Stanford Financial Receiver Seeks D&O Insurance Proceeds

In a move that recapitulates a classic dispute that has been brewing in bankruptcy court for years, the Stanford Financial Group receiver has asserted that the proceeds of Stanford’s D&O insurance policies are "receivership assets" and that his right to the proceeds "supersedes" the rights of insureds under the policy. Moreover, he has specifically threatened the insurer with "contempt" if it were to advance the individual insureds’ defense expenses. This sequence raises some fundamental issues about the D&O insurance structure and coverage and could highlight the importance of certain policy provisions that have recently become prevalent. It also raises some questions about some coverage structures.

 

Let me just say at the outset that I am not involved in this case and I do not intend in this post to express my opinions on the merits of the parties’ respective positions. Rather, the purpose of this post is simply to note the parties’ dispute and to make some observations.

 

According to a June 30, 2009 motion filed in the Stanford Financial SEC proceeding pending by former Stanford CEO Laura Pendergest-Holt (here), Stanford’s D&O insurance carrier had advised her that it would begin advancing her defense expense, subject to a reservation of its rights to deny coverage under the policy, on July 1, 2009. However, on June 25, 2009, the receiver sent the carrier a letter claiming that the D&O policy proceeds are "Receivership Assets" and that the receiver’s right to the proceeds "supersedes" the right of the other insureds under the policy. The carrier has withheld payment.

 

Pendergest-Holt’s motion seeks clarification that the receivership order does not apply to the D&O policy proceeds, and alternatively seeks authorization for disbursement of the D&O policy proceeds for payment of her defense expense. A host of other individuals claiming also to be insureds under Stanford’s D&O policy have sought to join in Pendergest-Holt’s motion, as reflected, for example, in the August 6, 2009 motion (here) filed by two former Stanford brokers. UPDATE: The receiver's response to Pendergest-Holt's motion can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the response.

 

The question of ownership and entitlement to D&O policy insurance proceeds is a long-standing question in the bankruptcy context. This recurring question became even more troublesome after so-called "entity coverage" was added to most D&O policies in the mid-90s. This coverage extension provides liability protection for the company itself. In public company policy’s, the coverage is limited just to securities claims. However, for private companies, like Stanford, the entity coverage is usually more extensive.

 

As reflected in a memo (here) by my friend Kim Melvin of the Wiley Rein firm, courts have continued to struggle with these issues in bankruptcy, with some courts finding that the policy proceeds are not a part of the bankruptcy estate and therefore not subject to the stay in bankruptcy, and others reaching a contrary conclusion.

 

But these questions may take on a different light in the context of the question of the advancement of defense expenses subject to a carrier’s reservation of rights. In these circumstances, policy funds are advanced without a final determination of coverage (one that might, in fact, never come, if the claims are compromised). When it comes to the entitlement to advancement of defense expense, it could be argued that, all else equal, the various insureds’ rights -- including the bankrupt company’s rights – under the policy could be regarded equivalent.

 

These issues could be even further complicated where, as here, the bankrupt company faces a likelihood of its own third-party liability claims, in which the company will likely incur its own defense expense.

 

One critical element of this dispute may be the question whether Stanford’s policy has a priority of payments provision, which predetermines the order of payment under the policy. This type of provision has become fairly standard in recent years. These provisions generally specify that payment of loss will first be made under the policy’s A Side coverage (which provides individual protection in the event the corporate entity is unable to indemnify them due to insolvency or legal prohibition). These provisions confirm the parties’ intent that the D&O policy serves primarily to protect the individual directors and officers.

 

Whether Stanford’s policy has this type of provision, and if so how the court will interpret and apply it here remains to be seen. The court’s interpretation of this provision (assuming it is in the policy) could be determinative of the parties’ dispute.

 

While the outcome of this dispute remains to be seen, the receiver’s position caused me to reflect on an auxiliary D&O insurance policy that many insureds have acquired in recent years, the so-called Excess Side A/DIC policy. The "difference in condition" coverage extension under this type of policy provides that the policy will "drop down" and provide first dollar coverage under certain circumstances.

 

Although these policies vary significantly, one of the relatively standard features of the DIC coverage is a provision specifying that the policy will "drop down" and provide first dollar coverage if the insured company is in bankruptcy and the proceeds of any traditional underlying insurance cannot be paid because the proceeds are subject to the automatic stay.

 

The circumstances of the dispute involving the Stanford D&O insurance policy present a situation where the individual insureds might well find themselves unable to access the protection of a traditional D&O insurance policy, at least if the receiver’s current efforts are successful. However, even if Stanford Financial D&O insurance program included a Side A/DIC policy, the typical Side A/DIC policy would not appear to provide drop down protection to the individual insureds in this circumstance, because their inability to access the policy proceeds is not as the result of the initiation of an action under the U.S Bankruptcy Code and not as a result of the automatic stay in bankruptcy.

