The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

Even after two years, the Madoff scandal continues to fascinate. Following close on the heels of last week’s news of Mark Madoff’s tragic suicide is the absolutely arresting news of Jeffry Picower’s estate’s $7.2 billion settlement with the U.S. government – to be specific, the precise amount of the settlement is $7,206,157,717, according to the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney’s December 17, 2010 press release.

According to the press release, the settlement amount represents “all the profits Picower withdrew over the years.” Picower apparently first invested with Madoff in the late 70’s, and withdrew billions over time. After Madoff’s scheme was exposed “it became clear” that Picower had “profited at the expense of more recent [Madoff] investors.”

One aspect of the settlement, and apparently a critical condition on which Picower’s widow had insisted, is the provision that “neither Picower nor any of the related entities participating in the settlement had any involvement in, or knowledge of, Madoff’s fraud.”

This settlement will not leave Picower’s widow destitute. Most of this money had been intended for a philanthropic foundation, not for Picower’s heirs. According to the Washington Post (here), Picower’s widow will retain $200 million and his daughter will retain $25 million, the funds for all of which reportedly derived from sources other than Madoff-related profits.

Those readers who are curious to know exactly how a $7.2 billion civil forfeiture works will want to take a look at the U.S. Attorney’s December 17, 2010 forfeiture complaint. The complaint, which can be found here, is styled as an action by the United States against the “Defendant in rem” – specifically, “$7,206,157,717 on Deposit at J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A..”

Among other interesting tidbits, the complaint reveals that, in order to generate those $7.2 billion in profits, the total amount that Picower had invested with Madoff’s investment advisory services was $617,456,578 – which by my calculation means that Picower’s investment with Madoff had supposedly generated lifetime returns of over 1,100%)

The estate’s December 17, 2010 stipulation of settlement with the government, which can be found here, represents in effect the estate’s agreement to forfeit the Defendant in rem to the government, to be effected, the stipulation recites, by the Clerk of Court’s issuance of “a warrant for the arrest of the Defendant in rem.”

Southern District of New York Judge Thomas Greisa approved the forfeiture case settlement. The settlement remains subject to the bankruptcy court’s approval.

This dual judicial approval is required because the settlement actually represents two different funds to be paid in settlement of two different matters. One fund, in the amount of $5 billion, is to be paid in settlement of the adversary proceeding the SIPC Trustee Irving Picard had filed against Picower in the bankruptcy court. The remaining $2.2 billion is actually in settlement of the civil forfeiture proceeding itself. Picard is to administer both funds for the benefit of the Madoff victims according to the detailed procedural specifications in the settlement stipulation.

The New York Times speculates that as a result of this and other recoveries, those who lost the amount of their principal investment by investing with Madoff may recover as much as 50 percent of their losses.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing the Picower settlement documents.

The Next Act of this Icelandic Saga Will Not be Staged in New York: Many readers may recall my May 2010 post about the events surrounding the failure of Iceland’s Glitnir Bank and the subsequent lawsuit filed in New York state court against the bank’s controlling shareholder and his wife, certain former bank directors and officers, and the Bank’s auditor.

At the time, I noted that “the obvious question about this case is what the heck is it doing in state court in New York?”

Apparently, the New York state court judge in charge of the case had exactly the same question. As reflected in Julie Triedman’s December 17, 2010 Am Law Litigation Daily article (here), on December 15, 2010, Judge Charles Ramos has thrown out the lawsuit on forum non conveniens grounds.

According to the article, among other issues with which Ramos was concerned was the practical problem associated with language translation. Judge Ramos seemed to accept the argument of counsel for one of the defendants, who had asked the Judge to “imagine the burden of trying to translate that all? We can’t even pronounce the names, much less translate this all.” (In that regard, I note that in typing my prior post about this case, I was unable to accurately reproduce the individual defendants’ names, as the requisite typographic symbols are simply unavailable.)

Judge Ramos also seemed annoyed by the very idea that this case could be added to his judicial burdens. The article reports that Judge Ramos said “you know something, we don’t need extra work. How many cases does the average judge in Iceland have in their inventory?...I’ve got 350.”

Demonstrating the true New Yorker’s perception of geography, Ramos added that “what I see unfolding is a case that is going to show me that the conspiracy was hatched in Iceland or Denmark or some place, but not necessarily New York.”

Ramos conditioned his dismissal on the defendants’ acceptance of jurisdiction in Icelandic courts. He advised the plaintiffs’ counsel to “get yourself a plane ticket.”

And Speaking of Failed Banks: Meanwhile, while everyone was distracted with other things, the FDIC quietly closed six more banks this past Friday night, bringing the 2010 YTD total to 157. There could be more bank failures yet to come this year, but given that next Friday is Christmas Eve and the following Friday is New Year’s Eve, the FDIC might be done closing banks, for this year at least.

Though the monthly totals fluctuated throughout the year from a monthly low of seven failed banks in February 2010 to a monthly high of 23 in April 2010, it definitely seems as if the bank closure pace slowed as the year progressed. There have been only 71 bank failures in the second half of 2010, compared with 86 in the first half. Moreover, after the FDIC closed 22 banks in July 2010, the agency closed only 49 banks over the following give months (an average of just under 10 banks a month).

The six bank closures this past Friday included three more bank in Georgia. There have been 51 bank failures total in Georgia since January 1, 2008, the highest total for any state during that period.

But the state with the highest number of bank closures in 2010 is Florida, which with one more bank closure this past Friday now has had 29 bank failures this year. (Georgia is second in 2010 bank failures with 21.) Florida also has the second highest number of bank failures since 2010, with 45.

Since January 1, 2010, there have now been a total of 322 bank failures. With 860 banks ranked as “problem institutions” in the agency’s most recent Quarterly Banking Profile, it seems likely that bank failure will likely continue as we head into 2010.

A Spectral Italian Vintner, Perhaps?: Novelist Jay McInerney’s wine column in this Saturday’s Wall Street Journal (here) contained this sentence: “When the elder brother died, he returned to Italy to run the family business.” In fairness, the surrounding context makes some sense out of this otherwise incomprehesible sentence. Nevertheless, The D&O Diary feels compelled to throw a flag on this sentence for unnecessary roughness in the use of the English language.

And Finally: If you have not yet had someone send you a link to the marvelous December 16, 2010  “Let it Dough!” illustrations on Christoph Niemann’s Abstract City blog on the New York Times website, give yourself a treat and take a few minutes to check them out here. (The “Hot Toddies” illustration alone justifies the time to visit the site.)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a March 12, 2010 order (here) in a Madoff-related derivative suit, the New York (Nassau County) Supreme Court, applying New York law, substantially denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding among other things that demand was excused. As far as I am aware, this is the first Madoff-related derivative suit to survive a motion to dismiss. It is also the first Madoff-related lawsuit dismissal motion denial by a New York court of which I am aware.

The derivative suit was filed on April 1, 2009 by non-managing member of Andover LLC, on behalf of Andover LLC, as nominal defendant. Among the defendants are Andover’s investment manager (Andover Management), general partner, and investment consultant (Ivy Asset Management) and Andover’s auditor. The complaint, which can be found here, alleged that Andover should recover damages for the defendants’ negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.

The complaint alleges that the defendants committed these wrongs by permitting Andover to invest "approximately a quarter of its assets under the personal control of [Bernard Madoff] through his investment firm." The complaint alleges that as of December 31, 2007, Andover had assets of $57.7 million. The complaint further alleges that Andover’s auditors were negligent in conducting annual audits by failing to plan and perform appropriate audits and appropriate tests that would have identified Madoff’s fraud.

The plaintiff alleged that serving a demand on Andover’s management to prosecute these claims would have been futile because Andover and its principles were involved in wrongdoing constituting the basis of the claims. The plaintiff also asserted that it would have been futile to demand that Andover pursue claims against Ivy because Ivy’s agreement with Andover required Andover to indemnify Ivy. The plaintiff alleged it would have been futile to demand that Andover suit the auditor because Andover’s misconduct was "inextricably interconnected" with that of management.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue; that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by New York’s Martin Act; that his derivative claims were barred by failure to make a demand on the managing member of the limited liability company and by the business judgment rule, and numerous other grounds. The auditor moved on lack of capacity and lack of proximate causation since the investment has been made before the current auditor was retained and the loss therefore could not have been avoided.

In its March 12, 2010 order, the court substantially denied the defendants’ motions in all material respects.

First, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s failure to make a demand was excused. The court reasoned that Andover Management and general partner had an interest in not being sued and an interest in protecting its principals, Ivy and its auditor from being sued, as claims against those persons "would tend to establish that Andover Management negligently breached its own fiduciary duty."

Second, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s claims were not barred by the Martin Act because the plaintiff’s claims do "not arise from alleged securities fraud and is not simply a securities fraud claim."

Third, the court also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim against Andover Management because "it may be inferred" that Andover Management "failed to exercise even slight care in failing to detect" Madoff’s fraud. It may also" be inferred" that Andover Management "showed complete disregard for Andover associates’ right and the safety of its investment."

In addition to its several other holdings, the court also denied the auditor’s motion to dismiss as well, observing that "the court must assume that an audit … conducted pursuant to generally accepted accounting procedure would have uncovered Madoff’s fraud" and that "a proper audit would have provided Andover with an opportunity to liquidate its investment."

The Andover case is not the first Madoff lawsuit to survive a motion to dismiss (see, for example, my recent post here about a dismissal motion denial in a Madoff-related case). However, it is as far as I am aware, the first dismissal motion denial in a Madoff-related derivative case and it is as far as I am aware the first dismissal motion denial in a court in New York, many of the Madoff-related cases are pending.

If the March 12 order is in any way indicative of the likely course of Madoff investors’ claims against feeder funds and investment gatekeepers, the investors’ litigation outlook appears favorable, at least at the dismissal motion stage. Indeed, the March 12 order fairly bristles with incredulity that the various defendants failed to take steps that, the court assumes, would have detected Madoff’s fraud.

But while a similar judicial predisposition might allow other claimants, like the plaintiff in this case, to survive a dismissal motion, it remains to be seen whether the claimants ultimately will be able to recover their losses or any substantial part thereof.

Of course, to even have any hope of any recovery, the aggrieved investors’ claims must first survive a motion to dismiss. The March 12 order in this case should be of keen interest to other Madoff claimants.

Special thanks to Daniel Tepper, one of the plaintiff’s counsel in the Andover case, for providing a copy of the March 12 order.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

One interesting thing about the most recently filed securities class action lawsuits is what they have in common – that is, that while the companies sued are drawn from a surprising diversity of industries, none of them are in the financial services sector. The absence of new securities suits against financially related companies is quite a contrast to the lawsuits that were being filed a year ago, and for that matter that were being filed in the first few months of 2009. There is an increasingly strong suggestion that after more than two and a half years, the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave may have finally just about played itself out.

The latest securities lawsuit is representative. That is, on November 17, 2009, plaintiffs’ lawyers announced (here) that they had filed a lawsuit in the District of Rhode Island against CVS Caremark and certain of its directors and offices. The complaint, which can be found here, alleges that the defendants failed to disclose operating problems the company was having in its pharmacy benefits management (PBM) business, which the company acquired in 2007. On November 5, 2009, the company disclosed (here) the PBM problems and also disclosed that the company was the subject of an FTC investigation into the company’s drug benefits practices.

Whatever else might be said about the new CVS lawsuit, the suit clearly was not filed against a financial services company and the allegations appear unrelated to the financial crisis.

The several new securities cases filed over the last two weeks share both these traits. That is, the defendant companies are outside the financial sector and the allegations generally do not appear to specifically relate to the global financial crisis.

A case in point is the lawsuit filed last week against The Boeing Corporation and certain of its directors and officers. The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ November 13, 2009 press release (here) describes the securities suit that was filed in the Northern District of Illinois. According to the press release, the complaint (which can be found here) alleges that the company misrepresented the production timeline and anticipated delivery dates of the company’s Dreamliner 787 commercial aircraft.

Similarly, on November 6, 2009, plaintiffs’ lawyer initiated a securities class action lawsuit against jewelry retailer Zale Corp. (about which refer here) alleging that the company had improperly recorded certain prepaid advertising expenses and intercompany accounts receivable.

Other examples include the November 10, 2009 action against Hemispherix Biopharma, (refer here) alleging misrepresentations in connection with the new drug application of one of the company’s clincal stage products; the action filed on November 6, 2009 against STEC, Inc.(refer here), the memory drive manufacturer, which is alleged to have overstated demand for one of its products; and the November 6, 2009 action filed against specialty women’s clothing retailer Limited Brands (refer here), which is alleged to have made misrepresentations regarding the company’s direct-to-consumer ecommerce initiative.

Again, none of these cases involve financial companies and none are directly related to the financial crisis.

To be sure, all along as the subprime and credit crisis litigation wave unfolded over the last two and a half (actually nearly three) years, there have been cases that didn’t involve financial companies and that were unrelated to the credit crisis. However, this recent collection of cases, particularly the absence of any financial related suits, seems to represent a categorically different filing pattern.

At the same time, there are still some cases being filed that unquestionably reflect back to the credit crisis. Indeed, late last week I noted (here) that a credit crisis-related lawsuit had been filed against VeraSun Energy. Even though the company itself is not financially related, the claims in the complaint relate to the company’s alleged problems arising from the company’s wrong way bets on certain financial derivative hedging contracts.

There undoubtedly are other cases yet to come like that filed against VeraSun, where the allegations reflect back on the events of the financial crisis – particularly, as was the case with the VeraSun filing, if the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ continue to file suits where the proposed class period cutoff date is well in the past, and accordingly the lawsuits involved long past events. As I noted in my post about VeraSun, those kinds of cases could continue to arrive for some time to come.

But while there could and likely will be further additional cases relating to or arising from the financial crisis, it seems increasingly likely that the mix of cases will be much more diverse that has been the case for almost three years now. This may entail some adjustment for D&O insurance underwriters, who have been very defensive against financial company risks, but much more agreeable to accepting other kinds of risks. The pattern over the last few weeks suggest that securities litigation risk may once again be dispersed across a wide variety of sectors and industries, and a more generalized underwriting approach to risk selection may be required going forward.

So What About Bernard Madoff’s Insurance?: If you are like me, you have probably wondered since the very beginning of the Madoff scandal what kind of insurance his firm carried. It turns out that, other than a bond, his firm didn’t carry professional liability insurance.

As reflected in Susan Sclafane’s November 17, 2009 National Underwriter article (here), Madoff apparently had for years refused to buy D&O insurance, and instead carried only a $25 million financial institutions bond because he was required to do so by participants in his legitimate clearing trade business. (The bond carrier, which reportedly was on the risk for 15 years, apparently has filed a rescission action.)

Not that the D&O insurance would have gone very far, even if there had been D&O insurance in place, in view of the massive scale of the losses. For that matter, given Madoff’s guilty plea, coverage for claims against Madoff or his firm would have been excluded under most D&O policies anyway.

Perhaps it was Madoff’s awareness that of the unlikelihood of coverage that convinced him not to squander his ill-gotten gains on insurance designed to protect his victims.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing the link to the National Undewriter article.

Today’s Grammar Question: Observant readers may have noticed that in discussing the recent securities filings I used the plural form of the verb "to be" in connection with my use of the noun, "none" – as in, "none of them are," rather than "none of them is."

While I have no particularly strong feelings on the question of the proper verb form to be used with the noun "none," a little bit of Internet research convinced me there are quite a number of people who feel quite strongly on the subject.

I also am persuaded that the plural verb form is generally proper (as discussed here), and that even for those who feel that either usage is proper, the plural form is in any event most appropriate when the word "none" is used in the sense in which I used it – that is, to mean "not any, " in reference to plural entities (about which refer here).

If there are any readers out there who have a strong reaction to my resolution of this grammatical issue, I suggest that the best response is either a long walk or a short drink. (Or if you prefer, a short walk and a long drink. Better yet, skip the walk.)

