The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

By now you will have heard that the U.S. Department of Justice has filed a securities class action lawsuit against S&P and its corporate parent, McGraw-Hill, about the rating agency’s  ratings of collateralized debt obligations as the subprime meltdown unfolded. A copy of the DoJ’s complaint, filed on February 4, 2013 in the Central District of California, can be found here.

The complaint has attracted widespread media attention, as well it should, since it represents that government’s first action against a rating agency in connection with the subprime meltdown and the credit crisis But there are a number of interesting features to this action, beyond just the fact that the DoJ has filed a lawsuit against a rating agency.

First, there’s the fact that the lawsuit was filed in the Central District of California, rather than in New York, where S&P is located. To the extent that the complaint supplies an answer for the choice of venue question, it appears that the DoJ chose the C.D. Cal. because that is where the failed Western Federal Corporate Credit Union was located. As is alleged in the complaint, the failed credit union was apparently an investor in a number of the specific CDOs mentioned in the complaint. Many of these investments resulted in a total loss to the credit union. More broadly, the DoJ alleges that the S&P engaged in a scheme to “defraud investors.” The specific investors mentioned by name in the complaint area all federally insured depositary institutions.

The second interesting thing about the complaint is that thought it was filed by the Department of Justice, it has been filed as a civil action, presumably because the DoJ feels stands a better chance of success with the lower standard of proof applicable in a civil case. But though the case was filed as a civil action, the claims asserted are a little unexpected (at least to me). The DoJ asserts substantive claims for wire fraud, mail fraud, and two counts of financial institution fraud under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”).

In its February 4, 2013 press release about the then-anticipated law suit, S&P characterizes  the DoJ’s use of FIRREA as a “questionable legal strategy” intended as an attempt to “end run” the “well-established legal precedent “ on which the defendants hope to rely. Presumably, the reference to the established precedent refers to case law finding that that rating agency’s opinions represent opinion protected under the first amendment.

I suspect a different explanation for the DoJ’s reliance on FIRREA. The fact is, many of the events described in the complaint took place many years ago, in some instances six years ago or more. The DoJ is rightly worried about possible statute of limitations concerns. That’s where FIRREA comes in. FIRREA has a ten-year statute of limitations for a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, the mail or wire fraud statutes, if the offense affects a financial institution (about which refer here). The defendants undoubtedly will try to raise a host of defenses, but the DoJ doesn’t want statute of limitations issues to cut the action short.

Third, the complaint names as defendants only S&P and its corporate parent. None of the other rating agencies are named – a point that gripes S&P. In its February 5, 2013 press release, issued after the complaint was filed, S&P notes that “every CDO cited by the DoJ also independently received the same rating from another rating agency.” It may simply be that S&P is up first and the other rating agencies’ turn is coming. However, another possibility may be that the DoJ had more to work with against S&P, particularly from the apparent treasure trove of emails that are liberally quoted in the complaint.

The complaint paints a very detailed picture of the dynamic inside S&P as it became increasingly apparent in early 2007 that residential mortgages originated in 2006 were failing quickly, particularly with respect to subprime and Alt-A mortgages. It is clear that S&P felt under a great deal of pressure not to move any more quickly than its competitors for fear of losing business. The warning signs appeared to accumulate as 2007 unfolded while at the same time the issuers who sought out S&P’s ratings were scrambling to complete offering s, to get mortgage backed securities out of their warehouse. The emails and other internal communications (at least as portrayed in DoJ’s complaint) seem to show a sequence of events where alarm bells were sounding louder yet deals continued to get pushed through.

As things deteriorated, a gallows humor seems to have set in, provoking a number of emails in which S&P staffers apparently acknowledged the growing problems. As quoted in detail in this February 5, 2013 Business Insider column (here), the emails show an apparent perception on the part of at least some S&P staff that the firm was compromising its rating standards under pressure from issuers. The emails include the now-infamous email in which one staffer quipped that a transaction could be “structure by cows” and the firm would still rate it. Another email exchange between an analyst and an investment banker outside the firm about how the MBS world is “crashing” and the firm is running around to “save face.”

Another analyst sent an email with a spoof version of Talking Heads’ classic hit, “Burning Down the House,” including lyrics that “huge delinquencies” in the 2006 vintage were “bringing down the house.” The complaint alleges that shortly after this first email, the same analyst sent an email with a video of the analyst singing the first verse of the spoof for an audience of laughing S&P staffers. (More about the surprise appearance from the Talking Heads in the DoJ’s complaint here.)

Whatever may be the reasons why the DoJ decided to proceed under FIRREA and to sue only S&P, the agency will still have to contend with the argument that the rating agency’s ratings are inactionable opinion or are protected by the First Amendment – arguments that the Sixth Circuit appeared to validate in its December 2012 opinion dismissing actions that the Ohio Attorney General filed against the rating agencies on behalf of Ohio state employee pension funds.

Time will tell how the DoJ attempts to address these arguments, but it appears from the agency’s complaint that the agency will be attempting to argue that S&P is not entitled to rely on these defenses because the ratings did not represent the rating agency’s opinions. The complaint alleges that the rating agency “falsely represented” that the ratings “reflected S&P’s true opinion” regarding the credit risks the complex securities represented to investors.  The DoJ may be poised to argue that the alleged misrepresentations on which its claims are based are not the opinions themselves but rather the rating firm’s statements about its process and the integrity of its process.

One final question is why is the government acting now, years after the crash and years after the events described in the complaint? Several media reports suggested that the DoJ acted only after attempts to work out a negotiated settlement failed. One of the S&P’s lawyers tried to suggest on CNBC that the government investigation intensified after the rating firm downgraded the U.S.’s debt. What ever the reason that the complaint is only being filed now, if nothing else the complaint does show that we are continuing to live with the fallout from the credit crisis and the issues from the crisis are going to be litigated for some time to come.

Alison Frankel has a good summary of the complaint and its allegations in her February 5, 2013 post on her On the Case blog (here).

Special thanks to the several readers who sent me a copy of the DoJ’s complaint.

And Finally: With a hat tip to the Business Insider article linked above, here is the original video version of “Burning Down the House”

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Though many include the rating agencies among the list of culprits that contributed to the global financial crisis, the rating agencies have up until now largely dodged attempts to hold them liable. While there have been a small number of cases (refer for example here) where courts have denied the motions of rating agencies to dismiss claims that had been filed against them, those few cases have not (or least not yet) resulted in the imposition of liability against the rating agencies.

However, in a gargantuan September 5, 2012 opinion that appears to represent the first imposition of liability on a rating agency in a case arising out of the financial crisis,, an Australian Judge that ruled that S&P’s AAA rating of a complex financial instruments was “misleading and deceptive” and “involved negligent misrepresentations” and therefore that S&P was liable to twelve local Australian governments that purchased the investments. The 1,459 page ruling by Federal Court Justice Jayne Jagot can be found here. A November 5, 2012 Bloomberg news article describing the ruling can be found here.

The financial instruments in question were structured financial product known as a constant proportion debt obligation (CPDO), which one witness in the case described as “grotesquely complicated” (a description that Judge Jagot affirmed to be  “accurate”). The CPDO structure involved a special purpose vehicle that issued notes allowing investors to invest in the CPDO’s performance. The CPDO was a complex and highly leveraged vehicle that would make or lose money through notional credit default swap (CDS) contracts referencing two CDS indices. (Got that? Good.)

The CPDO was created in April 2006 by ABN AMRO, which had determined that in order to obtain a AAA rating, the rating model needed to show a very low likelihood of default (less that 0.728%). ABN AMRO determined what model inputs were needed in order to produce a determination that the instrument’s likelihood of default was within the desired range. According to Judge Jagot’s opinion, ABM AMRO convinced S&P to use the these desired inputs, even though ABN AMRO had reason to know that at least some of the inputs did not correspond to known marketplace conditions. Judge Jagot found that S&P used these inputs even though it could have determined on its own that at least some of the inputs did not correspond to marketplace conditions.

Thereafter, ABN AMRO created and sold additional versions of the CDO, including the Rembrandt 2006-2 CPDO and Rembrandt 2006-3 CPDO. S&P gave these later financial instruments the same AAA rating using the same methodology. Judge Jagot found that S&P gave these later offerings the same AAA rating and using the same methodology even though during the period between these two subsequent offerings a number of questions had been asked internally within S&P about the methodology (Internal S&P emails from this time period and cited by Judge Jagot in her opinion contain statements asking whether there was “a crisis in CPDO land” and asking whether the rating agency had been “bulldozed” by ABN AMRO.)

In late 2006 and early 2007, the Local Government Financial Services Pty (PGFS), an authorized deposit-taking institution organized by and actin g on behalf of Australian local governments (“councils”), purchased a total of A$40 milli0on of Rembrandt 2006-3 CPDO. Between November 2006 and June 2007, a number of councils in New South Wales purchased a total of A$16 million of these CPDO notes from LGFS, which kept the remainder of notes it had purchased on its own balance sheet.

As 2007 progressed, the global financial crisis began to unfold, which, among many other things, caused spreads to widen between the instruments credit default swaps and the referenced CDS indices. As the spreads widened, S&P downgraded the notes and the value of the notes declined substantially. LGFS sold the notes it continued to hold for a principal loss of $16 million. The various local councils cashed out in October 2008, receiving back less than 10% of the capital they had invested.

Judge Jagot found that S&P’s AAA rating of the Rembrandt notes was “misleading and deceptive and involved the publication of information or statements false in material particulars and otherwise involved negligent misrepresentations to the class of potential investors in Australia, which included LGFS and the councils.” She also found that ABN AMRO “engaged in conduct that was misleading and deceptive and published information or statements false in material particulars and otherwise involved negligent misrepresentations to LGFS specifically and to the class of potential investors with which ABN AMRO knew LGFS intended to deal.” Judge Jagot also concluded that LGFS has also engaged in “misleading and deceptive conduct.”

Judge Jagot concluded that ABN AMRO and S&P were equally liable to LGFS for the entity’s losses, although a part of LGFS’s claimed losses were reduced by LGFS’s own conduct. She also concluded that S&P, ABN AMRO and LGFA were each proportionately liable for one third of the councils’ losses. S&P has said publicly that it intends to appeal the ruling.

