The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

One side-effect from the oil slick spreading across the Gulf of Mexico following the blowout of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, and a direct result of the massive economic and environmental damage it has caused, is the efflorescence of lawsuits from persons whose property or livelihood have been threatened or damaged by the spill. Given the magnitude of the damage and the extent of the ensuing litigation, it was perhaps only a matter of time before the expanding litigation wave came to include D&O claims too.

On May 7, 2010, a BP shareholder filed a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit (complaint here) against BP PLC, as nominal defendant, and 15 individual directors and officers, including Tony Hayward, BP’s CEO. The defendants also include Transocean Ltd. and related entities, the Deepwater Horizon’s rig owner; Cameron International Corp., which manufactured the blowout prevention devices that allegedly failed; and Halliburton Energy Services, which was installing cement casing on the well-head at the time of the explosion. The complaint also purports to name as defendants the third-party defendants’ insurers.

The complaint seeks recovery against the BP defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and corporate waste. The complaint alleges that despite numerous other prior safety and environmental concerns at BP the defendants "elected to cut costs, including safety and manufacturing expenditures in pursuit of profitable results, even lobbying regulatory authorities to "remove or decrease the extent of safety and maintenance regulation."

The complaint also asserts claims against the third-party defendants for contribution and constructive trust alleging that their misconduct was a "substantial factor in the disaster" and therefore they "should be held responsible for the effects of the disaster."

Among the damages to BP that the plaintiff alleges are the costs of $6 million per day that BP is spending to try to stop the leak and remediate its effects; BP’s required cleanup costs under federal and state statutory mandates; its exposure to lawsuits; as well as damage to BP’s reputation and good will, which as already resulted in a drop in BP’s share price.

There are a number of very interesting things about this lawsuit, particularly with respect to the claims against BP’s directors and officers.

The is that, in arguing that the BP board cannot objectively evaluate whether to bring the claims alleged in the complaint, the complaint explicitly references BP’s prior disasters, including the infamous 2005 Texas City, Texas refinery explosion and fire and the 2006 Prudhoe Bay oil spill. In particular this most recent complaint references the Prudhoe Bay shareholders’ derivative lawsuit filed against BP’s directors and officers, in which the defendants had (according to the latest complaint) agreed to "certain corporate governance changes at BP designed in part to prevent a recurrence of safety and maintenance problems at the company." (General background regarding the Prudhoe Bay lawsuit and its outcome can be found here.)

The Deepwater Horizon lawsuit complaint alleges that notwithstanding the commitment in the Prudhoe Bay litigation settlement agreement BP has "merely gone through the motions" to make the agreed upon changes, as a result of which the company has "not experienced one iota of improvement in its workplace and environmental safety." Elsewhere the complaint alleges that notwithstanding the severity of the safety concerns that led to this prior settlement that company has been "making purely cosmetic changes at the corporate level while ignoring the substance of the safety violations and the threat to" the environment as well as to "the Company’s own survival as a going concern."

Second, as another argument why demand on the current board should be excused, the complaint also cites the massive wave of litigation that has already been filed against BP in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. The complaint argues that the BP defendants "cannot reasonably be expected to defend BP itself against allegations of misconduct in [the other lawsuits] while simultaneously pursuing these claims" in the derivative suit "for the very same or very substantially related misconduct." Given the vast number of claims, the complaint contends, "it is not possible for the Director Defendants in this case…to impartially consider whether to bring these claims."

Third, the complaint, though filed in Louisiana, expressly references the standards identified in the British Companies Act of 2006, particularly the Act’s requirement in Section 172 that corporate boards ensure that their companies conduct operations with due regard for "the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment." This express reference to U.K. law is interesting given that the case is filed in Louisiana and highlights what may be one fundamental problem the plaintiff may face, as discussed further below.

