Panel Determines U.S.-Listed Chinese Company Was a "Fraudulent Enterprise"

In what is as far as I know the first determination of liability in connection with the recent wave of litigation filed against U.S. listed Chinese companies, a Hong Kong-based arbitration panel has entered an award in favor of an investment unit of C.V. Starr of over $77 million against China MediaExpress Holdings and related persons and entities, based on the panel’s determination that the company was a “fraudulent enterprise.” The panel’s December 19, 2012 award, which can be found here, makes for fascinating reading. (Hat tip to Jan Wolfe, who reported the award and related U.S.-court filings in a January 16, 2013 Am Law Litigation Daily article, here.)

 

In October 2010, China MediaExpress obtained a U.S. listing through a reverse merger with a U.S. listed publicly traded shell corporation. Prior to the reverse merger, the predecessor entity was owned by Zeng Cheng (“Cheng”) and Ou Wen Lin and Lin’s brother. China MediaExpress allegedly was in the business of providing advertising on inter-city busses. The company’s financial statements showed growing profits and large cash reserves. Starr invested a total of $53.4 million in China MediaExpress in two private transactions in January 2010 and October 2010. 

 

In early 2011, online analysts published reports questioning China MediaExpress’s financial statements. Shortly thereafter, China MediaExpress’s auditor and CFO resigned, as well as members of its board of directors. (Refer here for background.) Trading in China MediaExpress’s shares was halted. Pursuant to provisions in its stock purchase agreements with China MediaExpress, Starr initiated two Hong Kong arbitration proceedings against China MediaExpress, as well as Cheng, the Lin brothers and related entities. Separately, Starr initiated a securities fraud class action against China MediaExpress, its principals and related entities, and the company’s auditor in the District Court of Delaware. (In addition, certain other shareholders separately filed a securities class action lawsuit against China Media Express in the Southern District of New York, about which refer here.)

 

The arbitration panel, which was chaired by former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Andrew Moore II, heard evidence in the two consolidated arbitrations in May 2012. On December 19, 2012, the panel delivered its Award.  A copy of the arbitration award was filed in the District of Delaware lawsuit on January 13, 2013 (refer here).

 

The 49-page award makes for some fascinating reading. Among other things, the panel concluded that the company was “a fraudulent enterprise that caused Starr to lose the total value of its investment.” Cheng, the panel concluded, has “no credibility whatsoever”. Ou Wen gave the impression on the witness stand that “he would say whatever he thought would advance his case.” 

 

Among many things that troubled the panel was what had happened to the supposedly thriving business that had been represented to Starr. The company attempted to argue that the business had been destroyed by short sellers, a contention the panel described as “ridiculous,” observing that:

 

To put it bluntly, this claim of Cheng and CME that short sellers destroyed his business is nonsense. It is a fabrication evidently designed to hide the fact that CME never had the business it represented to the world that it had or that, if it did, it has been ravished by dishonest conduct on the part of those who conducted the business. Coupled with the conduct when challenged with the matters raised by [the company’s auditors] and other matters, Cheng’s claim that the short sellers destroyed his business indicates that Starr was correct with it contended that CME was a fraudulent enterprise.

 

The one specific transaction Cheng offered to explain what happened to all of the cash that the company had reported on its balance sheet was “a land transaction at Shoushan Waterfall.” However, the “evidence concerning this transaction was so implausible and contradictory that it is impossible to accept his claim that any money invested in that transaction was for the benefit of CME and its shareholders even if money of CME was used to finance this transaction.” Overall, the evidence Cheng offered regarding this transaction (which had not been approved by the Board or reported to shareholders and involved a company in which Cheng had an ownership interest) established that Cheng was “in breach of his fiduciary duty.” The evidence concerning the transaction “simply reinforces the conclusion that Cheng was both an unreliable witness and a dishonest businessman.”

 

As Jonathan Weil said in his January 11, 2013 Bloomberg column about the latest accounting scandal involving a Chinese company, “Chinese stocks may not make for trustworthy investments, but they sure can be entertaining to watch from a distance.”

 

The arbitration panel’s award represents a devastating judgment against China MediaExpress and its key officials. It remains to be seen how Starr will be able to use this judgment in its separate U.S. securities fraud suit and whether it will be able to collect on the Hong Kong panel’s award. It will also be interesting to see what the claimants in the separate securities class action lawsuit will be able to make of the arbitration award. On the one hand, the panel’s brutally worded conclusions about the company and its principals are damning. On the other hand, the issue preclusive effect of these determinations in separate proceedings involving separate parties and separate evidentiary standards is the kind of thing good lawyers could argue about for a long time.