As a decision of an Australian court, the ruling will have no direct legal bearing on the outcome of any of the many cases pending against the rating agencies in the United States. Moreover, Judge Jagot’s ruling is very fact intensive and involves a host of specific factors that uniquely related to the circumstances at issue.

Nevertheless, the opinion (though dauntingly long and complicated) is very interesting and it offers a fascinating glimpse of the processes involved in rating at least one of the very complicated financial instruments that caused so many problems during the financial crisis. Judge Jagot’s opinion provides a look behind the scenes that can only be described as disturbing. Of course, S&P disputes her conclusions and intends to appeal her rulings. But Judge Jagot’s painstaking analysis suggests that, here at least, the rating agency was, as one email Judge Jagot  put it, “bulldozed” by the financial firm that created the instrument the rating agency was rating, and did not independently verify the validity of the inputs employed in the rating model it used.  

These conclusions are consistent with the allegations that have been raised in the many claims against the rating agencies here in the U.S.  -- that the rating agencies were insufficiently independent and used inadequate ratings methodologies in providing the highest investment rating to complex financial instruments in the run up to the financial crisis. The fact that a court expressly found that a rating agency misled investors as a result of which the rating agency must be held liable to the investors has no precedential effect in these other cases. But it could have an effect on the context within which these other courts consider the allegations against the rating agencies. At a minimum, Judge Jagot’s ruling could hearten the claimants in those other cases.

Without having read the entirety of Judge Jagot’s nearly 1,500 page opinion, I can’t say for sure whether or not she considered the issue that has proven so critical in so many of the cases here in the U.S. – that is, that the rating agency’s ratings are mere opinions for which the rating agency’s cannot be held liable unless the claimant can show that the rating agency did not in fact actually hold the stated opinions. The absence of this consideration could perhaps explain the difference in outcome between the Australian case and so man of the cases here in the U.S. Many of the cases in the U.S. have ben dismissed on this basis. The Australian case does show what kinds of things might come to light if the cases against the rating agencies are allowed to foreword.

ABN AMRO was of course acquired in October 2007 by a consortium of investors led by the Royal Bank of Scotland and that included Fortis, in a transaction that contributed substantially to the near collapse of both RBS and Fortis, both of which subsequently required massive government bailouts. There is a lot of competition among the deals completed in the run up to the financial crisis for the title of worst deal of all time (think, for example of BofA’s acquisition of Countrywide). But there is a good case to be made that the ABN AMRO deal takes the cake. Anybody trying to understand how it all went wrong might want to start by taking a look at the Judge Jagot’s opinion in this case. 

Felix Salmon has an absolutely terrific November 5, 2012 article on Reuters about Judge Jagot's opinion, here. Salmon is lavish in his praise for Jagot and her understanding of the complex financial instrument involved in the case.

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In the latest development in the long-running  investor lawsuit  involving the collapsed Cheyne Financial structured investment vehicle, Southern District of New York Judge Shira Scheindlin has held that the rating agency defendants in the case must face the investors’ claims for common law fraud under New York law. A copy of Judge Scheindlin’s August 17, 2012 opinion can be found here. (Hat tip to The S.D.N.Y Blog.)

As discussed at length here, the plaintiffs invested in certain notes that had been issued by Cheyne Financial, a $5.86 billion structured investment vehicle. The notes were collateralized by certain assets, included residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS). The notes Cheyne issued received the highest possible ratings from the rating agencies. Cheyne collapsed amid the subprime meltdown in 2007. Cheyne was unable to pay the senior debt as it became due and Cheyne is now in bankruptcy. The investors lost substantially all of their investment.

After Cheyne collapsed, the investors filed suit against Morgan Stanley, which had promoted and distributed the notes; Bank of New York Mellon, which had provided certain custodial and administrative services for Cheyne; and the rating agencies (including Moody’s and S&P and their corporate parents). The plaintiffs asserted thirty-two claims under twelve different legal theories. Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged common law fraud under New York law; common law tort claims alleging misrepresentation; and assertions based on alleged breach of contract.

As discussed here, on May 4, 2012, Judge Scheindlin dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting, but she denied the rating agencies’ motions to dismiss with respect to the negligent misrepresentation claims, finding that, based on the plaintiffs’ allegations, the ratings qualified as actionable misstatements under New York law. The rating agencies and Morgan Stanley separately moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ fraud claims.

In her August 17, 2012 opinion, Judge Scheindlin denied the rating agencies’ motions for summary judgment on the common law fraud. The defendants had argued that the ratings were opinions for which they could not be liable, because they were not disbelieved when made Judge Scheindlin said that “while ratings are not objectively measurable statements of fact, neither are they mere puffery, or unsupportable statements of belief akin to the opinion that one type of cuisine is preferable to another,” adding that:

Ratings should best be understood as fact-based opinions. When a rating agency issues a rating, it is not merely a statement of that agency’s unsupported belief, but rather a statement that the rating agency has analyzed data, conducted an assessment, and reached a fact-specific conclusion as to creditworthiness. If a rating agency knowingly issues a rating that is either unsupported by reasoned analysis or without a factual foundation, it is stating a fact-based opinion that it does not believe to be true.

Judge Scheindlin also found, referring to internal rating agency communications and emails (including an instant message involving two S&P analysts, in which one analyst comments that “it could be structured by cows and we would rate it”), that the plaintiffs have “offered sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that the ratings were both misleading and disbelieved by the Rating Agencies when issued.” Judge Scheindlin also found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether the defendants acted with the requisite state of mind. Finally, she concluded that the plaintiffs had raised disputed issues of fact whether or not each of the plaintiffs had relied on the alleged misrepresentations.

In an interesting twist, at the end of her opinion, Judge Scheindlin added an “Addendum” in which she “ordered” the plaintiffs “to show cause by August 31, 2012 why their negligent misrepresentation claims against the Rating Agencies should not be dismissed” based on the Second Circuit’s August 14, 2012 opinion in Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (here). The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of negligent misrepresentation claims against the credit rating agencies, which were accused of issuing misleading and unsupported ratings on auction rate securities that had been issued by Merrill Lynch. The appellate court said New York law requires a showing that the rating agencies had a duty, as a result of a "special relationship," to give Anschutz correct information. The Second Circuit said the claimant had failed to establish such a relationship, so the dismissal of its case against the agencies could not proceed. Alison Frankel has a detailed analysis of the Second Circuit’s opinion in an August 15, 2012 post on her On the Case blog, here.

An August 18, 2012 Bloomberg article discussing Judge Scheindlin’s opinion can be found here.

FDIC’s Slow Failed Bank Lawsuit Filing Pace Continues: Almost exactly a month ago, I noted that the FDIC seemed to have broken the apparent lull in failed bank lawsuit filings, when if filed two lawsuits in quick succession. I anticipated that perhaps the two new lawsuits might indicate that the pace of filings would be picking up, particularly given that as the year progresses, the third anniversary of so many bank closures would be approaching (potentially triggering the applicable statute of limitations).

However, it now appears that the assumption that the lawsuits would be picking up may have been premature. Since the two lawsuits were filed in July, the FDIC has filed no new lawsuits, as reflected on the professional liability lawsuits page on the agency’s website. Indeed, in the four-month period between April 20, 2012 and August 20, 2012, the agency has filed only three new lawsuits, after filing eleven new lawsuits in the preceding four months. This low number of filings during the last four months as during the equivalent period is all the more surprising given that during the equivalent period three years prior approximately 50 banks closed.

Another reason why it seems reasonable to expect that the FDIC would be filing new lawsuits is that, according to its website, the agency has authorized so many more lawsuits than it has filed – and it has been increasing the number of authorized lawsuits each month. In the latest update to its website on August 14, 2012, the agency indicated that his has now authorized suits involving 73 failed institutions; against 617 individuals for D&O liability (those figures represented an increase from the prior month’s numbers of with 68 failed institutions against 576 individuals). So far the agency has filed 32 suits involving 31 failed institutions, involving 268 institutions.

Clearly the difference between the number of suits authorized and the number of suits filed suggests that there are many more cases in the pipeline – and with the increases in the numbers of authorized suits, the logjam in the pipeline seems to be increasing. It is entirely possible that the agency is trying to work out resolutions of at least some of the backlog of cases without filing suit, and in the connection may have entered tolling agreements. But just the same it does seem that we should start to see lawsuits coming in – which we may yet see before the year is out.

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The rating agencies must defend against  claims for negligent misrepresentation in connection with the ratings the firms assigned to a pair of structured investments vehicles, Southern District of New York Judge Shira Scheindlin has ruled in a pair of May 4, 2012 decisions. Judge Scheindlin did grant the defendants’ motions to dismiss claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting, which substantially narrowed the plaintiffs’ claims.  But she denied the rating agencies’ motions to dismiss with respect to the negligent misrepresentation claims, finding that, based on the plaintiffs’ allegations, the ratings qualified as actionable misstatements under New York law.

Judge Scheindlin issued the opinions in two cases involving structured investment vehicles, one called Rhinebridge and one called Cheyne Financial. Judge Scheindlin’s opinion in the Rhinebridge case can be found here and the opinion in the Cheyne Financial case can be found here.

The background on the Cheyne financial case can be found here. The Rhinebridge case arose out of the Rhinebridge structured investment vehicle’s (SIV) June 27, 2007 offering of certain investment securities to certain Qualified Institutional Buyer and Qualified Purchasers. In connection with the offering, the rating agencies gave the Rhinebridge securities the highest ratings. The plaintiffs also allege that the rating agencies helped structure the investment vehicle. The offering proceeds were invested in a variety of residential mortgage related investments. The SIV was forced into receivership on October 22, 2007, becoming, the plaintiffs alleged, “perhaps the shortest-lived ‘Triple A’ investment fund in the history of corporate finance.”  In addition to the rating agencies, the plaintiff investors had also sued IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG , the bank that sponsored the SIV, and Morgan Stanley, which had acted as offering underwriter.

Judge Scheindlin had originally dismissed the plaintiffs’ common law claims, holding under New York law that the common law claims were preempted by the Martin Act. However, in December 2011, as discussed here, the New York Court of Appeals rejected Martin Act preemption for common law claims, and Judge Scheindlin allowed the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings to assert common law claims. After the plaintiffs amended their pleadings the defendants renewed their motions to dismiss.   

In her May 4 ruling in the Rhinebridge case, Judge Scheindlin granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting. However, she denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation.

