The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

Among the more noteworthy aspects of the recently enacted Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act are the legislation’s crowdfunding provisions. These provisions are intended to allow small businesses a new means of raising funds directly from investors using the Internet. But many commentators are concerned about these provisions. Among other things, some have noted that the transaction costs that the Act required fund-raising companies to incur may deter start-ups from using crowdfunding. And a number of other commentators have raised concerns about fraud.

The possibility of crowdfunding fraud, and some suggestions about possible means of preventing the fraud, is discussed in an August 22, 2012 Thomson Reuters News & Insight article entitled “Crowdfunding: Small-Business Incubator or Securities Fraud Accelerator?” (here), written by Lyndon Tretter of the Hogan Lovells law firm. The author notes that many commentators are “concerned that the potential for fraud on the crowd may outweigh the promise of new financing for legitimate startups.” Among other reasons for these concerns is that with crowdfunding, “the risk of fraud increases because the pool of investors includes those who have no personal relationship with the business owner and who may be geographically remote from and thus unable to oversee the business itself.”

The author notes that, while the JOBS Act expressly provides investors the opportunity to seek a recovery if they believe they have been misled, because each crowdfunding investor will only have a relatively small stake in the enterprise, they may lack the incentive or resources to pursue a recovery. Even in the aggregate, the investors’ collective investments may not be enough to attract the interest of the traditional class action attorney, so the civil liability provisions “may not prove to be very useful in practice.”

To address these concerns, the author proposes that the SEC promulgate rules designed to address the likeliest sources of abuse: the promise of unrealistic returns on investment and the ability of insider to use the money they raise for themselves of their own benefit. The author specifically proposes that the SEC use its rulemaking to require the fund raisers to state the personal investments that the insiders have made in the enterprise; require particularized disclosure of the anticipated use of the offering proceeds; require disclosure of any salary, benefits or compensation the issuer is expected to pay in the next year; and require disclosure of any transaction with a related party that the issuer anticipates in the coming year. The author also suggests that the SEC encourage investors to consider the benefits of investing locally, under circumstances when investors might have a better chance to monitor the company directly.

The author also proposes augmenting the JOBS Act’s civil liability provisions, among other things by allowing claimants to recover their attorneys fees incurred in pursuing a claim if the claimant can show that an individual insider intended the issuer’s disclosure to be misleading.

I think the author has done a commendable job of trying to think of ways to protect investors and to try to make the crowdfunding less susceptible to fraud. Unfortunately, it seems inevitable that there will be those who abuse the crowdfunding mechanism. It is bad enough that the crowdfunding procedure specified in the JOBS Act will be cumbersome and costly, as I noted in a prior post. But if there are highly publicized instances where crowdfunding is abused and investors are defrauded, prospective investors may be deterred altogether, and in the end the process could not only be costly but ineffective.

It will be interesting to see the SEC’s rules when they are finally released. But it will be even more interesting to see what becomes of the crowdfunding mechanism – in particular, what kinds of companies use the process, whether they process becomes a standard means of fundraising, and whether or not there are problems with fraud or other abuse. I wonder whether with all of the potential problems crowdfunding will prove to be an important and useful innovation or a just another failed initiative.

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In the latest of what undoubtedly will prove to be a surge of Madoff-related litigation, investors have filed two more lawsuits against investment firms that invested their clients’ money with Bernie Madoff, resulting in massive investor losses.

UPDATE: Please note that a regularly updated table of all Madoff investor litigation, including in particular Madoff "feeder fund" litigation, can be accessed here.

The Tremont Lawsuit

First, as reflected in their December 22, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of investors in the American Masters Broad Market Prime Fund, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership which is managed by Tremont Group Holdings, which is also the Fund’s General Partner. The defendants in the lawsuit include Tremont; Oppenheimer Acquisition Corporation, which acquired Tremont in 2001; Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, Oppenheimer’s parent; and Ernst & Young, the Fund’s auditor.