 

In any event, whatever the ultimate effect of the arbitration’s panel’s determinations may prove to be, the fact is that, according a statement by Starr’s lawyer quoted in the Am Law Litigation Daily article linked above, the panel’s ruling represents the “first time any of these issues concerning Chinese reverse mergers have been adjudicated.” The implication for other companies involved in these cases – many of which involve allegations even more sensational than were raised here – is ominous.

 

First Dismissal Motion Denial in Chinese Reverse Merger Securities Case

According to Cornerstone Research’s recently released mid-year 2011 securities litigation report (here), during the 18 months ending on June 30, 2011, there were a total of 37 securities class action lawsuit filings involving U.S. listed Chinese companies, 33 of which obtained their U.S. listing by way of a “reverse merger” a publicly traded shell company. While some have questioned how these cases will fare, at least one of these cases recently survived a motion to dismiss, a development that an August 4, 2011 memo from the O’Melveny & Myers law firm (here) suggested “could signal the willingness of courts to her reverse merger securities fraud actions.”

 

As discussed here, plaintiffs first filed their complaint against Orient Paper, certain of its directors and officers, and its auditor in the Central District of California in August 2010. Orient Paper had obtained its U.S. listing by way of a reverse merger transaction. The plaintiffs allegations were largely based on an online report by Muddy Waters, a securities analysis firm and known short seller of shares of Chinese companies. The plaintiffs alleged that the company had failed to disclose related-party transactions with its main supplier, and that company misstated its financials in its annual reports in 2008 and 2009. The allegations financial statements were based on alleged differences between its SEC filings and its Chinese regulatory filings. The plaintiffs also alleged that the allegedly misleading financial statements had audited by a disbarred and unlicensed auditor.

 

The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged material misrepresentation, arguing that the company’s auditor had not been disbarred and that an internal company investigation conducted by the company’s audit committee determined that there was no evidentiary basis to substantiate the financial misrepresentation allegations. The defendants also alleged that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled scienter.

 

In a July 20, 2011 order (here), Central District of California Judge Valerie Baker Fairbanks denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs had provided PCAOB documentation substantiating that the company’s auditor had been disbarred. Judge Fairbanks also found with respect to the company’s internal investigation that it had been conducted by the company’s own audit committee “with no public or signed statements by any of the outside firms” the company had hired for the effort.” She added that “the truth of the Muddy Waters report and the audit committee’s conclusions is a factual dispute not appropriate for resolution at this stage.”

 

With respect to the issue of scienter, she found that “viewed holisitically … the inference of scienter advanced by the Plaintiffs is “at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” Her find in this respect was based in part on the related-party transactions which indirectly benefited the company’s CEO. She also found the internal investigation on which defendants’ sought to rely in order to rebut the inference of scienter to be “questionable.”

 

According to the law firm memo, Judge Fairbanks’ ruling in the Orient Paper case is the first opinion involving a corporate defendant in a Chinese reverse merger company securities case. A prior ruling in the China Experts Technology case, discussed here, involved only the company’s auditors and also involved a case filed in 2007, prior to the current round of Chinese reverse merger litigation. The ruling in the China Expert Technology case did not relate to the company, which never responded to the complaint. The Orient Paper decision, by contrast, does not relate to the company’s auditor, who has not yet been served in the case.

 

With respect to Orient Paper decision, the law firm memo noted that Judge Fairbanks denied the motion to dismiss even though the plaintiffs had based “nearly all of their allegations on an Internet report authored by an admitted short seller.” The memo goes on to note that many of the cases filed against the Chinese reverse merger companies were, like that against Orient Paper, “preceded by disparaging reports from self-interested and often anonymous short sellers.”

 

In its assessment of the significance of the Orient Paper decision, the law firm memo says that “if this first motion to dismiss opinion is any view into the future, and defendants are unable to challenge the truth of the short seller reports at the pleading stage, most of these cases appear poised to proceed past the pleading stage, and instead, their issues will most likely be decided on motions for summary judgment.”

 

One obvious concern for these companies if they become involved in protracted U.S. securities litigation is the expense involved. This prospect may be particularly daunting for many of these companies because in many instances with which I am aware, the companies carry very low and in same cases minimal levels of directors and officers liability insurance. (My more detailed view of the D&O liability insurance issues involving the securities litigation exposures of U.S. listed Chinese companies can be found here.)

