The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

Recent sharply-worded accusations that the FDIC had failed to preserve documents attracted quite a bit of media attention. For example, a January 27, 2012 Wall Street Journal article reported the charges of counsel for two former IndyMac bank executives, repeating counsel’s remarks accusing the agency of a “stunning display of incompetence” for failing to preserve documents. Counsel made these statements in a filing in an action the FDIC had filed against fhe individuals in its capacity as receiver for the failed bank.

The Journal article also quoted the individual defendants’ counsel’s statement that “the breadth and depth of the government’s document-retention failures are staggering, and violations of this magnitude rarely occur,” and that “it is a stunning display of incompetence from an agency that is supposed to be an expert at seizing and managing banks.”

Based on these accusations, two of the inidividual defendants  sought sanctions against the government for willful spoliation of evidence, dismissal of the relevant counts of the lawsuit and an adverse instruction to the jury based on the government’s failure to preserve evidence.

The defense counsel’s provocative language may have succeeded in getting his accusations published in the Wall Street Journal. However, the language proved less successful when the matter came before Central District of California Judge Dale Fischer in a hearing on January 30, 2012. As reflected in a transcript of the hearing, Judge Fischer had quite a lot to say about counsel’s approach, including in particular, counsel’s use of language.

Judge Fischer started her remarks with a comment about counsel’s pleading tactics and then went on from there:

THE COURT: Now, there were a number of declarations attached to the reply that apparently were not filed immediately after they were signed. Why was that?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, we waited to file them with our reply.

THE COURT: And you seriously thought that was the appropriate approach?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, I did, your honor.

THE COURT: Well, for future reference, it wasn’t. Don’t hold back evidence that relates to your motion until after the opposing party files its opposition and then just stick it to them at the end. So I’m not sure why you thought that was appropriate, but now you know.

Along those lines: I also want to tell you, I don’t know why lawyers do this, and there’s a lot of them in the room so take heed, all of you, language like failures are staggering, violations of this magnitude rarely occur, stunning display of incompetence, bitter irony, breathtaking dereliction of duty are not only unpersuasive, they’re somewhat annoying. I don’t have time for rhetoric. I’m really, really busy. Why anyone would want this job, I don’t know…

But in any event, it’s just – I don’t know whether you stay up nights trying to think of clever phrases, but trust me, no judge that I’ve ever spoken to has ever said, Boy, can that guy turn a phrase. They only say, Boy, why didn’t he get to the point. So, please, in future pleadings, remember that.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: In addition to that, I’ve been around awhile both in practice and on the bench, so I suspect I’ve seen a few more cases than you, and really, it’s not all that staggering and it’s not all that great a magnitude, so when your experience and mine differ, it just takes all of the punch out of those comments.

To make matters even worse, Counsel, your statement that the government failed to make any effort to preserve the documents is simply false. And your statements in your papers so often go beyond the bounds of zealous advocacy that I have to say your papers had very little persuasive value. In fact, as I was trying to check some of the references you made to deposition testimony, I looked at it three or four times because I thought I must be searching for the wrong page because the pages you were citing to had oftentimes no relationship to the proposition you were citing them for. You started off extremely poorly as I started reading the papers, and I had little confidence in anything you had to say as I went through them.

Judge Fischer denied the defendants’ motion.

Readers of this blog may also be interested to read the discussion in the hearing transcript, beginning at page 27, about the role that the D&O insurance program in the ongoing case. From reading the transcript, it appears that the individual defendants contend that there a second $80 million insurance tower is relevant to this claim, although defense costs are being funded out of a first $80 million tower. The lawyers present at the hearing disagreed about the exact amount, but it appears that defense expenses to date in all of the various IndyMac-related lawsuits have totaled $35 million or $45 million. There were various references in the transcript to the lack of responses from the carrier. (The make-up of the two insurance towers and a prior coverage dispute involving IndyMac’s D&O insurance are discussed here.)

Also, and though it is difficult to discern from the bare face of the transcript, it appears that the reason that the FDIC wants to take this case to trial is to substantiate damages in excess of the applicable policy limits, in an apparent attempt to impose a judgment in excess of the limits on the D&O insurer(s).

As Judge Fischer commented at the outset of the discussion about the D&O Insurance, the case “seems to be insurance-company driven.” Which corroborates a point I have made before on this blog, that the D&O insurance may be the real battleground in the FDIC’s failed bank litigation.

This case, which was filed in July 2010, was the first that the FDIC filed against former officers of a failed bank as part of the current bank failure wave, as discussed at greater length here. It is also one of two FDIC actions against former IndyMac officials. The agency separately filed an action against the failed bank’s former CEO, as discussed here.

Judge Fischer’s aside that she doesn’t know why anyone would want to be a federal judge, triggered as it was by her frustration with the  matter before her, was remarkably like my own reaction as I read through the transcript. As I read along, my own decision years ago to walk away from the active practice of law seemed more and more like a really smart move.

Reading about the tone and temper of the parties’ pleadings in this case reminded me of the lyrics from the Crosby, Stills & Nash song “You Don’t Have to Cry,” which I often sing to myself when I hear about litigators bashing each other: “You are living a reality I left years ago, it quite nearly killed me/In the long run, it will make you cry, make you crazy and old before your time.”

What Do You Make, He Asked?: If you have not seen this video about teachers, drop everything and watch it right now. Thank you.

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In its latest failed bank lawsuit, the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver of the failed County Bank of Merced, California, has filed a complaint against five former officer of the bank. The FDIC’s complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on January 27, 2012, just short of three years from the date of the bank’s closure. A copy of the FDIC’s complaint can be found here.

County Bank failed on February 6, 2009 and the FDIC was appointed as its receiver. The FDIC’s lawsuit has been filed against five former officers of the bank, each of whom served on the bank’s Executive Loan Committee. The complaint alleges claims against them for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, in connection with 12 loans the bank made between December 2005 and June 2008, which the FDIC says caused the bank losses in excess of $42 million.

The FDIC alleges that the five defendants caused or allowed the bank to make “Imprudent real estate loans, typically for the construction and development of residences.” The complaint alleges that the bank’s real estate lending represented “significant departures from safe and sound practices.” The complaint further alleges that the bank’s management “disregarded the Bank’s credit policies and approved loans to borrowers who were not credit worthy and/or for projects that provided insufficient collateral and guarantees for repayment.”  The complaint further alleges that the bank’s management “unwisely continued risky commercial real estate lending in a deteriorating market even after becoming aware of the market decline.”

The FDIC filed its complaint only days before the third anniversary of the bank’s closure – that is, just before the expiration of the statute of limitations period within which the FDIC could bring its claims. Up until this point during the current bank failure wave, the FDIC has been proceeding very deliberately, in most cases filing lawsuits only after two years or more has elapsed since the date of bank closure.

The FDIC’s filing of this action just before the end of the limitations period is reminder that notwithstanding the FDIC’s deliberate pace in filing these lawsuits, the FDIC does face certain absolute time deadlines. Moreover, this particular bank’s closure occurred at a time when the number of bank closures began to escalate rapidly. The FDIC took control of increasing numbers of banks as 2009 progressed and on in to early 2010, which means that the limitations period within which the FDIC will have to file lawsuits will be about to run out for a host of failed banks in the coming months.

There were a total of 140 bank failures in 2009, ten in February 2009 alone, after only 25 bank failures in all of 2008. The numbers of bank closures escalated even further after February 2009. Indeed, there 95 bank failures in the last six months of 2009. In other words, as we move through 2012, the FDIC will be approaching the statute of limitations deadline for increasing numbers of banks.

In light of the approaching limitations deadline the 2009 bank failures, it seems likely that over the next few months we will see a surge in case filings, many, like the complaint here, filed at the very end of the applicable limitations period.

In any event, the FDIC’s action in the County Bank case represents the twenty-first failed bank action the agency has filed so far as part of the current bank failure wave, and already the third so far in 2012. The FDIC’s first two actions this year, both of which were filed in Puerto Rico, are described here.

Year End Securities Litigation Review Webinar: On February 1, 2012 at 11:00 am EST, I will be participating in a year-end securities litigation review webinar sponsored by Advisen . The webinar will be moderated by Advisen’s Jim Blinn and will also include my good friend David Williams of Chubb. The webinar is free. To register and for additional information, refer here.

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On December 29, 2011, in what appears to have been the final year-end step as the FDIC ramped up its failed bank litigation activity during 2011, the FDIC filed a civil lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina in is capacity as receiver of The Bank of Ashville, of Ashville, North Carolina, against seven former directors and officers of the bank. Though this lawsuit is only the latest in a series of failed bank actions the agency has filed, there are some interesting aspects to the case, as discussed below.

The Bank of Ashville was closed on January 21, 2011, and the FDIC was appointed receiver (about which refer here). The FDIC’s complaint in the recently filed action alleges that during the period June 26, 2007 through December 24, 2009, the defendants, “enticed by the ‘bubble’ in the real estate sector of the Bank’s lending markets,” caused the bank to pursue a growth strategy concentrated in “higher risk, speculative commercial real estate loans.” This focus resulted in rapid growth during the period.

The complaint alleges that that the defendants’ all but one of who lacked previous banking experience were “ill-equipped to manage the risks associated with the nature and extent of the Bank’s growth,” and that they increased the Bank’s risks by “implementing policies and procedures void of the most basic lending controls and neglecting to adequately supervise inexperienced and under qualified lending personnel.” The complaint further alleges that the defendants’ “failures to establish and to adhere to sound policies and procedures resulted in the approval of poorly underwritten and structured real estate dependent loans.”  The complaint also alleges that the defendants ignored regulatory and audit warnings.

As the problems in the real estate market began to emerge in 2008 and 2009, the defendants allegedly “took actions that masked the Bank’s mounting problems,” including approving additional loans or advances to borrowers on nonperforming loans.

The complaint asserts claims against the defendants for negligence, gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty, and seeks to recover $6.8 million in losses that the bank suffered on thirty commercial real estate and business loans.

At one level, there is nothing particularly striking about the allegations in the complaint. The amount of the alleged losses in the grand scheme of things is relatively modest, at least by comparison to those alleged in connection with other failed banks.  There are no particularly egregious facts alleged, such as self-dealing or even person enrichment. There are no provocative aspects of the complaint, like the inclusion of the failed bank’s D&O carrier as a co-defendant (as was the case here), or the inclusion of the bank’s outside lawyer as a defendant (as was the case here).

On the other hand, it could be that the lower level temperature of the case it itself noteworthy. It is possible that the FDIC’s willingness to initiate a lawsuit even in these circumstances suggests a certain level of aggressiveness on the FDIC’s part. This suggestion is further reinforced by the fact that the FDIC has brought this action relatively quickly after the bank’s failure, at least by comparison to other situations where the FDIC has pursued litigation. In most of its other lawsuits so far, the FDIC has only filed its lawsuit after the lapse of two years or more from the date of the failed bank’s closure. The modest amount of the damages sought together with the relatively accelerated filing date makes me wonder whether or not there is a context for the lawsuit filing.

The litigation activity of the FDIC as receiver is essentially a salvage operation. The FDIC is trying to reduce, or at least offset, the failed banks’ losses. The salvage operation often consists of an effort to capture the proceeds of the failed bank’s D&O policy. (Indeed, even the FDIC’s lawsuit against three former officers of Washington Mutual, the largest bank failure in U.S. history, turned out to be largely about the D&O insurance, as discussed here.) More than one of the FDIC’s lawsuits has looked like negotiation with the D&O carriers pursued by other means (consider this prior case involving the First National Bank of Nevada, here).

All of which makes me wonder whether this latest lawsuit, particularly given its timing and the quantum of damages sought, might be directed at  the failed bank’s D&O carrier. I do not mean to suggest that I am questioning the merits of the FDIC’s lawsuit, as I have no basis one way or the other to assess the merits. I am simply saying that the motivations for the lawsuit’s filing could have a lot to do with the failed bank’s D&O insurance – as in, the FDIC felt it needed to make a little noise to get the D&O carrier’s attention.

In any event, this latest filing represents the FDIC’s 16^th lawsuit of 2011, brining the total number of failed bank lawsuits the FDIC has filed during the current bank failure wave to 18, involving 17 different institutions. Based on the number of lawsuit authorized (as disclosed on the FDIC’s website) there clearly will be many more lawsuits to come during the New Year.

Goal Kick, For Real: In what has to be one of the most insane soccer goals ever, in a January 4, 2012 match, Everton goalie Tim Howard (a U.S. national who was the goalie for the U.S team at the 2010 World Cup) scored a wind-blown goal on a field-length kick. Sadly it was not enough for his team as Bolton would go on to beat Everton, 2-1.

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The well-publicized settlement this past week of the FDIC’s lawsuit against three former officers of the failed WuMu bank was widely reported as having a value of $64.7 million. A closer look at the parties’ December 15, 2011 settlement agreement reveals some interesting details about the settlement, including the specifics of how the FDIC came up with the reported $64.7 million figure for the settlement. The settlement documents also raise some interesting questions.

Washington Mutual Bank failed on September 25, 2008, in the largest bank failure in U.S. history. As discussed here, in March 2011, the FDIC as receiver for the failed bank filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington against WaMu’s former CEO, Kerry Killinger, its former President and COO, Stephen Rotella, and its chief of home lending, David Schneider. The FDIC’s complaint also names Killinger’s wife, Linda Killinger, and Rotella’s wife, Esther. The three former officers were alleged to have caused the bank’s demise through the aggressive residential lending strategy the bank pursued. The claims against the officials’ wives were based on claims that the spouses had arranged to transfer ownership of residential properties in order to evade creditors.

There was other litigation filed in connection with the events surrounding WaMu’s collapse, including a securities class action lawsuit separately filed against certain former directors and officers of WuMu; the bank’s offering underwriters; and its auditors. As discussed here, in July 2011, the securities class action lawsuit settled for $208.5 million, of which $105 million was to be paid on behalf of the former directors and officers. The entire $105 million amount was to be funded by the bank’s D&O insurance.

Although there were advance reports that the FDIC’s lawsuit against the former WaMu executives had settled, the FDIC did not formally announce the settlement until December 15, 2011. The FDIC’s press release announcing the settlement can be found here. The FDIC also released a detailed summary of the settlement, which can be found here.

As explained in the FDIC’s press release and in the accompanying summary, and as detailed in the parties’ settlement agreement, the $64.7 million settlement consisted of several components. The actual cash component of the settlement totaled only $40 million, of which $39.575 million is to be paid on the individual defendants’ behalf by the bank’s D&O insurers. The various insurers in the D&O insurance program that is contributing to the settlement are identified on page 2 of the settlement agreement, as well as in Exhibit A to the settlement agreement. In addition to the cash amount to be paid by the D&O insurers, a total of $425,000 in cash is to be paid by the three former officers ($275,000 from Killinger; $100,000 from Rotella; and $50,000 from Schneider). 

The remaining $24.7 million nominal value of the settlements consists of the transfer to the FDIC of certain claims the three individuals have filed in connection with the bankruptcy proceedings of WaMu’s corporate parent holding company. The amount and type of these claims varies among the three individuals, but basically the claims consist of various types of retirement, severance or bonus compensation to which the three individuals claim they are entitled.

In addition to the $64.7 million settlement of the FDIC’s action against the three former officers and two of their wives, the FDIC’s December 15 press release also mentions a separate $125 million settlement agreement. Though the information the FDIC provided about the $64.7 million settlement is quite detailed, the FDIC’s press release provides few details regarding this separate $125 million settlement. The press release says only that when the $64.7 million settlement is “combined with the $125 million settlement that the FDIC will receive under the settlement agreement with WMI [the bankrupt holding company] to release its claims against 12 former WaMu directors and other officers, this settlement will result in payments and turn over of claims totaling $189.7 million.”

There are a number of interesting things about the settlement and the settlement documents.

First, the settlement against the three executive officers may have a nominal face value of $64.7 million, but the actual value could prove to be substantially less. The individuals’ claims in the bankruptcy proceeding are among the many claims asserted by unsecured creditors and are also subject to whatever defenses the bankrupt estate may have. The ultimate value the FDIC actually receives from the assignment of these claims might be nowhere near the face values claimed in the various settlement documents.

Second, the D&O insurers’ $39.575 million contribution to the settlement could use a little more elaboration. The D&O insurance program described in the settlement agreement consists of $100 million, arranged in six layers. One might assume that the insurers’ $39.575 million contribution to this settlement represents all or substantially all of the proceeds remaining in the insurance program, owing to the erosion of the limits through the accumulation of defense costs. That is probably what happened, But what is hard to figure is how this insurance and the insurers’ $39.575 million settlement contribution fits in with the other settlements described above, particularly the securities class action settlement and the separate $125 million settlement mentioned in the FDIC’s press release.

As noted above, D&O insurers are to contribute $105 million to the securities class action lawsuit settlement. If this amount seems hard to square with the $100 million insurance program described in the FDIC’s settlement agreement with the three executives, it is probably because the D&O insurance contribution to the securities class action settlement was a drawn from a separate tower of insurance. Indeed, stipulation of settlement relating to D&O portion of the securities class action lawsuit describes a very different insurance program than the one the FDIC describes in the more recent settlement. The class action settlement documents describe a $250 million insurance program (not a $100 million program), consisting of a different line up of carriers than listed in the FDIC settlement documents. Although it is hard to tell from the much less detailed description of the insurance tower in the FDIC’s settlement documents, it looks as if the FDIC settlement is to be funded out of a separate tower of insurance, perhaps relating to a separate policy year.

If it is hard to square the details of the FDIC settlement and the securities class action settlement, the separate $125 million settlement is a real puzzle. The FDIC’s press release does not explain the source of funds for the $125 million settlement. Indeed, it is hard to tell from the FDIC’s press release exactly what is going on with the $125 million settlement. The FDIC’s press release describes it as a “settlement agreement with WMI to release its claims against 12 WaMu directors and other officers.” This sentence is confusingly written, but it seems to suggest that the settlement is between the bankrupt holding company and the FDIC, and the $125 million is to be paid (by whom?) in order to secure from the FDIC a release of the FDIC’s claims against the bank’s former directors and officers.

From the comments about the $125 million settlement in the press, I am making the guess that the bankrupt estate agreed to pay the amount on the theory that if the FDIC sued the various other directors and officers, these directors and officers would be entitled to indemnification. The estate agreed to pay the $125 million, in exchange for the FDIC’s release of its claims, without the FDIC having to actually go through the necessity of actually filing a lawsuit against the other directors and officers.

Whatever else may be said about the $64.7 million settlement, it is undeniable that the three executives were called upon to contribute to the settlement out of their own assets, both in the form of cash contributions and in the form of the surrender of rights the individuals themselves undoubtedly considered to be valuable. I emphasize this because one of the questions I have repeatedly asked during the current banking crisis is whether the FDIC will seek to recover from the personal assets of directors and officers of failed banks. The FDIC’s settlement with the three executive officers shows that the FDIC may indeed seek to recover from the personal assets of individuals. One might speculate that the FDIC’s actions may have something to do with the fact that the WaMu collapse was the largest bank failure in U.S. history. It is hard to know the extent to which that aspect of this settlement is relevant to what approach the FDIC might take in connection with its other failed bank lawsuits.

While the individual executives did indeed contribute toward the settlement out of their own assets, the settlement has been criticized, mostly on the theory that the individuals did not contribute enough. For example, in her December 17, 2011 column in the New York Times, Gretchen Morgenson referred to the $64.7 million settlement as representing only a “pittance” and as “small potatoes.” She gripped that much of the cash value is to be funded by D&O insurance.

For myself, I am unprepared to judge the settlement. I would need to know more about the amounts remaining under the insurance policies. I would also need to understand more about the interaction between the amount of the FDIC’s recovery from the three executives; the three individuals’ rights of indemnification from the bankrupt estate; and the $125 million settlement. (Morgenson suggests that any additional recoveries from the individuals, if indemnified by the estate, would simply reduce the $125 million settlement.)

The reality is that if the FDIC had pressed for greater recovery or a larger settlement, it is possible that all the FDIC would have accomplished would have been further erosion of the remaining D&O insurance limits through the accumulation of additional defense expenses. The end result likely would have been an even smaller recovery. The $64.7 million settlement may not satisfy Morgenson and others, but it may have been the best available.

I will say that one particular criticism of Morgenson’s is misplaced. She disparages the settlement as a “wrist slap” and “yet another example of the minimalist punishment meted out to major players in the credit boom and bust.” Morgenson’s criticism fundamentally misperceives the nature of the FDIC’s action against the WaMu executives.

The FDIC’s action, in its role as WaMu’s receiver, was never intended as a means to administer punishment. Receivership actions are simply salvage operations, intended to try to reduce (or rather, offset) the failed bank’s losses. Whether punishment is to be sought is the business of other agencies and regulators – the Department of Justice, the OCC and the SEC. (Indeed, in the FDIC has referred cases to the DoJ and the SEC where the circumstances surrounding a bank’s failure appear to warrant, as apparently was the case with the failed United Commercial Bank, about which refer here [scroll down]). Whether or not these agencies’ inaction in connection with WaMu’s failure may fairly be criticized, it is not a fair criticism here that the FDIC acting as WaMu’s receiver was insufficiently punitive. The administration of punishment is simply not the FDIC-R’s role.

The FDIC as receiver for the failed WaMu bank sought only to maximize its recovery of dollars, and that I strongly suspect that the settlement they reached with the three executives offered the best opportunity for the agency to maximize its dollar recovery.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a link to the FDIC’s settlement agreement.

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Whether the process is just winding down for the year or the process is actually winding down for good, the bank closure rate has recently fallen off dramatically. The FDIC has not taken over any banks for three weeks straight, with no bank closure at all so far during the month of December. And there were only five bank closures in November, after eleven in October.

With 90 bank failures so far in 2011, the total number of failed banks since January 1, 2008 stands at 412. The monthly high water mark during that four year period occured in July 2009, when the FDIC took control of 24 banks. More recently, the monthly numbers of bank failures has been well below the monthly high. But even if the rate of bank failures has more recently been down from those higher levels, the overall 2011 bank failure levels remain well above 2008 levels, when only 25 banks failed.

More than half of the bank failures so far this year have been concentrated in just four states, Georgia (which has had 23) and Florida (12), Illinois (9) and Colorado (6). The number of 2011 closures Colorado is a little bit unexpected, as during the preceding three years between 2008 and 2010, the state had a total of only three bank failures. The other three states, by contrast, have pretty much led the way throughout the current bank failure wave. Since 2008, Georgia has had a total of 74 bank failures; Florida has had 57; and Illinois has had 43. Bank closures in those three states, plus California (38) represent more than half (209) of the 412 bank failures between January 1, 2008 and today.

The number of lawsuits that the FDIC has filed so far against the former directors and officers of failed banks as part of the current bank failure wave currently stands at 17 (about which refer here, scroll down). The FDIC has maintained its very deliberate pace in initiating new lawsuits. However, this past week the agency did update the page on its website on which it discloses the number of lawsuits that has been authorized.

According to the FDIC’s site, as of December 8, 2011, the FDIC has authorized suits in connection with 41 failed institutions against 373 individuals for D&O liability for damage claims of at least $7.6 billion. These figures representing the authorized lawsuits contrast starkly with number of lawsuits that the agency has actually filed: So far, the agency has filed only 17 lawsuits against 135 former directors and officers of 16 failed financial institutions. Given the discrepancy between the number of suits authorized and the number of suits filed, there clearly are many more suits in the pipeline, with even more lawsuits likely to be authorized in the months ahead.

The FDIC’s website also mentions that that two of the 17 lawsuits it has filed so far already have settled. One of the two settlements occurred in the lawsuit the FDIC filed in connection with the failed First National Bank of Nevada. As discussed here, the FDIC and the defendants in that case settled for a stipulated judgment, the individual defendants’ assignment to the FDIC of their rights under the bank’s D&O insurance policy, a release of claims and the FDIC’s covenant not to execute the judgment against the individuals. The other of the other of the two settlements was entered in the lawsuits the FDIC had filed on connection with the failed Corn Belt Bank and Trust. In May 2011, the parties advised the court that they had settled the case, but the court file does not reflect the details of the settlement.