Further Apologies: I apologize to everyone for continuing service problems with this site, particularly with respect to the delivery of email notifications. LexBlog, my blog hosting service, is continuing to suffer ill effects from a sustained spambot attack a few days ago. Along with everyone else, I sure hope things return to normal soon, if for no other reason than for the sake of my sanity.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Another Subprime-Related Securities Lawsuit Dismissal: In yet another subprime-related securities class action lawsuit decision in defendants’ favor, on July 29, 2009, District of Connecticut Judge Stefan Underhill granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the securities lawsuit pending against CBRE Realty Finance and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the opinion can be found here. Background regarding the case can be found here.

As reflected in Alison Frankel’s July 30, 2009 article about the decision in The American Lawyer Daily (here), the court’s order in the CBRE Realty case may be particularly noteworthy because the plaintiffs’ complaint asserts claims under the ’33 Act, in connection with which the plaintiffs would not have to plead scienter or even loss causation in order to survive a motion to dismiss -- they only need to plead a material misrepresentation or omission.

In his July 29 order, Judge Underhill found that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled that the alleged misrepresentations or omissions were material. The plaintiffs had alleged that in connection with company’s IPO, the company’s offering documents had not adequately disclosed the risk of default in connection with two Maryland condominium conversion projects known as Triton. Judge Underhilll concluded that plaintiffs had failed to allege that there was not sufficient collateral to back the $51 million loan to Triton.

Judge Underhill’s ruling does not indicate whether or not it is with or without prejudice; however, he did order the court clerk to close the file.

I have added the CBRE decision to my register of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit dismissal motion outcomes, which can be accessed here.

Still More Bank Failures: In case you missed it, this past Friday night, the FDIC closed five more banks, bringing the year to date total number of bank failures to 69. The FDIC has taken control of 32 banks just since June 19, 2009. An August 1, 2009 Bloomberg article detailing the latest bank closures can be found here.

The most recent round of bank closures continues the trend concentration of recent bank closures within the community banks. Four of the five latest bank closures involved institutions that had assets of under $1 billion. Of the 69 banks that have closed this year, 59 have had assets under $1 billion.

The signs are that the bank closures will continue for some time to come. The July 31, 2009 Wall Street Journal reported (here) that banking regulators have already entered at least 285 memoranda of understanding with banking institutions this year, on pace for nearly 600 by year end, compared with 399 for the full year last year. While the MOUs are designed to try to direct the institutions away from closure, the sheer number of agreements is a reflection of the difficult circumstances that many banking institutions are facing.

The FDIC’s complete list of banking institutions that have failed since October 2000 can be found here.

Another Madoff-Related Insurance Coverage Action: In an earlier post (here), I noted the arrival of the Madoff-related insurance coverage litigation and suggested there would be much more similar coverage litigation ahead. Another Madoff-related coverage lawsuit has now arrived.

On July 20, 2009, Blezak Black filed an action (here) in New Jersey (Camden County) Superior Court against its crime insurers. The plaintiff alleges to have invested over $13 million with Madoff, which it lost. The plaintiffs’ crime insurers have denied coverage for the claim. The plaintiff’s complaint alleges breach of contract and seeks a judicial declaration of coverage.

I have added this lawsuit to my register of Madoff-related insurance coverage litigation, which can be found in Table V of my register of Madoff lawsuits. The register can be accessed here.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the latest Madoff-related insurance coverage lawsuit complaint.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Given the massive amount of litigation arising out of the Madoff scandal as well as the enormous sums of money involved it is perhaps inevitable that the scandal would also generate its own category of insurance coverage litigation. As the two cases described below demonstrate, the Madoff-related coverage litigation has now arrived. There undoubtedly will be much more to come in the weeks and months ahead.

The first of the two recently filed coverage complaints was filed on July 14, 2009 in Hennepin County (Minn.) District Court by Upsher-Smith Laboratories, a pharmaceutical company. A copy of the complaint can be found here. Since 1995, Upsher-Smith had invested all of its funds in its profit sharing plan with Bernard L. Madoff Securities LLC. As of December 2008, the company had invested $12 million in plan assets with Madoff. The company had also invested millions of its own with Madoff.

As a result of the plan losses, the U.S. Department of Labor launched an investigation, and by letter dated June 30, 2009, the DOL has demanded that the company "restore losses" to the plan, or the DOL may file a lawsuit.

Upsher-Smith filed a claim with its "Employee Benefits Plan Administrative Liability" insurer in connection with the plan losses and the DOL’s actions. The company has also filed an action with its crime insurer in connection with its own separate losses. Both carriers have denied coverage. In its July 14, 2009 complaint, Upsher-Smith seeks a judicial declaration of coverage under both policies, and also alleges breach of contract against both insurers.

The second of the two complaints was filed on July 15, 2009 in the Southern District of New York by Ann & Hope, Inc., which operates retail stores, as well as by an affiliated entity and affiliated persons. The complaint, which can be found here, was filed against the company’s crime insurers. The complaint alleges that on August 14, 2008, Madoff’s firm "caused $5 million to be transferred" from the affiliated company to Madoff’s account with JP Morgan. As a result of Madoff’s fraud, the funds have been lost. The company submitted a claim to its crime insurer, which has denied the claim. The complaint seeks a judicial declaration of coverage and also alleges breach of contract.

Merely because these complaints have been filed does not, of course, mean that they are meritorious. In that regard, I note that both complaints neglect to mention the specific grounds on which the respective carriers have denied coverage, an omission that may be telling. The stilted wording on the Ann & Hope complaint alleging that Madoff "caused the funds to be transferred" may suggest the kind of coverage problems that the companies seeking coverage under their crime policies for Madoff losses will have to solve.

There may well have been other Madoff-related insurance coverage litigation before these two cases, although I have been keeping track of all Madoff-related litigation fairly attentively and I have not seen any other coverage lawsuits before. The one thing I know for sure is that these lawsuits won’t be the last.

Madoff may be in prison for the next 150 years, but while he does his time outside the prison walls, the litigation his crimes have engendered will grind on for many years. I predict that the litigation will live on long after his obituary appears.

I have in any event added the two insurance coverage cases to my register of Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here. In recognition of the distinction that these two new coverage cases represent, I have created a new table on my litigation chart (Table V) for Madoff-related coverage litigation. I hope readers will help me to maintain the table by supplying me with copies of complaints of which they may become aware.

Special thanks to loyal reader Bill Sweeney for providing me with copies of the two coverage complaints.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Following close on the heels of the Massachusetts regulator’s action filed last week against Madoff feeder-fund Fairfield Greenwich and related individuals, on April 6, 2009, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo initiated a civil action in New York (New York County) Supreme Court against J. Ezra Merkin and Madoff feeder fund Gabriel Capital Corporation. The AG’s April 6 press release, which links to the complaint and accompanying exhibits, can be found here.

The complaint alleges that over the course of many years beginning in the 90s and going through December 2008, Merkin earned $470 million in management and incentive fees, representing to investors and to nonprofits on whose boards he sat that he was managing their money when in fact he was simply handing much of the money over to be managed by Bernard Madoff, whom Merkin "failed to adequately oversee, audit or investigate."

The complaint alleges that through his "misrepresentations, concealment, self-dealing, reckless conduct and gross negligence," Merkin "abused the trust of investors" and "breached the fiduciary duties" he owed to the nonprofits on whose boards he sat. As a result, the complaint alleges, investors lost approximately $2.4 billion.

Merkin not only misrepresented his role as a money manager, but also, according to the complaint, concealed Madoff’s critical role in (supposedly) managing the funds. The complaint also alleges that not only was Madoff perhaps uniquely aware of many of the "red flags" about Madoff (including his uncanny returns, his suspicious clearing of trades every quarter end, and the suspicious identity of his auditor), but he also received numerous warnings about Madoff from "his closest and most trusted advisors." The complaint alleges that Merkin disregarded these warnings because his "financial incentive to keep funds with Madoff blinded him."

The complaint alleges that the Ascot funds, one of the groups of funds Merkin founded and supposedly managed, turned virtually all of its investor funds over to Madoff to handle. Of the $1.7 billion in the Ascot funds as of May 2008, $215 million, or about 12 percent, belonged to 35 nonprofit groups, of which more than half ($115 billion) belong to organizations on whose board Merkin sat as a director. The complaint alleges that "Merkin embedded himself in charitable boards and used those positions to solicit new investments."

The complaint charges Merkin with violations of the Martin Act for fraudulent conduct in connection with the sale of securities; with other statutory violations for "persistent fraud in the conduct of business"; and with violations of New York’s Not-for-Profit Corporation Law and breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with Merkin’s service on the boards of certain nonprofit entities. The complaint seeks payment of damages and disgorgement of fees, restitution and other equitable relief.

The NYAG’s complaint obviously presents a host of factual and legal issues. Among other things, it also raises some potentially complex and even vexing insurance complications as well.

Merkin will obviously seek to resort to his firm’s D&O and/or E&O coverage in connection with his defense against the AG’s claims. However, his firm’s insurance coverage may already be under significant pressure as a result of the extensive civil litigation already pending against him and his firm.

Moreover, his firm’s insurance coverage would only cover him as excess insurance in connection with the allegations against him in his capacity as a director of the referenced nonprofit entities. Insofar as he is named as a defendant in those capacities, his firm’s policy would cover him, if at all, after both the nonprofit’s available insurance and indemnification obligations were exhausted.

In other words, as a result of the allegations against him in his capacity as a director of those nonprofits, he would as a theoretical matter be in a position to attempt to resort to those organization’s insurance policies as well as to seek indemnification from those organizations.

The potential implications that these nonprofits insurance policies (and even indemnification obligations) would be called upon to respond to the claims against Merkin would raise a host of complex issues, including, for example, allocation issues (owing to the fact that Merkin is named as a defendant in multiple capacities). But as a strictly theoretical matter – and without expressing any opinion as to the merits of the effort or the justice it would or would not represent – Merkin certainly might well seek to access the various nonprofits’ insurance policies, at least to the extent he is named as a defendant in his capacities as a director of the nonprofits. However, even to the extent the policies afforded coverage in connection with this claim it would only be for Merkin as an individual and to the extent of his insured capacity under each particular policy, and it would not in any event extend to his funds.

One additional complicating factor, at least as a preliminary matter, is that the various nonprofit organizations are not referenced by name in the complaint. This initial hurdle is likely surmountable through discovery, and seemingly would quickly be overcome. (According to an April 7, 2009 Wall Street Journa article about the AG's law suit, which can be found here, the institutions on whose Boards Merkin sat and which had funds invested with Merkin included New York University, New York Law School, Yeshiva University and Bard College.) Whether or not the potentially affected policies would in fact respond to these claims would of course have to be determined according to the applicable allegations and the applicable policy language.

Ironically, as least some of these nonprofit institsutions have separtely initiated their own actions against Merkin and his funds -- for example, New York Law School (refer here for the complaint) and New York University (refer here) have each filed suit against Merkin . These separate actions against Merkin would likely trigger the insured vs. insured exclusion found in most D&O insurance policies and therefore would not themselves implicate coverage. The irony is that these same institutions, who are pursuing substantially the same claims against Merkin as is the NYAG,  could  see their insurance policies accessed and potentially depleted by the NYAG's complaints, assuming for the sake of discussion that the policies are in fact implicated as discussed here.

A detailed and particularly compelling portrait of the long relationship between Madoff and Merking is set out in New York Magazine’s February 22, 2009 article entitled "The Monster Mensch" (here). The article describes Merkin as "an intellectual showman" and a "marvel of erudition" who commanded respect as a civil and philanthropic leader and as Chariman of GMAC, the finance arm of General Motors. He was, according to a friend quoted in the article, the "wisest man on Wall Street." Which may explain a lot, unintentionally and in retrospect, about Wall Street.

I have in any event added the NYAG’s complaint to my roster of Madoff-related lawsuits, which can be accessed here. (The list also includes a separate action filed against Merkin, Gabriel and the funds' auditor on April 6 by publisher and real estate magnate Mortimer Zuckerman, who claims in his complaint that he lost $40 through his investments with Merkin.)I note that this list gets considerably longer every day, as new complaints continue to arrive. Special thanks to the many readers who continue to provide me with copies of the new lawsuits, particularly to Jon Jacobson of the Greenberg Traurig firm.

And Finally: Although arguably it has nothing to do with Merkin himself or any of the foregoing, I nevertheless feel compelled to alert readers to the interesting and somewhat peculiar meaning that the work "merkin" has in the English language.

According to Wikipedia (here), a "merkin" is "a pubic wig, originally worn by prostitutes, after shaving the genitalia to eliminate lice or disguise the marks of syphilis." The Wikipedia entry helpfully provides a picture of "a mock merkin."

Now you know.

Special thanks to the loyal reader who pointed out this fact – which, upon further reflection, may not be quite so unrelated after all.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In an April 1, 2009 administrative complaint (here), Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth William Francis Galvin accused Madoff feeder fund Fairfield Greenwich Advisors and its Bermuda affiliate of "complete disregard of its fiduciary duties to its investors" and of "flagrant recurring misrepresentations" that "rise to the level of fraud."

If you have not yet seen the complaint, you should take a look, because it contains some rather striking allegations, the most provocative of which are based on the transcript of a telephone conversation in which Bernard Madoff coaches senior Fairfield officials on how to respond to inquiries from the SEC.

At one time Fairfield has a much as $14 billion of assets under management, of which nearly $7 billion was invested with Madoff through its flagship funds. The firm earned hundreds of millions of dollars in fees from investors in connection with the Madoff related investments. (Detailed background regarding the Fairfield group can be found here.) UPDATE: Fairfield's principals were on track for payouts totalling over $117 million in 2008, before the scandal surfaced, as reflected in documents filed with complaint, according to the Dealbook blog (here).

The complaint alleges that Fairfield’s managers were "blinded by the fees they were earning" and "did not engage in meaningful due diligence" but instead "turned a blind eye to any fact that would have burst their lucrative bubble."

The complaint alleges that in contrast to the due diligence efforts Fairfield claimed in its marketing materials, the firm "neglected to do any meaningful check into whether Madoff was actually making trades he said he was making." The complaint further alleges that "the concept of due diligence was merely part of Fairfield’s marketing pitch, not an activity it meaningfully engaged in with respect to Madoff."

The centerpiece of the complaint is a transcript of a December 2005 telephone conversation between Madoff and several senior Fairfield officials. Fairfield apparently recorded the conversation then apparently unbeknownst to Madoff and produced the recording in connection with the Massachusetts investigation. The transcript of the call can be found here.

The SEC was about to interview the Fairfield officials in connection with the SEC’s investigation of allegations against Madoff by Harry Markopolos. The transcript shows that Madoff opened the call by stating "obviously, first of all, this conversation never took place, okay?"

Madoff then gave the Fairfield officials precise instructions on what to say in response to the SEC’s questions, noting at one point that "the secrecy as to information is the key issue for everybody," even going so far as to say to the Fairfield officials that "the less you know about how we execute… the better you are."

The complaint alleges with respect to this phone conversation that Madoff was "manipulating the flow of information to the SEC" and that as a result of its cooperation, Fairfield helped Madoff "evade SEC detection."

The complaint also alleges that Fairfield’s reliance on the outside audit firm’s audit of Madoff’s investment company was "absurd," and that Fairfield made "patently false representations" about the audit and the auditor even though Fairfield "did not know one thing about this one-person auditing firm."

The complaint also alleges that as 2008 progressed, client redemptions and larger problems in the financial marketplace began to trouble the Fairfield officials. They began to debate internally about "gaps" in their knowledge about Madoff. Their internal communications reflect liquidity concerns as well as concerns about Madoff’s counterparty exposures.

The complaint alleges that the officials did not follow up on these concerns. Instead, in response to Madoff’s anger about increasing fund redemption in the late fall 2008, they tried to support him by marketing against redemptions as well as by placing their own cash in new Madoff funds formed at the eleventh hour.

The complaint seeks a cease and desist order and restitution to all investors who invested in Madoff through Fairfield, as well as disgorgement of related fees and an administrative fine.

In response to the complaint, Fairfield issued an April 1, 2009 statement (here) in which it characterized the complaint as "false and misleading" and asserted that it "conducted vigorous and robust monitoring [of Madoff] on an ongoing basis." The complaint, according to the statement, is based on "nothing more than 20-20 hindsight that supposes that anyone familiar with Madoff’s operation should have determined that it was a Ponzi scheme." But, the statement notes, not one person detected the fraud.

