The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

The bankruptcy context is particularly ripe for D&O claims, and it also represents a particularly difficult claims context for D&O insurers. Anyone with any doubts about just how complicated bankruptcy claims can be will want to take a look at the settlement that the various concerned parties recently reached in the bankruptcy of defunct Florida homebuilder, TOUSA, Inc.

As discussed below, various D&O insurers will be paying a total of $67 million to settle claims that had been asserted against former directors and officers of TOUSA and related entities. According to the motion papers, the settlement agreement is part of a “grand bargain” to resolve claims among the various parties in adversary proceedings filed in the bankruptcy matter, as a part of larger efforts to facilitate the entry of a liquidation plan for the TOUSA bankruptcy estate. The parties’ June 4, 2013 settlement agreement can be found here. The parties’ June 6, 2013 motion for court approval of the settlement can be found here.

The $67 million aggregate settlement amount does not include additional funds that will be contributed by at least one other D&O insurer that reportedly will be entering a separate settlement agreement, and also does reflect an additional $8.5 million that two of the insurers involved have agreed to pay toward incurred but as yet unpaid defense expenses. One of TOUSA’s D&O insurers declined to participate in the settlement, and the settlement contemplates an assignment to the bankruptcy estate and to secured lenders committee of the debtors’ and the insured persons’ rights against the non-settling insurer. The settlement agreement is subject to bankruptcy court approval.

Background

On January 29, 2008, TOUSA and related entities filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in the Southern District of Florida. In the years prior to the bankruptcy, related TOUSA entities had entered into a joint venture known as Transeastern JV to acquire another Florida homebuilder. In connection with the JV various TOUSA entities entered into certain debt financing agreements. The joint venture later failed.

On June 14, 2008, the unsecured creditors committee filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy matter against a total of 19 former directors and officers of TOUSA and related entities. The committee alleged that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties by failing to act in the best interests of the various TOUSA corporate entities and of the entities’ constituencies, including the creditors, and that certain of the defendant aided and abetted these breaches. During the course of ensuing proceedings, the individual defendants filed a total of six motions to dismiss the fiduciary duty claims, each of which was denied by the bankruptcy court.

The debtors and the individual defendants submitted the fiduciary duty matter as a claim to TOUSA’s D&O insurers. Certain of the insurers denied coverage for the claim. The debtors and the individuals filed an insurance coverage action as an adversary proceeding  in the bankruptcy matter seeking a judicial declaration of coverage  After the coverage action was commenced, the parties entered into an interim funding agreement that allowed for the payment of the defense fees of the individual defendants in the fiduciary duty action.

In addition, in December 2009 certain of the lenders involved in financing the failed Transeastern JV sent demand letters to the debtors and to the individual directors and officers asserting claims against them in connection with the various JV lending transactions. The debtors submitted these demands as claims to TOUSA’s D&O insurance carriers, for which several of the D&O insurers denied coverage.

In August 2010, the court ordered the parties to mediation. The list of participants in the mediation is long; it includes various creditors committees, the various debtor entities, the various entities that were involved in proving the joint financing of the failed JV, the individual defendants themselves, and as many as 12 D&O insurers.

The Settlement Agreement

It is some measure of the complexity of this matter and the number of moving parts that the mediation commenced in August 2010 only finally resulted in a settlement that could be submitted to the court in June 2013.

A total of ten of TOUSA’s D&O insurers participated in the settlement agreement submitted to the court. The ten participating insurers (and their respective contributions to the $67 million settlement and also toward additional defense expenses) are listed on page 11 of the settlement agreement. An eleventh insurer (apparently from Bermuda) reportedly will be entering a separate agreement in an amount that is not specified in the motion papers. A twelfth insurer (identified in footnote 1 on page 3 of the settlement agreement) declined to participate in the settlement, and one feature of the settlement is the debtors’ and the individual defendants’ assignment of their rights against this one non-settling insurer.

The list of the various parties and participants to this “grand bargain” settlement consumes more than two pages of the settlement agreement. As might be expected with a list of participants that long, the settlement agreement is complicated. As explained on page 9 of the motion for approval of the settlement, the $67 million settlement amount will be divided, with almost $48 million going to the unsecured creditors in connection with the breach of fiduciary duty claims; and a total of about $19 milliongoing to the various JV lenders, with this amount to be further divided among the lenders in differing amounts according to their respective interests. Presumably the separate settlement agreement with the Bermuda insurer will contribute additional amounts toward these various settlement funds.

Discussion

The settlement documents does not detail how TOUSA’s D&O insurance program was arranged, but the D&O insurers’ varying payment amounts specified in the settlement agreement suggests that the insurance was arranged as a tower and that the various insurers contributed toward the settlement according to their respective attachment point in the tower, with each succeeding insurer in the tower contributing a correspondingly smaller amount.

It is not clear from the settlement papers, but it appears that the insurance programs from more than one policy year may have been implicated here  (for example, the description of the complications involved with defense counsel payments suggests that there was a dispute between at least two carriers that might have been the primary carriers). Obviously, the involvement of more than one insurance tower and questions whether only one or both of the towers had been triggered represented a further complicating factor in trying to reach a settlement agreement.

Given the bankruptcy context, it seems probable that the insurance was funded as a loss under the D&O insurance policies’ Side A coverage (providing coverage for amounts that are not indemnified, whether due to insolvency or legal prohibition). This detail may have been relatively unimportant to the various “traditional” D&O insurers. But to the extent that any of the excess D&O insurers were providing only excess Side A insurance (or Excess Side A/DIC) insurance, this is a very important distinction, because if these losses were not Side A losses the Excess Side A insurers’ coverage would not have been triggered. From outward appearances (and it is always hard tell from the outside) at least some of the contributing D&O insurers were Excess Side A insurers. If that is the case, then this represents yet another recent example where the Excess Side A limits have been called upon to contribute toward a major D&O loss.

I can only imagine how difficult it was for the various parties to reach a settlement understanding in this case.Actually, that isn’t quite right – I really can’t imagine how they reached a settlement understanding.

With all of the competing claimants and the varying and competing interests, and the various insurers – many of them disputing whether there coverage was even involved owing to questions whether more than one tower of insurance was involved – trying come up with a framework for settlement, figuring out how much each insurer would contribute, and then deciding how the various contributions would be divided among the various claimants, had to have been an absolute nightmare. Just to add to the mix, there were further complications owing to the Bermuda insurer and to the one remaining excess insurer that declined to participate in the settlement. And throughout all of this, defense costs that would erode the amount of limits remaining for settlement were being incurred.

There is probably much more besides that could be said about this settlement, particularly by someone with an inside perspective (and I encourage anyone with a perspective on this settlement to add their comments to this post, using this blog’s comment feature if possible and posting anonymously if necessary).

The one last thing I will say is that this massive settlement is yet another example of a jumbo D&O settlement outside of the context of securities class action litigation. As I have noted numerous times in recent years on this site, the mix of corporate and securities litigation is changing, and while securities class action litigation remains important, it is now one of multiple sources of significant corporate and securities litigation. Increasingly, these other types of corporate and securities lawsuits are contributing significantly to the severity of losses in this arena. The number of jumbo D&O settlements that do not involve securities class action litigation continues to grow.

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Mutual fund directors have been attacked before. For example, in his 2002 letter to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Berkshire chairman Warren Buffett took a detour in an essay about corporate governance to express concerns about mutual fund directors. He noted that mutual fund directors effectively have only two “important duties”; to pick the fund manager and to negotiate the manager’s fee. The record of mutual fund managers pursuing either goal has been “absolutely pathetic.” The manager selection process for far too many funds has become a “zombie-like process that makes a mockery of stewardship.”

Within months of Buffett’s stinging criticisms, many participants in the mutual fund industry were ensnared in the so-called “market timing” scandal, in which it was alleged, among other things, that mutual funds were permitting trading in their fund shares after market close. In the wake of the market timing scandal, the mutual fund industry faced not only a great deal of scrutiny but also a wave of enforcement actions.

At least according to a March 25, 2013 Wall Street Journal article entitled “Fund Directors Are Feeling the Heat” (here), mutual fund directors are attracting attention once again. The Journal article was focused on the administrative proceedings that the SEC has filed against eight former members of the board of directors overseeing several Morgan Keegan mutual funds. The agency filed the administrative action, a copy of which can be found here, in December 2012. In its December 10, 2012 press release accompanying the filing, the agency said that the directors had “abdicated” their asset –pricing responsibilities.

The administrative proceeding relates to five Morgan Keegan mutual funds whose portfolios contained below-investment grade debt securities, some of which were backed with subprime mortgages. In its press release about the proceeding, the agency claims that the funds “fraudulently overstated the valuation of their securities as the housing market was on the brink of financial crisis in 2007.” The agency has previously charged the funds’ managers with fraud, and the Morgan Keegan itself agreed to pay $200 million to settle related charges.

The agency alleges that the directors delegated their fair valuation responsibility to a valuation committee without providing meaningful substantive guidance and made “no meaningful effort to learn how fair values were being determined.”

The Journal article reports that the parties to the administrative proceeding are in settlement negotiations, but in the meantime the proceeding is going forward. The Journal article notes that the directors met 30 times in 2007, including 14 times in three months, and received daily updates on the value of the five mutual funds they oversaw.

Regardless of how the administrative proceeding against the former Morgan Keegan mutual fund directors ultimately plays out, the proceeding is, according to the Journal article,  “making waves” across the mutual fund industry. According to a December 14, 2012 memorandum from the Debevoise & Plimpton law firm, the administrative proceeding against the Morgan Keegan directors represents “a stark warning to fund directors and all fund personnel charged with management or oversight duties that they need to take their responsibilities for overseeing fund management seriously, even with respect to the complex and technical area of asset valuation.” The action signals “the SEC’s willingness to charge senior officials for failing to ensure the fair valuation of hard-to-value securities.”

The SEC’s decision to pursue an administrative action against the fund directorsseems clearly calculated to send a message. The fact that the agency filed the administrative proceeding against the directors after it had concluded an enforcement action against the fund management company itself does seem, as the Debevoise law firm said in its memo, that the administrative proceeding was intended to serve as a “stark warning.”

The SEC’s action against the Morgan Keegan directors unquestionably is noteworthy, but it is far from the first instance where allegations have been raised against mutual fund directors in the wake of the financial crisis. There were in fact a number of private securities class action lawsuits filed against mutual funds after the subprime meltdown, and a number of these suits included the funds’ outside directors as named defendants.

For example, March 2008, investors in the Charles Schwab YieldPlus Funds initiated a securities suit alleging violations of the federal securities laws and seeking damages; the defendants in that action included the funds’ trustees. The federal litigation ultimately settled for $200 million (with an additional $35 million to settle separate but related state litigation). The consolidated subprime-related securities class action litigation involving several Oppenheimer mutual funds, and which also included the funds’ trustees as named defendants, ultimately settled for a total of $100 million, as discussed here.

Indeed, as discussed here, the Morgan Keegan funds themselves were also involved in separate securities class action litigation that included as named defendants the same individual outside directors as were named in the SEC administrative proceeding. The separate Morgan Keegan fund securities class action litigation ultimately was settled for $62 million (refer here). 

The SEC’s administrative action against the Morgan Keegan funds’ outside directors not only has important implications in general about mutual funds outside directors’ accountability. It also has important implications about the scope of their potential liability exposure. Together with the possibility of private securities litigation, the possibility of an aggressive SEC pursuing administrative actions or even enforcement proceedings against the outside directors of mutual funds underscores the fact that serving as a mutual fund director entails significant liability exposures.

The extent of the liability exposures in turn highlights the importance for the outside directors to confirm that the mutual funds maintain D&O liability insurance sufficient to ensure that the directors can defend themselves against all claims that might arise against them. As the circumstances surrounding the Morgan Keegan funds demonstrate, when adverse developments lead to claims, numerous claims involving numerous parties can be involved. This fact underscores the need to ensure that the mutual funds maintain insurance limits of liability that are sufficient to respond in the complex claims situations. Finally, the need to ensure that the sufficient funds remain to protect the outside directors when multiple claims arise underscores the need to makes sure that the insurance program is structured to provide that a portion of the D&O insurance is dedicated solely to the outside directors’ protection.

Securities Suit Against U.S.-Listed Chinese Company Settles: In 2010 and 2011, plaintiffs’ lawyers rushed to file securities suits in U.S. courts against Chinese companies with shares listed on the U.S. securities exchanges. However, the suits have not proven to be as remunerative as the plaintiffs’ lawyers might have hoped. As I noted in an earlier post, many of the cases that have settled have involved only very modest settlements.

A recent settlement in one of these suits might provide modest grounds for encouragement for the plaintiffs’ lawyers. On March 25, 2013, the parties to the securities class action lawsuit pending in the Southern District of New York against Sinotech Energy Limited filed a stipulation of settlement indicating that they had agreed to settle the case for a total of $20 million. (The settlement does not include the company’s auditor, Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP). The settlement is subject to court approval. The parties’ settlement stipulation can be found here.

Though this settlement is more substantial than the prior settlements, it should be noted that Sinotech Energy’s contribution to the settlement is only $2 million. The remaining $18 million is coming from several offering underwriter defendants who were also named as defendants in the litigation. This outcome is in fact consistent with what many plaintiffs’ lawyers have told me about these cases, which is that while they hope to recover from the company defendants, their real hope for recovery is based on the attempt to try to recover from the outside professionals who helped the companies to go public. (I am guessing that the reason that Ernst & Young Hua Ming was not a party to this settlement may have something to do with the $117 million that Ernst & Young agreed to pay in the Ontario securities suit relating to Sino Forest; the plaintiffs may be hoping they can use that prior settlement as a “price of poker” indicator.)

Whether or not the plaintiffs can succeed in recovering from the outside advisors, they likely will have to set their expectations of recoveries from the Chinese companies themselves at modest levels. It isn’t just that the Chinese companies have not contributed significantly to the settlements so far; it is that apparently in many instances, the Chinese companies are not even paying their own defense lawyers. As reflected in a March 14, 2013 Reuters article entitled “Defense Attorneys in China Securities Cases Look for an Exit” (here), defense counsel in several of these cases involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies are seeking to withdraw from the cases because their Chinese clients are not paying them. It doesn’t bode well for any eventual recovery for the plaintiffs if the defendant company isn’t bothering to pay its own lawyers.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending me a copy of the Reuters article.

The M&A Litigation Problem: As anyone following recent litigation trends knows, litigation relating to M&A transaction has become a serious problem. If it is any consolation, the courts are working on it, at least in Delaware, according to Vice Chancellor Donald Parsons of the Delaware Chancery Court. In a forthcoming article entitled “Docket Dividends: Growth in Shareholder Litigation Leads to Refinements in Chancery Procedure” (here, Hat Tip to the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog), Parsons contends that the Delaware Chancery Court is developing tools to address the concerns associate with the M&A litigation.

According to Parsons, Delaware’s courts are best positioned to respond to this litigation, although, owing to the phenomenon of multi-jurisdictions litigation, it is can’t resolve all of the concerns. Those who are interested in Parsons’ views may want to review Alison Frankel’s tidy summary of the article in a March 26, 2013 post on her On the Case blog (here).

You Think Your Job is Tough?: Next time you are feeling that your job is too demanding or stressful, spend a little time considering this guy’s job.

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In order to try to defend themselves from claims asserted against them by the FDIC as receiver for a failed bank, the failed bank’s directors and officers often raise affirmative defenses, either based on pre-receivership conduct (as for example, in connection with pre-failure examinations) or post-receivership conduct (as for example in connection with the agency’s management of the liquidation process). Whether or not these defenses can be asserted against the FDIC was litigated extensively in the failed bank litigation arising in the S&L crisis era. These questions were raised again in one of the FDIC’s current bank cases. In a February 12, 2013 order (here), Northern District of Illinois Judge Virginia Kendall granted the FDIC’s motion to strike the directors and officers affirmative defenses.