Though only two settlements have been announced, there are stories circulating that the FDIC has settled the lawsuit that the agency filed against three former directors and officers of failed Washington Mutual bank and their wives. Indeed, in an October 27, 2011 order in the case (here), Western District of Washington Marsha Pechman stayed all pending deadlines in the case, after noting that the parties had advised the court that the case had settled. (She gave the parties 60 days to complete their settlement and to file their settlement papers with the court.)

The amount of the purported WaMu settlement has not yet been disclosed, but there are a number of relevant data points that may suggest the likely settlement range. The recently announced $208.5 million settlement of the WaMu securities class action lawsuit included a $105 million settlement contribution on behalf of the individual director and officer defendants, to be funded entirely by D&O insurance.

In the settlement papers filed in connection with the WaMu securities class action settlement, it was disclosed that the $105 million in insurance proceeds were to be drawn from a D&O insurance tower (including both traditional and Excess Side A insurance) of $250 million. The $105 million contribution toward the WaMu securities class action settlement materially reduced the amount of insurance remaining in the tower, and it is likely the defense costs in the various actions pending against the former WaMu officers and directors further depleted the amount of insurance remaining.

The amount of the any settlement in the WaMu FDIC lawsuit remains to be seen and it also remains to be seen whether and to what extent the individuals might contribute toward the settlement out of their own assets. But the amount of insurance remaining is at this point likely to be under $100 million, so in the absence of any significant contribution from the individuals the amount of any cash settlement in the WaMu case is likely to be below $100 million. Given that the collapse of Washington Mutual was the largest bank failure in U.S. history, it will be interesting to see the amount of any settlement that ultimately does emerge.

The American Civil War Viewed from Other Shores: As detailed in Amanda Foreman’s massive book A World on Fire: Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil War, many individual Britons were so taken up with the apparently romantic appeal of the Confederacy that they enlisted in the Confederate Army. Many were convinced that the South would win its independence, and one Englishman was so certain that he converted “his entire savings into Confederate currency, while it was still cheap to buy.”

The British sympathies for the Southern Cause had many sources, but one of the most important was economic, as a significant part of the British mill industry was dependent on the import of cotton from the Southern States. But despite this obvious financial pull toward the Confederacy, the British Government remained officially neutral, in part because the government did not want to be drawn into the war, on either side. As the war progressed and the appalling numbers of casualties began to accumulate, a vocal peace party began to form in England, in the interests of stopping the carnage. Most of the supporters of this position believed (without any particular evidence) that the Confederacy would have to abandon slavery anyway, after the war ended.

It took two developments, both of which were agonizingly long in coming, for British sentiment to begin running in favor of the North and of the Union. The first was Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, which allowed Northern supporters to contend that the purpose of the war was to end slavery. The real problem the supporters of the North faced was that for the first two years of the war, the North looked incapable of winning. Finally, after the tide finally turned at Gettysburg, the increasing likelihood of a Northern victory allowed the British political elites to begin to envision the possibility of a re-united country after the war concluded.

What Foreman does particularly well in this interesting and detailed book is to tell the tale of the battle for the hearts and minds of the British people while the actual war went forward back in the States. The British government’s official position may have been one of neutrality but it seems as if no one in Britain was personally neutral. After the surrender at Appomattox and shock of Lincoln’s assassination, the Britons rediscovered their natural affinities for their American cousins, and the groundwork was laid for a relationship that has ever since been described as “special.”

I heartily recommend this book, which the New York Times selected as one of the Ten Best Books of 2011.

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An inevitable part of the current wave of bank failures has been the FDIC’s filing of lawsuits against former directors and officers of the failed institutions. And though the FDIC’s initiation of this litigation has been gradual, the lawsuits have now started to accumulate in significant numbers. And just as this FDIC litigation was perhaps inevitable once the banks started to faile, so too it was also perhaps inevitable that the FDIC lawsuits would be accompanied by D&O insurance coverage litigation.

As discussed below, the failed bank insurance coverage lawsuits are now starting to arrive. If the initial cases are any indication, one of the main coverage battlegrounds will be the typical D&O insurance policy’s Insured vs. Insured exclusion. Specifically, the question will be whether the FDIC as receiver pursuing the failed bank’s claim against the bank’s former directors and officers is acting as an “insured” under the D&O policy so as to preclude coverage under the policy.

First up in this analysis is Michigan Heritage Bank of Farmington Hills, Michigan, which failed on August 29, 2009 (about which refer here). As discussed in greater detail here, on August 8, 2011, the FDIC, as the bank’s receiver, filed a lawsuits in the Eastern District of Michigan against a single former officer of the bank.

What followed next is that on November 1, 2011, Michigan Heritage’s D&O insurer filed an action in the Eastern District of Michigan seeking a judicial declaration that there is no coverage for the underlying lawsuit or for the bank officer’s defense expenses under the bank’s D&O policy. A copy of the insurer’s declaratory judgment complaint can be found here.

Among other things, the carrier seeks a judicial declaration that the policy’s Insured vs. Insured exclusion precludes coverage for the underlying lawsuit. The insurer’s argument is that as the bank’s receiver, the FDIC is asserting the bank’s own claims and is seeking to recover the bank’s losses. Therefore, the carrier contends, the FDIC’s lawsuit is a claim “by, on behalf of, or at the behest of” the bank, and as the bank and the defendant loan officer are both insureds under the policy, the policy’s Insured vs. Insured exclusion precludes coverage.

A very similar sequence has also followed with respect to Westernbank, of Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, which failed on April 30, 2010. As reflected here, on December 17, 2010, the FDIC, through its outside counsel, sent a letter to Westernbank’s D&O insurer asserting claims against the bank’s former directors and officers.

Westernbank’s directors and officers , in turn, on October 6, 2011, filed an action in local Puerto Rico court seeking judicial declaration that the FDIC’s claim is covered under the bank’s D&O policy. The complaint, which is in Spanish, can be found here. According to an October 14, 2011 press release from the direcrors and officers' counsel, the complaint seeks a judicial declaration with respect to “the controversial and critical question whether the FDIC-R can be deemed an insured under the Policy so as to excuse [the carrier] from providing coverage.”

Though these declaratory judgment actions have only just been filed, they are in many ways a vestige of an earlier time. As I discussed in a blog post way back in August 2008, when the current bank wave was only just starting to unfold, the question whether the Insured vs. Insured exclusion precluded coverage for claims by the FDIC as receiver against former directors and officers of failed banks was hotly contested during the S&L crisis. As I said in my earlier post, and as appears likely now, the Insured vs. Insured exclusion could be a critical part of the failed bank insurance coverage litigation during the current round of bank failures as well.  

During the S&L crisis, where the FDIC had its greatest success in overcoming the Insured vs. Insured exclusion was where it was able to argue successfully that the Insured vs. Insured exclusion precluded coverage only with respect to collusive lawsuits. Because it was able to show that its claims and lawsuits were fully adversarial, it was able to establish that the exclusion did not apply.

The FDIC was not uniformly successful in arguing that the exclusion only precluded collusive claims, and there has in fact been some intervening case law to the effect that the Insured vs. Insured exclusion applies even when the underlying claim is not collusive.

It will in any event be interesting to see how these coverage cases develop. The one thing that seems certain is that as the FDIC failed bank litigation continues to accumulate, so too will the related coverage litigations. Many of the related coverage suits likely will also involve these same Insured vs. Insured issues.

Another issue that is likely to be litigated in coverage cases arising out of FDIC failed bank litigation is the enforceabilty of the so-called Regulatory Exclusion, which when present in the D&O policy precludes coverage for claims brought by the FDIC and other regulators. Not all policies implicated in the bank failures have these exclusions, but where they are present they are likely to be relied upon by the carriers to contest coverage. It is probably worth noting that these issues were fully litigated during the S&L crisis and the courts generally found that the regulatory exclusion precluded coverge for FDIC claims. My prior blog post about the regulatory exclusion can be found here.

A good summary of the D&O insurance coverage issues involved in FDIC failed bank litigation can be found here.

Special thanks to the several loyal readers who sent me links to ths source documents referenced above.

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On October 25, 2011, the FDIC filed its latest failed bank lawsuit, in connection with events surrounding the July 2009 failure of Mutual Bank of Harvey, IL. The FDIC’s complaint, which was filed in the Northern District of Illinois, names as defendants eight former directors and two former officers of the bank. But in addition, the complaint also names as defendants the bank’s outside General Counsel, who was also a director of the bank, and well as the General Counsel’s law firm. There are a number of other interesting things about this complaint as well.

The FDIC’s complaint alleges that Mutual Bank’s failure has cost the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund an estimated $775 million in losses. In its lawsuit, the FDIC seeks to recover over $115 million in losses the bank suffered on twelve commercial real estate loans, $10.5 million in unlawful dividend payments and $1.09 million in wasted corporate assets.

The complaint asserts claims against the director defendants and the officer defendants for gross negligence, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint alleges that the directors and the officers approved high-risk loans to uncreditworthy borrowers. The complaint also asserts the directors failure to supervise the bank’s lending activities, approval of unlawful dividend payment and corporate waste.

The complaint also asserts claims against James Regas and his law firm, Regas Frezadas & Dallas, for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting the director and officer defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty. The lawyer and his firm are allege to have facilitated the unlawful payment of dividends; failed to counsel and prevent the bank’s board from making grossly imprudent loans; ignoring federal lending regulations; and facilitating bank transactions to entities in which one of the attorney defendants held an interest, despite the conflict of interest.

Interestingly, the roster of director defendants does not include Pethinaidu Velchamy, the bank’s former Chairman, or Parameswari Velchamy, the former Chairman’s wife, who was also a director of the bank. The complaint alleges that the two have each filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code, and that “despite” their respective “culpability for the events described,” the stay in bankruptcy “precludes” naming them as a defendant “unless the stay is modified or lifted.”

Among other things, the Complaint alleges (in paragraph 34) that the former Chairman has filed a lawsuit against the bank’s former auditors, in which the Chairman supposedly alleges that “the Bank’s balance sheet contained hundreds of millions of dollars in loans that had been funded on the basis of substandard, if not reckless underwriting and … were not identified for corrective action because of critical failure in the Bank’s internal credit risk review function.”

Though the former Chairman and his wife are not named as defendants in the lawsuit, their son and daughter, both of whom served as members of the board of directors, were named as defendants.

These family connections are particularly interesting in relation to the FDIC’s waste allegations. Among other things, the FDIC alleges that board facilitated the payment of $250,000 in bank funds for the wedding of the Chairman’s daughter; authorized $495,000 in “bonuses” to pay the criminal defense costs of the bank President’s wife, who had been indicted for Medicaid fraud; and approving the use of $300,000 in bank funds to hold a board meeting in Monte Carlo.

Regas, the lawyer defendant, and his law firm, are alleged to have been aware that loans referenced in the complaint were “grossly deficient” but that despite the awareness of the “imprudence, and in some cases, unlawful nature of these transactions,” the lawyer and his firm failed to protect the bank from foreseeable injury inherent in these transactions. The law firm is alleged to have received over $3 million in fees between January 2007 and April 2009.

Regas is also alleged to have participated in a 2006 land loan transaction involving undeveloped real estate. The $28.5 million loan was originated by another bank for which Regas also served as director. The individual that sold the land to the borrower is described in the complaint as Regas’s “close friend and business colleague.” After the other bank made the loan, Regas allegedly arranged for Mutual Bank to acquire a $24.5 million participation in the loan. Regas allegedly steered the loan through the Mutual Bank approval process and did not abstain from voting to approve the loan. Regas is alleged to have abandoned his fiduciary duty to Mutual Bank in favor of the other bank and his friend. The loss to the bank from the loan is alleged to be approximately $24.5 million.

This latest complaint is the 16^th lawsuit that the FDIC has filed in connection with the current wave of bank failures, but so far as I am aware, it is the first in which the FDIC has named a failed bank’s outside lawyer and law firm as defendants. During the last round of bank failures in the S&L crisis, the FDIC pursued an aggressive litigation approach and often included failed bank’s lawyers or law firms as defendant. In many of those cases, as here, the lawyer defendants had served on the failed bank’s board and were alleged to have engaged in conflicts of interest. That prior history and the presence of those types of allegations here suggests that we are not about to see a comprehensive campaign against the outside law firms of failed banks. The firms or their lawyers are relatively unlikely to get drawn into the type of failed bank litigation if the firm did not have an attorney on the failed bank’s board or did not otherwise allegedly engage in conflicts of interest.

Out of the 16 failed bank lawsuits the FDIC has filed so far, this is the fourth involving an Illinois Bank (there have also been four lawsuits so far involving failed banks in California and Georgia, respectively). Like many of the lawsuit filed so far, this one was not filed until more than two years had elapsed since the bank’s closure. Given the fact that the bank closures did not really peak until late 2009 and early 2010, and allowing for that two year plus lag time, we could start to see increasing numbers of additional FDIC failed bank lawsuits in the months ahead.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the Mutual Bank complaint.

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Early on during the current wave of bank failures, there were some pretty reckless predictions about how many banks might fail – indeed, some commentators suggested as many as 1,000 banks might ultimately fail, a prediction that I disputed at the time. But while it continues to seem highly unlikely that as many as 1,000 banks ultimately will fail, the failed banks are continuing to accumulate and we recently passed a significant failed bank milestone.

The total number of bank failures since January 1, 2008 now stands at 406. The 400^th bank failed without much fanfare a couple of weeks ago, on October 14, 2011. Regulators took control of four different banks on October 14, and four more the following Friday, October 21, 2011. With these latest bank failures, the total number of failed banks in 2011 now stands at 84. This year’s total seems highly unlikely to reach the 157 banks that failed in 2010 or the 140 that failed in 2009. But with about nine or ten weeks left to go in the year, it is possible that the total number of bank failures this year could reach as many as 100, particularly if the FDIC continues to take control of as many as four additional banks each Friday evening.

Many of the bank failures since January 1, 2008 have been concentrated in just a small number of states. Indeed just four states account for 214 of the failed banks or about 52% of the total: Georgia (73); Florida (57); Illinois (46) and California (38). Even during this fourth year of the failed bank wave, these same states continue to have the largest numbers of bank failures, particularly Georgia, which has had 22 bank failures this year alone. During 2011, Florida has had 12, Illinois has had 11 and California has three. Together these four states account for 45 of the 84 bank failures during 2011, or roughly 53%.

By interesting contrast to these states that have experienced such a high number of failed banks, eleven states have had not bank failures at all so far. The eleven states without any failed banks are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Vermont. Among other things, this list suggests that the New England states have fared pretty well during the bank failure wave.

As the banks have failed, the failed bank litigation has also accumulated --  although the FDIC’s failed bank litigation has accumulated gradually. So far the FDIC has initiated 15 lawsuits against the directors and officers of 14 different institutions. As of October 24, 2011, the FDIC has authorized lawsuits involving 34 failed institutions and 308 officers and directors for D&O liability of at least $7.3 billion. As the total number of failed banks continues to accumulate, the authorized number of lawsuits will only grow.

The lag time between the date of bank closure and the date of the FDIC’s lawsuit filing seems to be running at least two years or more. As Jon Joseph points out in an October 24, 2011 post on his law firm blog (here), more than more than 335 of the 406 total bank failures occurred after July 2009, which seems to suggest that we are about to enter an extended period of active FDIC failed bank litigation. Joseph states in his blog post that now that time has elapsed since the wave of bank failures began to accumulate significantly,” the pace of lawsuits against former bank officers and directors will increase markedly.” Joseph also points out two thirds of the 15 FDIC failed bank lawsuits so far have involved failed banks in Georgia, California and Illinois (which is slightly more than the distribution of failed banks among those states but hardly surprising given the number of bank failures in those states.)

Of course, time will tell whether and to what extent we will see an uptick in FDIC failed bank litigation. But not only does significant litigation activity seem likely, it seems likely that the litigation will continue to accumulate for some time to come, given that banks are continuing to fail in significant numbers. Indeed, the recent closures would seem to suggest that the FDIC failed bank litigation will be continuing to arise well into 2014. As banks continue to fail in the weeks and months to come, this projected date could move into 2015.

Better get used to FDIC failed bank litigation, because it is going to be a big part of the landscape in the directors’ and officers’ liability arena for some time to come. In light of these issues, Jon Joseph has some practical suggestions for the boards of the surviving banks, in the blog post I linked to above.

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In what is as far as I know the first outright dismissal motion grant in the wave of cases filed against U.S.-Listed Chinese companies that began last year, on October 6, 2011, Southern District of New York Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the securities class action lawsuit filed against China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of Judge Cedarbaum’s opinion can be found here.

As detailed here, the plaintiffs first filed their action in June 2010. According to their amended complaint, during the class period, the defendants inflated the amount of the company’s proven oil reserves, overstated reported earnings inflated profits and misrepresented the company’s internal controls. An allegedly “bizarre series of events” followed the company’s February 23, 2010 announcement that it would be restating prior financials, including “revelation of illicit bank transfers” made to company officials and “a dizzying number of resignations and replacements” of top executives. Over the next few months additional details were revealed regarding the transfers, ultimately resulting in the resignation of the CEO and several members of the board. The NYSE had halted trading on the company’s shares on May 25, 2010, but when trading resumed on September 9, 2010, the company’s share price “plunged.”

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on loss causation grounds, arguing that the plaintiff had several opportunities to sell its shares at a profit following the allegedly corrective disclosure at the end of the class period, and contending that had the plaintiff “chosen to sell at those post-disclosure dates, it would have turned a profit.”

Judge Cedarbaum agreed. Even though the plaintiff ultimately sold its shares at a loss, she concluded that “that loss cannot be imputed to any of NEP’s alleged misrepresentations,” adding that “a plaintiff who forgoes a chance to sell at a profit following a corrective disclosure cannot logically ascribe a later loss to devaluation caused by the disclosure.” Because she found that the plaintiff “has not suffered any loss attributable to the misrepresentations alleged in the complaint,” she granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

The dismissal of the China North East Petroleum Holdings case may simply reflect the unusual movement of the company’s share price.. For whatever reason, the company’s share price quickly rebounded following the September 9, 2010 “plunge” – although the share price has steadily declined following that sharp, short rebound. The share prices of other U.S.-listed Chinese companies have not reflected this pattern. Particularly as the various accounting scandals have mounted, companies caught up in the scandals have seen their share prices drop down and stay down. (Indeed, the share prices of all U.S.-listed Chinese companies have been depressed as the scandals have spread.)

So the outcome of this particular lawsuit may be nothing more than a reflection of the rather atypical stock price movements that surrounded its various disclosures. Judge Cedarbaum’s ruling may have little bearing on other cases involving companies whose share price movements would not support the type of loss causation arguments that were successful in this case.

Nevertheless, Judge Cedarbaum’s ruling is a reminder that merely because a raft of lawsuits has been filed against U.S.-listed Chinese companies does not mean that the cases are meritorious or that the plaintiffs will be successful. The China North East Petroleum case was one of the first of these cases to be filed, as it was filed in June 2010, before the filings against U.S.-listed Chinese companies really began to pick up momentum in the second half of 2010. Because it was one of the first of these cases to be filed, it is among the first to reach the motion to dismiss stage. It remains to be seen how the other cases will fare .But the dismissal of this case shows that the plaintiffs in this cases face numerous obstacles in attempting to pursue these suits. (As I noted in an earlier post, here, there has also been at least one dismissal motion denial in a securities suit involving a U.S.-listed Chinese company.)

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of Judge Cedarbaum’s ruling.

FDIC Files Suit Against Former Directors and Officers of Alpha Bank: On October 7, 2011, the FDIC filed a civil action in the Northern District of Georgia against 11 former directors and officers of the failed Alpha Bank & Trust of Alpharetta, Georgia. Scott Trubey’s October 7, 2011 Atlanta Journal Constitution article about the lawsuit can be found here. A copy of the FDIC’s complaint can be found here.

Alpha Bank failed on October 24, 2008, only about 30 months after it opened. The FDIC’s suit seeks damages of $23.9 million in connection with 13 specific loans that the suit contends were approved “despite plainly inadequate, incomplete, or outdated financials of the borrower and/or the guarantors” in the loans, resulting in loans to borrowers “with no apparent ability to repay or otherwise service the loans.”

The Alpha Bank lawsuit is the fifteenth lawsuit that the FDIC has filed as part of the current wave of bank failures, which began only shortly before the Alpha Bank failed. The Alpha Bank lawsuit is the fourth failed bank lawsuit that the FDIC has filed so far in Georgia, that state that has had more bank failures during the current bank failure wave than any other state. Many more lawsuits are likely to come, including many more lawsuits in Georgia.

This lawsuit is actually the first the FDIC has filed for several weeks. After the FDIC filed a total of five lawsuits in very quick succession in August, there was some speculation that the logjam in anticipated FDIC failed bank lawsuit filings had broken and that we were about to see a quick accumulation of additional suits. But after that flurry of August activity, new filing activity had dropped off until the filing of this Alpha Bank lawsuit on Friday. It will be interesting to see if the Alpha Bank filing is followed by another flurry of filing activity, as was the case in August.

It is worth noting that the FDIC has only now, nearly three years after Alpha Bank failed, gotten around to fling this lawsuit. This consistent in general with the lag time between the bank failure date and the initial lawsuit filing date that has characterized the lawsuits that the FDIC has filed so far. In view of this apparent timing pattern and the fact that the bank failure wave peaked during late 2009 and early 2010, the likelihood is that we may be in for increased numbers of new FDIC failed bank lawsuits in coming months and possibly for at least the next couple of years.

In addition to the FDIC lawsuit, the former directors and officers of Alpha Bank previously were the target of a lawsuit brought by shareholders of the bank, as I discussed in an earlier post, here.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending a copy of the FDIC's complaint.

Unauthorized Reincarnations Will Be Punished to the Maximum Extent of the Law: According to an October 6, 2011 New York Times article (here), the Dalai Lama’s recent announcement that his successor “may be an emanation and not a reincarnation” has upset the Chinese government, which apparently contends that its authority extends even to matters involving reincarnation.

The article quotes a statement about the affair from the People’s Daily, described as the Communist Party’s “mouthpiece,” as having warned that: 

All reincarnation applications must be submitted to the religious affairs department of the provincial-level government, the provincial-level government, the State Administration for Religious Affairs and the State Council, respectively, for approval.

Hannah Arendt had something like this in mind when she coined the expression “the banality of evil.”

Travel Journal: The Köln Concert: The D&O Diary’s European sojourn continued in Cologne this week, after a three-hour train ride from Amsterdam. Fortunately for me, the glorious weather I enjoyed in Amsterdam followed me to Cologne. After arrival at the Hauptbonhof (central train station) in Cologne and dropping my bags at the hotel, I emerged into a city swathed in October sunshine (quite a contrast to my prior visits to the city, which were uniformly water-logged).

For a visitor to the city, the three most distinctive things about Cologne are a river, a church and a beer. The river is the Rhine, which surges through the city on its way toward the North Sea. The church is the city’s great cathedral, or “Dom” as it is known locally, which looms large from its strategic perch along the river.  And the beer is kölsch, a light beer that according to convention and regulation can only be brewed in the Cologne region.

My visit to Cologne (or Köln as it is known in German) was quite a bit different than my trip to Amsterdam, owing to the fact that unlike my visit to Amsterdam, my trip to Cologne was business related. Due to meetings and other commitments, I had less opportunity for frolics and detours, alas..

Nevertheless, I did still manage to find ways  to enjoy some of Cologne’s distinctive features, including the city’s famous local brew, kölsch. It is a light and refreshing beer that is traditionally served in tall, thin cylindrical 0.2 liter glasses. The waiters in the brew pubs carry around trays full of the glasses, and in a smooth single motion they remove your empty glass at the same time as they provide a fresh one. They mark the number of glasses consumed with pencil marks on a coaster. First timers learn the hard way that the waiters will continue to bring fresh glasses unless you take your coaster and put it over top of your glass.

