The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

Carriers generally contend that  insurance does not cover amounts that represent “disgorgement” or that are “restitutionary” in nature. But what makes a particular payment a “disgorgement”?  In a December 13, 2011 opinion (here), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Department, First Division, held that amounts Bear Stearns paid in settlement of SEC late trading and market timing  allegations represented a disgorgement that is not covered under its  insurance program.  Because the appellate court’s decision reversed the lower court ruling that the settlement payment did not constitute a disgorgement, the case provides an interesting perspective of the question of what makes a particular payment a “disgorgement” for purposes of determining insurance policy coverage.

 

Background

In 2006, the SEC notified Bear Stearns that the agency was investigating late trading and market timing activities units of Bear Stearns had undertaken for the benefit of clients of the company. The agency advised the company that it intended to seek injunctive relief and monetary sanctions of $720 million. Bear Stearns disputed the allegations, among other thing arguing that it did not share in the profits or benefit from the late trading, which generated only $16.9 million in revenue.

 

Bear Stearns ultimately made an offer of settlement and --without admitting or denying the agency “findings” – consented to the SEC’s entry of an Administrative Order, in which, among other things, Bear Stearns agree to pay a total of $215 million, of which $160 million was labeled “disgorgement” and $90 million as a penalty.

 

At the relevant time, Bear maintained a program of insurance that, according to the subsequent complaint, totaled $200 million. Bear Stearns sought to have the carriers in the program indemnify the company for the company’s settlement with the SEC. However, the carriers claimed that because the $160 million payment was labeled “disgorgement” in the Administrative Order, it did not represent a covered loss under the insurance policies.

 

In 2009, J.P. Morgan (into which Bear Stearns merged in 2008) filed an action seeking a judicial declaration that the insurers were obliged to indemnify the company for the amount of the $160 million payment in excess of the $10 million self insured retention. The company’s supplemental summons and amended complaint can be found here. The company argued that notwithstanding the Administrative Order’s reference to the amount as “disgorgement,” its payment to resolve the SEC investigation constituted compensatory damages and therefore represented a covered loss under the insurance program. In support of this contention, the company further argued that Bear Stearns’ earned only $16.9 million in revenue and virtually no profit from the late trading and market timing activities, and therefore the SEC settlement amount could not have represented a disgorgement. The carriers moved to dismiss the company’s declaratory judgment action

 

The Lower Court’s September 14, 2010 Order

In an order entered September 14, 2010, (here), New York (New York County) Supreme Court Charles E. Ramos denied the carriers’ motion to dismiss. He held that the Administrative Order’s use of the term “disgorgement” did not conclusively establish that the settlement amounts were precluded from coverage.

 

In reaching this conclusion, he noted that the Administrative Order “does not contain an explicit finding that Bear Stearns directly obtained ill-gotten gains or profited by facilitated these trading practices,” and he found that the provision of the Order alone “do not establish as a matter of law that Bear Stearns seeks coverage for losses that include the disgorgement of improperly acquired funds.” He also found that the Order does not, as would be required to preclude coverage “conclusively link the disgorgement to improperly acquired funds.”  He noted in that regard that “there are no findings that Bear Stearns directly generated profits for itself as the result” of the alleged misconduct and for him to so conclude now “would be to resolve disputed issues of material fact.”

 

Because he found that he was “unable to conclude, on the basis of the language of the Administrative Order alone that the disgorgement is specifically linked to the improperly acquired funds,” he rejected the insurers’ argument that they were entitled to dismissal.

 

The December 13 Appellate Decision

A December 13, 2011 opinion written by Justice Richard Andrias of  the N.Y. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, reversed the lower court’s holding, granted the motions to dismiss and directed the entry of judgment in favor of the insurers. Contrary to Justice Ramos, the appellate court concluded that the sequence of events and allegations “read as a whole” are:

 

not reasonably susceptible to any interpretation other than that Bear Stearns knowingly and intentionally facilitated illegal late trading for preferred customers, and that the relief provisions of the SEC Order required disgorgement of funds gained through that illegal activity.

 

The Court went on to state that “the fact that the SEC did not itemize how it reached the agreed upon disgorgement figure does not raise an issue as to whether the disgorgement payment was in fact compensatory.” 

 

The Court further noted that in generating revenue of at least $16.9 million, “Bear Stearns knowingly and affirmatively facilitated an illegal scheme which generated hundreds of millions of dollars for collaborating parties and agreed to disgorge $160,000,000 in its offer of settlement.”  

 

Discussion         

Given that the SEC Administrative Order expressly identified the $160 million portion of the settlement as a “disgorgement,” it was always going to be an uphill battle to establish that the amount was not a disgorgement. The company argued essentially that the amount was not a disgorgement because the payment did not correspond to any specific pecuniary benefit that Bear Stearns received. The company argued in paying the amount it was not so much disgorging anything so much as it was paying damages. Justice Ramos concluded that the Administrative Order was not factual conclusive and that there was enough of an issue that dismissal was not appropriate.

 

The appellate court essentially concluded that the question was not so much whether Bear Stearns was disgorging an amount corresponding to its own specific pecuniary gain, but rather whether or not it was disgorging amounts that its “illegal scheme” had “generated.”  In effect, it was enough to show that there was a benefit from the illegal conduct, whether or not person making the disgorgement directly received that benefit.

 

This case is fairly fact specific, but it still a useful and interesting decision because it reaffirms the basic principles around the insurability of disgorgements and because it illustrates the issues to be considered in determining whether or not a specific amount represents a disgorgement or not.

 

All of that said, the company may still seek to appeal this decision to the New York Court of Appeals and so there may yet be more to be heard in connection with this case.

