National City Corporation Subprime Securities Suit Settles for $168 Million

In the latest eye-popping subprime-related securities class action lawsuit settlement, the parties to the National City Corporation securities class action lawsuit have agreed to settle the case for $168 million. The proposed settlement is subject to court approval. The August 8, 2011 press release of the New York Comptroller, acting on behalf of the New York State pension funds as lead plaintiff, can be found here.

 

The settlement papers are not yet available on PACER (indeed, that is the reason I waited for a day to publish a post about this settlement, in the hope that I might be able to run down copies of the papers. No luck so far – should I get my hands on them, I will post them to this site.) Jan Wolfe’s August 9, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article describing the settlement can be found here.

 

As detailed here, this case arises out of the financial woes that beset Cleveland-based National City as its portfolio of subprime related mortgages nearly dragged the bank down. In their 249-page consolidated amended complaint (here), the plaintiffs alleged that as the residential real estate market began to collapse in 2007, the bank’s residential mortgage and construction loan portfolio – which allegedly was of much lower quality than the bank had disclosed -- began to deteriorate much more rapidly than the company acknowledged publicly. The plaintiffs alleged further that the bank’s failure to recognize this deterioration rendered the bank’s financial statements and other disclosures materially misleading.

 

National City’s financial difficulties proved so severe that in October 2008, it was acquired at fire sale prices by PNC. The transaction was highly controversial at the time, and not just because it involved a takeover of a landmark Cleveland institution by a bank based in Pittsburgh. As discussed at greater length here, because PNC moved to acquire National City using TARP funds that PNC had only just received and only after TARP funds were withhold from National City.  The PNC acquisition was itself the subject of separate litigation, which was later voluntarily dismissed. PNC’s acquisition of National City means that the likely source of funds for this settlement was PNC itself, to the extent not otherwise funded by D&O insurance – hence my interest in seeing the settlement papers.

 

The parties to the related-ERISA class action previously settled that action for $43 million, as discussed at greater length here.

 

The $168 million National City securities class action lawsuit settlement follows close on the heels of the announcement of the $627 million Wachovia bondholders’ settlement. I have long wondered when the overhang of subprime-related securities class action lawsuit would finally start to work itself off. With these settlements, it seems increasingly likely that the time may now be here.

 

There have been larger settlements announced in connection with the subprime-related securities class action litigation wave, but the National City settlement is still attention-grabbing. Among other things, the National City settlement, if approved, would be the 53rd largest all-time securities class action lawsuit settlement. As was the case with the Wachovia settlement, the National City settlement was not (prior to the settlement) one of the highest profile subprime-related cases. But while these two cases may not have been at the center of the radar screen, these two nine-figure settlements in quick succession undoubtedly have gotten everyone’s attention.

 

The problem for the parties in the remaining subprime cases is that these settlements -- and the recent $125 million settlement in the Wells Fargo mortgage-backed securities cases – create an even more challenging environment in which to try to work out a settlement. The plaintiffs in these other cases undoubtedly will by try to rely on these settlements as a way to try to argue that the price of poker is going up.

 

Here We Are Now, Entertain Us: It may not be quite the same thing without Kurt Cobain, but still this is pretty awesome.

NERA Releases Year-End 2010 Securities Class Action Litigation Study

On December 14, 2010, NERA Economic Consulting released its annual year-end study of securities class action lawsuit filings and settlements. The report, entitled "Trends 2010 Year-End Update," can be found here. Among other things, the NERA study reports that class action filings "picked up substantially" in the second half of 2010, and that median class action settlements reached an all-time high in 2010.

 

There are a couple of important considerations to be taken into account with respect to the NERA report. The first is that its analysis is with respect to filings and settlements through November 30, 2010. The report does incorporate a number of projections to account for the year’s final month.

 

In addition, the NERA report’s "counting" methodology, as reflected in footnote 3 of the study, may differ from the methodology used in other publicly available analyses of securities class action filings.

 

The NERA report states that "until cases are consolidated, we report multiple filings that potentially are related to the same allegations if complaints are filed in different circuits." And until cases are consolidated, "we report multiple filings if different cases are filed on behalf of investors in common stock and other securities." If the cases are ultimately consolidated, the data are adjusted. NERA’s methodology differs from that used by other observers (including The D&O Diary), and may result in a filing count that is higher than reported elsewhere.

 

The study does report a number of interesting findings, including the fact that class action filings accelerated in the second half of 2010. In fact, the study reports, the number of new class action filings in September (25) represents the highest monthly total of new "standard"  filings since August 2004.