Fourth the plaintiffs’ bid to join the third-party defendants’ insurers seemingly represents an attempt to take advantage of the fact that Louisiana is one of the few jurisdictions permitting tort claimants to bring so-called "direct actions" against their tortfeasor’s liability insurers.

Though the plaintiff’s complaint invokes the full-throated rhetoric of righteous outrage, it nevertheless faces certain hurdles that could shut the case down before it gets started.

The first of course is that the plaintiffs have not made the requisite demand on BP’s board to bring these claims directly on the company’s behalf. As noted above, the plaintiff has argued that due to prior litigation against BP and current Deepwater Horizon-related litigation now emerging, demand should be excused.

Setting aside the question whether or not demand is excused, there are other potential threshold hurdles. One that is amply illustrated in the complaint’s reference to the U.K. law noted above which is that BP is a U.K. corporation organized under the U.K.’s laws. BP will undoubtedly attempt to argue that the "internal affairs doctrine" dictates that the U.S. court should decline jurisdiction, so that these claims involving a U.K. corporation and U.K. law may be heard in U.K. courts.

The "internal affairs doctrine" was argued successfully by another U.K. corporation, BAE Systems, which successfully had derivative litigation in the U.S. arising from the company’s bribery scandal dismissed in reliance on the "internal affairs doctrine." Indeed, BP itself unsuccessfully raised similar arguments in the Prudhoe Bay derivative litigation.

The plaintiffs’ complaint attempts to anticipate these arguments. The complaint is full of explicit references to the myriad vital contacts between BP and the U.S. Among other things the complaint emphasizes that 39% of BP’s shareholders are located in the U.S. and that its energy production and capital expenditures are larger in the U.S. than in any other country. The plaintiff is clearly cueing up an argument that the circumstances uniquely affect the U.S. and its interests and therefore the case comes within an exception to the doctrine.

Where the BP derivative litigation may ultimately head remains to be seen. At a minimum, BPs directors and officers face the prospect of enormous expense defending against this litigation, and significant potential liability.

It should not be overlooked that this lawsuit represents yet another example of a company domiciled outside the United States facing a D&O claim in the U.S. courts. The susceptibility of non-U.S. companies to U.S.-based D&O litigation is a topic of recurring interest, among other reasons because of the securities law issues regarding the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. securities laws, of the kind raised in the National Australia Bank case now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.

These questions of non-U.S. companies’ exposure to U.S. claims are also a topic of recurring interest to D&O insurers. The most obvious concern to insurers is the extent to which non-U.S. companies face threats of D&O litigation in the U.S. and therefore should be paying D&O premiums commensurate with the existence of the U.S.-based litigation exposure.

My final observation about the new BP lawsuit is that while I was reading the complaint I had the premonition that the BP derivative complaint may represent the precursor of the as-yet-unfiled but undoubtedly soon-to-arrive first D&O lawsuit based on global climate change related allegations.

The BP complaint’s allegations about the extent of the environmental and economic damage from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, as well as the reputational harm to the company, and about management’s failure to anticipate and prevent the alleged harm, both to the spill victims and to the company, may prefigure the way the first global climate change lawsuit will be written (up to and including the tone of unrestrained moral outrage). The only thing missing is some event – or perhaps some alleged disclosure violation – and the existing environmental disaster derivative lawsuit template will be adapted for new global climate change derivative litigation.

Whether or not the litigation template is adapted to global climate change, the threat of environmentally-related D&O litigation undoubtedly will persist. Indeed, heightened concern and anxiety in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster will only make this type of litigation more likely in the future.

A good overview of the litigation environment surrounding the oil spill and the general implications for the insurance industry can be found in a May 7, 2010 memo from Laura Foggen and Benjamin Theisman of the Wiley Rein law firm entitled "The Gulf Oil Spill: Considerations for Insurers" (here).

A May 10, 2010 Bloomberg article about the new BP derivative lawsuit can be found here.

