D&O Insurers Fund $118 Million Partial Settlement of Broadcom Options Backdating Derivative Suit

In what is one of the largest ever shareholders’ derivative lawsuit settlements, the parties to the consolidated federal options backdating related derivative lawsuit involving Broadcom Corp. have agreed to settle the case for $118 million, to be funded entirely by the company’s D&O insurance carriers. The settlement does not include the company’s co-founders, Henry Samuels and Henry T. Nichols, III, against whom the suit will continue. As discussed below, the settlement has a number of interesting features, including certain details surrounding the insurers' settlement participation, particularly the substantial participation in the settlement of Broadcom's Excess Side A insurance carriers.

 

As reflected in Broadcom’s August 28, 2009 filing on Form 8-K (here), and the accompanying stipulation of settlement (here), the $118 million settlement, which is subject to court approval, is to be funded by the company’s D&O insurers and includes $43.3 million that "Broadcom had already recovered in connection with prior reimbursements from its insurers (subject to a reservation of rights that will be released upon settlement approval."

 

The stipulation also provides that in connection with the settlement Broadcom will pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs of $11.5 million.

 

There are a number of interesting things about this settlement. The first is its size. The settlement’s total value of $118 million would make this the second largest options backdating related derivative lawsuit settlement, exceeded only by the $900 million UnitedHealth Group options backdating derivative settlement (about which refer here and here).

 

Indeed, the $118 million settlement may be among the largest shareholders’ derivative settlements of any kind, exceeded or equaled only by a small handful of prior derivative settlements (including, in addition to the UHG settlement noted above, the $115 million AIG derivative settlement and the $122 million Oracle derivative lawsuit settlement).

 

These settlements are of course all dwarfed by the  $2.876 billion judgment entered against Richard Scrushy in the HealthSouth shareholders' derivative lawsuit, but that astronomical judment represents its own peculiar point of reference, like some odd parallel universe. 

 

But notwithstanding the settlement’s size, the net overall benefit to the corporation on whose behalf the lawsuit nominally was filed is an interesting issue. Not only is $43.3 million of the total settlement amount in the form of previously reimbursed defense expense, and not only is the settlement amount further reduced by the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees of $11.5 million, but the roughly $63.2 million remainder from the $118 million total is more than offset by litigation expenses the company has incurred in connection with the options backdating scandal.

 

As stated in the recitals in the separate Insurance Agreement (here) filed as an exhibit to the settlement stipulation, Broadcom has "advised the Insurers that it has claims for reimbursement exceeding $130 million in respect of the Broadcom Stock Option Matters, of which approximately $85 million remains outstanding."

 

Broadcom and its directors and officers were and are involved in a diverse range of lawsuits and claims as a result of the options backdating scandal, not just the shareholders derivative lawsuit. But the fact is that the remainder of the forthcoming cash settlement payment (after payment of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees) effectively represents only a partial offset of the company’s enormous options backdating related litigation expenses.

 

The corporation’s recovery of disputed legal expenses is unquestionably a benefit to the corporation, but how much additional litigation expense was generated along the way? It does seem to raise certain questions about the efficiency of the process. Indeed, in an August 31, 2009 American Lawyer article about the settlement (here), Susan Beck commented that "we’re still scratching our heads over this one."

 

The answer to the question of why the derivative lawsuit was a necessary vehicle to secure this extent of defense expense reimbursement from the carriers lies in the way Broadcom's D&O insurance was structured

 

The Insurance Agreement accompanying the settlement shows that Broadcom had a total of $200 million of D&O insurance, arranged in various layers, with $100 million of "traditional" D&O insurance, and an additional $100 million of Excess Side A insurance. Excess Side A insurance  only provides protection to individual directors and officers (and not to the company itself) and only against loss that is nonindemnifiable, whether due to insolvency or legal prohibition. This element of insurance for nonindemnifiable loss is critical to understanding this settlement.

 

The Insurance Agreement recites that the insurance carriers believed they had certain defenses to coverage, but that in connection with the settlement, these coverage issues were being compromised. In exchange for relinquishing these potential coverage defenses, the carriers each paid amounts less than their full policy limits, with each successive carrier contributing a correspondingly smaller amount.

 

The Insurance Agreement specifies the dollar amount each carrier is to contribute to the settlement. Among other things, the Insurance Agreement shows that the Excess Side A insurers will contribute a total of $40 million, with each of the successive Excess Side A carriers contributing a correspondingly smaller amount.

