The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

The Internet is buzzing over Bank of America’s June 29, 2011announcement (here) of its eye-popping $8.5 billion settlement to resolve “nearly all” of the repurchase claims involving legacy Countrywide-issued residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). The company’s press release and accompanying June 29, 2011 filing on form 8-K contain a lot of information about the underlying dispute and the settlement, but the deal has many moving parts and there is a lot to absorb here.

From a survey of the settlement documents, it appears that, among other things, the settlement resolves only the investors’ repurchase claims under the documents governing the securities but apparently does not resolve the investors’ separate claims under the federal securities laws, as discussed below.

The deal itself involves a settlement with the Bank of New York Mellon as trustee to 530 RMBS trusts having an original principal balance of $424 billion and unpaid principal balance of $221 billion. According to the Wall Street Journal’s account of the deal, the dispute had begun with a demand last October from a law firm representing 22 institutional investors. 

The investors had demanded that BofA repurchase mortgages that had been packaged into securities, basing their demand on allegations of   “breaches of representations and warranties contained in the Governing Agreements with respect to the Covered Trusts (including alleged failure to comply with underwriting guidelines (including limitations on underwriting exceptions), to comply with required loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, to ensure appropriate appraisals of mortgaged properties, and to verify appropriate owner-occupancy status),  and of the repurchase provisions contained in the Governing Agreements. ”Although the original demand was on behalf only of the 22 investors, the settlement is on behalf of virtually all investors in the trusts.

The settlement agreement can be found here. The plaintiffs’ firms press June 29, 2011 press release about the settlement can be found here. The basic framework of the settlement is straightforward – BofA will pay $8.5 billion to settle the claims. But there is more to it than that.

First, the settlement requires court approval. The settlement agreement explains that the Trustee will initiate an “Article 77 proceeding” in order to obtain the necessary approval. An article 77 proceeding is an action provided for under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, refer here. All costs associated with the Article 77 proceedings are to be borne by BofA. The 8-K specifically warns that given the number of trusts and investors and the complexity of the settlement “it is not possible to predict whether and to what extent challenges will be made to the settlement.”  The settlement is also conditioned on the receipt of tax rulings from the IRS and New York.

Second, on its face, the settlement involves a lot more than $8.5 billion. The 8-K says that” in addition to” the $8.5 billion settlement payment, BofA is “obligated to pay attorneys’ fees and costs to the Investor Group’s counsel as well as all fees and expenses incurred by the Trustee in connection with the settlement, including fees and expenses related to obtaining final court approval.” According to the exhibits to the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs’ firm is to receive $85 million in fees and costs.. As Susan Beck points out on the Am Law Litigation Daily, that may only represent one percent of the settlement, but it is still a respectable chunk of change.

Third, although the settlement is intended to be broad, there are a number of matters that the settlement does not resolve. For example, the settlement does not cover “a small number” of legacy transactions, including six transactions in which BNY Mellon did not act as Trustee.

Perhaps even more interestingly, the settlement does not resolve the investors’ claims under the securities laws. As the 8-K states, “because the settlement is with the Trustee on behalf of the Covered Trusts and releases rights under the governing agreements for the Covered Trusts, the settlement does not release investors’ securities law or fraud claims based upon disclosures made in connection with their decision to purchase, sell or hold securities issued by the trusts.”

Specifically, Paragraph 10 of the Settlement Agreement states that “release and waiver in Paragraph 9 does not include any direct claims held by Investors or their clients that do not seek to enforce any rights under the terms of the Governing Agreements but rather are based on disclosures made (or failed to be made) in connection with their decision to purchase, sell, or hold securities issued by any Covered Trust, including claims under the securities or anti-fraud laws of the United States or of any state; provided, however, that the question of the extent to which any payment made or benefit conferred pursuant to this Settlement Agreement may constitute an offset or credit against, or a reduction in the gross amount of, any such claim shall be determined in the action in which such claim is raised, and the Parties reserve all rights with respect to the position they may take on that question in those actions and acknowledge that all other Persons similarly reserve such rights.”

Fourth, beyond the $8.5 billion settlement, BofA will also record an additional 2Q11 charge of $5.5 billion additional representations and warranties exposure to non-government sponsored entities “and to a lesser extent GSE exposures.” Despite the sizeable amount of this charge, the 8-K specifies that the amount is not intended to include a variety of other costs, including “potential claims under securities laws.” The 8-K adds that the company is “not able to reasonably estimate the amount of any possible loss” concerning these other matters (including securities claims), noting that “such loss could be material.”