Among the Fairfield officials mentioned by name in the complaint is Andres Piedrahita (a Fairfield partner and son-in-law of Fairfield founding partner Walter Noel), whom the complaint alleges in 2007 alone earned in excess of $45 million. The March 31, 2009 Wall Street Journal ran a fascinating front-page article about Piedrahita entitled "The Charming Mr. Piedrahita Finds Himself Caught in the Madoff Storm" (here), reporting among other things that Piedrahita had once told a friend that his "real job" was "to live better than any of my clients."

Piedrahita, trading on his "outstanding public relations skills," played a key role in "expanding the reach of the Madoff fraud by wooing wealthy Latin Americans and Europeans." Piedrahita is now under investigation with both Spanish and U.S. authorities, and is a defendant in numerous class action lawsuits, along with Fairfield and other Fairfield officials.

Meanwhile, the April 2009 issue of Vanity Fair has a lengthy article (here) about Fairfield founder Walter Noel and his family. The article features a particularly striking photgraph of Noel's five daughters, one of whom is the wife of Piedrahita. An October 2002 Vanity Fair article focused just on the five daughters can be found here. After awhile, trolling through the backstory on these sidelights to the Madoff scandal begins to create the same sensation as reading an overwritten novel.

A comprehensive list of the Madoff-related lawsuits, including the numerous lawsuit filed against Fairfield and related entities and individuals, can be accessed here. I have added the new Massachusetts complaint to the list.

Hat tip to the Wall Street Journal for the Fairfield Statement.

Other Stories We’re Following: According to news reports (here), a man in Newark, Ohio has been charged with drunk driving on a bar stool. The man apparently had built a motorized bar stool using a dismantled lawn mower. He managed to crash the stool, apparently as a result of the 15 beers he reportedly consumed prior to the accident. Readers interested in seeing this amazing (albeit unexpectedly dangerous) vehicle will want to refer here.

Meanwhile, on March 27, 2009, the Macomb (Ga.) Daily reported (here) that "a woman who sued a city of Warren police dog that she says bit her on the buttocks was ordered by a judge to pay $500 for frivolously naming the dog as a defendant." Frivolous? Has the judge ever been bitten on the butt by a police dog? Incidentally, the dog’s name is "Liberty" which is clearly what the dog took with the plaintiff’s behind

And in world news, Barrack Obama has apparently given Queen Elizabeth II an iPod as a gift in connection with his visit to Buckingham Palace today, as reported here. Alas, it is too late now, but had I been consulted in advance, I would have suggested loading the device with the music of this year’s inductees into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, in particular the songs of Run-D.M.C.

The Rock Hall induction, by the way, is this Saturday, April 4, 2009, in Cleveland, Ohio. (Cleveland Rocks, baby.)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Along with the flood of securities lawsuits, the current credit crisis has also generated a wave of litigation under ERISA, as I have detailed here. And just as many of the credit crisis-related securities cases have failed to survive preliminary judicial scrutiny (as noted recently here), at least some of the ERISA cases also may encounter judicial skepticism, if the recent decision in the Huntington Bancshares ERISA litigation is any indication.

On February 9, 2009, in an opinion that bespeaks a reluctance to sustain litigation based on the effects of the global financial crisis, Southern District of Ohio Judge Gregory Frost granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Huntington ERISA case. A copy of the opinion can be found here.

Background

The lawsuit had been brought on behalf of participants in Huntington’s 401(k) plan. The plaintiffs alleged that the plan fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties in connection with Huntington’s July 1, 2007 acquisition of Sky Financial. The plaintiffs alleged that Huntington’s risk of loss greatly increased by subjecting Huntington to $1.5 billion of subprime exposure through Sky’s relationship with Franklin Credit Management Corp.

The plaintiffs alleged that because of the merger with Sky Financial and its subprime exposure, Huntington stock became too risky to be considered a prudent plan investment. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to take any action to protect the plan assets from the "enormous and entirely foreseeable" risk that he increased subprime exposure would injure the plan and its participants’ retirement savings. The plaintiffs claim that defendants’ alleged breaches caused over $100 million in losses to the plan.

The February 9 Opinion

Judge Frost first agreed with the defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs’ allegation that Huntington violated ERISA when is acquired Sky "is simply an attempt to second guess Huntington’s business decisions and is not governed by ERISA."

Judge Frost also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty when they continued to invest in Huntington shares after the merger. Among other things, Judge Frost noted that large public pension funds had continued to invest in Huntington, and indeed had even increased their investment, after the merger.

He also noted that "although Huntington has experienced a significant drop in its stock price," its share price essentially "moved in tandem with the other regional banks in Huntington’s geographic footprint." Judge Frost also noted that the plaintiffs "do not point to any ‘red flags’ that should have placed Defendants on notice of a need to cease offering the Huntington stock."

Judge Frost also rejected plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants had failed to warn investors (including plan participants) of the risk, finding that in its SEC filings, Huntington "specifically disclosed its exposure to subprime, housing and construction markets and frequently disclosed the effect of increasing market turmoil."

Discussion

Judge Frost’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ ERISA claims was based on the specifics of plaintiffs’ allegations. However, his rejection was also clearly based in part on his perception of what the case represents. Among other things, he observed that:

it is clear that federal courts are currently experiencing a significant rise in "stock drop cases" due to the current status of the Stock Market and the economic climate in general, which of course includes the subprime lending crisis. However, ERISA was not intended to be a shield from the sometimes volatile stock market.

Judge Frost’s reference to "stock drop cases" shows not only how he perceived the Huntington case itself but also reflects a more general perception of the overall subprime litigation wave – that is, that the current influx of cases is the due to stock market volatility caused by the global economic downturn.

His general view the subprime cases represent an effort by investors to avoid the consequences of market volatility could, if widely shared, represent a substantial hurdle to the plaintiffs in many of these cases – both cases filed under ERISA as well as cases filed under the federal securities laws. Indeed, I have already noted (most recently here) numerous other credit crisis-related securities cases where courts clearly have shown skepticism that the plaintiffs’ losses were the result of anything other than the financial crisis itself.

To be sure, there have been subprime-related ERISA cases that have survived dismissal motions, just as there have also been subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits that have survived motions to dismiss. For example, as I discussed here, the judge in the NovaStar ERISA case recently denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, a decision that is particularly noteworthy because the motion to dismiss was granted in the NovaStar subprime-related securities lawsuit. (My discussion of the NovaStar securities lawsuit dismissal with prejudice can be found here.)

But while some of the ERISA cases may yet survive preliminary motions, many of the cases could also face the same kind of judicial skepticism reflected in Judge Frost’s opinion in the Huntington case. If so, a substantial number of the lawsuits being filed in the current wave of subprime and credit crisis-related litigation could fail to make it past the preliminary stages.

I have in any event added the Huntington decision to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements, dismissals and dismissal motion denials, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of the Huntington opinion.

An Unusual Madoff Victim Has Unusual Problems: As reflected in my register of Madoff-related litigation (which can be accessed here), the Madoff scandal has resulted in a wide range of suits and other legal proceedings. But the most unusual of the Madoff-related proceedings may be the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed on March 11, 2009 against Bernard Madoff in the Middle District of Florida by Gino Romano.

In his hand-written motion (a copy of which can be found here), Romano, an inmate in the federal prison system, alleges that Madoff enlisted him to recruit other inmates to invest with Madoff, by guaranteeing Romano "an annual return of 18.5%." Romano alleges that Madoff initiated this contact with Romano by sending him an "investment package" in January 2005.

Romano alleges that he "collected $1 million dollars from gang leaders" including members of "the Mexican Mafia, Chicago’s Gangster Disciples, the Black Panthers, the Aryan Brotherhood, and D.C. Blacks." Romano asserts that "now I’m in danger from these gangs because Madoff Ponzi scammed us."

The dangers Romano claims he now faces include not only irate gang members, but Madoff himself, whom Romano asserts has sent Romano threatening letters. Among other things, Madoff allegedly has communicated to Romano that "he is going to kill me and he has stolen Ponzi money to hire the best hitman money can buy."

As readers might well imagine, Romano finds all of this very distressing. He alleges that because of Madoff’s threats he has "suffered a mental breakdown, bed wetting, [and] panic attacks."

Call my cynical, but I have my doubts about many of Romano’s allegations. However, I am willing to allow the possibility that the part about "bed wetting" might well be true – although it seems unlikely that Madoff is responsible for that.

Special thanks to loyal reader Jon Jacobson for providing me with copies of numerous new Madoff-related pleadings, including Romano’s. I have added all of these new pleadings to my register of Madoff-related suits (here).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Even though I was not even away a full week for the recent PLUS D&O Symposium, there was a flood of noteworthy developments while I was gone. Here is a roundup of last week’s news and notes.

Subprime-Related Derivative Lawsuit Largely Dismissed: In a detailed and painstaking February 24, 2009 opinion (here), Chancellor William Chandler dismissed the bulk of the consolidated subprime-related derivative suit pending against Citigroup, as nominal defendant, and certain of the company’s directors and officers, in Delaware Chancery Court. A very thorough review of the opinion can be found on the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog, here.

Chancellor Chandler dismissed all but one of plaintiffs’ claims for failure to adequately plead demand futility. He did, however, allow plaintiffs’ claims of waste concerning the compensation and benefits package for Citigroup’s CEO to continue.

The most interesting part of Chancellor Chandler’s opinion relates to the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants failed to monitor the company’s business risk with respect to Citigroup’s exposure to the subprime mortgage market. Chandler characterized this claim as an assertion that "the director defendants should be personally liable to the Company because they failed to fully recognize the risk posed by subprime securities."

Chandler noted that Delaware case and statutory law places "an extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim for personal director liability for failure to see the extent of a company’s business risk." Chandler concluded that in light of this burden, plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations (and thus their failure to plead particularized facts) were insufficient to excuse demand.

Among other things, Chandler noted that the "oversight duties under Delaware law are not designed to subject directors, even expert directors, to personal liability for failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk."

Chandler did take pains to distinguish the recent Chancery Court decision in which the "failure to monitor" claim against the directors and officers of AIG survived a motion to dismiss. (The February 10, 2009 opinion in the AIG case can be found here.) In that case, unlike the Citigroup action, the defendants "allegedly failed to exercise reasonable oversight over pervasive fraudulent and criminal conduct." The Citigroup case, by contrast, involved only alleged failure to recognize the extent of the company’s business risk.

Both because of the high-profile nature of the Citigroup case as well as Chancellor Chandler’s detailed review of the applicable provisions of Delaware law, his opinion could prove to be particularly influential in other pending subprime and credit crisis-related derivative suits. The basis on which he distinguished the AIG case could also prove to be an important distinguishing characteristic in the determination of which derivative suits will survive and which may be dismissed.

I have in any event added the Citigroup opinion to my table of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements, dismissal and dismissal denials. The table can be accessed here. A list of the subprime and credit crisis-related derivative suits themselves can be found here.

One final observation about the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog, which I referenced above. If you have any inclination or desire to follow the important legal trends affecting the potential legal liabilities and responsibilities of corporate directors and officers, you will find the Delaware litigation blog absolutely indispensible. I would rank the blog among the few truly must-read resources in this area on the Internet. The blog’s post on the Citigroup case is just one example why.

More Stanford Financial Developments and Litigation: In addition to the initiation of criminal charges against former Stanford Financial Group investment officer Laura Pendergast-Holt for obstructing the SEC’s investigation (about which refer here), last week’s developments regarding the Stanford scandal included the SEC’s filing late Friday night of an amended enforcement complaint in the matter.

According to the SEC’s amended complaint (which can be found here), R. Allen Stanford and his firm’s CFO, James M. Davis, operated a massive Ponzi scheme and misappropriated at least $1.6 billion of investor money in bogus personal loans to Stanford. An unspecified additional amount was also put into speculative investments, which by the end of 2008 made up the bulk of the Stanford Financial Group’s investments, though the company marketed its portfolio as a "well-diversified portfolio of highly marketable securities."

The amended complaint also alleged that Stanford and Davis fabricated portfolio’s investment performance, deciding each month on the return to be reported and "reverse engineering" the financial statements to reflect investment income that was never earned.

A February 28, 2009 New York Times article describing the criminal charges and the amended SEC complaint can be found here.

In addition to these criminal and regulatory developments, the Stanford Group was also hit with an additional civil lawsuit, this time involving a case filed in a Canadian Court. According to a February 27, 2009 article in the Financial Post (here), on February 25, 2009, Calgary-based furniture manufacturer has initiated a class action lawsuit in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench against Allen Stanford, Stanford International Bank, Stanford Group Company, Stanford Capital Management LLC, James M. Davis and Laura Pendergast-Holt.

The company alleges that it invested $1 million in certificates of deposit issued by the bank. The complaint, which seeks class action status, seeks damages for misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, conversion, fraudulent conveyance and breach of trust. The complaint also asserts fraud in connection with other Stanford investments.

I have added the new Canadian lawsuit to my running tally of the Stanford related litigation, which can be accessed here.

More Madoff Litigation, Too: During the past week, additional litigation related to the Madoff scandal also continued to flow in. I have added multiple new cases to my running tally of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here. Special thanks to the several readers who have alerted me to new Madoff cases, particularly to loyal reader Jon Jacobson.

One of the more interesting new cases is the one filed on February 24, 2009 in the District of New Jersey. Though this case raises allegations similar to those asserted in prior cases, the complaint asserts claims neither against Madoff and firm nor against the Madoff feeder funds. Rather, the sole defendant in the case is Peter Madoff, Bernard Madoff’s brother.

According to the complaint in the case (which can be found here), Peter Madoff and his brother "have worked side by side" for "nearly 40 years," and their offices "were only a few feet from each other." The complaint alleges, among other things, that Peter Madoff was responsible for "regularly verifying and accurately reporting the financial condition" of the Madoff firm, as well as establishing and monitoring internal controls and detecting and reporting any legal violations. The complaint asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20 of the ’34 Act, for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation.

Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service for the Peter Madoff complaint.

Auction Rate Securities Litigation Continues to Amass: As I have previously noted (here), the various massive auction rate securities settlements do not seem to have stemmed the tide of auction rate securities litigation, and cases involving institutional and entity investors, who are not part of the regulatory settlements, continue to file new lawsuits.

The latest example of this phenomenon is the complaint filed on February 25, 2009 in the Eastern District of Missouri by KV Pharmaceutical Company against Citigroup Global Markets. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

The complaint alleges that between May 2005 and February 2008, Citigroup counseled KV into investing $72 million in auction rate securities that are now illiquid. Among other things, the complaint alleges that the securities can now be sold, if at all, at substantial discounts to par value. The complaint alleges that "holding $72 million of illiquid ARS exacerbates KV’s current cash crisis, which is requiring KV to seek borrowed capital and engage in overall cost-cutting by, among other things, eliminating approximately 700 jobs."

Clearly the auction rate securities market’s continued failure to function is causing enormous stress for the persons and entities unfortunate enough to have been stuck holding these instruments when the music stopped last February.

Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service for the KV Pharmaceutical complaint.

More Failed Banks: Add two more banks to the growing list of 2009 bank failures. On Friday, February 27, 2009, the FDIC took control of the Heritage Community, Glenwood, Illinois (about which refer here), and of the Security Savings Bank of Henderson, Nevada (refer here). Prior to its closure, the Heritage Community Bank had assets of $232.9 million, and Security Savings Bank had assets of $238.3 million.

The closure of these two banks brings the total number of  banks closed during February 2009 to ten, and the 2009 year to date total to 16 (compared to 25 during all of 2008). The FDIC's complete list of failed banks can be found here.

As I recently noted (here), a significant number of the 2009 bank failures, including the two most recent examples, involve smaller community banks. These troubling developments raise serious concerns both for the banking community and for the larger economy. The rash of bank closures also raises the likelihood that there will be increased litigation involving the failed banks and their former directors and officers.

Did the Milberg Kickback Scheme Hurt Class Members?: Those readers who were fortunate enough to have attended the PLUS D&O Symposium among other things heard interesting comments from St. John’s University law professor Michael Perino about the fascinating video, "The Rise and Fall of Bill Lerach" (to see the video trailer for which, refer here). Perino mentioned in his discussion the research he had completed about the impact on shareholder class members from the kickback payments the Milberg firm made to the paid plaintiffs.