 

Given the number of carriers involved, the complexity of the coverage issues and the sheer quantity of dollars involved, the completion of this settlement is an extraordinary accomplishment. I tip my hat to all of the lawyers involved in putting this together.

 

The key to understanding the inner logic of this deal is to recognize that without the existence of a shareholders' derivative lawsuit against the individual directors and officers creating the type of nonindemnifiable loss that is the sole type of loss for which the Excess Side A policies provide coverage, the Excess Side A policies would not have been triggered.

 

The defense expenses incurred in connection with the other options backdating related litigation matters are presumptively indemnifiable. The company's payment of these indemnifiable amounts, in and of itself, would not have triggered the Excess Side A policies.

 

However, the derivative lawsuit's claim against the individual defendants for the harm to the corporation caused by the backdating includes claims on the corporation's behalf for the enormous litigation expense the company incurred due to the alleged misconduct. The settlement of the claims in the derivative lawsuit against the individual defendants to recoup the harm to the corporation was not indemnifiable, triggering a potential payment obligation for the Excess Side A carriers.

 

So if, for example, there had been no derivative lawsuit, and the company had, say, tried to recoup its defense expense from the carriers directly in a declaratory judgment action, the Excess Side A carriers would have taken the position that because there was no nonindemnifiable loss, their policies were not implicated. The derivative lawsuit, asserting nonindemnifiable claims against the individual defendants, triggered the Excess Side A policies, which ultimately contributed a total of $40 million toward the settlement.

 

The fact that the Excess Side A carriers are contributing so significantly to this settlement is particularly noteworthy. When the options backdating scandal first arose and the wave of derivative lawsuits began to flood in, it was a topic of discussion in the industry whether the options backdating scandal might be the event that would break through and produce significant aggregate losses for the Excess Side A insurers. Whether or not other options backdating claims have hit Excess Side A insurers, the Broadcom options backdating derivative lawsuit settlement certainly did, and the Excess Side A insurers’ $40 million contribution toward the settlement in and of itself makes this settlement a noteworthy event.

 

With jumbo derivative settlements now a more frequent occurence, Excess Side A insurers could begin to accumulate substantial claims losses. The rising tide of corporate bankruptcies as a result of the global financial meltdown could also produce significant Excess Side A claims losses ahead. Both developments underscore the value to policyholders of the inclusion of this kind of insurance within their D&O insurance program.

 

I have in any event added the Broadcom options backdating-related derivative settlement to my chart of options backdating related case resolutions, which can be accessed here.

 

Citigroup Subprime ERISA Class Action Dismissed: Following close on the heels of his dismissal of the Citigroup subprime-related derivative lawsuit (about which refer here), on August 31, 2009, Southern District of New York Judge Sidney Stein granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Citigroup subprime-related ERISA class action as well. A copy of Judge Stein’s August 31 opinion can be found here.

 

The plaintiffs had alleged that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA in a number of ways, most significantly by offering Citigroup stock as an investment option even though defendants knew or should have known that Citigroup was an imprudent investment. Among other things, Judge Stein held that the Plan itself required the Citigroup stock to be offered as an investment option and therefore the defendants had no discretion in that regard.

 

With respect to the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants had failed to give complete and accurate information, Judge Stein held that the defendants did not have an affirmative duty to disclose financial information about Citigroup because ERISA fiduciaries are not required to provide investment advice, and to the extent the defendants did provide information about Citigroup it was not in their capacities as ERISA fiduciaries, and, in any event, "plaintiffs have failed to allege facts showing that the defendants knew the statements were misleading."

 

I have in any event added the Citigroup ERISA class action dismissal to my register of subprime and credit crisis-related case resolutions, which can be accessed here.

 

Special thanks to Courtney Scott at the Tressler, Soderstrom law firm for providing me with a copy of Judge Stein’s opinion in the ERISA class action suit.

 

Blast from the Past: A New Options Backdating Lawsuit

Subprime-related litigation may be all the rage, but the latest securities class action lawsuit harkens back to the era of the prior scandal-driven event. On July 8, 2008, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed an options backdating-related securities class action lawsuit against MRV Communications and certain of its directors and officers.

 

A copy of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ July 8 press release can be found here, and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

The lawsuit follows the company’s June 5, 2008 announcement (here) that it has "established a committee of independent directors to review the company’s historical stock option practices." During late 2006 and early 2007, the company had previously conducted "an informal and voluntary review" of its share practices and found no problems. However, in the course of reviewing transactions involving two European subsidiaries, the company identified information suggesting that "the conclusions reached in the earlier review were incorrect," and the company is now undertaking a comprehensive review, not just limited solely to the European subsidiaries.