 

Alison Frankel’s June 21, 2011 report about the Orient Paper decision in Thomson Reuters News & Insight can be found here. My prior discussion about the role of the Muddy Waters firm in raising the allegations asserted in may of these Chinese reverse merger companies can be found here, in a post that also discusses the litigation hurdles that the plaintiffs in many of these cases will face.

 

Many thanks to the loyal reader who forwarded me a copy of Judge Fairbanks’ decision.

 

Securities Litigation in Japan: In a July 2011 publication entitled “Trends in Securities Litigation in Japan: 2010 Update” (here), NERA Economic Consulting provides a status report on the current state of securities litigation in Japan. Among other things the study reports that “the number of judgments related to damages litigation over misstatements has decreased substantially to seven in 2010 from 14 in 2009.”

 

The study also notes that the number of regulatory actions by the Japanese Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission regarding monetary penalties for misstatement has “increased to a record high of 12 in 2010 from nine in 2009.” In light of the number of enforcement actions “the potential for future misstatement cases is expected to continue to rise.” The study also notes the increase in the number of shareholder petitions “for appraisal of stock purchase price in company reorganizations.”

 

Guest Post: Claims Against China-Based Reverse Merger Companies: A Tempest in a Teapot of Gunpowder Green Tea?

As numerous commentators have noted, one of the most distinctive litigation developments over the last twelve months has been the emergence of U.S. securities litigation against Chinese companies that obtained their listings on U.S. exchanges that a “reverse merger” with a publicly traded U.S. shell company.

 

Given the prominence of these issues, I am very happy to publish the following guest post from Anjali C. Das, who is a partner in the Chicago office of the Wilson Elser law firm. Many thanks to Anjali for her willingness to publish her article here. I welcome guest posts from responsible commentators on topics relevant to this blog. Any readers who are interested in publishing a guest post on this site are encouraged to contact me directly.

 

 

Here is Anjali’s guest post:

 

D&O Spotlight on China: Claims Against China-Based Reverse Merger Companies: A Tempest in a Teapot of Gunpowder Green Tea?

 

 

Introduction

           

These days, nearly everything to do with China has grabbed the spotlight – not least of all the country’s extraordinary and seemingly unstoppable economic growth. Not surprisingly, many U.S. investors have been pouring millions of dollars into Chinese companies with the hopes of gaining super-sized returns. However, naysayers have long predicted a bursting of the China bubble. At least for investors in China-based issuers, perhaps that time is now. Not unlike the bursting of the internet bubble in the 1990s fueled by explosive growth and investment in “dot.com” companies, investors and regulators may now have reason to fear the rapid rise and fall of Chinese companies that have accessed U.S. capital markets through reverse mergers. While short-sellers are publicly denouncing the purported fraud at these companies (and making big bucks shorting the stock), U.S. regulators are investigating the rash of accounting scandals at these companies which have caused some auditors to abruptly resign. Meanwhile, D&O insurers have to contend with the collateral damage resulting from the multitude of claims against China-based issuers and their directors and officers. This article highlights the following topics involving Chinese reverse merger companies: 

 

 

PCAOB's Research Note on Chinese reverse mergers

SEC's investigation of China-based issuers and their auditors

NASDAQ's proposed new listing requirements for reverse merger companies

SEC's Investor Bulletin on reverse merger companies

Moody's "Red Flags" report on China-based companies

D&O insurance coverage issues for claims against China-based issuers

 

 

 

PCAOB Issues a Report on China Reverse Mergers

 

 

On March 14, 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB") issued a report examining the audit implications for reverse mergers involving China-based companies. A copy of the report can be found here. As explained in the PCAOB report, a reverse merger is an acquisition of a private operating company by a public company shell company. While the public shell company is the surviving entity, the  private company's shareholders typically control the surviving company or hold publicly traded shares in the company.  A perceived benefit of a reverse merger is that it enables a company to become an SEC reporting company with registered securities without having to file a registration statement under U.S. federal securities laws.

 

 

 

The PCAOB report identified 159 companies from China that accessed the U.S. capital markets in a reverse merger transaction from 2007 through March 2010, representing 26% of all reverse mergers during the period. Reportedly, the market capitalization of these companies was $12.8 billion as compared to a $27.2 billion market cap of the 56 Chinese companies that completed initial public offerings in the U.S. during that same period. 