In denying the motions to dismiss the negligent misrepresentation claims, Judge Scheindlin said that:

the Rating Agencies (1 intended that their ratings would be used to evaluate the SIV; (2) intended that the plaintiffs –members of a select group of qualified investors – would rely in the ratings to evaluate the SIV; and (3) prepared their ratings with the end and aim of inducing investors such as the plaintiffs to invest in the SIV.

Judge Scheindlin’s ruling was specifically dependent on her determination, based on the plaintiff’s allegations, that “there was a privity-like ‘special relationship’ between the plaintiffs and the Rating Agencies.”  Judge Scheindlin also allowed the negligent misrepresentation claims to go forward as to IKB Deutsche Industriebank and Morgan Stanley.

Judge Scheindlin’s ruling in the Cheyne Financial case paralleled her rulings in the Rhinebridge case, and her order in the Cheyne Financial case expressly referenced her rulings in the Rhinebridge case.

Discussion

Among the causes many cite for the subprime meltdown is the willingness of the rating agencies to assign investment grade rating to securities backed by subprime mortgages. For that reason, in many of the lawsuits filed as part of the subprime litigation wave, plaintiffs have named rating agencies as defendants, seeking to hold them responsible for their investment losses. However, as discussed here, whether the rating agencies could actually be held liable is unclear, because in the past courts have found the rating agencies’ rating opinions to be protected by the First Amendment. The rating agencies have also raised a number of other defenses regarding their rating opinions.

A series of rulings in several cases have questioned the rating agencies’ defenses. As discussed here, in a September 2009 ruling in the Cheyne Financial case, Judge Scheindlin held that, at least where the rating agencies’ ratings were released only to a select group of investors, the rating agencies could not rely on their First Amendment defense. In May 2010, a California state court judge followed Judge Scheindlin in rejecting the rating agencies first amendment defense, as discussed here. In November 2011, in a case involving Thornburgh Mortgage mortgage pass through certificates, District of New Mexico Judge James Browning also rejected the rating agencies first amendment defenses, also relying on Judge Scheindlin’s opinion in the Cheyne Financial case, as discussed here.

Judge Scheindlin’s May 4 rulings arguably represent the latest decisions holding that the rating agencies could at least potentially be held liable for their ratings opinions. However, Judge Scheindlin’s latest rulings, like the prior rulings holding that the rating agencies could not rely on First Amendment defenses, were largely reliant on the fact at that the securities in question had only been distributed to a select group of investors. Indeed, in the Rhinebridge case, Judge Scheindlin found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that there was a privity-like relationship between the plaintiff investors and the rating agencies.

The various rulings In these cases, including also Judge Scheindlin’s most recent rulings in the Rhinebridge and Cheyne Financial cases, represent significant developments in connection with investors’ efforts to try to hold the rating agencies liable. However because these rulings are all dependent on the fact that the securities at issue were distributed only to a select group of investors, these rulings may not be helpful in cases involving securities that were more broadly distributed. But though these rulings have limitations, they also represent a growing body of case law on which investors can try to rely in asserting their claims against the rating agencies.

David Bario’s May 7, 2012 Am Law Litigation Daily article discussing Judge Scheindlin’s rulings can be found here.  Special thanks to Dan Newman of SCN Strategies for sending along copies of the opinions.

FCPA-Related Securities Class Action Suit Filed Against Wal-Mart: In yesterday’s post, I noted that CalSTRS had filed a shareholder derivative action against Wal-Mart, as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and officers, in connection with the revelations concerning the company’s Mexican bribery allegations. Now, in addition to the shareholder derivative lawsuits, investors have also launched a securities class action lawsuit in connection with the bribery allegations.

According to their May 7, 2012 press release (here), the plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a securities class action lawsuit against the company and certain of its directors and officers in the Middle District of Tennessee. The complaint, which can be found here, features a quote from and even a picture of company founder Sam Walton (allegedly taken from the company’s annual report). According to the press release, the complaint alleges that the defendants “ concealed from the investing public during the Class Period” that “the Company had violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the bribery payments” and  that  "Walmart management did not address ethical concerns in a ‘timely and effective manner’ as represented by defendants.”

As I said previously about the CalSTRS derivative suit, these lawsuit filings reinforce the view that follow-on civil litigation is an almost invariable accompaniment of FCPA-related investigations, and show that FCPA-related exposures are a matter of serious shareholder concern. Taken collectively, the risk of an FCPA investigation as well of the related follow-on civil litigation risk are increasingly important liability exposures for companies and their directors and officers.

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In a May 11, 2011 opinion (here), a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of rating agency defendants in litigation filed under the Securities Act of 1933 and involving mortgage-related securities issues by Lehman Brothers and IndyMac and the Residential Asset Securitization Trust (RUST). The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s rulings that the credit rating agencies could not be held liable under Section 11 of the ’33 Act as “underwriters” – even if they helped structure the securities at issue.

The plaintiffs were purchasers of mortgage backed securities. The plaintiffs generally alleged that the originators of the loans that backed the securities failed to comply with the general loan underwriting guidelines described in the offering documents. The plaintiffs allege that the rating agencies determined the composition of the loans in the mortgage pool that the instruments securitized. The plaintiffs also allege that the credit enhancements supporting the loans were insufficient to support the investment ratings the rating agencies gave the securities.

The plaintiffs premised their securities liability claims against the rating agencies based on their argument that the rating agencies were "underwriters" within the meaning of Section 11 of the ’33 Act. The plaintiffs based their theory that the rating agencies were "underwriters" on the argument that the "underwriter" liability extends to those "who engaged in steps necessary for the distribution." Plaintiffs argued that because the rating agencies structured the certificates at issue to achieve the desired ratings, that had performed a necessary predicated for the securities’ distribution in the market, and therefore they should be liable as underwriters.

In separate rulings on February 1 and February 17, 2010, Southern District of New York Lewis Kaplan granted the rating agency defendants’ motions to dismiss in the Lehman Brothers Mortgage Backed Securities lawsuit, as discussed here and here. Judge Kaplan relied on his ruling s in the Lehman Brothers case to granting the rating agency defendants’ dismissal motions in the IndyMac and RUST cases.  The plaintiffs’ appealed. Because the separate cases raised similar issues, the appeals were consolidated before the Second Circuit.

The Second Circuit affirmed Judge Kaplan’s ruling that the rating agencies cannot be held liable as “underwriters” under the ’33 Act. The Second Circuit said that:

The plain language of the statute limits liability to persons who participate in the purchase, offer, or sale of securities for distribution. While such participants may be indirect as well as direct, the statute does not reach further to identify as underwriters persons who provide services that facilitate a securities offering but who do not themselves participate in the statutorily specified distribution-related activities.

The Second Circuit also affirmed the lower court rulings that the Rating Agencies were not subject to “control person” liability under Section 15. Finally, the appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ leave to amend their pleadings.

The Second Circuit’s ruling not only is fatal for the claims of the plaintiffs in these cases with respect to the rating agencies, but also in the many other cases where other plaintiffs had raised similar claims. To be sure, these claims had not been faring particularly well in the district courts, as most other district courts were following Judge Kaplan’s district court ruling in the Lehman Brothers case. But now with the Second Circuit’s opinion these claims seem to have received what may be their final blow.

It is worth noting, however, that investors have filed lawsuits relating to subprime investments against the rating agencies on other theories. For example, in one case, discussed here, CalPERS had sued the rating agencies in connection with the agencies’ ratings on certain investment vehicles, asserting claims of negligence and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. In the Cheyne Financial case (discussed here), the plaintiff investors had asserted a variety of common law claims against the rating agencies, including common law fraud and misrepresentation. These claims based on other theories will not be affected by the Second Circuit’s ruling.

What remains to be seen is whether the subprime mortgage-backed securities investors will prevail against the rating agencies on any theory.

Nate Raymond’s May 11, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article about the Second Circuit’s decision can be found here.

Is It Really Time to Head Out?: I know things have been challenging for securities class action plaintiffs’ lawyers. A string of Supreme Court decisions has made it lot tougher for them to pursue their claims and the cumulative impact of various legislative reforms have made it more difficult for the plaintiffs’ claims to survive the preliminary motions. But has it gotten so bad that it is time to pull up stakes to try to pursue shareholder claims in another country? Apparently so, at least judging from the actions of Michael Spencer, a securities class action plaintiffs’ attorney for the Milberg firm in New York.

According to a May 10, 2011 article in The (Toronto) Globe and Mail entitled “Top U.S. Class Action Lawyer Coming to Canada” (here), Spencer, who was lead plaintiffs’ counsel in the Vivendi securities trial, has been completing all of the requirements for being admitted to the Ontario bar, with the goal of practicing law there. He apparently intends to set up his Canadian practice with the Toronto law firm of Kim Orr Barristers. P.C.

The article explains that Spencer’s move is due to the years of tightening down on securities class actions in the U.S. (particularly in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank). By contrast, court’s applying Ontario’s securities laws have recently certified a global class (in the Imax case, for example). The article quotes Spencer as saying “Simply put, Canada presents a great opportunity.”

I have recognized that the cumulative impact of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions had made life tougher for the plaintiffs’ bar. But I had not thought that things had reached a point that litigation prospects looked more promising outside the United States. The fact that we have reached the point that litigation prospects look brighter in Canada than in the United States represents a watershed development of some kind. I wonder how the Canadians feel about that…

I note for the record the Spencer has been a guest blogger on this site; his guest post can be found here.

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The rating agencies have been among the targets in many of the lawsuits filed as part of the subprime-related litigation wave. By and large, the rating agencies have been successful in knocking out these cases in the early stages, particularly the lawsuits seeking to hold them liable as "underwriters" under the federal securities laws.

At the same time, there is a small but growing number of cases in which the rating agencies’ preliminary motions have been unsuccessful, and there is a definite sense in which these decisions are building on each other, particularly with respect to the issues surrounding the First Amendment defenses on which the rating agencies are seeking to rely.

The latest example of a case where the rating agencies’ preliminary motion on First Amendment grounds have been unsuccessful is the negligence suit that Calpers filed in California state court against the three principal rating agencies.

Background

In July 2009, Calpers sued the three main rating agencies in California state court. Calpers alleged that it had invested about $1.3 billion in instruments issued by three structured investment vehicles (SIV). The investments carried the rating agencies highest ratings, which ratings Calpers alleged were "wildly inaccurate." Calpers claims to have lost over $1 billion on the investments.