 

The company also indicated that financial reports issued during the period 2002 to 2008 may be affected and "the company expects to restate its financial statements for the impacted period." The company indicated that investors should not rely on the company’s financial statements issued during those periods. The company’s share price dropped 24% on the news.

 

According to the plaintiffs’ counsel’s press release,

during the Class Period, defendants made false and misleading statements concerning the Company's employee stock option grant practices and financial results. Defendants allegedly caused or allowed MRV to issue statements that failed to disclose or misstated the following: (i) that the Company had problems with its internal controls that prevented it from issuing accurate financial reports and projections; (ii) that because of improperly recorded stock-based compensation expenses the Company's financial results violated GAAP; and (iii) that the Company's public disclosures covering a seven-year period presented an inflated view of MRV's earnings and earnings per share, which would later have to be restated.

Even though the options backdating scandal may now seem like ancient history, new options backdating lawsuits have continued to filter in during 2008. Indeed, the MRV Communications lawsuit is the third new options backdating related securities class action lawsuit to be filed during 2008. (The prior two involved TeleTech Holdings, about which refer here, and Maxim Integrated Products, refer here.)

 

The one thing that is clear is that we still have a very long way to go before we have seen the end of the options backdating scandal. This may be an important thing to keep in mind when assessing the current subprime and credit crisis mess, which is in my view an infinitely bigger deal than the options backdating scandal. It undoubtedly will be many, many years before we reach the end of the subprime mess.

 

In any event, I have added the MRV Communications lawsuit to my running tally of options backdating-related securities class action lawsuits, which can be found here. With the addition of the MRV Communications lawsuit, the current tally of options backdating related securities class action lawsuits now stands at 39.

 

Finally, I have substantial grounds on which to suspect that MRV Communications was also named as nominal defendant in a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. I have not yet been able to verify this filing, so I have not yet added MRV Communications to my list of options backdating related derivative lawsuits. I would be grateful if any reader out there who can verify the filing of the MRV Communications options backdating-related derivative complaint would please let me know.

 

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for the link to the MRV Communications complaint.

 

Updated Options Backdating Settlement Analysis:  And speaking of the Securities Litigation Watch, Savett has posted on the blog (here) an updated version of his analysis of the value and timing of the options backdating-related class action settlements. The updated analysis accounts for the recent UnitedHealth option backdating class action settlement.

 

And Finally: Readers interested in the blogosphere’s internal dynamics of will be interested to follow the sequence events that ensued after I added The D&O Diary’s post last night about mid-year FCPA enforcement and litigation activity.

 

The post was quickly picked up by Dick Cassin’s excellent FCPA Blog (here). The FCPA Blog clearly (and deservedly) enjoys a strong and influential readership, which apparently includes, among others, Dan Slater at the WSJ.com Law Blog, who added his own post (here) referencing back to my item. The Law Blog’s inclusion of a picture of The D&O Diary’s author made this sequence perfect and complete.

This blogging stuff never ceases to amaze me.

Headline News: Settlements, Lawsuits, Dismissals

About the UnitedHealth Group Class Action Settlement: UnitedHealth Group announced on July 2, 2008 (here) that it reached an agreement to settle its high profile options backdating-related securities class action lawsuit for $895 million. A July 3, 2008 Law.com article discussing the settlement can be found here.

 

Not only is this settlement the largest options backdating related securities lawsuit settlement to date, it is one of the largest securities settlements ever. The settlement does at least provide some counterweight to the view that some have expressed (refer here) that the options backdating related lawsuits may be settling low compared to historical standards.

 

This settlement, together with the $750 million Xerox settlement announced in March 2008 (including $80 million from the company’s auditor) and the flood of high profile, high stakes subprime-related litigation, may also undercut the view that has been expressed that overall settlements may begin to decline as the cases from the era of corporate scandals cycle out of the system.

 

It is probably worth noting that, as reported in the July 3, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here), the UnitedHealth settlement has not yet been completely resolved, as the settlement does not include United ealth’s former CEO William McGuire, nor does it include its former General Counsel, David Lubben.

 

Although it has not received nearly as much attention, it is also noteworthy that in its July 2 press release UnitedHealth also announced that it had also settled for $17 million the options backdating related ERISA lawsuit pending against the company and certain of its officials. As far as I am aware, this is the roughly half dozen options backdating related ERISA lawsuit to have settled. (To see a complete list of options backdating related ERISA lawsuits, refer here.)