 

 

Reverse merger entities listed on U.S. exchanges are required to file audited financial statements with the SEC, and the auditors of the financial statements are required to be registered with the PCAOB. According to the PCAOB, U.S. firms audited 116 or 74% of the China-based reverse merger companies, while Chinese registered accounting firms audited 38 or 25 of companies. The PCAOB report raises concerns that some U.S. firms are not conducting proper audits of China-based companies, including handing off the audit work to a local Chinese accounting firm without verifying the accuracy of the results. The PCAOB has identified various "key considerations" to determine the appropriate level of oversight of firms that performs audits of foreign companies with the aid of assistants outside the firm, including:  the ability to supervise outside assistants; whether the outside assistants have appropriate language skills, and whether the auditor would have the ability to comply with the PCAOB's documentation requirements.

 

 

           

SEC Launches Investigation of China-Based Issuers and Auditors

 

 

In response to a congressional inquiry by House Representative Patrick T. McHenry, Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro issued a letter on April 27, 2011 seeking to assure Congress and the public that the SEC "has moved aggressively to protect investors from the risks that may be posed by certain foreign-based companies listed on U.S. exchanges" -- particularly those companies based in China.  As SEC Chairman Schapiro noted in her letter, there has been a recent marked increase in China-based companies listed on U.S. exchanges through the process of a reverse merger.

 

           

Last summer, the SEC reportedly launched a "proactive risk-based inquiry into U.S. audit firms" which have a significant number of issuer clients based outside the U.S.  Among other things, the SEC has requested auditors to provide information concerning the firms' compliance with U.S. audit standards for foreign-based reverse merger companies based in China.  Since the SEC launched its investigation, dozens of China-based companies have disclosed auditor resignations and accounting problems.  Since February 2011, Big Four accounting firms have resigned or been dismissed from at least seven Chinese companies listed in the U.S., as reported here. These auditors have reportedly experienced difficulty obtaining independent bank confirmations of a company's bank accounts, balances, and transactions, as reported here.   In at least one case, the auditor purportedly received false information directly from the bank itself, prompting the auditor to resign. 

 

 

In an effort to protect U.S. investors, the SEC has reportedly suspended trading in several China-based reverse merger entities.  In addition, the SEC has revoked the securities registration of many other China-based reverse merger companies.  In some instances, the SEC is also pursuing these companies' auditors for improper audits.   As the SEC Chairman observed, the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd Frank") has enhanced the SEC's ability to obtain audit documentation in connection with its investigations of issuers based in China and other countries. 

 

 

NASDAQ Proposes New Listing Requirements for Reverse Mergers

 

 

 

On June 8, 2011, the NASDAQ filed proposed rules with the SEC to adopt additional listing requirements for companies that become public through a reverse merger. Under the proposed rules, which can be found here, a company that is formed by a reverse merger shall only be eligible to submit an application for initial listing if the combined entity can satisfy the following conditions: 

 

 

traded for at least 6 months in the U.S. over-the-counter market, on another national securities exchange, or on a foreign exchange following the filing of all audited financial statements;

 

maintained a bid price of $4 or more per share for at least 30 of the most recent 60 trading days;

 

in the case of a U.S. domestic issuer, the company has timely filed its two most recent financial statements (i.e., Form 10-Q or 10-K);

 

in the case of a foreign based issuer, the company timely files comparable financial statements (i.e., Form 6-K, 20-F or 40-F) that includes an interim balance sheet and income statement presented "in English"

 

 

In support of its proposed enhanced listing requirements, the NASDAQ cited the "extraordinary level of public attention to listed companies that went public via a reverse merger," and "allegations of widespread fraudulent behavior by these companies, leading to concerns that their financial statements cannot be relied upon." The NASDAQ believes that these new listing requirements will protect investors and "discourage inappropriate behavior" by companies. 

 

 

SEC Issues an Investor Bulletin on Reverse Mergers

 

 

 

On June 9, 2011, the SEC issued a bulletin cautioning investors of the potential pitfalls of investing in reverse merger companies. The bulletin can be found here. Among other things, the SEC observed that many reverse merger companies ("RMCs") "either fail or struggle to remain viable following a reverse merger"; there have been instances of fraud and other abuses involving RMCs; and some RMCs have been using smaller U.S. auditing firms that may not have sufficient resources to conduct adequate overseas audits. The SEC bulletin also cited recent examples where it suspended trading of RMCs due to accounting irregularities and/or revoked the securities registrations of RMCs due to the companies' failure to timely file required periodic financial statements.