Calpers alleged that it would not have invested in the securities if the securities had not carried the highest investment ratings. Calpers alleged that the rating agencies "did not have a reasonable basis" for giving the SIVs the highest investment ratings.

The ratings were flawed, Calpers alleged, because they failed to account for "foreseeable scenarios" and failed to account for the SIVs’ critical risk – that is, that the were highly concentrated in certain types of residential mortgages and residential mortgage backed securities. Calpers also alleged that the rating agencies used "inadequate mathematical and statistical models" and "employed increasingly lax standards" while giving the SIVs the highest ratings, in order to be able to continue to secure business providing ratings for structured financial products.

The rating agencies demurred to Calpers’ complaint, asserting that the allegations were legally insufficient. In early May 2010, California (San Francisco County) Superior Court Judge Richard Kramer announced from the bench that he would be overruling the rating agency defendants’ demurrer to Calpers’ negligence claims, but that he was sustaining the demurrers with leave to amend as to Calpers’ allegations of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Judge Kramer indicated at the hearing that the reasons for his reasons would appear in a forthcoming opinion.

The May 24 Opinion

In an opinion dated May 24, 2010 and filed on June 1, 2010 (and which can be found here), Judge Kramer set out the reasons for his rulings on the rating agency defendants’ demurrers.

The most noteworthy aspect of Judge Kramer’s opinion is his statement of the bases on which he rejected the defendants’ argument that they could not be held liable for their ratings opinions because the opinions are protected under the First Amendment. Judge Kaplan said (citing and relying on Judge Shira Sheindlin’s opinion in the Cheyne Financial case, about which refer here):

The court rejects Defendants’ arguments that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution preempts Plaintiff’s claims. The right to free speech allows us to give our opinions to things of public concern. The issuance of these SIV ratings is not, however, an issue of public concern. Rather, it is an economic activity designed for a limited target for the purpose of making money. That is not something that should be afforded First Amenment protection and the Defendants are not akin to members of the financial press.

Judge Kaplan also rejected the rating agency defendants’ arguments that the plaintiff’s claims are precluded by New York’s Martin Act or by the Credit Rating Agency Defense Act. However, he did find that plaintiff’s claim of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage was legally insufficient, although he allowed plaintiff leave to attempt to replead the claim.

Discussion

There have only been a handful of preliminary motion rulings so far that have been unfavorable to the rating agencies. But Judge Kaplan’s opinion in the Calpers case demonstrates that each of these rulings, even though seemingly limited, creates an opportunity for later plaintiffs to try to exploit the rulings in other cases.

For example, Judge Kaplan expressly relied on Judge Sheindlin’s September 2009 opinion in the Cheyne Financial case. Judge Sheindlin’s rejection of the rating agencies’ First Amendment defense in that case was by its own terms narrow; she said only that credit rating that is not directed to the public at large, but that is "provided instead to a select group of investors," is not entitled to First Amendment protection.

Though Judge Kaplan expressly quoted this narrowing language, his opinion arguable is not as narrow. To be sure, he emphasized that the SIV itself was designed for a "limited target. But he also said that the rating agencies are not the equivalent of the "financial press," and he indicated that the opinions were not entitled to protection where the opinions are not of "public concern." This analysis may or may not be sufficient to bar the First Amendment defense in a public-at-large kind of claim, but it nonetheless does seen to constrain the availability of the defense in a wide variety of circumstances – and a wider variety of circumstances than would the standard in Judge Sheindlin’s case.

Whether plaintiffs in other cases will be able to build further on Judge Kaplan’s opinion remains to be seen. It particularly remains to be seen whether Judge Kaplan’s analysis will prove useful in a public-at-large case, as opposed to a "select group of investors" kind of case.

Nevertheless the plaintiffs in these cases have shown themselves capable of building on openings in the defense. However, even the plaintiffs that have already survived preliminary motions are all still a very long way from any actual recovery. But surviving the motions to live for another day is the name of the game for plaintiffs in these kinds of cases. The small but growing number of rulings favorable to the plaintiffs seem to offer some reason to suspect that a number of these cases against the rating agencies may yet go forward.

Special thank to Henry Turner of the Turner Law Offices for providing me with a copy of Judge Kaplan’s opinion in the Calpers case.

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On May 20, 2010, the U.S. Senate passed the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (S. 3217) by a vote of 59 to 39. The Senate websites latest version of the Bill can be found here, and the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee’s link to the most current version can be found here. Though these may be the most current versions available they do not necessariliy represent the final text of the bill, which was substantially amended and is not yet publicly available.

The Senate Bill must now be reconciled with the financial reform legislation the House passed last December (about which refer here). The reconciliation committee will be selected this upcoming week, and the plan is to have the reconciled version available for President Obama’s signature before July 4.

The massive Senate bill weighs in a 1566 pages. It is in many important ways substantially similar to the House bill, although there are also critical differences. Among the differences is the Senate bill’s controversial provision, sponsored by Sen. Blanche Lincoln, requiring financial firms to separate derivatives trading from banking operations and even spin them off under certain circumstances.

Among other measures that were not included in the Senate bill is the amendment proposed by Senator Arlen Specter that would have legislatively overturned Stoneridge and created a private right of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud. Theoretically, the measure could be included during the reconciliation process, but that seems highly unlikely at this point. Susan Beck’s May 21, 2010 Am Law Litigation Daily article reporting on the amendment’s defeat can be found here.

Another provision not included in the Senate bill is the measure incorporated in the House version (Section 7216) to provide extraterritorial jurisdiction for securities cases involving conduct within the U.S. constituting significant steps in furtherance of the securities violation, even if the transaction occurs outside the U.S. and involves only foreign investors. This provision, if incorporated in the reconciled version of the legislation, would legislatively address the "f-cubed" securities suit raised in many cases, included the National Australia Bank case now before the U.S. Supreme Court.

On the other hand, the Senate bill, like the House version, does incorporate a number of statutory corporate governance reforms. Among other things, the Senate version provides for non-binding shareholder votes on executive compensation (Section 951). The Senate bill also includes a measure requiring clawbacks from "any current or former officer" of incentive compensation awarded in the three year period prior to a financial restatement (Section 954). The Senate bill also adds additional disclosure requirements regarding compensation and regarding employee and director hedging (Sections 952 and 955)

In addition the Senate bill also specifies rules governing director elections (Section 971), among other things mandating that in uncontested elections, directors receiving a majority of votes are deemed elected. The measure further provides that directors receiving less than a majority in an uncontested election shall resign, with the board to consider whether or not to accept the resignation.

The Senate bill also requires companies to disclose the reasons why they have or have not chosen to have the same person serve both as board chair and CEO (Section 973)

The Senate bill also adopts a number of measures under the heading of "Investor Protection and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities." Among other things, the Senate bill, like the House version, includes measures providing protection and rewards for whistleblowers who report securities law violations to the SEC (Sections 922-24). The Senate bill also creates an Investor Advisory Committee that would consult with the SEC on matters pertaining to protecting investor interests (Section 911). The Senate bill also creates an Office of Investor Advocate within the SEC (Section 914).

Of particular interest to readers of this blog, the Senate bill, like the House bill, has a number of provisions relating specifically to insurance. The Senate Bill creates an Office of National Insurance (Section 502), which is in form substantially similar to the Federal Insurance Office in the House version. Like the agency created in the House version the agency created in the Senate bill would be housed within the Treasury Department. Neither the House nor the Senate version envisions that that the new federal agency would replace state insurance regulation. Instead, the new agency would monitor the industry in order to identify systemic risks; oversee TRIA; and coordinate international insurance regulatory efforts, among other things.

The Senate bill also contains a number of other insurance-related provisions, including a section addressing reporting, payment and allocation of premium taxes (Section 521); and another section relation to the regulation of non-admitted insurance (Section 522). Yet another measure specifies streamlined non-admitted insurance procedures for certain commercial insurance buyers (Section 525)

There are many other measures of more general interest in the massive Senate bill, including "improvements" to the regulation of rating agencies (Section 931 et seq.); increased disclosure requirements in connection with municipal securities (Section 975 et seq.); the creation of a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Section 1001 et seq.); provision for the regulation of hedge fund advisors and others (Section 401 et seq.); and the institution of regulation for swap markets (Section 721 et seq.).

Though the ultimate shape of the legislation that will be presented to President Obama remains to be seen, the likely scope of many measures is already relatively clear, as both versions of the legislation include numerous substantially similar provisions. Whether or not the provisions ultimately enacted into law will suffice to prevent future financial crisis is a separate question but there can be little doubt that the financial system is about to face some enormous changes.

It is probably worth emphasizing here, as it may be overlooked elsewhere given the other high-profile issues the legislation involves, that the reform legislation, when enacted, will entail significant federal government involvement in areas previously viewed as the province of state regulation. Specifically, both insurance and corporate governance have until recently been regarded as matters with respect to which state interests should control.

Though significant levels of regulatory responsibility will remain at the state level both for insurance and corporate governance, this reform legislation significantly increases the federal government involvement. It doesn’t seem too suspicious to conjecture that these measures represent significant milestones in what is likely to be continued growth of federal responsibility in these areas.

The bill’s provisions relating to insurance could be of practical significance for insurance professionals. I did not review the provisions at length in this post, but if they survive in some form in the final bill, I will undertake a detailed review at that time.

Rating Agencies in the Crosshairs: The financial reform bill’s provisions relating to the rating agencies represent only one of a variety of developments that is raising the heat for those firms. David Segal’s May 23, 2010 New York Times article entitled "Suddenly, the Rating Agencies Don’t Look Untouchable" (here) takes a look at the assaults the rating agencies are facing on a variety of directions, including on the litigation front.

The article makes the point that though the rating agencies are prevailing in most of the credit crisis related cases in which they have been involved, there have also been a small handful of cases that have survived initial motions to dismiss. The article makes the point that as the litigation evolves, the plaintiffs’ lawyers are learning from every decision, including the dismissals, and are refining their arguments in subsequent cases.

The author of The D&O Diary is quoted briefly toward the end of the article.

More Deepwater Horizon Securities Litigation: As I have previously noted, the Deepwater Horizon disaster has already produced significant corporate and securities litigation, including the BP shareholders derivative suit (about which refer here) and the Transocean securities class action lawsuit (refer here). Now this litigation also includes a securities class action lawsuit filed against BP and certain of its directors and officers.