 

According to the NERA report, there were a total of 219 filings in the year’s first eleven months. NERA projects a total of 239 filings by year end, which would represent an increase over the 220 filed in 2009 and would be "broadly consistent with the long-term average."

 

Though companies in the financial sector remain the most frequently targeted, the number of credit crisis-related lawsuits continues to decline. There were only 31 credit crisis related filings in 2010, compared to 57 in 2009 and 103 in 2008. More than half of the new lawsuits against companies in the financial sector in 2010 were unrelated to the credit crisis. About 40% of all 2010 cases named companies in the financial sector, which, while well below the peak of 72% in 2008, still remains above the 28% in 2005 and 2006, prior to the credit crisis.

 

Other sectors that also saw significant amounts of securities class action litigation included health technology firms, electronic technology and technology services sector. As I previously noted (here), there was also a sharp upturn in cases against companies in the for-profit education sector.

 

Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Morrison v. National Australia Bank (about which refer here), the anticipated drop in cases against non-U.S. companies did not really materialize, largely do to the "spate of suits against Chinese-domiciled companies" (about which I recently commented here).

 

On the other hand, the number of belated filings of securities lawsuits declined in the second half of 2010. As I previously noted, there had been an upsurge in new case filings reflecting a substantial time lag between the date of filing and the proposed class period cutoff. The NERA study reports that for 2010 filings, the median time to file was only a month, compare to nearly six months for cases in the second half of 2009.

 

Among trends in factual allegations, the NERA study reports that filings of cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty more than doubled in 2010. Many of these cases were related to mergers or acquisitions.

 

With respect to case resolutions, the NERA study reports a number of interesting filings. Among other things, the study reports that the average settlement for cases settled in 2010, adjusted for outlier settlements, was $42 million, which is in line with 2009’s record high but well above the $30.4 million average for the period 2003 to 2010.

 

Even more significantly, the NERA study reports that in 2010, the median settlement jumped to $11.1 million, which not only represents an all-time high, but is more than a third higher than the 2009 median of $8.5 million. However, the report also notes that median investor losses for cases filed in 2010 were down substantially and more in line with pre-credit crisis cases. These more recently filed cases may push median settlements down in future years closer to the historical median.

 

Consistent with this last point, though average and median settlements are elevated, the settlements as a percentage of investor losses were consistent with similar ratios going back to 2002. The percentage in 2010 was 2.4%, well within the 2.2% to 3.1% range between 2002 and 2009.

 

One factor that may affect average and median settlements in the near term is the substantial overhang of unresolved subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits. Even though several high-profile credit crisis cases have been resolved, many more remain pending. The NERA study reports that of the 230 credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuits, only about 8% have been settled, and another 29% have been dismissed, but fully 63% remain unresolved. These cases will continue to work their way through the system in the months ahead.

 

The NERA report is full of a wide variety of interesting information and insights, and is worth reading at length and in full. I hope to have my own study of the 2010 filings shortly after year end.

 

Risk Metrics Releases Updated Top 100 Securities Settlements List

RiskMetrics has issued its year-end 2009 scorecard of the Top 100 securities class action lawsuit settlements. The list, which is updated quarterly, can be accessed on the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here). The details in this very interesting tabulation support a number of interesting observations, discussed below.

 

The year-end Top 100 tally reflects the incorporation of 15 new settlements added to the list during 2009. However, because RiskMetrics identifies a specific case’s Settlement Year as "the year in which the hearing to grant final approval of the settlement or most recent partial settlement occurred," there were several high-profile settlements entered late in 2009 that are not, because they are not yet final, reflected in the most recent update, including the $225 million Comverse Technology settlement (about which refer here) and the $160.5 million Broadcom settlement (here).

 

The settlements added to the list during 2009 include the tenth largest all-time settlement, in the form of the $925 million UnitedHealth Group settlement (refer here and here). Among the all-time top 25 settlements are several other settlements added to the list in 2009, including the $586 million IPO Securities Litigation settlement (refer here), the $554 million HealthSouth settlement (refer here), the $475 Merrill Lynch settlement (refer here), the $445 million Qwest Communications settlement (refer here), and the $400 million Marsh & McLennan settlement (here).

 

The price of admission to the Top 100 list is steep. Taking into account the late-year Comverse Technology and Broadcom settlements, which presumably will be added to the list during 2010, future settlements will have to excess $80 million to crack the Top 100. And to break into the top 25, a settlement will have to exceed $400 million. (It should not be overlooked that there have been 25 settlements of $400 million or greater, which is a staggering fact all by itself.)