The complaint (which can be found here) alleges violations of the federal securities laws as well as state common law fraud, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint also assets derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims on behalf of the Fund.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release, the complaint alleges that

defendant Tremont, general partner of the Fund, concentrated over half of its investment capital with entities that participated in the massive, fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Bernard Madoff ("Madoff"). Investors who entrusted their savings to Tremont have suffered millions in damages and are faced with financial ruin.
 

The complaint also alleges that the defendants "failed to perform the necessary due diligence that they were being compensated to perform as investment managers and fiduciaries" and that the defendants "either knew or should have known that the Fund’s assets were employed as part of a massive Ponzi scheme and took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, proximately causing billions of dollars of losses and possible complete collapse of the Fund." Oppenheimer and Mass Mutual are named defendants as controlling persons of the Fund.

The complaint alleges with respect to Ernst & Young that the firm was "reckless or grossly negligent" in connection with its performance of its auditing duties, and specifically that the firm failed to detect "a myriad of ‘red flags’ indicating a high risk to Tremont from concentrating its investment exposure in Madoff."

The complaint alleges that the defendants allowed Tremont to invest $3.3 billion, over half of its assets, with Madoff.

The Fairfield Lawsuit

In addition, investors have also initiated a lawsuit in New York County (New York) Supreme Court against the Fairfield Greenwich Group, the hedge fund firm that has as much as $7.5 billion invested with Madoff. A December 22, 2008 Bloomberg article describing the Fairfield lawsuit can be found here. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

The lawsuit, which is filed as a class action on behalf of in the Fairfield Sentry fund, names as defendants Fairfield itself; Fairfield’s founding partners, as well as two principals of a Bermuda affiliate of Fairfield. It alleges breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

According to the news reports, the complaint alleges that the fund’s managers "had an obligation to look into Madoff’s investment methods and that the team ignored the ‘red-flag warning’ that Madoff’s investment produced small, steady gains in a declining market." The article also quotes the plaintiffs’ attorney as saying that the case has been filed in state court rather than federal court so that discovery can go forward quickly.

The arrival of these new lawsuits, following closely in the wake of the prior Madoff-related litigation suggests that there could substantial associated litigation yet to come, particularly with respect to the so-called feeder funds that invested clients’ assets with Madoff. The press coverage certainly suggests that there will be extensive additional litigation, as reflected, for example, in the December 22, 2008 National Law Journal article entitled "Lawyers from Florida to New York Besieged by Madoff Investors" (here).

The Tremont lawsuit’s inclusion of Ernst & Young corroborates an article published in the December 22, 2008 New York Times entitled "In Madoff’s Wake, Scrutiny of Accounting Firms" (here), which suggests that investors suffering losses from their investments in Madoff feeder funds may attempt to target the firms’ auditors. As noted in the article, the lawsuit filed last week against Madoff feeder fund Ascot Partners (about which I wrote here) also named the fund’s auditor, BDO Seidman, as a defendant in that case.

Credit Crisis Litigation Issues: A November 17, 2008 paper entitled "Legal and Economic Issues is Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis" (here) written by Harvard Law Professor Allen Ferrell, and Jennifer Bethel and Gang Hu of the Babson Business School surveys the marketplace conditions behind the credit crisis litigation and reviews the legal issues that are likely to arise as the litigation goes forward.

The article focuses on three principles that the authors believe will be critical in the credit crisis related securities litigation (1) no fraud by hindsight; (2) truth on the market defenses; and (3) loss causation issues.

With respect to the truth on the market defense, for example, the authors contend that "the quality of disclosures in the mortgage backed securities registration statements (and virtually all mortgage backed securities were registered) actually improved between 2001 to 2006 (in part due to the promulgation of Regulation AB in 2004) and that it was quite clear from these registration statements that the quality of the underwriting in a number of instances had declined."

With respect to the "loss causation issue," the authors contend with respect to the banks that suffered massive writedowns during 2007 and 2008, that the banks"suffered substantial losses due to their ‘super senior’ positions in CDOs and various liquidity guarantees to asset backed commercial paper conduits, rather than directly on their mortgage-backed security holdings."