On July 31, 2009, regulators closed the Mutual Bank of Harvey, Illinois and the FDIC was appointed as receiver.  As discussed here, on October 25, 2011, the FDIC initiated a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint was noteworthy at the time because the bank not only named as defendants eight former directors and two former officers of the bank but also included the complaint also names as defendants the bank’s outside General Counsel, who was also a director of the bank, and well as the General Counsel’s law firm.

The defendants asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including the defenses of failure to mitigate, comparative fault, superseding/intervening cause, lack of proximate cause and waiver and estoppel. The FDIC moved to strike the affirmative defenses.

In her February 12 order, Judge Kendall first addressed the defendants’ defenses that were based on the FDIC’s alleged conduct during the regulatory and investigatory of the FDIC’s examination of the bank (that is, its pre-receivership conduct).  Judge Kendall granted the FDIC’s motion to strike these defenses because the conduct of the FDIC during the pre-receivership regulation of the bank falls into the “discretionary conduct” exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Discretionary agency conduct cannot be the basis of a claim against the U.S. or one of its agencies. Judge Kendall said the same reasoning “applies with equal force to affirmative defenses pleaded against a government agency because of that agency’s discretionary acts.”

The defendants also asserted affirmative defenses of failure to mitigate, superseding/intervening cause, comparative fault, which related to the agency’s post-receivership conduct. These defenses relied primarily upon the agency’s alleged post-receivership failure to collect on the bank’s accounts and improperly disposed of the bank’s assets, among other things. After an extensive review of the case law developed during the S&L crisis, Judge Kendall concluded that all of the conduct on which the defendants sought to rely was within the agency’s discretionary functions. Judge Kendall granted the FDIC’s motion to strike these defenses “because they improperly challenge the discretionary power of the FDIC to maintain and dispose of the Bank’s assets post-receivership.”

The defendants also raise affirmative defenses related to causation, such as lack of proximate cause and intervening/superseding causes, based on the general market conditions during the financial downturn. Judge Kendall noted that proximate cause is an element of the FDIC’s case in chief and is not properly pleaded as an affirmative defense. However, she noted, “striking the affirmative defenses related to lack of proximate cause and/or presence of intervening cause by no means bars the defense from asserting that the FDIC has not carried its burden with respect to the element of causation.”

Finally, Judge Kendall also struck the defendants attempt to reserve the right to assert affirmative defenses at a later date. Judge Kendall found that this attempted reservation is an “improper reservation under the Federal Rules.”

Discussion

The FDIC generally argues that when it takes over as receiver, it “stands in the shoes” of the failed bank. That does not seem entirely to be the case, however, at least with respect to some of the affirmative defenses these defendants sought to assert here. Certainly, if the bank were still viable and asserted the claims against the directors and officers of the kind that the FDIC is asserting, the individual defendants would have the right to assert affirmative defenses (or at least to argue that they had that right under applicable state law). However, the agency argued that it is not susceptible to these defenses because of its discretionary agency functions. Clearly, if the agency has the right to make that argument, its receivership status involves something other than just standing in the shoes of the failed bank.

During the current bank failure wave, other failed banks’ directors and officers  have also sought to assert affirmative defenses against the FDIC, and in at least some instances, they have done so with somewhat greater success that the defendants here. For example, as discussed here, in a February 2012 ruling, Northern District of Georgia Judge Steve C. Jones granted in part and denied in part the FDIC’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses of the former directors and officers of the failed Integrity Bank.

Judge Jones granted the FDIC’s motion to strike the directors and officers affirmative defenses based on the agency’s pre-receivership conduct. However, Judge Jones denied the FDIC’s motion to strike the affirmative defenses based on a failure to mitigate, estoppel and reliance “to the extent those defenses are based upon post-receivership conduct by Plaintiff in its capacity as receiver.” 

Judge Jones’s rulings in the Integrity Bank case are now before the Eleventh Circuit on interlocutory appeal, although the principal issue before the appellate court is whether r not under Georgia law the FDIC can assert claims of ordinary negligence against the failed bank’s directors and officers. Interestingly, Judge Kendall’s opinion does not refer to Judge Jones’ s rulings in the Integrity Bank case (perhaps because Judge Jones’s rulings relied to a certain extent on Georgia law).

Whether or not the former directors and officers of a failed bank can assert affirmative defenses against the FDIC represents a significant issue, and one on which the courts appear to be differing conclusions. It remains to be seen whether one or the other line of analysis will control these issues. It should be noted that in both of the two district court opinions, the district court judges did agree that even if the defendants could not argue causation issues as an affirmative defense that the defendants could argue that the FDIC had not carried its burden to establish causation in its case in chief.

Many thanks to a loyal reader for sending me a copy of Judge Kendall’s opinion.

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Most states have adopted statutes providing individuals who serve as directors on nonprofit boards with limited immunity from liability. Among other issues that frequently arise is the scope of the protection provided under this statutory immunity. A recent decision from the Connecticut Appellate Court in a case involving a liability claim against the volunteer President of the nonprofit interpreted the statutory immunity expansively to encompass a broad range of activities. The decision provides interesting insight into the extent of immunity available to nonprofit board members. The Connecticut Appellate Court’s decision, released on January 1, 2013, can be found here.

Background

The Friends of Hammonasset is nonprofit volunteer organization organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The organization works with the Hammonasset Beach State Park (a Connecticut State Park). Deanna Becker serves as the volunteer President of Friends. Becker is not compensated for her services.

In January 2010, the park held its annual “Owl Prowl” event. The Friends organization was invited to participate in the event and handled all of the publicity for it. One the evening of the event, one of the attendees slipped and fell on roadway and broke his wrist.

The injured individual filed a personal injury lawsuit against Friends and against Becker. The trial court entered summary judgment for both defendants, holding that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for premises liability against Friends and also that Becker has immunity from plaintiff’s claims brought against her in her capacity as President of Friends. The plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Court’s decision

On appeal the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in Becker’s favor because his claims against Becker did not relate to duties or activities within the scope of the statutory immunity.

The statutory immunity provisions, which are contained in Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-557m, provide that the officer or director of tax-exempt organization who is “not compensated” for their services “shall be immune from civil liability for damage or injury … resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person’s policy or decision-making responsibilities if such person was acting in good faith and within the scope of such person’s official function and duties, unless such damage or injury was caused by the reckless, willful or wanton misconduct of such person.”

In his appeal, the plaintiff argued that this section does not apply because he did not allege that Becker was negligent in her “policy or decision-making responsibilities.” Rather, he alleged that she was negligent in her supervising, training and oversight activities as the President of Friends, in that she allegedly failed to suet up a walk through of the path to determine if safety hazards existed; failed to assign a member of Friends to do a walk through; and failed to notify or assign a volunteer to notify the state to plow or sand the area.

The Appellate Court determined that these alleged activities of Becker were within her “policy or decision-making responsibilities,” noting that:

When the phrase “decision-making responsibility” is examined in conjunction with the dictionary definitions of supervise, oversee and train, the allegations in the complaint describe conduct falling squarely within Becker’s decision-making responsibilities. The allegations imply that Becker had the authority to make decisions that included ordering a walk through of the park before the event, directing that a Friends volunteer perform the walk through, and informing the state of dangerous conditions that the volunteer might find. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot prevail on his claim that decision-making responsibilities do not encompass supervising, training and overseeing.

The Appellate Court also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the state statutory immunity provision was preempted by the federal Volunteer Protection Act. The Act contains a provision preempting any state law to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Act, but exempting from preemption any state statue that provides “additional protection” to volunteers. The Appellate Court interpreted the Connecticut statutory provisions to provide “greater protections” than the Act, and accordingly the Appellate Court concluded that the Act did not preempt the Connecticut statutory provisions.

Discussion

In a January 21, 2013 Hartford Business Journal article discussing this decision (here), Dylan Kletter, an attorney with the Brown Rudnick law firm, notes that the Appellate Court’s decision confirms that the statutory immunity provisions “provide broad protection” for volunteer nonprofit board members and officers, adding that

Although the scope of an officer or directors’ “policy or decision-making responsibilities” will vary based on the unique facts of each tax-exempt organization’s mission and activities, the court’s decision gives comfort to such volunteer officers and directors and reinforces the concept that unless such an individual acts with “reckless, willful or wanton misconduct” in the exercise of their duties, they may similarly qualify for total immunity from legal liability and damages.

Most other states statutory immunity provisions are similar to those of Connecticut, so the “comfort” that volunteer directors and officers can take from this decision is not limited just to those in Connecticut. The decision provides reassurance that courts will broadly interpret the scope of responsibilities for which the immunity protection is available. (It should be noted that some statues require that the nonprofit organization’s by-laws must expressly grant the immunity in order for an individual to be entitled to the immunity.)

But though this decision is reassuring for volunteer directors and officers, it nevertheless must be kept in mind that the immunity available under these statutory provisions is limited – and limited in a number of ways.

First, the protection is only available to nonprofit directors and officers who are not compensated. So if for example a nonprofit organization were to bring on their board a specialist of some kind who provides the organization with some indispensable exercise and if that individual were compensated for their board service, that individual likely would not qualify for the statutory immunity. 

Second, the scope of the statutory protection is limited. It not only is restricted to “policy and decision-making responsibilities” but only to those within “the scope of such person’s official function and duties.” At a minimum, these limitations present potentially fruitful grounds for dispute over the questions whether the individual’s alleged misconduct was with the scope of protected activities, as this case shows.

Third, the statutory provisions restrict not only the breadth of activities that are protected but also the kind of activities that are protected. Thus the immunity is not available when the individual officer or director was not “acting in good faith” or was engaging in “reckless, willful or wanton misconduct.” Plaintiff’s lawyers interested in averting the statutory immunity defense will likely keep these limitations in mind when drafting the complaint and will shape their allegations accordingly.

Finally, although it is kind of obvious, it is worth noting that even at its greatest extent, the statutory immunity provisions protects only individuals. It does not protect the nonprofit organization itself.

The volunteer directors and officers of nonprofit organizations can be reassured that they have immunity from liability for claims of negligence against them in connection with their actions undertaken within the scope of their duties. But because there are numerous limitations to the protection availably under the immunity statutes, it remains important for these organizations and their representatives to ensure that the organizations have and maintain a comprehensive program of liability insurance, including in particular broad, state-of-the- market D&O insurance. Because of the extent of the scope of protection afforded under these insurance programs is so important for nonprofit organization directors and officers, they will want to ensure that a knowledgeable and experienced insurance professional designed and placed their program.

The FDIC Ramps Up the Lawsuits: Earlier last week, I noted that the FDIC had filed the first of failed bank D&O lawsuit in 2013. I speculated at the time that there would be many more cases to come this year. As if to prove my point, late last week, the FDIC filed two more failed bank lawsuits, including the latest the agency has filed involving a failed Georgia bank. Both of the new lawsuits were filed on January 25, 2013. Both of the banks involved failed on January 29, 2010, so that agency filed its lawsuits just before the third anniversary of the banks’ failures and just ahead of the end of the statute of limitations period.

First, the agency filed an action in the Western District of Washington in its capacity as receiver for the failed American Marine Bank of Bainbridge Island, Washington against four officer defendants (one of whom was also a director) and six director defendants. The FDIC’s complaint (a copy of which can be found here) alleges claims for breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence and negligence. Among other things, the FDIC alleges that the defendants “took unreasonable risks with the Bank’s loan portfolio; allowed irresponsible and unattainable rapid asset growth concentrated in high-risk and speculative” construction and commercial real estate loans; and “disregarded regulator advice and criticisms regarding lending activities. The complaint alleges that the defendants’ actions caused damages to the bank of “no less than $18 million.”

Second, in the latest lawsuit the agency has filed involving a failed Georgia bank, the FDIC filed an action in the Northern District of Georgia against eleven former directors and officers of the failed First National Bank of Georgia, of Carrollton, Georgia. In its complaint, which the FDIC filed in its capacity as receiver for the failed bank, the FDIC asserts claims for negligence, gross negligence and for breach of fiduciary duties. The complaint, which can be found here, alleges that the defendants failed to properly oversee the bank’s lending function, improperly approved millions of dollars in loans, allowed excessive concentration in certain lending areas and knowingly permitted poor loan underwriting. The FDIC alleges that these actions cause damages to the bank in excess of $29.97 million.

These latest lawsuit are the 46^th and 47^th that the agency has filed as part of the current failed bank wave and the second and third so far in 2013. For whatever reason, the FDIC’s suits have been disproportionately concentrated in Georgia. This latest suit is the 15^th in Georgia so far, meaning that just under third of all of the FDIC’s lawsuits have involved failed Georgia banks. Though more banks have failed in Georgia than any other state as part of the current bank failure wave, Georgia’s bank failures represent far less than a third of all bank failures. There may be some timing issues here as many Georgia banks were among the first to fail but it still remarkable how many suits the agency has filed in the state.

Scott Trubey’s January 25, 2013 Atlanta Journal Constitution article about the latest Georgia lawsuit can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending me a link to the article and alerting me to the new lawsuit. Special thanks to yet another reader for sending me a copy of the Western District of Washington complaint.

Advisen Claims Trend Seminar: On Tuesday January 29, 2013 at 11 am EST, I will be participating in a Quarterly D&O Claims Update Webinar hosted by Advisen. The webinar will provide a quarterly review of securities and other litigation impacting D&O coverage and will identify and analyze the trends of greatest significance to Risk Managers and Management Liability professionals. The participants in this free webinar will include AIG’s Tom McCormack, and Advisen’s David Bradford and Jim Blinn. Further information about the seminar, including registration instructions, can be found here.

A Spectacle Too Many Are Missing: One of the world’s great sporting events is taking place, yet very few are paying any attention. The 2013 African Cup of Nations soccer tournament is being played now (actually, between January 19, 2013 and February 10, 2013) in South Africa. Though the tournament features many of the world’s best soccer players as well as a host of upstarts, the tournament undeservedly is receiving little attention, particularly in the United States.

Among the many incredibly talented players participating are the tournament are reigning African Footballer of the Year, Yaya Touré of the Côte d’Ivoire (who plays his club football for Manchester City in the English Premiere Leagu); Emmanuel Adebayor, the Togolese football player and striker for Tottenham Hotspur in the English Premier league; Michael Essien, the Ghanian player who is currently playing for Real Madrid in La Liga, the Spanish football league, on a season loan from Chelsea in the English league; and Gervinho, who plays for Côte d’Ivoire and for Arsenal in the English Premier League. There are many others great players as well.

Even more exciting than these marquee players are the upstarts, like the team from Niger that has qualified for the tournament for only the second time, or the team from tiny Cape Verde Islands, which has never previously qualified for the tournament, yet, after a stunning 2-1 victory on Sunday against Angola, is sitting in second place in its tournament bracket and has already qualified for the tournament’s next round.

The tournament has featured some brilliant games, including in particular the game in which Burkina Faso, which had hung on throughout the game, scored in the fourth minute on stoppage time on the absolute final play of the game to pull off a tie against a much more talented Nigerian team, or the game in which an inexperienced Niger side played with sheer determination to scrap out a nil-nil draw against the much more experienced team from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

A soccer aficionado friend of mine regards the world’s seeming inattention to these games with a shrug, noting that it may be that international soccer competitions, like Opera or Single-Malt Scotches, are an acquired taste that can be appreciated only by the cognoscenti. I disagree. This tournament features the highest level of athleticism and games that flow with an incredible beauty. I think many sports fans would be drawn into these games on first glimpse of they only saw the games.