 

The Securities Litigation Watch blog also notes that the price of admission to the Top 100 list has doubled since the end of 2005; at year-end 2005, the 100th largest settlement on the list was in the amount of $39 million. By year-end 2009, the 100th largest settlement was $79.75 million.

 

Settlements related to options backdating securities cases are well-represented among the Top 100 settlements, including number 10 all-time, the UnitedHealth Group options backdating securities lawsuit settlement. Other Top 100 options backdating settlements include Brocade Communications Systems ($160 million) and Mercury Interactive ($117.5 million). The yet to be added Comverse Technology ($225 mm) and Broadcom settlements ($160.5 mm) also rank among the top all-time settlements. The separate $118 million Broadcom options backdating-related derivative lawsuit settlement, though not relevant to this list because it did not arise in a securities class action suit, is nevertheless noteworthy in this connection.

 

The Top 100 settlements also include two subprime-related securities class action settlements, the $475 million Merrill Lynch settlement and the $150 million Merrill Lynch bondholder settlement. Call it a hunch, but I am guessing that before all is said and done with the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, there will be a lot more of those cases on the Top 100 settlements list.

 

The Top 100 settlements involve cases in 38 different federal district courts, with the largest number in the Southern District of New York (25). Other districts with significant numbers of settlements include the District of New Jersey (8), the Northern District of California (7), the Central District of California (6), and the Southern District of Texas (5).

 

Among the plaintiffs’ firms, the law firm with the highest number of Top 100 securities class action settlements is the Milberg firm (in its various manifestations), with 29, followed by the Bernstein Litowitz firm, with 26 and the Coughlin Stoia firm, in its various forms, with 14.

 

Of the Top 100 securities class action settlements, over two-thirds (68) were finalized in the most recent five year period between 2005 and 2009. The bar graph on page 5 of the report, which depicts the definite upward trend in the more recent years, strongly communicates the increasing severity of securities class action claims.

 

The inevitable implication of this inexorably increasing claims severity is that the price of poker is going up. This fact, taken together with the dramatic increases in the costs associated with defending securities suits, has important implications for D&O insurance limits selection. Simply put, commonplace notions about limits adequacy that have developed over time may have gone completely out of date in the most recent years.

 

The significant recent increase in the number of mega settlements suggests that the answer to the question "How much insurance is enough" may be categorically greater than even a short time ago. The inevitable ratchet effect from these settlement trends, creating ever greater measures of what "cases like this settle for," also suggests that these numbers will not be going back down either.

 

A Closer Look at Two Recent Securities Lawsuit Settlements

In recent days, settlements relating to two high-profile securities class action lawsuits were announced. Because there are some interest things about these two settlements, I take a closer look at each of them below.

 

Is the Qwest Securites Class Action Lawsuit Finally Settled?  In Qwest Communications  August 6, 2008 filing on Form 10-Q (here), the company announced that it would pay an additional $40 million, and that its former CEO, Joseph Nacchio, and its former CFO, Robert Woodruff, would “contribute a total of $5 million insurance proceeds,” to try to settle the long-standing consolidated Qwest securities litigation. These payments, together with amounts to which Qwest previously agreed, bring the total value of the class settlement to $445 million.

 

The court had previously approved the $400 million settlement, to which Nacchio and Woodruff were not parties, over Nacchio and Woodruff’s objections. Among other things, the two individuals contended that the prior settlement was structured to strip them of their indemnification rights. As I discussed here, on a January 16, 2008 opinion, the Tenth Circuit held that the two individuals had standing to challenge the settlement because provisions interfered with the two individuals’ potential rights and existing legal claims for indemnification. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to provide further analysis of the individuals’ settlement objections.

 

According to the company’s 10-Q, the revised settlement resolves the class claims against the two individuals (in addition to all other defendants, the claims against who were resolved in the initial settlement), in exchange for which the two individuals withdrew their objections to the settlement and resolved their indemnification dispute with the company.

 

In a statement that is noteworthy in the larger context, the 10-Q reports that the company has “the right to terminate the settlement if class members representing more than a specified amount of alleged securities losses elect to opt-out.” The 10-Q provides no information as to what might constitute the “specified amount.”

 

This “blow up” provision, by which the deal is off if a specified percentage opts out, is not atypical, but it is interesting in the context of the Qwest settlement. As I noted in a prior post (here), the now superseded Qwest settlement had the distinction of being the first settlement (of which I am aware) in which the value of the individual opt-out settlements exceeded the value of the class settlement. (At that time, the aggregate value of the opt-out settlements totaled $411 million, compared to the $400 million class settlement).