On May 21, 2010, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Western District of Louisiana against BP and nine of its directors and officers. A copy of the complaint can be found here. The case is brought on behalf of purchasers of BP’s American Depositary Receipts "based on Defendants' repeatedassurances of BP's safe operations, reflected in the ADR price, have seen the value of their shares plummet 20% overnight - representing about $30 billion in market capitalization - as the truth about BP's operations has emerged."

The complaint alleges that "by touting the growth potential of its Gulf of Mexico operations… and highlighting the safety of the operations, BP convinced investors, including Plaintiffs, that BP would be able to generate tremendous growth with minimal risk." However, the plaintiffs allege, "The truth was that BP was cutting comers and reducing its spending on safety measures in an effort to maximize profits in the Gulf of Mexico."

Interestingly, the plaintiffs’ Louisiana counsel is the law firm of Domengeuax, Wright, Roy & Edwards, a Lafayette, Louisiana firm that has already been very active in pursuing Deepwater Horizon claims on behalf of commercial fisherman, shrimpers, oystermen, and charter boat operators, as well as on behalf of families of persons suffering injuries or death in the initial platform explosion, as reflected here.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog for providing a copy of the BP complaint.

O.K., Who Invited the Actuary?: In his rambling biography of Pablo Picasso, Norman Mailer describes an opium-laced party at Le Bateau-Lavoir, Picasso’s Montmartre rooming house, where the guests included such luminaries as Guillaume Apollinaire and numerous avant- garde sculptors, painters and poets. Mailer also reports that the guests included "Maurice Princet, the actuarial mathematician for insurance companies, who would give them his own popular introduction to Einstein’s work before long."

Say what?

I mean no disrespect to my many insurance actuary friends, but even were I to have access to Picasso’s opium, I don’t think I could imagine how an actuary wound up in this particular scene. I mean, can you picture Princet trying to bring down the house with the old story about the guy "who couldn’t disprove the null hypothesis"?

In fairness, I should acknowledge that Princet was to play in important role in the later development of "cubism," and indeed has been described by one of the principal actors in the drama as the "godfather" of cubism, for having introduced Picasso to certain mathematical concepts. I don’t think I would be alone, however, in finding it startling that the cast of characters in this particular production includes an insurance actuary.　

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In a April 26, 2010 opinion (here) that could have significant implications for motions to dismiss in the many subprime-related securities actions pending against the rating agencies, Southern District of New York Judge Schira Scheindlin rejected the arguments of Moody’s and S&P that the action investors in the Rhinebridge structured investment vehicle (SIV) should be dismissed because the investors’ losses were caused the global credit crisis rather than those firms’ investment ratings.

Background

The investor plaintiffs had filed a putative class action lawsuit for common law fraud in connection with the collapse of Rhinebridge. The action was brought against IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG and related entities; the rating agency defendants, including Moody’s and S&P; and certain individuals. (If IKB’s name sounds familiar, that is because it was one of the principal buyers in the now infamous Abacus transaction at the heart of the SEC’s action against Goldman Sachs.)

The plaintiffs contend that the defendants fraudulently misrepresented the value of Rhinbridge and its Senior Notes. These misrepresentations took the form of the high credit ratings assigned to the Notes. The Notes’ triple A ratings allegedly conveyed to investors that they were highly credit worthy and exceptionally strong, but also allegedly concealed that Rhinebridge’s portfolio actually consisted of toxic assets that were heavily concentrated in the structured finance and subprime mortgage industries. The Notes were downgraded in October, Rhinebridge entered receivership and the investors lost million of dollars.

S&P and Moody’s moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to demonstrate loss causation, in that they failed to account for the global liquidity crisis that began in the summer of 2007.

The April 26 Opinion

Judge Scheindlin rejected the defendant rating agencies’ loss causation argument, observing that "to hold that plaintiffs failed to plead loss causation solely because the credit crisis occurred contemporaneously with Rhinebridge’s collapse would place too much weight on one single factor and would permit S&P and Moody’s to blame the asset-backed securities industry when the their alleged conduct plausibly caused at least some portion of plaintiffs’ losses."

She added that "even if the existence of the credit crisis—standing alone – could be enough to defeat a plaintiffs’ pleading of loss causation, it is not apparent that the credit crisis was the sole cause of Rhinebridge’s collapse."

Judge Scheindlin also noted that "S&P and Moody’s may yet prevail at a later stage in this case," adding that "if defendants ultimately prove that plaintiffs’ losses were, in fact, cause entirely by an intervening event, then defendants will prevail either at summary judgment or at trial."

Judge Scheidlin declined to find, as plaintiff had urged, that the rating agencies were "one of the major causes" of the global financial crisis. She observed that:

Blame for the financial crisis can be, and had been, spread globally – from the financial sector’s increasingly complex financial products, to mortgage originators, to the government’s loosened regulatory practices and its failure to respond to the collapse and substantial weakening of multiple financial powerhouses. While the Rating Agencies’ actions may have been a "substantial factor" causing the loss, that is not tantamount to labeling their conduct a "major cause" of the global financial crisis.

Discussion

While numerous subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits have been filed against the rating agencies have been filed and are slowly working their way through the courts, the fundamental questions of whether and under what circumstances the rating agencies might be held liable to investors are yet to be worked out.

Even before those basic liability issues can be addressed, the threshold pleading issues still have to be sorted out. Judge Scheindlin emphatically did not hold that the rating agencies can be liable. However, her April 26 opinion does represent a strong signal that the rating agencies will not get off the hook merely because there was a larger financial crisis beyond the rating agencies’ actions in connection with the specific transactions.

To put everything under the heading of the credit crisis, Judge Scheindlin held, would be to permit the rating agencies to "blame the asset-backed securities industry when the alleged conduct plausibly caused at least some proportion of plaintiffs’ losses."

So it remains to be seen whether the rating agencies may be held liable. But Judge Scheindlin’s opinion suggests that the rating agencies will not be able to get the cases against them dismissed on the simple theory that the credit crisis and not their rating actions caused investor losses, where plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the rating agencies cause some proportion of the losses.

This holding potentially removes at least one threshold barrier to the question of ultimate liability, at least for purposes of the pleading stages, and reduces the extent to which the rating agencies may be able to rely on the "coincidence" of the global credit crisis as an out from the cases against them.

For my discussion of Judge Scheindlin’s opinion in a separate subprime lawsuit against the rating agencies in which, on the facts alleged, she held that the rating agencies were not entitled to dismissal on the grounds that their ratings were protected by the First Amendment, refer here.

The WSJ.com Law Blog’s post on Judge Scheindlin’s opinion can be found here. Andrew Longstreth’s April 27, 2010 Am Law Litigation Daily article about the decision can be found here. .

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In a ruling that may have potential significance for the many claims that have been filed against the rating agencies in the subprime litigation wave, on February 17, 2010, Southern District of New York Judge Lewis Kaplan dismissed all but one of the claims that had been filed against the individual defendants in the Lehman Brothers Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation. A copy of Judge Kaplan’s February 17 order can be found here.

Background

Plaintiffs had purchased the mortgage back securities that Lehman Brothers issued in August 2005 and August 2006. The plaintiffs allege that the originators of the loans that backed the securities failed to comply with the general loan underwriting guidelines described in the offering documents. The plaintiffs allege that the offering documents had failed to disclose that the rating agencies, which were paid for providing their ratings, had conflicts of interest and had been involved in helping to structure the securities. The plaintiffs also allege that the offering documents failed to disclose that the credit enhancements supporting the loans were insufficient to support the investment ratings the rating agencies gave the securities.

The individual defendants in the case are the officers and directors of the Structured Asset Securities Corporation, which issued the registration statements and acted as depositor in the securitization process. The individual defendants moved to dismiss.

As noted in prior posts, Judge Kaplan has previously dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against the rating agencies themselves (refer here), rejecting plaintiffs’ arguments that the rating agencies were "underwriters" under the ’33 Act. Judge Kaplan also previously dismissed the separate ERISA class action claims (refer here, scroll down). In his February 17 decision, Judge Kaplan separately ruled on the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The February 17 Decision

Judge Kaplan held that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the offering documents failed to disclose the rating agencies’ conflict of interest were insufficient to state a claim, for two reasons.

First, Judge Kaplan held that the Securities Act does not require disclosures of "that which is publicly known," and "the risk that the rating agencies operated under a conflict of interest because they were paid by the issuers had been known publicly for years."

Judge Kaplan then went on to hold that "the rating agencies’ role in structuring the certificates is not material as a matter of law." His conclusion is based on the following analysis:

If the fee arrangement undermined an investor’s confidence in the rating agencies’ independence, a disclosure that a rating agency was involved in structuring the Certificates prior to rating them would have added nothing important to the "total mix" of information. If, on the other hand, an investor trusted the ratings agencies to give an honest opinion notwithstanding the fact that they were paid by the issuer, the fact that they were involved in structuring the Certificates, assuming that they were, likewise would have been unimportant. In consequence, these claims are insufficient.

With respect to the plaintiffs’ allegations that the offering documents contained misrepresentations about the amount and form of credit enhancement, Judge Kaplan held that the statement about the credit enhancement was a "statement of opinion," which could be actionable only if the complaint alleged that the rating agencies did not actually hold that opinion.

Judge Kaplan found that "at best" the complaint’s allegations "support an inference that some employees believed the rating agencies could have used methods that better would have informed their opinions," which he held to be insufficient to state a claim.

But Judge Kaplan did hold that the complaint’s allegations that the loan originators "systematically failed to follow the underwriting guidelines" were "sufficient at this stage to support a reasonable inference that the offering documents’ description of the underwriting guidelines was materially misleading."

Accordingly, Judge Kaplan granted the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss all of the claims against them except plaintiffs’ Section 11 claims about the loan originators’ supposed departures from underwriting standards.

Discussion

Even though Judge Kaplan’s February 17 opinion was issued in connection with claims asserted against the individual defendants and not in connection with claims asserted against the rating agencies themselves, the opinion nevertheless potentially could be of great significance in other subprime mortgage-related cases in which claims have been raised against the rating agencies.

In particular, Judge Kaplan’s holding that the offering documents’ omissions about the rating agencies’ alleged conflicts of interest and role in structuring the securities were not legally actionable may be of particular significance.