The games are actually a lot easier to see this year than during prior tournaments, because ESPN 3 is showing at least some of the games live – but because of the time difference, they are being broadcast during the morning in the U.S., which is not a time when most people are watching sports. For those who are interested in the games or who think they might be interested, but aren’t interested in sitting down to watch soccer at 10 am in the morning, the best way to watch these games is through the Watch ESPN app. On the ESPN 3 Channel on the App, under the Replay tab, all of the games are listed by date. (You can also find all of the games by clicking on the Sports tab along the top of the user interface and clicking on “Soccer” in the drop down menu).

To get a sense of the sheer athleticism this tournament involves, as well as the incredible enthusiasm of the teams’ supporters, watch this video of the 22 year-old Tunisian forward, Yousef Msakni, scoring the game winning goal in stoppage time in a first-round game against Algeria:

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As the current wave of bank failure litigation has unfolded, the directors and officers of banking institutions rightly have become more concerned about the own potential liability exposures and interested in learning more about how they might be able to reduce their risks and exposures. In the following guest post, Joseph T. Lynyak III and Rodney R. Peck of the Pillsbury law firm take a look at the current litigation environment facing directors and officers of financial institutions and provide some practical steps that these officials can take to try to mitigate their risks

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I would like to thank Joe and Rob for their willingness to publish their articcle on this site. I welcome guest posts from responsible commentators on topics of relevance to this blog. Any readers who are interested in publishing a guest post on this site are encouraged to contact me directly. Here is Joe's and Rod’s guest post.

In this article, we analyze the steps that officers and directors of bank and non-bank financial companies and their holding companies and affiliates can take to address personal liability for alleged breaches of duty to manage and supervise a financial company’s operations, allegations which are being made in an increasing number by federal and state regulatory agencies, including the federal banking agencies and the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).

On December 10, 2012, a California jury returned a verdict of $169 million in a case brought by the FDIC against three former IndyMac Bancorp Inc. executives after determining that those officers were negligent in making loans to homebuilders by continuing to push for growth in loan production without proper regard for creditworthiness and market conditions. Soon thereafter, the former CEO of IndyMac Bank agreed to pay $1 million from his personal assets in addition to available insurance proceeds to settle another FDIC claim related to the failure of IndyMac Bank. In an unrelated yet problematic series of developments, the newly formed CFPB recently assessed civil money penalties against three holding companies for aggressive marketing practices in an aggregate amount exceeding $500 million.

Approximately 25 lawsuits were filed in 2012 by the FDIC against former officers and directors of failed institutions, up from 16 in 2011. In total, more than 40 lawsuits have been filed against officers and directors of failed institutions since 2010. Since the beginning of 2007, approximately 467 financial institutions have failed. The FDIC has indicated that it is continuing its investigation of many bank failures and additional actions can be expected. Outside directors, in addition to inside directors and senior officers, were named in 30 of the cases. (See, Cornerstone Research, “Characteristics of FDIC Lawsuits Against Directors and Officers of Failed Financial Institutions,” December 2012.)

These and similar administrative and civil enforcement actions brought by governmental entities have caused considerable concern among officers and directors of financial services companies. Specifically, many individuals have raised questions whether—and in what circumstances—management or members of a board of directors might be held personally liable for similar penalties or damages, and if so, what prudent actions could be taken to mitigate that risk.

Although these issues are complex and the risk will vary based upon differences between the corporate laws of state jurisdictions and the possible applicability of several banking and securities laws (among others), this article presents an overview and proposed approach to analyzing the risk of personal liability. It also includes a methodology to evaluate protections that might be available under current corporate governance provisions.

What follows is a summary of pertinent legal issues relating to the risk of personal liability, distinctions to be drawn between liability arising in the bank and non-bank context, and steps that directors and officers might take to minimize personal liability risk, as well as a methodology for taking an inventory of existing protections available to a board and management.

Overview and Summary—State Corporate Laws

From a traditional corporate law perspective, both officers and directors of a corporation owe a duty to the corporation to avoid self-dealing and conflicts of interest (the “duty of loyalty”) and an affirmative obligation to use reasonable efforts to properly manage and supervise the business of the company (the “duty of care”). The degree or standard by which an officer or director must comply with his or her duty of care is generally governed by the corporate law of the state in which the company is incorporated. That standard can range from an obligation to act in a reasonable manner and avoid negligent actions or decisions, to a diminished level of care that creates personal liability only in the case in which one acts in a grossly negligent fashion.

Because most state legislatures have considered these questions, each state’s Corporations Code has its own version of the duty of care, and in many jurisdictions the courts have further refined that standard by judicial interpretation. For example, in several states, liability for breaching the duty of care can only be actionable when a director or officer is grossly negligent, while in other states the standard of gross negligence protects only outside directors while management is held to the higher standard of mere negligence. Further, in many jurisdictions there is recognition—either by statute, case law or common law—that directors and/or officers may rely upon the so-called “business judgment rule” that protects them against personal liability provided that the officer or director took reasonable steps to come to a decision even when the decision is proven to be wrong.

In addition, several states have authorized limitations of liability for corporate misfeasance by permitting a corporation to adopt provisions in its articles or bylaws that further limit liability for board members or management. Importantly, in recent years, several states have adopted expanded indemnification rights for corporate stakeholders by permitting a corporation to adopt in its articles and bylaws very broad rights to indemnify officers and directors against individual damage claims brought against them in their individual capacities.

The lesson to be learned is that concerned officers and directors should establish a baseline to identify by what state law standard they will be measured when being judged regarding compliance with the duty of care, as well as related state law limitations regarding liability.

Additional Concerns for FDIC-Insured Institutions, Subsidiaries and Holding Companies

In addition to the state law standards regarding a director or officer complying with his/her duty of care, there are several other significant considerations that require attention for an officer or director of an FDIC-insured institution or a bank or savings and loan holding company.

First, an important U.S. Supreme Court decision, Atherton v. FDIC, confirms that there is no federal common law regarding the duty of care for a national bank or a federal savings association. Accordingly, based upon the Atherton decision (which interpreted a provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or the “FDI Act”, for receivership claims brought by the FDIC following a failure of a bank or thrift), the standard for national bank and federal association officers and directors generally follows state law, except that state law cannot impose a standard lower than gross negligence. Of course, for banks and bank holding companies organized under state corporate laws, the duties of care on the part of officers and directors are governed by such laws (subject to the partial preemption under the Atherton decision).

Second, applicable regulations for national banks and federal savings associations provide a useful alternative that permits a national bank or federal savings association to adopt for corporate governance purposes the Corporations Code of the state in which the institution is located, the Model Business Corporations Act or the Delaware General Corporations Code. This is a potentially valuable option that should be carefully considered. For example, in states in which liability for bank officers is based upon the higher standard of mere negligence, adopting the corporate law of Delaware not only lowers the standard for breach of the duty of care to gross negligence, but may also provide enhanced protection in regard to indemnification and the availability of the Delaware version of the business judgment rule.

However, it should be noted that Section 18(k) of the FDI Act (and thus, FDIC’s regulations) severely (and unfairly) limits indemnification rights of officers and directors of FDIC-insured institutions, their subsidiaries and their holding companies in instances in which civil money penalties and other regulatory enforcement orders are assessed against an “institution affiliated party,” which includes officers and directors of an FDIC-insured institution, its subsidiaries and any parent holding company. Even though defense costs may be paid or advanced by an institution (and commercial insurance may be purchased to pay such expenses), the proceeds of the insurance cannot be used to pay for penalties assessed.

Mitigation Considerations for Officers and Directors

If there is a key conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion, it should be that individuals acting as officers and directors of financial intermediaries should engage in advance planning and clearly understand the nature of their rights in regard to administrative enforcement actions that might be brought by one of the federal banking agencies or the CFPB. Importantly, when complying with his or her duty of care, an officer or director should ensure that the record reflects reasonable steps to comply with that standard.

In that regard, an officer or director should be provided with legal advice as to what degree of diligence and review should be incorporated into the decision-making process, as well as how that process is reflected in the records of the institution. Particularly in the case in which the business judgment rule is available, the business records of the entity should reflect that all appropriate steps were taken prior to decisions being made.

It should be noted, however, that a distinction should be drawn between an FDIC receivership claim and assessment of civil money penalties by the CFPB or one of the federal banking agencies. In the case of a receivership claim following a bank failure, the above-referenced duty of care for personal liability purposes (e.g., negligence, gross negligence, etc.) is most often a determinative factor. However, in the administrative context in which civil money penalties are being assessed, culpability need not be based upon the failure to comply with a duty of care, but rather, can be based upon an institution’s compliance or non-compliance with an enforcement order previously issued in which officers and directors are ordered to take specific remedial steps to achieve compliance.

A Methodology for Determining and Achieving Reasonable Risk Mitigation to Avoid Personal Liability

As even the casual observer can see, being an officer or director for a financial institution—whether FDIC-insured or otherwise—presents a range of challenges. Complicating the situation is the nature of legal representation of companies, in that counsel for a company is usually not deemed to be providing individual legal advice to officers or directors, and hence the use of in-house counsel or a company’s outside lawyers to provide personal advice may not be appropriate or available in all cases.

We suggest that several steps be considered to address the concerns discussed by this article.

First, as noted above, officers and board members should obtain an overview of the rules governing compliance with the duty of care applicable to the company, including how courts and agencies have interpreted those rules. Among other things, identifying process issues and evidencing development of policies and procedures is essential, as well as ensuring that business records reflect robust discussion and reasonable reliance on experts (i.e., to be able to take advantage of the business judgment rule).

Second, a corporate governance review should take place to determine whether corporate documents such as articles and bylaws include the most favorable indemnification rights permitted under applicable law. (In that regard, it is important to note that in most cases such protections are optional under state corporate law and must be affirmatively adopted by a company’s board of directors.)

Third, employment agreements and indemnification agreements should be reviewed and updated on an annual basis to maximize contractual rights for designated officers and directors.

Fourth, extreme care should be exercised when transactions or other matters arise in which the director or officer may be seen as having a conflict of interest. All corporate processes should be followed, including full disclosure of the nature of the conflict, approval of the matter by a majority of disinterested directors, advice of counsel, etc.

Fifth, directors should work with management to establish internal tracking systems on matters requiring attention (“MRA”) arising out of regulatory examinations. Repeat violations of law or failure to remediate troublesome conditions by the next examination can be seen as a lack of proper board oversight. Careful attention should be given to the regulators’ evaluation of management and appropriate action taken when poor ratings are given. However, reliance on the regulators’ evaluations of management alone may not be sufficient because it appears that regulatory evaluations of management in many cases of failed banks have not been significantly downgraded by the regulators until a year or two before the bank’s failure. (Cornerstone Research, supra.)

Finally, a legal review of a company’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policies should be conducted and benchmarked against similar institutions in similar circumstances. It should also be noted that the contractual terms of directors’ and officers’ liability policies are frequently negotiable, and can result in valuable additional liability protection.

Other Standards of Liability Impacting Officers and Directors of a Financial Company

Although this article focuses on corporate and banking liability standards applicable to officers and directors of a financial intermediary, other standards of care arise in particular circumstances as part of the performance of the activities of an officer or director of a financial company. For example, in several instances under the federal securities laws, a corporate officer for a registered company can be held liable in civil or SEC actions for material misstatements in offering materials unless the director has engaged in a “due diligence” review. In regard to companies and “institution affiliated parties” that are subject to Section 8 of the FDI Act, liability might be viewed as a strict liability standard if a federal banking agency views the actions of an officer or director as having engaged in a violation of a federal law, regulation, or unsafe or unsound banking practice. Similarly, the newly established CFPB may also directly access civil money penalties and other remedial measures if an officer or director has participated in the violation of a covered federal consumer protection law.

Please note that this article summarizes several complex liability topics and by its nature is a starting point for further inquiry by officers and directors of banks and non-banks participating in the financial services industry.

Joseph T. Lynyak III is a partner in the Finance practice at Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles. He can be reached at (213) 488-7265 or joseph.lynyak@pillsburylaw.com.

Rodney R. Peck is a partner in the Corporate & Securities practice at Pillsbury in San Francisco. He can be reached at (415) 983-1516 or rodney.peck@pillsburylaw.com.

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A distinctive feature of the current wave of FDIC failed bank litigation is the aura of déjà vu surrounding the suits. The resemblance of the current lawsuits to those filed during the S&L crisis is uncanny. And not only are the suits similar, but in many instances they even involve the same lawyers as last time around.

Just the same, any suggestion that the risks and exposures for financial institution directors and officers have not changed since the S&L crisis would be mistaken. The liability risks for FI Ds & OS have changed dramatically in recent years. In that earlier era, there was no Sarbanes Oxley Act and no Dodd-Frank Act, and there was no criminal money laundering liability. There was no Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or its requirements for compliance with consumer protection laws. There were no data privacy liability exposures of the type now emerging. Through these and a myriad of other legislative and judicial developments, the liability exposures of financial institution directors and officers have changed exponentially.

The individual directors and officers at financial institutions must navigate a difficult course in a treacherous environment. Fortunately for these individuals and their advisors, there is now a comprehensive resource to guide them. Samuel Rosenthal, a partner in the New York office of the Patton Boggs law firm, has written an exhaustive single-volume desk book  entitled Director and Officer Liability in Financial Institutions (here). Rosenthal’s 1045-page book is an indispensable reference for anyone who wants to understand and address the liability exposures of financial institution directors and officers.

Rosenthal’s book is built on a familiarity with the earlier litigation from the S&L crisis era as well as an awareness of the fraught circumstances now facing financial institution directors and officers following the subprime meltdown and ensuing credit crisis.

What makes this book so valuable is that it not only broadly organizes the traditional background regarding director and officer liability exposures but it also incorporates a thorough review of the new range of liability risks that have emerged as a result of legislative and judicial developments in recent years.

Thus for example, Rosenthal not only reviews the traditional civil liabilities facing financial institution directors and officers under the common law and federal statutory law, but also the myriad new criminal provisions to which FI Ds & OS are now subject, as well as the new potential consumer protection and privacy exposures they now face. Rosenthal brings many years of practical experience to this review; here is his perspective on the many recent changes:

This period over the last twenty-five years has witnessed a stunning trend in enforcement efforts has it has moved from traditional concepts dependent upom mens rea to one criminalizing conduct that might have been regarded – at best – to be a civil violation years ago. Directors and officers can be sued, barred from the industry or even jailed for conduct that years ago would have merited little or no attention from regulatory authorities and prosecutors.

In recognition of this new environment, Rosenthal’s book provides a detailed yet practical overview of the current state of governmental enforcement actions to which FI Ds&Os could be subject, including in particular a thorough summary of the recent civil actions and enforcement actions of the relevant federal agencies, as a way to afford insight into these agencies' current expectations and approach.

Finally the book provides a practical manual for directors and officers of financial institutions on how they can best try to defend themselves – from the investigative stage through ensuing civil and criminal proceedings. The defense overview section includes a separate chapter on the indispensable question of how the directors and officers can pay for their costs of defense. This section includes a critical review of the relevant indemnification and D&O insurance issues.

The one thing that is hard to capture in this short book review like this is how detailed and specific this book is. The book’s scope and depth are extraordinary. As I browsed the book’s lengthy table of contents, I found myself turning frequently to the interesting and perceptive discussion of a host of issues on which I am currently involved. In each case, the book’s treatment of the topic was thorough and helpful.