Let Us Remember Justice Stevens – and The Bee, Don’t Forget the Bee: Everyone here at The D&O Diary is very interested in President Obama’s nomination of Solicitor General Elena Kagan to the U.S. Supreme Court. Press coverage in coming months undoubtedly will be filled with stories concerning her nomination and the confirmation process. Though attention is appropriately focused on the nominee, we think it is also appropriate to pause and consider the Justice she hopes to replace, John Paul Stevens.

We can think of no better place to being that in Ian Frazier’s piece, "Remember Justice Stevens" in this week’s issue of the New Yorker (here). Be forewarned, you may start to suspect that the article is going off the tracks right about the point where the author states: "A few minutes passed before Justice Stevens became aware of the bee under his shirt, just at the base of his neck."

 

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Beazer Homes has announced in its December 22, 2009 filing on Form 8-K (here) that it has settled the subprime-related shareholder’s derivative lawsuit that had been filed against the company, as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and officers. According to the filing, the case has been settled in recognition of the corporate governance reforms the company has enacted and in exchange for the agreement to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees of $950,000. As reflected below, this appears to be the first settlement of a subprime-related derivative lawsuit.

The Derivative Lawsuit and Settlement

The plaintiff had filed a shareholders’ derivative complaint in Northern District of Georgia in April 2007. (A separate complaint filed in Delaware was later dismissed.). According to the plaintiff’s amended consolidated derivative complaint (here), the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties and violated the federal securities laws by ignoring "numerous and obvious ‘red flags’ existing even prior to 2006 that alerted them or would have alerted them had they not consciously disregarded such red flags, to a plethora of improper loan practices at Beazer." The loan practices "eventually led to a vast amount of foreclosures and other problems, materially impacting the company’s stability."

The amended complaint also alleges that the defendants’ mismanagement has led to investigations of the company’s mortgage and accounting practices by the IRS, the Department of Justice, the FBI, HUD, and the SEC.

As part of the settlement and as reflected in the parties’ October 30, 2009 stipulation of settlement (here), Beazer acknowledged "that the commencement, prosecution and settlement of the Derivative Action were material contributing factors in causing the Company to agree to adopt and/or implement the corporate governance reforms and remedial measures" described in an attachment to the stipulation.

In addition, the stipulation provides that "Beazer and the individual defendants shall pay, or cause their insurers to pay, upon Court approval, an aggregate amount of $950,000 to Plaintiff’s Counsel for their attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of expenses."

There is nothing in the agreement to indicate that the company’s insurers have affirmatively agreed to pay these amounts.

Related Litigation

Beazer Homes and certain of its directors and officers had also been separately sued in a securities class action lawsuit, that later resulted in a $30.5 million settlement (here), that was, according to the company’s press release at the time, to be funded from insurance proceeds." Subsequent to the class action settlement, certain mutual fund investors in Beazer elected to opt out of the class action settlement and in September 2009 filed their own separate opt-out complaint in the Northern District of Georgia.

Beazer is now engaged in coverage litigation with its third level excess D&O insurer, as reflected in the declaratory judgment complaint that Beazer filed against the carrier on December 17, 2009, in the Northern District of Georgia. According to the coverage lawsuit, Beazer’s third level excess carrier "wrongfully denied coverage for Beazer Homes in connection with the Opt-Out Litigation." The complaint goes on to recite that the carrier’s "sole ground" for denying coverage "is the assertion that Beazer Homes purportedly breached a so-called ‘warranty letter.’" (My recent post discussing "warranty letters" can be found here.}

Discussion

With Beazer’s top level excess carrier denying coverage and engaged in coverage litigation with the company, it is unclear whether or to what extent insurance is presently available to fund the cash portion of the Beazer derivative settlement, even assuming insurance would otherwise apply to an agreement to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees.

But setting aside the issues surrounding the availability of insurance to fund the payment of the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, there is the overall question of the benefit of litigation that is settled in "recognition of" remedial actions that the company has already taken, undoubtedly due to the onslaught of regulatory and legal problems the company has encountered.