As special as the warm afternoon sunshine was on the day of my arrival in Cologne, my best opportunity to enjoy the city’s riverine location came later in the week, when I took a lunch break bike ride along the river. I pedaled my rental bike across the river to the east side and headed south along the paved bike path. (I was heading upstream, as the Rhine flows generally northward.)

Within minutes, I was away from the city center, and shortly thereafter, it was just me and the crickets and the birds. The riverside is flat and the bike path smooth, and the kilometers just rolled away. The serene countryside, softened in soothing autumnal tones of brown and gold, drew my on and on. I had intended to ride for only a short while,  but at each curve of the river, a church steeple ahead or a flock of birds in the river lured me to keep going. I am quite sure I traveled at least 30 miles roundtrip before I was done.

To be able to escape from a city into the countryside in less than 15 minutes on a bicycle is a very fine thing. It is a privilege we lack in most of the U.S., with our sprawling urban areas and our autocentric culture. In Europe, the urban density and the accessibility to the countryside are interrelated, and provide both a more vibrant city life and greater ease of access to rural areas. In the U.S., urban sprawl means many cities that are empty at night, and are surrounded by endless suburbs that blur into the countryside even far from city centers.

During my European trip, I had some very pleasant experiences, including my lunchtime bike ride on the Rhine. These kinds of experiences are available at home, too, but they occur less frequently. I think that when you are in a new place, you are more open to the possibilities, particularly in a foreign country. How frequently do any of us in our day to day lives at home drive further down the road just to see what is around the next bend? But in my all too brief European visit, every time I yielded to curiosity, I was rewarded with something novel, something interesting, something worth seeing.

If I bring anything home with me from my European visit, it is a renewed appreciation for the possibilities of the moment, where just ahead there are always new things to discover.

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Turns out that while some of us were wondering when the lawsuits arising out of the current bank wave would really start to accumulate, the FDIC itself was busy filing lawsuits -- they just didn’t tell anybody about it, at least not until now. Specifically, the FDIC filed three more lawsuits in August than had previously come to light. At a minimum, these lawsuits suggest the FDIC has been more active in pursuing its litigation strategy than may have been perceived. The suits also suggest that the FDIC’s declarations about its planned litigation strategy are very much in earnest.

The three newly publicized lawsuits, each of which were filed by the FDIC in its capacity as receiver of a failed bank, are as follows:

First, on August 8, 2011, the FDIC filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan against a single former loan officer at Michigan Heritage Bank, of Farmington Hills, Michigan, which failed on April 24, 2009 (about which refer here). A copy of the complaint in this lawsuit can be found here. The complaint alleges that the individual, whom the complaint alleges had been CEO of a different Michigan bank that failed in 2002, caused the bank to incur losses in excess of $8.2 million. The complaint, which asserts claims of negligence, gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, alleges among other things that the lending officer “failed to conduct due diligence and analysis prior to originating and recommending approval of 11 commercial loans that resulted in losses” and “failed to adequately inform [the Bank’s] board of directors and senior management of deficiencies with respect to those loans.”

Second, on August 9, 2011, ,the FDIC filed a lawsuit in the District of Kansas against six former officers and directors of the Columbian Bank and Trust Company, of Topeka, Kansas, which failed on August 22, 2009 (about which refer here). The FDIC’s complaint in this lawsuit can be found here. The FDIC seeks to recover losses of at least $52 million the bank allegedly suffered because the defendants allegedly “negligently, grossly negligently, and in breach of their fiduciary duties originated and/or approved poorly underwritten large commercial and commercial real estate loans … and failed to properly supervise the Bank’s lending function.” The FDIC also alleges that the defendants (one of whom owned or controlled the bank’s holding company) “failed to heed the warnings of bank supervisory authorities.”

Third, on August 10, 2011, the FDIC filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina against nine former directors and officers of the Cooperative Bank, of Wilmington, North Carolina, which failed on June 19, 2009 (about which refer here). The FDIC’s complaint in this action can be found here. The complaint alleges that defendants “failed to manage the inherent risks associated with their aggressive growth strategy” and “permitted a lax loan approval process.” The complaint further alleges that through out the period 2005 through the bank’s failure, state and federal regulators “repeatedly warned” the bank’s management and board “about the risks associated with its high concentrations in speculative loans and weaknesses in lending functions,” yet the bank’s board “permitted and approved” the bank’s continued lending practices. The FDIC alleges that the defendants’ negligence, gross negligence and reckless conduct “ultimately led to the bank’s failure.”

There are a number of interesting things about these three new lawsuits, beyond the fact that they were filed on three successive days in August. For one thing, all three involved banks that failed more than two years before the complaints were filed. The timing of the filings relative to the earlier closures says something about the FDIC’s internal timetable for working up potential lawsuits. Another thing about these lawsuits are that the involve banks in states that have not been particularly hard hit during the current bank failure. By and large the bank failures have involved banks in just a few states, particularly Georgia, Illinois, California and Florida. Hard to know for sure what it signifies, but it is interesting that none of these suits involve banks from those hard hit states.

Another interesting thing about these suits is that all three involve relatively small banks. The Michigan Heritage bank lawsuit  involves a single mid-level lending officer and relatively modest losses on a relatively small number of loans. The implication seems to be that the FDIC intends to be very thorough and that there are not going to be cases that are too small to bother with. This is a salvage operation, pure and simple, and the FDIC is going to recover everything it can, no matter how small.

In any event, when these three additional lawsuits are taken into account, the total number of lawsuits that the FDIC has filed against former directors and officers of failed banks as part of the current bank failure wave is now up to fourteen, five of which were filed in August, and half of which were filed since June 30, 2011. The fact that these suits were filed in August and are just coming to light now suggests the possibility that there could be other FDIC lawsuits that have been filed but that have not yet surfaced.

Whether or not there are other filed but not yet publicized suits out there, it is clear there are many more lawsuits to come. On its website, the FDIC has said that as of September 13, 2011, the agency has approved lawsuits involving suits in connection with 32 failed institutions against 294 individuals with damage claims of at least $7.2 billion. The FDIC’s fourteen lawsuits to date involve only 103 directors and officers. The implication is that there are at least 18 more lawsuits yet to be filed – and that is only taking into account the lawsuits that have been approved as of September 13, 2011. There undoubtedly will be many lawsuits approved in the months ahead, with additional filings to follow after that.

Given the two year lag time between failure date and filing date that these three lawsuits described above demonstrate, and given the fact that the pace of bank failures only really accelerated during late 2009 and early 2010, it seems likely that the failed bank filings will not only continue well into at least 2012, but that over the next few months the pace of failed bank lawsuits could really take off. 

Indeed, one of the clear implications of the FDIC’s lawsuit filings during August of this year is that the agency’s declared litigation strategy is for real. The FDIC clearly does intend to pursue the active litigation strategy it has laid out on its website. And in light of these latest filings, the FDIC’s litigation approach clearly will not be limited just to the largest banks, but could well involve many smaller failures as well.

To be sure, the FDIC’s approach does not necessarily require an actual lawsuit in every case. Early on in connection with many of the bank failures, the FDIC has submitted notices of claim to the failed banks’ former directors and officers and to the failed bank’s D&O insurance carriers. In many cases, the FDIC may attempt to try to negotiate a settlement with the former directors and officers and the D&O carriers, without the actual filing of a civil action.

Reliable sources advise me that that is in fact exactly what happened in connection with one large failed bank in Florida. Apparently, the FDIC was able to negotiate a settlement in connection with the failed bank without actually filing a lawsuit against the failed bank’s former directors and officers. To the extent the FDIC pursues this approach in other cases and succeeds in negotiating settlements, there could ultimately be fewer complaints. In view of the fact that this approach would avert the erosion of the D&O insurance limits of liability by the payment of defense expenses, this approach could actually result in improved recoveries.

But though there may be cases where actual lawsuit filings are averted, the likelier scenario in many cases is that there will be an FDIC lawsuit. With the revelation of the FDIC’s August lawsuit filings, and the suggestion that the FDIC is now actively pursuing its litigation strategy, it is clear that the game is on. For months to come, one of the predominant stories on the directors and officers’ liability scene will be the FDIC’s pursuit of growing numbers of failed bank lawsuits against the former directors and offices of the failed institutions

.

One final note. The FDIC’s website makes it clear that its litigation strategy is not limited just to suits against former directors and officers. The site says that the agency has “also has authorized 20 fidelity bond, attorney malpractice, and appraiser malpractice lawsuits. In addition, 175 residential malpractice and mortgage fraud lawsuits are pending, consisting of lawsuits filed and inherited.”

Active Self-Defense: As discussed in prior posts (refer for example here), the individuals dragged into the failed bank lawsuits will rely on a number of theories in order to try to defend themselves. Former Indy Mac Chairman and CEO Michael Perry is taking a different approach. He has launched a website called “Not Too Big to Fail” (here) on which he is attempting to defend himself against charges the FDIC has asserted against him and other former IndyMac executives.

As discussed here, in July 2011, the FDIC filed a lawsuit in the Central District of California against Perry. The FDIC alleges that Perry acted negligently when he allowed IndyMac to generate and purchase $10 billion in loans when the secondary mortgage market was becoming illiquid. When IndyMac was later unable to sell the loans, the bank transferred them to its own investment portfolio, which then caused over $600 million in losses. Perry has also been named as a defendant in other lawsuits arising out of IndyMac’s July 2008 failure.

On his website, Perry asserts that “not one of the lawsuits against me has merit.” He says that “I and the management team and directors of IndyMac Bank made prudent and appropriate business decisions based on the facts available to us at the time and always with the primary goal being to keep IndyMac bank safe and sound.”

The name of the site is taken from Perry’s complaint that IndyMac did not receive government bailout funds that were made available to other banks. He asserts that this occurred because IndyMac was “not too big to fail.”

Though Perry’s website represents a rather impressive display of self-justification, it seems unlikely that his Internet-based public relations campaign will accomplish much. I suppose though for someone in Perry’s position there is some satisfaction involved with telling off the regulators, even if it is unlikely to change the outcome of any of the claims against him. The one thing that is clear is that Perry is both unrepentant and defiant.

Well, Maybe Next Year: For those who missed the allusion in the title of this blog post, the reference was to the lyrics of the song “Send in the Clowns,” from Stephen Sondheim’s Broadway musical A Little Night Music. The lyrics include these lines: “Sorry my dear/ But where are the clowns?/Quick, send in the clowns/Don’t Bother, they’re here.”  

Although many have sung this tune, it is has perhaps become most closely associated with Judy Collins. There are actually a surprising number of verions on You Tube of Judy Collings singing this song. Here's an audio only version:

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I am pleased to present below a guest post by Mike Hogan, Executive Vice President at U.S. Risk Financial Services. I would like to thank Mike for his willingness to publish his article on this site. I am interested in publishing guest posts from responsible commentators on topics of interest to readers of this blog. Please contact me directly if you are interested in submitting a guest post for consideration.

Here is Mike’s guest post:

The banking crisis of the 1980’s, resulted in the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Endorsement Act by Congress, (FIRREA) that significantly increased the penalties for both banks, and individuals and broadened the applicability of Civil Money Penalties. These penalties may be assessed for the violation of any law, regulation, as well as for a violation of any condition imposed in writing by the appropriate Federal banking agency in connection with any written agreement between a depository institution and the agency.

Clearly, the banking industry has suffered through some of its most difficult times during the last three years as indicated by the 25 bank failures in 2008, 140 bank failures in 2009 and 157 failures in 2010. This year, thru September 2, 70 banks have failed with the expectation of considerably more before year end.  This year, on June 24, 2011, the FDIC announced  57 enforcement actions against problem banks that included 11 Civil Money Penalties, the majority of which were issued to individuals. 

As a result of these failures and the fact that over 800 banks are currently on the FDIC “Problem Bank List”, the agency has initiated a new trend to review directors and officer’s liability policies during their examinations. The intent of this review is to determine if there is a “regulatory exclusion” on the policy and to identify the potential limits of liability that might be available for recovery of losses the FDIC sustains when taking a bank into receivership.  

In the last few months the FDIC has also begun to review bank D&O Insurance  policies to determine if a “Civil Money Penalty” endorsement attached to the policy. If they find a Civil Money Penalty endorsement is attached to the policy, the agency is issuing citations to the bank along with a requirement that the endorsement be immediately deleted from the policy.

According to this author’s interview of an attorney in the FDIC’s legal division, the governing bank regulation is the Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1828(k)) Part 359.1(1)(2)  - Golden Parachute and Indemnification Payments. This regulation provides that a depository institution may not purchase an insurance policy that would be used “to pay or reimburse an IAP (institution affiliated party a.k.a Directors and Officers) for the cost of any judgment or Civil Money Penalty assessed against such person in an administrative proceeding or civil action commenced by any federal banking agency…”. Section 18(k) of the statute includes the same prohibitions. (See 12 U.S.C. 1828( k) (5)-(6) ). (Both Part 359 and Section 18 prohibit the bank from purchasing an insurance policy that includes Civil Money Penalties insurance coverage. 

The FDIC’s position with respect to insurance for Civil Money Penalties is made even more difficult by the period of time such coverage has been made available.  Over the last twenty years, most if not all of the principal insurers that offer directors and officers liability insurance to banks have also provided Civil Money Penalties coverage for bank officers and directors as long as the bank is performing well and have no current regulatory concerns. During this period, banks have been advised to retain photocopies of the Directors and Officers personal checks in the event the bank has to prove that these individuals had paid for the coverage personally. This was based on the assumption that if the bank could prove that the directors and officers paid for the coverage personally, that the FDIC wouldn’t object to the coverage. 

Insurance agents and brokers that have placed directors and officers liability insurance that include Civil Money Penalties coverage are potentially exposed to criticism for offering coverage that is contrary to FDIC rules and regulations,  and putting their client bank in a situation where the FDIC  cites the bank for violation of the FDIC regulations.   Equally, agents could be faced with competition from agents and other Insurers who are willing to offer the coverage in spite of these regulations.  Interestingly, many of the bank directors and officers liability insurers are continuing to offer bank management the choice of whether they want to purchase the coverage or not. 

These issues would lead most agents to believe that the most appropriate approach is to be proactive by advising their client bank management of the regulation and its intent so the directors and officers can make their own decision on whether to retain the current endorsements on the directors and officers liability policy or to remove it prior to the next FDIC exam. 

The FDIC attorney this author consulted further advised that the FDIC has no concerns or interest in policies where the bank is not named as an Insured on the policy. This could lead insurers to consider other options for providing Civil Money Penalties coverage. For example, the coverage could be offered through a stand alone policy where the bank is not named as an Insured. Alternatively, insurers may consider offering the coverage on a Side A Policy naming the Board and officers as Named Insureds or on an Individual D&O policy by endorsement. In either event,   directors and officers will have to pay for the coverage personally, as opposed to the bank purchasing it on their behalf. 

My New All-Time Favorite Headline: Our sincerest condolences to the family of the late Percy Foster. We mean no disrespect. But you have to admit, it is pretty hard to beat this headline from the September 14, 2011 issue of Perth Now: "Gordon Ramsay's Dwarf Porn Double Dies in Badger Den." (here)

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A recent negotiated resolution of an FDIC failed bank lawsuit suggests disputes over D&O insurance coverage may represent the real frontline in the failed bank litigation wars. The compromise was reached in the lawsuit the FDIC only recently filed in the District of Arizona involving the failed First National Bank of Nevada. As discussed below, the FDIC and the bank officer defendants have reached a settlement agreement that includes a stipulated judgment, assignment of insurance rights, release of claims against the individual defendants, and a covenant not to execute the judgment against the individual defendants.

First National Bank of Nevada failed on July 25, 2008 (as discussed here). First National Bank of Arizona was one of FNB Nevada’s sister banks until the two banks merged less than 30 days prior to FNB Nevada’s failure. As discussed here (scroll down), on August 23, 2011, the FDIC filed an action in the District of Arizona against Gary Dorris, who was CEO and Vice Chairman of the banks’ holding company as well as of both FNB Nevada and FNB Arizona, and Phillip Lamb, who was EVP of the banks’ holding company as well as of both FNB Nevada and FNB Arizona. The FDIC’s complaint alleged mismanagement and gross negligence at FNB Arizona that allegedly left FNB Arizona holding millions of dollars of bad loans.

On September 2, 2011, just days after the FDIC filed its complaint against the two individuals, the FDIC and the two defendants filed a joint motion for entry of judgment. A copy of the joint motion for entry of judgment can be found here. Though they had filed an answer denying liability, the defendants nevertheless consented to the entry of judgments “for purposes of compromising disputed claims.” Pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement, the two individuals each consented to the entry against each of them of separate judgments in the amount of $20 million (plus post-judgment interest).

As part of the parties’ settlement agreement, upon the entry of the judgment the defendants will assign to the FDIC all of their rights and claims against the D&O insurer. The FDIC for its part agreed not to take any action to enforce the judgment against the individuals, except with respect to the individuals’ rights under the D&O policy. The joint motion alleged that the bank’s D&O insurer has “denied coverage, refused to defend, to advance defense costs, to indemnify, or to consider settlement of the claims brought against the defendants.”

Assuming for the sake of discussion that the court enters the consent judgment in the form the parties have requested, the FDIC’s obvious next move is to file a lawsuit against the bank’s D&O insurer, seeking to recover the amount of the judgments from the D&O insurer. The joint motion does identify the D&O insurer, but it does not specify the face amount of the D&O insurance policy, nor does it specify the basis on which the D&O insurer has denied coverage.

The fact that the consent judgment was submitted within days after the initial complaint was filed does seem to suggest that the lawsuit filing was itself part of a coordinated plan anticipating the consent judgments, as a way to shift the FDIC’s focus from the individuals themselves to the D&O insurer, the recovery of whose policy proceeds appears to have been the FDIC’s objective all along.

The problem with this approach is that it has not been established that the individuals in fact breached any duties or that they should be or could be held liable on the merits. Of course, the individuals would contend that when the D&O insurer failed to provide them with a defense, they were left on their own to take whatever steps they could to protect themselves from liability and to avert the accumulation of further defense expense. The FDIC, as the individuals’ successor in interest under the policy, now undoubtedly will argue that having disclaimed coverage and having declined to participate in the individuals’ defense, the carrier should not be heard to object to the basis on which the individuals compromised the lawsuit.

But merely because the FDIC will succeed to the individuals’ rights under the policy does not establish that there is coverage under the policy or that the D&O insurer has any liability for the amounts of the consent judgment. If it comes to that, the D&O insurer will undoubtedly attack the judgment on many bases. The D&O insurer will also likely maintain its assertion that there is no coverage under the policy for the claims against the individuals as well as for the judgment.

Given that this bank closed in mid-2008, which was very early in the current wave of bank failures, it is relatively unlikely that the operative policy had a regulatory exclusion (as those had only just started making their return to the D&O insurance marketplace at or about that time). The likelier possibility is that the coverage denial is based on some policy process issue, such as timely notice, claims made date, or the like.

As I previously noted, it could be argued that the D&O insurer, having denied coverage, should not be heard to object to the fact that the individuals have taken steps to protect themselves. However, the problem with these type of consent judgment/covenant not to execute type deals is that this approach can run the risk of slipping into a collusive arrangement, with the insured individual willingly agreeing to a settlement amount that has no relation to the his or her true liability exposure. In my prior life as an insurance company coverage attorney, I saw more than one deal that could only be described as abusive, and I have one particular deal   in mind that qualified as grotesque bad faith (it was so awful no court would touch it and it died a very ignominious death).

Whatever the merits or demerits of these types of deals, we undoubtedly will see many more of them before the current round of failed bank litigation finally plays itself out. FNB Nevada failed in the earliest days of this wave of failed banks, and the FDIC is just now getting around to pursuing claims and insurance coverage related to its closure. Many hundreds of banks have failed in the interim and over the coming months and years, the FDIC will be pursuing claims and insurance coverage in connection with many of those subsequent bank failures. In many of these cases, as apparently was the case here, the FDIC’s ultimate objective will be the recovery of D&O insurance proceeds.

As a result, there may well be many more occasions where, as here, individuals, in order to extricate from an FDIC lawsuit, similarly agree to a consent judgment and an assignment their rights to their D&O insurance policy in exchange for a covenant not to execute the judgment against them and their assets.

The larger message here is that as the FDIC ramps up its claims and lawsuits against the former directors and officers of failed banks, one of the consequences will be a rash of coverage lawsuits involving the failed institutions’ D&O insurance policies. All I can say is that it seems like old times to me. I expect that all across the country there are coverage attorneys getting their files from 20 years ago out of storage. 

As I said at the outset, D&O insurance coverage suits may represent the real frontlines of the failed bank litigation wars. (It is no coincidence that the lawsuit filed at the same time as the suit against the FNB Arizona defendants, the one filed against former directors and officers of Silverton bank, described here, apparently also is really a dispute about D&O insurance coverage; indeed in that case, the FDIC took the extraordinary step of naming the D&O insurers as defendants in the liability lawsuit.)

 In any event, it is clear that coverage lawsuits involving failed bank D&O policies will be one of predominant features of the D&O insurance scene for the next several years to come.

News coverage regarding the bank executives’ settlement with the FDIC can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending me a copy of the parties’ joint motion for entry of judgment.

Court Rejects Failed Bank Directors and Officers Bid to Dismiss Claims Against Them: Meanwhile, in a case in the Northern District of Illinois involving the former directors and officers of the failed Heritage Community bank, the court has rejected the individual defendants’ motions to have the claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against them dismissed, except to the extend the negligence claims are duplicative of the fiduciary duty claims.

As discussed here, in November 2010, the FDIC filed a lawsuit against certain former directors and officers of Heritage. The defendants moved to dismiss the FDIC’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty allegations, arguing that the alleged misconduct that on which the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are based are protected by the business judgment rule; that the FDIC had failed to sufficiently state claims for gross negligence, negligence or breach of fiduciary duty; and that the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims were duplicative.

In a September 1, 2011 order (here), Northern District of Illinois Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer denied the defendants’ motions, except that she granted the motions to the extent the negligence claims were duplicative of the fiduciary duty claims. In rejecting the defendants’ attempt to rely on the business judgment rule, she found that because these arguments represented affirmative defenses and held that the “appropriate mechanism for consideration” of the affirmative defenses is “a motion for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment.”

Judge Pallmeyer also found that the FDIC’s allegations “are sufficient to meet the liberal notice pleading requirements and to set for the duty, breach, causation and damage elements of claims for gross negligence, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.”

For those involved in defending former directors and officers in FDIC litigation (and these individuals’ D&O insurers), Judge Pallmeyer’s ruling may be concerning. One of their principal defenses for individuals caught up in FDIC failed bank litigation will be that under FIRREA, they can only be held liable for gross negligence (refer here for an excellent discussion of these issues). This argument is most compelling with respect to outside directors, as  a judge in the Central District of California recently recognized in dismissing NCUA claims that had been brought against outside directors of the failed WesCorp credit union (as discussed at greater length here). Although Judge Pallmeyer did dismiss the negligence claims to the extent they were duplicative of the fiduciary duty claims, she did not reach the question whether or not under FIRREA the individuals can be held liable only for gross negligence.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for forwarding the Heritage bank ruling to me.

Annual Law Firm Survey of D&O Insurance Coverage Issues: On September 7, 2011, my good friends at the Troutman Sanders law firm issued their annual survey of coverage decisions involving D&O and professional liability insurance policies, which can be found here. The survey is very comprehensive and has the added virtue of being indexed by topic, which makes the survey a particularly useful resource for those involved with D&O insurance claims to keep at hand.

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On August 22, 2011, when the FDIC filed a lawsuit related to the collapse of Silverton Bank, which is Georgia’s largest failed bank, the named defendants included not only bank officers that the regulators allege are responsible for the bank’s failure, but also the bank’s former outside directors and even the bank’s D&O insurers. A copy of the FDIC’s complaint, which was filed in the Northern District of Georgia, can be found here. Scott Trubey’s August 22, 2011 Atlanta Journal Constitution article about the lawsuit can be found here.