In many of the other cases in which claims have been asserted against the rating agencies, the claimants have, like the plaintiffs in the Lehman case, alleged that the rating agencies had undisclosed conflicts of interest and were involved in structuring the investments at issue. The rating agencies will undoubtedly find Judge Kaplan’s holding that the alleged omission of this information is not legally actionable to be helpful.

Judge Kaplan did not reach the question whether or not the rating agencies’ ratings are protected by the First Amendment, which is another defense on which the rating agencies will attempt to rely. But if the alleged omissions about the rating agencies are not actionable in the first place, there may never be a need to reach the First Amendment issues.

Judge Kaplan conclusion that the disclosures concerning the securities’ credit enhancements represented opinion rather than statements of fact is also instructive, even without getting into the First Amendment issues. As his February 17 decision states, statements of opinion are actionable only if the allegations show that the opinions were not actually as disclosed. Again, Judge Kaplan’s rulings are instructive and potentially significant as they suggest ways in which the claims against the rating agencies may be considered without even getting into the First Amendment issues.

Finally, Judge Kaplan’s holding that the rating agencies’ alleged conflicts of interest and involvement in the securitization transaction are immaterial does raise interesting questions about claimants’ ability to overcome the rating agencies’ First Amendment defenses. The plaintiffs have argued that the rating agencies were not entitled to rely on the First Amendment defense in the context of these kinds of structured investments because of the conflicts of interest and involvement in the transaction. Perhaps Judge Kaplan’s rulings are unrelated to these issues, but it does seem incongruous that considerations that are immaterial would be sufficient to overcome a constitutional defense.

Of course, it is entirely possible that other courts may not be persuaded by Judge Kaplan’s analysis. It is not intuitively obvious that, because it was public knowledge that rating agencies had conflicts, the rating agencies’ involvement in the transactions is legally immaterial. Indeed, the jump between the public knowledge of the conflict of interest and the immateriality of the rating agencies’ involvement in the transactions is frankly unsatisfying. Other courts might well be unwilling to make that analytic jump.

I have in any event added Judge Kaplan’s February 17 opinion to my table of subprime-related lawsuit motion to dismiss rulings, which can be accessed here. Because a portion of the claims against the individual defendants survived the dismissal motion, I have listed the ruling in the table of dismissal motion denials.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending a copy of Judge Kaplan's February 17 opinion.

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Rating agencies are not susceptible to ’33 Act liability as "underwriters," even if they helped structure the mortgage backed securities at issue, according to February 1, 2010 ruling (here) by Southern District of New York Judge Lewis Kaplan in which he dismissed Moody’s and McGraw-Hill (S&P’s parent) from the Lehman Brothers Mortgage-Backed Securities Litigation.

Plaintiffs had purchased the mortgage back securities that Lehman Brothers had issued in two offerings in August 2005 and August 2006. The plaintiffs allege that the originators of the loans that backed the securities failed to comply with the general loan underwriting guidelines described in the offering documents. The plaintiffs allege that the rating agencies determined the composition of the loans in the mortgage pool that the instruments securitized. The plaintiffs also allege that the credit enhancements supporting the loans were insufficient to support the investment ratings the rating agencies gave the securities.

The plaintiffs premised their securities liability claims against the rating agencies based on their argument that the rating agencies were "underwriters" within the meaning of Section 11 of the ’33 Act. The plaintiffs based their theory that the rating agencies were "underwriters" within the meaning of Section 11 on the argument that the "underwriter" liability extends to those "who engaged in steps necessary for the distribution."
 

Judge Kaplan found this argument "unpersuasive," noting that

The Rating Agencies’ alleged activities may well have had a good deal to do with the composition and characteristics of the pools of mortgage loans and the credit enhancements of the Certificates that ultimately were sold. But there is nothing in the complaint to suggest that they participated in the relevant "undertaking" – that of purchasing the securities here at issue, the Certificates – "from the issuer with a view to their resale." The Section 11 claim is insufficient in law.

Judge Kaplan also rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the rating agencies had "seller" liability under Section 12(a)(2) or control person liability under Section 15.

The rating agencies dismissal from this subprime-related securities class action lawsuit is not as significant as it would have been if it had based on the rating agencies’ claims that their ratings opinions are proteced by the First Amendment. Though Judge Scheindlin rejected that argument on narrow grounds in the Cheyne Financial case (refer here), the First Amendment defense undoubtedly will play a crucial role in many of the subprime-related securities cases that have been filed against the rating agencies, and the litigants in the many cases that have been filed against the rating agencies will have to await a later date to get a clearer sense of how those arguments will fare in these cases.

But though Judge Kaplan did not reach the first amendment issue, his ruling nevertheless is significant. As the subprime litigation wave unfolded, there were a number of complaints filed against the rating agencies asserting ’33 Act claims against them in which the plaintiffs in those cases had argued that the rating agencies were susceptible to "underwriter" liability under Section 11. Judge Kaplan’s rejection of that theory undoubtedly will be influential in those other cases where the plaintiffs have attempted to assert Section 11 "underwriter" liability against the rating agencies.

I have in any event added Judge Kaplan’s ruling to my list of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit resolutions, which can be accessed here.

SEC Issues Climate Change Interpretive Guidance: The SEC decided recently to issue interpretive guidance on climate change disclosure. The SEC has now issued the interpretive guidance, which can be found here. I think this is a significant development, and not just because the SEC has now formally put climate change disclosure on the list of things to do for reporting companies.

It is clearly a topic worthy of much longer treatment than I am able to give it while I am in New York attending the PLUS D&O Symposium, but the danger is that the disclosure requirement establishes the predicate for a plaintiff to later claim that a public company failed to meet its climate change-related disclosure obligations. In my view, the SEC’s issuance of the interpretive guidance brings us that much closer to the day when we may start to see D&O claims arising out of misrepresentations or omissions concerning climate change related disclosures.

The End of the World: In response to my recent statement that I was tired and could use a nap, one of my much younger colleagues replied "O.K, first we take zee nap, ZEN WE DEESTROY ZEE WORLD!" She undoubtedly saw from the puzzled look on my face that I didn’t have a clue what she was talking about, so she immediately sat down and showed me this YouTube video, which she described as "the original viral Internet video." Readers should be forewarned that  the video uses vulgar language and contains humor that some may find crude or offensive. It is also seriously funny. Viewer discretion is, however, strongly advised.

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On November 20, 2009, Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray announced (here) the filing of a lawsuit in the Southern District of Ohio on behalf of five Ohio pension funds against Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. According to his press release, the complaint, which can be found here, charges the rating agencies with "wreaking havoc on U.S. financial markets by providing unjustified and inflated ratings of mortgage-backed securities in exchanged for lucrative fees from securities issuers."

During the period January 1, 2005 through July 8, 2008, the plaintiff pension funds purchased a variety of asset-backed securities all of which had "false and misleading" ratings of AAA or equivalent. The complaint alleges that while the ratings purportedly were objective and independent, "in truth, the Rating Agencies subverted those principles and negligently provided unjustified and inflated ratings in exchange for the lucrative fees the ABS issuers paid the Defendants for not only rating the securities but also for helping to structure them."

The complaint makes liberal use of the rating agencies’ internal communications that the SEC disclosed following its own investigation of the firms, and also quote extensively from the SEC’s investigation report (about which refer here).

The complaint asserts that "when the housing and credit markets collapsed, the flaws in the Defendants’ AAA ratings gradually became clear." The value of the pension funds’ investments "dropped precipitously" which, the complaint alleges, caused the funds to lose over $457 million, as "these purportedly safe investments became obvious for what they were – high risk securities that both the issuers and the Rating Agencies knew to be little more than a house of cards." The complaint asserts claims for relief under the Ohio Securities Act and for negligent misrepresentation.

The Ohio action follow the similar action that Calpers filed in July 2009 against the rating agencies, as discussed here.

As I have previously discussed on this blog, the rating agencies have proven to be a popular target for investors angry about losses they sustained on mortgage-backed securities and other investments following the subprime meltdown. But as I have also previously noted, these investor actions could face significant hurdles, particularly with respect to the rating agencies’ constitutional defenses. Significant case law supports the rating agencies’ position that their ratings opinions are protected by the first amendment.

In attempting to overcome these arguments, the Ohio funds will undoubtedly seek to rely on Judge Shira Scheindlin’s September 2009 opinion in the Cheyne Financial case, in which she rejected the rating agencies’ argument that their rating opinions were entitled to immunity under the First Amendment.

But as I noted in my prior post discussing Judge Scheindlin’s opinion, the extent to which these plaintiffs will be able to rely on her opinion may be limited. First, as a district court opinion, it will be of at most persuasive but not precedential value. Moreover, Judge Scheindlin’s conclusions were made in the context of an action made under New York’s fraud laws, which may or may not be relevant to an action under Ohio’s laws.

In addition, Judge Scheindlin’s ruling in the case was limited by its own terms. In disallowing the first amendment defense, she said "where a rating agency has disseminated their ratings to a select group of investors rather than to the public at large, the rating agency is note afforded the same protection." To the extent the ratings the Ohio funds’ allege to be misleading were not made to a select group of investors, as was the case with respect to the investments involved in the Cheyne Financial case, Judge Scheindlin’s ruling arguably may not be relevant.

But despite the obstacles, Cordray appears enthusiastic about the case. In fact, he seems to have decided in general that he can extract significant political value by pursing securities litigation. On November 20, 2009, he wrote on his blog, Speak Out Ohio, that "my office is aggressively pursuing Wall Street corporations and executives that harm investors here in Ohio and around the world." (Yes, the Ohio Attorney General has a blog. Doesn’t everybody?) Among other things, he also references in his blog post the recent $400 million settlement in the Marsh contingent commission securities class action lawsuit, in which his office participated.

Just to underscore how enthusiastic he is about pursing securities class action litigation, Cordray also separately published on November 20, 2009 a detailed report of the securities class action lawsuits his offices has pursued or is pursuing.

The political value that Cordray thinks he can gain by initiating securities litigation may be discerned from the tenor and tone of some of his remarks in his blog. For example, with respect to the rating agency lawsuit, he says that:

This case goes to the heart of what’s wrong with Wall Street today. Ohio workers—including our families, friends and neighbors – work hard to create wealth in our economy. Then Wall Street corporations and executives manipulate that wealth, for their benefit, and they do so with total disregard for our life’s work and the importance of our retirement savings. Ordinary people throughout Ohio are hurt by this kind of misconduct. And we won’t stand for it.