Just the same, the book is written with the directors and officers themselves in mind. The book is intended to inform them of their duties and exposures; of the steps that can take to try to mitigate their risks; and what they should do when claims arise. The book also aims for those who counsel financial institution directors and officers. The book will also be valuable for anyone involved in claims concerning FI Ds&Os, including regulators, claimants, defense counsel, and D&O insurance claims counsel.

In short, Rosenthal’s  book is a comprehensive, practical and helpful guide for financial institution directors and officers written by a knowledgeable and experienced practitioner. For anyone called upon to address liability and enforcement issues, having this book at hand will be like having a hotline to a skilled and trusted advisor. This book is an essential resource that everyone involved in D&O liability issues should have on their desks.

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Trial in the FDIC’s failed bank lawsuit against three former officers of IndyBank commenced on November 6, 2012 in the federal court in Los Angeles. According Scott Reckard’s November 9, 2012 Los Angeles Times article (here), the parties’ counsel have delivered their opening statements. The case, which was the first failed bank lawsuit the FDIC filed as part of the current bank failure wave, is also the first to go to trial.

As detailed here, the FDIC first filed the lawsuit against the former IndyMac officers in June 2010. The FDIC’s lawsuit seeks to recover damages from the individual defendants for "negligence and breach of fiduciary duties." The lawsuit alleges "significant departures from safe and sound banking practices."  As discussed here, in July 2011, the FDIC filed a separate lawsuit against IndyMac’s former CEO, Michael Perry.

There are three individual defendants in the case that is now in trial:  Scott Van Dellen, the former President and CEO of IndyMac’s Homebuilders Division (HBD), who is alleged to have approved all of the loans that are the subject of the FDIC’s suit; Richard Koon, who was HBD’s Chief Lending Officer until mid-2006 and who is alleged to have approved a number of the loans at issue; Kenneth Shellem, who served as HBD’s Chief Compliance Officer until late 2006, and who is alleged to have approved many of the loans at issue.

The case against the three former IndyMac officers has been very vigorously litigated; I detailed the particularly memorable hearing regarding one discovery dispute that arose in the case here. (While writing this article, I reread the article about the discovery dispute; Central District of California Judge Dale Fischer’s comments during the hearing make for very interesting reading, and I commend the article to readers looking for a little diversion.) Among other significant pretrial rulings, in October 2012, Judge Fischer also held that under California law the individuals were not entitled to rely on the business judgment rule, as discussed here.

And in June 2012, as discussed here, in a significant ruling in a related D&O insurance coverage case, Central District of California Judge Gary Klausner held that all of the various IndyMac lawsuits (including the one the FDIC filed against the three former IndyMac officers) were interrelated to the first filed lawsuit, and thus triggered only a single tower of D&O insurance. This holding was of particular significance both to the former IndyMac officers and to the FDIC, as the FDIC’s lawsuit was filed during the policy period of the second insurance tower. The ruling that the subsequent lawsuit are all interrelated to the first filed lawsuit means that the only insurance available for the individuals (and out of which the FDIC might recover from the insurers) is whatever is left under the first tower of insurance.

According to their July 2012 motion to stay the FDIC’s lawsuit against them, the three defendants represented to the court that defense fees in various IndyMac-related lawsuits as well as the costs associated with settlements that had been reached in several of the cases will deplete or threaten to deplete all of the remaining proceeds under the first tower of insurance.  (The motion asserts that defense fees in excess of $50 million and settlements totaling $29 million would deplete the $80 million insurance tower.) The defendants sought to stay the FDIC’s lawsuit against them so that they could pursue their appeal of Judge Klausner’s insurance coverage ruling. The defendants’ motion can be found here. Judge Fischer denied the defendants’ motion to stay the proceedings.

The upshot of the unavailability of the second tower of insurance and the apparent exhaustion of the first tower is that the three individual defendants face the prospect of that there might not be any insurance available to protect them in the event that the trial results in an award of damages against them (subject of course to the outcome of the pending appeals of Judge Klausner’s insurance coverage ruling).

The FDIC’s original complaint had named a fourth individual, William Rothman, as a defendant as well. According to a footnote in the motion to stay referenced above, Rothman had settled with the FDIC in exchange for Rothman’s assignment to the FDIC of Rothman’s rights under the second tower of insurance.  The separate suit against IndyMac’s former CEO, Michael Perry, remains pending.

In any event, it will be very interesting to see how this case proceeds. It is highly unusual for a case like this to proceed to trial, particularly where there may be limited or even no insurance out of which the FDIC may be able to recover any judgment. (Interestingly, in the defendants’ motion to stay referenced above, counsel for the defendants asserts that “the FDIC specifically structured this lawsuit in order to reach the Tower 2 Policy,” in which case Judge Klausner’s insurance coverage ruling upset a part of the FDIC’s strategy in their case against the three individual defendants.) Obviously, the outcome of the appeal in the insurance coverage case is of keen interest to the FDIC as well as to the individual defendants.

I am sure that there are many readers who will be following this trial closely and who may be able to monitor the case more closely than I can. I would be grateful if readers would be willing to keep me informed about the case.

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Under the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, corporate officials can be held liable for misconduct in which they did not participate and of which they have been entirely unaware, based on their responsibility for the corporation itself. As shown in a July 27, 2012 opinion from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (here), a misdemeanor conviction based on the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine can not only result in criminal penalties  but can also include  “career-ending” consequences, in the form of a lengthy ban from participating in governmental programs. Although the appellate court struck down the specific disbarment at issue in the case, it upheld the government’s right to impose the ban.

As discussed below, this case serves as a reminder of the significant exposures corporate executives face under the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine.

Background

Purdue Frederick Company was accused of fraudulent misbranding of the painkiller OxyContin. Among other things prosecutors alleged that unnamed employees of the company marketed OxyContin as less addictive and less harmful than other painkillers. The company ultimately pled guilty to felony misbranding. Among other things, monetary sanctions of about $600 million were imposed on the company.

Under the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, three Purdue executives – Purdue CEO Michael Friedman, general counsel Howard Udell, and medical director Paul Goldenheim—were accused of the misdemeanor of misbranding of a drug. The individuals pleaded guilty to misdemeanor misbranding, for (as the appellate court put it) “their admitted failure to prevent Purdue’s fraudulent marketing of OxyContin.” The individuals were sentenced to extensive community service, fined $5,000, and ordered to disgorge compensation totaling about $34.5 million.

Several months after the individuals’ conviction, the Department of Health and Human Services determined that the individuals should be excluded from participating in Federal health care programs for 20 years. During the individuals’ ensuing administrative appeals, the individuals managed to get the length of the disbarment reduced to 12 years. The 12 year disbarment ultimately was affirmed by a U.S. District Court, and the individuals appealed, arguing that the agency did not have the authority to impose the disbarment and also arguing that because the agency lacked a substantial basis for the length of the disbarment, its imposition was arbitrary and capricious and therefore invalid.

The July 27 Opinion

In a July 27, 2012 opinion written for a divided three-judge panel, D.C. Circuit Administrative Judge Douglas Ginsberg affirmed the agency’s authority to impose the disbarment, but agreed with the individuals that in this case the imposition of the 12-year disbarment “was arbitrary and capricious for want of a reasoned explanation for the length of their exclusions,” and the court remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. Chief Judge David Sentelle concurred in part and dissented in part, noting that he would have affirmed the length of the disbarment.

None of the three judges questioned the agency’s authority to impose disbarment. Judge Ginsberg’s opinion expressly rejected the individuals’ argument that the agency’s imposition of the disbarment for an offense lacking a mens rea element (that is, lacking a culpable state of mind) violated their constitutional rights to due process. Among other things, the individuals noted that the imposition of criminal penalties under the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine had been upheld in the past only because the “associated penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”

The appellate court rejected this constitutional argument, saying that “we do not think excluding an individual … on the basis of his conviction for a strict liability offense raises any significant concern with due process,” adding that “surely the Government constitutionally may refuse to deal further with senior corporate officers who could have but failed to prevent a fraud against the Government on their watch.”

The court did hold that the agency had failed to justify its imposition of a 12-year disbarment, noted that “we do not suggest that the appellants’ exclusion for 12 years based upon a conviction for misdemeanor misbranding might not be justifiable; we express no opinion on that question. Our concern here is that the [agency’s administrative review board] did not justify it in the decision under review.” Noting that no prior disbarment had exceeded ten years, the court concluded that the agency’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious with respect to the length of their exclusion because it failed to explain its departure from the agency’s own precedents.”

Discussion

If nothing else, this case serves as a reminder of the power that the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine gives prosecutors to pursue criminal charges against corporate officials based on the misconduct of the officials’ subordinates in which the officials were not involved and of which the officials may have been entirely unaware. And even though the appellate court reversed the “career ending” disbarment that the agency had imposed on the corporate officials here, the appellate court emphasized that there was nothing inherently wrong with the length of the disbarment; the appellate court’s reversal was strictly based on the agency’s failure to explain the length of the disbarment.

Indeed, the appellate court expressly affirmed the agency’s authority to impose disbarment even in the case of strict liability offense that lacked any culpable state of mind. The court seemed entirely untroubled by concerns surrounding convictions under the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine that these convictions involve the imposition of liability without culpability in the form of a guilty state of mind. (For more about concerns with imposing liability about culpability, refer to my prior post here).

To be sure, in connection with their pleas of guilty to misdemeanor misbranding, the individuals had expressly admitted that they had “responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance or to promptly correct” the misbranding activity. Their convictions and their admissions, as well as the seriousness of the underlying misconduct, may cast this case in a different light.

Nevertheless, I continue to find the willingness of courts and regulatory authorities to impose criminal convictions and “career restricting” penalties on officials who had no involvement in or even awareness of the misconduct to be troubling. The court itself noted that the justification for the strict liability imposition of criminal liability based on the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine was premised in part on the supposition that that the penalties involved were relatively small. There is nothing small about the type of career-ending disbarment the government sought to impose here. To the contrary, this case shows that the consequences for individuals convicted under the responsible corporate officer doctrine can be significant.

A July 2012 memo from Eric Reed of the Fox Rothschild law firm entitled “Even Without Knowledge or Participation, Corporate Officers Can Be Criminally Liable for Subordinates’ Misdeeds” (here) points out that this case “stands as a reminder” of several concerns about the Responsible Officer Doctrine, including that “ignorance of misconduct by subordinates is not always a defense for corporate officers.” This case also shows that “when violations occur, resolving regulatory or criminal charges may not conclude all liabilities for a particular occurrence” and in parallel administrative or agency proceedings “facts admitted or proved in an initial proceeding may bind in the later matters.”

One of the bedrock principles of our criminal justice system is that a prerequisite of liability should be a finding of culpability. Even if, as courts now seem comfortable in assuming, there are circumstances where the kind of strict liability imposed under the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine is appropriate, that type of liability should be rare and imposed sparingly. My concern, as I have noted elsewhere, is that the imposition of this type of liability is becoming increasingly common and is imposed far too often. As this case shows, the consequences for individuals on whom this type of liability is imposed can not only be substantial, but it can be career-ending. This deeply troublesome trend deserves far greater attention, and the constitutional concerns raised here deserve much closer consideration than they were given by this court.

Susan Beck’s July 30, 2012 article on the Am Law Litigation Daily about the D.C. Circuit’s opinion can be found here.

Goldman Sachs Settles Mortgage-Pass Through Securities Suit: The parties to the Goldman Sachs/ GS Mortgage Pass Through Certificates securities suit have reached an agreement to settle the case for $26.6125 million. The settlement is subject to court approval. In addition, as reflected on the parties’ July 31, 2012 motion for preliminary court approval of the settlement (here), the settlement is subject to a $1.3125 reduction if Stichting APB (which filed a separate action relating to the mortgage-pass through certificates) elects not to participate in the class settlement. The settlement fund is inclusive of $5.3 million for attorneys’ fees and expenses. The parties’ stipulation of settlement can be found here.

As noted in detail here, the case had in January 2011 survived in principal part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court had subsequently certified a plaintiff class. The defendants had sought leave to appeal the class certification to the Second Circuit. The defendants’ petition to the Second Circuit, which remained pending at the time the settlement was reached, has now been stayed pending approval of the settlement.

Alison Frankel has an interesting August 1, 2012 post on her On The Case blog about the GS Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Settlement, in which she asks, among other things, whether the MBS cases are turning out to be a "bust" for the plaintiffs' lawyers. As always, Frankel has interesting thoughts and observations on the topic. Her post can be found here. I should add that if your not reading all of Alison's posts every single day,  you are making a very serious mistake.

I have in any event added the Goldman mortgage pass-through certificate settlement to my list of subprime and credit crisis-related case resolutions, which can be accessed here.

Corrected Link: Yesterday, I wrote about the latest antitrust lawsuit to be filed in the wake of the emerging Libor scandal. Unfortunately, it appears that the link I originally put up on the site to the new case complaint was faulty. I have corrected the link. Readers who may have wanted to see the complaint but were unable to do so owing to the faulty link can see the complaint here. I apologize for the faulty link as well as any confusion the faulty link may have caused.

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On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (commonly referred to as the JOBS Act). This legislation, which enjoyed strong bipartisan support in Congress, is intended to ease the IPO process for emerging growth companies and to facilitate capital-raising by reducing regulatory burdens and disclosure obligations. Among other things, the Act also introduces changes that could impact the potential liability exposures of directors and officers of both public and private companies. These changes could have important D&O insurance implications.

In the latest issue of InSights, I take a detailed look at the provisions of the JOBS Act and consider the Act’s possible impact on D&O liability and insurance. The InSights article can be found here.

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Among the important questions that will need to be answered in connection with the current wave of failed bank litigation is the question of extent to which the non-director officers will be able to defend themselves in reliance on the business judgment rule.

In the following guest post, Jonathan Joseph (pictured to the left) takes a look at the extent to officers may defend themselves in reliance on the business judgment rule in cases to which California law applies. These questions go to the heart of the

officers’ potential liabilities and the legal standards that will be applied to address those questions.

Jonathan Joseph is a member of the California State Bar and has focused for over 33 years on regulatory, corporate, securities and transactional matters for banks and bank holding companies and officers and directors of distressed and failed institutions.  He currently serves as the Co-Vice Chair and Secretary of the Financial Institutions Committee of the Business Law Section of the California State Bar (2008 – present). He is the founder and managing partner of Joseph & Cohen, Professional Corporation in San Francisco, CA. Mr. Joseph is also a member of the Washington D.C. Bar and the State Bar of New York. He may be contacted at Jon@josephandcohen.com. A substantially similar version of this article was initially published in Issue No. 1 2012 of the Business Law News of the California State Bar. The original article on which this revised version is based was originally written before the initial decisio in FDIC v Perry was reported (about which decision, refer here).

Many thanks to Jon for his willingness to publish his article here. I welcome guest posts from responsible commentators on topics relevant to this blog. Any readers who are interested in publishing a guest post on this site are encouraged to contact me directly. Jon's article follows. Footnotes appear below following the article text.