 

Derivative litigation related to the options backdating woes at UnitedHealth previously resulted in the largest reported derivative settlement, as I discussed in a prior post, here.

 

I have added the UnitedHealth options backdating securities class action lawsuit settlement and ERISA lawsuit settlement to my table of the options backdating related settlements and dismissals, which can be accessed here.

 

Credit Rating Lawsuits: As I discussed in a recent post (here), even though the credit rating agencies’ conflicted role has been a central topic in the discussions surrounding the subprime meltdown, the plaintiffs’ lawyers have largely avoided drawing the credit rating agencies into the subprime litigation. However, lawsuits filed just in the past several days suggest that this may be changing, in addition to the lawsuit discussed in my prior post.

 

Though the plaintiffs’ lawyers had not generally been targeting the credit rating agencies for their rating activities, they have previously filed lawsuits on behalf of the shareholders of Moody’s (refer here) and  of The McGraw Hill Company, parent of Standard & Poor’s (refer here), alleging misrepresentation in their financial disclosures.

 

As described in a July 1, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have now initiated a shareholder securities class action lawsuit against Fimalac, S.A., the corporate parent of Fitch’s rating agency. According to the press release, the complaint (which can be found here) alleges that the defendants failed to disclose with respect to Fitch’s ratings of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) that:

(i) the information upon which Fitch based its ratings of RMBS and CDOs was misleading and in many cases fraudulent; (ii) to continue to collect fees for its ratings, Fitch was applying lax standards or no standards at all when issuing its RMBS and CDO ratings; and (iii) Fitch was failing to monitor the credit quality of RMBS and CDOs after issuing its initial ratings, as Fitch was obligated to do, and many of these securities had deteriorated badly after Fitch had issued its ratings. Fitch is now under investigation by the New York Attorney General, the Connecticut Attorney General, the Ohio Attorney General and the SEC as a result of its practices of rating billions of dollars of securities without a reasonable basis for doing so and Fimalac’s stock is trading at approximately 50% of its Class Period high.

But the new Fimilac shareholder lawsuit is directed against Fimilac as a reporting company, not directly against the company for Fitch’s rating agency activities. As I noted in my prior post, plaintiffs' lawyers have largely avoided allegations against rating agencies for their rating activities. However, in a lawsuit initiated in New York state court on June 3 , 2008 and removed to federal court on June 23, 2008, plaintiffs have alleged that entities affiliated with Credit Suisse, and the Moody’s, S&P  and the Dominion Bond Rating Service (DRBS) rating agencies misrepresented the values of Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates issued by the Home Equity Mortgage Trusts. (Refer here for background regarding the lawsuit.)

 

The basis of the claims of liability against the rating agencies in the Home Equity Mortgage Trust lawsuit, as alleged in paragraph 87 of the complaint (here), is that  the rating agencies  “prepared valuations, i.e., assigned ratings to the Certificates, in connection with the Offering, as defined in Section 11 (a)(4) of the Securities Act.” These allegations are similar to the allegations against the credit rating agencies in the HarborView case discussed in my prior post.

 

Whether or not these cases against the credit rating agencies for their rating activities ultimately go forward remains to be seen. As I have previously discussed (here), the credit rating agencies will contend that their rating activities are protected by the First Amendment.

 

In addition, it remains to be seen whether the Home Equity Mortgage Trust case will go forward in state or federal court. As discussed at length in my prior post (here), the ’33 Act expressly provides for concurrent state court jurisdiction and also expressly proscribes removal of state court ’33 Act actions to federal court. As discussed here, in at least one case, a federal court has concluded that a ’33 Act claim that has been initiated in state court and removed to federal court must be remanded back to state court.

 

One More Note About the Fimalac Lawsuit:  Fimilac is a foreign-domiciled company whose shares do not trade on U.S. exchanges. Many of its shareholders obviously are domiciled outside the United States. If these non-U.S. shareholders were to be included in the class, the new class action complaint against Fimilac might present the complicated f-cubed litigant problem (which I discussed most recently here). However, the plaintiffs’ counsel in the Fimilac case purport to represent a class composed solely of U.S. residents, apparently as a way of avoiding the f-cubed litigant problem.

 

As I discussed in my recent post relating to the new securities class action filed against EADS (refer here), these attempts to plead around the issues involving foreign-domiciled  plaintiffs still test the outer limits of the jurisdictional reach of U.S. securities laws against foreign-domiciled companies whose shares do not trade on U.S. exchanges. The case against Fimilac will be interesting to watch for reasons other than the involvement of a credit rating agency.