The settlement documents do not indicate whether any portion of the settlement will be funded by insurance. Given the nature of the settlement and of the underlying claims, the settlement would not appear to be a matter than would involve D&O insurance. At least one reader has raised the question whether or not the settlement might involve BofA’s E&O insurance. Much would depend on the nature of the coverage the bank has purchased. I welcome readers’ thoughts on the possibility of insurance coverage availability for this type of a settlement.

In any event, as massive as the settlement and the separate charge are, they do not and not intended to relate to the investor claims asserted under federal securities laws or state laws. As for those claims, I guess we will all just have to stay tuned…

Readers will of course recall that the parties to the securities class action lawsuit brought by shareholders of Countrywide against Countrywide and certain of its directors and officers previously announced a more than $600 million settlement (refer here). There are many other pending suits brought on behalf of investors who purchased Countrywide-issued mortgage backed securities. 

UPDATE: There is even more to this deal than I discussed above. If you have read this far, you will really want to take the time to read Susan Beck's excellent detailed analysis of the settlement in the Am Law LItigation Daily,here.

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In resolution of a securities case that at one time had actually been dismissed and that even after being revived was substantially narrowed based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Morrison decision, the parties to the Credit Suisse subprime-related securities class action lawsuit have reached a settlement by which the company has agreed to pay the plaintiff class $70 million. A copy of the parties’ March 10, 2010 settlement agreement can be found here. The settlement is subject to court approval.

As reported in greater detail here, the plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in this action in April 2008. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had made material misrepresentations about the company’s asset valuation system, its internal controls (which allegedly allowed unauthorized placement of high risk mortgage-backed assets in client accounts), and its own exposure to losses related to subprime mortgages. Credit Suisse is domiciled in Switzerland. Its shares trade on several securities exchanges outside the U.S. and its ADRs trade on the NYSE.

In an October 5, 2009 order (here), Southern District of New York Judge Victor Marrero granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, having concluded based on pre-Morrison standards that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of claimants who reside outside the U.S. and who had purchased their shares on foreign exchanges (so-called f-cubed claimants). The complaint had not identified the domicile of some other named plaintiffs, but Judge Marrero dismissed their claims as well.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs amended their complaint and the defendants renewed their motions to dismiss. As discussed here, on February 11, 2010, Judge Marrero held that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint was sufficient to overcome the initial defects and he allowed the case to go forward as to plaintiff shareholders who had purchased Credit Suisse ADRs on the NYSE and as to U.S.-based shareholders who had purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock Exchange. However, he also ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs that resided outside the U.S. and that had purchased their shares outside the U.S.

In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank case. The defendants in the Credit Suisse case moved to dismiss the claims by Americans who bought their Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss exchange – that is, the so-called "f-squared" claims. In a July 27, 2010 opinion, Judge Marrero ruled that Morrison also precludes the f-squared claims. As discussed here, Judge Marrero was the first to hold that under Morrison applied to preclude f-squared as well as f-cubed claims.

The parties then initiated a mediation process that resulted in the settlement agreement filed with the court on March 10.

The settlement agreement has a number of interesting features. First, the settlement agreement specifies that following the settlement’s preliminary approval Credit Suisse "and/or its insurers" will cause the payment of the $70 million settlement fund to the escrow agent. The settlement agreement itself does not specify how much of the settlement ultimately is to be borne by Credit Suisse’s insurers. The use of the word "or" in the phrase "or its insurers" suggests that the insurers contribution could possibly be as much as the entire $70 million, but there is simply no way to tell for sure from the face of the settlement document. However, the clear suggestion is that at least some portion of the settlement is to be paid by Credit Suisse’s insurers.

Second, even though Judge Marrero dismissed out the Americans who bought their Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss exchange, the proposed settlement class consists not only of all purchasers who acquired Credit Suisse ADRs on the U.S. Exchange, but also "all U.S. Residents who purchased [Credit Suisse] securities on the Swiss Stock Exchange during the class period." Clearly, plaintiffs counsel was not prepared to concede – at least for settlement purposes – that Judge Marrero’s ruling on this issue was correct.