 

The apparent nonapplicability of the drop down coverage to these circumstances under the typical Excess Side A/DIC policy made me reflect that there could be a need for an extension of the DIC coverage’s drop down protection to circumstances like this one where the proceeds of the traditional D&O insurance policy may be unavailable for the individual insureds’ protection for reasons other than the operation of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. There may well be some DIC policies out there that might respond in this situation, but the typical Excess Side A/DIC policy likely would not.

 

The Stanford Financial insurance dispute will be interesting to watch, although it is an extremely unwelcome situation from the perspective of the individuals involved. In any event, the specifics of the situation suggest a possible (and arguably necessary) extension of the DIC coverage in the typical Excess Side A/DIC policy.

 

I know that many readers may have much more experience with the coverage issues involved in the receiver’s actions in the Stanford Financial case, and many readers may also have views about the extent and limitations of the typical Excess Side A/DIC policy. I encourage readers to share their views with others using the blog’s "Comment" feature.

 

Quelle Surprise: The Lawyers Want to Be Sure They Will Be Paid: Among other things, the receiver’s asset freeze together with the dispute of over the D&O policy proceeds may have left the various individuals’ lawyers wondering when and how they will be paid. R. Allen Stanford’s new criminal defense lawyers want assurance they will be paid before they will take any actions.

 

As reflected in an August 10, 2009 Texas Lawyer article entitled "Stanford’s Lawyers Want Assurance on Pay" (here), Stanford’s erstwhile new legal defense team has entered an appearance in the criminal proceeding against Stanford – solely for the limited purpose of determining "whether Mr. Stanford will be granted access to monies to pay for his legal fees and expenses."

 

"Private Companies Need D&O Insurance, Too": The Stanford Group case may represent an extreme example, but it does illustrate that private companies can become involved in serious claims for which D&O insurance is required. But many private company officials remain unconvinced of the need for D&O insurance, particularly when it comes to closely held companies.

 

A recent memo by Shannon Graving and Thomas H. Bentz, Jr. of the Holland & Knight law firm entitled "Private Companies Need D&O Insurance, Too" (here) takes a look at this recurring question about private companies and D&O insurance. As the article shows, private companies and their directors and officers may be susceptible to a wide variety of claims, as a result of which, the companies – even family owned businesses – would be well advised to secure D&O insurance protection.

 

More Madoff-Related Coverage Litigation: As I noted in a prior post (here), Madoff-related coverage litigation has started to arrive, and there undoubtedly will be more to come. Along those lines, Bloomberg reported today (here) that Madoff feeder fund Tremont Group Holdings and its related organizations have filed an action in Delaware Chancery Court against its insurers for denying coverage for Madoff-related claims.

 

According to the article, Tremont is owned by OppenheimerFunds, a unit of Mass Mutual Financial Group. The article reports that the complaint alleges that Mass Mutual’s D&O insurers and its bond insurers "have ignored repeated requests to pay defense costs." The complaint apparently contends that MassMutual’s D&O insurer has taken the position that the company’s bond insurer should pay a portion of the defense expense, but that "the primary bond underwriters have refused to pay any portion of the joint defense expense." The complaint seeks a judicial declaration of coverage under the applicable policies.

 

I don’t yet have a copy of this complaint, but I will post a link as soon as I get a copy. I would be grateful if any reader that has a copy of the complaint would forward a copy to me (anonymously, of course, if necessary), so that I can post the link. UPDATE: A copy of the complaint can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of this complaint.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending me a copy of the Bloomberg article.

 

The List: Tracking the Stanford Group Litigation

LAST UPDATED ON February 24, 2010. With the arrival today of two more lawsuits against R. Allen Stanford and the Stanford Financial Group of companies, it may now be time to start keeping a table of the Stanford Group-related litigation. Given the magnitude of the losses and the publicity surrounding the Stanford scheme, there could well be a great deal more of litigation ahead.

 

My running tally of Stanford Group lawsuits can be found here. The document categorizes the suits into several tables, including a final table in which I have listed related proceedings. I will update the table as new cases arrive, and I will indicate the date of the most recent update at the top of this post.

 

The first of the two lawsuits to be added (that is, latest as of the time this post was originally created) today is the securities class action lawsuit filed on February 20, 2009 in the Middle District of Louisiana, in Baton Rouge. A copy of the complaint can be found here. This latest securities lawsuit joins two separate securities class action complaints previously filed in the Southern District of Texas, as well as the SEC enforcement proceeding filed in the Northern District of Texas. UPDATE: In addition to these cases, the plaintiffs in the first filed Southern District of Texas case have also filed a substantially identical complaint in the Nothern District of Texas as well, refer here.

