The Winter Storm Update on the PLUS D&O Symposium Opening Session

So your flight was cancelled and you weren’t able to make it to New York for the PLUS D&O Symposium? Have no fear, my flight managed to get through and I made it to the conference, and so I am able to report here on the first day’s proceedings.

 

It may be cold consolation for those of you who didn’t make it, but you should know that you are not alone. There were quite a few empty seats in this morning’s sessions, and even a couple of speakers were unable to make it. Fortunately, the conference organizers were able to locate some able substitutes, and the show is going forward.

 

The day’s opening session was, as is customary, devoted to current corporate and securities litigation trends. The session was chaired by Bruce Angiolillo of the Simpson Thacher law firm, who substituted into the role at the last minute. The other panelists included leading members of both the plaintiffs and defense bar, as well as Columbia Law Professor John Coffee.

 

There were a number of recurring themes during the opening session, one of the most interesting of which was the recurring suggestion that the nature of securities class action litigation has been changing. For example, Professor Coffee noted that the source of the wrongdoing has changed; whereas in the past, the typical securities case would involve allegations of financial fraud, now there are many more cases involving alleged product defects or operational deficiencies than there are cases alleging financial fraud or restatements. Plaintiffs’ attorney Michael Dowd of the Robbins Geller firm, while acknowledging that filings of new financial fraud cases may have declined more recently, stated that he "has faith" that the financial fraud cases "will be back."

 

Other panelists echoed this suggestion that securities cases are changing, although they invoked different points of reference. Bill Grauer of the Cooley law firm noted that cases are becoming "much more complex" and "much more fragmented," particularly as one set of circumstances can and often does give rise to a multitude of separate regulatory and litigated proceedings.

 

In focusing on the past year’s most significant developments, the panel extensively discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the Morrison case (about which refer here) and in the Merck case. With respect to the Morrison case, among the topics discussed were the as yet unanswered questions that will have to be resolved in the wake of Supreme Court’s decision.

 

For example, Professor Coffee noted that questions remain on the question whether Morrison will apply to liability claims under Section 11 of the ’33 Act as well as to the Section 10(b) type claims that were involved in the Morrison case itself (at least one court has said that Morrison does extend to the ’33 Act, refer here). He also noted that the applicability of Morrison to tender offer litigation also remains to be answered. Finally, he noted that we are all waiting to find out what impact, if any, the Morrison opinion will have on the jury verdict entered in the Vivendi case (about which refer here).

 

Jay Eisenhofer of the Grant & Eisenhofer firm also noted some additional questions that remain in the wake of Morrison, including whether or not Morrison will preclude claims of persons who purchased American Depositary Receipts in the U.S (at least one court has held that at least with respect to ADRs purchased over the counter, as opposed to on an exchange, Morrison does preclude the applicability of Section 10(b)). He also noted that it will remain to be seen whether plaintiffs who bought their shares outside the U.S. can pursue claims under the law of the non-U.S. company’s home country, and whether or not plaintiffs can and will attempt to pursue claims under the common law.

 

The panel also extensively discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Merck case (about which refer here). Several panelists noted the difficulty defendants will now have, in the wake of Merck, showing that the plaintiffs had access to information sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations, the result of which may be to keep cases alive much longer. Professor Coffee asserted that while the Merck decision may not be as important as the Morrison decision, it will "have an impact," and Dowd agreed that Merck will "have an impact on the quantity and quality of cases."

 

The panel also discussed the rising levels of merger and acquisition related litigation. As a preliminary matter, Eisenhofer expressed some skepticism whether there really is an increase in the level of M&A activity, suggesting that the apparent increase may simply be a refection of the fact that these types of suits may not have been fully "captured" in litigation statistics in the past, and that M&A litigation generally will "rise and fall" with the level of economic activity.