However, it appears that the Judge Marrero’s ruling dismissing out the f-squared claimants was taken into account in the settlement. The Americans who bought Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss exchange will enjoy only a limited recover compared to the ADR purchasers. 90% of the net settlement amount is to go to settlement class members who purchased ADRs on the NYSE, and 10% is to go to the U.S. shareholders who purchased common shares on the Swiss exchange. (ADR holders will receive $1.38 per share and the U.S. shareholders will or 13 cents a share..)

As Alison Frankel points out in her March 11, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article about the Credit Suisse settlement (here), the settlement split between the ADR holders and the U.S. common shareholders is similar to the settlement split in the recent $125 million Satyam settlement (about which refer here) in which the ADS holders were to receive $1.38 a share and common shareholders were to receive 6 cents a share.

Third, although the settlement agreement itself does not specify the amount of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, the accompanying settlement papers discloses that the plaintiffs’ counsel intends to move the court and seek attorneys’ fees "not to exceed 27-1/2 percent of the settlement proceeds" plus $350,000 in expenses. If the plaintiffs’ counsel were to receive the full 27.5 percent amount, that would translate into a fee award of $19.25 million.

Beyond its specific features, the settlement is also interesting for what it represents. For starters, it is represents one of the few settlements so far of the more that 230 subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuits that accumulated during the period 2007 to 2010. By my count, the Credit Suisse settlement represents only the 19^th settlement of a credit crisis securities suit overall and only the second such settlement so far in 2011.

As Cornerstone Research discussed in its recently released study of 2010 securities class action lawsuit settlements (refer here), the credit crisis cases have "settled at a slower rate than traditional cases." Though many of these cases have been dismissed, others have survived dismissal motions. (And some, like the Credit Suisse case itself, were initially dismissed but survived renewed dismissal motions.) As I have noted elsewhere there is a backlog of unresolved credit crisis lawsuits. Though these cases are in many instances still working their way through the system, more of these cases will be moving toward settlement in the months ahead.

The size of the Credit Suisse settlement is also noteworthy. The $70 million settlement amount makes the case the fifth largest credit crisis securities suit settlement so far. Many of the credit crisis lawsuit settlements have been large – the Cornerstone study shows that the average and median credit crisis settlements have run substantially higher than the average and median settlements of securities suits generally. The suggestion is that the aggregate costs of all of these settlements could represent a very substantial figure, a possibility that, among other things, could have important implications for the D&O insurance industry.

Break in the Action: The D&O Diary’s publication schedule will be intermittent for the next two weeks. The normal publication schedule will resume on March 28, 2011.　

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As a result of a November 2, 2009 ruling (here) by Northern District of California Judge Susan Illston, the PMI Group securities class action lawsuit is the latest subprime-related securities suit to survive a renewed motion to dismiss following plaintiffs’ filing of an amended complaint after the motion to dismiss their initial complaint had been granted. As was the case with respect to the recent ruling in the Washington Mutual subprime-related securities class action lawsuit (about which refer here), the PMI Group lawsuit plaintiffs overcame the shortcomings of their initial pleading with an amended complaint reliant upon added confidential witness allegations.

Background

The PMI Group, a residential mortgage insurer that also owns a controlling interest in bond insurer Financial Guaranty Insurance Corporation, as well as certain of PMI’s directors and officers, were first sued in a securities class action lawsuit in March 2008 (about which refer here). As discussed here, on July 1, 2009, Judge Illston granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ consolidated complaint.

In her July 1 order, Judge Illston held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged material misrepresentation and loss causation, but she granted the motion with leave to amend on the grounds that the consolidated complaint did not adequately allege scienter. Among other things, Judge Illston observed that the complaint "falls short of showing that the defendants were aware that the statements were false and misleading when made."

On July 24, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint and the defendants renewed their dismissal motions.

November 2 Ruling

In her November 2 decision, Judge Illston denied the renewed dismissal motion. She noted that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint "differs from the original complaint in a number of ways." Among other things, she noted that the plaintiffs had "supplemented their allegations regarding previous confidential witnesses and added three new confidential witnesses." The plaintiffs also added additional allegations regarding admissions the defendants had allegedly made, as well as allegations PMI itself had made in a lawsuit against a third party, among other things.

Based on these amended allegations, Judge Illston found that the plaintiffs had "cured the deficiencies" in the prior complaint and that the amended complaint "sufficiently alleges a strong inference of scienter." Among other things, Judge Illston referenced the amended complaints’ allegation, through the confidential witnesses, of the defendants’ awareness of the alleged problems in PMI’s credit risk assessments, as well as rising defaults.