In light of Professor Perino’s remarks, I thought readers might appreciate having a link to the Professor’s research paper, which can be found here. As reflected in the paper’s abstract, Perino concluded that not only were the firm’s fee requests and awards overall higher in the cases identified in the indictment, but that these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that class members were harmed.

An interesting commentary on the paper can be found on Professor Ribstein’s Ideoblog, here.

Insurance Persons of the Year: The LexisNexis Insurance Law Center is receiving nominations for the "Insurance Law Persons of the Year." The Center will be making four awards: the Policyholder Attorney of the Year; the Insurer Attorney of the Year; the Insurance Regulator of the Year; and the Insurance Jurist of the Year. In each case, the award will go to the person in each area that had the most impact in insurance law during 2008.

The deadline for nominations is March 6, 2009. Nominations can be sent to Karen Yotis the following address: karen.yotis@lexisnexis.com.

My New All-Time Favorite Headline: The table I have assembled regarding the Stanford Financial Group litigation, which I mentioned above, has proven to be a popular addition to this blog. I am grateful that a number of other blogs and sites have linked to the post in which the table can be accessed.

But as nice as it is for other blogs to recognize my post, nothing can top the article posted on February 24, 2009 on the American Lawyer website (here), entitled "D&O Diary Launches Stanford Financial Litigation Tally; Kevin LaCroix is Our Hero." That one even impressed my wife (I think), which is really saying something.

My thanks to AmLaw reporter Alison Frankel for this nice but undeserved accolade.

And Finally: Just a reminder to all my readers that I continue to report additional items between blog posts on Twitter. Among other things, I am increasingly active in retweeting interesting items from other Twitterers. Readers interested in monitoring my "tweets" are encouraged to click on the Twitter button in the right-hand column above to follow my Twitter posts.

In addition, I remain interested in connecting with readers on LinkedIn. I have recently become much more active in various LinkedIn groups and I would like to draw other readers into the dialog. I encourage readers interested in connecting with me on LinkedIn to click on the button in the right hand column above and join my network.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a recent post (here) discussing the New York state court lawsuit recently filed against Banco Santander and related entities on behalf of Madoff-related victims, I mentioned that among the claims asserted in the complaint is a cause of action under New York General Business Law Section 349. This item caught the attention of Albany Law School professor Christine Sgarlata Chung, who has a particular interest in the question whether Section 349 is applicable to securities claims.

At my invitation, Professor Chung has submitted the following brief guest post relating to the plaintiffs’ Section 349 claims:

I read with interest your recent post on the Madoff-related class action filed by the Coughlin Stoia firm.  As you note, the complaint asserts a variety of state law claims, including claims under §349 of the New York General Business Law.   This is an interesting approach, given the reluctance of some New York courts to apply §349 to securities transactions. 

 For example, in Gray v. Seaboard Securities, Inc., 788 N.Y.S 2d 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), plaintiffs alleged that they opened accounts at Seaboard, purchased stock recommended by Seaboard, and paid full service brokerage commissions to Seaboard based on Seaboard’s promise to provide proprietary research.   Plaintiffs alleged that Seaboard engaged in a deceptive business practice within the meaning of §349 by failing to provide the promised investment advice.

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that §349 does not apply to securities transactions.  On appeal, plaintiffs argued that §349 does not contain a "wholesale exclusion" for securities transaction.  They also argued that their claims arose from Seaboard’s furnishing of services (i.e., investment advice) and not from securities transactions per se. 

The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims, noting that the "vast majority of [New York] courts which have considered the issue have found general Business Law §349 inapplicable to securities transactions for essentially two reasons."   First, the court reasoned "individuals do not generally purchase securities in the same manner as traditional consumer products, such as vehicles, appliances or groceries, since securities are purchased as investments and not goods to be consumed or used."  Second, the court held that because the securities arena is highly regulated at the federal level, "it is questionable that the legislature intended to give securities investors an added measure of protection beyond that provided by securities acts." 

It is important to note that in 2001, a different department of the New York appellate court held that § 349 does not contain a blanket exception for securities transactions.   See Scalpe & Blade, Inc.  v. Advest, Inc., 722 N.Y.S. 2d (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).  Still, given Gray and its ilk, I am curious to see how the Coughlin Stoia plaintiffs fare with their § 349 claim.

Special thanks to Professor Chung for her interesting commentary on this issue. The D&O Diary welcomes guest posts from responsible commentators and we are always interested in submissions and contributions from readers.

Other Madoff-Related Notes: A February 18, 2009 Wall Street Journal article entitled "Accounting Firms that MIssed Fraud at Madoff May be Liable" (here) suggests that accounting firms for Madoff feeder funds could be "legally vulnerable to claims that they should have uncovered red flags, according to legal and accounting experts."

And a February 17, 2009 article in The (London) Times reports (here) that lawyers from firms in 21 different countries (including the U.S.) recently met in Madrid and formed a global alliance to represent claimants who lost money as a result of the Madoff scheme. Hat tip to the Securities Docket (here) for the linkl to the Times article.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a case demonstrating the range of both the potential legal theories and the prospective litigants that could become involved in Madoff-related litigation, a pension fund has filed an ERISA class action against an investment advisory firm for the advisory firm’s investment of the pension fund’s assets in a Madoff "feeder fund."

On February 12, 2009, the Pension Fund for Hospital and Health Care Employees – Philadelphia and Vicinity filed an ERISA lawsuit against Austin Capital Management Ltd. in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on its own behalf as well as on behalf of all employee benefit funds for whom Austin acted as investment manager and whose assets were invested in whole or in part by Austin in any Madoff-related investment during the period February 12, 2005 to the present.

A copy of the complaint can be found here. A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers February 13, 2009 press release can be found here. A February 17, 2009 Law.com article describing the lawsuit can be found here.

The complaint alleges that in June 2008, the plaintiff’s investment consultant retained Austin "for the purpose of managing a portion of the [plaintiff’s] assets, to be invested in hedge funds." At the time, Austin, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cleveland-based KeyCorp, had approximately $2.3 billion of assets under management.

In July 2008, the plaintiff’s investment consultant placed $10 million of the plaintiff’s assets with Austin for investment with the Austin Capital Safe Harbor Dedicated ERISA Fund, Ltd., an exempt corporation operating under the laws of the Cayman Islands. Austin is the investment manager for Austin Safe Harbor.

The complaint alleges that Austin invested a portion of Austin Safe Harbor assets in "Madoff-related investments, specifically funds managed by Tremont Holdings." According to a February 3, 2009 Bloomberg article (here), Tremont in turn "placed money through its Rye Select Broad Market Prime Fund, L.P.," which in turn invested with Madoff’s firm.

The complaint alleges that Austin was a fiduciary to the class of benefit funds, but that Austin failed to conduct adequate due diligence prior to recommending and investing monies in Madoff-related funds. The complaint also alleges that Austin ignored "red flags."

The complaint identifies several other public pension funds for which Austin acted as investment manager. The complaint states that Austin managed $170 million for the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board, of which $12 million was exposed to Madoff-related investment, and also managed $170 million for the New Mexico Education Retirement Board, of which $8-10 million was in Madoff-related investments. According to news reports (here), the Massachusetts pension fund recently voted to fire Austin due to the Madoff-related losses.

There are a number of interesting things about this lawsuit. The first is that it seeks relief under ERISA. So far as I am aware, this is the first Madoff-related lawsuit asserting claims under ERISA. The interesting thing about an ERISA class action, as opposed to a securities class action, is that the ERISA action is not subject to the PSLRA’s discovery stay and other procedural requirements. So the ERISA plaintiff is free to conduct discovery even while the dismissal motion is pending.

The opportunity under ERISA to avoid some of the challenges of litigating under the federal securities laws clearly was one of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s motivations in bringing the action. The Law.com article linked above quote the attorney as saying that ERISA provides "an easier and quicker route in repairing the damage."

By was of comparison, the attorney cites as the shortcomings (from his perspective) of seeking relief under the securities laws, the "high burden of proving fraud" and the "limitations on showing third parties were at fault." The attorney said that while Madoff may have been involved in fraud, "it would be much more difficult to prove that third-party investment funds that invested with Madoff were also defrauding clients."

The other interesting thing about the fact that this lawsuit was filed under ERISA is that it at least potentially draws into the mix yet another type of insurance. Up to this point, the likeliest source of insurance funds in connection with the prior Madoff-related lawsuits has been the target defendants’ D&O insurance or errors and omissions (E&O) insurance. A claim under ERISA at least potentially triggers coverage under applicable fiduciary liability policies (if any). The spread of Madoff-related insurance exposure to include fiduciary liability coverage may not have been among the factors considered in earlier estimates about aggregate Madoff-related insurance losses.

The final interesting thing about this lawsuit is what it says about just how broad the pool of Madoff-related defendants has become. The plaintiff pension fund in this lawsuit did not invest with Madoff. It did not even invest with a Madoff feeder fund. Instead, it invested with an investment advisor that invested with a feeder fund that in turn invested with Madoff. (Got that?) The sheer span of these increasingly remote connections required to establish the Madoff-related link underscores just how widespread the Madoff litigation may yet become.

I have in any event added the new lawsuit to my running tally of all Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

 When the Madoff scandal news first broke, I thought it would be like so many other fraud controversies, dominating the headlines briefly and then fading into the background – as seemingly has happened with the Marc Dreier debacle. But perhaps as a result of the scale and breadth of the harm caused, the Madoff scandal story just seems to keep escalating.

Today’s headline revelation is the widely reported news (refer here), that Ruth Madoff, Bernard Madoff’s wife, allegedly withdrew a total of $15.5 million from a brokerage account just prior to Mr. Madoff’s now-famous confession to his sons and subsequent arrest.

This allegation first arose in a footnote of a complaint filed on February 11, 2009 by Massachusetts Secretary of State William F. Galvin to revoke the broker-dealer registration of Cohmad Securities Corporation. The complaint and related exhibits can be found here.

The Enforcement Section of the Massachusetts Securities Division of the Officer of the Secretary of the Commonwealth had "sought to determine whether the businesses of Cohmad and Madoff Investments were so intertwined that they could be viewed as a common enterprise, and not as separate entities, for purposes of imputing liability and obtaining investor relief." The complaint alleges that Madoff was one of Cohmad’s co-founders and directors.

As detailed in the complaint, Galvan contends that Cohmad "categorically refuses to discuss its actions with regulators" and therefore "has no right to continue to engage in the securities business in the The Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

As part of the complaint’s contention that Cohmad and Madoff’s securities firm are "so intertwined that they could be viewed as a common enterprise," Galvin cites, among other things (in footnote 4, on page 25 of the complaint) wire transfer records showing the "flow of funds" between the two enterprises, referring specifically to documents showing that "Ruth Madoff withdrew [from Madoff-related accounts at Cohmad] $5,500,000 on November 25, 2008 and withdrew $10,000,0000 on December 10,2008." Madoff was arrested on December 11, 2008.

The documents reflecting these two wire transfers can be found on the last two pages of Exhibit 16 (refer to pages 51 and 52, here).

A news wire story (here) quotes a spokesman from Galvin's office as saying "We're not accusing her of anything wrong." The spokesman added "Now, what someone in New York or the feds may think of it may be entirely different."

A Painful Situation: And under the general heading of marital complications related to the Madoff scandal, I reference the difficulties facing Steven Simkin, formerly married to Laura Blank. On February 3, 2008, Simkin filed a complaint in New York State (New York County) Supreme Court (here) against his former wife in connection with the Madoff-related investment the couple had maintained prior to their divorce.

According to the complaint, the couple entered a June 27, 2006 agreement providing for the division of their marital assets. The couple "mistakenly believed" that their largest asset was their account with Madoff Investment Securities, which they believed to be valued at $5.4 million. As part of the agreement, Simkin agreed to pay Blank half of the assumed account value in cash. (Ouch.)

The account is now "worthless, literally not worth the paper on which the parties’ valuation rested." Simkin’s complaint alleges that

As a result of the parties’ clear mistake of fact, Steven paid Laura millions of dollars believing, as did Laura, that it represented her share in the "Account" (as the parties understood it to be) and retained the "Account" as a portion of his equitable share of the couple’s assets. As a result, Laura obtained a windfall and Steven did not receive an equitable share of the couple’s joint assets. Accordingly, by this action, Steven seeks to reform the Agreement, which is grounded upon a material and mutual mistake respecting the couple’s assets at the time …and recover from Laura so as to accomplish the goal the parties intended by executing the Agreement.

Mr. Simkin, you have my sympathy.

Special thanks to the several readers who send me links to the Massachusetts Secretary of State’s complaint and to Jon Jacobson for help in finding the Simkin complaint. I have added the two complaints to my register of Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

A Clawshank Redemption?: And under the general heading of trying to recover previously paid out amounts, one issue that has gained a great deal of attention is whether the trustee in the Madoff liquidation proceeding can recover ("clawback") amounts paid out to fund investors who cashed out before the scandal was revealed. The Securities Docket has a post on the topic (here), discussing efforts that some of the investors who redeemed their shares to change the claims bar date in the Madoff liquidation proceeding out of concern for anticipated clawback efforts. .

In a February 2009 memorandum entitled "How Long and Strong is Trustee Piccard’s Claw?" (here), the Seyfarth Shaw law firm takes a detailed look at the trustees’ powers, and reviews the similar clawback efforts undertake in the Bayou funds scandal.

The memo concludes that the trustee’s ability to clawback redemption payments is "not unbridled" and that there are "powerful defenses that can and will be advanced, including the good faith defense that protected many redeeming investors in the Bayou case." The memo also notes that "additional defenses also are likely to be developed as the facts surrounding what Madoff did come into sharper focus."

Meanwhile, in Europe:  According to press reports (here), European investor rights group Deminor has initiated a legal proceeding in a Luxembourg court in order to compel two Luxembourg units of UBS to provide informatoin and materials relating to the entities' role in steering clients to Madoff-related investmens.

The action, which Deminor initiated on February 11, 2009, is filed against UBS S.A. and UBS Fund Services, as well as against the Luxalpha SICAV Fund, Luxembourg Third Party Management Company SA and Access Management Luxembourg SA.

According to the news reports, the action seeks information regarding contracts between the UBS units, Madoff, and Luxalpha, an investment fund that UBS allegedly promoted. Regulators closed Luxalpha last week for not complying with regulatory requirements. The action also seeks to obtain audit reports of the fund, prepared by Ernst & Young.

Deminor claims that it represents individual and institutional investors that had lost over $1.3 billion as a result of the Madoff scheme.

I would be very grateful to any reader who might be able to provide me with a copy of the new Luxembourg complaint.

Gender Issues: A February 11, 2009 Washington Post article entitled "In Banking Crisis, Guys Get the Blame" (here) raises the question whether the current global economic crisis is a result of the fact that the financial industry and its regulators are "overwhelmingly male-dominated."

The article quotes one commentator as saying that "you can argue that the men have made a right mess of it, and now the ladies should have a go." Another commentator observes that "maybe if we had some more women in the boardrooms, we may not have seen as much risk-taking behavior."

Finally, one commentator with an odd notion of human anatomy, commenting on London’s top financial sector officials, observed that "there are quite a lot of alpha males with testosterone steaming out their ears."

At least when it comes to relying on women to clean things up, Iceland "is leading the way," having appointed a female prime minister as well as two women to lead two of its major banks. The prime minister’s spokesperson is quoted as saying "Men, especially young men, made a mess of things. There is a strong discussion that women would have taken a more cautious approach in the financial sector."

And Finally: I have added a Twitter button in the right hand column. Readers interested in receiving Twitter updates (or "tweets" as they are known) between blog posts will want to click on the Twitter button and register to become a "follower" of my Twitter site. I also add "tweets" when I have added new blog posts. I have come to appreciate that there are many web denizens who prefer to receive their information as "tweets", so that is why this blog now has a Twitter button.

The New York Times has a nice February 11, 2009 article (here) with a good overview of what Twitter is all about.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

I have previously tried to anticipate the future direction of the credit crisis litigation wave (refer, for example, here), but what I failed to foresee is that as the credit crisis itself has entered the remedial phase – or what we all hope turns out to be the remedial phase – there also would be litigation arising from the administration of the remedies. A recent securities lawsuit demonstrates how circumstances surrounding the government’s bailout efforts can lead to litigation.