Hat tip to The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog (here) for the link to the authors’ paper.

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If today’s filings are any indication, a huge wave of Madoff victim lawsuits could be coming. Madoff investors were quick to sue Madoff and his firm, with the first complaint filed last Friday (as noted here). But with Madoff’s firm in liquidation and the money likely long gone, investors who lost money as a result of Madoff’s scheme are casting around for other targets from whom to try to recover their losses. Early returns suggest that investment firms and Madoff "feeder funds" could find themselves facing substantial Madoff victim litigation.

UPDATE: Please note that a regularly updated table of Madoff investor litigation, including "feeder fund" litigation can be accessed  here.

First, as reflected in their December 16, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a securities lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against investment partnership Ascot Partners L.P., its founder and general partner (Merkin), and its auditor, BDO Seidman. The class members are persons who purchased limited partnership interests in Ascot.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that Ascot and Merkin

caused and permitted $1.8 billion -- virtually the entire investment capital of Ascot -- to be handed over to Madoff to be "invested" for the benefit of plaintiff and the other limited partners of Ascot. Plaintiff's investment in Ascot has been wiped out, as a direct result of: (a) defendant Merkin's abdication of his responsibilities and duties as General Partner and Manager of Ascot and its investment funds and; (b) the failure of Ascot's auditor Seidman, in light of "red flags" indicating a high risk to Ascot from concentrating its investment exposure in Madoff as sole third-party investment manager for all of the Partnership's assets, to perform its audits and provide its annual audit reports in conformance with generally accepted auditing standards.

The press release states that the complaint alleges ’34 Act violations as well as related statutory and common law breaches. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

UPDATE: On December 16, 2008, investors also filed a separate lawsuit against a different fund affiliated with Merkin, Gabriel Partners. A copy of the December 17, 2008 press release can be found here.  A copy of the complaint can be found here.  A WSJ.com Law Blog post about the Ascot and Gabriel lawsuits can be found here.

Second, and also on December 16, another plaintiffs’ firm initiated a separate securities lawsuit in the Central District of California. The lawsuit is filed against Madoff and his firm, but also names as defendants Brighton Company, a California limited partnership and a so-called "feeder fund," and its principal ( Stanley Chais). The firm’s press release (here) states that Brighton was "one of the many feeder funds that directed investor capital" to Madoff and his firm. The press release says that Chais "managed several investment groups [including Brighton], the monies for which were given to Madoff" and his firm.

The complaint (here) alleges that the plaintiff invested money through CMG Ltd., a California limited partnership. The complaint alleges that CMG provided all of its investment capital to Chais as general partner for Brighton, which in turn invested all of CMG’s money with Madoff. The complaint alleges that "all defendants contributed to the false, misleading, unlawful, unfair and fraudulent acts and practices associated with the Ponzi scheme."

The purported class consists of two groups; all persons who invested capital with Chais and Brighton, and all persons who invested with Madoff and his firm. The complaint alleges violations of the ’34 Act.

The press release also states that "the firm is investigating the actions of other feeder firms on behalf of investors." The December 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal has an article (here) discussing Stanley Chais and his investment funds'  (and charitable organizations') relation to Madoff
 

Given the magnitude and widespread dispersion of the Madoff losses, and given the fact that there appears to be little money left with Madoff and his fund, it seems highly likely that there will be other (perhaps many other) investment funds, "feeder funds," hedge funds, funds of funds, and other entitles, targeted by Madoff victims. The attention in the press (for example, here) to alleged failures of investment firms to catch supposed red flags or to conduct due diligence will only increase the likelihood of this kind of litigation. The inclusion of the auditor in the Ascot lawsuit suggests that some of these claims could range pretty far afield.

A December 16, 2008 Business Week article discussing the likelihood of Madoff investor claims against hedge funds and others, also discussing the Ascot lawsuit, can be found here.