In addition, and as discussed further below, on August 23, 2011, the FDIC separate filed an action in the District of Arizona against certain directors and officers of the failed First National Bank of Nevada.

When Silverton failed on May 1, 2009, it had assets of over $4 billion. Prior to its collapse, Silverton had done business as a “banker’s bank” and had been chartered to do serve the needs of community financial institutions, by providing correspondent and clearinghouse services. The bank eventually expanded into residential and commercial real estate acquisition and development loans, which it accomplished through “participations” in which the Bank shared funding and risk with other banks.

The FDIC’s complaint alleged that its case represents “a text book example of officer and directors of a financial institution being asleep at the wheel and robotically voting for approval of transactions without exercising any business judgment in doing go.” The complaint, which seeks recovery of damages of $71 million, asserts claims against the individual defendants for negligence, gross negligence, breaches of fiduciary duty and waste.

The individual defendants named in the lawsuit include not only the bank’s former President and CEO and two other former bank officers, but also 14 additional former outside board members. In naming the outside directors, the FDIC stressed that what makes this case “so unique and troubling” is that the bank’s board was not composed of “ordinary businessmen” but, rather, in view of the bank’s business as a banker’s bank, of individuals who were all CEOs or presidents of other community banks. These outside board members “by virtue of their elevated positions within their own banks, were more skillful and possessed superior attributes in relation to fulfilling their duties” than “others who may serve in this capacity.

The complaint alleges that the individual defendants allowed the bank to pursue a strategy of rapid expansion, particularly with respect to commercial real estate lending, just as the economy started to head south, and allowed the bank to continue to pursue this strategy even after the signs of economic problems began to mount. The complaint alleges that the bank’s “aggressive banking plan” was accompanied by weaknesses in loan underwriting, credit administration and a complete disregard of a declining economy, which “led to the failure of the Bank.”

The complaint also alleged that the individual defendants “directed the Bank on a course of expansive and extravagant spending on unnecessary items for the Bank after the economy began to decline.” The individual defendants are alleged to have “authorized the purchase of two new aircrafts, a new airplane hanger to house three large and expensive airplanes, and a large and lavish new office building.”

In addition to naming the former officials of the failed bank as defendants, the complaint somewhat unconventionally also names as defendants the bank’s two D&O insurers.

At the time the bank failed, it carried a total of $10 million of D&O insurance, arranged in two layers consisting of a primary layer of $5 million and an additional $5 million layer excess of the primary. The complaint relates that when the binder for the relevant primary policy was issued on March 3, 2009 (that is, less than two months before the bank failed), the binder listed ten endorsements, including an endorsement containing the so-called regulatory exclusion (for background about the regulatory exclusion, refer here). However, when the primary carrier issued the policy on April 1, 2009, only seven of the ten endorsements that had been listed on the binder were included on the D&O policy. Among the endorsements that were listed on the binder that were not included on the issued policy was the endorsement with the regulatory exclusion.

On the afternoon of May 1, 2009 (that is, the day Silverton was closed), a representative of the primary carrier sent an email message that he “had noticed that the Regulatory Endorsement was on the Binder but left off the policy in error,” and attached to the email an endorsement with the Regulatory Endorsement dated May 1, 2009 but with an effective date of March 9, 2009. The complaint characterizes this as a “last minute attempt to unilaterally change the terms of the Policy.” The complaint further alleges that policy issuance terminated the binder.

The FDIC’s complaint seeks a judicial declaration that the regulatory exclusion is not a part of the primary or excess policy, and that the Insured vs. Insured exclusion, on which the carriers also purport to rely to deny coverage, does not preclude coverage for the claim. (Refer here for a discussion of the issues surrounding the applicability of the Insured vs. Insured exclusion in connection with a claim involving the FDIC as receiver.)

Discussion

The FDIC’s lawsuit against the former Silverton directors and officers is not the first lawsuit filed as part of the current round of bank failures in which the FDIC has included outside directors as defendants. For example, the lawsuit the FDIC recently filed in connection with the collapse of Haven Trust included the failed bank’s former outside directors as defendants, as discussed here.  The FDIC seems to have particularly targeted the outside directors of this failed bank, owing to the unusual circumstance that former directors were all themselves also senior executives of other banking institutions. The FDIC clearly intends to try to bootstrap this fact in order to argue that these specific directors should be held to a higher standard of care. (My recent post on issues surrounding questions of bank director liability can be found here.)

Upon reflection of the unique circumstances by which these directors came to be on the Silverton board, it occurs to me that the FDIC may have certain additional motivations in pursuing claims against the former outside directors of the bank. The parrticular circumstance I have in mind is the fact that each of these outside directors of Silverton was also an officer of another banking institution. To the extent these individuals were serving on the Silverton board at the direction of the sponsoring institution, these individuals potentially could have coverge for claims in connection with their Silverton board service under the outside director liability provisions of their sponsoring bank's D&O insurance policies. I am expressing no views on whether or to what extent such coverage actually would be available, nor could I without further information about their sponsoring banks' D&O insurance policies and about the circustances by which they came to be on the Silverton board. My purpose in noting the observations here is simply to suggest this possible additional motivation that the FDIC might have in pursuing claims against these particular outside directors. In any event, the outside director liability coverage, if any, under the sponsoring company's D&O insurance may be limited to outside director service on nonprofit boards.

The FDIC’s inclusion of the D&O insurers as parties defendant in the liability lawsuit is unorthodox to say the least. One the one hand, as the complaint recites, the D&O insurers have denied liability for the FDIC’s claim, which might set the predicate for a more conventional (and separate) declaratory judgment action against the carrier. From reading the complaint, it seems that the primary carrier’s belated attempt to correct the omission of the regulatory exclusion from primary policy may explain the FDIC’s more aggressive approach here.

Whatever else may be said about the FDIC’s inclusion of the insurers as defendants in this lawsuit, the alleged facts provide a veritable parable about the importance of making sure that the issued policy matches the terms of the binder. It will be interested to see how the Court addresses what allegedly appears to be a policy issuance error, as the insurance arrangement to which the parties had agreed unquestionably was intended at the time of contract formation to include a regulatory exclusion.  For that matter, it will be interested to see whether the Court permits the coverage action to remain joined with the underlying liability action, and whether or not the Court will permit the two related actions to go forward at the same time.

FDIC Also Files Lawsuit Against Former Officials of First National Bank of Arizona: In addition to its new lawsuit against the Silverton officials, the FDIC also filed a separate lawsuit in August 23, 2011 in the District of Arizona  against two former directors and officers of First National Bank of Arizona,  which had been one of the sister banks of First National Bank of  Nevada until they merged shortly before FNB Nevada failed. FNB Nevada was among the first banks to fail as part of the current round of bank falures when it failed on July 25, 2008. A copy of the FDIC's complaint in the case can be found here.  

The complaint alleges breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and gross negligence against the former officers, asserting that they cause the bank to sustain "losses from the unsustainable business model they promoted for FNB Arizona's loan portfolio -- a model that depended on real estate values rising indefinitely and low defaule rate." The complaint alleges that "when the real estate market collapsed and default rates skyrocketed, FNB Arizona was left holding millions of dollars of bad loans it could not sell." The FDIC alleges that as a result of the defendants' conduct, the FDIC has sustained losses in excess of $193 million.

The Current FDIC Failed Bank Lawsuit Count: These complaints represent the tenth and eleventh that the FDIC has filed against former directors and officers of a failed bank as part of the current round of bank failures. The Silverton lawsuit represents the third so far in Georgia. There undoubtedly will be more lawsuits to come, as the FDIC has indicated on its website that as of August 4, 2011, it has authorized suits in connection with 30 failed institutions against 266 individuals for D&O liability with damage claims of at least $6.8 billion. With the Silverton Bank and FNB Nevada lawsuits, the FDIC has now filed suits in connection with eleven failed institutions against 77 individuals. Even just taking account of the lawsuits that have already been authorized, there are many more suits to come, and undoubtedly even more lawsuits will be authorized.

But with the back to back arrival of these two lawsuits in the space of two days, both involving banks the failed early on the the bank failure wave, there is a sense that the long lagtime associated with the FDIC's lawsuit filings may be over. For what it is worth, both of these new complaints both involve the same lawfirm on behalf of the FDIC, the Mullin Hoard & Brown law firm of Amarillo, Texas.

It is probably worth noting that the FDIC’s lawsuit is not the first to be filed against the former directors and officers of Silverton. As reflected here, the bank’s defunct parent company earlier this year filed suit against the bank’s former CEO and its former accountant and accounting firm, seeking about $65 million in damages.

Special thanks to the several readers who sent me copies of the Silverton complaint and related links. Special thanks also to the loyal reader who sent me a copy of the FNB Nevada lawsuit as well.

Number of Problem Banks Declines: According to the FDIC’s latest Quarterly Banking Profile, released on August 23, 2011 (refer here), the number of problem institutions during the second quarter of 2011 declined to 865, from 888 at the end of the first quarter of 2011. This reduction represents the first quarterly decline in the number of problem institutions in 19 quarters. (The FDIC identifies banks as problem institutions as those that are graded a 4 or a 5 on a 1-to-5 scale as a result of “financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that threat their continued financial viability.” The FDIC does not release the names of the individual problem institutions.)

While the quarterly decline in the number of problem institutions is good news, the latest quarterly figure still represents a significant number and percentage of all banks. The 865 problem institutions represents about 11.5% of the 7513 of all reporting institutions. This is slightly lower than the 11.7% of all banks that were rated as problem institutions at the end of the first quarter.

With the continued weakness in the sector, the number of failed and troubled banks will continue to remain a concern for some time to come.

The FDIC’s August 23, 2011 press release regarding the latest Quarterly Banking Profile can be found here.

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In the wake of the current round of bank failures, the FDIC has filed a number of lawsuits against former directors and officers of failed banks, and has indicated that it intends to file more. Among the issues this litigation raises is the question of when the former directors of a failed bank can be held liable. As discussed in an August 10, 2011 memo from the Manatt, Phelps & Phillips law firm (here), a recent decision a case in the Central District of California involving a failed credit union may provide some insight into this question.

First, some background. Section 11(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act provides that directors and officers of failed institutions can be held liable “for gross negligence.” in an action brought by the FDIC in its role as receiver.  As explained in the FDIC’s online materials about professional liability claims, case law interpreting this statute has established that “state law, not federal common law provides the liability standard for directors and officers, and that section 11(k) provided a gross negligence floor for the FDIC claims in states with insulating statutes.” (State insulating statutes allow corporations to amend their bylaws to limit the civil liability of the corporations’ directors.) As a result, even in states with insulating statutes, directors cannot protect themselves from FDIC claims based on gross negligence. 

The recent decision in the Central District of California involved a case brought by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) against 16 former directors and officers of Western Corporate Federal Credit Union (WesCorp). As discussed at greater length here, the NCUA alleged that the defendants had allowed WesCorp to purchase vast amounts of securities backed by Option ARM mortgages without appropriate analysis of the creditworthiness of the underlying securities or appropriate regard for the limits on concentrations in the company’ s portfolio.

In an August 1, 2011 order (here), Central District of California Judge George Wu granted the director defendants’ motion to dismiss the NCUA’s most recently amended complaint, for reasons discussed in the court’s July 7, 2011 minute order (here). In the July 7 minute order, Judge Wu noted that “the business judgment rule protects the director defendants,” adding that the director defendants “may have made choices—or not made choices – with which the NCUA disagrees, but that does not mean they failed in their responsibilities so severely that they lose the protection of the business judgment rule.”

Judge Wu drew a distinction between the officer defendants (whose dismissal motion he denied) and the director defendants, observing that “the question in assessing the director defendants’ liability vis a vis the Option ARMs and concentration levels is what the director defendants knew at the time that should have dictated to them that they do something more or different from all that they did do.” He concluded that the NCUA has “failed to present sufficient allegations in this regard, so as to fit within the exceptions to the business judgment rule.”

The law firm memo linked above observes that the holding in the WesCorp case is “equally applicable to actions brought by the FDIC against former directors of a failed bank.” In that regard, it is worth noting that the FDIC itself has said, in its online materials describing its approach to professional liability claims, that it is the FDIC’s “long-standing internal policy” of pursuing claims against outside directors only where “the facts show that the culpable conduct rises to the level of gross negligence or worse.” In other words, the FDIC itself has said that it is not its policy to pursue claims against directors based on mere negligence.  The law firm memo suggests, by reference to the WesCorp case, that conduct within the protection of the business judgment rule by definition is not grossly negligent, and therefore cannot serve as a basis for director liability.

In the law firm memo, the author notes that the misconduct that the FDIC has alleged in many of the cases it has filed as part of the current wave of bank failures arise in the context of the collapse of the residential real estate market and against the background of the global economic crisis. In light of those circumstances, the FDIC’s allegations may be susceptible to the argument that it is “attempting to substitute its after-the –fact judgment for that of the board made in real time.” The business judgment rule exists to “prevent a court from second guessing honest, if inept, business decisions.”

Directors’ protections under the business judgment rule may, however, be overcome where, for example, there is evidence that the directors’ “improper motives or undue influence, conflict of interest” or where the directors failed to be “fully informed before making decisions.”

The possibility of being drawn into an FDIC lawsuit is a recurring source of anxiety for outside directors of failed or troubled banks. Indeed, the FDIC has filed a number of these suits and clearly intends to file more. But directors concerned about the possibility of this type of litigation can be reassured, first, that it is the FDIC’s own policy only to pursue claims against outside directors where it believes there is evidence of gross negligence, and, second, that as a result of the protections of the business judgment rule, the directors cannot be held liable for actions that merely prove to have been mistaken or even inept. Judge Wu’s ruling in the Wescorp provides directors reassurance that defendant directors may even be able to get the claims against them dismissed -- even if claims against the officer defendants are not -- where the allegations presented are insufficient to meet these requirements.

The law firm memo concludes with a number of lessons for current bank directors from the current environment and from the FDIC’s allegations in the cases that it has filed so far. Among other things, the memo’s author notes the following: that board membership is a serious responsibility for which the individual directors must be willing to devote “substantial amounts of time” in order to perform their duties in accordance with the FDIC’s expectations;  that board members are “charged with holding management’s feet to the fire in addressing strategic challenges and operational problems”; that directors must act independently and must not “turn a blind eye to unsafe or unsound practices; and that directors “must be very sensitive to the appearance of a conflict of interest.”

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One of the many distinctive traits of the litigation that surrounded the S&L crisis in the late 80s and early 90s was the plethora of lawsuits  between the FDIC (and other federal banking regulators), on the one hand,  and the failed banks’ insurers, on the other hand,  over the interpretation of the banks’ management liability insurance policies. Among the questions surrounding the current bank failure wave has been whether or not we will see a similar round of insurance coverage litigation. If a lawsuit filed last week in the Middle District of Alabama is any indication, the anticipated insurance coverage litigation may be on its way.

The coverage lawsuit arises out of the massive failure of Colonial Bancorp, which closed its doors on August 14, 2009. The bank’s holding company filed for bankruptcy on August 25, 2009. Among the factors contributing to Colonial’s failure was the criminal conspiracy relating to the failed mortgage lender, Taylor Bean & Whitaker. In April 2011, Lee Farkas, Taylor Bean’s ex-Chairman, was convicted of wire fraud and securities fraud.

Prior to Farkas’s conviction, two Colonial Bank employees pled guilty in connection with the Taylor Bean scheme. As reflected here, on March 2, 2011, Catherine Kissick, a former senior vice president of Colonial Bank and head of its Mortgage Warehouse Lending Division, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank, wire and securities fraud for participating in the Taylor Bean scheme. As reflected here, on March 16, 2011, Teresa Kelly, the bank’s Operations Supervisor and Collateral Analyst, pled guilty on similar charges.

The two bank employees allegedly caused the bank to purchase from Taylor Bean and hold $400 million in mortgage assets that had no value. The employees also allegedly engaged in fraudulent actions to cover up overdrafts of Taylor Bean at the bank. The employees are also alleged to have had the bank engage in the fictitious trades with Taylor Bean that had no value.

At the time of the bank’s failure, the bank carried three financial institution bonds. At or about the time that Colonial failed, the bank submitted notices of claim under the financial institutions bonds in connection with the activities and actions that ultimately were the topic of the criminal guilty pleas of the bank employees.

In a complaint filed on July 29 in the Southern District of Alabama (a copy of which can be found here), the FDIC as receiver for Colonial Bank, as well as the bankrupt bank holding company on its own behalf, filed an action against the bank’s bond insurer. Among other things, the complaint alleges that the losses caused by the misconduct “constitute recoverable losses under the Bonds up to the full aggregate limits of liability of the Bonds.” 

The complaint states that the bond insurer “has neither accepted nor denied the Plaintiffs’ claims under the Bonds.” The complaint alleges  that the insurer “has failed to investigate the claims and losses in a reasonable and appropriate manner.” After cataloging the back and forth between the FDIC and the insurer on their respective efforts to enter a confidentiality agreement, the complaint alleges that the insurer “has declined to enter into any of the proposed confidentiality agreements or offer appropriate confidentiality agreements of its own,” and “hence” the FDIC is unable to produce the confidential information that the insurer has requested. The complaint asserts a single claim for breach of contract.

Interestingly, the complaint does not specify whether or not the FDIC or the bankrupt holding company is entitled to recover under the bonds, but rather says that the amount of any recovery under the bonds is to be deposited in a bankruptcy court escrow account, where the issue of entitlement to the proceeds will be determined.

There are a number of arguably unusual features of this dispute. First, it is filed in connection with the failed bank’s financial institutions bonds, rather than in connection with the failed bank’s D&O insurance policy. To be sure, given the circumstances surrounding the bank employees’ guilty pleas, the implication of the bonds is hardly surprising. But the typical bank closure during the current round of bank failures will not implicate the failed bank’s financial institution bonds. The relevant insurance issues will more likely arise, if at all, under the failed bank’s D&O policy.

Another interesting thing about this dispute is that the parties are in coverage litigation even though the carrier has not even denied coverage. It looks as if the parties’ so-far unsuccessful attempts to hammer out a confidentiality agreement have gotten a little bit out of hand. It is mercifully uncommon for parties in similar circumstances to be unable to come up with a mutually acceptable confidentiality agreement. It may be that once the parties in this circumstance can finally manage to come up with a confidentiality agreement that this whole dispute will resolve itself without the need for further litigation (whether or not there was ever really any need for litigation in the first place.)

But the fact that the FDIC has not hesitated to file this suit in the first place certainly does evince a willingness to use the court to pursue its claims, as receiver, in connection with failed banks’ insurance policies. And while this case may not on its face present any significant coverage issues of more general significance, the likelihood is that as the FDIC presses claims for insurance recovery, that some of these claims will find their way into court with significant implications for questions of coverage under the applicable policies.

As I have said before, so many aspects of the current bank failure wave provide a feeling of déjà vu for those of us who lived through the S&L crisis. If the feeling is not necessarily one of nostalgia, it at least has a certain familiarity. Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not there will be any where near the amount of coverage litigation this time around. It just looks to me from this recent lawsuit that just like last time, the FDIC is not messing around, and it is not going to hesitate to use the courts to pursue claims against failed banks’ insurers.

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On July 14, 2011, the FDIC filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia against 15 former directors and officers of Haven Trust Bank of Duluth, Georgia. This suit is the ninth the FDIC has filed as part of the current bank failure wave and the second that the FDIC has filed in Georgia. A copy of the FDIC's complaint can be found here. Scott Trubey’s July 14, 2011 Atlanta Journal-Constitution article describing the lawsuit can be found here.  

Haven Trust was one of the earliest bank closures of the current wave when it failed on December 18, 2008. The bank’s failure has already been the subject of extensive litigation. In late December 2008, the bank’s investors filed a securities class action lawsuit against the former directors and officers of the bank. But as discussed here, on January 14, 2011, Northern District of Georgia Judge Charles A. Pannell, Jr. granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the securities suit.

The FDIC’s suit filing against the Haven Trust officials may come as little surprise; indeed, as discussed here, the FDIC had previously sought to intervene in the investors’ securities suit. Among other considerations the FDIC cited as part of its bid to intervene was the FDIC’s own intention to assert claims against the individual defendants and the FDIC’s concomitant “interest” in the bank’s D&O insurance. On December 29, 2010, Judge Pannell denied the FDIC’s motion to intervene, as discussed here. He specifically rejected the argument that the FDIC has a “legally protectable interest” in the D&O insurance, as a mere prospective claimant.

In its lawsuit, the FDIC accuses the former directors and officers of gross negligence and alleges that they breached other duties. The complaint specifically alleges improper lending practices and seeks to recover over $40 million. Among other things, the FDIC alleges that the bank suffered losses of over $7 million on improper loans to family members of two bank insiders.

While this lawsuit is only the second that the FDIC has filed against former directors and officers of a failed Georgia bank as part of the current round of bank failures, there undoubtedly will be many more to come. Georgia, with 65 bank failures since mid-2008, has had more bank failures than any other state during that period. The prior FDIC lawsuit involving a Georgia bank failure was the lawsuit filed in January 2011 against former directors and officers of Integrity Bank, about which refer here. 

Though the FDIC has so far filed only nine lawsuits against failed bank officials, many more lawsuits will be coming. According to the professional liability lawsuit page on the FDIC’s website (which can be found here), the FDIC had as of July 7, 2011 authorized lawsuits against 248 individuals at 28 failed institutions. Even with the Haven Trust lawsuit, the FDIC has sued only 68 individuals in connection with nine failed institutions. Many more suits have been authorized, and it seems likely that even as the suits already authorized are filed, even more with be authorized in the months ahead.

Haven Trust was one of the first banks to fail back in late 2008, and the FDIC is just getting around to filling suit now. Since Haven Trust failed, well over 300 other banks have failed, and further bank failures seem likely. Given the lag time on the Haven Trust lawsuit, the FDIC lawsuits could continue to accumulate for at least another three years or more.

A Final Observation: The online registration form for Google+ provides the following choices for the registrant’s gender on a drop-down menu: “Male,” “Female,” and “Other.”

“Other”?

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In the eighth lawsuit that the FDIC has filed so far as part of the current round of bank failures, on July 6, 2011, the FDIC filed suit in the Central District of California against former IndyMac CEO, Michael Perry. The FDIC’s complaint can be found here.  

IndyMac failed nearly three years ago, on July 11, 2008, as discussed here. The FDIC’s complaint against Perry alleges that he caused over $600 million in losses by causing the bank to purchase mortgage loans in 2007, just as the mortgage marketplace was destabilizing. The complaint alleges that Perry acted negligently when he allowed IndyMac to generate and purchase $10 billion in loans when the secondary mortgage market was becoming illiquid. When IndyMac was later unable to sell the loans, the bank transferred them to its own investment portfolio, which then caused over $600 million in losses.

The news articles report that the Complaint alleges the “instead of enforcing credit standards, Perry chose to roll the dice in an aggressive gamble to increase market share while sacrificing credit standards.”

Even though its complaint against Perry is only the eighth so far during the current banking crisis, the lawsuit is the second that the FDIC has filed against former IndyMac executives. As discussed at length here, the first lawsuit the FDIC filed during the current round was filed in July 2010 against four former officers of IndyMac’s Homebuilder Division.

The FDIC’s concentration on IndyMac likely has something to do with the fact that the bank’s closure represented the second largest bank failure as part of the current banking crisis, following only the massive WaMu failure. (IndyMac has assets of about $32 billion at the time of its closure). IndyMac was also one of the earliest banks to fail – it was just the fifth bank to fail during 2008, while there have been well over 300 bank failures since then. So the FDIC’s post-mortem processes may be further along on IndyMac than with respect to the many other bank failures that have followed.

The FDIC’s lawsuit is far from the first legal imbroglio in which Perry has become involved. As discussed here, on February 11, 2011, the SEC filed a lawsuit against Perry and two other former IndyMac officers, accusing them of “misleading investors about the mortgage lender’s deteriorating financial condition.”