 

And Finally: The news about the dismissal of the lawsuit against Richard Grasso has gained a great deal of press attention. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal, in a July 3, 2008 editorial (here), congratulates Grasso and fellow defendant Kenneth Langone for their success in fighting the lawsuit, which the Journal viewed as an example of the overreaching of former New York AG Eliot Spitzer.  

 

The Journal’s editorial is perhaps closest to the mark in its observation that “Mr. Grasso is fortunate he had the resources to fight back.” Had Grasso not had the wherewithal to resist, he might never have tasted vindication. Readers of this blog will be particularly interested to know that it was insurance funds – a very large amount of insurance funds – that ultimately allowed Grasso to succeed.

 

According to Langone, and as reported on Bloomberg (here), in defending themselves against the lawsuit, Grasso, Langone and the NYSE directors “spent more than $70 million fighting the case, all covered by insurance.”

 

So Grasso is indeed fortunate that he had the resources to fight back, but perhaps contrary to the Journal’s suggestion, and even Grasso’s own prior comments (refer here) it was not his own treasure that financed the fight.

 

The expenditure of the mind-boggling sum of $70 million in litigating this case is yet another reminder of the extraordinary costs associated with the kind of high stakes litigation in which directors and officers can become involved. As I recently noted (here), the escalating expense associated with this kind of litigation has important implications for limits adequacy assumptions.

 

While it may be that only extraordinary cases consume these astonishing quantities of money, a company’s D&O program is expected to be able to respond even to catastrophic claims. As seems to be increasingly apparent, the costs associated with just defending a catastrophic claim could exhaust many insurance programs. All of this may suggest the need to reexamine conventional assumptions about limits adequacy.

Anticorruption Enforcement "Stalemate" and Other Web Notes

In prior posts, I have examined the increasing importance of anticorruption efforts and their significance for purposes of corporate governance. But a recent report by a global watchdog group suggests that not all governments are actively enforcing their anticorruption commitments, with potentially serious consequences for the developing world.

 

Transparency International describes itself as a “global civil society organization leading the fight against corruption.” Among other things, the group issues an annual progress report on the enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials.

 

On June 24, 2008, the group issued its 2008 Progress Report (here), which states that there has been a “dangerous stalemate on enforcement” and that “less than half” of the OECD Convention signatories “are living up to their commitments.” The report further states that while there has been “significant enforcement by 16 governments,” there is “little or no enforcement by 18 governments.”

 

The watchdog group is particularly worried about the “mixed message” that these uneven enforcement efforts may be sending. One commentator for the group is quoted as saying that “strong enforcement action against Siemens signaled to German business that foreign bribery will no longer be tolerated. But the backtracking of other countries, including the UK’s termination of an investigation into BAE Systems’ deals in Saudi Arabia, reinforces doubts about government commitment to enforce the Convention.”

 

The report leave no doubt about the importance of anticompetitive enforcement; as the report states, “compliance by signatory states is critical in draining the supply of bribe money that distorts public decision making in some of the world’s poorest states, with disastrous consequences for their citizens.”

 

My most recent post discussing the BAE Systems investigation can be found here, and my most recent post discussing the Siemens investigation can be found here.

 

Hat tip to the SOX First blog (here) for the link to the Transparency International report.

 

Siemens might not only have problems with the anticorruption laws, but also with its complexion, according to a June 24, 2008 Financial Times article reporting on comments from Siemens' current head, in an article entitled "Siemens is 'too white, German and male'" (here).

 

Another Options Backdating Securities Class Action Settlement: On June 24, 2008, Brooks Automation announced (here) that it had settled the securities class action lawsuit that was pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the lawsuit had previously been denied, as I discussed in a prior post, here. The case settled for $7.75 million dollars, all of which is to be paid by the company’s liability insurance carrier.

 

In any event, I have added the Brooks Automation settlement to my table of options backdating-related lawsuit dismissals, denials and settlements, which can be accessed here.

 

“Aggregator” Standing: Ordinarily this blog would not pause to comment on a “justiciability” case, at least one outside the context of directors and officers liability. But we found some of the commentary about the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 23, 2008 decision in Sprint Communications v. APCC Services (here) particularly interesting, and we thought we would pass it along for the benefit of those readers as interested as we are in procedural and jurisdictional matters.

 

George Washington University Law Professor Jon Siegel has a post on his blog Law Prof on the Loose (here) discussing the decision and the question whether “aggregators” who compiled the claims of payphone operators against long-distance carriers can demonstrate a sufficient injury to have standing to sue. The Supreme Court decided that they do. Siegel’s post does an interesting and humorous job explaining the case, the issues, and the decision, and he also explores the interplay between the majority and dissenting opinions. Read and enjoy.