If you are wondering whether Cordray’s litigation endeavors are producing their intended results (that is, by generating favorable publicity for Cordray, who clearly has higher political aspirations), you will be interested to know that the filing of the rating agency lawsuit made the front page of the business section of Saturday’s Cleveland Plain Dealer. Since the only thing in Cleveland worse than the Cleveland Browns is the Cleveland economy, the paper’s business section is actually widely read, for same morbid reasons that people gawk at traffic accidents.

Ben Hallman of the Am Law Litigation Daily has an interesting November 20, 2009 profile of Cordray and of the ratings agency case here. Among other things, Hallman notes that Cordray is a former five-time undefeated Jeopardy! champ. Hallman also (correctly, in my view) notes that Cordray is "making a strong bid to be the Midwest’s answer to Andrew Cuomo."

On the Other Hand, Securities Litigation Could Also a Scam Worse Than Bernie Madoff’s: While Cordray is convinced that he is helping to protect the little guy by pursuing securities suits against Wall Street, Lawrence W. Schonbrun, the executive director of Class Action Litigation Watch, asserts that securities class action litigation is "a financial rip-off worse than Bernie Madoff."

In a November 21, 2009 editorial in The Buffalo News (here), Schonbrun takes on the plaintiffs’ securities class action bar, asserting that class action securities litigation is "skimming hundreds of millions of dollars from investors in U.S. corporations." Using Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the SEC’s settlement of the BofA/Merrill Lynch bonus action as a starting point, Schonbrun argues that:

In a typical year, more than 200 securities class action lawsuits are filed against American companies, with an average settlement of more than $100 million each; that adds up to a staggering $20 billion a year! Over nearly 40 years, that means that the system has drained upward of $800 billion of shareholder wealth, not just from people who directly trade securities but from all Americans who own mutual funds, or have pension funds or other types of investments. Kind of dwarfs Madoff’s $65 billion, doesn’t it?

Schonbrun is rather obviously playing fast and lose with the numbers, since there has never yet been even one year when class action lawsuits settlements average $100 million, and there certainly have not be 40 years’ worth of average settlements of $100 million.

But his rant does raise an interesting question, which is -- who is actually helped and who is actually hurt by the class action lawsuits? It is true that when class action settlements are funded in whole or in part by defendant corporations, it is shareholders that are hurt. As Schonbrun points out, among the most significant shareholders are the very kinds of pension funds on whose behalf Cordray is busy filing lawsuits. Schonbrun’s intemperate screed didn’t quite get there, but there is a very interesting question about whether the kinds of lawsuits Cordray is busy congratulating himself for filing (at least to the extent they are filed against publicly traded companies, as opposed to the rating agencies) actually benefit the pension funds over the long haul.

So here’s my idea: Let’s have a public debate between Cordray and Schonbrun. Call it "Class Action Smackdown" or something like that. To enhance the entertainment value, the rules of engagement could specify (drawing on Cordray’s Jeopardy! experience) all of the contestants’ statements would have to be expressed in the form of a question. That could be quite a spectacle.

And Speaking of Class Action Litigation: Meanwhile, back at the Southern District of New York courthouse, the Vivendi securities class action lawsuit trial is now in its sixth week. The trial disappeared from the radar screen for a while, but it was back in the news again this week, as former Vivendi CEO Jean-Marie Messier took the stand.

According to news reports, he told the jury that he might have made mistakes but her never misled shareholders. The AP newswire story quotes him as saying "Some of my management decisions turned out wrong, but fraud? No. Never. Never. Never." According to the AmLaw Litigation Daily account of his testimony, Messier also called the allegations in the case "blatant lies, infamous lies." Messier’s testimony reportedly will continue for several days.

And Speaking of Liability Exposures: I have been involved with D&O claims, one way or another, for well over 25 years. After such a long period observing the havoc of lawsuits against directors and officers, I never ceased to be amazed by corporate officials who are convinced they don’t need management liability insurance. To me, that attitude as foolhardy and dangerous as that of the soldier who is convinced he doesn’t need a helmet because he is sure that he is never going to get hit.

One product I have been particularly surprised that corporate officials often must be convinced they need is Fiduciary Liability Insurance. This insurance, which is quite inexpensive given the extent of the protection it affords, is designed to protect plan fiduciaries against claims by employee plan participants or beneficiaries that the fiduciaries breached their duties.

On November 19, 2009, CFO.com had a particularly good article entitled "Fiduciary Liabilities: Are you Covered?" (here) which describes Fiduciary Liability Insurance and explains why it is an indispensible part of every company’s insurance program. I commend the article for anyone involved in advising companies about their management liability insurance.

And Finally: So which country do you think has the most English speakers, India or China? You might might be tempted to say India. But you would be wrong. Correct answer? China. I guess if you start with a billion people, having the most of anything is a lot simpler.

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Among the causes many cite for the subprime meltdown is the willingness of the rating agencies to assign investment grade rating to securities backed by subprime mortgages. For that reason, in many of the lawsuits filed as part of the subprime litigation wave, plaintiffs have named rating agencies as defendants, seeking to hold them responsible for their investment losses. However, as discussed here, whether the rating agencies could actually be held liable is unclear, because in the past courts have found the rating agencies’ rating opinions to be protected by the First Amendment.

However, in a September 2, 2009 opinion (here) in a lawsuit relating to investment notes issued by Cheyne Financial, Southern District of New York Judge Shira Scheindlin denied the rating agencies’ motions to dismiss. Most significantly, Judge Scheindlin rejected the rating agencies’ argument that their rating opinions were entitled to immunity under the First Amendment, and she also rejected their argument that their rating represented non-actionable opinion.

Background

Plaintiffs claims in the lawsuit related to their investment in certain notes that had been issued by Cheyne Financial, a $5.86 billion structured investment vehicle. The notes were collateralized by certain assets, included residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS). Cheyne collapsed amid the subprime meltdown in 2007. Cheyne was unable to pay the senior debt as it became due and Cheyne is now in bankruptcy. The investors lost substantially all of their investment.

The notes Cheyne issued received the highest possible ratings from the rating agencies. However, according to Judge Scheindlin’s factual recitation in her September 2 opinion, that rating agencies played a "more integral role" than merely providing ratings. The rating agencies were involved in "structuring and issuing" the notes. For example, the rating agencies "helped to determine how much equity was required at each level of the SIV."

For their efforts, the rating agencies were paid approximately $6 million, an amount the court noted was "three times their normal fees." Moreover, the rating agencies fees increased "in tandem with the Cheyne SIV’s growth." As Judge Scheindlin put it, "unbeknownst to investors, the Rating Agencies’ compensation was contingent upon the receipt of the desired ratings for the Cheyne SIV’s Rated Notes."

After Cheyne collapsed, the investors filed suit against Morgan Stanley, which had promoted and distributed the notes; Bank of New York Mellon, which had provided certain custodial and administrative services for Cheyne; and the rating agencies (including Moody’s and S&P and their corporate parents). The plaintiffs asserted thirty-two claims under twelve different legal theories. Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged common law fraud under New York law; common law tort claims alleging misrepresentation; and assertions based on alleged breach of contract. The defendants moved to dismiss.

Judge Scheindlin’s Opinion

The rating agencies moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ fraud allegations, arguing that their ratings were protected by the First Amendment and represented non-actionable opinion.

Judge Scheindlin rejected the rating agencies’ attempt to rely on the First Amendment, noting that "where a rating agency has disseminated their ratings to a select group of investors rather than to the public at large, the rating agency is note afforded the same protection." Judge Scheindlin held that here, because the Cheyne note ratings were provided only to "a select group of investors" as part of a private placement, the First Amendment defense is inapplicable.

Judge Scheindlin further rejected the rating agencies’ argument that their ratings were in any event non-actionable opinion, holding that the "plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that the Rating Agencies did not genuinely or reasonably believe that the ratings they assigned to the Rated Notes were accurate and had a basis in fact."

In finding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the rating agencies did not reasonably believe the rating had a basis in fact, Judge Scheindlin among other things noted that the complaint alleged that the ratings "appeared to investors to equate the Rated Notes to other investments" such as investment grade bonds, though the notes "in reality and unbeknownst to investors, differed materially"; that, contrary to representations, the SIV’s portfolio consisted of more that 55% of RMBS, which "made the SIV a risky investment and certainly not deserving of high ratings."

The complaint further alleges that the rating agencies were subject to numerous conflicts of interest. Thus, even the rating agencies allegedly were aware that "the process used to derive ratings was deeply flawed and unreliable," but they nonetheless issued the ratings because they were compensated by a fee "substantially larger than normally received" and their fee was "directly connected to the success of the Cheyne SIV." These conflicts "compromised the objectivity of the ratings."

Judge Scheindlin further found that the plaintiffs had adequately pled scienter, based on the complaint’s allegations of motive and opportunity. She noted that the complaint alleged that the rating agencies knew Morgan Stanley would have "taken its business elsewhere" if the notes did not receive the desired rating, and in exchange for their "unreasonably high ratings" the rating agencies received "fees in excess of three times their normal fees."

With respect to motive and opportunity, the complaint further alleged that the rating agencies’ "remuneration was dependent on the successful sale of the Rated Notes," and that "they could sell successfully only if they were highly rated."

Judge Scheindlin also rejected the rating agencies’ argument that as sophisticated investors, the plaintiffs’ could not show actionable reliance on the ratings.

Finally, with respect to the plaintiffs’ other claims, Judge Scheindlin found that New York’s Martin Act precluded the plaintiffs’ common law tort claims, and that the plaintiffs’ had not alleged sufficient facts to support plaintiffs’ claims sounding in contract. She allowed the plaintiffs’ leave to amend their contract claims, but the dismissal with respect to the plaintiffs’ tort law claims was with prejudice.

Discussion

Judge Scheidlin’s rulings in the Cheyne Financial case are potentially of great significance in the many other lawsuits that have been filed against the rating agencies as part of the subprime litigation wave. In those many other cases, the rating agencies will also attempt to rely on the same threshold defenses on which they sought to rely in the Cheyne Financial case. The claimants in those other cases will cite Judge Scheindlin’s opinion in attempting to argue that the defenses should not be available to the rating agencies.