The exact nature of the duties and liabilities of corporate officers who are not directors is a subject that has received little attention from courts and commentators. [1]  Many cases which relate to the duties and liabilities of corporate fiduciaries explore whether negligence and breach of care claims are protected by the business judgment rule and the courts that have spoken have done so mostly in terms of its application to decisions or judgments of corporate directors. [2] While the standard of liability for non-director officers remains relatively unexplored, there is widespread consensus among the courts on the policy justifications for the deferential treatment of directors under the business judgment rule.[3]

Recently, two Federal banking agencies have brought civil damage actions in California against corporate officers of failed federally-insured depository institutions in which they assert that the widely recognized deference accorded by courts to decisions by directors does not apply to corporate officers. These cases seek damages for the alleged negligence of non-director officers as well as officers who were also directors for huge losses suffered when regulators closed the institutions based largely on pre-closure decisions made in good faith that didn’t turn out well. Three of these cases, which are all triangulating on the same issues, are discussed below. [4] 

While none of these cases has proceeded to trial, rulings at the motion to dismiss and judgment on the pleadings stage in two of these matters, all within the Central District of California, have emerged with contradictory results -- including one ruling in August to the effect that the business judgment rule doesn’t apply to non-director officers. This is troubling to some California practitioners as the great weight of authority by courts and commentators has favored application of the business judgment rule to officers acting in their capacity as officers within the scope of their delegated authority.[5] 

In most states, including California, Delaware and New York, despite the case law being sparse, there has been little dispute that the business judgment rule or BJR applies equally to corporate officers and directors. Consequently, these pending Central District cases are worthy of focus since any final rulings upholding the position asserted by the Federal banking agencies could have far flung effects. If the BJR is ultimately held not to protect good faith decisions by officers of California based banks, that holding would extend to officers of any California corporation.

These cases touch upon significant underlying themes being widely debated in American society today (e.g., Occupy Wall Street) as to who should be held responsible for the tremendous costs of bailing out the largest American banks in 2008, why more executives and directors of such institutions haven’t been held accountable and whether corporate executives and directors could have anticipated the acute global financial meltdown in 2008 and thereafter.[6]

The Standard of Conduct and Business Judgment Rule

The general standard of conduct applicable directors and officers of California corporations in the performance of their functions as they relate to matters in which they are disinterested is a corporate governance principle widely recognized throughout the United States. The standard is well summarized by the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance [7]:

“A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director’s or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinary prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.”

In California, as elsewhere, when it is applicable, the business judgment rule.[8] precludes judicial second-guessing of decisions made by corporate fiduciaries in good faith or where the decision can be attributed to any rationale business purpose.[9]  The rule is procedural and process oriented. It sets up a presumption that decisions are based on sound business judgment and the “presumption can only be rebutted by a factual showing of fraud, bad-faith or gross-overreaching" [10]  based on a widespread “judicial policy of deference to the business judgment of corporate directors in the exercise of their broad discretion in making corporate decisions." [11] The relevant consideration is whether the process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests even if a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision to have been “substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through stupid to egregious." [12]

Two Federal Banking Agencies Seek Damages for Breach of the Duty of Care

Since the global financial crisis began in 2008, four hundred twelve banks have been closed across the United States through December 15, 2011 including thirty-eight banks in California. [13] As of December 8, 2011, the FDIC has authorized suits in connection with 41 failed institutions against 373 individuals for director and officer liability with damage claims of at least $7.6 billion. [14]  Credit unions also failed during this period, although the actual number of failures is lower. {15]  Federal banking regulators are required to investigate insured depository institution failures and bring lawsuits to recover damages. Enforcement authority under Federal law was strengthened in 1989 after Congress concluded that a large number of saving and loan failures during the 1980’s were due to outright fraud and other egregious conduct. [16]

Thus, it isn’t surprising that the banking agencies have instituted damage suits in connection with some of the most recent failures and more will undoubtedly be authorized in the coming months. [17] As stated above, both the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), in Van Dellen and Perry, and the National Credit Union Administration (‘NCUA”), in Siravo, have asserted that corporate officers in California are not protected by the business judgment rule. [18] Their basic argument is that section 309 of the Corporations Code applies on its face to directors, not officers and that there is no common law business judgment rule in California case law that applies to limit the liability of officers.

The Aftermath of the Failure of IndyMac Bank

Van Dellen and Perry involve two different actions by the FDIC as receiver arising out of the failure of IndyMac Bank, FSB in 2008. On July 11, 2008, IndyMac Bank, Pasadena, CA was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the FDIC was named Conservator. With about $32 billion in assets when it was closed, the failure is the second largest since 2008 and the FDIC has estimated that the loss was $8 billion. Van Dellen was filed in July 2010 against former officers of the homebuilder division of IndyMac Bank alleging breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in approving loans made by the division. 

The FDIC’s other companion IndyMac case is more recent. It was filed against former Chairman of the Board and CEO Michael Perry in July 2011 seeking $600 million in damages, alleging in a single count that Perry, solely in his capacity as an officer (i.e., CEO), had been negligent. [19]  The complaint in Perry is noteworthy for several reasons including that i) the allegations artfully bypass his actions as a director, ii) the complaint is comprised of a single claim for ordinary negligence, and iii) no outside directors were named. The latter is presumably due to the FDIC’s conclusion that the BJR would immunize the outside directors’ conduct. [20]  Alternatively, it is possible that the outside directors settled or are negotiating to settle the FDIC’s claims against them.

In addition to anticipating the weakness of claims for ordinary negligence against the bank’s directors when it filed the Perry action solely against Michael Perry, the FDIC may also have concluded that it couldn’t support gross negligence theories against directors (including Perry). In Siravo, the NCUA had originally named the former outside directors of WesCorp and alleged they had been negligent, but lost this argument on a motion to dismiss based on the courts assessment that the BJR was applicable. On August 1, 2011, after earlier allowing the FDIC to amend its complaint several times, Judge George Wu issued his Siravo Order in which he dismissed all claims against the directors on business judgment rule grounds – without leave to amend. [21].

The Failure of WesCorp Federal Credit Union - NCUA v. Siravo

Siravo involves losses arising out of the failure of Western Corporate Federal Credit Union (“WesCorp”), which was the largest corporate credit union in the United States when it was placed into conservatorship by the NCUA on March 19, 2009. On October 1, 2010, the NCUA placed WesCorp into involuntary liquidation. WesCorp was originally seized after the NCUA concluded that its liquidity was imperiled by $6.8 billion in anticipated losses stemming from investments in private-label mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). The NCUA originally brought suit against former officers and directors of WesCorp alleging they breached their duty of due care and were grossly negligent when they approved investments in MBS. Due to Judge Wu’s decision to dismiss the NCUA claims against WesCorp’s outside directors, the only remaining defendants in Siravo, as of the date this article went to print, were five officers.

The Siravo Order was issued pursuant to a motion to dismiss brought by the officer and director defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The standard for such a motion required the court to 1) construe the NCUA’s complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. [22]  The court was not required to accept as true “legal conclusions merely because they were cast in the form of factual allegations." [23] and the complaint against the defendants will not be upheld if it “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'" [24] Rather, the court concluded that to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." [25]

The director defendants in Siravo argued that the facts as pled in the amended complaint made clear that they had operated far above the standard of culpability necessary for a claim to survive application of the business judgment rule. The director defendants further argued that the complaint failed to focus, as required, on the “process” in which they made their decisions, but rather attacked simply the content and results of their decision.

In considering director defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Wu held that the plaintiff would effectively have to plead “fraud, breach of trust, conflict of interest, bad faith, oppression, corruption, complete abdication of responsibility, willful ignorance or gross overreaching” in order to overcome the business judgment rule as applied to the directors. [26]  In the final analysis, Judge Wu concluded that the directors “may have made choices – or not made choices – with which the NCUA disagrees, but that does not mean they failed in their responsibilities so severely that they lose the protection of the business judgment rule." [27]

The director defendants also argued that the business judgment rule extends to officer defendants such as a WesCorp executive who had been the Chief Investment Officer. The NCUA argued that a 1989 California decision, Gaillard v. Natomas Co. [28]  held that only directors are protected in California by the business judgment rule. In denying the motion to dismiss the officer defendants from the breach of duty claim, the court focused on the plain language of section 309 of the Corporations Code (which is applicable only to directors) and refused to recognize the common law application of the BJR to an officer in California. The Judge noted that some California decisions had included officers within the scope of the BJR’s protection, but found nevertheless that Gaillard v Natomashad considered the issue and concluded that the WesCorp officer defendants did not enjoy the rules protection. The court may have been swayed by an inference that executives had received increased compensation as a result of a shift in WesCorp’s investment emphasis which increased the compensation paid to top executives. [29]

Judge Fischer Rules that the BJR May Be Raised by Corporate Officers

Just one month after Judge Wu’s ruling in Siravo, Judge Dale S. Fischer issued the Van Dellen Order which also considered the issue of whether the common law business judgment rule extends to good faith conduct by corporate officers in California. The procedural posture in Van Dellen was slightly different than in Siravo. In Van Dellen the officer defendants had filed an Answer raising affirmative defenses. The FDIC moved for partial judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(c) as to some of the affirmative defenses including the business judgment rule. However, because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is functionally identical to a motion to dismiss, the applicable standard is essentially the same as for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. [30]  Judge Fischer rejected the reasoning employed by Judge Wu and reached the opposite conclusion. The Judge distinguished Gaillard v. Natomas and held that as a matter of law the FDIC had failed to demonstrate that the business judgment rule is inapplicable to officers in Californa. [31]

The Van Dellen officer defendants had argued that the common law component of the BJR applies even if Section 309 does not apply to officers and that Gaillard v. Natomas was a duty of loyalty case inapplicable to whether the BJR is a defense to breach of care claims. Presumably, the Judge was aware of Professor Melvin Eisenberg’s criticism of Gaillardin his 1995 study for the California Law Revision Commission [32]  since her ruling closely tracked the Eisenberg Law Revision Commission Analysis. She held that “California has recognized that ‘[t]he common law business judgment rule has two components’ and ‘[o]nly the first component is embodied in Corporations Code section 309’… most California cases discussing § 309 involve directors and not officers, … the common law component of the business judgment rule may apply to officers even if § 309 does not." [33]

Motion to Dismiss Ruling in FDIC v. Perry Could Be Tie Breaker

The Perry case is also being considered in the Central District of California before Judge Otis Wright. Perry has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The motion was considered on November 7, 2011 following briefing by the FDIC and Perry. Perry’s motion points the court to the Van Dellen Order and notes that the FDIC’s position that section 309 applies to directors only is beside the point since the second, uncodified component of the BJR, applies to directors and to officers. [34]

Perry also attacked the FDIC’s reliance on Gaillard. Perry pointed out that Gaillard related to golden parachutes provided to a corporation’s officers and involved self-dealing. Perry argues that Gaillard correctly held that the BJR was inapplicable because the officers therein had a personal interest in golden parachutes, but the second aspect of the court’s holding was incorrect because the officers were not entitled to the protection of the BJR only because they had engaged in self-dealing. [35] Perry does not involve any self-dealing or duty of loyalty allegations.

The officer defendants in Siravo intend to raise the Van Dellen Order at a hearing in early 2012. It is possible, therefore, that Judge Wu might modify his prior BJR ruling as it relates to officers. In Perry, the courtis expected to rule on Perry’s motion to dismiss in the next few months. While the issue may seem narrow, the implications in California could be far-reaching if the FDIC’s position prevails. The FDIC argues that good reasons exist as to why the BJR should not apply to corporate officers. In contrast to outside directors, they state that because officers receive higher absolute pay levels, they stand to reap substantial rewards for serving and taking risks and for this reason, the FDIC reasons they should face greater risks. [36]  Perry’s reply is that FDIC’s assertion that policy reasons support limiting the BJR protection only to directors is entirely off base. Perry asserts that not a single state has implemented such a policy. [37]

The BJR represents sound public policy that, as a general rule, should continue to be applied by the courts as a presumption that good faith judgments by officers and directors of California corporations can only be rebutted by a factual showing of fraud, bad faith or gross overreaching. To employ a different rule as advocated by the banking agencies – one that permits judging the content of decisions by corporate fiduciaries with the benefit of hindsight – would, in the long run, be injurious to shareholder interests. [38]  Such a holding would tend to chill the ability of corporate executives, including bankers, to take legitimate and reasonable business risks that could benefit their corporations and shareholders.

Professor Melvin Eisenberg has noted that the BJR is premised on the idea that business judgments are necessarily made on the basis of incomplete information and in the face of obvious risks, so that typically a range of decisions is reasonable. Fact finders are ill-equipped to distinguish between bad decisions and proper decisions that turn out badly based on 20-20 hindsight. If courts too often erroneously treat decisions that turned out badly as bad decisions, and unfairly hold directors and officers liable for such decisions, corporate decision makers might tend to be unduly risk-averse. The business judgment rule protects directors and officers from such unfair liability and encourages risk taking. [39]

The Van Dellen Order, dated September 27, 2011, and the Siravo Order, dated August 1, 2011, both considered the business judgment rule as it relates to tort claims against corporate officers under California law and reached conflicting results. The Perry cased involves the same issue. A motion to dismiss the single claim for negligence in Perry was heard on November 7, 2011. No ruling had been delivered as of early December 2011. The ruling, when issued by the Perry court, could be viewed as a tie-breaker. Alternatively, since the issue presents an unsettled question of an important legal principle in California, if the Court in FDIC v. Perry follows the Siravo result (i.e., ruling against Perry), it could pave the way for an appeal by Perry to the Ninth Circuit.

These decisions and future rulings in other FDIC civil damage actions against bank executive officers that have also been brought by the FDIC recently in California and appeals of District Court decisions could shape California law as it applies to officers of California corporations and federally-insured depository institutions headquartered in California for years. Consequently, California business leaders and corporate practitioners should follow these cases closely. 

Given the justifications and importance of the business-judgment rule and the uncertainty of its status and formulation in California, particularly as it applies to officers of corporations in the exercise of judgment when making business decisions, it may be desirable to codify the rule legislatively unless the Ninth Circuit or the California Supreme Court act first and find that the business judgment rule applies to officers.

Postscript

On December 13, 2011, the District Court in Perry denied Michael Perry’s motion to dismiss, holding that the business judgment rule does not apply to officers under California law. The Court’s order was based on the Judge’s conclusion that no authority exists for the proposition that the common law BJR applies to officers and he further inferred that when the legislature adopted section 309 it must have meant to eliminate the common law business judgment rule. His finding is surprising because the legislative history doesn’t explicitly state the legislature intended to override the common law business judgment rule when it enacted section 309 in 1977.   Consequently, the Court’s reasoning isn’t particularly persuasive.

In an amended order issued on February 21, 2012, Judge Otis Wright approved Perry’s request for an immediate interlocutory appeal of his order. Judge Wright found that his order involved “a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differences of opinion” and that the immediate appeal “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

This author’s view is that the Ninth Circuit should overrule the District Court’s decision in Perry. This can be accomplished by holding that Gaillard v. Natomas was misapplied by the District Court since Gaillard is only applicable to cases involving breach of the duty of loyalty. The Appellate Court should also correct the District Court’s unfounded conclusion regarding the legislative intent underlying section 309 by finding that in 1977 when section 309 was enacted the common law business judgment rule as applied to officers was not eliminated. Consequently, the BJR would continue as a valid defense for officers of California corporations and federally chartered institutions headquartered in the State.   Common sense and public policy call out for such a result.

*End*

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Indemnification is the first and most important line of defense for the protection of directors and officers. But corporate officials are not always entitled to indemnification. For example, under Delaware law, they cannot claim mandatory indemnification if their defense is not successful. And they cannot seek permissive indemnification is they did not act in good faith.

A February 7, 2012 decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery takes a detailed look at the contours of these indemnification limitations, in the challenging context of a case involving a former CEO who was terminated for cause and who pled ultimately guilty to criminal charges. The court reviewed the indemnification questions in consideration both of statutory indemnification provisions as well as a separate indemnification agreement and concluded that further discovery was required in order to permit a determination whether or not the former CEO did or did not act in good faith in connection with at least some of the amounts for which he sought indemnification The decision, which can be found here, raises a number of interesting implications.