To be sure, the stipulation recites that the derivative litigation was a "material contributing factor" in causing the reforms to be initiated. Some observers may question whether the reforms would have been enacted in any event regardless of the derivative lawsuit, and might even question the social utility of a process the most tangible result of which is the transfer of monies to the plaintiffs’ lawyers who initiated the process. Those same observers would likely also note that the stipulation’s concession about the role of the derivative suit in the implementation of the governance reforms was simply a price the defendants had to pay to put an end the derivative suit, the same as the agreement to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.

By my count, there were twenty seven subprime and credit crisis related derivative lawsuits filed, as reflected here. As far as I can determine, the Beazer Homes derivative settlement is the first of the subprime and credit crisis-related derivative suit to settle. There undoubtedly will be other settlements ahead.

Though Beazer Homes derivative suit is not options backdating related, it reflects the same settlement pattern as many of the options backdating derivative suits. As shown on my table of options backdating related derivative lawsuit case resolutions (which can be found here), many of the backdating derivative cases resulted in settlements comprised of an agreement to adopt corporate therapeutics and governance reforms, together with the payment of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.

It remains to be seen whether others of the subprime and credit crisis related derivative suits will settle on the same or similar grounds. The plaintiffs’ lawyers that make their living off of these kinds of cases will have to accept that there will be questions about the value for shareholders and for society from this process, where the most visible thing that is accomplished is the plaintiffs’ lawyers collection of their fees. Of course, the plaintiffs’ lawyers themselves will cite the corporate reforms, a point which in the interest of balance, I acknowledge here.

I have in any event added the Beazer Homes derivative settlement to my tally of subprime and credit crisis related lawsuit resolutions, which can be accessed here.

Break in the Action: The D&O Diary will be on a short break over the next few days. We will resume the "normal" publication schedule after the holidays.

But before I go, I wanted to leave something to make you smile. Here, if you have not yet seen it, is Jill and Kevin’s Wedding Dance. Enjoy. (My oldest daughter says: "I like the bridesmaids’ dresses. They seem like people I would like, too --they dance the same way I do.")

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In my recent subprime and credit crisis lawsuit status update (here), I commented that the defendants seemed to be getting the upper hand at the dismissal stage in many of these cases. Two recent dismissal motion rulings tend to corroborate this view. In addition, the defendants in the auction rate securities cases continue to have their dismissal motions granted.

SunTrust Bank: The first of these two recent dismissal motion rulings is the September 24, 2009 opinion (here) by Northern District of Georgia Judge Thomas Thrash, Jr. in the SunTrust Banks auction rate securities lawsuit. As reflected in greater detail here, the plaintiffs alleged that SunTrust Bank’s broker-dealer subsidiary sold them auction rate securities. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to disclose certain features about the securities and about the auction rate securities marketplace. The plaintiffs also allege that the defendants engaged in manipulative auction practices.

Judge Thrash granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the disclosure related allegations because the allegations "about the Defendants state of mind do not meet the heightened pleading requirements applicable to securities fraud cases."

As an initial matter, Judge Thrash found that the plaintiffs’ allegations were "not stated with particularity." Though the plaintiffs contend that "high level corporate officials" issued certain management directives, the plaintiffs "do not identify any of these officials, by name, by title, or even by job description." With respect to the supposed directives, the Plaintiffs "do not describe what these documents may have said, who issued them, or when they were distributed."

Judge Thrash further found that the plaintiffs’ allegations "do not give rise to a strong inference that the Defendants’ acted with an intent to defraud or with severe recklessness." Thus, while the complaint refers to supposed management directives and uniform sales materials, the allegations are "not strongly supported" in the complaint. The confidential witnesses on whom plaintiffs rely do not reference the supposed directives or sales materials, and "none of the Plaintiffs’ allegations mention a single communication from any high level corporate officials, let alone any management directives or uniform sales materials."