 

One attribute of the M&A related litigation that is arising is that it is often characterized by multiple proceedings in separate jurisdictions, a development that created logistical and cost issues for all concerned, which represents another manifestation of corporate and securities litigation. Several panelists suggested that one reason that these cases may be "migrating" away from Delaware is that the Court of Chancery has proved to be skeptical of many of these cases and therefore unwilling to award plaintiffs significant attorneys fees, particularly where the ostensible benefit to the defendant company as a result of the litigation is slight.

 

The panel discussed the question of whether or not companies can use forum selection clauses in their by laws to try to designate in advance to forum in which litigation involving the Board must go forward. The problem is that at least one court (in the Oracle case, about which refer here, scroll down) has found that a by-law forum selection clause is not enforceable.

 

The panel debated whether or not the whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act will be significant. While some panelists expressed the view that the whistleblower provisions could have a significant impact on securities litigation, others were less sure. Professor Coffee noted that at least in the short run, the SEC’s budget constraints and the unwillingness of Congress to fund many activities mandated in Dodd-Frank may constrain the significance of whistleblowing at least for now.

 

As far as what may lie ahead in 2011, the panel discussed at length the cases now pending on the U.S. Supreme Court’s docket, particularly the Halliburton case, which will examine the question of whether or not the loss causation issue must be determined at the class certification stage. Eisenhofer expressed the view that the Halliburton case is "the big case of the Supreme Court term."

 

Professor Coffee stated that he believed, consistent with the holding in the Seventh Circuit and with the amicus brief filed by the Solicitor General, that far from loss causation being an issue that must be determined at the class action certification stage, as the Fifth Circuit has held, the issue of loss causation is a "common issue" that does not have to be proven at the class certification stage because it is not related to the Rule 23 predominance requirement.

 

Dowd, the plaintiffs’ attorney, noted that one consequence of this these efforts to drive issues that appropriately should be dealt with later in the case into a point earlier in the case is that defense expenses accrue much more quickly and much earlier in the case, sometimes creating impediments to later settlement because defense fees have substantially exhausted the available insurance.

 

Angiolillo had an interesting comment on what may be interfering with case settlement. He suggested that over the last ten years or so, it has become increasingly common for company’s D&O insurance to be structured into a tower of as many as twelve layers of insurance, and that as defense fees and prospective settlement amounts move progressively through the towers, points of resistance emerge that interfere with settlement efforts. Angiolillo suggested that the process participants "need to do a better job getting everyone on the same page" because this "structural issue …inhibits settlements."

 

And For Those Who Want More: Those home-bound due to weather and therefore unable to attend this conference and want more about what is going on with respect to directors and officers liability and insurance issues can refer to the several recent blog posts I have added on that very topic, including The Top Ten D&O Stories of 2010 (here), What to Watch Now in the World of D&O (here), A Closer Look at the 2010 Securities Class Action Filings (here), and The Latest Status on the Subprime and Credit Crisis-Related Securities Litigation (here).

 

When is a Securities Suit Stale?

When the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling earlier this year in the Merck case pertaining to the question of what triggers the running of the statute of limitations in securities cases, there was some speculation that the decision might encourage an influx of cases involving events from the distant past. There really have not been that many cases that seemed to have been filed in reliance on Merck -- at least not until now.

 

A case filed late last week, in which the class period cutoff date is over three years past, seems to represent a pretty clear example of a filing made in reliance on Merck, and may suggest both the kinds of filings that Merck may encourage and also the problems these cases may present.

 

Just to review, in its April 2010 decision in Merck, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for cases under Section 10(b) is not triggered until the claimants have, or with reasonable diligence could have had, knowledge of the facts constituting the violation, including in particular facts constituting scienter.

 

According to their September 17, 2010 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers’ have filed an action in the District of Idaho against PCS Eduventures!.com, its CEO and its former CFO. Though the complaint (a copy of which can be found here) was only just filed last week, the lawsuit purports to be filed on behalf of investors who purchased the companies’ shares between March 28, 2007 and August 5, 2007 – a period that ends more than three years before the complaint was filed.