The Wall Street Journal is helpfully collecting a list of Madoff’s victims here. It is a long list but it is also clearly incomplete; for example, Fairfield Greenwich Advisors may have been hit with $7.5 billion in losses, but those amounts in reality represent the losses of Fairfield’s own investors. The list would be substantially longer if all of these and other fund investors and customers were listed individually. The fund investors are the ones, like the plaintiffs in the cases described above, that will likely target the investment funds.A December 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled "Fairfiled Group Forced to Confront its Madoff Ties" (here) conveys some pretty strong suggestions along those lines.

In any event, going forward, the number one question D&O insurance underwriters will be asking financial institution applicants will be whether the applicant invested funds with Madoff.

Meanwhile, the Credit Crisis Litigation Wave Churns On: It seems as if the plaintiffs’ lawyers have kicked it into high gear as the year end approaches. There has been a flood of new securities lawsuit filings so far in December. By my informal count, there have already been at least 20 new securities lawsuit filings so far this month (if you count the two cases described above), an unusually high number for December, which historically is a quiet month for securities filings.

And though the filings have included a diversity of cases (as I discussed here), the filings have also included a number of new subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits, including at least four new cases that have been filed or become public this week.

For example, as reflected in their press release (here) on December 16, 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against investors in the C-Bass Trust Certificates backed by residential mortgage loans and issued by Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC. The defendants include C-Bass, the issuing trusts, and the offering underwriters. The complaint, which can be found here, asserts claims under the ’33 Act.

In addition, on December 4, 2008, plaintiffs’ initiated a securities class action on behalf of investors who purchased AIG shares in shelf offerings conducted during the period 2003 to 2007. The complaint (here) asserts claims against AIG, certain of its directors and officers, and its offering underwriters under the ’33 Act.

And on December 8, 2008, defendants removed to federal court a lawsuit that previously had been filed in New York County (New York) Supreme Court against Residential Asset Securitization Trust (which issued certain residential mortgage pass-through certificate), its offering underwriter, and two rating agencies. A copy of the removal petition, to which the original complaint is attached, can be found here.

Finally, plaintiff shareholders have initiated a securities class action lawsuit (here) against private equity firm American Capital Ltd. in the District Court of Maryland, alleging among other things that the firm failed to disclose its exposure to disruptions in the credit market.

I have added these new lawsuits to my running tally of subprime and credit-crisis related litigation, which can be accessed here. With the addition of these new lawsuits, the running tally of subprime and credit-crisis securities lawsuits now stands at 138, of which 98 have been filed during 2008.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for providing information and links about these new lawsuits.

And Finally: Before writing this post, I had no prior acquaintance with the phrases "Madoff victims" and "feeder funds." I guess I better get used to them.

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Eastern cultures ascribe events to destiny, fate, or “karma.” But in our culture we demand to know who is to blame. The Zeitgeist of America’s blame culture apparently has decreed that Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, the former Bear Stearns fund managers, are to be the first level scapegoats for the subprime crisis. The “perp walk” to which they were subjected last week – why? Whatever happened to the presumption of innocence?—is now a standard component of the American blame ritual.

But a review of the charges against them does raise some concerns. Indeed, many observers have already questioned the proceedings.

A number of commentators have observed that Cioffi and Tannin’s alleged misrepresentations were no different than those of many others on Wall Street. Indeed, both Bloomberg’s Caroline Baum (here) and Professor Peter Henning of the White Collar Crime Prof blog (here) see little difference between Cioffi and Tannin’s statements about the Bear funds and the remarks of Bear Stearn’s CEO Alan Scwartz two days before the company’s collapse that “our liquidity position has not changed.” Professor Ribstein, on his Ideoblog (here), suggests that the difference between Cioffi and Tannin on the one hand, and Schwarz on the other, is that Cioffi and Tannin made the mistake of being hedge fund managers rather than corporate executives (“the bad luck of their chosen line of work”)

Some commentators even question the culpability of the two individuals’ alleged misrepresentations. As Professor Henning notes:

A false hope that the hedge funds would pull through, no matter how misguided, can be a defense to a fraud charge. Showing that Cioffi and Tannin were of two minds, or conflicted about where the market was headed, does not mean that the statements to investors were part of a fraudulent scheme.