Discussion

Judge Illston’s denial of the renewed motion to dismiss in the PMI Group case follows the October 27, 2009 ruling in the Washington Mutual subprime-related securities suit in which the renewed motion to dismiss following an initial dismissal similarly was granted. In both cases, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint overcame the pleading shortcoming found in their initial complaint.

If nothing else, these cases demonstrate that it is possible for plaintiffs to overcome an initial dismissal. Though not all plaintiffs will be able to muster sufficient confidential witness testimony and other allegations to cure the initial pleading shortcomings, these rulings at least show that plaintiffs who are able to muster enough can overcome the initial pleading hurdles and survive the motion to dismiss, even if the initial motions were granted.

And though two case decisions alone may represent far too little data from which to generalize, the success of these plaintiffs on renewed dismissal motions following pleading amendments does suggest that it might have been mature for some commentators (including me perhaps) to suggest that plaintiffs are not faring well in the subprime-related securities class action lawsuits.

Even though a number of dismissal motions have been granted in these cases, many of the motions were granted without prejudice. The recent rulings in the PMI Group and WaMu subprime-related securities suits suggest that a certain number of these initially dismissed cases may well survive renewed motions, and so the scoreboard could look different, perhaps quite a bit different, when all the initial pleading processes in these cases have fully played out.

I have in any event added the November 2 ruling to my register of dismissal motion rulings in the subprime-related lawsuits. The register can be accessed here.

It is probably worth noting that another significant corporate investor in the Financial Guaranty Insurance Corporation, The Blackstone Group, has also been sued in a subprime-related class action lawsuit in connection with the company’s write-down of its investment in bond insurer, about which refer here.

Another Subprime Lawsuit Settlement: It appears that I may have missed an earlier settlement of a subprime-related securities class action lawsuit. As reflected here, on September 2, 2009, the parties to the Hovnanian Enterprises subprime-related securities suit entered an agreement to settle the case for $4 million. I have added this settlement to my list of subprime-related lawsuit case resolutions, here.

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It seems that Southern District of New York Judge Jed Rakoff has been busy lately reviewing proposed settlements related to Merrill Lynch. But unlike his recent well-publicized refusal to accept the SEC’s proposed settlement of its enforcement action regarding the Merrill Lynch bonus disclosures, he did agree on August 21, 2009 to preliminarily approve the proposed $150 million settlement in the securities class action lawsuit brought on behalf of purchasers of certain Merrill Lynch bonds and preferred securities. A copy of Judge Rakoff’s August 21 order can be found here.

This settlement relates to what has come to be known as the "Bond Action," to differentiate it from the "Securities Action." As reflected here, the parties to the securities action had previously agreed to a $475 million settlement in that case (as well as a $75 million settlement of a related class action under ERISA).

As reflected at greater length here, the Bond Action was brought on behalf of those who invested in the more than $24 billion in preferred and debt securities that Merrill had issued to the public between October 2006 and May 2008.

As reflected in the plaintiffs’ Corrected Amended Complaint (here), the lead plaintiffs asserted claims on behalf of the class under Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act. The defendants included not only Merrill itself and certain of its directors and officers, but also the offering underwriters as well.

The complaint alleged that the offering documents issued in connection with the specified securities offerings failed to "accurately disclose the existence and the value of tens of billions of dollar of complex derivative securities linked to subprime mortgages" that Merrill was carrying on its balance sheet. The complaint further alleges that these exposures "nearly wiped Merrill out by September 2008" and also "nearly toppled Merrill’s white knight acquirer," the Bank of America, and only a massive federal bailout rescued the banks’ merger.

There are several interesting things about this settlement, beyond just its size alone. The first is that the defendants entered the settlement while the motions to dismiss the amended complaint were still pending. While there may be any number of reasons for the timing of this development, it does (together with the timing of the prior Securities Action settlement) suggest that following its acquisition of Merrill, Bank of America moved quickly to clear the decks of Merrill litigation that predated the merger, even if substantial sums proved to be required to accomplish that goal.

The substantial sums of cash raises another interesting question, which is the omnipresent question for all bailed out financial institutions – is this being financed with federal bailout money? Or, to put it another way, are taxpayer funds going to pay off the plaintiffs and their lawyers in this case? (For an earlier discussion of the question whether TARP money would go to settle securities lawsuits, refer here.)