 

The gist of the complaint is that on March 28, 2007, the company announced that it had entered a license agreement with its Mideast distributor, PCS Middle East, for a fixed license fee of $7.15 million. However, the complaint alleges that PCS Middle East did not have the ability to pay the fee without first entering a contract with the Saudi Arabian government. PCS did not have a contract with Saudi Arabia, and the complaint alleges that "PCS officers knew there was no contract."

 

The reason that the class period cuts off in August 2007 is that on August 15, 2007, after several months worth of disclosures about the Saudi arrangement or reflecting the revenue from the arrangement, the company issued an "update" clarifying that while the company had relied on their Mideast distributor’s assurances that a contract was "imminent," in fact, the company was "unable to confirm a timeframe or other specifics regarding any such contract" and the company’s managers "do not know when our Company will be called upon to participate in the initiative through our independent licensee."

 

The complaint anticipates the statute of limitations issue by alleging that "it was not until August 26, 2010, when the SEC instituted a civil action against PCS and others, did [sic] any reasonable investor could have reasonably suspected that Defendants’ misstatements about its purported $7.5 million sales contract were made with scienter."

 

The SEC’s August 30, 2010 press release regarding its enforcement action can be found here and the SEC’s amended enforcement complaint against PCS and its CEO and former CFO can be found here.

 

According to the SEC’s complaint, in March 2007, the company’s Mideast representative had been promising the Saudi contract for months, at a time when the company also faced the looming possibility of missing its EBIDTA requirements in one of its loan covenants. The SEC alleges that the company concocted the license fee arrangement with its Mideast distributor as a way to come up with revenue to satisfy the EBITDA requirement.

 

The company booked the fee as revenue in March 2007, even though the distributor could not pay the fee until there was a Saudi contract. The SEC alleges that the company’s officers "knew there was no contract with Saudi Arabia." The SEC also alleges that in the absence of the contract, the company lacked an appropriate basis to recognize the fee as revenue, a fact of which the SEC also alleges company management was aware.

 

Discussion

Because the investor complaint was filed more that three years after the August 2007 "update," the complaint would appear to be untimely, unless the plaintiffs succeed in persuading the court that the statute of limitations was not triggered until the SEC filed its complaint more than three years later, in August 2010.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court held in Merck that the statute of limitations is not triggered until the claimant has knowledge of the facts constituting the violation, including the facts constituting scienter. The plaintiffs expressly allege in their complaint that until the SEC initiated its enforcement action, they were unaware of the facts constituting scienter – that is, that the PCS officials knew all along there was no Saudi contract.

 

The defendants undoubtedly will argue that the plaintiffs could have with reasonable diligence uncovered the facts constituting the violation, and indeed the company’s mealy-mouthed August 2007 "update," which uses a lot of words to explain the simple facts that there was no Saudi contract and there never had been a Saudi contract, should have set off some alarm bells.

 

The defendants will argue in particular that the August 2007 update specifically noted that the company had only been told that the Saudi contract was "imminent" and had been "unable to confirm the timeframe or other specifics regarding any such contract" – meaning that even back in March, when the company booked the fee revenue, the company lacked specifics regarding the contract, which suggests that the company lacked the minimum necessary to recognize the fee as revenue, and that the company clearly was as aware in March as it was in August that it lacked sufficient specifics to support recognition of the revenue.

 

It will be interesting to see how this case unfolds. At a minimum, the lawsuit’s filing does demonstrate the troublesome potential of the Merck decisions to encourage the pursuit of litigation over long-distant events.

 

The problem is that this possibility creates significant uncertainty about when events in the past so long gone that companies can be sure that they are "out of the woods" about past problems. This is also a serious problem for D&O insurance underwriters trying to assess the risk associated with companies that have had problems in the past. If cases like this one go forward, underwriters will be compelled to extend their scrutiny of a particular company far into the past, with no sure way of knowing how far back is far enough. This uncertainty poses a challenge for companies and underwriters alike.