Professor Henning goes on to observe:

As a Wall Street case, the charges seem a bit thin to me. Hedge fund managers are essentially salesmen, touting their wares in much the same way that the man in the used car lot has a great deal for you….The fact that Wall Street salesmen talked out of both sides of their mouths is nothing new.

Professor Henning also questions the significance of Cioffi’s withdrawl of $2 million from one of the funds, noting that “withdrawing your own money is not the type of theft one expects to see in a fraud case.”

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece today (here), former prosecutor Robert Mintz suggests that the duo’s biggest mistake was failing first – “these two were among the first to see their funds implode and that, perhaps more than any other reason, is why they now find themselves facing the prospect of significant jail time.”

These observations are all interesting and might (perhaps under different circumstances) suggest that the government could face an uphill battle. However, the circumstances demand a burnt offering and that is why Cioffi and Tannin were dragged into the public square. A burnt offering we shall have.

There is one additional element of the indictment that has not received as much attention that may be worth noting here. That is, as discussed in the U.S. Attorney’s June 19, 2008 press release (here), one element of the indictment relates to a possible cover up. The press release states that, after the SEC had requested the production of documents and materials in Summer 2007, Tannin’s “tablet computer” and Cioff’s “notebook” apparently “went missing."

One of the ineradicable lessons from the Watergate era is that the evasion will get you even if the underlying conduct does not. (Just ask Martha Stewart.) If the government can show that the defendants did inappropriately dispose of their technological devices as part of an evasion, the cover-up charges could loom a great deal larger.

And while the commentators may question the criminal indictment, they recognize that the alleged misconduct might support civil liability. Indeed, Professor Ribstein acknowledges that while “not a criminal case,” this “sort of case is suited for a civil fraud claim.” It has been somewhat overshadowed by the criminal indictment, but the SEC did in fact file a civil enforcement proceeding against Cioffi and Tannin at the same time as the indictment.

The SEC enforcement action (as described in the SEC’s June 19, 2008 Litigation Release, here), contains additional allegations against the two, including for example, that they “misrepresented the funds’ deteriorating condition and the level of investor redemption requests in order to bring in new money and keep existing investors and institutional counterparties from withdrawing money.” Among other things, the SEC alleges that Cioffi and Tannin “misrepresented their funds’ investment in subprime mortgage-backed securities.” It is alleged that the funds’ monthly performance summaries described the exposure as from 6 to 8 percent, when it supposedly later emerged that the “total subprime exposure – direct and indirect—was approximately 60 percent.”

The SEC seeks “permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement of all illegal profits plus prejudgment interest, and the imposition of civil monetary penalties.” But as serious as are these proposed sanctions, they still pale by comparison to the threat of incarceration the individuals face as a result of the criminal indictment.

As the U.S. Attorney’s press release states, “if convicted of securities fraud, Cioffi and Tannin face maximum sentences of 20 years imprisonment. If convicted of conspiracy, they each face a maximum sentence of five years.”

All of which leads to the final question. As Robert Mintz asked in his Journal op-ed piece today, “are we attempting to criminalize conduct primarily based upon the fact that we now know that the investing decisions led to a bad end?”

UPDATE: Professor Jay Brown has a paritcularly good post today on these same themes on his Race to the Bottom blog (here). Among other things, Professor Brown says that "this matter should be left to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the private investors...It should not be left to the criminal authorities."

Just the Thing: Even more American than the instinct to blame is the propensity for someone to try and profit off of another’s misfortune. And in that spirit, readers may be interested to know that a Ralph Cioffi signed Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Christmas Card is available (here) on eBay. As of the time of this blog post, the current bid was $81.

Sometimes I feel like the entire world is nothing more than abstraction of the old comic strip, The Strange World of Mr. Mum.

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