The bare face of Judge Rakoff’s order preliminarily approving the settlement does not broach any of these subjects. However, he did take a parting shot at the end of the order, by adding a handwritten paragraph just above his signature, stating that "notwithstanding any provision anywhere in this case that could otherwise be interpreted, no attorneys’ fees shall be paid or otherwise distributed until after all other authorized distributions of funds have occurred."

I have in any event added the Merrill Lynch Bond Action settlement to my register of subprime and credit crisis case resolutions, which can be accessed here.

Andrew Longstreth's August 26, 2009 article in the American Lawyer about the settlement can be found here.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch (here) for providing a copy of Judge Rakoff’s order.

And Speaking of Subprime-Related Securities Lawsuit Case Resolutions: In recent orders in separate subprime-related securities lawsuits, two separate courts granted renewed motions to dismiss after the plaintiffs had filed amended complaints seeking to address concerns noted in prior orders dismissing the plaintiffs’ initial complaints.

First, on August 4, 2009, in the Centerline Holding Company case (about which refer here), Judge Schira Scheindlin entered an order (here) granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Judge Scheindlin had previously granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ initial complaint (as discussed here), but she had previously also allowed plaintiffs leave to amend. In her August 4 order, she denied plaintiffs leave to amend.

Second on August 21, 2009, Central District of California Judge John F. Walter granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint in the Downey Financial case. A copy of Judge Walter’s opinion may be found here. As reflected here, Judge Walter had previously dismissed plaintiffs’ initial complaint with leave to amend. However, the dismissal entered on August 21 was with prejudice.

The Downey Financial case may be of particular interest, because Downey Financial represents one of the relatively few bank failures out of the recent wave of closures that has resulted in shareholder litigation. The plaintiffs’ lack of success in that case may suggest why plaintiffs’ lawyers’ have at least so far pursued relatively few lawsuits in connection with the bank failures. The dismissal could discourage others as well.

I have in any event added the two dismissals to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits case dismissals and dismissal motion denials, which can be accessed here.

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In the latest subprime-related securities lawsuit to be settled, on July 15, 2009, the parties to the Accredited Home Lenders Holding Company securities fraud lawsuit filed a motion for preliminary approval of their proposed $22 million settlement of the case. A copy of the parties’ stipulation of settlement can be found here. Background regarding the case can be found here.

The Accredited Home Lenders case was one of the earliest subprime-related securities lawsuits to be filed – the first filed complaint in the case was filed in March 2007. And as reflected here, it was also one of the early subprime-related cases to survive a motion to dismiss.

In her January 4, 2008 order denying the motion to dismiss, Central District of California Judge Marilyn Huff found that the plaintiffs’ complaint adequately pled that the alleged misrepresentations were false and misleading. In making this finding Judge Huff relied on the "group pleading doctrine" which she found properly applied to the officer defendants because they had "direct involvement with the company’s day to day affairs and financial statements." She also found that the complaint adequately pled scienter, based on confidential witness information that the defendants directed "deviations" from company policy.

Accredited itself filed for bankruptcy protection in May 2009. According to the settlement stipulation, the settlement is conditioned upon receiving bankruptcy court approval for the company’s participation in the settlement.

According to the stipulation, the settlement was the result of "extensive settlement discussions" in April 2009, following mediation.

The $22 million settlement apparently is to be entirely funded by a transfer of funds from the company’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurers, who are identified in the definitions section of the stipulation. The stipulation recites that settlement is also conditional on bankruptcy court approval of the use of the insurance proceeds to fund the settlement.

The Accredited settlement joins the recent $30.5 million settlement announced in the subprime-related securities lawsuit involving Beazer Homes (about which refer here). Because the Accredited case was one of the first subprime lawsuits to be filed and because it had already progressed past the motion to dismiss, it may or may not immediately prefigure coming events in other subprime cases, as so many of the cases are still just in their earliest stages. Nevertheless, as settlements like those in the Beazer and Accredited cases accumulate, a better sense of the range of possible settlements may begin to emerge.

I have in any event added the Accredited settlement to my register of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits settlements and case resolutions, which can be accessed here.

ABA TIPS Panel: "The Financial Collapse -- What Caused It and How Will It Continue To Impact Corporations and Their Boards?": The American Bar Association Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section (TIPS) Task Force on Corporate Governance will hold this meeting at the ABA Building in Chicago on July 30, 2009 as part of the ABA Annual Meeting, to discuss the 2008 financial collapse and how corporations can manage risk throughout the remainder of the ongoing crisis.