 

 

Moody's Issues its "Red Flags" Report on China-Based Companies

 

 

To address investors' increasing concerns with the quality of financial reporting from publicly listed Chinese companies, on July 11, 2011 Moody's credit rating agency issued a "Red Flags" report for China-based companies. The report examines 20 red flags grouped into five categories that identify possible governance or accounting risks for China-based companies, including:

 

 

            Weaknesses in corporate governance: short track record of operations and listing history,         murky shareholders' background, large and frequent related-party transactions;

 

            Riskier or more opaque business models: unusually high margins compared to peers,     concentration of customers, complicated business structures;

 

            Fast-growing-business strategies: very rapid expansion, big capital investments resulting         in large negative free cash flow and intangible assets;

 

            Poorer quality of earnings or cash flow: discrepancy between cash flows and accounting             profits, disjointed relationship between growth in assets and revenues, large swings in working capital, insufficient tax paid compared to reported profits;

 

 

            Concerns over auditors and quality of financial statements: a switch in auditing firm or    legal jurisdiction of auditor's office, delay in reporting, or adverse comments from      auditors.

 

 

Moody's applied its red flags analytical framework to 61 rated Chinese companies. According to Moody's report, due to the rapid growth of Chinese companies, nearly all Chinese high-yield issuers tripped red flags related to aggressive business and financial strategies and quality of earnings. Moody's observed that fast-growing companies put pressure on managerial and financial resources. Additionally, these companies may make large capital investments that could negatively impact cash flow for a prolonged period of time. Also, due to the prevalence of strong founding families, many Chinese companies tripped the red flag for concentration of family ownership which may reflect weaknesses in corporate governance.  Moody's also noted the so-called arms-length related-party transactions were not always transparent. Interestingly, according to Moody's report, concerns over auditors arose less frequently compared to other red flags. 

 

 

 

Shorts-Sellers Creating Havoc

 

 

 

Meanwhile, short-sellers are wreaking havoc on China-based issuers' stock and publicly accusing these companies of fraud. In several instances, detailed reports issued by short-sellers have triggered a wave of internal investigations, investigations by regulators, and shareholder litigation against companies. While some companies have gone to lengths to deny short seller's often unsubstantiated accusations, the damage is done when the investors get spooked and the company's stock price spirals downward. 

 

 

All of the negative publicity has impacted Chinese companies across the board, regardless of whether specific allegations of fraud have been asserted. Where investors were once rushing to dump huge sums of money into any business with ties to China, they are now rushing to liquidate their stock holdings at the slightest sign of any trouble. The fallout has had a devastating impact on the number of reverse merger transactions of Chinese companies. Not surprisingly, some Chinese companies have postponed plans to sell shares in the U.S., either through reverse mergers or initial public offerings ("IPOs"). As reported here, compared to 47 reverse merger transactions in the first half of 2010, there have been only 29 for the first half of 2011.  At least for now, Chinese companies are no longer the darling of Wall Street.

 

 

The Rise of Shareholder Litigation

 

 

Approximately 30 shareholder suits were filed in the first half of 2011 against China-based companies listed on U.S. exchanges and the companies' directors and officers. On the surface, many of these suits are classic securities class actions alleging securities fraud and violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") for materially false and misleading financial statements and related derivative actions.  However, suits against China-based companies may pose unique hurdles and added expense to the defense of shareholder claims in the U.S. For one thing, many or most of the individual defendants, corporate documents, and key witnesses may reside in China. Moreover, testimony and documents may need to be translated from Chinese to English. As such, defense costs can escalate rapidly. Also, given the current regulatory climate and increased suspicion of China-based issuers, the company may also be the subject of parallel proceedings or investigations by the SEC and other regulators. In some situations, the company's Board may simultaneously launch an internal investigation – particularly if the company's outside auditor abruptly resigns without issuing a clean audit opinion. That could also trigger a wave of management departures, putting added strain on the company's already stretched resources. 

 

 

D&O Insurance Coverage Issues

 

 

 

Claims against China-based issuers and their directors and officers may raise a host of coverage issues under traditional Directors and Officers (“D&O”) liability insurance policies including, but not limited to: 

 

 

Reasonable and necessary defense costs

Coverage for parallel proceedings and investigations

Rescission

Known Claim exclusion

Fraud and personal profit exclusions

Severabiity of the policy exclusions and application

 

 

 

D&O policy limits for public companies are typically eroded by defense costs. This may occur more rapidly in suits against Chinese companies in light of the complexities of transnational discovery. As such, it is in the interests of D&O insurers and insureds alike to ensure that these claims are being defended with maximum efficiency to minimize the possibility that the D&O insurance is significantly impaired or even exhausted by defense costs alone. While many large defense firms now have outposts in China, it is still imperative to gain an understanding of the anticipated division of labor between the U.S. based lead defense attorneys and their colleagues in China with respect to discovery, document collection, witness interviews, and other matters. Additionally, there should be an objective assessment to determine whether it is cheaper and more efficient to outsource certain discovery-related tasks such as collection and translation of documents.