 

Attention Deficit: We all suffered through those undergrad classes that seemed like they would never end, but the Chronicle of Higher Education has a June 20, 2008 article entitled “Short and Sweet: Technology Shrinks the Lecture”(here) reporting that after all these years, academia may finally be doing something about it.

 

Apparently, many Profs who have made their living droning on and on have finally seen themselves on video, as part of the effort to put their lectures on line. Appropriately enough, the experience seems to have been a wake-up call for many professors. As one Prof observed, “You wanted to kill yourself after about 20 minutes.” (I am not sure, but I think that particular Prof may have taught my Econ 101 class.)

 

So as part of their transition to online teaching, many professors are breaking their sessions into 20-minute segments. I guess the 20 minute time frame was selected to minimize the number of boredom-induced suicides.

 

At least some of the professors have managed to make the mental leap: “Shorter may work better in the classroom, too.” Tragically, this breakthrough comes too late to benefit the current generation, but at least our children and grandchildren can hope for a better tomorrow.

Uh-Oh! Serious Options Backdating Settlement Problems

As reflected in my running tally of options backdating lawsuit settlements (which can be accessed here), a number of the options backdating-related derivative lawsuits have settled for some combination of an agreement to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, some adjustment to the company officials’ options grants, and the company’s adoption of corporate governance reforms. But two April 7, 2008 opinions by Judge William Alsup of the United States District Court of the Northern District of California in separate options backdating derivative cases may raise potentially troublesome questions whether settlements in this form, without some cash payment directly to the corporation, are sufficient. As a minimum, the two opinions have important implications for the way settlements are presented to the court, and could also have important effects on the settlement dynamic in other cases going forward.

The first and most detailed of the two opinions relates to the options backdating derivative suit filed on behalf of Zoran Corporation, about which lawsuit I first wrote here. In a June 5, 2007 opinion in the Zoran case (here), Judge Alsup had previously denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, as I previously discussed here.

Following the dismissal denial, the parties to the Zoran case entered settlement negotiations, resulting in a February 26, 2008 stipulation of settlement, which the parties presented to the court on March 3, 2008. At the preliminary approval hearing, the plaintiffs’ damages expert, at the court’s request, presented a report calculating the plaintiffs’ maximum damages as $16 million (including prejudgment interest), which incorporated both the alleged damaged cause to company by the defendants’ option grants as well as by option grants to the rank-and-file employees.

The proposed Zoran settlement involved: the payment of up to $1.2 million of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs; the repricing or cancellation of certain of defendants’ options, which repricing or cancelation was represented to the court to have a value of $1.65 million; the company’s adoption of certain corporate governance reforms; and the grant of a broad claims release.

In an April 7, 2008 opinion (here) that contains some remarkably harsh language, Judge Alsup denied the parties’ request for preliminary approval of the settlement.

The parties undoubtedly knew the settlement was in trouble when Judge Alsup opened his analysis by stating that the class action procedure can “lend itself to abuse” and “one form of abuse is a collusive settlement.” Judge Alsup said that a collusive settlement “usually comes with a cash award to counsel, a broad release of claims, and a cosmetic non-cash recovery for the abused shareholders.” Courts, Judge Alsup notes, must take care that absent shareholders are treated fairly; here, he concludes, the settlement “falls short of deserving preliminary endorsement.”

In considering the settlement, Judge Alsup turned first to the substance of the plaintiffs’ claims (the implication being that the claims appeared to be meritorious), and to a declamation upon the plaintiffs’ expert’s $16 million damages estimate. Judge Alsup then addressed each of the settlement components, finding each component lacking.

First, Judge Alsup noted that the parties were not proposing to restore to the corporation the gains the defendants made from the sale of options, but rather that certain other options would be canceled or repriced. The option cancelation was represented to have very substantial value to the corporation, but the two sides’ experts had reached different conclusions about the value. Judge Alsup found that by using the most conservative valuation method and valuation date, the value of the cancellation was only $216,955, a small fraction of the value both sides had represented to the court.

The court next turned to the repriced options, with respect to which Judge Alsup noted, with incredulity, that the options had actually been repriced in December 2006, which was not only over a year before the settlement was presented to the court, but was even before the plaintiff filed the consolidated amended complaint. The court said that “it should have been plainly disclosed that the defendants were proposing to settle based on an old concession rather than a new consideration.” The court went on to note that “even if the flaw could somehow be ignored,” the value of the repriced options had been “exaggerated.” If a “meaningful” valuation date were used, the value of the repriced options is “zero.”