As reflected in their February 9, 2009 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama against Colonial BancGroup and certain of its officers. Colonial is a bank holding company that operates Colonial Bank, N.A., which has 347 bank branches in Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Nevada and Texas, and over $26 billion in assets.

The lawsuit relates to Colonial’s efforts to obtain TARP money, and in particular to the company’s December 2, 2008 and January 27, 2009 press releases discussing the company’s TARP-related efforts. A copy of the complaint can be found here. Special thanks to Courthouse News Service for the complaint.

In its December 2, 2008 press release entitled "Colonial BancGroup Received Preliminary Approval from the U.S. Treasury for $550 Million in Capital" (here), Colonial announced that it had "received preliminary approval" to participate in the Treasury Department’s capital purchase program, pursuant to which Colonial "will receive $550 million from the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008."

In the December 2 press release, Colonial also stated that in exchange for its investment, the Treasury was to receive preferred shares paying a 5% dividend for the first five years. If the preferred shares are not redeemed within five years, the dividend rate increases to 9%. The press release also stated that the Treasury will also receive warrants to purchase shares of Colonial.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ February 9 press release, in response to Colonial’s December 2 announcement, Colonial’s share price "surged over 50 percent from its $2 per share close on December 1, 2008 to close at $3.08 per share on December 2, 2008."

However, the complaint alleges that the defendants failed to disclose that "Colonial would be required to raise additional outside capital of $300 million before it could receive the $550 million in TARP funding." The complaint further alleges that Colonial "belatedly disclosed" this requirement after the markets closed on January 27, 2009. The complaint alleges that in response to the company’s January 27 announcement, Colonial’s share price declined 45%, from $1.58 per share to $0.85 per share.

Colonial’s January 27, 2009 press release, which can be found here, stated that Colonial’s participation in TARP is "subject to Colonial’s increasing equity by $300 million." The January 27 press release also states that Colonial is "actively pursuing a variety of capital raising alternatives to increase equity by $300 million, which should satisfy this condition of the TARP preliminary approval."

As discussed in a February 6, 2009 Birmingham Business Journal article (here), Colonial’s announcement that it must raise $300 million of additional funds to qualify for TARP "is raising eyebrows among some banking analysts and banking experts." The article quotes one commentator as saying that this item represents "a pretty significant omission" on Colonial’s part in its announcement of the TARP funding. The article also quotes an analyst as saying she felt "deceived" by the bank because it "withheld important information."

The Colonial lawsuit is far from the first credit crisis-related securities lawsuit in which governmental intervention of one sort or another is involved. For example, the government’s role in brokering Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch features prominently in the securities lawsuit recently filed against BofA (about which refer here). The need for governmental rescues has also featured in a number of other credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, including for example, the lawsuits filed against Fortis (refer here), ING (refer here), and the Royal Bank of Scotland (refer here). But so far as I know, the Colonial case is the first securities lawsuit where the allegations are tied directly to the TARP funding program.

I supposed that after more than two years of credit crisis litigation, as well as massive governmental involvement in the financial markets, it should come as little surprise that we have reached the point where lawsuits relating to the bailout efforts themselves are starting to arise. I suppose we should start getting ready now for the inevitable stimulus-related lawsuits which undoubtedly will follow not long after Congress finishes its current efforts.

The Colonial lawsuit does raise an interesting categorization issue, which is whether the case properly should be counted as credit crisis-related and grouped with the previously filed credit crisis-related securities lawsuits. After reviewing Colonial’s press releases and considering the reasons why the company needed TARP money in the first place, I have concluded that the lawsuit is related to the ongoing credit crisis and therefore it belongs in my running tally of credit crisis related securities lawsuits.

My running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits can be accessed here. With the addition of the Colonial lawsuit, the tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits that have been filed during the period 2007 through 2009 now stands at 156, of which 15 have been filed in 2009. A spreadsheet showing the 2009 credit crisis related securities lawsuits can be accessed here.

One final note about TARP -- the Bank Lawyer's Blog reports (here) that some banks in the Dallas area are advertising the fact that they haven't taken TARP money because they don't need to. That line of analysis could get awfully murky under the Treasury department's proposed updated bailout approach, under which banks will be "stress tested" and only the likeliest to survive will receive aid.

Madoff Update: Regular readers know that in addition to my running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, I have also been maintaining a separate tally of Madoff-related litigation. The Madoff-related litigation register, which can be accessed here, is subdivided into multiple tables, reflecting the various types of litigation that has arisen out of the Madoff scandal.

I recently updated the Madoff lawsuit register by adding a number of new Madoff lawsuits, based on excellent information, materials and links provided by several readers, including in particular Jon Jacobson of the Greenberg Traurig law firm. My special thanks to all for the contributions.

And Finally: Describing it as "the beginning of a long process," the SEC Actions blog has a post (here) discussing the partial settlement that Bernard Madoff has reached with the SEC. The WSJ.com Law Blog also has a post here describing the partial settlement. A link to the SEC’s litigation release regarding the partial settlement can be found here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Even though Madoff victims previously filed a securities class action lawsuit against Banco Santander and other parties in the Southern District of Florida (as discussed here), a different group of claimants has now filed a separate lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against substantially the same set of defendants. However, the new lawsuit purports to represent a different approach, and also presents specific allegations pertaining to Banco Santander’s public offer (here) to compromise the Madoff-related claims.

On February 4, 2009, plaintiffs filed a purported class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York "on behalf of all persons or entities who owned shares of Optimal Strategic U.S. Equity Ltd. on December 10, 2008." The defendants include Banco Santander S.A. and related entities; Optimal Investment Services; PricewaterhouseCoopers; several HSBC-related entities; and several individual defendants. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

Both the purported class and cast of defendants named in this new lawsuit are similar to the class and defendants named in the previously filed Southern District of Florida lawsuit (about which refer here). However, unlike the prior lawsuit, the most recent lawsuit does not assert any claims under the federal securities laws.

Even though the new lawsuit purports to involve a class action, it asserts, rather than alleged violations of the federal securities laws, common law claims against all defendants for negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The complaint also asserts a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty claim against PricewaterhouseCoopers. In addition, the complaint asserts a claim against all defendants under Section 349 of the New York General Business Law.

What makes this class action complaint’s lack of securities law allegations noteworthy is that it was filed by one of the leading plaintiffs’ securities class action law firms. A number of possibilities suggest themselves as to the reasons for the omission of a claim based on the firm’s area of specialty.

The first is the possibility that the firm hopes to maintain its own lawsuit separately and without consolidation with the previously filed lawsuits.

Another more interesting possibility is that the law firm wants to avoid the discovery stay under the PSLRA. Indeed, press reports (here) relating to the lawsuit expressly noted that "unlike other Madoff-related cases, the suit does not contain a securities claim, meaning plaintiffs can receive relevant information about the case before any trial that could bring to light previously unknown details on the case."

A leading plaintiffs’ securities firm’s use common law claims as a tactical way to insert a discovery tentacle, possibly to support later amended securities claims, is a disturbing possibility that would represent a circumvention of the PSLRA’s intended protections. Of course, there is always the possibility that the plaintiff lawyers in fact intend to pursue the common law claims without later adding securities claims, which would represent an interesting development in and of itself.

Yet another reason the plaintiffs’ lawyers may have dispensed with a federal securities claim is suggested in the claim asserted against PricewaterhouseCoopers. Under Stoneridge, the plaintiffs have no aiding and abetting claim against the audit firm under the securities laws. The complaint nevertheless asserts an aiding and abetting claim against the audit firm, but for fiduciary duty violations, not Securities law violations, suggesting an attempt to avoid Stoneridge’s limitations.

The new complaint in any event expressly references Banco Santander’s public offer to compromise the Madoff-related claims (about which refer here). Among other things, the complaint describes Santander’s offer as "woefully inadequate," citing the fact that the offer "does not compensate Class members for any interest or gain their money would have earned," and asserting that the preferred stock Banco Santander is offering would be substantially discounted in the open market.

For their part, the plaintiffs in the action previously filed in the Southern District of Florida have filed an "emergency motion" to enjoin Banco Santander from contacting putative class members to try to secure a release from them of their claims. In the memorandum filed in support of the motion (a copy of which can be found here), the plaintiffs allege that Santander "has launched a misleading and coercive campaign to pick off class members one by one, by pressuring them to release their claims based on incomplete and misleading information."

The memorandum cites Santander’s supposed use of closed door meetings, in which class members are presented with "onerous conditions and take-it-or-leave-it terms with quick expiration dates." The memorandum also references Santander’s "failure" to inform the putative class members of the existence of the lawsuit that "seeks recovery in excess of the compensation proposed."

The motion seeks to enjoin Santander from contacting class members, in order to prevent an "end-run around the Court’s jurisdiction and power to preside over this Class Action."

Whatever else may be said about the multidirectional litigation, it seems fairly certain that Banco Santander is getting a quick indoctrination into the battlefield tactics of the U.S. plaintiffs’ bar.

I have in any event added the new lawsuit to my running tally of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here. The new lawsuit appears in Table IV, in which I have identified "additional lawsuits against related defendants" and that are distinct from the federal securities class action lawsuits separately listed in the document.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog for a copy of the complaint of the new lawsuit.

More Bank Closures: The expanding wave of bank failures swelled again this past Friday night when the FDIC announced the closure of three more banks, bringing the number of 2009 year-to-date closures to nine.

The three latest bank closures are Alliance Bank, previously a $1.14 billion asset bank in Culver City, CA (about which refer here); County Bank, previously a $1.3 billion bank in Merced, California (refer here); and First Bank Financial, previously a $279 million asset bank in McDonough, Georgia (refer here). The FDIC’s complete list of failed banks can be found here.

The closure of nine banks already in 2009, including in particular the closure of six banks in just the last two weeks, is extraordinary in and of itself. It is also noteworthy in context, as the number of bank closures just in the opening weeks of this year already exceeds the total number of all bank closures during the four years between January 1, 2003 and January 1, 2007. Indeed, during the period January 1, 2000 to January 1, 2008, only one year (2002, with 11 closures) had more bank closures than the nine already in the first six weeks of the year.

As I recently noted (here), the increasing number of bank closures is a difficult and disturbing trend, Unfortunately, all signs are that the number of bank closures will continue to grow as the year progresses.

Event Registration Update: If you are planning on attending the PLUS D&O Symposium on February 25 and 26, 2009 at the Marriott Marquis hotel in New York but you have not yet registered, you may want to get your registration in at your earliest opportunity. Event registration is rapidly filling, and so you may want to register now before it is too late. Registration information can be found here.

This year’s conference promises to be particularly interesting and informative. I am co-Chairing this year’s Symposium with my good friends, Chris Duca of Navigators Pro and Tony Galban of Chubb. The key note speakers include former Secretary of States Madeline Albright and New York Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo. Other panelists and speakers include a number of noteworthy individuals, including Stanford Law Professor Joseph Grundfest, Wilson Sonsini partner Boris Feldman and many others.

The Symposium will also feature a reprise of the excellent video, first shown at the PLUS International Conference in November, of "The Life and Times of Bill Lerach." The Securities Docket recently featured a trailer of the video, here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Banco Santander, the Spanish bank whose customers may have suffered as much as $3.1 billion in Madoff-related losses, is reportedly offering some clients compensation for their losses. Reports of this compensation proposal follow one day after investors filed a securities class action lawsuit against Banco Santander and related entities in federal court in Miami.

According to a January 27, 2009 Wall Street Journal article (here), Banco Santander is offering its private banking clients up to $1.79 billion in compensation for losses from the Madoff scheme. The offer would not apply to institutional investors.

According to the Journal, the bank has approached its Latin American clients, offering them preferred stock with a 2% coupon in exchange for an agreement not to sue and an agreement to keep their deposits with the bank. (The great majority of Santander customers who suffered Madoff losses were Latin American, perhaps as many as 70%.) UPDATE: Banco Santander's January 27, 2009 statement regarding the proposed compromise can be found here.

Meanwhile, according to their January 27, 2009 press release (here), on January 26, 2009 plaintiffs’ lawyers initiated a Madoff-victim securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida.

The class action complaint (which can be found here) was filed by a Chilean company and an Argentinean individual. Both named plaintiffs claim they lost money through their investment in the Optimal Strategies U.S. Equity Fund, a subfund managed by Optimal Investment Services ("Optimal SUS") and marketed by Banco Santander S.A. in the United States. The complaint alleges that substantially all of the Optimal SUS fund was invested with Madoff’s firm.

The complaint is filed on behalf of persons who owned Optimal SUS shares on December 10, 2008 or who purchased shares of Optimal SUS between January 23, 2004 and December 10, 2008.

The complaint names as defendants Banco Santander S.A., Banco Santander International, Optimal Investment Services S.A. (Santander’s Geneva-based hedge fund unit) and certain individuals related to Optimal.

In addition, the complaint also names as defendants PricewaterhouseCoopers, whose Dublin office serves as the Optimal Fund’s auditors. The complaint also names as defendants two related HSBC entities, HSBC Securities Services (Ireland) Ltd. and HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) Ltd., which acted as administrator, registrar, transfer agent and custodian for the Optimal Funds.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that the defendants violated the U.S. securities laws by

issuing materially false and misleading statements about their due diligence and oversight of Madoff and BMIS. Among the allegedly false statements made in the Explanatory Memorandum dated January 7, 2008, that was distributed to investors, was the assurance that Optimal "bases its investment decisions on a careful analysis of many investment managers." The complaint further asserts that had the Defendants conducted a reasonably "careful analysis" of Madoff and BMIS, Defendants would not have lost billions of dollars belonging to the investors.

In addition to the securities claims, the complaint also alleges common law causes of action including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. The complaint also alleges professional negligence against PricewaterhouseCoopers.

The new Banco Santander lawsuit is similar in many respects to the other securities class action lawsuits that have been filed against Madoff "feeder funds." What makes the case interesting is that both the named plaintiffs and the defendants are foreign domiciled (or at least owned by a foreign parent company). To be sure, one of the named plaintiffs, the Chilean company, specifically alleges that it invested in the Optimal SUS subfund through a Banco Santander International bank account in Miami, Florida.

Notwithstanding the lawsuit’s international flavor, the class action against Banco Santander may be unsurprising, as the bank has disclosed that its clients’ exposure to Madoff through the Optimal SUS fund was as much as $3.1 billion, which the Journal reports is the largest loss by any single bank. (Only investment companies Fairfield Greenwich and Tremont, both of which already face securities litigation, had larger losses).

It remains to be seen where Santander’s proposed compromise leaves the newly filed lawsuit. At least according to the Journal’s account, the proposed compromise does not apply to institutional investors. The Journal also reports that "some of those who have privately received the offer were unhappy with its terms and vowed to hold out for a better deal."

The Journal does report that the Spanish law firm that joined in bringing the suit is scheduled to meet with bank officials on February 6, 2009. Bloomberg quotes the Spanish attorney (here) as saying that the Santander offer is " a step in the right direction"; he added, however, that "at first sight, it looks insuficient."

In any event, I have added the Banco Santander suit to my list of Madoff-related securities class action lawsuits, which can be accessed here. According to my tally, there have now been eleven Madoff-related securities class action lawsuits filed.

Special thanks to the several readers who forwarded me copies of the Banco Santander complaint.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As has been well-publicized, within a matter of weeks of closing its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, Bank of America announced previously undisclosed 4Q08 operating losses at Merrill of $21.5 billion that required BofA to obtain an emergency $20 billion cash injection from the U.S. Treasury, as well as an additional $118 billion asset backstop. BofA’s stock market valuation has dropped more $100 billion since the day before the merger was announced through the company’s January 16 earnings release.

As the Wall Street Journal reported (here), questions immediately arose following BofA’s announcement of the Merrill losses, such as why BofA’s CEO Kenneth Lewis "didn’t discover the problems prior to the Sept. 15 deal announcement" and "why he didn’t disclose the losses prior to the vote on the Merrill deal on Dec. 5 or before closing the deal on Jan. 1."