 

One final question has to do with the SEC’s action. I am not sure of theory on which the SEC will show that its action was timely, a question that presents its own separate set of issues and that will have to be worked out as the enforcement action goes forward. I welcome readers thoughts on the statute of limitations issues.

 

More Bank Failures: In case you missed it, the past Friday evening after the close of business, the FDIC took control of six more banks, bringing the 2010 year to date total number of bank failures to 125. The 2010 pace of bank closures continues to run well ahead of the pace in 2009, when the FDIC closed 140 banks. Bank closure number 125 in 2009 did not occur until December.

 

Among the six banks closed this past Friday night were three more Georgia banks. Since January 1, 2008, there have been 44 bank failures in Georgia, the highest total for any state during that period. However, the 14 bank failures in Georgia so far in 2010 represent only the third highest state total this year, behind Florida (23) and Illinois (15).

 

The Coolest Time-Waster Website Ever: Check out the Global Genie. When you click on the "Shuffle" button, the site displays a Google Earth view of some random location somewhere on five continents (Antarctica and for some reason South America are not included). Each location is helpfully identified by an accompanying Google Map. The "Shuffle" button quickly becomes addictive.

 

Supreme Court Grants Cert in Merck: Is This a Big Deal?

Relatively few securities lawsuits make it to the U.S. Supreme Court, so for that reason alone it is a noteworthy development that on May 26, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Merck’s petition for a writ of certiorari in the securities class action lawsuit relating to the company’s disclosures about Vioxx, the pain medication Merck withdrew from commercial distribution in 2004.

 

The Supreme Court will address the question of what is required to establish "inquiry notice" sufficient to trigger the running of the two-year statute of limitations for private securities lawsuits. As discussed below, the question before the court is likely to produce an opinion that, while likely to be narrow and technical, could nevertheless have a great deal of practical significance for many cases.

 

Background

The first Vioxx-related securities class action lawsuit was filed on November 6, 2003. (Refer here for a detailed background on the case.) Though Vioxx was not finally withdrawn from commercial distribution until September 2004, the district court granted Merck’s motion to dismiss the consolidated class action based on the statute of limitations, finding that there was sufficient public information available prior to November 6, 2001 to trigger the plaintiffs’ duty to investigate the alleged fraud. A copy of the district court April 12, 2007 opinion can be found here.

 

On September 9, 2008, the Third Circuit, in an opinion (here) written by Judge Dolores Sloviter, and accompanied by a vigorous dissent from Judge Jane Roth, reversed the district court and concluded that no "storm warnings" of the alleged fraud existed for more than two years prior to the filing of the original complaint.

 

In order to determine whether or not there was sufficient publicly available information to trigger the statute, the Third Circuit reviewed several categories of information that the district considered to have constituted "storm warnings," including: various studies that raised concerns about Vioxx’s side-effects; an FDA warning letter that publicly criticized Merck for its misleading marketing of Vioxx; several consumer fraud lawsuits that were filed against Merck throughout 2001; and an October 2001 New York Times article that discussed Vioxx testing results and side effects.

 

Based on its detailed factual review of each of these various categories of information, the Third Circuit concluded that "the District Court acted prematurely in finding that [plaintiffs] were on inquiry notice of the alleged fraud." Among other things, the Third Circuit found it relevant that throughout the period Merck continued to issue reassuring statements that minimized the various public disclosures. The Third Circuit also considered it relevant that Merck’s share price did not react to the various disclosures and that the analysts following Merck did not alter their ratings in response to these developments.

 

In dissent, Judge Roth stated her view that there various categories of information provided sufficient "storm warnings" to put investors on inquiry notice, regardless whether or not there was any significant change in Merck’s share price or in analysts’ ratings.

 

The Cert Petition

In its petition for certiorari, Merck argued that the various Circuit courts have issued conflicting opinions on what is required to put a plaintiff on "inquiry notice" sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. Merck argued that the Third Circuit, together with the Ninth Circuit but in contrast to the other Circuits, had held that "no duty to investigate arises, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until the plaintiff receives specific evidence of the elements of its claim without the benefit of any investigation."