Perry is also one of the defendants named in the consolidated securities class action lawsuit first brought in the Central District of California in 2007 by IndyMac shareholders. The shareholder suit has a long and involved history, as discussed here. On March 29, 2010, Central District of California Judge George Wu denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ sixth amended complaint, while at the same time certifying the case for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Judge Wu’s order can be found here.

In any event, a list of the eight lawsuits that the FDIC has filed can be found on the FDIC’s website, here. As noted on the same page, as of July 7, 2011, the FDIC “has authorized suits in connection with 28 failed institutions against 248 individuals for D&O liability with damage claims of at least $6.8 billion.” Since the eight lawsuits filed so far involve only seven institutions and only 53 former directors and officers, there clearly are many more lawsuits (perhaps as many as 21 or more) the FDIC is preparing to file. In all likelihood, even further lawsuits will be approved in the future as well. All of which means that we could be heading into a period of very significant failed bank litigation.

Readers who scan the FDIC’s website closely will undoubtedly notice that one of the eight lawsuits has already settled. The settled case  is the lawsuit the agency filed in March 2011 in connection with Corn Belt Bank and Trust Company (about which here). As reflected in the FDIC’s May 10, 2011 motion (here), the parties settled the case. However, the court records do not reveal any of the details of the settlement.

The Name Game:  As far as I am aware, Michael Perry, the former Indy Mac CEO, is not related to Michael Dean Perry, who played football in the NFL, for the Cleveland Browns among others, during the 80s and 90s. According to Wikipedia (here), Michael Dean Perry had a McDonald’s hamburger sandwich named after him – the “MDP,” which was only served in Cleveland-area McDonald’s while Perry played for the Browns. As far as I am aware, the former IndyMac CEO did not have a sandwich named after him.

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According to FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile, released on May 24, 2011 (refer here), the pace of bank failures slowed during the first quarter. However, both the absolute and relative number of problem institutions continued to increase, albeit at a reduced pace compared to recent quarters. The FDIC’s May 24, 2011 press release about the Quarterly Banking Profile can be found here.

During the first quarter of 2011, 26 banking institutions failed, compared to 41 in the first quarter of 2010. The total of 26 bank failures in the first quarter is the smallest quarterly number of bank failures in seven quarters.  (My prior post on the declining pace of bank closures can be found here.) A total of 43 banks have failed year to date in 2011 as of May 25, 2011.

As of the end of the first quarter 2011, there were 888 “problem institutions,” compared to 884 at the end of 2010 and 775 at the end of the first quarter 2010. The increase in the number of problem institutions during the twelve month period ending March 31, 2011 is 113, or about 14.5%. (The FDIC identifies banks as problem institutions as those that are graded a 4 or a 5 on a 1-to-5 scale as a result of “financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that threat their continued financial viability.” The FDIC does not release the names of the individual problem institutions.)

 The increase of only four additional problem institutions since year-end 2010 represents only a slight increase in the number of problem institutions. In its press release, the FDIC noted that this increase is “the smallest increase in three and a half years.” However, the 888 problem institutions as of March 31, 2011 represent the larges number of problem institutions since March 31, 1993, when there were 928.

The number of problem institutions as a percentage of all reporting institutions has continued to increase. This is not only due to the increase in the absolute number of problem institutions but also because of the declining number of reporting institutions. The decline in the number of reporting institutions is not only due to bank failures, but also due to mergers and acquisitions.

The 888 problem institutions as of March 31, 2011 represent about 11.7% of all 7574 reporting institutions. By way of comparison, the 775 problem institutions as the end of the first quarter 2010 represented only about 9.7% of all 7,934 reporting institutions as of that date. So both the absolute and relative numbers of problem institutions has increased substantially during the 12 months ending March 31, 2011.

Though the number of problem institutions has continued to increase, the aggregate assets those problem institutions represent has decreased. Thus the 775 problem institutions as of March 31, 2010 represented assets of $431 billion, whereas the 888 problem institutions as of March 31, 2011 represented assets of $387 billion.

With all of the remaining numbers of problem institutions, there are still a lot of challenges in the banking industry. There may yet be more bank failures yet to come, perhaps many more. However, the overall message of the Quarterly Banking Profile is guardedly upbeat. The press release quotes the FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair as saying that “the industry shows signs of improvement, “ and adding that “the process of repairing bank balance sheets is well along, but is not yet complete.”

As I have noted elsewhere, the numbers of bank failures overall may be slowing, but the lawsuits involving directors and officers of failed institutions may just be ramping up – slowly

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The FDIC’s pursuit of litigation against directors and officers of banks that have failed as part of the current round of bank failures has been moving forward, albeit at a deliberate pace. The agency’s litigation efforts advanced a couple of steps in recent days, as the agency filed an additional lawsuit and publicly announced that even more are coming.

The FDIC filed its latest lawsuit on May 5, 2011 in the Northern District of Illinois. The lawsuit was filed against certain former directors and offices of Wheatland Bank of Napierville, Illinois, of which the FDIC took control on April 23, 2010 (about which refer here). The actual lawsuit in which the FDIC filed its complaint had begun as a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit in Cook County (Illinois) Circuit Court. The FDIC had removed the lawsuit to federal court (refer here) and on May 5, 2011, the federal court granted the FDIC’s motion to intervene as a party plaintiff and to filed its amended complaint.

In its complaint (a copy of which can be found here), the FDIC seeks to recover at least $22 million that the bank allegedly sustained in connection with commercial real estate loans (CRE). The complaint asserts claims for gross negligence, negligence, breach of the fiduciary duty of care, breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and failure to supervise. The 6 individual defendants include four directors (two of whom who were also officers of the bank and two of whom were nonofficer directors who served on the loan committee), as well as the bank’s chief lending officer and its chief financial officer.  

The complaint alleges that:

Defendants recklessly implemented an unsustainable business model pursuing rapid asset growth concentrated in high-risk CRE loans without having adequate loan underwriting and credit administration practices to manage the risk. To make matters worse, the Bank routinely violated whatever loan policies it had in place and approved loans that had little chance of repayment. The Bank also made loans to favored shareholders and borrowers on terms that were preferential and abusive and then, after default, failed to pursue the borrowers and guarantors on these loans. Regulatory warnings about the Bank’s reckless lending practices were repeatedly ignored by Defendants. The out-of-control lending continued until the Bank was closed after only three years of operation.

With the filing of the Wheatland Bank complaint, the FDIC has now filed a total of seven lawsuits against former directors and officers of banks that have failed as part of the current round of bank failures. My running list of the FDIC’s lawsuits can be accessed here.

Interestingly, three of the seven have been filed against banks that had operated in Illinois. At one level, this not a surprise as Illinois has been of the leading states in terms of the number of failed banks. But there have been more in Georgia (which has only one lawsuit), and the over 360 bank failures since January 1, 2008 have involved banks in many different states. It isn’t clear if there is a reason why the litigation seems to be advancing in Illinois, as opposed to anywhere else.

While the FDIC has now filed a total of seven lawsuits against the former directors and officers of failed banks, it seems clear that there are more to come. On May 11, 2011, the FDIC updated its professional liability lawsuit page on its website to reflect that the FDIC has authorized suits against 208 individuals for D&O liability with damage claims of at least $3.86 billion. (The latest update increased the number to 208 from last month’s figure of 187.) Since the seven lawsuits the agency has filed includes only 52 individual lawsuits, there clear implication is that there are many more lawsuits yet to come against the remaining 156 defendants.

The FDIC’s website also discloses that the FDIC also has authorized 13 fidelity bond, attorney malpractice, and appraiser malpractice lawsuits. In addition, 135 residential malpractice and mortgage fraud lawsuits are pending, consisting of lawsuits filed and inherited.

The number of directors and officers against whom the FDIC has authorized litigation has increased every month since the FDIC first began publishing the data in September 2010. The aggregate figure has increased much more quickly than the total number of individuals against whom lawsuits have actually been filed. The clear implication is that the FDIC is being very deliberate in preparing its claims. The suggestion is that the lawsuits will continue to come in slowly – and that the process of filing the lawsuits may go on for quite a while yet.

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As recently as this past Monday, commentators were grumbling that the FDIC is moving too slowly in pursue claims against former directors and officers of failed banks. The FDIC has responded in dramatic fashion with a March 16, 2011 lawsuit filing in the Western District of Washington against three former Washington Mutual executives, as well as two of the executives’ wives.

According to news reports (here), the lawsuit seeks damages of as much as $900 million. The media stories also suggest that there is an agreement by WaMu’s outside directors to pay $125 million to settle claims by the FDIC is pending approval. A copy of the FDIC’s recent complaint against the WaMu executives and their wives can be found here.

WaMu’s September 2008 failure (about which refer here), represents by far the largest bank failure in U.S. history. The events surrounding its failure have already been the subject of extensive litigation, not the least of which is a pending securities class action lawsuit filed on behalf of WaMu’s shareholders, which, as noted here, survived a renewed motion to dismiss after the lead plaintiffs amended their complaint.

The FDIC filed its recent lawsuit in its capacity as WaMu’s receiver. The lawsuit names as defendants WaMu’s former CEO, Kerry Killinger, its former President and COO, Stephen Rotella, and its chief of home lending, David Schneider. In a rather unusual twist that shows just how aggressively the FDIC may be prepared to get in pursuing these claims, the complaint also names Killinger’s wife, Linda Killinger, and Rotella’s wife, Esther as explained below.

The complaint asserts claims against the three executives for Gross Negligence, Ordinary Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

The complaint alleges that the three defendants caused the bank to take "extreme and historically unprecedented risks with WaMu’s held-for-investment loan portfolio." The three allegedly focused on short term gains, to the disregard of the bank’s long term safety and soundness. The executives, lead by Killinger, allegedly developed an executed a strategy to make billions of dollars of risky residential mortgages, increasing the risk profile of the bank’s held for investment mortgage portfolio.

The bank’s business strategy dictated a lending approach for which few lenders were turned away. The bank also layered multiple levels of risk with particularly risk loan products such as option ARM mortgages, the riskiness of which was further compounded by allowing stated income lending and other questionable lending practices.

The complaint alleges further that these executives continued to pursue their aggressive growth strategy even at a point when housing prices "were unsustainably high" and while relying upon an aging infrastructure that was inadequate to keep up with the enormous loan volume. The complaint alleges that the three executives knew the strategy was risky, knew the process weaknesses, and even knew there was a housing price bubble. Yet, the complaint alleges, the three executives marginalized the company’s risk management department.

As a result, when the bubble collapsed, the bank "was in an extremely vulnerable position" and, as a result of the three executives "gross mismanagement" the bank suffered losses of "billions of dollars."

The complaint also includes fraudulent conveyance claims against Killinger and his wife Linda, and against Rotella and his wife Esther.

The complaint alleges that in August 2008, Killinger and his wife transferred two residential properties to qualified personal residence trusts and appointed themselves as trustees. The complaint alleges that these transfers were made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud Killinger’s future creditors.

The complaint contains similar allegations against Rotella and his wife with respect to an April 2008 residential real estate transfer and a September 2008 transfer from Rotella to his wife of $1 million.

In statements to the Wall Street Journal, here, Killinger and Rotella said the FDIC’s allegations are "baseless" and "lack credibility" and that the lawsuit is "unworthy of the government." I recommend that readers take a few minutes and read these two individuals' statements. Whatever may be the merits of this and similar cases brought by the FDIC, it is very clear from these statements that there will be a personal price to pay for the individuals involved. The personal pain these men are feeling is palpable, and there will be more of this kind of pain for other former bank officials as more of these kinds of lawsuits are filed.

With the filing of this complaint, the FDIC has unmistakably demonstrated that it will pursue claims against former directors and officer of failed banks when it chooses to do so. Indeed, the claims against the two executives’ wives clearly show that the FDIC will proceed aggressively.

Given that WaMu represented the largest bank failure in U.S. history, it may come as no surprise that the FDIC is pursuing these kinds of claims. What has been surprising to some, and what occasioned the criticism I mentioned in my opening paragraph, is how deliberate the FDIC has been in choosing to pursue claims. WaMu failed nearly two and one half years ago. If the FDIC were to act with similar deliberation in pursing other claims, it could well be some time before we know for sure how extensive the FDIC’s litigation activity ultimately will be in pursing claims as part of the current bank failure.

It is, however, quite clear that the FDIC will be pursuing more of these types of claims. The FDIC recently updated the Professional Liability Lawsuits page on its website (here) to show that the FDIC’s board has approved lawsuits against 158 individual directors and officers of failed banks. Since the six lawsuits the FDIC has filed to date only amount to about 40 individual defendants in total, there are many more lawsuits to come, just based on the actions that have been approved so far.

One particularly interesting detail about the news surrounding the FDIC’s recent lawsuit is the report that WaMu’s outside directors have agreed to pay $125 million to settle claims. It is interesting that the outside directors agreed to pay this amount without the intervening step of a lawsuit against them. One question that immediately occurs to me is whether and to what extent this $125 million payment is to be funded by D&O insurance.

WaMu’s D&O insurance program was undoubtedly already under pressure due to the significant presence of other claims already pending against its former directors and officers. One possibility that occurs to me is that the bank may have carried a significant layer of Side A DIC protection, which may well have been triggered by the bank holding company’s bankruptcy. Because of the bankruptcy, all of the claims represent potential Side A losses, suggesting that the bank’s Excess Side A/DIC program could well have been called in to contribute. All these are details that those of us on the outside can only wonder about; however, comments from knowledgeable persons who are closer to the situation are always welcome.

Whatever may be the case, it is clear that D&O insurance may be playing a role of some kind in all of this. At least Stephen Rotella thinks so. In his statement to the Wall Street Journal to which I linked above, he speculated that the lawsuit itself "may be a way for the FDIC to collect a payout from insurers who provided officers and directors liability coverage for the time they worked at WaMu."

As noted, with this lawsuit, the total number of lawsuits the FDIC has filed as part of the current wave of failed bank litigation is now up to six. A list of the six lawsuits can be found here.

A March 17, 2011 Bloomberg article about the FDIC’s lawsuit can be found here. A March 17, 2011 Seattle Post-Intelligencer article about the suit can be found here.

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In the fifth FDIC lawsuit against former directors and officers of failed banks as part of the current bank wave, on March 1, 2011, the FDIC as receiver for the failed Corn Belt Bank and Trust Company filed suit in the Central District of Illinois federal court against four former officer and directors of the bank, seeking to recover losses of at least $10.4 million.. A copy of the FDIC’s latest complaint can be found here.

According to the Complaint, examiners began criticizing the bank’s lending practices as early as 2003. The Complaint alleged that between 2003 and 2008 the bank "failed to address recurring criticisms by examiners regarding imprudent lending practices," and April 2, 2007, the bank entered a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with examiners. In November 2008, after the bank failed to comply with the MOU, the FDIC issued a cease and desist order. The bank ultimately failed on February 13, 2009.

The lawsuit itself is failed against the four members of the bank’s loan committee. These four individuals include the bank’s CEO, its chief lending officer and two outside directors. The complaint alleges that the four defendants "failed to adequately inform themselves of the relevant risks and acted recklessly in approving one or more of five high-risk commercial loans."

The five loans, all of which were made between 2005 and 2007 and all of which related to the long-haul trucking business, allegedly were "improperly underwritten and extended 100 percent financing to out of state, start-up businesses, and were primarily secured by rapidly depreciating semi-tractors." The complaint further alleges that the CEO and Chief Loan officer unilaterally funded the fifth of the five loans after the loan committee tabled its approval, and they failed to unsure that the loans were properly administered.

The complaint alleges that the defendants’ alleged conduct was "particularly egregious" because they approved one or more of the five loans "after Bank examiners repeatedly warned the Bank that it suffered from weak loan administration, and that it was facing risks posed by out of area lending, high loan-to-value ("LTV") loans, and excessive exposure to loan concentrations within its loan portfolio." All five of the loans at issue allegedly shared these characteristics.

The complaint alleges gross negligence under FIRREA and negligence under Illinois law against the four individuals for approving the loans. The complaint also specifically alleges gross negligence under FIRREA and negligence under Illinois law against the former CEO and the former chief lending officer in connection with the approval of the fifth of the five loans. Finally, the complaint alleges gross negligence under FIRREA and negligence under Illinois law against the former CEO and former chief lending officer for failing to properly administer the loans and for failing to protect the bank’s security interest in the collateral.

The FDIC’s complaint against the four former Corn Belt officials is just the fifth complaint filed so far as part of the current bank wave, and first since the FDIC filed two complaint’s the same day in January 2011. It is the second of the five to be filed against officials of a failed bank that had been based in Illinois. The complaint is interesting because it not only names the two bank officers as defendants, but it also names two outside directors who had served on the bank’s loan committee, as well.

Like the four prior lawsuits the FDIC filed as part of the current wave of bank failures, this lawsuit was filed over a year after the institution itself failed. Although the FDIC’s motivations can only be inferred, it appears that what may have provoked this suit is what the FDIC attempted to describe as the defendant’s "particularly egregious" conduct of having approved these particularly loans in the fact of examiners’ warning about loans sharing the characteristics of the five loans at issue.

In the Professional Liability Litigation page on the FDIC’s website (here), the FDIC has said, as of its last update, that it has approved lawsuits against a total of 130 individuals. The four previous lawsuits that had been filed named a total of 35 individuals as defendants. With the addition of the four individuals named as defendants on the Corn Belt lawsuit, a total of 39 individuals have now been named as defendants, suggesting that lawsuits to be filed against 91 additional individuals remain pending. Of court, the total number of individuals against who lawsuits have been authorized is likely to continue to grow as well.

My table of the lawsuits the FDIC has filed against former directors and officers of failed banks as part of the current failed bank wave can be accessed here.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for alerting me to the Corn Belt lawsuit.

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Though 2010 was a "turnaround" year for banks, the number of problem institutions continued to increase  during the year, according to the FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile for the fourth quarter of 2010. A copy of the FDIC’s February 23, 2011 press release about the report can be found here, and the Quarterly Banking Profile itself can be found here.

The FDIC defines a problem institution as one the agency has rated as a 4 or 5 on a 1 to 5 scale of ascending regulatory concern. Problems institutions are those with financial, managerial or operational weaknesses that threaten their continued viability. The FDIC does not publish the names of the institutions that it defines as problem institutions.

Of the 7,667 institutions that were federally insured as of December 31, 2010, the FDIC rated 884 as problem institutions, or about 11.5% -- or one out of nine -- of all banks in the country. These problems banks represented $390 billion in assets. These year end 2010 figures compare with the 702 banks rated as problem institutions at the end of 2009, representing $402 billion in assets.

The year-end 2010 tally of problem banks is not only up from the end of 2009, it is also up from the end of the third quarter of 2010. There were 860 problem institutions as of September 30, 2010, representing $379 billion in assets.

Though the number of problem institutions has continued to increase, the rate of increase has slowed. The FDIC noted in its press release that the rate of increases in the number of problem institutions has declined in each of the last four quarters.

The number of problem institutions as of the end of 2010 is the largest number of problem institutions since March 31, 1993, when there were 928.

The number of problems institutions has continued to grow even as the number of bank failures has continued to mount, which has the effect of reducing the number of institutions rated as problems. The 157 bank failures in 2010 were the highest number of bank failures since 1992 (when 181 banks failed.) Though the FDIC stated in its press release that it expects 2010 to be the high water mark of the current bank failure wave, 22 additional banks have failed already in 2011, putting this year’s bank closure pace ahead of last year’s.

Overall, however, the news in the Quarterly Banking Profile was relatively good. The FDIC characterized 2010 as a "turnaround" year, one in which the banking industry reported four consecutive quarters of positive income. The industry’s fourth quarter aggregate profit of $21.7 billion represented a $23.5 billion increase from the industry’s $1.8 billion loss in the year prior quarter. Almost two thirds of reporting institutions reported improvements in quarterly net income from a year ago. Much of the improvement in earnings is attributable to reductions in provisions for loan losses.

The DealBook blog’s summary of the FDIC’s report can be found here.

More Investors Opting Out?: Luke Green has an interesing February 23, 2011 post on his Risk Metrics Insights blog (here) about the number of large institutional investors that have opted out of the $624 million Countrwide securities class action settlement. As many as 33 large investors have opted out of the settlement, which has resulted in changes to the class action settlement, including the reduction of the settlement amount to $601.5 million. Many of the opt outs apparently have initiated separate litigation, as well. Green notes that there are a host of arguments against and in favor of opting out, but he nevetheless asks whether the willingness of large investors to opt out possibly represents a larger trend.

D&O Case Law Survey: The policyholder side coverage law firm Lowenstein & Sandler has published a "Review of 2010 Case Law on D&O Insurance Coverage," which can be found here. The memo provides brief reviews of critical D&O insurance coverage decisions from the past year.

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More banks have failed in Georgia than any other state as part of the current bank failure wave, but the FDIC had not yet filed a civil action against the former officials of a failed Georgia bank – that is, until now. On January 14, 2011, in what is the third FDIC lawsuit overall against former officials of a failed bank as part of the current round of bank failures, the FDIC filed a lawsuit against eight former officials of the failed Integrity Bank of Alpharetta, Georgia. The FDIC’s complaint can be found here.

UPDATE: As discussed further below, in addition to the Integrity Bank case, the FDIC also filed a separate lawsuit on January 14, 2011 in the Central District of California against former directors and officers of the failed 1st Centennial Bank of Redlands, California.

Including one bank closed already in 2011, there have been 52 bank failures in Georgia since January 1, 2008. Integrity Bank was one of the first in Georgia to fail when it was closed on August 28, 2008.  

In some ways, it may come as no surprise that the FDIC filed its first failed bank lawsuit in Georgia against officials from Integrity Bank. As noted here, the FDIC had successfully intervened in a derivative lawsuit brought by the trustee of the bank’s bankrupt holding company. In moving to intervene in the trustee’s lawsuit, the FDIC had said that it intended to file its own lawsuit against former Integrity bank officials.

In addition, two former Integrity officials have already drawn criminal charges involving activities at the bank, as discussed here. One of the two indicted Integrity officials, Douglas Ballard, is also named as a defendant in the FDIC’s civil lawsuit. As noted here, in July 2010, the two individuals entered criminal guilty pleas in the case.

As noted in Scott Trubey’s January 18, 2011 Atlanta Journal-Constitution article about the FDIC’s civil suit (here), among the former Integrity Bank officials names as defendants in the FDIC’s lawsuit is Georgia State Senator Jack S. Murphy,   who was only recently named as Chairman of the Georgia Senate Banking Committee. Another defendant, Clinton M. Day, a former bank chairman, previously was a state senator and was at one time the Republican Candidate for lieutenant governor, and also once served on the Senate Banking Committee

The FDIC, which filed the lawsuit in its capacity as Integrity Bank’s receiver, seeks to recover “over $70 million in losses” that the FDIC alleges the bank suffered on 21 commercial and residential acquisition, development and construction loans between February 4, 2005 and May 2, 2007.

The 56-page complaint, which names as defendants eight former directors of the company who also served on the bank’s director loan committee, alleges one count of negligence and gross negligence, and one count of breach of fiduciary duties.

The complaint alleges that the 21 loans at issue were “concentrated in a small number of preferred individual borrowers,” in violation both of the bank’s own lending policies and applicable statutory lending limits. The loans are alleged to have been made without appropriate documentation and with inadequate collateral. The complaint alleges that state and federal regulators “repeatedly warned” the bank about its heavily concentrated loan portfolio and lax oversight and control of its lending function.

The complaint concludes that “the years of excess risk taking and lack of oversight by the Defendants that fueled Integrity’s astronomical growth ultimately led to its failure on August 29, 2008.” The complaint also quotes the bank’s founder as admitting that “Our overwhelming success up to [mid-2006] became intoxicating and we shifted some of our focus from asset quality to earnings and growth which was a mistake …[t]his shift in our focus also created gaps in the enforcement of Bank policies and procedures. In other words, we became lax on having our checker checking the checker.”