 

 

Shareholder litigation against Chinese companies may spawn multiple parallel proceedings and investigations by the government, regulators, the Board, a Special Litigation Committee, and others. A key issue is whether such investigations constitute covered Claims or Securities Claims under the D&O policy. Historically, many D&O policies narrowly limited the availability of coverage for investigations, such as formal investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) commenced by service of a subpoena on a director or officer. However, in the past few years, some D&O policies began to offer enhanced coverage, including coverage for both formal and informal investigations by regulators. Nowadays, the definition of a Securities Claim is less standard and may contain many subtle, yet critical nuances impacting coverage. Not surprisingly, there has been a significant amount of litigation and reported decisions with respect to coverage for investigations under D&O policies. However, many of these decisions are fact-specific and driven by now obsolete D&O policy language and definitions which continue to evolve. 

 

 

Recently, on July 1, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in MBIA, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13402 (2d Cir.), that sets forth a comprehensive analysis of coverage for various investigations under a D&O policy. In that case, the policy definition of a covered Securities Claim included “a formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document.” First, the Second Circuit held that investigations commenced by the SEC and the New York Attorney General (“NYAG”) were covered under the policy definition of a Securities Claim. The court observed that the issuance of a subpoena by NYAG was, at a minimum, a “similar document” related to a “formal or informal investigative order”. The court also opined that requests for information by the SEC pursuant to oral requests and subpoenas were covered because they were connected to the SEC’s formal order of investigation. The court also concluded that fees incurred by an independent consultant retained by MBIA in the context of negotiating a settlement with the SEC and NYAG were also covered.

 

 

Second, the Second Circuit concluded that legal fees incurred by MBIA’s Special Litigation Committee (“SLC”) to determine whether to pursue or terminate pending shareholder derivative actions were covered and did not clearly fall within the policy’s sub-limit of liability for shareholder derivative demands. Prior to the filing of the derivative actions, a shareholder demand on MBIA’s Board had been made and ultimately rejected. After the shareholder derivative suits were filed, the SLC sought and obtained dismissal of the lawsuits. The Second Circuit determined that the legal fees incurred by the SLC arguably fell within the policy’s coverage for “costs ‘incurred in . . . investigating’ ‘Claims’ or ‘Securities Claims,’ respectively, each of which is defined to expressly include lawsuits.” The Second Circuit also determined that that the insurer had failed to carry its burden of proving that the SLC’s legal fees were not covered under the policy definition of Loss which excluded “any amount incurred by [MBIA] (including its board of directors or any committee of the board of directors) in connection with the investigation or evaluation of any Claim or potential Claim by or on behalf of [MBIA]”. 

 

 

           

To the extent claims against China-based issuers and their directors and officers allege accounting improprieties and false and misleading financial statements, D&O insurers might have a potential rescission argument if the policy was issued in reliance on these false financials. In some instances, D&O policies and/or applications contain a Known Claim Exclusion which might serve as a basis for denying coverage if an insured knew and/or failed to disclose a fact, circumstance, act, error, or omission that might give rise to a Claim under the policy. Also, standard D&O policies contain fraud and personal profit exclusions that might apply; however, these exclusions are usually restricted to a finding “in fact” or “final adjudication” that the insured committed fraud or unlawfully profited. In addition, both the application and the exclusions might be “severable,” such that the knowledge or wrongful acts of one insured cannot be automatically imputed to other insureds except in limited situations.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

 

 

Some might conclude that the spotlight on China-based reverse merger companies is merely a tempest in a teapot, as compared to the global financial crisis precipitated by the subprime market meltdown and collapse of numerous financial institutions at home and abroad. Nonetheless, the reality is that many China-based issuers have been targeted by regulators and investors alike for purported securities and accounting fraud that could ultimately cost D&O insurers millions in losses. At least for now, this trend seems to be gaining traction. Until the pot is done brewing and the tea leaves are read, D&O insurers should tread carefully in handling claims against their China-based issuers.