The revised Qwest settlement value exceeds the aggregate value of the prior publicly disclosed value of the opt-out settlements. But given the magnitude of the prior opt-outs, there certainly is an interesting question of what greater quantity of opt-outs might be required to blow up the revised settlement? And are the prior opt-outs included in that equation? Along those lines, it should also be noted that in its October 30, 2007 filing on Form 10-Q (here), the company announced that the aggregate amount claimed by various persons then opting out from the class settlement is "in excess of $1.9 billion" (which presumably included the $411 million in opt out settlements entered to that point). And if that amount of opting out is not enough to blow up the settlement, then just how much is?

 

Whether or not this settlement finally resolves this class action, the entire sequence of events may be significant in another respect as well. The events have the potential at least to mark the end of an approach to securities class action case resolution that became fashionable during the era of corporate scandals – that is, to try to ensure that as part of the case settlement that the certain individual defendants were forced to pay out of their own assets to resolve claims asserted against them. The extreme cases reflecting this approach were Enron and WorldCom, where individuals were made to pay settlement amounts without recourse to insurance or indemnity.

 

The Qwest securities class action, and in particular the difficulties that the company encountered in trying to settle the case without resolving claims against Nacchio and Woodruff, could constrain future attempts to implement this approach. Of course, it may also be argued that the Tenth Circuit did not specifically disallow the prior settled that excluded the two individuals; it merely required the district court to provide further explanation of why it approved the settlement that arguably deprived the individuals of their indemnification rights.

 

One puzzling note about the amended settlement is the statement in the company's 10-Q’s that Nacchio and Woodruff were contributing $5 million “insurance proceeds.” The document does not specify the source of the insurance, nor how there could be further insurance available after prior settlements, defense expense and other litigation expense.

 

Another odd note about this insurance component of the settlement is the suggestion that the two individuals were "contributing" the insurance funds, as if the $5 million was drawn from funds that these two individuals alone controlled, or at least that they were in a position to direct. Given that this case first arose way back in 2001, it is relatively unlikely (albeit not impossible) that these individuals carried individual director liabiltiy (IDL) insurance or that the company carried separate Side A insurance (although if the company did carry separate Side A coverage, the company's refusal to indemnify would trigger the protection). The other possibiltiy is that earlier on the parties and the company's insurers reached some accomodation that dedicated certain insurance funds solely for these two individuals, an arrangement that would be unusual particulary in the context of a claim that would seem likely to exhaust all available insurance.

 

In any event, in the end, despite all the efforts to the contrary, the claims against Naccho and Woodruff were settled without these two individuals having to make a contribution out of their own assets. The Qwest securities class action, and in particular the difficulties that the company encountered in trying to settle the case without including the claims against Nacchio and Woodruff, could constrain future attempts to implement this approach. (Of course, it may also be argued that the Tenth Circuit did not specifically disallow the prior settled that excluded the two individuals; it merely required the district court to provide further explanation of why it approved the settlement that arguably deprived the individuals of their indemnification rights.)

 

An August 7, 2008 Rocky Mountain News article describing the revised settlement can be found here.

 

About the GM Securities Litigation Settlement: As noted on the 10b5-Daily blog (here), in the company’s August 7, 2008 filing on Form 10-Q (here), General Motors announced that on July 21, 2008, it had settled the securities class action lawsuit pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers. For background regarding the lawsuit, refer here. The company agreed to pay $277 million and its auditor, Deloitte & Touche, agreed to pay $26 million, bringing the total value of the settlement to $303 million.

 

The 10-Q also announced that on August 6, 2008, the parties had also reached an agreement to settle the related shareholders’ derivative lawsuit. The settlement agreement “requires our management to recommend to the Board of Directors and its committees that we implement and maintain certain corporate governance changes for four years.” The company also agreed not to oppose the derivative plaintiffs’ petition for attorneys’ fees and costs “not to exceed $7.465 million.”

 

The 10-Q states further that the company believes “that a portion of our settlement costs are covered by insurance.” The document states that the company anticipates “recording income of approximately $200 million in the third quarter with insurance-related indemnification proceeds for previously recorded indemnification costs” including “the cost incurred to settle the General Motors Securities Litigation suit.”

 

An August 8, 2008 Business Insurance article (here) reports that a GM spokeswoman clarified that only $100 million of the $200 million of insurance relates to the securities lawsuit settlement; “half” of the $200 million, the article reports that the spokeswoman said, “is for settlements of litigation the company is not disclosing.”

 

Notwithstanding the odd note about $100 million of insurance for the settlement of undisclosed litigation, the overall suggestion is that $177 million of GM’s contribution to the securities lawsuit settlement is uninsured – or perhaps $7.645 million more than that if the attorneys’ fees in the derivative lawsuit are to be paid by insurance.

