the simple negligence claim. This argument is
24 identical to the one made by the Director Defendants, and the court
25 rejects it for the same reasons. Liberal pleading standards mean
26 that plaintiffs must be allowed to plead their claims in the
27 alternative.

28 ///

1 **E. Motion of Defendant Faigin**

2 Defendant Faigin joins the Motions of both the Director
3 Defendants and the Officer Defendants. The court's conclusions
4 with respect to those Motions apply equally to Defendant Faigin's
5 Motion.

6 **F. Motion of Defendant Lannan**

7 Defendant Lannan was a director of the Bank from 2003 to 2008.
8 Eric Rosa, employed by China Trust Bank at the time, referred the
9 CTB loans to Lannan. (Compl. ¶¶ 52, 53, 58.) Lannan voted to
10 approve these loans, and all of the nine loans at issue. (Compl.
11 ¶¶ 29, 57.) The Complaint alleges that he received a referral fee
12 of \$75,000 for the four CTB participation loans. (Compl. ¶ 9.)
13 When regulators learned that Lannan had voted to approve the CTB
14 participation loans while receiving a referral fee, they required
15 the Board to ratify the purchase without Lannan. Defendants
16 Faigin, Amster, Glennon, Kanner, King, and Kellogg voted in favor
17 of ratification a year after the original approval. (Compl. ¶ 58.)

18 Lannan joins the Outside Director Defendants' Motion.
19 Additionally, he moves to dismiss the first claim for relief which
20 alleges that he was negligent in voting on loans from the China
21 Trust Bank and then receiving a referral fee of \$75,000. Whereas
22 the other directors are protected by the business judgment rule for
23 negligence, the FDIC alleges that Lannan had a conflict of interest
24 and therefore is not protected by the business judgment rule.
25 Lannan asserts that his vote was consistent with California
26 Corporations Code § 310 and is therefore protected by the business
27 judgment rule of § 309. He also asserts that the third claim for
28 relief for breach of fiduciary duty should be dismissed.

1 California Corporations Code § 309 codifies a director's
2 standard of care. Under that rule, a contract is not "void or
3 voidable" because a director has a "material financial interest" in
4 the transaction if the following conditions are met:

5 (1) The material facts as to the transaction and as to
6 such director's interest are fully disclosed or known to
7 the shareholders and such contract or transaction is
8 approved by the shareholders (Section 153) in good faith,
9 with the shares owned by the interested director or
10 directors not being entitled to vote thereon, or

11 (2) The material facts as to the transaction and as to
12 such director's interest are fully disclosed or known to
13 the board or committee, and the board or committee
14 authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or
15 transaction in good faith by a vote sufficient without
16 counting the vote of the interested director or directors
17 and the contract or transaction is just and reasonable as
18 to the corporation at the time it is authorized, approved
19 or ratified, or

20 (3) As to contracts or transactions not approved as
21 provided in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subdivision, the
22 person asserting the validity of the contract or
23 transaction sustains the burden of proving that the
24 contract or transaction was just and reasonable as to the
25 corporation at the time it was authorized, approved or
26 ratified.

27 Cal. Corp. Code § 310.
28

1 Under § 309, a director is protected by the business judgment
2 rule when he or she performs the duties of a director "in good
3 faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best
4 interests of the corporation and its shareholders and with such
5 care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person
6 in a like position would use under similar circumstances." Cal.
7 Corp. Code § 309. Under California law, "a director is not liable
8 for a mistake in business judgment which is made in good faith and
9 in what he or she believes to be the best interests of the
10 corporation, where no conflict of interest exists." Gaillard, 208
11 Cal.App.3d at 1263 (1989). "The business judgment rule does not
12 shield actions taken without reasonable inquiry, with improper
13 motives, or as a result of a conflict of interest." Kruss v.
14 Booth, 185 Cal.App.4th at 728 (2010).

15 The FDIC argues that it is undisputed that a conflict of
16 interest exists, since Lannan does not deny that he referred the
17 four loans and received a fee for them. Lannan contends that
18 because he complied with § 310 and because the referral fee was not
19 improper, the prospect and receipt of "a referral fee for these
20 loans did not impose any legally independent obligations on him to
21 investigate these loans or refrain from voting on them." (Lannan
22 Mot. at 10.) He claims the same protections of the business
23 judgment rule as the other Director Defendants. The FDIC counters
24 that his compliance with § 310 means only that the contract is not
25 voidable, not that he did not have a conflict of interest.

26 In other words, the parties dispute whether compliance with §
27 310 annuls what would otherwise be a conflict of interest under §
28 309. The court finds that as a matter of policy a director with a

1 personal interest in the transaction should not benefit from the
2 business judgment rule. The aim of the business judgment rule is
3 to protect disinterested directors making their best efforts at
4 business decisions. When a director has a personal stake in the
5 transaction, even if it is allowed because of his compliance with §
6 310, he is nonetheless not a disinterested director in the case of
7 that particular transaction. Section 310 neutralizes the effects
8 of a conflict of interest so as to create a valid contract, but it
9 does not neutralize a conflict of interest for all purposes. "The
10 satisfaction of section 310's requirements . . . does not render
11 such contract immune from attack on other grounds, such as
12 corporate waste, and does not render the directors immune from
13 liability for breach of fiduciary duty as a result of their
14 approval of such contract." Gaillard, 208 Cal.App.3d at 1273. For
15 these reasons, the court finds that Lannan's compliance with § 310
16 does not result in the protection of the business judgment rule
17 under § 309.

18 The court DENIES Lannan's Motion.

19 **IV. Conclusion**

20 For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES all of the
21 Motions to Dismiss.

22 IT IS SO ORDERED.

23
24
25 Dated: July 8, 2013



26 DEAN D. PREGERSON

27 United States District Judge

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