Judge Alsup had similar concerns with respect to the corporate governance reforms, in that several of the reforms “were already adopted by Zoran’s board well before the parties sat down to discuss settlement terms.” The reforms in any event “do not compensate the company for damages suffered by the company as a result of defendants’ backdating.” The reforms are “hard to accept in lieu of some substantial portion of the $16 million in damages asserted by the plaintiffs’ expert.” Judge Alsup also found that the claim release was overbroad, and swept in circumstances that were not asserted in the amended complaint.

In concluding that the settlement was inadequate, Judge Alsup stressed that “the corporation would recover no cash, all the cash is going to counsel,” and even the supposed value of the $16 million of the foregone benefits is “illusory” and he concluded that this “low end settlement” did not deserve approval.

Judge Alsup was clearly troubled that he had been obliged on his own to ferret out the settlement’s weaknesses, many of which were contrary to counsels’ representations.

Judge Alsup concluded his opinion with a rather stern lecture on counsels’ “duty of candor,” which he said requires counsel to “lay out the weaknesses as well as the strengths” of the settlement. He also stressed that it is “unfair to try to slip a weak or collusive settlement past the judge, hoping he or she will sign off or will not stumble upon the right questions.” A $1.65 million settlement, while at the low end, might be adequate, but the “main vice is that the proposal does not come even close to the $1.65 million settlement it was advertised to be.”

Many of the problems the court identified clearly were the result of communications issues. The parties perhaps could have avoided some of the difficulties by making joint valuation presentations that were scrubbed and scrutinized ahead of time. The court was also clearly upset to discover upon inquiry (rather than being told) that some of the remedies proposed had been undertaken prior to the settlement agreement; better communication around these settlement components potentially could have averted some of the court’s concerns.

But there are other aspects of the court’s commentary that are not merely the consequence of poor communication. First and foremost, Judge Alsup appeared to be troubled by how little the corporation would be getting, and in particular that the corporation would be getting no cash. He was also troubled that the settlement’s putative $1.65 million value, even if valid, was at the “low end” of plaintiffs’ damages analysis. In a sign that may have important implications for other settlements, he was also clearly skeptical that the noncash portions of the settlement – including even the corporate governance reforms, to which he attached little value --had value commensurate with the claimed injuries to the corporation.

But while there clearly are important implications from Judge Alsup’s ruling in the Zoran case, before fully considering those implications, it is important also to review Judge’s Alsup’s opinion (here), also dated April 7, 2008, in the CNET Networks options backdating-related derivative lawsuit, which provides even further context.

In his CNET Networks opinion, Judge Alsup refused even to consider the parties’ proposed settlement. Judge Alsup had previously granted defendants’ motion to dismiss (refer here), on the grounds that demand was not excused, but stayed the case to allow the plaintiffs to seek discovery through the Delaware courts and to attempt to replead. In response to an inquiry from the court about status, the parties advised the court that settlement negotiations were underway, and the parties then presented a joint motion to lift the stay for the limited purpose of seeking a preliminary approval of a settlement. Judge Alsup said that it found these actions “disappointing” because the parties did not, as they had represented to the court they would, complete discovery, nor did plaintiff file an amended complaint. Instead the parties sought to settle the case, about which Judge Alsup said

any settlement, at this early stage, seems very premature, for the Court could not be in a position to evaluate a settlement until we know what claims are viable and what depositions, discovery, and damage assessments show about the strength and magnitude of those claims. At this stage, moreover, plaintiff has no standing at all to negotiate on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders. Plaintiff has never been excused from the demand requirement. Plaintiff is not in any way authorized to release claims on behalf of any shareholders or the corporation. It would be hard to see how plaintiff could do so intelligently without first framing the claims and then performing sufficient due diligence through formal discovery and investigation, including a full damage report. Now, any legitimate settlement reached later may be tainted by what could appear to have been collusion. To deal with this eventuality, all notes and materials generated by or during the recent settlement discussions should be preserved. For the Court’s views on collusive settlements see In Re Zoran Corporation Derivative Litigation.

Judge Alsup went on to note that “the best way to tee up this case for settlement is to find out first whether the plaintiff even has standing to sue (the demand issue) and thus to release claims on behalf of the corporation,” and then to evaluate which options were backdated and the dollar value to the corporation of these claims. “It would,” Judge Alsup said, “be very hard to evaluate a settlement without due diligence, including depositions and documents.”