Though a total of 325 banks have failed since January 1, 2008 (through Friday January 14, 2011), the Integrity Bank lawsuit is only the FDIC’s third lawsuit against former officials of failed banks filed as part of the current wave of bank failures. There undoubtedly are more lawsuits to come, as the FDIC’s website indicates (here) that through December 2010 the FDIC has authorized lawsuits against a total of 109 former bank officials. The website clearly shows that lawsuits against additional officials are being authorized each month.  

With the likelihood of many more lawsuits to come, I have started a list of the FDIC’s lawsuits, which can be accessed on accompanying blog post, here.

Special thanks to alert loyal readers who alerted me to this new lawsuit.

UPDATE: FDIC Also FIles Suit Against 1st Centennial Bank: After I first published this blog post, I learned that that in addition to the Integrity Bank lawsuit, the FDIC also filed a lawsuit on January 14, 2011 against 12 former directors and officers of the failed 1st Centennial Bank of Redlands, California. A copy of the FDIC's 1st Centennial complaint can be found here.

1st Centennial failed on January 23, 2009, so the FDIC's lawsuit arrived about two years after the bank first failed.

The complaint alleges that after a period of rapid growth, and at a time when it was apparent that the Southern California real estate market was already in decilne, the bank increased its exposure to the riskiest loans, in excess of regulatory limits. The complaint alleges that by concentrating the bank's activities in these riskiest loans, the bank suffered capital and liquidity problems. The complaint specifically alleges that the defendants 16 specific loans that caused the bank at least $26.8 million in losses. The complaint alleges that the bank's failure caused the FDIC insurance fund losses of about $163 million.

I have added the 1st Centennial bank complaint to my list of bank lawsuits, which as a result of this latest suit now shows that the FDIC has launched a total of four lawsuits so far as part of the current wave of bank failures.

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The FDIC as receiver of the failed Haven Trust Bank may not intervene in a securities lawsuit brought by the aggrieved investors of the Bank’s holding company, according to Northern District of Georgia Judge Charles A. Pannell, Jr.’s December 29, 2010 order in the case. Judge Pannell’s ruling, a copy of which can be found here, could have important implications for other failed bank investor cases in which the FDIC has or may seek to intervene.

Background

Banking regulators closed Haven Trust, located in Duluth, Ga., on December 12, 2008. As detailed here, on December 31, 2009, investors who purchased shares in the bank’s holding company filed suit in the Northern District of Georgia alleging that the company’s former officials had misled investors in connection with the share offering, in violation of federal and state securities laws. The individual defendants had served as directors both of the holding company and of the operating bank.

On October 4, 2010, the FDIC as the failed bank’s receiver moved to intervene in the investor action. As detailed at greater length here, the FDIC alleged that the investor action was essentially just a "derivative lawsuit in disguise," and, under FIRREA, as receiver, the FDIC succeeded to all of the bank’s rights, including its rights to control actions brought on the company’s behalf.

The FDIC also asserted that it had an "interest" in the case sufficient to support intervention because of its interests in preserving the D&O insurance policy for potential recoveries in connection with future claims the FDIC as receiver might assert against the former directors and officers of the bank.

The December 29 Ruling

In his December 29 ruling, Judge Pannell rejected both of the bases on which the FDIC had sought to intervene.

First, Judge Pannell rejected the FDIC’s argument that the investors’ claims were essentially just derivative claims over which the FDIC had priority rights under FIREEA. Judge Pannell said

These claims are not derivative claims against the Bank but are instead direct claims against the defendants …. While the FDIC controls derivative claims against the Bank’s former officers, it does not control claims against the holding company’s officers …. In this case, the plaintiffs assert their claims not as stockholders of the failed Bank, but instead as shareholders of the holding company.

Second Judge Pannell rejected the FDIC’s argument that it was entitled to intervene because of its prospective interest in the Company’s D&O insurance policy. Judge Pannell found that the FDIC does not have a "legally protectable interest" because the FDIC "has no rights with respect to this insurance policy except as a potential claimant against certain of the policy’s insured parties," and the FDIC’s "potential future rights" are "insufficient to establish that the FDIC has an interest in this case that justifies intervention as of right."

Finally, Judge Pannell denied the FDIC’s request for "permissive intervention" because the FDIC’s intervention "would needlessly delay the current proceedings while the FDIC investigates to determine whether it has any legitimate claims against the defendants."

Discussion

As NERA Economic Consulting noted in its August 2010 study of failed bank litigation (here), private investor securities suits were "not a notable feature of the S&L crisis," because few of the institutions that failed during that era had conducted securities offerings. By contrast, private litigation against directors and officers of failed banks during the current wave have been "widespread." As a result, the FDIC is in a position of competing with investor claimants for dwindling D&O insurance policy proceeds, as the Haven Trust case demonstrates.

As I discussed in my prior post about the FDIC’s bid to intervene in the Haven Trust case, the claimants who may be competing with the FDIC for the D&O insurance policy proceeds include not only aggrieved investors, but in instances where the bank holding company is in bankruptcy, may also include the bankruptcy trustee.

In both of these kinds of cases, the claims against the individual defendants will be direct claims aimed against them in their capacities as directors and officers of the holding company. At least according to the logic of Judge Pannell’s decisions in the Haven Trust case, the FDIC’s rights as receiver may not be sufficient to allow the FDIC to control or otherwise take priority over these direct claims targeted at the holding company level.

The essential problem at the heart of all of these kinds of disputes is that the parties left aggrieved in the wake of a bank failure are set against one another in a scramble for the D&O insurance (or whatever might be left of it after defense expenses have eroded the limits). Meanwhile, the former directors and officers are put squarely in the crossfire, with heightened exposure to multiple conflicting claims. Whatever else might be the merits of Judge Pannell’s holding, the practical effect of his ruling is to exacerbate all of these forces.

From the FDIC’s perspective, Judge Pannell’s ruling, if followed by other courts, could put the FDIC in a quite a dilemma. On the one hand, the FDIC has been proceeding quite deliberately as part of its process of investigating bank failures and deciding whether to bring claims. (Indeed, even though 322 banks have failed since January 1, 2008, the FDIC has filed only two lawsuits against former directors and officers of failed banks).

On the other hand, however, if by proceeding deliberately the FDIC is to be disadvantaged in the scramble for D&O insurance policy proceeds, and if the FDIC is unable to intervene in and stay investor and trustee actions against former bank officials, it may find itself compelled to move more quickly to file suit, simply to try to preserve a part of the dwindling policy proceeds before the other claimants get there.

Whether or not the FDIC will now accelerate its investigative and litigious processes remains to be seen. But at a minimum, Judge Pannell’s ruling suggests that the FDIC does not have priority rights over the direct claims of bank holding company investors, which is a principle that could prove important in the numerous other failed bank-related proceedings.

Special thanks to the several loyal readers who sent me a copy of Judge Pannell’s ruling.

Editorial Note: In my January 3, 2011 post, I mentioned that I would be publishing a list of the top ten D&O stories of 2010 today (January 4, 2011). However, because of the several time sensitive developments (including the above), I will postpone the publication of the top ten list until later in the week. Sorry for any confusion.

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While the condition of commercial banks continues to improve overall, the number of "problems institutions" also continues to grow, in both absolute and percentage terms, according to the FDIC’s latest report on the banking industry. The FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile, dated November 23, 2010 and reporting figures through September 30, 2010, showed that the FDIC now rates 860 banks as problem institutions, up 829 at the end of the second quarter.

The increased numbers of problem banks stands in contrast to the overall tenor of the report. Tthe FDIC said that during the thing quarter the banking industry was characterized by "resilient revenues and improving asset quality." Year over year earnings improved for the fifth consecutive quarter. Indeed almost two out of three institutions reported higher net income than a year earlier.

Other signs are also positive. Quarterly provisions for loan losses were at the lowest quarterly amount since the fourth quarter of 2008, net charge-offs were lower than both the previous quarter and the year-earlier quarter, and industry assets continued to improve.

However, within this good news, some evidence of continuing difficulties also emerged. One in five banks continues to be unprofitable. The 860 institutions reported as problem institutions represent more than 11 percent of all 7,780 insured institutions. In other words, the FDIC ranks about one our of nine of all banks in the country as problem institutions.

(The FDIC considers a bank a "problem institution" if it is ranked as either a "4" or a "5" on the agency’s 1 to 5 scale of supervisory concern. Problem institutions are "those institutions with financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that threaten their continued financial viability." The FDIC does not publish the names of the banks it considers to be problem institutions.)

The 860 problem institutions at the end of the third quarter represent an increase of 308 problem institutions during the twelve months since September 30, 2009, or about 56%. This increase is all the more noteworthy given that 172 banks closed during that period and so fell off of the problem list.

The number of problem institutions at the end of the third quarter is the largest number of problem institutions since March 31, 1993, when there were 928.

One positive note is that while the number of problem institutions continues to increase, the aggregate assets represented by these problem institutions declined in the third quarter, to $379.2 billion, from $403.2 at the end of the second quarter. This is the second quarter in a row that the assets of problem banks have declined. The fact that aggregate assets are declining even as the total number of problem banks is increasing suggests that many of the newly added problem banks are smaller institutions.

A total of 314 banks have failed since January 1, 2008, with 149 during 2010 alone (so far). Yet the number of problem institutions continues to grow, which suggests that there could be more, possibly many more, bank failures yet to come. Although there had been some hope that the number of bank failures might have peaked and would now begin to taper off, the FDIC’s latest report suggests that we could continue to see bank closures well into 2011 and possible beyond.

In the meantime, as I recently noted, the FDIC reportedly is gearing up to pursue both civil and criminal proceedings against former directors and officers of the failed banks, while at the same time investors have also been pursuing their own separate claims. It seems highly probable that these claim-related activities will escalate in the months ahead.

A November 23, 2010 New York Times article about the FDIC’s report can be found here.

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The FDIC has authorized more than 50 lawsuits against former directors and officers of failed banks, according to an October 8, 2010 Bloomberg article. But merely because the lawsuits have been authorized does not necessarily mean we will see 50 lawsuits, as it appears that the FDIC approval was calculated in part to encourage pre-litigation settlements.

Since January 1, 2008, the FDIC has taken control of 294 banking institutions, as detailed here. The FDIC has been a very active litigant seeking to assert its rights of priority over other litigants’ claims against the directors and officers of failed banks, but the FDIC itself has filed only one lawsuit against the senior officials at a failed bank.

Though the FDIC has to date pursued relatively little litigation itself, it has asserted claims against individuals at failed banks. These claims have come in the form of demand letters nominally addressed to the individuals but also with copies to the failed institution’s D&O insurers.

For example, as discussed here, the FDIC filed a November 24, 2009 motion in the BankUnited Holding Company bankruptcy proceeding asserting its rights of priority to assert claims against Company’s bank unit’s directors and officer. Attached to the motion was a copy of a November 5, 2009 letter the FDIC’s attorneys sent to former directors and officers of BankUnited, in which the FDIC presented a demand for civil damages and losses. Copies of the letter were sent to the company’s primary and first level excess D&O insurers.

With its recent litigation authorization, the FDIC may now proceed to file more lawsuits against directors and officers of failed banks. However, the authorization (and surrounding publicity) may have been calculated to try to avoid litigation and encourage pre-litigation settlement in connection with some of the claims the FDIC has previously asserted in the form of demand letters like the one in BankUnited.

Along those lines, the Bloomberg article quotes an FDIC spokesman as saying that "the goal is to reach as many settlements as possible," adding further that "it’s both in our interest and theirs to try and settle this matter before it gets into court and we get into expensive litigation." Thus, it appears that the authorization and surrounding publicity is designed in part to encourage settlements before available funds have been reduced by defense expenses.

The article cites the FDIC’s estimate that the 50 authorized lawsuits would represent an effort to try to recoup more than $1 billion in losses. By way of comparison, and according to the NERA’ August 2010 report on failed bank litigation (about which refer here), during the S&L crisis, the FDIC recovered about $1.3 billion in D&O claims.

In terms of the number of lawsuits filed, the 50 currently authorized lawsuits would represent about 17% of the 294 banks that have failed since January 1, 2008. During the S&L crisis, the FDIC filed lawsuits in connection with about 24% of the 1.813 failed financial institutions -- meaning roughly 435 lawsuits. Because the institutions failing during the current banking crisis are larger than the institutions that failed during the S&L crisis, the potential litigation recoveries in connection with many of the current failed institutions are proportionately larger.

Even though the FDIC want to try to settle cases if it can, it seems probable that it soon will be filing lawsuits, perhaps many of them in the days ahead. The Bloomberg article quotes the FDIC’s spokesman as saying that "we’re ready to go," adding that "we could walk into court tomorrow and file the lawsuits."

As a loyal reader said, commenting on the reports of the FDIC’s litigation authorization, "Game on." Indeed.

UPDATE: In picking up this story, various news sources have clarified that the FDIC did not authorize 50 lawsuits but rather authorized lawsuits against 50 individuals. Refer for example here. At least one knowledgeable source I consulted confirmed that what the FDIC authorzied was not 50 separate lawsuits, but rather lawsuits against 50 indiviudals. The expectation then is that there might be 5 to 10 lawsuits, which is quite a bit different than 50 lawsuits. Hard to see how the FDIC plans to get to $1 billion in recoveries from that level of litigation activity.

Special thanks to the several readers who sent me copies of the Bloomberg article.

Morgan Keegan Funds ’33 Act Subprime-Related Claims Survive Dismissal: In a September 30, 2010 order (here), Middle District of Tennessee Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr. granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the ’34 Act claims but denied the motions to dismiss the ’33 Act claims in the Regions Morgan Keegan Open-End Mutual Fund securities class action litigation.

Plaintiffs are investors in three Morgan Keegan select mutual funds. The defendants are the funds themselves, their corporately affiliated asset manager, related corporate entities, as well as their corporate parent. The defendants include individual officers and directors of the funds and related entities.

The plaintiffs’ allegation is basically that the funds invested in CDOs and other illiquid subprime mortgage-backed investments in excess of stated restrictions on the funds’ investments. The plaintiffs contend that their investment losses are not the result of normal market factors, but rather are due to the funds investment in lower-priority tranches of asset-backed securities. When the market for the instruments began to decline in 2007, the funds found themselves holding assets that quickly declined in value and which they could not readily sell because of the limited market for such investments. Two of the funds declined in value over 70 percent, the third declined over 20 percent.

In reviewing the motions to dismiss, Judge Mays noted that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint "exceeds four hundred pages, comprising 766 paragraphs and six appendices." This extraordinary length may in the end have weighed against the plaintiffs. Judge Mays observed that "when it is possible to ask legitimately, after reading a four-hundred page Complaint, who is being sued for what on a particular count, Plaintiffs have not met the PSLRA’s pleading standards," adding that "it is not for the Court or for Defendants to ask who is ‘relevant’ to a particular count. It is the plaintiffs’ duty to state clearly against whom they seek damages." Judge Mays found that dismissal of the ’34 Act claims on this basis alone is sufficient.

Judge Mays went on, assuming for the sake of analysis that the plaintiffs claims had been pled with sufficient particularity, to hold that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently pled scienter. In attempting to establish scienter, the plaintiffs had relied on the "group pleading" doctrine. Judge Mays assumed for purposes of his opinion that group pleading had survived the PSLRA, but nevertheless concluded that "plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the inference of scienter is at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent."

But while Judge Mays granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ ’34 Act claims, he denied the defendants motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ ’33 Act claims, finding that the plaintiffs had adequately identified the allegedly misleading statements in order to state a claim.

I have added the Morgan Keegan ruling to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

Indian Summer: Wikipedia’s various supposed explanations for the origins of the phrase "Indian Summer" seem equally implausible and lack the ring of truth. Whatever the origin of the expression, the weather to which it refers is a delight and a balm in our weary world. In a few short weeks, the winds will howl and the snows will blow. But for now, a beneficent sun shines in an azure sky arching over the changing leaves' brilliant colors. It is enough to make your heart glad.

Horseshoe Lake, Shaker Heights, Ohio, October 9, 2010

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With one lone exception, the FDIC has not yet itself pursued litigation against the directors and officers of a failed financial institution. However, the FDIC has already made it clear that it intends to assert its rights under FIRREA as the receiver of failed banks to take control of shareholders’ derivative lawsuits.

More recently, and perhaps more aggressively, the FDIC is now attempting to intervene in two direct shareholder actions where failed institutions’ aggrieved investors are asserting their own claims, rather than derivatively asserting those of the failed institution. These more recent moves may represent efforts not just to assert but to extend the FDIC’s litigation preclusion rights. The FDIC’s actions are interesting in and of themselves, but also for what the FDIC has claimed in asserting its rights.

The FDIC’s most recent move in this direction is its October 4, 2010 motion to intervene in the Haven Trust Bancorp securities class action litigation pending in the Northern District of Georgia. A copy of the FDIC’s memorandum in support of its motion to intervene can be found here. Haven Trust Bancorp was the parent corporation for Haven Trust Bank, a Duluth, Georgia failed bank of which the FDIC took control on December 12, 2008.

The FDIC has previously moved to intervene in the negligent misrepresentation lawsuit that individual investors had filed in Fulton County (Georgia) State Court against certain former directors and officers of Georgian Bancorp. A copy of the FDIC’s September 23, 2010 motion to intervene, and accompanying motion to remove the case to federal court upon grant of the intervention, can be found here. Georgian Bancorp was the corporate parent of Georgian Bank, of which the FDIC took control on September 25, 2010. My prior post about the Georgian Bancorp case can be found here.

Both of these lawsuits are direct, not derivative, actions. In each case the plaintiffs seek to recover damages in the form of their own lost investment interests. In asserting that it nevertheless has the right to intervene, the FDIC raises a number of interesting arguments.

First, in both cases, the FDIC asserts that both cases are basically just derivative lawsuits in disguise. Thus, for example, in the Haven Trust case, the FDIC asserts that "although Plaintiffs have attempted to frame their allegations of wrongdoing and damages in terms of securities fraud and misrepresentations …Plaintiffs’ alleged losses clearly emanate from the fact that the Bank, as sole asset of the Holding Company, became worthless upon the appointment of the FDIC as receiver for the Bank." In the Georgian case, the FDIC asserts that the plaintiffs’ claim is "in substance a derivative claim." The FDIC asserts, the shareholders’ claims are, in effect, "double derivative" claims.

Second, the FDIC asserts that as receiver of the respective banks, under 12 U.S.C. Section 1821 it has succeeded to "all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution, and of any stockholder … of such institution with respect to the institution and the assets of the institution." In reliance on this provision, the FDIC asserts as an initial matter that it has priority rights to assert the claims presented in the respective plaintiffs’ complaints, because they are essentially derivative complaints.

The FDIC’s further argument in reliance on this statutory provision is with reference to the respective institutions’ D&O insurance policies. Thus, for example, the FDIC asserts in the Georgian case that among the assets with respect to which it assumed priority upon being appointed receiver was Georgian’s D&O insurance policy, which "provides limited and finite monies for claims covered by the Policy and may be the only source of recovery against the Defendants in this or any subsequent lawsuit."

The FDIC points out further that the D&O policy is a "wasting asset" that would be reduced by defending the plaintiffs’ claims. The FDIC has the right to intervene, it therefore asserts, because "its ability to recover in a subsequent lawsuit will be affected by any judgment in this action or protracted litigation."

The FDIC is even more explicit about the possibility of its pursuing claims in its intervention motion in the Haven Trust case. There the FDIC explicitly stated that its investigation includes examination of the "acts and/or omissions of the Bank’s former officers and directors in connection with their management of the Bank’s affairs." The FDIC states that after completing its investigation it will determine "whether claims should be brought against any individual or entity," noting that "several of the defendants in this case, as former officers and/or directors of the Bank, are potential targets."

There are a number of concerns with the grounds on which the FDIC is moving to intervene. First, the FDIC completely disregards the investors’ own legal right to assert their own claims for their own alleged financial injuries. Second, and perhaps more to the point, the investors are asserting their claims as shareholders of the parent holding companies of the failed banks, not of the failed banks themselves. The FDIC’s priority rights extend to its rights as receiver of the failed bank. Whether the FDIC can assert rights on behalf of the parent holding company of the failed bank is a potentially contentious proposition.

Section 1821 (d)(2)(A)(i), on which the FDIC relies to assert its priority rights, refers to the rights, titles, etc., of the "insured depositary institution, and of any shareholder …of such institution." However, the plaintiffs’ in this shareholder suits are not asserting rights as shareholders of the institution, but of the parent holding company. The FDIC may or may not be able to persuade a court to make the leap from its rights as receiver of the failed bank to the rights of the shareholders of the bank’s parent company, but the argument seems to strain the language of the provision.

Finally, the FDIC may indeed be interested in preserving the D&O policies, but there is nothing about Section 1821 that gives the FDIC priority to the proceeds of the policy, in preference to other prospective claimants. The insurance proceeds are not a cash fund like an investment account: rather, the proceeds are available only for payment of certain kinds of loss arising from claims. The policy itself may be an asset of the estate, but the proceeds are available only pursuant to the terms and conditions of the policy, only for payment of claims, and the rights of the insureds and the claimants to the proceeds of the policy are determined by the policy’s own terms.

Whatever else may be said about the FDIC’s actions in moving to intervene in these case, they do show both that the FDIC is actively considering pursuing its own lawsuits, and that it is will to move aggressively to preserve its own recovery prospects in the event it subsequently decides to pursue lawsuits. The pretty clear message is that the FDIC does intend to pursue lawsuits, too.

As if the prospect of competing lawsuits from both investors and regulators were not daunting enough for directors and officers of failed institutions (and their insurers), a lawsuit recently filed in South Carolina suggests yet another type of prospective claimant that may be asserting claims against failed banks’ directors and officers.

On September 29, 2010, the trustee for the estate of Beach First National Bankshares filed a lawsuit in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina against certain directors and officers of the bankrupt company. A copy of the complaint can be found here. The company’s wholly owned subsidiary, First National Bank of Myrtle Beach, was closed on April 9, 2010 The Trustee’s complaint asserts claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.

While the Trustee may have seized the initiative in this case, there would seem to be the possibility that the FDIC might yet seek to intervene in the Trustee’s case just as it did in the cases described above. Disappointed shareholders might also seek to assert their own claims for harm to their own investment interests, particularly since the First National holding company is a publicly traded company.

The possibility of claims asserted by these various prospective and active claimants underscores how one of the consequences of a bank failure may be a scramble for the proceeds of the insurance policy. The FDIC may well contend that under FIRREA it has certain priorities but other claimants are also highly motivated to circumvent the FDIC’s asserted rights.

Of course in the end the FDIC may establish its priority. But in the meantime, the scramble for the D&O insurance could become quite a circus. And in the center ring could be the directors and officers of the failed institutions – and their insurers – against whom the competing claimants will assert their claims. The likelihood for further D&O litigation involving failed banks’ directors and officers seems high.

One final thought about the FDIC's interventions in the two case discussed above -- there have been a fair number of shareholder class actions brought by investors in failed financial institutions. It will be interesting to see how far the FDIC goes with thie intervention tactic and whether it will seek to intervene in other cases involving larger financial institutions. Perhaps its initiatives in the two Georgia lawsuits are test cases that will determine whether it will seek to intervene elsewhere.

Many thanks to a loyal reader for providing copies of the various pleadings to which I linked above.

A copy of an October 3, 2010 Myrtle Beach Sun News article about the Beach First Trustee’s lawsuit can be found here. (Full disclosure, I was interviewed in connection with the article.)

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According to the FDIC’s Second Quarter 2010 Quarterly Banking Profile, which the agency released on August 31, 2010, aggregate indicators of banking institutions’ financial health are improving, but at the same time the number of "problem institutions" also continues to increase. The FDIC’s August 31, 2010 press release about the Quarterly Banking Profile can be found here.