With these kinds of questions circulating, it comes as no surprise that plaintiffs’ attorneys have initiated litigation. There were actually two different lawsuits announced on January 21, 2009 relating to these circumstances. Both of the lawsuits purport to be filed on behalf of persons who held BofA securities on October 10, 2008, the record date for the December 5, 2008 special meeting of shareholders to approve the merger.

The first of these two lawsuits was filed in the Southern District of New York, as described in the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ January 21 press release (here). The second was filed in the Northern District of Georgia, as described a separate January 21 press release (here). The complaint in the N.D.Ga. action can be found here.

Both complaints name as defendants Bank of America and certain of its directors and officers. The S.D.N.Y. action also names Merrill’s CEO John Thain as a defendant as well. Both lawsuits allege that the defendants made materially false and misleading statements in the proxy materials in order to secure sufficient proxies to approve the merger. The defendants are alleged to have known that excessive losses at Merrill should have been disclosed to allow shareholders a well-informed vote on the merger.

Of all the interesting issues surrounding these circumstances, the most significant is the question of when BofA became aware of the magnitude of Merrill’s losses. (A related question is when Merrill became aware of the losses, but don’t expect any Merrill shareholders to raise the concern, as the completion of the merger was clearly in their best interest.)

The Journal article linked above reports that BofA now asserts that it learned of the magnitude of Merrill’s losses after the Dec. 5 shareholder vote, and that by Dec. 17, Lewis was so alarmed by the losses, which he reportedly characterized as "monstrous," that he traveled to Washington for an emergency meeting with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.

What happened at this Dec. 17 meeting presents its own interesting set of issues. Paulson and Bernanke apparently told Lewis that, according to the Journal, "failing to complete the Merrill acquisition would be disastrous" and would "further destabilize markets" and "hurt the bank" and potentially set off a "ripple effect that would exacerbate a fragile situation." The government officials also promised Lewis the backstop protection if the losses proved to be as significant as Lewis feared.

The meeting raises a host of questions, as discussed in the January 20, 2009 Wall Street Journal article entitled "BofA’s Merrill Deal Exposes Myth of Transparency" (here). The article suggests that "by most any reasonable measure, if the Merrill losses were concrete enough to seek a government lifeline, they were concrete enough to report to the company’s shareholders." The question is whether Lewis kept mum about the losses and the promised lifeline at Bernanke and Paulson’s request; the article asks whether perhaps the government was "complicit in nondisclosure."

While there may have been a marketplace interest in keeping the deal on track, there is no existing law that would relieve the company of its disclosure duties for the benefit of larger marketplace interests. The January 20 Journal article raises the question whether "a new legal standard could eventually emerge, sort of a ‘national interest’ doctrine absolving companies of governance actions that may be potentially harmful, but are important to an economic or defense emergency."

These are interesting questions. However, it should be noted that they arguably are irrelevant to the recently filed lawsuits, as the December 17 meeting took place well after the December 5 shareholder vote. There is of course always the possibility of a separate lawsuit on behalf of persons who acquired BofA shares, for example, between the December 17 meeting and before the company’s recent announcement of the Merrill-related losses. UPDATE: In the day immediately after I added this post, additional lawsuits came flooding in, including at least one (here) that is filed against, among others, a subclass of claimants who purchased Bank of America securities between January 2, 2009 and January 16, 2009.

Regardless whether or not other lawsuits in fact emerge, two questions will be paramount: when did the magnitude of the Merrill losses become apparent, and when did BofA have a duty to disclose this information to its shareholders?

Whatever else might be said about these circumstances, the certainly do underscore the magnitude of the problems confronting the economic and banking systems, as well as the challenges facing the incoming administration as it struggles to address these problems while taking up the reins of government.

These circumstances also raise serious questions about whether or not there are or should be exceptions to the transparency principles on which our entire system of securities and market regulation is based. It doesn’t require much imagination to picture the bedlam that could have ensued if the Merrill deal had fallen apart just before Christmas. The system can ill afford any more of the kind of chaos that enveloped the markets in September and October last year.

On the other hand, BofA’s shareholders might well feel that any analysis concluding that information was properly withheld from them for the sake of the overall market improperly negates their rights and expectations as shareholders.

It may or may not get addressed in a court in connection with the litigation involving the Merrill deal, but the question whether or not there is "national interest" exception to the standard disclosure principles is surely a very interesting question.

Professor Larry Ribstein discusses the question whether there is a national interest exception to the securities laws in his Ideoblog, here.

I have in any event added the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch litigation to my running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here. With the addition of this new litigation, the current tally of these cases now stands at 146, of which five have been filed in 2009.

More Madoff Litigation: The Madoff-related litigation wave has also continued to roll on. For example, on January 21, 2009, plaintiffs’ lawyers announced (here) that they had initiated a class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of persons who purchased between 2003 and the present variable universal life insurance issued by Tremont International Insurance Limited or Argus International Bermuda Limited.

The complaint (which can be found here) alleges that the insurer, an entity owned by Tremont Capital Management had breached its duties by offering Tremont-related funds as investment options for the variable investment account component of the policies. The complaint further alleges that the Tremont-related funds were heavily invested in Madoff funds.

The complaint alleges that the defendants violated a number of legal duties. The complaint does not, however, assert a violation of the federal securities laws. As a result I have included in the list of "other" litigation in my table of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

This latest lawsuit not only demonstrates that the Madoff litigation continues to roll in. It also shows what an incredible diversity of individuals and investors were harmed by losses from Madoff’s fraudulent scheme. It also shows how incredibly complicated it all is going to be to unwind this whole mess.

And Finally: Readers who registered the question posed on my preceding blog post whether President Obama had completed the oath of office as required by the Constitution will be relieved to know that the issue has been resolved.

On the apparent theory that there is nothing in the Constitution against do overs, Obama and Chief Justice reprised their roles in another rendition of the oath of office in a considerably less formal ceremony at the White House on the evening of January 21, 2009, as reported here.

That certainly is a load off my mind.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks (1)
• Share Link

We are barely into the New Year, but all signs are that two of the critical securities litigation trends of 2008 – the subprime/credit crisis related litigation wave and the Madoff-related litigation wave – remain significant factors and apparently will continue to drive new lawsuit filings as we head into 2009, as the recent lawsuit filings discussed below suggest.

The New RBS Lawsuit

First, with respect to the credit crisis litigation, on January 12, 2009, plaintiffs’ lawyers issued a press release (here) stating that they had initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Series S American Depositary Shares (ADSs) of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group and related entities and certain directors and officers. The complaint also names as defendants the offering underwriters that conducted the June 2007 offering of the shares.

The Complaint (which can be found here) alleges misrepresentations and omissions in the offering documents, which incorporated the Company’s 2004, 2005 and 2006 financial statements. The Complaint alleges that the company "ultimately announced huge multi-billion pound impairment charges associated with its exposure to debt securities, including mortgage-related securities tied to the U.S. real estate markets, causing the price of RBS’s Series S ADSs issued in the Offering to decline." The ADSs, which were originally offered at $25/share, now trade around $10/share.

According to the Complaint, the offering documents omitted that:

(a) defendants’ portfolio of debt securities was impaired to a much larger extent than the Company had disclosed; (b) defendants failed to properly record losses for impaired assets; (c) the Company’s internal controls were inadequate to prevent the Company from improperly reporting its debt securities; (d) the Company’s participation in the consortium which acquired ABN AMRO would have disastrous results on the Company’s capital position and overall operations; and (e) the Company’s capital base was not adequate enough to withstand the significant deterioration in the subprime market and, as a result, RBS would be forced to raise significant amounts of additional capital.

RBS is actually the second company from the ill-fated consortium that was the "successful" bidder in the ABN AMRO buyout to get dragged into U.S. securities litigation.

As I noted here, another consortium member, Fortis, was also hit with a securities class action lawsuit in October 2008. As I noted in that prior post, "it is one more of those amazing things about the current circumstances that, despite the size of the ABN AMRO calamity, it is effectively just background noise in the larger cataclysm." (An abridge version of the ABN AMRO debacle can be found here.) Both RBS and Fortis have also been the recipients of massive bailout efforts from their respective governments.

The ABN AMRO losses to RBS continue to amount. For example, on January 12, 2009, Bloomberg reported (here) that, as a result of loans RBS acquired as part of the ABN AMRO deal, RBS is the biggest lender to bankrupt U.S. chemical maker Lyondell Chemical Co., and may face losses on its $3.47 billion of loans. The loans were part of the $20.5 billion raised to finance Bassell AF’s 2007 leveraged buyout of Lyondell.

More Madoff Litigation

According to their release (here), on January 12, 2009, plaintiff’s counsel initiated another Madoff-related securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of investors in the Herald USA Fund, Herald Luxemburg Fund, Primeo Select Funds, and Thema International Funds, against the Funds, Medici Bank, Bank Austria Creditianstait, Unicredit S.A., Pioneer Alternative Investments, HSBC Holdings plc and Ernst & Young LLP, as well as Medici Bank’s founder Sonja Kohn and its former CEO Peter Scheithauer. A copy of the complaint in the case can be found here.

Austrian regulators took control of Bank Medici after the bank revealed that it had invested as much as $3.2 billion in funds managed by Bernard Madoff and his firm. Bank of Medici is 25% owned by Unicredit. As reported here, one of the Bank’s largest customers was Unicredit’s Pioneer Investments, which invested as much as €805 with the Funds. Further background can be found here.

According to the press release, the Complaint alleges defendants caused the Funds "to concentrate almost 100% of their investment capital with entities that participated in the massive, fraudulent scheme perpetrated" by Madoff and his firm.

Run the Numbers: With the addition of the RBS case, the total number of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits going back to 2007 now stands at 143, of which two have been filed already in 2009. My updated tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related cases can be accessed here.

The new lawsuit on behalf of the Bank Medici Funds investors brings the total of Madoff-related securities class action lawsuits to eight, as reflected on my running tally of the cases, which can be accessed here.

Keeping Count: In my analysis (here) of the recently released Cornerstone/Stanford Clearinghouse report regarding the 2008 securities litigation, I noted that the report’s count of new 210 securities lawsuit filings through December 15, 2008 contrasted with my own count of 224 securities lawsuits through December 31, 2008. As I noted in my analysis, the additional lawsuits filed between December 15 and December 31 were critically important in understanding fully 2008 filing trends, as they significantly affect relative and absolute filing numbers during the year.

The Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website has now updated its count through year’s end, bringing their 2008 tally to 226. The Stanford website can be accessed here.

On further review of their figures, my account appropriately should be adjusted from 224 to 226.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Investors whose fortunes were tied to Bernard Madoff and his firm have already been counting (and mourning) their losses. But for the insurers that provided coverage for financial firms targeted in the Madoff-related litigation, the losses have only just begun to accumulate.

How high the insurance losses ultimately may run remains to be seen, but early estimates suggest that that the insurance losses, even just for defense expenses, could be significant.

A January 9, 2008 Bloomberg article (here) reports that Madoff-related claims "may cost insurers who cover financial institutions more than $1 billion as they pay legal costs for investment managers who gave client money to Madoff." Indeed one respected industry participant is quoted as saying that a total of $1 billion "feels a little low to me."
 

The losses could well affect not only D&O insurers, but also insurers offering"error and omissions" E&O insurance. For many of the kinds of investment firms involved in these cases so far, the type of insurance protection they would most likely purchase provides both coverages within a single package.

The article correctly points out that how large the insurance losses ultimately turn out to be depends on how many of the Madoff "feeder funds" and other litigation targets actually have purchased these kinds of insurance. As one observer quoted in the article notes, hedge funds and other investment vehicles "often don’t buy coverage."

There are a variety of other factors that also could affect the total cost to insurers of the Madoff-related claims. The first is the question of who is insured under the policies. In many of these Madoff-related lawsuits (a complete list of which can be accessed here), the plaintiffs have named a laundry list of related defendants, often including not only investment managers and advisors, but also investment funds, offshore entities, and a squadron of associated individuals.

These claims are going to stress-test the insurance policies involved. The policyholders will find out how well put together the policies were, in light of the entities’ related structures and operations. There may well be instances where the entire family of advisors, managers and funds were not fully yoked together under the coverage umbrella.

But an even more important set of issues that potentially could affect the scope of insurance losses are the potential coverage defenses the carriers may seek to assert. In particular, insurers will be looking closely to see whether the allegations raised in these lawsuits trigger one of more of the standard conduct exclusions, particularly the personal profit and the fraud exclusions.

The conduct exclusions typically are written on an after adjudication basis, meaning that the only apply to preclude coverage only after an adjudicated determination that the prohibited conduct actually took place (as I recently noted in my discussion of the potential coverage insurance issues arising in connection with the Satyam scandal, here).

Moreover, at this point the fraud involved appears to involve misconduct of Madoff himself, rather than the feeder funds, although obviously investigators are probing the potential complicity of a wide variety and number of persons associated with Madoff.

The personal profit exclusion may prove to be the more relevant. A typical exclusion precludes coverage for loss "based upon, arising from, or in consequence of … an Insured having gained any profit, remuneration or advantage to which such Insured as not legally entitled, if a judgment or final adjudication in any proceeding establishes the gaining of such remuneration or advantage."

Investors have already claimed that the feeder funds inappropriately exacted management fees or other compensation without conducting appropriate due diligence or otherwise earning their fees. However, an adjudicated determination of these allegations would be required for the profit exclusion to preclude coverage.

Although there is currently no reported reason to suggest that the "feeder funds" were aware of Madoff’s scheme, insurers will also be looking closely at who know what and when, looking for possible bases to rescind coverage based on alleged misrepresentations in the policy application.

Yet another factor that could restrict the total insurance losses is the limitation on the amount of insurance potentially involved. In my experience, many investment advisory firms and hedge funds buy relatively lower limits of insurance coverage. Thus, in many cases, the available insurance involved could be relatively slight and could quickly be exhausted by defense costs alone. As a result, a portion of the potential defense expense and the amount of some settlements could wind up being uninsured.

I suspect that as a result of the Madoff-related events, many investment advisory firms, hedge funds and other financial firms will now need far less persuading of the value of this type of insurance or that more than just minimal limits could well be advised. Unfortunately, for the firms acquiring this insight for the first time now, this type of coverage could well become much more expensive even if otherwise available.

As noted in a December 31, 2008 publication of the Lloyd’s insurance market entitled "Madoff Scandal Poses Challenges for Directors" (here), the "sheer scale of the fallout from Madoff could seriously affect the financial insurance market’s dynamics, affecting the availability and cost of both professional indemnity and directors and officers coverage." The article quotes one source as stating with respect to this type of coverage that "prices are going to increase and cover will be restricted."

More Madoff Lawsuits: Meanwhile, the Madoff-related lawsuits continue to flood in. For example, on January 8, 2009, Pacific West Health Medical Center, Inc. Employees Retirement Trust sued Fairfield Greenwich Group and related entities and individuals in the Southern District of New York on behalf of all persons who purchased shares of the Fairfield Sentry funds, alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties. The defendants are also accused of negligence, unjust enrichment and breach of contract.

A copy of the Pacific West complaint can be found here. A copy of a January 9, 2009 Bloomberg article describing the complaint can be found here.

It also looks as if overseas investors are about to get involved in Madoff litigation, which may be unsurprising give that, as the Financial Times reports (here), as much as half of the Madoff losses have been borne by non-U.S. investors.

According to a January 8, 2009 Reuters story (here), investment activist group Deminor is readying to sue UBS, HSBC, Hyposwiss and others in courts in Luxembourg and Ireland in connection with the Madoff scandal. The charge is that the defendant banks acts as depositories for sponsored funds that invested clients’ money in Madoff-related vehicles. The allegation is that the depository banks were responsible for the sponsored funds and negligently failed to check what was inside the clients’ portfolios.

According to an earlier Financial Times article (here), UBS at least sought to exculpate itself from any responsibility for clients’ assets through the subscription documents it used.

In any event, I have updated my running tally of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to David Demurjian for the link to the Bloomberg article, and to a loyal reader who prefers anonymity for the Reuters and Financial Times articles.

Can Madoff Losses Be Recovered?: In addition to all of the factors noted above that could diminish the aggregate Madoff-related insurance losses, there is also the question whether the investors’ claims are meritorious. That is, do the claimants actually have a legitimate basis upon which to try to recover their losses from the Madoff "feeder funds" and others?