 

An interesting aspect of this case is the identity of the lead plaintiffs. Despite the defendant company's iconic status as an American company, the lead plaintiffs were two overseas institutional investors, Deka Investment GmbH, an investment fund manager based in Germany, and Luxembourg-based fund manager Deka International S.A, both affiliates of DekaBank. The presence of foreign plaintiffs in U.S. class actions has become increasingly common, a trend that is likely to continue as U.S.-based plaintiffs firms expand their presence overseas. The Securities Litigation Watch has frequently discussed this trend, as noted here.

 

One additional interesting aspect of this settlement is that it the parties were able to resolve the case at such an early stage. According to an August 11, 2008 article on Law.com (here), the federal judge to whom the case was assigned sent the case to mediation while the defendants' motions to dismiss were still pending.

 

According to RiskMetrics data quoted in the Business Insurance article, the GM settlement ranks as the twenty-fifth largest securities fraud settlement ever. And again, citing RiskMetrics data, the August 9, 2008 Wall Street Journal reported (here) that the GM settlement is the third largest securities lawsuit settlement of 2008, after the $895 million UnitedHealth Group settlement and the $750 Xerox settlement.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for the link to the Business Insurance article.

 

D&O Funds Gone, Case Grinds On: In a prior post (here), I noted that in the criminal case arising out of the collapse of Collins & Aikman, one of the defendants had sought an early  trial date because of the approaching depletion of the D&O insurance policy limits, potentially leaving him without resources to fund his defense.

 

In an August 8, 2008 post on his Race to the Bottom blog (here), Professor Jay Brown reports that even though no date has yet been set for the criminal trial in the case, the D&O insurance policy limits are now entirely exhausted. Counsel for one of the defendants reportedly stated at a July 24, 2008 status conference in the case that “the fourth and final layer carrier has informed us that – basically not to assume that there’s going to be any money after invoices submitted on July 31st.”

 

The possibility that $50 million in insurance limits might be exhausted before a trial date is even set is a nightmare scenario for any director or officer.

 

As I noted in my prior post, escalating defense expense is an increasingly important consideration in the D&O limits selection equation. The potential for defense expense alone to deplete all available insurance in a catastrophic claim like the one involving Collins & Aikman may seem like an extreme case, but D&O insurance ought to be able to respond and provide protection even in a catastrophic claim. However, increased limits along may not be the answer; rather, insurance structures, designed to ensure dedicated protection to specified individuals, may be the most important protection against the devastating potential of catastrophic D&O claims.

Cornerstone Releases 2007 Securities Settlement Analysis

On March 31, 2008, Cornerstone Research released its review and analysis of 2007 securities class action settlements. Cornerstone’s press release can be found here and the full report can be found here. The Cornerstone Report differs in certain particulars from the previously released NERA Economic Consulting report (about which refer here), but the two reports are directionally consistent.

Cornerstone’s press release emphasizes that the aggregate dollar value of all settlements was down 60% compared to 2006, but the full report emphasizes that, when the four largest settlements are removed from the analysis, the aggregate value of all settlements in 2007 exceeded all prior years except the unprecedented year of 2006.

The full report also highlights that the median securities class action settlement reached an all-time high of $9.0 million in 2007, compared to a median of $6.9 million for the years 1996 through 2006. The increase in the median settlement in 2007 is “partly due to the fact that the percentage of cases settling for $10-20 million increased substantially from prior years.” On the other hand, the number of settlements in excess of $100 million declined from 14 in 2006 to only nine in 2007.

According to the Cornerstone report, the average securities class action settlement fell from $105 million in 2006 (excluding the Enron settlement) to $62.7 million in 2007. But the 2007 average still exceeded the average of $54.7 million for the years 1996 through 2006.

The Cornerstone report examines the factors affecting settlement amounts and concludes that the presence of institutional investors lead plaintiffs and the existence of parallel shareholders’ derivative lawsuits both tend to have an upward effect on settlement values.

The press release quotes Stanford Law Professor Joseph Grundfest as saying that “it seems clear that the aggregate dollar value of settlements over the next two or three years is likely to decline significantly because the inventory of large cases in the pipeline just isn’t there. The interesting open question is whether the subprime crisis will cause an uptick in securities fraud settlement activity that might, given the settlement cycles in the litigation industry, only become apparent three to five years from now.”

The differences between the analysis in the Cornerstone and NERA Economic Consulting reports appears to be due at least in part to the different methods the two studies used to categorize settlements by settlement year, with one report categorizing the settlements by the year in which the settlement was announced and the other report categorizing the settlement by the year in which it was approved.