I will be participating in this free session, which will be chaired by my good friend Kim Hogrefe from Chubb. The panel will also include Fiona Phillip of Howrey LLP and Dr. Faten Sabry of NERA Economic Consulting. The event will be followed by a reception. More information about the event, including event registration can be found here.

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Though the subprime and credit crisis-related securities litigation wave is now well into its third year, relatively few of the cases have yet settled or otherwise finally been resolved. However, the parties to one of the securities lawsuits filed in the earliest stages of the litigation wave have announced that they have settled the case, in a development that potentially may have significance for the many other pending cases.

On May 5, 2009, Beazer Homes announced (here) the settlement of the securities lawsuit that had been filed in the Northern District of Georgia in March 2007 against the company and certain of its directors and officers. In the settlement, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice and release all claims against the defendants in exchange for the payment of $30.5 million. According to the press release, the settlement is to be “funded from insurance proceeds” on behalf of the Company and the individual defendants and “there will be no financial contribution by the Company.” The settlement agreement is subject to court approval.

As reflected in the May 5, 2009 memorandum the plaintiffs’ filed in support of their request for judicial approval of the settlement (here), the settlement apparently also applies to the company’s auditor, Deloitte and Touche, which had been named as a defendant in the case.

Beazer Homes is a residential home builder that also provided home loan and mortgage finance services to home buyers. As reflected at greater length here, in quick succession in March 2007, the company announced the resignation of its CFO and that the company had received inquiries regarding its mortgage lending practices. The company’s share price declined and plaintiffs filed several securities class action lawsuits. On May 12, 2008, Beazer restated its financial statements for the previous nine years.

As reflected in their amended complaint, the plaintiffs’ alleged that the audit committee of the company’s board concluded that the company’s mortgage practice violated certain federal and/or state origination requirements and also discovered accounting and financial reporting errors or irregularities that required restatement because of improper accumulation of reserves, improper revenue recognition and other accounting and financial misstatements. The plaintiffs allege that the company’s disclosures during the class period had misled investors about the company’s origination practices and financial condition.

Relatively few of the many subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits filed to date have yet been settled or otherwise resolved to date. (A complete list of the subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements, dismissals, and dismissal motion denials can be accessed here.) The outsized Merrill Lynch settlement (about which refer here) is noteworthy for its sheer size, but otherwise may have relatively little to say about many of the other pending cases that involve relatively smaller companies, and relatively smaller investment losses. In this context then, the Beazer Homes settlement may be significant for a number of reasons.

First, the case appears to have been settled before the court had ruled on the plaintiffs’ motions to dismiss. Particular cases may settle for any number of reasons, so that fact that the Beazer Homes case settled prior to the dismissal motion ruling may or may not imply anything about other cases – but nevertheless, the settlement prior to dismissal motion ruling does at least raise the possibility for other cases. Along those lines it should be noted that the memorandum the plaintiffs filed in support of their request for settlement approval reports that the parties settled the case as a result of mediation in April 2009, while the dismissal motions were fully briefed by not yet argued.

The Beazer Homes case is also significant because it represents a substantial settlement funded entirely with proceeds of the company’s insurance. If the number of aggregate dollars required to resolve the many other pending subprime and credit cases is extrapolated out from the Beazer settlement, the implied resulting figure – even allowing for the likelihood that a substantial number of the cases will be dismissed – is potentially huge. There have in fact been some noteworthy estimates of the likely aggregate cost to the insurance industry required to resolve all of these cases; whether or not these estimates ultimately prove accurate, the Beazer settlement suggests at least for now that the final resolution of these cases could in the aggregate required some truly impressive sums from insurers.

All of that said, there are some material attributes of the Beazer case that might suggest that its settlement may not necessarily be representative of what to expect from other subprime and credit crisis cases. The first is that the company’s own audit committee concluded that it had violated certain applicable mortgage origination laws. The second is that (at least according to the amended complaint) the company remains under investigation from governmental and regulatory authorities, including the SEC. These circumstances may distinguish Beazer from many of the other cases that have been drawn into the subprime and credit crisis litigation wave, and to that extent at least the settlement may or may not provide a useful indication of likely future settlements in other cases.

I have in any event added the Beazer Homes settlement to my list of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements and other case resolutions, which can be accessed here.

Delaware Amends Corporations Code to Address Indemnification and Advancement Concern: As I noted in an earlier post (here), in a March 2008 decision in the Schoon v. Troy case, the Delaware Chancery Court raised concerns when it held that a subsequent board may retroactively eliminate the advancement rights of a prior director.