The positive news is that the industry’s 2Q10 earnings of $21.6 billion are the highest since the third quarter of 2008. Almost two-thirds of the banks reported higher year-over-year quarterly net income. However, 20 percent of institutions did report quarterly net losses (compared to 29 percent 2Q09).

The quarterly report also reflects that provisions for loan losses, while "still high by historic standards," represented the smallest total since the first quarter of 2008. Fewer borrowers are falling behind on their loan payments. With respect to just about every type of loan, troubled loans declined for the first time in more than four years. The only exception was commercial real estate loans, which continued to show increased weakness.

Despite this relatively good news, the number of problem institutions increased in the second quarter, to 829, up about 7% from the 775 problem institutions at the end of 1Q10, up 18% from the 702 problem institutions at the end of 2009, and up almost 100% from the 416 at June 30, 2009. (The FDIC defines a "problem institution" as those it rates as "4" or a "5" on its one-to-five scale of rating banks’ financial and operating criteria. The FDIC does not disclose the names of the problem institutions.)

The number of problem institutions is the highest since March 31, 1993, when there were 928.

To put the latest number of problem institutions into perspective, at the end of the second quarter, there were a total of 7,830 insured institutions. So the 829 problem banks represent about 10.6% of all insured institutions.

Or to put it a different way, one out of every ten banks in the United States is a problem institution. (And that’s after the 283 banks that have failed since January 1, 2008 have been taken out of the equation).

Though the number of problem institutions increased in the quarter, the assets associated with these banks did decrease. The 829 problem institutions at the end of the second quarter represented assets of about $403 billion, down slightly from the $431 billion that represented by the 775 problem institutions at the end of 1Q10.

To put the assets associated with the problem institutions into perspective, the collective assets of all insured institutions totals $13.2 trillion. The $403 billion in assets associated with the problem institutions represents about 3.1% of the industry’s total assets.

One other sign that the banking industry as a whole may not yet be in the clear, notwithstanding the relatively positive industry news overall, is that during the second quarter and for the first time in the 38 years for which data is available, there were no new insured institutions.

Since January 1, 2008, 283 banks have failed, 118 in 2010 alone. But even with the growing numbers of failures (each one of which presumably reduces the number of problem institutions by a count of one), the number of problem institutions continues to grow. The likelihood seems to be that the number of failed banks will continue to grow for some time to come.

Eric Dash’s August 31, 2010 New York Times article about the report can be found here.

Ain't Too Proud to Beg: The D&O Diary has been selected as a nominee candidate for the LexisNexis Top 25 Business Law Blogs of 2010. The ultimate list of the Top 25 blogs will be chosen based on comment submited by members of either of two LexisNexis business law communities, the Corporate & Securities Law Community and the UCC, Commercial Contracts and Business Law Community. If you are a registered member of either of these communities, I would appreciate your comment in support. Members of the Corporate & Securities Law Community can submit comments here, and members of the UCC, Commercial Contracts and Business Law Community can submit comments here. The deadline for comments is October 8, 2010.

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In recent months, I have documented on this blog the rising tide of failed banks as well as the ensuing failed bank related litigation. An August 16, 2010 report by Paul Hinton of NERA Economic Consulting entitled "Failed Bank Litigation" (here) takes a comprehensive view of the economics and causes of recent bank failures, compares the recent bank failure wave to the S&L crisis, and analyses the implications for litigation against the directors and offices of the failed institutions. The report contains a wide variety of different kind of information that readers will find interesting and useful.

Bank Failures to Date

The report begins with an analysis of the causes of the bank failures to date. The report notes that the earliest failures in the current wave derived from "losses in residential real estate and their structured finance businesses," but more recently the bank failures have been "characterized by smaller institutions that are more specialized in financing local businesses, commercial mortgages and real-estate development."

The report specifically notes that banks that went on to fail were held worse performing loans in each loan category than banks overall. These banks were also "less well prepared to deal with expected losses," since their allowance for loan losses at the beginning of the credit crisis were "not correspondingly higher," but instead were "lower than for all other banks."

Possible Future Bank Failures

Looking ahead, though the economy has improved and banks overall are showing signs of recover, the number of problem banks continues to rise and loan performance has yet to turn around. Many community banks may be burdened as a result of their issuance of trust preferred securities, the holders of which have priority rights in the event of bank failure, which could deter prospective investors. A wider concern for community banks is "the risk posed by continuing financial distress in commercial real estate markets," an issue I explored at length in a prior report here.

The report notes that one group of banks particularly at risk are "community banks with high [construction and development, or C&D] loan concentrations and the smallest allowances for loan losses compared to their level of non-performing loans." Another high-risk group of institutions are banks that are "under-provisioned and that have relatively high levels of non-performing loans."

Comparison to the S&L Crisis

Though the number of failed banks so far in the current wave is lower than the number that failed during the S&L crisis, "the losses incurred in 2009 are larger than all but one year of losses during the S&L crisis (expressed in 2010 dollars)," because the average size of banking institutions and savings institutions has increased since the time of the S&L Crisis. The average per failed bank loss in the current crisis ($303 million) is more than three times larger in 2010 dollars than for banks in the S&L crisis and were attributable to banks that were about two and a half times as big.

The factors contributing to bank failures in the current failed bank wave appear similar to the factors the FDIC identified as having caused bank failures during the S&L crisis. That is, economic conditions were "secondary to poor management and other internal problems."

Many readers will find the reports analyses of the banking regulators’ S&L crisis-related litigation track record particularly interesting. Among other things, the report documents (in Figure 14) that the FDIC pursued D&O claims with respect to about one-quarter of failed institutions. The report also shows (in Figure 15) that the FDIC’s peak recoveries lagged peak bank failures by about three years, which may be suggestive of the likely recovery track for the current bank failures.

Of particular interest is the detail (in Figure 16) regarding the FDIC’s professional liability claims recoveries during the period 1990-1995 (when most, but not all, of the FDIC’s S&L Crisis-related recoveries took place.). The chart shows that overall, excluding recoveries related to Drexel Burnham and excluding further criminal restitutions, the FDIC recovered $3.2 billion, $1.3 billion of which was from D&O claims, $1.15 billion of which was from accounting claims, and $500 million of which was from attorney malpractice claims. Another $300 million was from fidelity bond claims.

Failed Bank Litigation

The report details the FDIC’s special litigation authority under FIREEA (about which refer here), while noting that the FDIC’s special standing may not entirely preclude the claims of private litigants. Though the FDIC has to date filed only one action against former directors and officers of failed banks, all signs are that the FDIC is readying itself to bring more claims, as the report details.

Among other things, the report notes that many of the failed and troubled banks in the current wave are publicly traded, by comparison to the S&L crisis, when almost none of the failed institutions are publicly traded. As a result, there is much more investor related litigation this time around than there was during the prior crisis.

The report notes that of the roughly 240 credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuits, there were 45 against depository institutions (after excluding auction-rate securities cases). Eleven were filed against failed banks. Of the 20 banks that failed prior to 2010 and that produced the largest losses. 13 were publicly traded, of which eight have been sued in securities class action lawsuits as of the end of 2009.

The report notes that the private litigants will compete with the FDIC for D&O insurance, and while the FDIC is generally first in line to recover assets, private litigants may be able to recover against insurance assets even when the FDIC is not (for example, where the D&O policy has a regulatory exclusion that would preclude coverage for the FDIC’s claim but not for the investors’ claims).

Though there is already extensive litigation and more seems likely to come, all claimants, including even the FDIC, will face a basic causation problem; as the report concludes, "distinguishing the effects of underwriting practices from the effects of a deteriorating economy will be one of the important elements of this litigation." These cases "will require careful case-by-case economic analysis."

Conclusion

Overall, this report is useful and informative. Readers will undoubtedly find the report’s distillation of important background information and analysis in a single source to be particularly helpful.

Many D&O insurance professionals in particular will find this report to be helpful, particularly those involved with either the placement of D&O insurance for banking institutions or those involved in claims arising under those policies. Underwriters and brokers will find the report’s analysis of the causes of bank failures and the likely causes of future failures informative. Those involved in claims and claims administration will find the aggregate date from the S&L crisis claims particularly useful.

Special thanks to the report’s author, Paul Hinton, for providing me with a copy of the report. I would also like to thank Paul for his numerous citations to this blog in his report.

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On July 2, 2010, in what is as far as I am aware the first suit by the FDIC against former directors and officers of a failed bank as part of the current wave of bank failures, the FDIC as receiver of IndyMac filed a lawsuit in the Central District of California against four former officers of IndyMac’s Homebuilder Division (HBD). 

Very special thanks to Peter Christensen of the Appraiser Law blog for providing links to the complaint.

The FDIC took control of IndyMac on July 11, 2008. At the time, the outstanding balance on HBD’s portfolio of homebuilder loans was nearly $900 million. The FDIC alleges in its complaint that IndyMac’s losses "are estimated to exceed $500 million."

The lawsuit is filed against Scott Van Dellen, HBD’s former President and CEO, who is alleged to have approved all of the loans that are the subject of the FDIC’s suit; Richard Koon, who was HBD’s Chief Lending Officer until mid-2006 and who is alleged to have approved at least 40 of the loans at issue; Kenneth Shellem, who served as HBD’s Chief Compliance Officer until late 2006, and who is alleged to have approved at least 57 of the loans at issue; ;and William Rothman, who served as HBD’s Chief Lending Officer from mid-2006 and who is alleged to have approved at least 34 of the loans at issue.

The lawsuit seeks to recover damages from the four individual defendants for "negligence and breach of fiduciary duties." The lawsuit alleges "two significant departures from safe and sound banking practices."

First, the complaint alleges that HBD’s management "repeatedly disregarded HBD’s credit policies and approved loans to borrowers who were not creditworthy and/or for projects that provided insufficient collateral." The complaint further alleges that HBD’s compensation plans encouraged HBD’s management to "push for growth in loan production volume with little regard for credit quality."

Second, HBD’s management is alleged to have "continued to follow a strategy for growth at the tail-end of the longest appreciating real estate market in over four decades," despite management’s alleged "awareness that a significant downturn in the market was imminent and despite warnings from IndyMac’s upper management about the likelihood of a market decline." HBD’s management allegedly "unwisely continued operations in homebuilder lending in deteriorating markets even after becoming aware of the market decline.

The FDIC’s complaint, which sprawls to some 309 pages, details a litany of allegedly negligent lending practices, including approving loans where repayment sources were not likely to be sufficient; where the loans violated applicable laws and the Bank’s own internal policies; where the loans were made to borrowers who "were or should have been known to be not creditworthy and/or in financial distress; based on inadequate or inaccurate financial information; without taking proper and reasonable steps to insure that the loan proceeds would be used in accordance with the loan application.

The complaint is very detailed and reflects painstaking preparation. A lot of time and effort went into the preparation of this complaint, which may in and of itself explain why the FDIC has not up until this point filed other complaints against directors and officers of failed banks. If the FDIC is taking similar measures in connection with other claims that it might be considering, it is little wonder that there have been no claims up until this point. Complaints containing this level of specificity and painstaking detail will take a significant amount of time to prepare.

There are some particular reason why IndyMac attracted one of the first claims. First, the FDIC took control of IndyMac relatively early in the current round of bank failures – it has been almost exactly two years since IndyMac closed, meaning the FDIC has had a greater amount of time to review the circumstances that led up to IndyMac’s failure and consider potential claims. When the FDIC took control of IndyMac, it was only the fifth bank failure that year, meaning that IndyMac was among the earliest of the current bank failures.

But perhaps even more important that its timing was the sheer size of IndyMac’s failure. At the time of its closure, IndyMac had assets of about $32 billion, making its closure the second largest bank failure during the current wave of bank failures (exceeded only by the closure of Washington Mutual, which had assets of $307 billion).

More to the point, IndyMac’s failure triggered losses to the FDIC’s insurance fund of $8 billion, by far the largest amount of any bank failure during the current round. The magnitude of these losses suggests possible motivations for the FDIC to give priority to claims relating to IndyMac.

While the recently filed IndyMac claim may be the first claim the FDIC has filed against former directors and officers of a failed bank as part of the current bank failure wave, it is surely not the last. (Indeed, it may not even be the last filed against former IndyMac officials.) Statistics reported by the Alston & Bird firm suggest that during the last wave of bank failures in the S&L crisis, the FDIC filed claims in connection with about 24% of all bank failures.

The fact that the FDIC appears poised to pursue many additional claims against bank officials represents a threat both to the individuals themselves and to the bank’s D&O liability insurers. The extent to which the FDIC’s efforts result in significant recoveries will depend on a wide variety of factors, the most important of which is the extent to which the FDIC can successfully allege individual liability. But beyond that, the FDIC’s ability to actually recover money will depend on identifying and accessing funding sources.

The extent to which the FDIC will succeed in recovering substantial amounts of D&O insurance will depend on a host of factors, including in particular the terms and conditions of the applicable policies. Claims made and notice of claims issues will be highly relevant, as will potential policy exclusions, such as, for example, the regulatory exclusion, which insurers added to many policies in recent years. These insurance coverage questions suggest the likelihood that in addition to a round of claims against former officials of failed banks, we are also likely to see a parallel round of insurance coverage litigation.

In addition to the FDIC’s recent action, there has also been extensive litigation involving IndyMac’s shareholders, as detailed here. Most recently, on March 29, 2010, Central District of California Judge George Wu certified an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit of his denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ sixth amended complaint.

Bank Failure Wave Continues: Meanwhile, while the FDIC cranks up its litigation efforts, it is continuing to take control of additional banking institutions. This past Friday evening, July 9, 2010, the FDIC took control of four additional banks, bringing the 2010 total number of failed banks to 90.

Through June 30, 2010, the FDIC had closed 86 banks, which put the FDIC on pace to close 172 banks this year, compared to 140 in 2009 and only 25 in 2008. Indeed, by way of comparison, as of June 30, 2009, the FDIC had closed only 40 banks, as the pace of bank failures quickened substantially in the second half of 2009 and continued into 2010.

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The FDIC in its status as receiver of a failed bank may not avoid rescission of a fidelity bond procured by material misrepresentation, notwithstanding the FDIC’s statutory receiver rights, according to a June 7, 2010 Second Circuit decision. This decision represents an important interpretation of the FDIC’s statutory rights as receiver, and could prove to be an important precedent in future insurance-related litigation arising out to the current round of failed banks. The Second Circuit’s June 7 opinion can be found here.

Background

In 1999, Connecticut Bank of Commerce (CBC) entered an agreement to acquire MTB Bank. The transaction closed March 30, 2000. Prior to the deal’s closing, two things happened of relevance to the subsequent insurance dispute.

First, MTB discovered that its agents had advanced $950,000 based on fraudulent invoices in connection a business deal involving Harmony Designs. MTB noticed its fidelity bond carrier regarding the Harmony Designs matter, although MTB ultimately reduced its loss below the amount of the deductible.

Second, in March 2000, before the CBC deal closed, MTB’s president and other officers were indicted in an alleged conspiracy involving the imposition of Argentinean minerals. MTB also noticed its fidelity bond insurer regarding the indictments.

After the CBC deal closed, CBC was added to MTB’s fidelity bond. As the bond’s June 30, 2000 expiration approached, CBC sought to renew it. The insurer declined to renew unless CBC came to London to provide additional information in connection with the renewal. The insurer also refused to extend the bond period 30 days.

CBC declined to visit London as the fidelity bond insurer had requested. Instead, CBC obtained replacement fidelity bond coverage from a different insurer. In order to secure this replacement coverage, CBC completed and submitted a policy application that required CBC, among other things, to disclose losses sustained during the preceding three years; whether there were additional circumstances relevant to the application; and whether insurance had been declined or canceled during the past three years. Post-binding, CBC completed the replacement insurer’s separate application form, which also asked questions related to past losses and whether CBC had had insurance declined or canceled.

CBC answered "None" or "No" to these application questions. CBC did not disclose or identify the Harmony Designs loss, the indictments, or the predecessor insurer’s actions in connection with the fidelity bond insurance renewal application.

CBC went into receivership in June 2002. In 2006, the FDIC as receiver sued CBC’s fidelity bond insurer alleging breach of contract for dishonoring claims under the bond for CBC’s losses related to a loan scheme used to fund MTB’s acquisition.

The district court granted the fidelity bond insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that it properly rescinded the bond based on CBC’s application misrepresentations and omissions. The FDIC appealed.

The June 7, 2010 Opinion

In a June 7, 2010 opinion by Southern District of New York Judge John Keenan (sitting by designation on the Second Circuit), the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment on behalf of the fidelity bond insurer.

In seeking to overturn the district court’s opinion, the FDIC had sought to rely on its rights under 12 U.S.C. Section 1823(e), which protects the FDIC from defenses not apparent on the face of an asset it acquires as a receiver of a failed bank. The FDIC argued that this provision bars the fidelity bond insurer’s misrepresentation defense.

The Second Circuit held (contrary to a prior holding in the Sixth Circuit) that a fidelity bond is in fact an "asset" to which this provision applies. However, the Second Circuit rejected the FDIC’s argument that this provision bars the fidelity bond insurer’s policy defenses.

The Second Circuit said that the provision is intended to "bar ‘secret’ defenses which would diminish the FDIC’s interests in a failed bank’s assets," but that "defenses raised by the bond itself may prevent recovery by the FDIC."

The Second Circuit found that "as the grounds for rescission were plainly stated on the face of the bond, there is nothing secret about [the fidelity bond insurer’s] misrepresentation defense." To recognize the FDIC’s position, the Second Circuit said, would be to "strike the rescission clause from the bond."

In the final portion of its opinion, the Second Circuit went on to hold that each of the three alleged misrepresentations separately provided sufficient ground to support rescission. The Second Circuit found that the omission of the information about the Harmony Designs loss, about the indictments, and about the prior insurer’s refusal to renew or extend each separately representing sufficient grounds for rescission.

The Second Circuit’s holdings about the sufficiency of the fidelity bond insurer’s basis for rescission are quite broad. Among other things, the Second Circuit said that "information about previous losses is presumptively material," and "the determination of risk is one properly left to the insurer, not the insured, and the insurer cannot make an accurate risk assessment without full disclosure from the applicant."

Discussion

It seems probable that in connection with the current wave of bank failures that the FDIC as receiver to the failed banks will attempt to recover under the failed banks’ insurance policies. The Second Circuit’s holding in the CBC case underscores the fact that notwithstanding the FDIC’s receivership status, and the statutory rights that status may entail, the FDIC’s ability to enforce the failed bank’s insurance coverage is subject to the defenses the insurer may have that appear in the relevant policies.

To that extent, at least, the Second Circuit’s opinion could be relevant to may arise in the wake of the FDIC’s attempt as receiver to recover under the failed banks’ insurance policies.

The CBC opinion is relevant for another reason that arguably is completely independent of the FDIC’s involvement in this dispute. That is, the opinion starkly demonstrates the critical importance of the policy application process and the extent of the insurer’s rights, under certain circumstances, to seek rescission. The Second Circuit’s view of the applicant’s obligation to provide responsive information is broad and encompassing.

The Second Circuit’s rescission holding seems to reflect a perception that CBC knew that if it disclosed the prior losses it would be unable to secure replacement fidelity bond coverage. To that extent, the rescission holding may reflect the somewhat distinct circumstances of the case. However, the Second Circuit’s rhetoric is broad and is not delimited to the referenced circumstances. The breadth of the ruling rescission ruling could well prove helpful to insurers in other rescission cases, even those lacking the distinctive characteristics of this case.

Financial Reform Impact on the Insurance Industry: In a prior post (here), I noted that the Senate’s version of the financial reform bill includes a number of specific reforms that particularly impact the insurance industry.

In a June 7, 2010 memo entitled "The Impact on the Insurance Industry of the Financial Regulatory Reform Bills: A Legislative Update" (here), the Simpson Thacher law firm examines and compares the various insurance industry reforms proposed in the House and Senate versions of the reform legislation.

The memo details the numerous insurance industry measures that are substantially similar in the two bills, suggesting that the provisions are likely to survive the current conference process. Among other things, the provisions intended to streamline the regulation of reinsurance and nonadmitted insurance are "substantially identical in both bills, and are therefore likely be enacted into law, as are a number of other measures.

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According to the FDIC’s Quarterly Banking Profile for the 1^st Quarter of 2010, released on May 20, 2010 (here), results for reporting banks "contained positive signs of recovery for the industry," reflecting "clear improvement in certain performance indicators." Nevertheless, the number of "problem" institutions at quarter end increased to 775, up from 702 at the end of 2009 and representing 10% of all reporting institutions.

The positive signs include such things as lower provisions for loan loss reserves and reduced expenses for goodwill impairment. These and other factors contributed to reported earnings at FDIC-insured institutions of $18 billion, the highest quarterly total since the first quarter of 2008.

However, some of these positive sign look somewhat less reassuring on closer scrutiny. Thus, for example, though the reporting institutions reported $10.2 less in loan loss reserve increases than they had in the first quarter of 2009, only about one-third of all institutions reported year-over-year declines, with most of the overall reduction concentrated among a few of the largest banks.

In addition, there are indicators that some concerns have not yet started to improve. For example, the total number of loans at least three months past due climbed for the 16th consecutive quarter. The Wall Street Journal quotes FDIC chairman Sheila Bair as saying that "The banking system still has many problems to work through, and we cannot ignore the possibility of more financial market volatility,"

This uneven distribution of the positive signs and the continuing concerns in some areas helps explain at least in part how the number of "problem" institutions continues to grow despite the positive signs in the industry.

The FDIC defines "problem" institutions as those with "financial, operations or managerial weaknesses that threaten continued financial viability." These institutions are rated as "4" or "5" on the FDIC’s 1-to-5 scale of financial and operational criteria.

As of March 31, 2010, there were 725 "problem" institutions, which is the highest number since 1993. The 775 institutions represent total assets of $431,189 million. These figures also represent increases in the number of "problem" institutions and total assets of 154% and 96% respectively over the equivalent figures as of March 31, 2009, when there were 305 "problem" institutions representing $220,047 million in assets.

This increase over that period is all the more striking given that during the same 12 month period, the number of "problem" institutions was being reduced as some of those institutions changed their status from "problem" to "failed." During the period March 31, 2009 to March 31, 2010, the FDIC took control of 160 banks, which makes the growth in the number of "problem" institutions during that period all the more striking.

The March 31, 2010 "problem" institution figures also represent increases of 10% and 7%, respectively, in the number of institutions and total assets since December 31, 2009, when there were 702 "problem institutions" representing $402,782 in total assets.

Though the number of "problem" institutions continues to grow, the pressure on the FDIC may be beginning to ease. According to a May 19, 2010 New York Times article (here), the growing willingness of private investors to step in with financial investments in some trouble institutions is a positive sign that may mean fewer failed banks.

Interestingly, among the specific institutions the Times article mentions as having attracted private investment capital are banks that have also recently attracted securities class action lawsuits, including Synovus Financial, Sterling Financial, and Pacific Capital Corporation. (Perhaps the investment explains in part why the class action plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their suit against Pacific Capital Bancorp, about which refer here.)

Once consequence of the improving banking industry conditions and the increasing willingness of private investors to step in is that there may be few total number of bank failures than some observers had previously projected. Thus, even those who had predicted 1,000 bank failures (a figure I questioned at the time they were first pronounced), now, according to the Times article, "foresee perhaps 500 to 750 bank failures."

If the continued pace of bank failures continues unabated through the end of 2011, we could perhaps reach a total number of bank failures of as many as 500 to 750 banks. (There have been 357 bank failures since January 1, 2008.) However, the positive signs indicating improvements in the banking sector and the return of private investors offers some hope that at some point the number of bank failures may begin to decline. Indeed, the Journal article quotes FDIC officials as saying that the bank failures will probably peak in 2010.

But for now, with the most current FDIC figures indicating an increase in the number of "problem" institutions, signs are that bank failures will continue to accumulate, at least for the near term.

"Beyond Tone Deaf": Though the $250 million punitive damages award in the Novartis class action gender discrimination case is outside of The D&O Diary’s usual bailiwick, it still caught our attention. There undoubtedly will be further proceedings in the case, but for eye-popping jury verdict is attracting scrutiny.