I should acknowledge at the outset Francis Pileggi’s February 19, 2012 post on his Delaware Corporate and Commerical Litigation blog (here), which first brought this decision to my attention.

Background

Mark Hermelin was the CEO of K-V Pharmaceutical Company from 1975 to 2008, as well as a member of the company’s board from 1975 to 2010. In 2008, the company became aware of concerns that it had manufactured oversized morphine. K-V launched an internal investigation into the cause of the manufacture and distribution of the oversized tablets. In the course of the investigation, K-V discovered it had manufactured additional oversized tablets of other pharmaceuticals. K-V notified the FDA of the oversized morphine tablets, but did not report its discovery of the other oversized tablets.

K-V’s audit committee subsequently conducted an internal investigation and ultimately terminated Hermelin as CEO for cause. K-V’s announcement of the termination in an 8-K triggered an investigation by the local U.S. attorney, and regulatory actions by the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services. Hermelin sought advancement and indemnification for defense expenses he incurred in connection with these investigations and regulatory actions.

The outcome of Hermelin’s involvement in each of these proceedings is relevant to the consideration of his bid for indemnification. First, the audit committee investigation resulted in his termination. Second, the AUSA’s investigation ultimately resulted in Hermelin’s entry of a guilty plea to two counts of criminal misdemeanor strict liability based upon an application of the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine. Third, in connection with the HHS investigation, the agency issued a formal determination to exclude Hermelin from all federal healthcare programs for twenty years (which given Hermelin’s age is tantamount to a lifetime ban); and finally, in the FDA matter, K-V and Hermelin among others entered a consent decree whereby the defendants agreed to destroy certain drugs and refrain from manufacturing or distributing any drugs until the company complied with certain quality control requirements.

In seeking indemnification, Hermelin relied not only on the statutory indemnification provisions, but he also sought to rely on a separate indemnification agreement he had entered with the company. As the Delaware court observed in the indemnification proceedings, the indemnification agreement generally make mandatory what are permissive provisions for indemnification under the relevant statutory provisions.

The February 7, 2012 Ruling

In a February 21, 2012 ruling, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock summarized his consideration of the indemnification issues as a determination whether Hermelin had succeeded on the merits in any of these proceedings, thus entitling him to indemnification as a matter of law, or whether additional discovery is required to determine whether Hermelin acted in good faith, in which case Hermelin would be entitled to indemnification under the indemnification agreement.

In seeking to establish that he had been successful in certain of these proceedings, Heremlin argued among other things that the outcomes had been successful in the sense that the avoided worse outcomes for himself and for the company, and in some respects that he had in effect “taking one for the team.”

Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded that Hermelin had been successful in connection with the FDA matter, and therefore was entitled to mandatory indemnification for his fees in connection with that proceeding. He concluded further that Hermelin had not been successful in the criminal matter, the HHS investigation or the audit committee investigation, and was not therefore entitled to mandatory investigation in connection with those matters.

But as for whether Hermelin was entitled to permissive indemnification (made mandatory under the indemnification agreement) in connection with the criminal matter, the HHS investigation or the audit committee investigation, Vice Chancellor Glasscock determined that further discovery is required, as Hamelin will still be entitled to indemnification for these matters under the indemnification agreement unless KV can establish that Hermelin’s conduct underlying these matters for which he seeks indemnification does not meet the good faith standard required under the relevant Delaware statutes.

In reaching these conclusions, the Vice Chancellor referenced a number of the specific provisions of the indemnification agreement, including in particular the provisions specifying a presumption that Hamelin is entitled to indemnification and putting the burden of proof on the company to overcome the presumption. The Vice Chancellor also referenced the provisions of the agreement specifying that a specific outcome, order or plea will not by itself create a presumption that the indemnitee had a nonindemnifiable state of mind.

The Vice Chancellor did note the “dearth of case law addressing the scope of relevant evidence with respect to good faith” under the Delaware statutory provisions. The Vice Chancellor did note that none of the matters for which Hermelin seeks indemnification “contained a finding that Hermelin acted in bad faith or an admission of culpability by Hermelin.” The Vice Chancellor noted in particular with respect to Hermelin’s strict liability misdemeanor guilty pleas, that the “record is inadequate with respect to Hermelin’s conduct.” Similarly with respect to the HHS matter and the audit committee investigation that the record does not reflect findings that Hermelin acted in bad faith. The Vice Chancellor concluded that the parties must supplement the record before he can make the necessary determinations.

Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded by noting that the probable explanation for the dearth of case law addressing the relevant scope of evidence with respect to good faith is that most disputes of this type likely often settle, particularly where as here the parties are subject to an indemnification agreement that at least as an initial matter compels the company to foot both parties’ costs to litigate the matter. He concluded by observing that “I leave it to the parties to determine whether the elusive joys and potential benefits of such litigation outweigh the substantial costs that will result.”

Discussion

This case provides a number of valuable insights. First, it provides a very useful perspective on the actual mechanics of the Delaware statutory indemnification provisions. Indeed, as Francis Pileggi points out on his blog post to which I linked above, the case presented a question of first impression under Delaware law as to the evidence relevant for the determination whether or not executive has acted in good faith for permissive indemnification purposes.

Second, and more to the point, it underscores the value to corporate executives of having a separate indemnification agreement. The Vice Chancellor’s consideration of Hermelin’s agreement’s provisions emphasize the importance of several aspects the agreement, including in particular the presumption of indemnification; the burden of proof on the company of overcoming the presumption; and the specification that the mere fact of the entry of an order or plea will not be determinative of the issue of whether or not the indemnitee acted in good faith.

This case does underscore the breadth of a corporate official’s indemnification rights under Delaware law in an expansively constructed indemnification agreement. Here, Hermelin may yet obtain indemnification for much of his attorney’s fees notwithstanding (1) his termination for cause from the company; (2) his entry of a criminal guilty plea (resulting in his incarceration and the imposition of a substantial fine); and (3) an agency’s entry of a lifetime exclusion order against him. Indeed, unless the company can bear its burden under the agreement of showing that Hermelin did not act in good faith, he will have a mandatory right under the agreement for the indemnification of his fees.

This outcome does underscore the fundamental tension that may underlie many indemnification provisions and agreements. That is, a corporate official seeking to negotiate an indemnification agreement will want to have the agreement drafted as broadly as possible. The company on the other hand may want the agreement constructed more narrowly. This tension highlights the fact that it is always critical in connection with the consideration of any draft indemnification to establish whose interests are being examined.

Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s consideration of Hermelin’s rights of indemnification for the fees he incurred in connection with the criminal proceedings is particularly interesting. It is important to note that the criminal charges against Hermelin were made pursuant to the responsible corporate officer doctrine. As I have discussed in prior posts (here and here), the word “responsible” in the doctrine’s title does not mean the officer is responsible for the alleged misconduct, but only that the officer is responsible for the company. A criminal charge under this doctrine is, as the Vice Chancellor noted, a strict liability offense. As such, these nothing specific about a guilty plea that establishes that the defendant officer acted with a culpable state of mind, much less that the official acted with bad faith. Accordingly, a corporate official convicted of a strict liability criminal defense may nevertheless be entitled to corporate indemnification, in the absence of any finding of bad faith.

Moreover, given the absence of any finding of willfulness or deliberate misconduct, the guilty plea may not (depending on the actual policy exclusion wording) trigger the conduct exclusion in a D&O insurance policy. In other words, the defense fees at least could be fully insurable under the corporate reimbursement provisions of the typical D&O insurance policy. The typical presumptive indemnification provision found in many D&O insurance policies (presuming indemnification to the maximum extent permitted by law) underscores the possibility of this outcome.

I anticipate that there will be some who question whether or not Hermelin ought to have any right to indemnification under these circumstances. At this point, he may or may not be, it has not yet been determined. If the remaining indemnification disputes do not settle and the company proves he acted in bad faith, he will not be indemnified. He only receives indemnification if the company cannot prove he acted in bad faith, in which case I would say, why shouldn’t he receive indemnification?

Vice Chancellor Glasscock put it this way: “Delaware law furthers important public policy goals of encouraging corporate officials to resist unmeritorious claims and allowing corporations to attract qualified officers and directors by agreeing to indemnify them against losses and expenses they incur personally as a result of their services.” He added, the complete the picture that “prohibiting unsuccessful ‘bad actors’ also relieves stockholders of the costs of faithless behavior and provides corporate officials with an appropriate incentive to avoid such acts to begin with.”

Accordingly, any argument that Hermelin should not be entitled to indemnification has to proceed on the theory that he is a “bad actor.” As Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded, however, there is not a sufficient basis on the current record to conclude that Hermelin is a bad actor. I should add that the presence of the guilty plea to the strict liability criminal charge is an distracting and confusing irrelevancy. The criminal charge is basically a status offense; Hermelin was charged because of his title, not necessarily because of his actions – or even fault, as the charges were strict liability offenses.  

I have pointed out elsewhere the fundamental problems with the imposition of liability without culpability. As I have previously argued, this deeply troublesome trend is fundamentally inconsistent with traditional notions of justice and fair play. The problems associated with these types of prosecutions should not be compounded by efforts to try to use the prosecutions as a basis to try to strip corporate officials of their indemnification rights, at least in the absence of affirmative evidence of bad faith.

I suspect others may have strong views on this subject. I invite readers to add their views to the  dialog using this blog’s comment feature.

Readers with a penchant for historical references will definitely want to peruse Vice Chancellor’s musings on page 7 and page 13 about the proper historical allusion for Hermelin’s posture in the underlying actions, in light of his contention that his tactics of concession secured benefits and avoided worse detriments for himself and for the company. The possibilities include a Pyrrhic victory, a Hobson’s choice, a Morton’s Fork, or a Buridan’s Ass. Vice Chancellor Glasscock is of the view that the most appropriate historical reference for Hermelin’s defense is Lee’s surrender at Appomattox.

M&A Plaintiffs’ Attorneys as Toll Booth Operators: I have recently detailed on this blog the many problems associated with the upsurge in M&A related litigation, including among other things the problems associated with rising plaintiffs’ fee awards in these cases. I have also noted that the plaintiffs’ fee awards can be quite substantial even where there is no cash recovery for the benefit of the shareholders on whose behalf the plaintiffs’ lawyers supposedly brought the case.

A case in point is the recent $8.8 million plaintiffs’ fee award in the litigation related to the XTO Energy acquisition. As detailed in Nate Raymond’s February 14, 2012 article on Am Law Litigation Daily (here), a state appellate court has affirmed the award of these fees, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys recovered no cash for the plaintiff class. The appellate court’s ruling is the subject of Ronald Barusch’s scathing February 20, 2012 post on the Wall Street Journal’s Dealpolitik blog (here).

Among other things, Barusch contends that in the settlement, the shareholders received “nothing but words.” The author contends based on the appellate court’s decision that the fee award was calculated on “what appears to be a totally irrational basis” The author concludes that with “outrageous” outcomes like this, these kinds of cases these class actions “have become toll booths for just about every big merger.”

A Variation on the Chinese Company Litigation: As I and many others have noted, one of the most pronounced trends during 2011 was the wave of shareholder litigation involving Chinese companies. In an interesting variation on this litigation trend, a shareholder In one of the Chinese companies caught up in its own scandal has now been sued. According to a February 21, 2012 Wall Street Journal article (here), one of the investors in John Paulson’s hedge funds, which had invested in the scandal-ridden Sino-Forest Corp. (about which refer here and here), has filed a purported class action lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida against Paulson’s firm for failing to conduct sufficient due diligence in the firm.

According to the Journal article, Paulson’s fund lost about $500 million last year on its investment in Sino-Forest, although this figure includes the loss of the fund’s paper gains on the investment. The net total loss was $100 million. The lawsuit alleges gross negligence and a breach of the fund’s duties to investors for “failing to expend the resources to conduct the proper initial due diligence in Sino-Forest’s operations.”

Though the wave of litigation involving the Chinese companies seems to have peaked last year, litigation continues to arise. This latest suit presents the latest variation of efforts by U.S. investors to try to recoup losses based upon the companies involved in the accounting scandals. The interesting thing about this latest twist is that the litigation is extending not only to the Chinese companies and their directors and officers, as well as offering underwriters and auditors, but now it is even extending to shareholders.

Photography and the Physics of Canine Balance: All I can say is -- take a look at the oddly compelling photos in this collection captioned “Maddie the Coonhound Standing on Things” (here)

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The year just ended was eventful in many ways. Earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, blizzards and droughts were scattered across the globe, and political unrest shook many countries. In a year filled with such significant developments, events in the world of D&O liability pale by comparison. But even if there were no earth-shaking events, 2011 was nevertheless an eventful year in the directors and officers’ liability arena. Here is my selection of the top ten stories from the world of D&O.

1. M&A Litigation Becomes the Lawsuit of Choice for Plaintiffs’ Securities Attorneys: The traditional focus for any discussion of D&O litigation exposure has been federal securities class action litigation. But in recent years, there has been a shift in the mix of corporate and securities litigation filings. Taking into account both federal and state lawsuit filings, M&A-related lawsuits now outnumber federal securities lawsuit filings and M&A-related litigation is now the lawsuit of choice for many plaintiffs’ securities attorneys.

As a result of legislative changes and U.S. Supreme Court case law developments, “dispossessed plaintiffs’ lawyers” (as one academic recently put it) have been forced to seek an alterative business model. And M&A litigation appears to be an attractive business model for many plaintiffs’ lawyers. Corporate defendants, eager to complete the underlying business transaction, often are keen to settle these cases quickly. Settlements often include a not insignificant provision for plaintiffs’ fees.

The attractions of this business model is drawing competition, as increasingly each merger transaction is attracting  multiple separate lawsuits, often filed in differing jurisdictions. The jockeying between the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the competing cases in multiple jurisdictions has led to procedural complications and rapidly increasing costs of defense. Delaware, the traditional forum for this type of litigation, arguably now faced with “market share” competition, is according to some under pressure to show that it is not inhospitable to these kinds of lawsuits, and even to support plaintiffs’ fee awards (about which see more below).

Not only are both defense expenses and plaintiffs’ fee awards in merger objection suits mounting, but it is increasingly common for M&A-related cases to result in cash settlements on an order of magnitude often seen only in traditional securities class action lawsuits. Thus, the Kinder Morgan case, settled in August 2010 for $200 million (refer here); the Del Monte case settled in September 2011 for $89 million (refer here); the May 2010 ACS settlement was $69 million (refer here); and the 2011 Intermix Media settlement was $45 million (refer here).

The new M&A litigation model represents both a high frequency and a high severity risk. The severity risk is particularly acute given the exacerbating effects of escalating defense expenses and rising plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. The bottom line is that it is no longer sufficient to focus just on federal securities class action litigation. M&A related litigation is an increasingly important part of the overall mix of corporate and securities litigation. For anyone whose tasks include understanding the risks and exposures associated with corporate and securities litigation, this is an important development with significant implications. 

2. Chinese Take-Out: U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies Hit With Class Action Securities Litigation: Every year there seems to be one group or sector of companies that draws the unwanted attention of plaintiffs’ securities attorneys. During 2011, the hot sector was U.S.-listed Chinese companies. There were 39 different U.S.-listed Chinese companies hit with securities class action lawsuits during 2011, representing nearly one-fifth of all securities class action lawsuit filings during the year. Since January 1, 2010, there have been securities class action lawsuits filed against 49 different Chinese companies.

This surge of litigation involving Chinese companies has arisen out of accounting scandals, many of which were first revealed by online analysis, many of whom have short positions in the companies they are attacking. The Chinese companies have attempted to deflect the assertions by charging that the attacks are merely rumors started by interested parties with a financial incentive to drive down the companies’ shares prices. Fair or not, the online reports seem to be leading directly to shareholder litigation, as in many cases the shareholder plaintiffs’ are simply quoting the online analysts’ reports in their complaints.