These questions will be addressed in a webinar entitled "Madoff Litigation: Can the Lost Billions Be Recovered?" to be hosted by Securities Docket on January 14, 2009 at 2:00 P.M. The speakers include Gerald Silk of the Bernstein Litowitz firm, Brad Friedman of Milberg LLP, and Fred Dunbar of NERA Economic Consulting. Further background regarding the webinar can be found here. Registration for the webinar can be accessed here.

A replay of a prior Securities Docket webinar entitled "2008: A Year in Review" can be accessed here. (I was one of the speakers at this prior session.)

"Hitler Previews the Cubs’ Winter Meeting": This video is in questionable taste, contains foul language, and is very very funny, at least for those having some acquaintance with the Chicago Cubs. (The humor is more accessible if, for example, you know who Kerry Wood is.) Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending along a link to this video.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Over the holidays, I added two blog posts that readers may find particularly interesting. To make sure that readers returning to their desks after the holidays do not overlook them, I have highlighted the two posts below, with links.

The List: Madoff Investor and Feeder Fund Litigation (December 26, 2008): This post is the access point to a table of Madoff Investor and Feeder Fund litigation. I have updated the litigation table numerous times since the initial publication, as several readers have helpfully provided relevant additional links and documents.

I will continue to update the table as new Madoff litigation arises. Readers are strongly encouraged to let me know of any new or additional information necessary to keep the table accurate and up to date.

A Closer Look at the 2008 Securities Lawsuits (January 2, 2009): As part of an annual feature on this blog, I reviewed last year’s securities lawsuit filings. As detailed in greater length in the post, the 224 new securities filings in 2008 represents the highest annual filing total since 2004.

The post also discusses the possible impact of the 2008 securities filing activity on the D&O insurance marketplace.

2008 Year in Review: On January 6, 2008, at 2:00 p.m. EST, I will be participating in a free webcast sponsored by the Securities Docket (here) entitled “2008 Year in Review: Securities Litigation and SEC Enforcement.”

The webcast will be moderated by Bruce Carton of the Securities Docket, and will feature several of my fellow bloggers, including Francine McKenna of the re: The Auditors blog (here); Tom Gorman of the SEC Actions blog (here); and Walter Olson of the Point of Law blog (here). Additional information about the webcast can be found here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As other commentators previously have noted (refer here), the pace of securities lawsuit filings increased significantly in 2008 compared to recent years. According to my tally, there were 224 new securities lawsuits filed in 2008. The 2008 total represents a 30% increase over the 172 securities lawsuits filed in 2007, and an 88% increase over the 119 securities lawsuits filed in 2006.

The 2008 filing total also represents the highest annual filing total since 2004. All signs seem to indicate that the heightened filing levels will continue into 2009.

My 2008 securities lawsuit filing tally reflects a lower number than the figures NERA Economic Consulting recently published (refer here), and in that regard I urge readers to refer to my comments below about the particular complications associated with "counting" securities lawsuits in 2008.

Overall Observations

The most significant factor in this year’s heightened securities litigation filing activity was the number of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuit filings. Of the 224 new securities cases filed in 2008, 101 were subprime or credit crisis-related. As reflected on my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here, there have been 141 total of these cases filed overall during 2007 and 2008 combined.

One factor that increased the number of subprime-related lawsuit filings in 2008 was the influx of auction rate securities lawsuit filings (about which refer here). There were 21 of these auction rate securities lawsuits filed in 2008, largely in the first half of the year.

Another factor that increased the 2008 filings was the influx of Madoff-related litigation during December 2008. My running tally of the Madoff lawsuits can be found here. Investors have initiated Madoff-related securities class action lawsuits against at least seven distinct investment groups, and every sign is that this litigation will continue to flood in during the early weeks and months of 2009.

2008 Filings by SIC Code

The predominance of the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation during 2008 is borne out in the profile of the companies that were sued in securities lawsuits during the year. Though the companies targeted represent over 90 different Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) Codes, fully 99 of the lawsuits hit companies with SIC Codes in the 6000 series (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), including 19 in SIC Code 6021 (National Commercial Banks) and 20 in SIC Code 6211 (Security Brokers and Dealers).

There were a number of securities lawsuit defendants entities in 2008 that have no SIC Code designated. These defendants include mutual funds, private investment firms and other entities. By my count, there were as many as 23 new lawsuits filed in 2008 against entities that lack an SIC designation. In most cases, these entities are involved in investment or financial services-related businesses, which even further underscores the fact that much of the securities litigation activity in 2008 was concentrated in the financial sector.

But while securities suits against companies in the financial sector were a predominant factor in the 2008 securities lawsuits filings, there were other SIC Code categories that also saw significant litigation activity, including SIC Code 3674 (Semiconductors) which also saw ten filings; SIC Code 2834 (Pharmaceutical Preparations) which saw nine lawsuit filings; and SIC Code 3845 (Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus) which had five.

In addition, while the credit crisis lawsuits hit the financial sector hard, the credit crisis litigation wave spread outside the financial sector as the year progressed and the financial turmoil spread. As I noted here, and as a result of the dramatic events in the financial markets during September and October 2008, a number of companies outside the financial sector were hit with credit crisis-related lawsuits, particularly those with exposure to Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or those that made wrong-way bets on currencies or commodities.

State and Court Distribution of Filings and Defendants

The concentration of cases in the financial sector also affected the geographic distribution of the 2008 case filings. Though securities lawsuits were filed in 48 different federal district courts (as well as several state courts), 97 of the 224 securities filings in 2008 were filed in the Southern District of New York. The federal district with the second highest number of new lawsuit filings was the Northern District of California, where 12 new securities lawsuits were filed. Other districts with a significant number of filings include the District of Massachusetts (10), and the Central District of California (9).

Another factor contributing to the significant number of filings in the Southern District of New York was the number of lawsuits filed there against foreign-domiciled companies. Overall, there were 34 foreign companies sued in securities lawsuits in 2008, all but five of which were initiated in the Southern District of New York. The 34 foreign companies sued represented 17 different countries, with the largest number from Canada (8), China (5) and Switzerland (4).

The domestic U.S. companies hit with securities lawsuits were based in 31 different states, and the District of Columbia. The state with the largest number of new securities lawsuits was New York (42), followed by California (23), Massachusetts (13) and Ohio (10).

The Pace of Filings and Likely Future Trends

The pace of new lawsuit filings increased during the year, with 105 during the first half and 119 in the second half. The fact that the fourth quarter, with 67 new filings, was the most active quarter during the year, together with the fact that there were a significant number of filings (30) in December (typically a quiet month for securities lawsuit filings), suggests that the heightened level of securities filings will continue into 2009. Indeed, the filings in the fourth quarter of 2008 and during December 2008 represent, respectively, the highest quarterly and monthly totals in more than five years.

My conclusion that the increased securities litigation activity levels will continue in 2009 is reinforced by the likelihood that the credit crisis litigation wave will continue to spread outside the financial sector in 2009.

Some Comments about "Counting": One reason for the wide disparity in the various published versions of the 2008 securities lawsuit filings is that the seemingly simple task of counting lawsuits was particularly complicated during 2008.

One complication is that some companies were sued multiple different times by different sets of claimants, on different legal theories, or with respect to different sets of circumstances. For example, one historically unusual phenomenon that recurred during 2008 was the initiation of new securities lawsuits initiated by preferred shareholders or subordinate securities holders (about which refer here). The multiplication of lawsuits involving different claimants or different legal theories but related defendants raised a continuing series of questions whether or not a new action does or does not represent a separate lawsuit that should be separately counted.

This question whether or not a separate complaint represents a new lawsuit was particularly complicated with respect to the Madoff-related litigation that flooded in during the final weeks of December. As reflected in my running tally of these lawsuits, which can be accessed here, there have already been multiple lawsuits against related Madoff-feeder funds. Reasonable minds might well differ as to whether or not a particular complaint represents an entirely new lawsuit or simply a related or duplicate complaint.

Another attribute of this multiplicity of lawsuit filings is that the number of new lawsuits filed may be significantly different than the number of companies sued, as some companies were sued multiple times in multiple different lawsuits. As a result, there may be a certain amount of double counting associated with some of the lawsuit tallies or some of the analysis of lawsuit filings.

Yet another factor complicating the counting is that during 2008 plaintiffs initiated a number of securities class action lawsuits in state court (about which I previously commented here). In many instances these lawsuits are difficult simply to find. The inclusion of these cases, and the uncertainty around their numbers, could significantly affect the overall lawsuit tally.

As has been increasingly the case in recent years, it has become progressively more difficult simply to maintain definitional clarity about what exactly is being counted. To clarify what I have been tracking, I try to count class action lawsuits that allege violations of the federal securities laws. That said, I have excluded certain lawsuits that other reasonable minds might include. For example, I generally exclude merger objection lawsuits. In addition, I generally exclude lawsuits in which the securities allegation is simply that the defendants failed to register securities. On the other hand, I include lawsuits even if the defendant entity is not a publicly traded entity (for example, if the defendant is a private equity fund or a hedge fund.)

Because of these definitional issues, it is almost inevitable that various tallies of the 2008 securities lawsuits will differ.

UPDATE: The WSJ.com Law Blog has a January 5, 2009 post (here) regarding the 2008 securiteis class action filings. The Law Blog entry links to this post and includes comments from a number of commentators and practitioners in the field.

Impact on D&O Pricing?: The uptick in securities lawsuit filings in 2008 might well be expected to have an upward impact on D&O pricing, and indeed it may yet have that effect. But particular features of the 2008 filings might moderate that expected effect.

First, the concentration of the filings in the financial sector means that the impact from the heightened filing levels is not widespread throughout the D&O industry. D&O carriers are not yet experiencing the impact of the filing levels across their entire portfolio, and carriers that do not have significant financial industry exposure may not yet be experiencing elevated claims activity, although that likely will change as the credit crisis litigation wave spreads outside the financial sector.

Second, even with respect to the heightened activity levels, the impact is muted somewhat by the multiple different lawsuit filings against the same companies. The D&O impact from the third, fourth or fifth new lawsuit against the same company may not increase the aggregate losses to which insurance applies. Because the number of companies sued is less than the number of new lawsuits initiated, the aggregate claims frequency level is less than the overall filing levels might indicate.

Third, many of the defendant entities are not publicly traded companies. As I noted above, many of the defendant entities in new 2008 lawsuits were mutual funds, investment partnerships, hedge funds, or other investment vehicles. The incidence of litigation against these types of entities would have only an indirect impact at most on the market for public company D&O insurance.

Fourth, a significant amount of the securities litigation activity in 2008 involved claims likelier to create errors and omissions (E&O) insurance losses, rather than D&O losses. For example, the Madoff-related litigation and the auction rate securities litigation may or may not produce D&O insurance losses, but may well produce significant E&O losses. The spread of losses to other insurance lines could dilute the overall impact from the 2008 litigation on the D&O carriers.

Fifth, most of these cases are still in their earliest stages, and it will be some time yet before the losses begin to accrue. Until loss payments begin to mount, D&O pricing is unlikely to make dramatic changes (at least as a result of securities filing activity levels).

All of that said, the increase in litigation activity in 2008, together with the disruption involving market leader AIG and other leading carriers, as well as the prospect for continued significant litigation activity in 2009, are likely to create uncertain conditions in the D&O marketplace and could lead to increased carrier caution as 2009 progresses. Indeed, Advisen, a leading industry observer, is predicting that a hard market for insurance will develop toward the end of 2009 (about which refer here).

2008: The Year in Review: Readers interested in learning more about the 2008 securities litigation trends will want to the January 6, 2009 webcast sponsored by Securities Docket.

I will be participating in this free webcast, which will begin at 2 pm EST, along with a number of my esteemed fellow bloggers, including the Securities Docket’s own Bruce Carton; Walter Olson of the Point of Law blog; Tom Gorman of the SEC Actions blog; Francine McKenna of the Re: The Auditors blog; and Lyle Roberts of the 10b-5 Daily blog. Further information about the podcast can be found here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks (1)
• Share Link

THE TABLE OF CASES LINKED BELOW WAS LAST UPDATED ON September 28,  2010.

All signs are that the collapse of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme will produce a flood of litigation. By my count, there have already been at least seven federal securities class action lawsuits against Madoff, his firm, or the "feeder firms" that invested their clients’ funds with Madoff. There have also been a number of state court lawsuits as well.

It is already difficult to keep track of the lawsuits that have been filed. In all likelihood, there will be extensive additional litigation against other feeder funds and other third party defendants, which will make it even more difficult to keep track.

In order to monitor the Madoff-related litigation in a more orderly way, I have created a table of the lawsuits that have been filed to date.

The table can be found here.

I believe the table is complete, but I welcome any additional or clarifying information that readers may wish to bring to my attention.

I will update the table as new or different lawsuits emerge. Readers are strongly encouraged to let me know about any additional litigation I may have missed or to provide me with any information necessary to make the table more accurate.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (4)
• Trackbacks (1)
• Share Link

UPDATE: A regularly updated list of all Madoff investor litigation, including in particular Madoff "feeder fund" litigation, can be accessed here.

As further proof that the losses associated with the Madoff fraud scheme will trigger a wave of litigation, on December 23, 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers initiated a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of investors in the FM Low Volatility Fund, against Family Management Corporation ( the Fund’s general partner and manager) and certain of FMC’s directors and officers; three "fund of funds" in which FMC invested investor funds (Andover, Beacon and Maxam); and the Funds’ auditor.

The complaint, which can be found here, alleges violations of the federal securities laws and related stated and common law violations, and also asserts derivative breach of fiduciary duties on behalf of the Funds.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ December 24, 2008 press release (here), FMC

concentrated more than half of the Fund’s investment capital with at least three funds of funds ("FOFs") -- Andover, Beacon and Maxam -- that, in turn, all heavily invested in entities managed by Bernard Madoff ("Madoff") or Madoff-related entities. Investors who entrusted their savings to FMC suffered millions in damages as a result of Madoff’s fraudulent scheme.
 

The complaint further alleges that the defendants failed to perform requisite "due diligence" and "knew or should have known" about Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.

The plaintiffs’ also allege that FMC and its defendant directors and officers issued misleading offering documents that

falsely stated that FMC would not invest more than 35% of the Fund’s net asset value with any one investment vehicle, but, in reality, more than 60% of the Fund’s assets were funneled through three FOFs – Defendants Andover, Beacon and Maxam – and invested in Madoff-related entities. The Offering Memorandum also falsely stated that FMC would (i) endeavor to verify the integrity of each manager of a FOF in which the Fund was invested; (ii) attempt to monitor the performance of each manager; and (iii) request detailed information regarding the historical performance and investment strategy of each of the selected investments for the Fund. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, with no or inadequate due diligence or oversight, abdicated their responsibilities and entrusted the Fund’s assets to Madoff-run investment vehicles.

Even More Madoff Investor Litigation: In earlier post (here), I noted the class action lawsuit that had been filed against Tremont Group Holdings, certain of its directors and officers, and its corporate parents, on behalf of investors in the American Masters Prime Fund, whose assets Tremont managed and that had suffered losses due to Tremont’s investment of those funds with Bernard Madoff and his firm.

On December 23, 2008, plaintiffs filed a similar but separate lawsuit against Tremont and related entities, but on behalf of the class of investors in the Rye Funds, who also claim that they lost their investment due to Tremont’s investment with Madoff and his firm. The Rye Funds complaint also includes as a defendant Tremont’s auditor, KPMG. A copy of the Rye Funds’ investors’ complaint can be found here. A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers December 23 press release can be found here.

In addition, according to a December 24, 2008 Bloomberg article (here), New York University has initiated a New York state court lawsuit against J. Ezra Merkin, Gabriel Capital, and Ariel Fund, in which it alleges that $24 million of endowment investments due to the defendants’ investment of the assets with Madoff and his firm. A copy of the NYU lawsuit complaint can be found here.

An earlier class action lawsuit that previously had been filed against Gabriel and related defendants can be found here.

Special thank to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch (here) for providing a copy of the Rye Funds Complaint.