Those interested in trying to understand what the company may have done to get his with a punitive damages award of that magnitude will want to read Susan Beck’s scathing May 19, 2010 Am Law Litigation Daily column (here).

According to Beck, referring to the company’s trial counsel Richard Schnadig of the Vedder Price firm, "this was a company – and a lawyer – that simply didn’t know how to deal with the plaintiffs’ accusations. Their response to the women’s testimony was beyond tone deaf. It was, to put it bluntly, insulting and stupid."

As support for this statement, Beck cites Schnadig’s characterization in his closing arguments of the testimony of one the named plaintiffs, who testified that her manager had pressured her not to have children. Schnadig dismissed the plaintiff as hysterical, stating "I’ve never seen anybody cry so much on the witness stand in my life…She didn’t have very much to cry about…It’s like she had been knifed. Honestly, what’s wrong with this woman? She was so fragile." Her manager, Schnadig argued, was more credible because according to Schnadig, he was "a nice Southern guy."

Beck cites numerous other statements in closing arguments very much in the same vein.

Novartis may have had many other things to say in its defense, but these kinds of statements apparently did not play well with the jury. Jurors are scary enough as it is, but trying to convince a jury that the plaintiffs are just a bunch of crazy hysterics seems like a particularly ill-advised strategy.

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The FDIC’s closure of troubled financial institutions has recently taken on a state-based theme. Last week, on April 23, 2010, the FDIC closed seven banks, all of which were in the state of Illinois. This past Friday night, on April 30, 2010, when the FDIC again closed seven banks, the list included three from Puerto Rico, as well as two from Missouri. The FDIC’s Failed Bank List can be found here.

With the closure of seven banks on two successive Friday nights, the pace of bank failures has definitely picked up. The most recent round of closures brings the 2010 year to date number of bank failures to 64. The 2010 closure rate is well ahead of last year’s pace, when the FDIC closed a total of 140 banks. The FDIC did not close its 64^th bank during 2009 until July 24^th. There have been 229 bank failures since January 1, 2008.

The 23 banks closed in April 2010 is the second highest monthly total during the current round of bank failures, exceeded only by the 24 banks closed in July 2009. (By way of comparison, there were only 25 banks closed in all of 2008.)

The seven Illinois banks closed on April 23 brings the total number of Illinois bank failures to ten, the highest number for any state during 2010. The other states with the highest numbers of bank failures during 2010 are Florida (9), Georgia (7) and Washington State (6).

Though Illinois leads the 2010 bank failure tables, the state with the highest numbers of bank closures since January 1, 2008 is Georgia with 37 failed banks, followed by Illinois (32), California (26), Florida (25), and Minnesota (11).

There has definitely been a concentration of bank failures in certain states. However, the woes besetting banks are surprisingly widespread. 38 states (as well as Puerto Rico) have each had at least one bank failure since January 1, 2008.

The states without any bank failures since January 1, 2008 are: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia. There have been no failed banks in the District of Columbia either. (Readers who think they can discern the unifying factor that explains why these states have no failed banks are invited to add their explanations using the blog’s comment feature.)

The costs to the FDIC from these bank failures have been enormous. The cost to the FDIC’s Depositors Insurance Fund (DIF) from the April 2010 bank closures alone was $9.4 billion, the highest monthly total so far during the current bank failure wave.

The April 30 closure of Westernbank in Puerto Rico cost the DIF fund $3.31 billion, the third most costly closure in the current round. Only the July 11, 2008 closure of IndyMac ($8.0 billion) and the May 21, 2009 closure of BankUnited ($4.9 billion) were more costly to the fund.

Roughly three quarters of the banks that have failed so far this year have involved banks with assets under $1 billion. The 2010 failed banks involve a slightly higher proportion of larger banks; in 2010, about 26% of bank failures (17 out of 64) have involved banks with assets over $1 billion, compared to about 20% in 2009 (28 out of 140).

The 2010 bank closures have also involved a slightly greater proportion of the smallest banks. Thus, about 23% of the 2010 bank closures (15 out of 64) have involved banks with assets under $100 million, compared to about 17% of failed banks in 2009 (24 out of 140).

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As of year-end 2009, the FDIC identified 702 banks as "problem institutions," representing about 9% of all institutions reporting to the FDIC and the highest number of problem banks since 1993, according to the FDIC’s latest banking report.

On February 23, 2010, the FDIC released its Quarterly Banking Profile for the fourth quarter 2009, which can be found here. The FDIC’s February 23, 2010 press release describing the report can be found here.

The FDIC defines "problem institutions" as those with "financial, operational or managerial weaknesses that threaten their continued financial viability." Problem institutions are ranked as either 4 or 5 on the FDIC’s 1 to 5 scale of "risk and supervisory concerns." The FDIC does not publicly identify the problem institutions by name.

The 702 problem institutions at year end (out of 8,012 reporting institutions) represent the largest number of problem institutions since 1993. The 702 institutions also represented combined assets of $402.8 billion. The year end number of problem institutions is 27 percent greater than the 552 problem institutions as of the end of 3Q09. The 2009 year end figures compare to the 252 problem institutions, representing $159 billion in assets as of the end of 2008.

Given that the "problem institution" category tracks banks with "financial viability" concerns, it is hardly surprising that the increase in the number of problem institutions has been accompanied by a growing number of failed financial institutions. There were 140 bank failures in 2009, and there have already been 20 bank failures already in just the first seven weeks of 2010. The number of bank failures so far this year suggests that we may have at least as many if not slightly more bank failures this year compared to last year.

The FDIC’s report comes on the heels of the recent report of the Congressional Oversight Panel (about which refer here), in which the watchdog committee warned that coming commercial mortgage woes could further damage many lending institutions.

But not all of the banking news is bad. FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair is quoted in the FDIC’s press release as saying that the FDIC sees "signs of improving performance in the industry, " although basically that means that the pace of deterioration has slowed, not necessarily that the negative trends have been reversed.

Whatever else that might be said, the continued increase in the number of problem institutions as 2009 progressed suggests that we can expect to continue to see growing numbers of failed financial institutions as 2010 unfolds.

A Business Week article about the FDIC’s report can be found here, and a New York Times report can be found here.

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The FDIC has picked up where it left off at the end of 2009, with its first bank closure of the New Year. On Friday, January 8, 2010, the FDIC took control of Horizon Bank of Bellingham, Washington, for the first bank closure of 2010. While the FDIC’s continuation of its regulatory actions regarding troubled banks seems likely in the near term, what remains to be seen is whether the FDIC’s actions will include litigation against the former directors and officers of the failed banks.

Though the FDIC has yet to launch D&O litigation, the lawsuits may be just ahead. The FDIC is taking a series of steps clearly designed to prepare for litigation.

First, as reported in a January 10, 2010 article in FinCri Advisor (here), the FDIC is "subpoenaing bank officials and workers, hoping to gather evidence to use in potential litigation." By way of illustration, a recent motion filed by bank officials in connection with the bankruptcy proceedings involving Haven Trust Bancorp, the holding company for a Duluth, Georgia bank that failed in December 2008, states that certain of the officials "received subpoenas…issued by counsel to the [FDIC] regarding the FDIC’s investigation of certain matters relating to the failure of Haven Trust Bank." (The former officials’ motion sought access to the D&O insurance policy proceeds in order for the officials to be able to defend themselves.)

Second, as I noted in a prior post, the FDIC is sending civil demand letters to former directors and officers of failed banks. According to the FinCri Advisor article, former directors in Florida, California, Illinois, Texas and Georgia have received FDIC claims letters. According to a commentator in the article, one obvious trigger for a demand letter is the approaching expiration date of the D&O insurance policy.

An example of one of these demand letters is described in a January 8, 2010 Atlanta Business Chronicle article, here (registration required). The article describes a September 28, 2009 letter sent to the D&O liability insurer for Georgian Bank, an Atlanta bank that the FDIC closed on September 25, 2009. According to the article, the letter details the potential claims the FDIC might make against the bank’s former directors and officers, including allegations of "unsafe and unsound banking practices."

Industry experts quoted in the Atlanta Business Chronicle article say that "such letters likely have been filed with insurers by all 30 banks that have failed in Georgia since August 2008."

But while the FDIC is clearly pursing investigations and taking steps to try to preserve the right to try to recover D&O insurance proceeds, it "has not filed any D&O lawsuits in connection with the bank failures since the crisis began in 2008," according to an FDIC spokesman quoted in the article.

According to the FinCri Advisor article, "the FDIC spends about a year conducting an investigation into a failed bank before deciding whether it can pursue a claim against former directors and officers."

Because of the FDIC’s many continuing investigations, 2010, according to an attorney quoted in the FinCri Advisor article, "will be the year of investigation and tolling agreements." One reason for the FDIC to proceed carefully is that it doesn’t want to push cases early that may set bad precedents, which could "doom subsequent cases."

But though the FDIC is now proceeding cautiously, when the litigation ultimately comes, there is likely to be a lot of it. The FinCri Advisor article quotes the FDIC’s former head of litigation as saying that "about half" of the bank failures will "see some director litigation." Before all is said and done, the coming litigation "could rival the litigation that occurred in the 80s and 90s as a result of the many thrift failures."

Special thanks to loyal reader Henry Turner for providing me with a copy of the Haven Trust pleading and the Atlanta Business Chronicle article.

Another Perspective: As a continuation of my early post in which I linked to a variety of Top Ten lists, I note here the recent post on the Corporate Disclosure Alert blog (written by my law school classmate and investor advocate, Sanford Lewis) about "10 Questions of Risk Management for the New Decade" (here). Lewis contends that "far more must be done to turn the patchwork of risk management approaches into viable public policy and corporate governance solutions." The list of issues that Lewis contends should be addressed is interesting and provocative.

We Aren’t What We Watch – Are We?: On New Year’s Day, my hyperkinetic eldest daughter -- collegiate swimmer, rugby player – who rarely sits still long enough to watch TV, announced "I think I’ll watch some college football" and she plopped herself down beside me on the couch. Unfortunately for the nascent possibility of a little father-daughter bonding, the game broadcast at that moment was in the middle of the Flomax halftime report, and the commercial had just reached the point where it advised that Flomax’s adverse side effect may include a "reduction in semen."

As she was leaving the room, my daughter offered the observation that at least on TV college football is clearly meant for a "different demographic."

Indeed. But what exactly is the intended demographic?

The commercials themselves suggest that the target audience consists of people who are basically worried. They are not only worried just because they have to go pee all the time. They are worried about their credit scores. They are worried that their nest eggs have shrunk. They are worried about figuring out their taxes. They are worried because their computers are too slow and because their 3G network’s coverage areas are too small.

So many things to worry about. Too bad for you if all you want to do is watch a little football.

But in the midst of all of this apprehension and fear, there is cause for hope. For the overweight, for example, Taco Bell would like to communicate the optimistic message that you can lose weight by eating fast food. (I am not making this up.)

If playing time alone is any measure, the most important message for our society seems to be that Taco Bell now has a five-layer burrito for 89 cents. For those of you thinking, "No Way!" -- you have to understand that they are not offering to pay you 89 cents to eat that thing. They are expecting you to pay them. Seriously. As my son said, "Is that supposed to be food?"

Perhaps (I can hope optimistically) we are all in the wrong demographic. How much more fortunate are the viewers of the UK premier league soccer games. Since the game clock never stops, there are no commercial interruptions – which obviously is the reason that soccer has never been allowed to catch on commercially in the U.S. Of course, the soccer games do have halftimes, which does hold open the theoretical possibility for Flomax halftime reports.

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Though the year-to-date tally of failed banks is, as of Friday night, now up to 133, the much-anticipated wave of FDIC litigation against the directors and officers of the failed institutions has been slower to emerge. As I recently noted, however, the signs are that the FDIC is now starting to assert itself. Along those lines, a demand letter from the FDIC to the former directors and officers of BankUnited FSB, filed in the bankruptcy proceedings of BankUnited’s corporate parent company, shows that the FDIC is prepared to assert claims and demonstrates what those claims will look like.

On May 21, 2009, in a rare Thursday night action, the FDIC took over BankUnited, about which refer here. At the time of its closure, BankUnited has assets of over $12 billion, but as a result of the loss share arrangement the FDIC reached with the investors that purchased BankUnited’s assets, the FDIC estimated that the bank’s failure would cost the FDIC $4.9 billion.

On May 22, 2009, BankUnited’s parent company, BankUnited Financial Corporation, and related entities filed a petition for bankruptcy in the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Florida.

According to court filings in the bankruptcy proceedings, BankUnited carried $50 million in directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, arranged in four layers. The program’s extended reporting period had a November 10, 2009 expiration date.

On November 24, 2009, the FDIC filed a motion with the bankruptcy court regarding the FDIC’s rights to assert claims against the BankUnited’s former directors and officers. A copy of the motion can be found here. In essence, the FDIC’s motion sought to establish the FDIC’s right to assert its claims in priority over the claims against the bank’s former directors and offices that committee on unsecured creditors and others sought to assert.

As part of its motion, the FDIC attached a copy of a November 5, 2009 letter that the FDIC, as BankUnited’s receiver, had sent to fifteen former directors and officers of the bank, in which the FDIC presented its "demand for civil damages arising out of losses suffered as a result of wrongful acts and omissions committed by the named Directors and Officers." The letter explains that the demand for civil damages is "based on the breach of duty, failure to supervise, negligence, and/or gross negligence of the named Directors and Officers."

Though the letter is nominally addressed to the fifteen individuals, copies of the letters also were sent directly to the bank’s primary and first level excess D&O insurers. The FDIC’s motion papers explain, in footnote 4, that the FDIC sent the letter to the bank’s primary and first level excess D&O insurers, but not to the second and third level excess D&O insurers, because the second and third level excess insurer’s policies "contain a regulatory exclusion."

In its November 5 letter, the FDIC states that its demand is based on damages "arising out of losses suffered due to wrongful acts committed in connection with the origination and administration of unsafe and unsound residential real estate loans." The letter cites in particular the individuals’ alleged wrongful acts in connection with "pursuing an overly aggressive grown strategy focused primarily on the controversial Payment Option ARM product (the ‘Option ARM’)." The letter asserts that by the end of 2007, Option ARM mortgages represented 70% of the bank’s residential loan portfolio and 60% of its total loan portfolio, and by 2008 represented 575% of the bank’s capital.

The letter asserts that individuals failed "to implement adequate credit administration and risk management controls failed to heed warnings and/or recommendations of bank supervisory authorities and bank consultants." The letter also states that the "inherent risk" of Option ARM loans was "coupled with deficiencies in the Bank’s underwriting, appraisal process and credit administration."

As the FDIC summarized in its November 24, 2009 motion, the letter asserts that the bank’s directors and officers:

(i) adopted an overly aggressive and reckless growth strategy by investing most of the Bank's assets in "Option ARM" lending products;

(ii) failed to provide the Bank with adequate reserves for potential loan losses resulting from its investments in Option ARM lending products;

(iii) engaged in reckless, high-risk, and limited scrutiny lending;

(iv) failed to oversee the Bank's affairs, including the failure to monitor the rising volume of loan delinquencies and to establish lending policies that would adequately protect the Bank; and

(v) failed to provide adequate personnel and administrative capacity to appropriately monitor loan appraisals and to carry out diligent underwriting reviews.

Among the FDIC’s more colorful allegations, the letter accuses the directors and offices of "encouraging an extremely liberal and aggressive lending mentality to 'make the loan as long as the borrower has a pulse.'" The letter also accuses the individuals of "engaging in reckless, high-risk, and limited-scrutiny lending to fuel the bank's aggressive and rapid growth — in direct contradiction to public representations of the bank's conservative lending and strict underwriting policies."

In addition, the letter accuses the individuals of "approving and putting in place a compensation structure that drove the bank's directors and officers to pursue recklessly risky lending and business practices."

The letter asserts that these "breaches of their fiduciary duties" caused the bank to suffer loan losses between January 1, 2006 and May 21, 2009 of over $227 million. In addition to these losses, the FDIC recognized a $4 billion loss to pay off liabilities the Bank used to fund its lending activities. The FDIC’s letter concludes with the note that its investigation is continuing and that it will supplement its demand as appropriate as its investigation progresses.

The FDIC’s demand letter demonstrates not only its willingness and intent to assert claims against the former officials of failed lending institutions, but also show that it is highly aware of the D&O insurance requirements relating to those claims. The timing of the FDIC’s November 5 demand letter (sent just prior to the insurance program’s expiration), coupled with the fact that no demand was sent to the excess carriers whose policies contain regulatory exclusions, shows that the FDIC claims approach is keyed to the failed financial institutions’ D&O insurance program.

So the signs are that the claims against the directors and officers of failed banks are coming, and that one of the principal purposes of the exercise is to try extract recoveries from the banks’ D&O insurance policies. Seems just like old times…

A December 11, 2009 Palm Beach Post article about the FDIC’s demand letter can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the Palm Beach Post article.

More Troubled Bank Litigation: In yet another sign that litigation involving troubled banks could be an increasingly important part of D&O claims activity in the weeks and months ahead, on December 11, 2009, plaintiffs filed a purported securities class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of Washington against Sterling Financial Corporation and two of its officers.

As reflected in the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ December 11 press release, the complaint, which can be found here, alleges that the defendants failed "to disclose the extent of seriously delinquent commercial real estate loans and construction and land loans" and that the defendants "failed to adequately and timely record losses for its impaired loans, causing its financial results and its Tier 1 capital ratio to be materially false."

According to the press release, the complaint further alleges that:

(a) defendants’ assets contained hundreds of millions of dollars worth of impaired and risky securities, many of which were backed by real estate that was rapidly dropping in value and for which Sterling had failed to record adequate loan loss reserves; (b) defendants failed to properly account for Sterling’s commercial real estate loans and construction and land development loans, failing to reflect impairment in the loans; (c) Sterling had not adequately reserved for loan losses such that its financial statements were presented in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"); (d) Sterling had not adequately accounted for its goodwill or its deferred tax assets such that its financial statements were presented in violation of GAAP; (e) Sterling had not adequately reserved for loan losses such that its Tier 1 capital was presented in violation of banking regulations; and (f) the Company’s capital base was not adequate enough to withstand the significant deterioration in the real estate markets and, as a result, Sterling would be forced to consent to a cease and desist order from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation directing it to raise $300 million in capital.

What makes the FDIC’s demand letter to the BankUnited officials and the shareholders’ complaint against Sterling Financial noteworthy is not that the banking activities to which the allegations relate are unique; to the contrary, it seems particularly important to note that during the period of the these banks’ alleged misconduct, many other banks were involved in the same or similar banking activities. This fact together with the growing number of failed banks and the significant additional numbers of troubled banks suggests that in the weeks and months ahead there could be many more demands and lawsuits along the lines of the ones described above.

I don’t think I am going out on a limb to say that litigation involving failed and troubled banks could be one of the most important litigation trends in 2010.

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The FDIC’s latest Quarterly Banking Profile (here) shows that as of September 30, 2009, the country’s commercial banks are continuing to struggle, and that as a result of the banks’ woes the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) is $8.2 billion in the red. The rising numbers of "problem" institutions suggests both that the number of failed banks could continue to grow and that the DIF could remain under pressure – although as discussed below, the DIF situation may not be quite as dire as the headline details might otherwise suggest.

The FDIC report states that the number of banks on the FDIC’s "problem" institution list rose during the third quarter to 552 from 416 at the end of 2Q09, and that the total assets of "problem" institutions increased from $299.8 billion to $345.9 billion. If assets at "problem" institutions of a third of a trillion dollars sound bad, that’s because it is. The FDIC reports that both the numbers and assets of "problem" institutions are "now at the highest level since the end of 1993."

The FDIC defines "problem" institutions as "those with financial, operational or managerial weaknesses that threaten their continued financial viability." To be classified as a "problem," an institution would have to be ranked as either a "4" or a "5" on the FDIC’s "scale of 1 to 5 in ascending order of supervisory concern." The FDIC does not provide the names of the "problem" institutions, nor does it specify how many of them are rated "4" and how many are rated "5."

To put the number (552) and assets ($345.9 billion) of the third quarter-end "problem" institutions into some perspective, there were "only" 171 "problem" institutions as of the end of 3Q08. In twelve months, the number of "problem" institutions more than tripled, and the assets at "problem" institutions more than doubled.

Along with the growing numbers of "problem" institutions have come an escalating number of bank failures. During the third quarter of 2009, "fifty insured institutions with combined assets of $68.8 billion failed," which represents "the largest number [of bank failures] since the second quarter of 1990 when 65 insured institutions failed." As of the September 30, 2009, 95 banks had failed, and as of November 20, 2009, the 2009 YTD total number of bank failures stood at 124.

This wave of bank failures has taken its toll on the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). During the third quarter, the DIF decreased by $18.6 billion, to negative $8.2 billion, "primarily because of $21.7 billion in additional provision for bank failures."

Although these DIF figures sound disastrous, there is more to the story than just the reported negative figure. The FDIC’s November 24, 2009 press release accompanying the report (here) explains that the negative balance reflects a $38.9 billion "contingent loss reserve that has been set aside to cover estimated losses over the next year." In addition, the DIF balance is not the same as the FDIC’s cash resources, which stood at $23.2 billion as of the end of the third quarter.

To further bolster the FDIC’s cash position, on November 12, 2009, the FDIC’s board voted to required insured institutions to prepay three years’ of deposit insurance premiums – worth about $45 billion – at the end of 2009. The press release on the prepayment assessment can be found here.

With the increase in the number of "problem" institutions and the obvious relationship between rising numbers of "problems and the likely number of future bank failures, signs are that we could continue to see significant numbers of bank failures as we head into 2010. While I still don’t think we are going to see 1,000 failed banks by the end of 2010, we are clearly going to be seeing a lot more failed banks.

As bad as all of this is, the Quarterly Banking Profile hints at the possibility that all of the bad news might not even be out in the open yet. Among any other details, the Quarterly Banking Profile also reports that "growth in [loan loss] reserved continued to lag the rise in noncurrent loans, and the industry’s ratio of reserves to noncurrent loans declined for a 14^th quarter, from 63.6 percent to 60 percent."

In terms of what all of this means for the economy, perhaps the most significant detail in the document is its report that "loan balances declined by the largest percentage since quarterly reporting began in 1984." The FDIC’s press release quotes FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair as saying that "there is no question that credit availability is an important issue for economic recovery. We need to see banks making more loans to their business customers."

Europeans Worried About Proposed U.S. Investor Protection Law: According to a November 23, 2009 Financial Times article (here), the European Commission is worried about legislation currently before Congress that would specify the circumstances under which investors could sue foreign domiciled companies in U.S. courts.

As I discussed in a prior post (here), Section 215 the Investor Protection Act of 2009 is addressed to "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" which would amend the ’33 Act, the ’34 Act and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to specify that U.S. courts could properly exercise jurisdiction in any action involving "conduct with the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors," as well "conduct outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect in the United States."

Under the first of these two prongs, U.S. based conduct alone would be sufficient jurisdictional basis, even with respect to foreign purchasers of who purchased their shares of foreign-domiciled companies on foreign exchanges (so-called "f-cubed claimants").

The article quotes the former director of litigation for Bank of America as saying that "if this legislation passes, there will be greater opportunity for foreign companies to be hauled into U.S. courts." The article also reports that Charlie McCreevy, the European Union Commission for Internal Markets as having "expressed concern over the measure."

All-Time Worst E-Mail Faux Pas?: The title of the Clusterstock’s post (here) pretty much says it all: "Cornell Business School Employees Accidentally Email Everyone with Their Dirty Email Love Notes." Clusterstock observes that the "this might set some kind of record for the worst email mistake anyone has ever made."

Due to the family-oriented nature of this blog, The D&O Diary will not reproduce any examples of the couple’s inadvertently forwarded emails.

The good news is that the two employees involved are married. The bad news is that they are not married to each other.

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