Obviously not all of these cases are meritorious and indeed some of them have been dismissed (refer for example here). On the other hand, other cases have survived the initial dismissal motions (refer for example here). Even in those cases in which the plaintiffs’ claims survive the initial pleading threshold, their claims stiff face substantial challenges, not the least of which are problems involved with effecting service of process and in conducting discovery in China, as well as deriving from the geographic distances and language issues involved. (Refer here).

Eventually the plaintiffs’ lawyers will simply run out of Chinese companies to sue, but for now the phenomenon shows no sign of letting up. During the second half of 2011, there were a total of 13 Chinese companies sued in securities class action lawsuits in the U.S., including two in December alone.

The recent litigation against the U.S.-listed Chinese companies is a reminder of circumstance-specific events that can drive securities class action lawsuit filings. Countless things determine litigation activity levels, many of which cannot be captured or predicted in historical filing data. Simply put, the numbers vary over time, because, for example, contagion events and industry epidemics happen.

3. Massive Settlements Emerge as the Subprime and Credit-Crisis Litigation Wave Slowly Plays Out: The subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave is about to enter its sixth year. Though there were additional credit crisis-related lawsuit filings during 2011, the arrival of new cases seems to have largely come to an end. However, there is still a massive backlog of cases filed over the last five years that is yet to be resolved. During 2011, a number of these cases were settled, and in some cases the settlements were massive.

The 2011 settlements include the largest so far in subprime and credit crisis-related cases, the $627 million Wachovia bondholders settlement, about which refer here. Other settlements include the following: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities, $315 million (refer here); Lehman Brothers offering underwriters settlement, $417 million (refer here); Washington Mutual, $208.5 million (refer here); Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities, $125 million (refer here); National City, $168 Million (refer here); Colonial Bank, $10.5 million (refer here); and Lehman Brothers executives, $90 million (refer here) and E*Trade, $79 million (refer here).

If you include the Lehman Brothers’ offering underwriters’ settlement, the various subprime and credit crisis lawsuit settlements total about $4.432 billion. The average settlement so far is about $110 million, although that figure is clearly driven upward by the largest settlements. If the Countrywide, Wachovia bondholders and Lehman offering underwriters’ settlements are removed from the equation, the average settlement drops to about $74.7 million.

As impressive as these settlement numbers are, there are still many more cases pending. Of course, a certain number of the pending cases will ultimately be dismissed. But many will not, and eventually those remaining cases will be settled. Although it is impossible to conjecture how large the total tab for all these cases ultimately will be, the implication from the cases that have settled is that the total amount will be massive. 

The possibilities here may have significant implications for D&O insurers. Of course, not all of these amounts will be covered by D&O insurance. But a significant chunk will be. Indeed, a number of the recent settlements will be funded entirely or almost entirely by D&O insurance, including the D&O portion of the WaMu settlement, the Colonial Bank settlement, the E*Trade settlement and the Lehman Brothers executives’ settlement. Interestingly, the Lehman executives’ settlement will come close to exhausting what is left of Lehman’s $250 million insurance tower.

In other words, the D&O insurers have had some very large bills to pay. Signs are that there will be further amounts due in the months ahead.

4. Costs Incurred in Connection with Informal SEC Investigation Held Not Covered: One of the perennial D&O insurance coverage questions is whether or not a D&O insurance policy provide coverage for defense expenses and other costs incurred in connection with an informal SEC investigation. In October 2011, in a case that was closely watched in the D&O insurance industry, the Eleventh Circuit  issued a per curiam opinion affirming a lower court holding that costs Office Depot had incurred in connection with an informal SEC investigation and investigating an internal whistleblower complaint were not covered under its D&O insurance policies.

The sheer dollar value of the costs for which Office Depot had sought coverage underscores the extent of the problems involved. Office Depot had incurred tens of millions of dollars in expense before the SEC investigation became formal. Under the circumstances presented and based on the policy language at issue, the district court held and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that Office Depot did not have insurance coverage for these costs. The holding was a reflection of the specific policy language at issue, but D&O insurers undoubtedly will try to rely on the holding in other circumstances in which coverage is sought for costs incurred in connection with informal SEC investigations.

Meanwhile, the insurance marketplace has evolved in recognition of policyholders’ interest in having insurance coverage for the costs of informal SEC investigations. Recently, some carriers have been willing to provide coverage for costs individuals incur in connection with informal SEC investigations. In addition, at least one carrier now offers a separate insurance product that provides coverage for costs that the entity itself incurs in connection with an informal SEC investigation. Although this entity protection for informal SEC investigative costs is subject to a large self-insured retention and to coinsurance, the fact remains that if such a policy had been available to Office Depot and if Office Depot had had such a policy in place, at least a significant part of Office Depot’s costs of responding to the informal SEC investigation might have been covered.

Policyholder advocates undoubtedly will take the position that the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in the Office Depot case does not represent the final word on the question of D&O insurance coverage for costs incurred in connection with informal SEC investigation. In making these arguments, the policyholder advocates undoubtedly will seek to rely on the Second Circuit's July 2011 opinion in the MBIA case, in which the court held that costs incurred in voluntarily responding to a governmental investigation are covered. (The MBIA case is itself also a reflection of the policy language involved and circumstances presented, including in particular the fact that most of the costs at issue were incurred after the SEC had issued a formal investigative order, by contrast to the Office Depot case, where most of the costs were incurred before the investigation was formalized.)

These questions undoubtedly will continue to be disputed and even litigated. But it will be interesting to see how the marketplace continues to evolve as the industry continues to try to craft solutions to this recurring problem.

5. FDIC Litigation Against Failed Bank Directors and Officers Slowly Emerges: Since January 1, 2008, there have been 414 bank failures, including 92 in 2011 alone. Though the number of bank closures this past year represents a decline from the prior year’s total of 157, the likelihood is that there are further bank failures ahead in 2012, albeit at a reduced pace from recent years. (The January 3, 2012 Wall Street Journal comments that “failures will be a part of the landscape for many months, maybe years, as weak banks take a long time to recover or fail.”) But even if the number of new bank failures may finally be starting to decline, the FDIC’s pursuit of litigation against the directors and officers of failed banks may just be getting started.

During 2011, the FDIC stepped up its failed bank litigation activity. The FDIC filed 15 lawsuits against directors and officers of failed banks in 2011, bringing the total number of FDIC failed bank lawsuits to 17. Signs are that the number of FDIC lawsuits will continue to grow in the months ahead. According to the FDIC’s website, as of December 8, 2011, the FDIC has authorized suits in connection with 41 failed institutions against 373 individuals for D&O liability for damage claims of at least $7.6 billion. These figures representing the authorized lawsuits contrast starkly with number of lawsuits that the agency has actually filed: So far, the agency has filed only 17 lawsuits against 135 former directors and officers of 16 failed financial institutions. Given the discrepancy between the number of suits authorized and the number of suits filed, there clearly are many more suits in the pipeline, with even more lawsuits likely to be authorized in the months ahead.

As the FDIC’s failed bank lawsuits have begun to emerge, settlements of these cases are also slowly developing. The most noteworthy of the settlements so far is the well-publicized resolution of the FDIC’s lawsuit against three former WaMu officers. Although widely reported as having a value of $64.7 million, the cash value of the settlement was actually about $40 million, as discussed here. All but a very small portion of the cash component was paid for out of WaMu’s directors and officers’ insurance coverage. Although it is interesting that the individual defendants were called upon to contribute out of their own assets toward the settlement, the fact is that D&O insurance represented almost all of the cash component of the settlement.

The point here is that as the FDIC failed bank lawsuits accumulate in the coming months and as the filed cases move toward resolution, D&O insurers could be called upon to contribute amounts toward defense and resolution of these cases that in the aggregate could be massive.

6. Eurozone Crisis Includes Corporate Liability Exposures: The financial crisis gripping the European economic community has many dimensions. As governments wrestle with concerns about sovereign debt of Eurozone countries, as well as unemployment and unrest, companies exposed to European sovereign debt face perils of their own. As the fallout from the collapse of MF Global demonstrates, the hazards these companies face include, among many other concerns, liability exposures stemming from the companies’ investments in European sovereign debt.

Among the many disturbing features of MF Global’s demise is the speed of its collapse. And inevitably its collapse was immediately followed by an onslaught of securities class action lawsuit filings against the firm’s directors and officers. MF Global collapsed because of its exposure to European sovereign debt. The company is of course far from the only enterprise exposed to European debt. A host of other financial institutions and banks are also exposed and many more enterprises are exposed to the companies with European debt exposure. The possibility of sovereign debt rating downgrades or even debt write-offs looms over the firms carrying these assets on their balance sheets. 

Though the larger problems for the global financial marketplace clearly are of a much higher order, these issues also pose a challenge for D&O insurance underwriters. As noted above, there is not just the question of whether or not a company is exposed to European sovereign debt. There is also the far more difficult to discern question of whether or not a company is exposed to a company that is exposed to European sovereign debt. If the European difficulties were to evolve from a crisis to a disaster  – for example, though the withdrawal of one or more countries from the Euro – the aftereffects could be even more widespread. As MF Global’s rapid demise illustrates, these kinds of concerns are sufficient to quickly send a company into bankruptcy.

There is no way to know for sure, but I suspect strongly that as the New Year progresses, there will be a lot more to be said about European sovereign debt risk, at both the global and individual company levels.

7. Whistleblower Rules Go Into Effect, Whistleblower Lawsuits Emerge: The SEC issued its implementing regulations with respect to the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions in August 2011. In November 2011, the agency released its first report to Congress, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, on whistleblower activities, as of the end of the 2011 fiscal year end on September 30, 2011.

Though the SEC’s report reflected only a seven week time period, it revealed a heightened level of whistleblower reporting. In just the first seven weeks, the program recorded 334 whistleblower reports, which implies an annualized level of nearly 2,500 reports. Interestingly, about 10 percent of all whistleblower reports during the period reflected in the study originated outside the United States. The SEC made no whistleblower bounty payments during the period reflected in the study, as permitted under the Dodd-Frank Act. It seems likely that as the agency makes bounty payments additional whistleblowers will be motivated to come forward.

With the implementation of provisions for potentially rich whistleblower bounties under the Dodd-Frank Act, there have been concerns that the incentives will not only lead to increased numbers of reports and increased enforcement activity, but that the regulatory action will in turn generate follow-on civil litigation.  As discussed here, a December 2011 securities class action lawsuit filed against Bank of New York Mellon give a glimpse of how heightened whistleblower activity could lead to increased follow-on civil litigation.

The lawsuit followed whistleblower reports that the company engaged in a scheme to fraudulently overcharge its customers for foreign currency exchange transactions. Although the whistleblower allegations first emerged in separate whistleblower lawsuits, the foreign currency exchange allegations are also the subject of whistleblower reports to the SEC. In addition to the securities class action lawsuit, the whistleblower allegations have also triggered multiple regulatory actions. The train of events that the BNY Mellon whistleblower allegations set in motion shows how the revelation of whistleblower allegations can lead not only to significant regulatory action but also to significant follow on civil litigation.

Given the substantial bounties for which the Dodd-Frank Act provides, it seems likely there will be increased numbers of reports to the SEC, which in turn could mean increased levels of enforcement activity. Along with all other concerns these possibilities present, there is also the concern that the increased number of reports and increased enforcement activity could, following the same sequence illustrated in connection with the BNY Mellon whistleblowers, lead to a surge in follow-on civil litigation. As we head into 2012, we will have to watch whether increased whistleblowing will lead to increased follow-on civil litigation, similar to the suit against BNY Mellon.

8. Aggrieved Overseas Investors Seek Litigation Alternatives Outside the United States: For many years, the United States was the forum of choice for aggrieved investors to seek redress, regardless of whether or not the investors purchased their shares in the United States. However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank abruptly and unexpectedly eliminated access to U.S. courts for investors who purchased their shares outside the U.S. As a result, these investors increasingly are seeking alternative means to pursue their claims. Though we are still in the earliest days following the Morrison decision, there seem to be significant indications that aggrieved investors are developing a new playbook that includes resort to non-U.S. courts.

Investors’ pursuit of claims outside the United States was not long in coming after the Morrison decision and as its implications began to emerge in the lower U.S. courts. For example, in January 2011, after investors’ claims in U.S. court against Fortis were dismissed based on the Morrison decision, investors filed an action in Dutch court seeking remedies under Dutch law, but raising the same allegations that previously had been asserted in U.S. courts. Similarly, in December 2011, hedge funds and other investors whose action against Porsche had been dismissed from U.S. courts based on Morrison filed an action raising the same allegations against the company and its management in a German court.

Developments in other jurisdictions also reflect investors’ efforts to develop alternative remedies in the absence of access to U.S. courts. Among other things, at least two class actions pending in Canadian courts have not only survived dismissal motions but have had global classes certified. As discussed here, investors have also shown a willingness to pursue claims in a variety of other countries, including, for example, Germany and Australia. Recent statutory amendments in other countries (including, in particular, Mexico) may lead to investors in those countries to seek to pursue claims there.

Increased litigation and regulatory exposure outside the United States has a variety of implications, not the least of which concerns D&O insurance. As companies and their directors and officers face increased exposures on a global basis, D&O insurance policies will be called upon to respond in new and unusual situations. These developments in turn will require policies that are well adapted to the changing circumstances.

9. Judge Rakoff Rejects Settlement of SEC Enforcement Action Against Citigroup: Southern District of New York Judge Jed Rakoff’s November 2011 rejection of the $285 million settlement of the SEC’s enforcement action against Citigroup was not the first occasion on which Rakoff rejected a proposed SEC settlement. But this latest rejection has caused quite a stir, and not only because of the sharp rhetoric he used in rejecting the settlement (among other things, he derided the settlement because it “shortchanged” investors.) The most significant aspect of Rakoff’s rebuff is his refusal to accept a settlement in which Citigroup neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s allegations.

The SEC, perhaps stung by the Rakoff’s sharp words, and even more concerned about the possibility that it might be constrained from the entry into future no admit/no deny settlements, has appealed Rakoff’s ruling to the Second Circuit.  The SEC is right to be concerned about the implications of Judge Rakoff’s ruling. Following Judge Rakoff’s ruling, at least one other court has questioned a proposed SEC settlement that contained the “neither admit nor deny formulation.”

The problem for the SEC is that if proposed settlements cannot be approved unless the target defendants admit to wrongdoing, it may become significantly more difficult to settle cases and the SEC will be forced to take more enforcement actions to trial. This would not only put an enormous strain on the agency’s resources, but it could result in an overall reduction in the agency’s enforcement reach as it is forced to concentrate both more time and means on fewer enforcement actions.

The inability to enter into a no admit/no deny settlement presents a highly unattractive picture for target defendants as well. If fewer enforcement actions settle and more enforcement actions are forced to trial, the costs of defending an SEC enforcement action could escalate substantially. Target defendants unable to avoid the risks and uncertainty of trial without admitting wrongdoing will have to consider the possible effects of any admission on separate private civil actions. Any admissions in the enforcement actions could undermine their defenses in the separate civil actions. Moreover, depending on what is admitted, the admissions could have the further also undermine the target defendant’s insurance coverage by triggering a conduct exclusion on the defendant’s insurance policy.  