Several aspects of Judge Scheindlin’s opinion could be particularly helpful to other claimants. In particular, the significance she attached to the involved role of the rating agencies in structuring the investments they later rated could be particularly helpful, as claimants have asserted these same kinds of allegations in many of the other cases against the rating agencies. The same is also true with respect to her findings that the rating agencies’ compensation arrangement put them in a conflict of interest.

But while Judge Scheindlin’s opinion undoubtedly will be helpful to other claimants, the Cheyne Financial decision is far from conclusive of the issues surrounding the protections the rating agencies may be able to rely upon in connection with their ratings. Thus, even in the Southern District of New York, the opinion is at most of persuasive not precedential value. Though Judge Scheindlin is a highly respected Judge, other court nevertheless may decline to follow her analysis, particularly if the factual allegations are distinguishable.

A further way that Judge Scheindlin’s opinion could be of limited value is that her rulings were made under New York law with respect to allegations of common law fraud. Many of the other lawsuits that have been filed against the rating agencies allege violations of the federal securities laws, which other courts could view as being a critical distinction – although it does seem that shouldn’t make any particular difference with respect to the First Amendment issue.

Another consideration could further limit the impact of Judge Scheindlin’s rulings is that her analysis of the First Amendment issue may not persuade other courts. Indeed, a September 4, 2009 Wall Street Journal article (here) discussing the opinion quotes First Amendment scholar Martin Redish as saying that "the fact that [a rating] was just to a select audience should not disqualify it from First Amendment protection."

Even if other courts agree that the First Amendment protection does not apply to ratings that have only been disseminated to a small group, many of the claims that have asserted against the rating agencies in other cases do not involve the same kind of restricted offering involved in the Cheyne case. Many of the ratings that are now being challenged were issued in connection with public offerings, for securities that subsequently traded on the public securities exchanges. For ratings on those kinds of securities that were issued as part of those kinds of offerings, Judge Scheindlin’s analysis of the First Amendment issue, based on the fact that ratings of the Cheyne notes were not widely distributed, simply would not be applicable.

That does not necessarily mean that in those cases the rating agencies would be able to rely on the First Amendment defense, but it does mean that Judge Scheindlin’s First Amendment analysis would appear to be unavailing. Because so many of the cases in which the rating agencies have been named as defendants involve public securities offerings, Judge Scheindlin’s opinion could well have little impact at least on the First Amendment issue itself in many other cases against the rating agencies.

Nevertheless, as the Journal article puts it, Judge Scheindlin’s opinion is "one of the first to interpret the extent to which the [rating agencies] can expect First Amendment protection for their ratings of certain securities." The Journal quotes attorney David Grais as saying that Judge Scheindlin’s opinion "breaks new ground." Andrew Longstreath’s September 4, 2009 Law.com article about the opinion (here) quote Patrick Daniels of the Coughlin Stoia firm as saying "This is what we needed." Investors apparently believe that her ruling is a "landmark decision"

So, even though the Cheyne Financial decision is by no mean dispositive of the issue, it is nevertheless a highly significant development that could have a very significant impact in the many other subprime-related cases that have been filed against the rating agencies.

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As I have previously noted (here), one of the significant procedural developments in the subprime securities litigation wave has been the plaintiffs’ apparent interest in pursuing ’33 Act subprime-related lawsuits in state court. Section 22(a) of the ’33 Act expressly provides that the federal court’s jurisdiction for ’33 Act lawsuits is "concurrent with State and Territorial courts," which presents an immediate forum selection issue for any prospective ’33 Act plaintiff.

A recent ’33 Act lawsuit filing suggests that the forum selection issue involves not only electing between federal and state courts, but also deciding in which state to file, if a state court forum is to be preferred. The case also suggests that the forum selection may also entail forum shopping.

The Lawsuit

On December 2, 2008, the Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi filed a ’33 Act class action complaint in Orange County (California) Superior Court against Morgan Stanley and several Morgan Stanley affiliates, several individuals associated with the Morgan Stanley affiliates and fourteen issuing trusts that sold certain mortgage pass-through certificates. The complaint also names as defendants McGraw Hill Companies, the corporate parent of S&P, and Moody’s. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

The complaint alleges that the offering documents associated with the securities "misstated and omitted material information regarding the quality of the loans underlying the Certificates," and failed to disclose" that the loan originators had "systematically ignored their stated and pre-established underwriting and appraisal standards." The complaint also alleges that Morgan Stanley entities "overpaid for underlying mortgages without regard to the quality of the loans for the sole purpose of increasing its position in the mortgage lending and securitization industry."

The complaint further alleges that the rating agency defendants "directly participated in structuring the securitization transaction" and that the rating agencies’ ratings "did not represent the true risk of the Certificates."

The complaint asserts claims under Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the ’33 Act and seeks relief on behalf of the class of investors who purchased securities pursuant to or traceable to the March 16, 2006 Registration Statement and accompanying prospectus.

Jurisdiction and Venue

The plaintiff is a Mississippi public employee pension fund. Morgan Stanley has its headquarters in midtown Manhattan. The complaint does not allege that any of the other defendants are domiciled in California. Apparently none of the parties are from California. So what exactly is this case doing in California?

As to why it is in state court rather than federal court, the state court has concurrent jurisdiction as I noted at the outset. But the mere availability of a state court forum does not explain why a state court was chosen in preference to a federal court. In my earlier posts (here), I have speculated that the plaintiffs are hoping to make an end run around the PSLRA’s procedural requirements, although no one has ever confirmed that.

But even if the preference of state court over federal court can be explained, why a state court in California?

The complaint itself purports to allege a variety of California connections: a "substantial portion of the wrongs complained of" are alleged to have occurred in Orange County. The defendants are alleged to have "availed themselves of the benefits of conducting business" in Orange County. Moreover, the complaint alleges that "a great percentage of the underlying mortgages pooled in the Certificates…were securitized by properties located in California."

All of these supposed connections to California are superficially plausible. But the fact is that all the parties are from outside California. The transaction that is at the heart of the lawsuit took place outside California. The supposedly misleading documents were created outside California.

I have my own theory why the case has been filed in California. That is, the plaintiffs really want the case to be in state rather than federal court. They anticipate that the defendants will seek to remove the case to federal court. The case law on which the plaintiffs would seek to rely in trying to have the case remanded back to state court is more favorable in California and less favorable in New York.

Specifically, as discussed here, in New York, in the HarborView mortgage case (about which refer here), the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the subprime-related securities case to state court was denied. However, in the Luther v Countrywide case, a subprime-related Section 11 lawsuit originally filed in California state court but removed by the defendants to federal court, the motion to remand the case to state court was granted, and the remand was specifically affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. For a detailed discussion of the Luther case including the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, refer here.

So did the plaintiffs choose a California state court because of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Luther v. Countrywide case -- that is, because the chances of being able to proceed in state court in California was perceived to be greater than the chances of being able to proceed in state court in New York? If I am right, the plaintiffs selected the forum in order to increase the likelihood of a state court venue. Call it forum shopping to the second power.

Anyone who questions my theory should know that the complaint in the Morgan Stanley case explicitly references the Luther case, complete with case citation to the Ninth Circuit opinion. .

Of course, it may also be fairly observed that Orange County is ground zero for the mortgage meltdown, and as result the plaintiffs may expect a more sympathetic court and jury in that forum . This possible explanation is not inconsistent with my theory. Call it fourm shopping to the third power.

In any event, as I have previously noted, it appears likely that in connection with the subprime litigation wave, a significant amount of high stakes class action securities litigation will be going forward in state court. The plaintiffs’ lawyers ’33 Act forum selection preference is now well-established. Now we must wait and see what it all portends.

Rating Agency Defendants

The Morgan Stanley case is not the first subprime securities lawsuit naming the rating agencies as co-defendants. Indeed, the HarborView case referenced above also named rating agencies as defendants. However, in the HarborView case, the complaint alleged that the rating agency defendants were liable under Section 11 as "appraisers" as defined in Section 11(a)(4) of the ’33 Act. (Refer here for a detailed discussion of the allegations in the HarborView complaint.)

The Morgan Stanley complaint takes a different approach. Because it alleges that the rating agencies were directly involved in the creation of the securitized assets, the Morgan Stanley complaint alleges that the rating agencies are liable under Section 11(a)(5) as "underwriters" of the mortgage pass-through certificates. (The text of Section 11 can be found here.)

It will be interesting to see in any event whether these various liability lawsuits against the rating agencies succeed under any theory. As I have previously noted here, the rating agencies may have constitutional defenses protecting their rating activities. It remains to be seen whether the rating agencies involvement in the securitization process transformed them into "underwriters" sufficiently to subject them to Section 11 underwriter liability.

Run the Numbers

In any event, I have added the Morgan Stanley Pass-Through Certificates lawsuit to my running tally of subprime related securities litigation, which can be accessed here. With the addition of the new Morgan Stanley case, the current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits now stands at 133, of which 93 have been filed in 2008.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch (here) for a copy of Morgan Stanley mortgage pass-through certificates lawsuit complaint.

Subprime Loans, Predatory Lending?: One of the recurring allegations on behalf of subprime borrowers is that the subprime loans in which the borrowers became ensnared represented "predatory lending." A November 20, 2008 article by three NERA Economic Consulting economists – Denise Neumann Martin, Faten Sabry and Stephanie Plancich – reviews "the definition of predatory lending and describe the recent litigation history. The authors then examine alleged discriminatory lending in detail, reviewing key economic theory and evidence, as well as relevant statistical techniques."

The paper also reviews predatory lending allegations and takes a look at recent predatory lending lawsuit filings. The article categorizes the lawsuits according to the specific allegations, and also examines predatory lending lawsuit settlements.

The report contends that proper statistical analysis is required to establish whether or not discriminatory or other improper lending activity has taken place. The report states that:

A proper assessment of alleged predatory lending, then, must control for characteristics including but not limited to the credit history, employment status, income level, and education of the borrower, as well as the borrower’s preference for risk (or discount rate). The competitiveness of the market in which the loan was arranged and other relevant macroeconomic factors may also need to be considered. Such analysis is essential to distinguish behavior that is predatory from that which is explainable by these other factors and would not be evidence of discrimination.

The paper, entitled "The Use of Economic Analysis in Predatory Lending Cases: Application to Subprime Loans," can be found here.

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