 

The second of the two Stanford-related lawsuits to be added today is a lawsuit filed in Texas (Harris County) District Court by a trustee for the Rocky Mountain Trust. A copy of the trustee’s Original Petition can be found here. According to the Petition, the trust used its income to fund a foundation for "medical, dental and nutritional programs in Mexico and Central America." The Petition states that thousands of poor, including hundreds of Mexican orphans, have received assistance through the foundation. The defendants in the case include Stanford Group Company and related Stanford entities, as well as R. Allen Stanford and other individual Stanford directors and officers.

 

According to the Petition, the trustee was introduced to the Stanford group by acquaintances in Mexico. The trustee was persuaded to invest all of the trust’s assets in Stanford certificates of deposit. The trust is currently invested in three CDs, two of which total approximately $475,000 in face value and a third of which has a face value of about €202,000. Upon hearing of issues involving the Stanford CDs, the trustee unsuccessfully demanded return of the trust’s investment. The complaint asserts claims for common law fraud, violation of the Texas Securities Act, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and breach of contract. The complaint also seeks a temporary restraining order, and exemplary damages.

 

One common problem all of these cases will face is trying to get service of process on the elusive Mr. Stanford.

 

Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service (here) for the Louisiana and Texas state court complaints. Thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch for the new Northern District of Texas complaint.

 

Other Stanford-Related Notes: The FCPA Blog has an interesting post today (here) questioning whether Stanford’s interactions with the Antiguan authorities could subject him to enforcement action under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

 

Meanwhile, the February 24, 2009 Wall Street Journal is reporting (here) that a hedge fund run by Vice President Biden’s son and brother was exclusively marketed by companies controlled by R. Allen Stanford.

 

Finally, if you need a steady stream of news about the Stanford scandal, you will want to check out the Houston Chronicle’s Stanford Watch blog (here). Hat tip to the Daily Caveat for the link to the blog site.

 


For those readers who may not previously have seen it, I am also separately maintaining a list of litigation related to the Madoff scandal, which can be accessed here.

 

Merrill Lynch Subprime-Related Derivative Suit Dismissed and Other Web Notes

Even after Merrill Lynch’s recent $550 million settlement of the subprime-related securities and ERISA lawsuits pending against the company (about which refer here), the consolidated subprime-related derivative lawsuit against the company’s directors and officers remained pending. By contrast to the massive settlements in those other lawsuits, the derivative litigation was recently dismissed, because of the company’s January 2009 acquisition by Bank of America.

 

In a February 17, 2009 opinion (here), Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the derivative action. The defendants had argued that as a result of the Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill in a stock-for-stock transaction, the plaintiffs are no longer Merrill shareholders and therefore lack standing to pursue the derivative actions as filed. Judge Rakoff granted the motion in light of the requirement under Delaware law for a derivative plaintiff to show "continuing ownership."

 

In his opinion, Judge Rakoff expressly noted that the dismissal "is without prejudice to plaintiffs’ filing with this Court, if and when they have standing, a renewed action, recast as a derivative action against Bank of America, or as a so-called ‘double derivative action, or otherwise, but based on the same underlying allegations as the actions here dismissed." (As reflected here, a "double derivative action" is a lawsuit in which a shareholder of a parent corporation brings an action on behalf of a wholly owned subsidiary for alleged wrongs to a subsidiary.)

 

The subprime-related derivative litigation involving Countrywide was also dismissed, following Bank of America’s acquisition of Countrywide, based on the requirement that derivative plaintiffs must demonstrated continuing ownership in order to have standing to assert the derivative claim, as reflected here and here.

 

Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill is itself now the subject of extensive securities litigation, as discussed here.

 

A February 20, 2009 Law.com article discussing the dismissal in the Merrill subprime-related derivative litigation can be found here.

 

Second Stanford Financial Lawsuit Alleges Madoff Connection: As noted in a prior post (here), the same day as the SEC announced that it had launched a civil enforcement proceeding against R. Allen Stanford, the Stanford Financial Group and related entities and individuals, aggrieved investors also launched a securities lawsuit against many of the same entities and individuals in the Southern District of Texas.

 

A second lawsuit has now been commenced in the Southern District of Texas against the Stanford International Bank and related Stanford entities. Among other things, the second complaint expressly alleges a connection between the Madoff scandal and the new Stanford Financial scandal.

 

As reflected in the plaintiff’ lawyers February 19, 2009 press release (here), the action is brought "on behalf of purchasers of Stanford International Bank Ltd. ("SIB") certificates of deposit ("CDs") or shares in SIB’s Stanford Allocation Strategy proprietary mutual fund wrap program ("SAS") between February 19, 2004 and February 17, 2009."