For these and a host of other reasons, the SEC’s appeal of Judge Rakoff’s ruling to the Second Circuit will be very closely watched. Crucially, however, the Second Circuit has not yet agreed whether or not it will actually hear the appeal of Judge Rakoff’s ruling. In additiona, there is always the possibility that Citigroup and the SEC will reach an agreement that Judge Rakoff finds acceptable (a footnote in his opinion rejecting the initial settlement does lay out a schematic for a settlement that would be acceptable to him, as I discuss here). Depending on how it all finally goes down, this case has the potential to be one of the top stories of 2012, as well.

10. A Big Fee Award in Delaware Gets Everybody’s Attention: Sometimes in litigation, a case that results in a big number is interesting in and of itself. And on that score, Delaware Chancellor Leo Strine’s October 2011 post-trial damages award of $1.263 billion in a lawsuit arising out of Grupo Mexico’s 2005 sale of Minerva Mexico to Southern Peru Copper Corporation certainly qualifies as interesting. (The later addition of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest increased the amount of the award to $2 billion). But what really has drawn attention to the case is Strine’s award to the plaintiffs’ of fees amounting to 15% of the damages and interest – that is, $300 million. A December 28, 2011 Wall Street Journal article entitled “Christmas Comes Early for These Lawyers” (here) describes the award.

As noted in a December 28, 2011 WSJ.com Law Blog post (here), the $300 million fee award may be the largest fee award ever in a shareholders’ derivative suit. Indeed it appears to be one of the largest fee awards in any corporate or securities case, approaching in order of magnitude the awards in the massive Enron and World Com cases (where the fees awarded were $688 million and $336 million, respectively).

Grupo Mexico undoubtedly will appeal both the damages award and the fee award. Whether or not the $300 million award ultimately withstands scrutiny, there are reasons to be concerned about the award. As noted above with respect to M&A litigation, Delaware’s courts are facing competition and appear to have been losing “market share” for corporate litigation. At least some interpreters have concluded, as reported in the Journal article linked above, that the plaintiffs’ fee award is a not-so-subtle signal to plaintiffs’ lawyers that Delaware’s courts are “open for business.” Other interpreters suggested that the fee award represents a “message to the plaintiffs’ bar.”

It is an obvious concern if Delaware’s judges feel obliged -- in order remain competitive in the jurisdictional competition and to try to preserve declining corporate litigation market share -- to prove that plaintiffs’ lawyers will be rewarded for resorting to the state’s courts.

Bloggers of the World, Unite!: Everyone here is pretty much reconciled to the fact that writing a blog is not exactly accorded equal dignity with, say, writing for The New Yorker. So we were all very gratified by the article in December 31, 2011 issue of The Economist entitled "Marginal Revolutionaries" (here), in whch the magazine reports that "the financial crisis and the blogosphere have opened up mainstream economics to new attack." Among other things, the article cites "the power of blogging as a way of getting fringe ideas noticed." The article recounts the experiences of the "invisible college of bloggers" whose revolutionary economic analyses have moved from the fringe to become part of the central economic dialog of our times.

In the immortal words of  the theme song of revolutionaries everywhere , "Allons enfants de la patrie, Le Jour de gloire est arrivé!" 

Perspective: Those worried about the troublesome events of the day may want to spend a few minutes contemplating "The Hisory of the Earth as a Clock" (here). In the grand scheme of things, the current crises are a mere passing cloud. (Source: UW-Geoscience).

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In an August 2, 2011 post on the New York Times  Dealbook blog entitled “Ex-Directors of Failed Firms Have Little to Fear”(here), Ohio State University Law Professor  Steven Davidoff voices his consternation that the former directors of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers seemingly will be able to “continue their prominent careers.” Davidoff seems miffed that the former board members of these failed firms have not only been able to get on with their lives but many of them have continued to serve as board directors. Others maintain roles of prominence in academia or business. (Bear Stearns of course did not actually fail but for simplicity of expression in this post I have referred to it using that term.)

Davidoff acknowledges that the financial crisis that accompanied these companies’ failures was an “enormously complex event” and that officials at these failed firms can argue that “it was the crisis itself – not poor management or inadequate board supervision – that caused their firm’s demise.” Given that, Davidoff is “not arguing that these directors be tarred and feathered or that they should not be able to earn a living.” He is just suggesting that “at a minimum…other public companies might be more hesitant to keep these failed directors on their boards.”

Davidoff’s column does strain to maintain a balanced point of view, but there is nevertheless an unmistakable underlying assumption that these former board members should be shunned or otherwise punished as a result of their former firms’ failures. Davidoff's apparent thesis is consistent with a prior post of his, in which  he argued that directors should be held liable more often, a point of view with which I disagreed here. I also have some concerns about Davidoff's latest post, which I have outline below. I acknowledge that I have certain biases, which I outlined in my response to Davidoff's prior post. My concerns with the latest post are as folllows.

First, the SEC has the authority to bring enforcement actions and, among other things, to impose lifetime bans on individuals from future service as board members of public companies. The SEC has not brought any such action against these individuals, presumably because it does not believe it could bring a meritorious claim against them. Indeed, these individuals have not been found blameworthy or culpable in any way by any legal authority in connection with the demise of these two firms

Second, there is a peculiarly American notion that is something has gone wrong, then somebody must be punished – even if the designated scapegoat is not directly to blame for what has gone wrong. But it seems to me that little purpose would be served by forcing these persons onto the shelf and out of productive contributions to corporate life. Stigmatizing them would accomplish nothing, except perhaps satisfaction of some tribal atavistic urge for retribution.

It bothers Davidoff that these individuals have been getting on with their lives and in particular that there these individuals apparently have not taken a permanent and disqualifying hit to their reputations. Davidoff ascribes this to the alleged “decline in importance of reputation on Wall Street.”

I suspect strongly that these individuals would have a far different view of whether or not their have been consequences for them as a result of the firms’ failures, and in particular I suspect they would have a lot to say on the specific topic of reputation.

Even though these individuals have not been found to have done anything wrong, I am quite certain that these individuals’ lives have been quite disrupted as a result of these firms’ collapses. Not only has there been the harsh scrutiny they have all had to face, but there has also been a seemingly endless procession of legal events and proceedings. These individuals are undoubtedly spending more time than is healthy in the company of lawyers.

I simply cannot agree that reputation has declined in importance, on Wall Street or anywhere else. For several years I have participated in the Stanford Law School Directors College, in connection with which an attendee survey is conducted in which, among other things, the attendees express their concerns about governance issues. An overwhelming majority of attendees indicate that their biggest concern with respect to problems at the companies with which they are associated is not the risk of liability as such, but the risk to their reputations.

Most corporate directors have spent their entire lives building their professional reputations and they take them very seriously. None of the former directors affiliated with Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers can escape their association with those firms’ demises.

The fact that these individuals have been able to get on with their lives despite these failure of their former firms can be interpreted in a number of ways. One way is to conclude that in the “the old boy network of Wall Street,” as Davidoff calls it,  the corrupt fat cats complacently overlook each others’ peccadillos while lighting cigars with $100 bills. Another way to look at is that the kinds of individuals who serve on public company boards often are highly accomplished individuals whose talents and skills are sufficient that their services are still valued in other contexts despite the tarnish that comes even with association with an event like the collapses of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.

It seems to me that Davidoff’s real gripe is not really with the individuals themselves but rather is with the rest of the corporate, academic and business world, which just doesn’t think, as he does, that these individuals really ought to be more seriously stigmatized for their association with the failed firms. Perhaps these other organizations can see that these individuals have not been found culpable in any way for what happened at Bear Stearns and at Lehman. Perhaps these other organizations, motivated to act in their own best interests, value the service of the individuals for all of their skill, knowledge and experience,  notwithstanding their association with Bear Stearns and Lehman.

The bottom line for me is that I see no value in demonizing individuals who have not been found to have done anything wrong. To me, allowing on the one hand that these individuals shouldn’t be tarred and feathered and should be able to earn a living, but on other hand suggesting that their should be some things they shouldn’t be allowed to do is like arguing that they should be allowed to continue their lives, but should just have to wear some type of scarlet letter for which they are universally shunned. I just can’t get on board with that.

There are plenty of legal mechanisms in our country for determining culpability and imposing penalties. I am very wary of any suggestion that there should be social penalties outside of those processes.

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News reports about the September 22, 2010 Senate Banking Committee hearing regarding the SEC have focused on the provocative statements by SEC Inspector General H. David Katz. Among other things, Katz suggested that a Texas-based SEC official quashed the investigation of allegations regarding Stanford Financial Group, allowing the Stanford-related Ponzi scheme to continue. Katz also suggested that the SEC times its initiation of its enforcement action against Goldman Sachs to draw attention away from the Inspector General’s report critical of its Stanford-related failures. (Katz’s written testimony, which focuses primarily on the Stanford-related issues, can be found here.)

But along with the headline-grabbing commentary on the SEC’s processes, there was also other commentary and information at the Hearing suggesting the possibility of future regulatory and enforcement actions against corporate and banking figures in response to the global financial crisis.

First, at least according to press reports, the hearing seemed to reflect political expectations, in the wake of the financial crisis, for regulators to pursue actions against corporate officials. For example, the September 23, 2010 Wall Street Journal quotes Delaware Senator Edward Kaufman as having observed at the hearing that "we have seen very little in the way of senior officers or boardroom-level prosecutions of the people on Wall Street who brought this country to the brink of financial ruin. Why is that?"

Second, the same Journal article quotes the deputy inspector general of the FDIC as saying that the FDIC is investigating 227 banks.

There undoubtedly will be further fallout from the SEC Inspector General’s report about the SEC’s handling of the Stanford investigation. But amid those details, the larger picture should not be overlooked. That is, we remain in an atmosphere of recrimination that includes a political expectation that government officials should pursue action against corporate executives in connection with the financial crisis. In this atmosphere, because of the political pressures, it seems probable that government officials will feel obliged to bring claims and pursue actions.

And while these government actions might take any number of forms, one area where regulatory and enforcement action seems probably is in the banking arena. Just as during the S&L crisis, the FDIC pursued numerous claims in response to political pressure, the FDIC may well feel the same kind of pressure in the current circumstances, and may pursue claims as a result.

All of which is a reminder that larger forces may drive claims against corporate and banking officials, possibly for years to come.

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Time-honored legal principles typically shield corporate officers and shareholders from direct personal liability for legal violations of the corporation itself, consistent with the notion that the corporation itself has a distinct and separate legal identity. However, as I noted in a prior post (here), courts have evolved a concept called "the responsible corporate officer doctrine," pursuant to which individuals can be held liable for corporate misconduct without involvement in or even awareness of the wrongdoing. Recent indications suggest that regulatory authorities may be planning a more aggressive use of this doctrine, a development that may have disturbing implications.

The responsible corporate officer doctrine was first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1943 case of United States v. Dotterweich, in which corporate officers in positions of authority were held personally (and in that case, criminally liable) for violating strict liability statutes protecting the public welfare.

The Supreme Court approved the application of liability under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in the 1975 case of United States v. Park holding that the FDCAs "requirements of foresight and vigilance" are "no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health and wellbeing of the public that supports them." The Supreme Court approved the imposition of liability in that case, though the defendant had no involvement in or personal knowledge of the violation.

The responsible corporate officer doctrine has been absorbed into environmental law as well, and, as discussed here, and has served as the basis of imposing liability in environmental enforcement actions.

According to a March 5, 2010 memo from the Skadden law firm entitled "FDA Announces New Push to Prosecute Corporate Officers and Executives for No-Intent Crimes" (here), the FDA, under fire for lack of active oversight of its office of criminal investigations, has advised Congress that it intends to "increase the appropriate use of misdemeanor prosecutions…to hold corporate officials accountable." The law firm memo suggests that this FDA statement to Congress is consistent with the "recent uptick" in prosecutions relying on the responsible corporate officer doctrine against pharmaceutical and medical device executives.

The responsible corporate doctrine unquestionably is a well-established tool for the imposition of liability on corporate officials in the context of public "health and wellbeing." But though well-recognized, it nevertheless has disturbing implications. The FDA’s apparent intention to use the responsible corporate officer doctrine more aggressively arguably is part of a larger and even more disturbing trend to try to hold corporate officers liable without regard to personal culpability.

First, the idea that liability can be imposed on an individual for corporate misconduct, in apparent disregard of the corporate form and without culpable involvement or even a requirement of a culpable state of mind, seems inconsistent with the most basic concepts surrounding the corporate form. The doctrine arguably imposes liability for nothing more than a person’s status. The word "responsible" in the doctrine’s name does not mean that the individual is responsible for the misconduct, but on that that the individual is responsible for the corporation.

Second, the application of the doctrine can have serious ramifications. The Skadden memo points out that in one recent FDCA prosecution, the individuals against whom liability was imposed on the basis of responsible corporate officer doctrine were required to pay criminal fines of $34.5 million (The imposition of liability is currently on appeal.) The imposition of criminal penalties of this extraordinary magnitude without any fault or even culpable state of mind seems fundamentally inconsistent with the fault-based framework of our criminal justice system.

But the most troubling thing about the responsible corporate office doctrine is that the apparently expanded willingness of regulators to use the doctrine to impose liability on corporate officials is entirely consistent with developments elsewhere that also suggest a willingness of government regulators to try to impose liability without regard to involvement of awareness of the alleged wrongdoing.

In that regard, there have been at least two instances recently where the SEC has pursued enforcement actions against corporate officials without regard to their lack of knowledge of the alleged legal wrongdoing. Though these regulatory enforcement actions did not expressly rely on or even refer to the responsible corporate officer doctrine, the enforcement actions implicitly reflect a similar presumption, which is that in certain instances corporate officials can be held liable solely on the basis of their position without respect to the presence or absence of personal culpability.

First, as noted here, the SEC has initiated an enforcement action against the former CEO of CSK Auto, in which the SEC seeks to "clawback" compensation the CEO earned at a time with respect to which the company subsequently had to restate its financial statements. The SEC is pursuing this claim even though the former CEO is not only not charged with fraud, but is not even alleged to have had any involvement in or even awareness of the circumstances requiring the later restatement.

Similarly , the SEC more recently filed an enforcement action seeking impose control person liability on two officer of Nature’s Sunshine Products, in which the SEC sought to hold the individuals liable for the company’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Violation, though the individuals were not alleged to have had any involvement in or awareness of the wrongful conduct. The Nature’s Sunshine Products case is discussed here.

Though these recent SEC enforcement actions did not expressly rely on the responsible corporate officer doctrine, the SEC’s actions in these cases reflect a willingness – similar to that of the FDA and other regulatory authorities -- to impose liability on corporate officials without regard to fault or culpability. These regulatory actions raise a very disturbing specter of strict liability for executives.

Even if there are circumstances where, as the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized, that public health and welfare may justify the imposition of liability without culpability under certain circumstance, the enormous burden this possibility would impose on the civil rights and liberties of the affected individuals would seem to argue that these principles be used to impose liability on individuals only in the rarest and most extreme purposes.

But rather than restrict its use of these principles out of an appropriate respect for basic notions of fairness and individual liberty, regulators are moving in the exact opposite direction and apparently seeking new opportunities to use these principles to expand their regulatory reach.

The regulators may well feel this approach may be justified in order to accomplish regulatory goals and ensure that somebody pays the price for wrongdoing. The problem is that scapegoating individuals for misconduct in which they were not involved and of which they were not even aware is fundamentally unfair. In my view, this approach is inconsistent with some of the most basic assumptions of a well-ordered society governed by law.

If there are circumstances where public health and welfare might sometimes require the imposition of responsibility on a strict liability basis, the use of those circumstances should be infrequent and unusual. Regulators should be looking for ways to avoid relying on these powers rather than looking to expand their use. The imposition of penalties without regard to fault or culpability is a fundamentally unfair practice that should be discouraged at every possible opportunity.

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