As explained in the April 2009 issue of the Tressler, Soderstrom firm’s Special Lines Advisory (here, see page 3), the Delaware legislature has now amended Section 145 of the state’s General Corporation code to provide that “rights to indemnification may not be eliminated after the date an act giving rise to a claim takes place, unless a corporation’s indemnification provisions expressly preserve the right to retroactively eliminate the individual’s right to indemnification as permitted by the court in Schoon.“ The amendments are effective August 1, 2009.

Special thanks to my good friend Joe Monteleone for providing me with a copy of his firm’s memo.

Elliptically Speaking Awards (Euphemism Category): I might have considered this a bad parody if I had not seen for myself that this is an actual press release on the website of Nokia Siemens Networks. On November 11, 2008, the company announced (here) the following update on its “synergy-related headcount-adjustment goal.”

Nokia Siemens Networks has completed the preliminary planning process to identify the proposed remaining headcount reductions necessary to reach its previously announced synergy-related headcount adjustment goal. … To date, the company has achieved an adjustment of more than 6,000 employees and continues to expect a total synergy-related adjustment of approximately 9,000 employees. …Simon Beresford-Wylie, chief executive officer of Nokia Siemens Networks, [said] “With the successful completion of these plans, we will have the vast majority of the synergy-related headcount reductions completed and we can then start to put this chapter of our history behind us and focus on creating a world-class company.”

The proposed headcount adjustments are a result of merger-related synergies, including changes to the product portfolio; site optimization; streamlining of various functions; strategic, long-term R&D and workforce balancing; and other factors designed to build a competitive Nokia Siemens Networks. “We have now completed the preliminary planning necessary to identify the specific areas where we have additional synergy-related reduction needs,” said Bosco Novak, head of human resources at Nokia Siemens Networks. “It is our goal to engage constructively with employee representatives in Finland, Germany and other countries to quickly and fairly achieve these needed changes so we are able to remove the ongoing uncertainty that our employees have about synergy-related headcount reductions.”

Hat tip to Harper’s Magazine, which reproduced the press release in its May 2009 issue (here).

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They aren’t the first subprime lawsuit settlements, but the two massive settlements Merrill Lynch announced this past Friday are unquestionably the largest subprime subprime securities lawsuit settlements so far, and they certainly suggest the enormous stakes that may be involved in the mass of subprime and credit crisis-related litigation cases that remain pending.

In a January 16, 2009 filing on form 8-K (here), Merrill Lynch announced that the Lead Plaintiff, the Ohio State Teachers’ Retirement System, had accepted Merrill Lynch agreement to pay $475 million cash in settlement of the consolidated securities class action settlement pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers. As reflected more fully here, the consolidated case involved the claims of a variety of claimants, the basic allegations in the litigation were that the defendants

knew or recklessly disregarded that (i) the Company was more exposed to CDOs containing subprime debt than it disclosed; and (ii) the Company’s Class Period statements were materially false due to their failure to inform the market of the ticking time bomb in the Company’s CDO portfolio due to the deteriorating subprime mortgage market, which caused Merrill’s portfolio to be impaired.

My initial post about the filing of the Merrill Lynch subprime-related securities class action lawsuit can be found here.

In addition to the consolidated securities settlement, Merrill Lynch also announced on January 16 that it had entered into a proposed settlement of the class action brought on behalf of Merrill Lynch employees who invested in or held Merrill Lynch stock in their retirement plans. Merrill Lynch will pay $75 million in cash under the terms of this settlement.

Both consolidated cases focused primarily on Merrill Lynch’s subprime-related losses and related disclosures during the class period, and both settlements are subject to court approval.

The $475 million securities class action settlement ranks among the largest ever; according to a review of RiskMetrics data, it appears to be in the top 20 securities class action settlements of all time. The $75 milion settlement of the employees' claims is also one of the largest ERISA class action settlements ever; based on my informal survey, it may be among the top five largest of all time.

But the significance of the Merrill Lynch settlements may not be what they represent in and of themselves, but rather what their size may suggest for the remaining mass of subprime and credit crisis-related litigation.