 

According to the press release, the Complaint (which can be found here), alleges that the defendants

 

fraudulently peddled CDs that promised rates of return far above those available from other banks. Defendants claimed that these superior returns were possible because SIB invested its deposits rather than loaning them. To ensure that depositors could redeem their CDs, defendants assured them that SIB’s investments were liquid and diversified. In fact, nearly 80% of SIB’s investments were concentrated in just two high-risk, illiquid categories: private equity and real estate. Now that the real estate and private equity markets are in free fall, many of those who purchased SIB’s CDs have recently been informed that they cannot redeem them.

 

The complaint also alleges with respect to the defendants mislead investors about the SAS program. The complaint alleges that the defendants

 

picked a handful of mutual funds that had performed extremely well in 1999-2004 and claimed the returns of those high-performing funds as the historical returns of the SAS program. Defendants also inflated the claimed returns of the SAS program in 2006 and 2007. Investors, misled by defendants’ claims of historic returns, have fared very poorly in the SAS program.

 

The complaint also alleges that the defendants misled investors about SIB’s exposure to the Madoff scandal. The complaint alleges that the bank sent investors a letter

 

unequivocally stating that "Stanford International Bank did not have any exposure to the Madoff Fund." Just two days before this letter was sent, an SIB analyst informed all three of the individual defendants, including R. Allen Stanford ("Stanford"), that SIB had invested in Meridian, a New York-based hedge fund that used Tremont Partners as its asset manager. Tremont, in turn, had invested a portion of Meridian’s – and SIB’s – money with Madoff.

 

The two fraud schemes seem to have come together as if they were subatomic particles drawn by some unwritten law of physics.

 

The Sox First blog has an interesting post here on the parallels between the Madoff and Stanford scandal.

 

Yet Another Bank Closure: By contrast to the last several Friday nights in a row, the FDIC did not assume control of multiple banks following their closure by regulatory authorities. Rather than multiple banks, this Friday the FDIC announced that it had assumed control of just a single bank.

 

As reflected in its February 20, 2009 press release (here), the FDIC assumed control of Silver Falls Bank of Silverton, Oregon. Prior to its closure, the bank had assets of approximately $131.4 million.

 

The closure of the Oregon bank already brings the 2009 year to date total of bank failures to 14 (by contrast to the 25 banks that failed during all of 2008). As I have recently noted (here), the surging bank failure levels has some very troublesome implications, and the now standard Friday bank closure announcement is one more reflection of the current challenging financial circumstances.

 

Auction Rate Securities: Balance Sheet Valuation Concerns: With all the long-standing publicity surrounding the difficulties in the auction rate securities markets, and the extensive related litigation, you might expect that companies with balance sheet exposure to auction rate securities had long since adjusted the securities’ carrying values to reflect the current market conditions. But according to a recent study, many companies with auction rate securities exposure have yet to make any accounting adjustments.

 

As reported in a February 20, 2009 CFO.com article (here), a recent study of 625 corporate auction rate securities holders found that 186 of them, or nearly 30 percent, continue to report them at par value. The study’s author is quoted as saying that "there’s still an awful lot of companies out there that are not properly accounting for [the auction rate securities]."

 

These companies failure to recognize their balance sheet exposure to auction rate securities could represent a significant litigaton risk factor. There have already been at least one securities lawsuits against a nonfinancial company that included allegations based on the company’s alleged failure to disclose its exposure to auction rate securities (refer, for example here). Companies delaying their recognition of this exposure could be exacerbating an already serious concern. The delay potentially could represent a heightened litigation risk.

 

First Stanford Financial Group Securities Lawsuit Already Filed

In case you were wondering how long it would take, you should know that investors have already filed the first securities class action lawsuit in connection with the fraud allegations surrounding R. Allen Stanford and his Stanford Financial Group.

 

On February 17, 2009 -- the same day as the SEC announced its charges that Stanford had engaged in a "multi-billion dollar investment scheme" -- plainiff investors filed a securities class action lawsuit against Stanford and his related entites, as well as several other individual directors and  offficers, in the Southern District of Texas. The complaint, which can be found here, is filed on behalf of all persons who purchased securities and CDs from Stanford and affiliated selling agents from January 1, 2000 through February 17, 2009.

 

Though many of the Stanford investors reportedly are domiciled abroad (particularly in Latin America), the named plaintiffs in this initial lawsuit are all residents of the Houston area. The defendants include not only Stanford and his Houston-based firm but the affilated bank, based in Antigua.

 

The complaint describes the allegedly aggressive sales efforts undertaken to sell the affilated bank's CDs. The complaint alleges that the sales efforts misrepresented the safety and security of the CDs. The complaint also alleges that the Stanford affilated entitles misrepresented their performance and investment returns. The returns are alleged to have been "misleading and inflated."

 

Call it a hunch, but I suspect this complaint is only the first of many that will be filed in the days, weeks and months ahead.