Keeping Track: By my tally, the Family Management Corporation case is at least the seventh federal class action lawsuit filed in the wake of the revelation of the Madoff fraud. Of these, six of these seven are directed against so-called "feeder funds," the seventh directly against Madoff and his firm. In addition, there are several other state court lawsuits, including the one identified above and the earlier lawsuit filed against the Fairfield Greenwich fund firm (about which refer here).

If the early returns are any indication, there could be a flood of litigation yet to come. Of course it remains to be seen whether or to what extent any of these claims succeed. But in the meantime, indications are that these Madoff-related lawsuits will continue to mount.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In the latest of what undoubtedly will prove to be a surge of Madoff-related litigation, investors have filed two more lawsuits against investment firms that invested their clients’ money with Bernie Madoff, resulting in massive investor losses.

UPDATE: Please note that a regularly updated table of all Madoff investor litigation, including in particular Madoff "feeder fund" litigation, can be accessed here.

The Tremont Lawsuit

First, as reflected in their December 22, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of investors in the American Masters Broad Market Prime Fund, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership which is managed by Tremont Group Holdings, which is also the Fund’s General Partner. The defendants in the lawsuit include Tremont; Oppenheimer Acquisition Corporation, which acquired Tremont in 2001; Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, Oppenheimer’s parent; and Ernst & Young, the Fund’s auditor.

The complaint (which can be found here) alleges violations of the federal securities laws as well as state common law fraud, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint also assets derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims on behalf of the Fund.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release, the complaint alleges that

defendant Tremont, general partner of the Fund, concentrated over half of its investment capital with entities that participated in the massive, fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Bernard Madoff ("Madoff"). Investors who entrusted their savings to Tremont have suffered millions in damages and are faced with financial ruin.
 

The complaint also alleges that the defendants "failed to perform the necessary due diligence that they were being compensated to perform as investment managers and fiduciaries" and that the defendants "either knew or should have known that the Fund’s assets were employed as part of a massive Ponzi scheme and took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, proximately causing billions of dollars of losses and possible complete collapse of the Fund." Oppenheimer and Mass Mutual are named defendants as controlling persons of the Fund.

The complaint alleges with respect to Ernst & Young that the firm was "reckless or grossly negligent" in connection with its performance of its auditing duties, and specifically that the firm failed to detect "a myriad of ‘red flags’ indicating a high risk to Tremont from concentrating its investment exposure in Madoff."

The complaint alleges that the defendants allowed Tremont to invest $3.3 billion, over half of its assets, with Madoff.

The Fairfield Lawsuit

In addition, investors have also initiated a lawsuit in New York County (New York) Supreme Court against the Fairfield Greenwich Group, the hedge fund firm that has as much as $7.5 billion invested with Madoff. A December 22, 2008 Bloomberg article describing the Fairfield lawsuit can be found here. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

The lawsuit, which is filed as a class action on behalf of in the Fairfield Sentry fund, names as defendants Fairfield itself; Fairfield’s founding partners, as well as two principals of a Bermuda affiliate of Fairfield. It alleges breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

According to the news reports, the complaint alleges that the fund’s managers "had an obligation to look into Madoff’s investment methods and that the team ignored the ‘red-flag warning’ that Madoff’s investment produced small, steady gains in a declining market." The article also quotes the plaintiffs’ attorney as saying that the case has been filed in state court rather than federal court so that discovery can go forward quickly.

The arrival of these new lawsuits, following closely in the wake of the prior Madoff-related litigation suggests that there could substantial associated litigation yet to come, particularly with respect to the so-called feeder funds that invested clients’ assets with Madoff. The press coverage certainly suggests that there will be extensive additional litigation, as reflected, for example, in the December 22, 2008 National Law Journal article entitled "Lawyers from Florida to New York Besieged by Madoff Investors" (here).

The Tremont lawsuit’s inclusion of Ernst & Young corroborates an article published in the December 22, 2008 New York Times entitled "In Madoff’s Wake, Scrutiny of Accounting Firms" (here), which suggests that investors suffering losses from their investments in Madoff feeder funds may attempt to target the firms’ auditors. As noted in the article, the lawsuit filed last week against Madoff feeder fund Ascot Partners (about which I wrote here) also named the fund’s auditor, BDO Seidman, as a defendant in that case.

Credit Crisis Litigation Issues: A November 17, 2008 paper entitled "Legal and Economic Issues is Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis" (here) written by Harvard Law Professor Allen Ferrell, and Jennifer Bethel and Gang Hu of the Babson Business School surveys the marketplace conditions behind the credit crisis litigation and reviews the legal issues that are likely to arise as the litigation goes forward.

The article focuses on three principles that the authors believe will be critical in the credit crisis related securities litigation (1) no fraud by hindsight; (2) truth on the market defenses; and (3) loss causation issues.

With respect to the truth on the market defense, for example, the authors contend that "the quality of disclosures in the mortgage backed securities registration statements (and virtually all mortgage backed securities were registered) actually improved between 2001 to 2006 (in part due to the promulgation of Regulation AB in 2004) and that it was quite clear from these registration statements that the quality of the underwriting in a number of instances had declined."

With respect to the "loss causation issue," the authors contend with respect to the banks that suffered massive writedowns during 2007 and 2008, that the banks"suffered substantial losses due to their ‘super senior’ positions in CDOs and various liquidity guarantees to asset backed commercial paper conduits, rather than directly on their mortgage-backed security holdings."

Hat tip to The Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog (here) for the link to the authors’ paper.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

If today’s filings are any indication, a huge wave of Madoff victim lawsuits could be coming. Madoff investors were quick to sue Madoff and his firm, with the first complaint filed last Friday (as noted here). But with Madoff’s firm in liquidation and the money likely long gone, investors who lost money as a result of Madoff’s scheme are casting around for other targets from whom to try to recover their losses. Early returns suggest that investment firms and Madoff "feeder funds" could find themselves facing substantial Madoff victim litigation.

UPDATE: Please note that a regularly updated table of Madoff investor litigation, including "feeder fund" litigation can be accessed  here.

First, as reflected in their December 16, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a securities lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against investment partnership Ascot Partners L.P., its founder and general partner (Merkin), and its auditor, BDO Seidman. The class members are persons who purchased limited partnership interests in Ascot.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that Ascot and Merkin

caused and permitted $1.8 billion -- virtually the entire investment capital of Ascot -- to be handed over to Madoff to be "invested" for the benefit of plaintiff and the other limited partners of Ascot. Plaintiff's investment in Ascot has been wiped out, as a direct result of: (a) defendant Merkin's abdication of his responsibilities and duties as General Partner and Manager of Ascot and its investment funds and; (b) the failure of Ascot's auditor Seidman, in light of "red flags" indicating a high risk to Ascot from concentrating its investment exposure in Madoff as sole third-party investment manager for all of the Partnership's assets, to perform its audits and provide its annual audit reports in conformance with generally accepted auditing standards.

The press release states that the complaint alleges ’34 Act violations as well as related statutory and common law breaches. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

UPDATE: On December 16, 2008, investors also filed a separate lawsuit against a different fund affiliated with Merkin, Gabriel Partners. A copy of the December 17, 2008 press release can be found here.  A copy of the complaint can be found here.  A WSJ.com Law Blog post about the Ascot and Gabriel lawsuits can be found here.

Second, and also on December 16, another plaintiffs’ firm initiated a separate securities lawsuit in the Central District of California. The lawsuit is filed against Madoff and his firm, but also names as defendants Brighton Company, a California limited partnership and a so-called "feeder fund," and its principal ( Stanley Chais). The firm’s press release (here) states that Brighton was "one of the many feeder funds that directed investor capital" to Madoff and his firm. The press release says that Chais "managed several investment groups [including Brighton], the monies for which were given to Madoff" and his firm.

The complaint (here) alleges that the plaintiff invested money through CMG Ltd., a California limited partnership. The complaint alleges that CMG provided all of its investment capital to Chais as general partner for Brighton, which in turn invested all of CMG’s money with Madoff. The complaint alleges that "all defendants contributed to the false, misleading, unlawful, unfair and fraudulent acts and practices associated with the Ponzi scheme."

The purported class consists of two groups; all persons who invested capital with Chais and Brighton, and all persons who invested with Madoff and his firm. The complaint alleges violations of the ’34 Act.

The press release also states that "the firm is investigating the actions of other feeder firms on behalf of investors." The December 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal has an article (here) discussing Stanley Chais and his investment funds'  (and charitable organizations') relation to Madoff
 

Given the magnitude and widespread dispersion of the Madoff losses, and given the fact that there appears to be little money left with Madoff and his fund, it seems highly likely that there will be other (perhaps many other) investment funds, "feeder funds," hedge funds, funds of funds, and other entitles, targeted by Madoff victims. The attention in the press (for example, here) to alleged failures of investment firms to catch supposed red flags or to conduct due diligence will only increase the likelihood of this kind of litigation. The inclusion of the auditor in the Ascot lawsuit suggests that some of these claims could range pretty far afield.

A December 16, 2008 Business Week article discussing the likelihood of Madoff investor claims against hedge funds and others, also discussing the Ascot lawsuit, can be found here.

The Wall Street Journal is helpfully collecting a list of Madoff’s victims here. It is a long list but it is also clearly incomplete; for example, Fairfield Greenwich Advisors may have been hit with $7.5 billion in losses, but those amounts in reality represent the losses of Fairfield’s own investors. The list would be substantially longer if all of these and other fund investors and customers were listed individually. The fund investors are the ones, like the plaintiffs in the cases described above, that will likely target the investment funds.A December 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled "Fairfiled Group Forced to Confront its Madoff Ties" (here) conveys some pretty strong suggestions along those lines.

In any event, going forward, the number one question D&O insurance underwriters will be asking financial institution applicants will be whether the applicant invested funds with Madoff.

Meanwhile, the Credit Crisis Litigation Wave Churns On: It seems as if the plaintiffs’ lawyers have kicked it into high gear as the year end approaches. There has been a flood of new securities lawsuit filings so far in December. By my informal count, there have already been at least 20 new securities lawsuit filings so far this month (if you count the two cases described above), an unusually high number for December, which historically is a quiet month for securities filings.

And though the filings have included a diversity of cases (as I discussed here), the filings have also included a number of new subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits, including at least four new cases that have been filed or become public this week.

For example, as reflected in their press release (here) on December 16, 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against investors in the C-Bass Trust Certificates backed by residential mortgage loans and issued by Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC. The defendants include C-Bass, the issuing trusts, and the offering underwriters. The complaint, which can be found here, asserts claims under the ’33 Act.

In addition, on December 4, 2008, plaintiffs’ initiated a securities class action on behalf of investors who purchased AIG shares in shelf offerings conducted during the period 2003 to 2007. The complaint (here) asserts claims against AIG, certain of its directors and officers, and its offering underwriters under the ’33 Act.

And on December 8, 2008, defendants removed to federal court a lawsuit that previously had been filed in New York County (New York) Supreme Court against Residential Asset Securitization Trust (which issued certain residential mortgage pass-through certificate), its offering underwriter, and two rating agencies. A copy of the removal petition, to which the original complaint is attached, can be found here.

Finally, plaintiff shareholders have initiated a securities class action lawsuit (here) against private equity firm American Capital Ltd. in the District Court of Maryland, alleging among other things that the firm failed to disclose its exposure to disruptions in the credit market.

I have added these new lawsuits to my running tally of subprime and credit-crisis related litigation, which can be accessed here. With the addition of these new lawsuits, the running tally of subprime and credit-crisis securities lawsuits now stands at 138, of which 98 have been filed during 2008.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for providing information and links about these new lawsuits.

And Finally: Before writing this post, I had no prior acquaintance with the phrases "Madoff victims" and "feeder funds." I guess I better get used to them.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

From this week’s news, it almost appears as if there had been some kind of an unannounced competition for most outrageously fraudulent or corrupt scheme. First, there was Marc Dreier’s incredibly brazen plot to peddle bogus notes to hedge funds using assumed identities. Then there was Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s apparent attempt to flog Barrack Obama’s vacant Senate seat for personal enrichment. And finally there was New York financier Bernard Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, which may have taken investors for as much as $50 billion.  

The scale of the corruption and deception involved in these schemes is almost incomprehensible. It could be said of the three perpetrators of each of these scandals, as Time Magazine said (here) of Blagojevich, he is “either delusional, stupid or some combination of both.” But as astonishing as these developments may all be, they really don’t represent anything new.

Buried underneath the week’s headlines were the latest developments in an older but equally unsavory tale, which may serve as a reminder that there is, regrettably, nothing new about massive schemes of deception and corruption.

According to a December 12, 2008 Bloomberg article entitled “Siemens Agrees to Pay Fine to Settle Bribery Charges” (here), Siemens AG has agreed to plead guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations and pay $800 million to settle U.S. charges that it paid $1.36 billion in bribes to government officials in at least a dozen countries.

The FCPA Blog (here) has an extensive review of the charges against Siemens, as well as links to the supporting documents, including the criminal information filed against Siemens and the DoJ’s sentencing memorandum. As the FCPA Blog puts it, the criminal charging documents detail “years of systematic and intentional violations of the internal controls and books and records provisions. It's a story of fraud, deceit and concealment -- filled with phony contracts, fake invoices, slush funds, and a boardroom feigning ignorance. “

A hearing on the deal under which Siemens would pay a $450 million fine and forfeit $350 million in profits will take place on December 15. If accepted, the penalty would be by far the largest FCPA penalty ever, far eclipsing the prior record payment of $44 million in the Baker Hughes case (about which refer here).

The Siemens case is a reminder that, as startling as this past week’s revelations have been, there is nothing new about fraudulent schemes or deceptive behavior. In the timeless words of the Book of Ecclesiastes (here), “What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun.”

Next Up: The Litigation: One inevitable byproduct of the developments like those of the past week is litigation, and so it comes as no surprise that a lawsuit against Bernard Madoff and his firm has already emerged.

On December 12, 2008, an investor initiated a purported securities class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York against Madoff and his firm (BMIS), on behalf of “all persons and entities who purchased securities sold by or through” Madoff and his firm, “from the early formation of BMIS in the 1960s until December 12, 2008.” Refer here for news coverage of the lawsuit.

The complaint (reproduced below) alleges that its claims arise “from one of the most damaging Ponzi schemes in the history of Wall Street and the United States,” and that the defendants “swindled investors out of monies estimated to exceed $50 billion.” The complaint alleges breaches of the federal securities laws, civil RICO violations, and related state and common law violations.

Meanwhile, other plaintiffs’ firms have announced (for example, here) that they are investigating the alleged “massive fraud.” UPDATE: Please refer here to access my regularly updated list of all Madoff investor litigation, including in particular "feeder fund" lawsuits.

The filing of this lawsuit may not be surprising, and there may be further litigation yet to come. As detailed in the lead story in the December 13, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here), the victims of Madoff’s scheme include a host of institutional investors, hedge funds, and funds of funds. It may well be that these entities’ investors, eager to recoup losses as well as to assign blame, will also file lawsuits in a daisy-chain of litigation based on the Madoff firm’s collapse.

Hat tip to the Dealbook blog (here) for the text of the Madoff class action complaint, which can be viewed here:

Class Action Lawsuit Against Madoff

Another Friday Night Special: December 12, 2008 was a Friday, and that can only mean one thing – after the close of business, the FDIC announced another round of bank closures.

First, the FDIC announced (here) that state banking regulators had closed, and the FDIC had been appointed receiver of, Haven Trust Bank of Duluth, Georgia. Next, the FDIC announced (here) that state regulators had closed, and the FDIC had been appointed receiver of, Sanderson State Bank of Sanderson, Texas.

These two closures represent, respectively, the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth bank failures so far this year. The FDIC’s complete list of failed banks during the period October 2000 to the present can be found here. Haven Trust is the fifth Georgia bank to close this year, which represents the highest total for any one state. The Sanderson bank’s closure is the second in Texas this year.

As I have noted before (here), the pace of bank closures has accelerated as the year has progressed. Of the 25 bank closures in 2008, 21 have taken place since July 1, eight of them just since November 1. The trend certainly suggests that there will be further bank closures in the weeks and months to come. And, pertinent to the preceding discussion, there likely will also be further bank-related litigation (refer here).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link