Judge Alsup’s two opinions taken together represent a strong statement that, because of the court’s responsibilities to absent class members, the court must take its obligation to review proposed settlements very seriously. The court clearly should not be expected just to rubber stamp a settlement to which the parties’ representatives have agreed. In order to get settlement approval, and avoid the suggestion of collusion, the parties will have to show certain key considerations: first, and at a minimum, that the plaintiff even has standing to represent the class and enter the settlement; second, that the settlement is proportionate to the injury to the corporation that the plaintiff has claimed; third, that the claimed values to the corporation are supported; and fourth, that the corporation is fairly compensated for its damages and its release of claims.

Even though Judge Alsup’s opinions technically have no precedential effect beyond the immediate cases themselves, the strength of the language he used, the seriousness of the concerns he noted, and the possibility of similar questions undermining other settlements could well have an in terrorem effect on other litigants in other cases. Certainly no litigant would want to take a chance that a court might suggest that their proposed settlement could be “collusive.” Even though many of the aspects of these opinions are a reflection of the particular circumstance involved, the opinions also bespeak more general principles that could have broad influence. In particular, Judge Alsup’s statement in the CNET Networks case that he could not even consider a proposed settlement until the plaintiff first establishes its right to enter a settlement and presents an adequate factual record and damages analysis suggests that cases must have progressed past a certain stage before the parties can even proffer a proposed settlement to the court.

There are several interrelated issues arising from Judge Alsup’s requirement for a damages analysis, his requirement that the settlement be proportionate to the alleged harm, and his obvious concern in the Zoran case that no cash was going to the corporation. The overall suggestion is that a few gestures and payment of some legal fees may not be enough. There may actually need to be some cash going to the corporation, proportionate to the alleged harm. Judge Alsup’s unwillingness to recognize significant value to the corporation for the corporate governance reforms may be particularly troublesome.

As I noted at the outset, many of the options backdating derivative cases that have been settled so far have been resolved on terms similar in many respects to the components of the Zoran settlement. The likely reason why there is no cash payment to the corporation in many of these cases is that D&O insurers balk at funding amounts they contend represent a disgorgement or a return of an ill-gotten gain. The individual defendants, for their part, resist making out of pocket payments for which insurance is unavailable. The parties thus perforce attempt to cobble together an agreement that resolves the case without any cash transfer other than the payment of plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees.

Judge Alsup’s opinion, particularly his repeated use of the word “collusive” and statement that the value to the corporation from the Zoran settlement was “illusory” could introduce a great deal of tension into this negotiation dynamic. Both insurance carriers and individuals could face heightened pressure to make cash contributions to the corporation to resolve these cases. Insurers will likely continue to resist any payment on their part, owing to policy exclusions for disgorgement and the return of ill-gotten gains.

Another important implication is that the parties must be prepared to substantiate their settlement, and that discovery, depositions, damages assessments and other procedures may be required to satisfy these requirements. These procedures could prove costly for all concerned – particularly for the D&O insurers, who not only will foot the bill for increased defense expense, but also ultimately could be called upon to pay the plaintiffs’ fees as well, as part of any eventual settlement.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, of the parties involved, the participants that may face the biggest problems if these cases become more difficult to resolve are the plaintiffs’ lawyers. There is a suggestion in both of these cases that the plaintiffs’ lawyers are starting to find the cases tiresome and just want them to go away. Indeed, one of the things that clearly seemed to be bothering Judge Alsup in these cases is that the plaintiffs’ lawyers were settling (too) cheap or walking away without even doing what the Judge at least believes to be minimally required. The plaintiffs’ lawyers piled into these kinds of cases with enthusiasm but they may now be repenting their involvement. The implication of Judge Alsup’s opinion may be that the plaintiffs’ lawyers may be challenged to extricate themselves.

According to my tally (which can be found here), there have been a total of 166 options backdating lawsuits filed. To date, only a small portion of these cases (less than a third) have been settled or otherwise resolved. The vast majority, well over one hundred, of these cases remain pending. Of course it remains to be seen, but I suspect that Judge Alsup’s opinions in these two cases will prove to have introduced significant challenges for parties trying to move these pending cases toward resolution.

Very special thanks to Zusha Elinson of The Recorder for providing me with copies of these opinions. Elinson’s April 24, 2008 article in The Recorder about the opinions entitled “Alsup Rejects Easy Options Deals” can be found here (Full disclosure: I was interviewed in connection with the article).