To be sure, many of these cases may not be anywhere near the magnitude of the Merrill Lynch case, and many of the cases will be winnowed out through motions to dismiss. Yet among the over 140 subprime and credit crisis related securities lawsuits are many others that also involve huge shareholder losses, and many cases will survive the winnowing process of the motions to dismiss. If it is any indication of what may be yet to come, the Merrill Lynch settlements suggest the aggregate settlements of these cases could represent a staggering sum.

There are a couple of interesting things about the Merrill Lynch settlements. The first is that they came before any ruling on the many pending motions to dismiss in the consolidated cases. While the timing of the settlements, prior even to a ruling on the motions to dismiss, might be due to any number of factors, one likely possibility is that Merrill’s new owner, Bank of America, moved quickly to put the litigation in the past.

The other interesting thing about these settlements is that the 8-K does not mention the involvement of insurance money. That of course does not mean for sure that there will be no insurance contribution toward the settlements, but it does seem at least to make that suggestion. As I have noted elsewhere (here, for example), due to the insurance structures that many large banks have employed in recent years (some of which include only Side A insurance, which would not be triggered in many of these cases), insurance may not be a factor in many of the subprime and credit crisis-related cases involving the larger banks, which is a consideration that may mitigate the overall losses to the insurance industry from these lawsuits.

A January 16, 2008 Bloomberg article describing the Merrill Lynch settlement can be found here. Hat tip to the Securities Docket (here) for first highlighting the settlements.

In any event, I have added the Merrill Lynch settlement to my table of subprime and credit crisis related securities lawsuit settlements, dismissals, and dismissal denials, which can be found here.

And Finally: The January 18, 2009 Washington Post has an article entitled "Livid Investors Launch a Volley of Lawsuits" (here) that describes how investors angered by their investment losses are turning to the courts to seek recompense. (Full disclosure: I was interviewed in connection with the article.)

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In what is as far as I am aware the first class action settlement in the current wave of subprime-related securities lawsuits, on October 14, 2008, WSB Financial Group announced (here) that it had entered into a settlement agreement of the class action lawsuit pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers.

As detailed in greater length here, on October 30, 2007, plaintiffs’ lawyers’ had initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Western District of Washington. A copy of the plaintiffs’ consolidated complaint can be found here.

WSB Financial Group is the parent company of Westsound Bank. The lawsuit alleged that the offering documents associated with the company’s December 21, 2006 IPO contained material misrepresentations or omissions. Among other things, the complaint alleges that the offering documents stated that the company “focused on originating and maintaining a high-quality loan portfolio and had rigid underwriting policiesdesigned to ensure the credit quality of the Company's portfolio. In reality, however, WSB Financial originated hundreds of high-risk loans in violation of the Company's stated policies for a total amount of at least $90 million.”

In its October 14 press release, the company stated that the parties had agreed to a settlement of $4.85 million. The press release also states that the company’s D&O insurance policy would contribute $4.45 million toward the settlement and had previously contributed approximately $350,000 toward the cost of the settlement. The proposed settlement is subject to court approval.

As a relatively small settlement of one of the smaller, lower profile cases in the current litigation wave, this settlement is likely to have relatively little direct influence on other pending cases. The significance of this settlement may simply be that it has happened at all. With so many of the subprime and credit crisis-related cases only in their earliest stages, the likelihood of settlements emerging seemed like a distant prospect. It may yet be a considerable time before the higher profile cases move toward the settlement stage, even assuming they survive preliminary motions. This settlement suggests that at least some cases will move more quickly toward resolution.

Nevertheless, anyone who thinks that the current litigation morass might quickly be cleaned up may need to curb their enthusiasm. An October 13, 2008 Law.com article entitled “New Wave of Class Actions Filed in Wake of Subprime Collapse” (here) quotes a plaintiffs’ securities class action attorney as saying that he anticipates that subprime litigation “will keep us busy for seven or eight years.”

In any event, I have added the WSB settlement to my table of subprime and credit-crisis related case dispositions, which can be accessed here.

A Different Approach: In our country, the most important issue in any crisis is figuring out who to blame. Refined distinctions are not a necessary part of this blame assignment process, and blame can be assigned indiscriminately. (If you doubt this assertion, please refer to the public statements of any U.S. politician during the current financial turmoil.) Our transatlantic cousins apparently take a different approach, which I must say has much to recommend it.

According to an October 14, 2008 Law.com article (here), the nationalized British lender Northern Rock has announced that it will not bring legal action against its former directors and officers, after having concluded that "there are insufficient grounds to proceed with a negligence action against the ex-directors." The article also reports that "the bank's auditors are off the hook."

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