Judge Thrash found that "the more plausible theory is that high level corporate officials carelessly or negligently provided training on how to sell auction rate securities, and because of the improper training, many SunTrust brokers exaggerated the benefits," noting further that the allegations overall were "more consistent with a negligent state of mind than a fraudulent or reckless one."

The court did noted that "the only allegation that might suggest otherwise" is the contention that the defendant entities were among the companies the SEC investigated in 2006 for auction rate securities practices, and therefore the defendants’ senior executives "must have been aware of manipulative auction practices." But Judge Thrash found that the inference that the plaintiffs seek to draw from this allegation is "simply too weak and convoluted," because it required the court to assume that the executives continued the manipulative practices after the SEC investigation and willfully trained brokers to sell the securities without changing the practices or disclosing the practices to the brokers. The court said "Plaintiffs do not provide sufficient allegations to make anything more than a weak and convoluted inference" about this contention.

Finally, Judge Thrash found that the plaintiffs’ market manipulation allegations "do not meet the heightened pleading requirements applicable to securities fraud cases." Because plaintiffs had previously amended their complaint, he denied plaintiffs further leave to amend.

The SunTrust Banks auction rate securities lawsuit is the latest of the auction rate cases to be dismissed. (Refer to my recent post here for an overview of prior dismissals.) The SunTrust Bank case also follows the recent dismissal in the Raymond James auction rate securities case, where the case was dismissed not on the basis of a prior regulatory settlement, but rather because of pleading deficiencies, without regard to whether or not the defendant company had entered a regulatory settlement.

While there are a number of other auction rate securities cases in which the dismissal motions are yet to be heard, at this point, the plaintiffs have not yet survived a dismissal motion in any of the auction rate securities cases in which dismissal motions have been heard.

There were almost two dozen separate auction rate securities lawsuits filed (some with multiple complaints) after the auction rate securities market froze up in February 2008. But though the plaintiffs’ lawyers rushed to file these cases, so far the suits are not faring well at all for the plaintiffs.

Huntington Bancshares: The second of the two recent dismissal motion rulings involves the shareholders’ derivative suit filed in the Southern District of Ohio against Huntington Bancshares, as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and officers. The complaint relates to Huntington’s July 2007 acquisition of Sky Financial. At the time the deal was announced, Huntington officials stated that the acquisition would be "accretive to Huntington’s earnings.

The complaint alleges that in acquiring Sky, Huntington also acquired Sky’s long-standing relationship with Franklin, which included $1.8 billion debt in the form of high-risk residential mortgages. Just five months after the acquisition, Huntington took charges of $300 million for loan loss allowances on the Franklin debt, which was followed by a "restructuring" of the relationship with Franklin. In the weeks following the restructuring, Huntington’s share price declined.

In their February 2008 complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants knowingly concealed material adverse facts about mortgage-related losses resulting from the Sky acquisition and that Huntington knowingly acquired and continued to hold high-risk financial instruments that could not properly be valued. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to make a presuit demand on Huntington’s board.

In a September 23, 2009 order (here), Judge George C. Smith granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding under Maryland law that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently allege demand futility.

Judge Smith first held under the first prong of the demand futility analysis under Maryland law that "Plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity that a demand would have caused irreparable harm to Huntington."

Judge Smith found further that "because Plaintiff fails to establish that a single member of the Board is conflicted or committed for purposes of establishing demand futility," the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the second prong of the demand futility analysis under Maryland law.

While at this point, it is difficult to generalize with respect to the subprime and credit crisis related derivative suits, as there have been relatively few dismissal motion rulings either way, the plaintiffs do not seem to be faring particularly well in dismissal motion ruling so far (see for example my recent discussion of the dismissal in the Citigroup derivative suit, here).

I have in any event added these two dismissals to my list of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit resolutions, which can be accessed here.

Many thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the SunTrust Bank opinion.

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