 

Merck argued that as a result of its "more lenient" standard, "the Third Circuit has excused an investor from asking a single question until it has evidence not just of scienter, but of materiality and loss causation as well." Merck contended that the Third Circuit’s standard "runs contrary to the fundamental purpose of inquiry notice – to encourage the timely filing of fraud claims by placing an affirmative burden on plaintiffs to investigate potential claims."

 

Merck argued that the existence of a split in the circuits on this question not only undermines the goal of the uniform application of the statute of limitations, but it encourages plaintiffs to forum shop, burdens the parties with uncertainty and leaves investors unsure of their obligations.

 

In their brief in opposition to the writ, the plaintiffs had argued that the Third Circuit had made a very fact intensive determination, and had simply held that on the record there were not sufficient facts to trigger the obligation to investigate potential claims. The plaintiffs argued that the purported split in the circuits pertained only to what a plaintiff must do once the duty to investigate has been triggered, which, plaintiffs contend and the Third Circuit found, had not happened in this case.

 

On May 26, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the writ, and the case will be argued in the court term that begins in October, possibly with a new Justice on the bench.

 

Analysis

The possible significance of this case will be even more apparent after the case has been fully briefed and argued, but based on the record so far, I note the following:

 

First, the court seems to have taken this case based on Merck’s argument that there is a split of authority among the Circuit courts on what it is that puts a securities plaintiff on inquiry notice. Under these circumstances, the likeliest outcome at the Supreme Court level is that the Court will articulate the standard to be applied and then remand the case back to the lower courts for further proceedings. (I am assuming here that it is unlikely that the Third Circuit will not simply be affirmed, because the Supreme Court didn’t have to grant cert in order for the Third Circuit’s ruling to stand.)

 

This prospect in turn suggests a couple of things to me. The first is that the statute of limitations question in this case likely will be, as it has been up to this point, ultimately be decided on a very fact intensive basis. In addition, it also seems likeliest that the Court will simply choose among one of the existing standards for what triggers inquiry notice, which in turn suggests that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court’s decision in this case will plow any new ground.

 

Both of these factors suggest strongly that the Supreme Court’s decision will be narrow, precise and technical – as might be expected in a dispute over standards for triggering the statute of limitations.

 

That said, even if the Supreme Court’s opinion plows no new ground, it could nevertheless have enormous practical significance in at least some individual cases. Depending on how the Court’s decision unfolds, it could answer a number of critical issues that could be outcome determinative in some cases, including the following:

 

1. In order for plaintiff to be put on "inquiry notice," must the plaintiff be aware of the probability that fraud may have occurred, or merely the possibility that fraud may have occurred?

 

2. Is the awareness of the probability or possibility alone enough to trigger the statute, or must it also be shown that plaintiffs would have discovered facts sufficient to actually bring suit?

 

3. What is the relevance to the analysis, if any, of the presence or absence of movement in a company’s stock price or in analysts’ opinions?

 

4. What is the relevance to the analysis, if any, of reassurances from the Company, and how does that affect the triggering of inquiry notice?

 

All of that said, though the outcome of this case is likely to be narrow and technical and will likely produce a narrow definition of a technical standard, the decision potentially could have practical significance on questions of the timeliness of many securities lawsuits.

 

The Gibson Dunn law firm has an interesting May 27, 2009 memo here explaining in detail the contours of the split in authority among the various Circuit courts on the question of what triggers the running of the statute of limitations.

 

Special thanks to the several readers who send me links to briefs and articles relating to the Supreme Court’s cert grant in this case.

 

About the Nominee: Speaking of the recent nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court, a May 27, 2009 memo from the While & Williams firm (here) suggests that in insurance coverage cases, Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor has a track record of ruling in favor of insurers. On the other hand, as the memo also notes, not that many insurance cases actually make it all the way to the Supreme Court. Hat tip to the Point of Law blog (here) for the link to the memo.