 

Chris Dolmetch’s December 13, 2011 Bloomberg article discussing the opinion can be found here.

 

Advisen Management Liability Journal: Although I suspect that most readers of this blog have already seen it, if you have not yet had a chance, you will want to take a look at the inaugural issue of the Advisen Management Liability Journal, which can be found here. The publication is attractive and interesting and it clearly represents a welcome addition to help in the exchange of ideas in the D&O insurance industry. My congratulations to everyone at Advisen for this inaugural issue, particularly my good friend, Susanne Sclafane, the publication’s senior editor. I am sure everyone in the industry is looking forward to future editions of this publication.

 

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Among the most contentious D&O claims issues are questions surrounding defense cost coverage, including in particular questions such as the allowable billable rates or the involvement of multiple firms.  In a detailed November 8, 2011 opinion, Eastern District of California Judge Lawrence O’Neill, applying California law, addressed the hornets’ nest of problems involved when these kinds of questions arise. Though the disputes involved in this case are in some ways very case-specific, the case nevertheless provides (if only by way of negative example) a good illustration of how these questions might be avoided, managed or minimized. A copy of Judge O’Neill’s opinion can be found here.

 

Background

Lance-Kashian & Company is the general partner of River Park Properties III (RPP III), which in turn was general partner of Park 41, a real estate partnership.  In late 2008, Lance-Kashian’s D&O policy was up for renewal. The company’s risk manager directed that RPP III’s name be removed from the policy as a named insured. The D&O insurance policy that was in force for 2009 did not include RPP III as a named insured.

 

In late 2009, Lance-Kashian, RPP III, and certain Lance Kashian principals were sued in a bankruptcy court adversary proceeding by the Park 41 limited partner. The company notified its D&O insurer of the claim and asked the insurer’s permission to use the Cozen O’Connor law firm as defense counsel. In late December 2009, the insurer acknowledged receipt of the claim, reserved its right to deny coverage under the policy, and consented to the Cozen O’Conner firm’s involvement in the defense, but only at specified maximum rates (partner: $350/hour; associates: $250; paralegals, $150/hour). In light of the fact that RPP III was a defendant but was not an insured under the policy, the carrier proposed to allocate the defense fees between covered and non-covered parties, allocating one-third to the covered parties and two-thirds to the non-covered RPP III. The carrier argued in support of this proposed allocation that the bulk of the claims in the underlying complaint related solely or primarily to RPP III.

 

The carrier’s initial letter was the first in lengthy series of communications between the carrier’s counsel and the company’s risk manager. Judge O’Neill’s opinion details these communications, largely conducted by email. The parties later disputed the extent to which the communications either expressly or by silence amounted to the company’s assent to the allocation and defense counsel arrangements that the carrier has proposed.

 

At least part of the email exchange confirmed the carrier’s approval in the association in the defense of the Walter Wilhelm firm at the same specified maximum rates. In a separate email, the risk manager notified the carrier of the involvement of another firm, the Allen Matkins firm, which, the risk manager advised “would probably be used as an expert witness versus defense counsel.”

 

The company’s risk manager later submitted to the carrier invoices from the various law firms for payment. The invoices in turn set off an exchange about the aggregate level of fees, the involvement of multiple counsel, and concerns about the role of the Allen Matkins firm.

 

In January 2011, the underlying adversary proceeding finally settled. In connection with the subsequent coverage litigation, the risk manager submitted a declaration stating that the total defense expenses incurred in the case were “at least $1,557,295,” of which $618,251 was paid to the Allen Matkins firm; $475,000 was paid to Cozen O’Connor; $124,777 was paid to the Walter & Wilhelm law firm; and $144,133 was paid directly to third party vendors. At that point, the carrier had paid approximately $70,000 in connection with the defense.

 

The carrier initiated a civil action seeking a judicial declaration that it was only obligated to pay one third of the attorneys’ fees to which it had consented (that is, the Cozen  O’Connor fees and the Walter  Wilhelm fees) and only at the specified maximum hourly rates. The company disputed that the carrier was entitled to any type of allocation of the defense expenses or that any portion of the defense fees were not covered. The company counterclaimed, asserting claims of breach of contract and of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The company asserted several arguments in reliance on various parts of the California insurance code, which the company asserted governed in light of the carrier’s provision of the defense subject to a reservation of its rights. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

 

The November 8 Ruling

In his November 8 ruling, Judge O’Neill granted the carrier’s summary judgment motion “to the effect that [the carrier] reasonably set and allocated defense costs for counsel to which it had consented.” First, Judge O’Neill concluded that while the carrier had consented to the involvement in the defense of the Cozen O’Connor firm and the Walter Wilhelm firm at the specified hourly maximum rates, “the insureds point to no specific request accepted by [the carrier] for Allen Matkins’ retention.” 

 

Second, Judge O’Neill rejected the company’s argument that the carrier was obligated to reimburse all defense fees that were “reasonably related” to the insured persons’ defense. He concluded that the question was instead governed by the policy’s allocation provision, which specified that if a claim involved both covered and uncovered matters or parties, the insureds and the carrier would “use their best efforts to agree on a fair and proper allocation between insured and uninsured Loss.” The provision does go on to add: “However, [the carrier] shall not seek to allocate with respect to Claim Expenses and shall pay one hundred percent (100%) of Claim Expenses so long as a covered matter remains within the Claim.”

 

Judge O’Neill found that the record showed that the carrier “committed its best efforts to reach an allocation agreement, starting with the ROR letter and continuing with [its counsel’s] dogged efforts through numerous emails.” However, he added, “the same cannot be said for the insureds,” commenting further that “the inferences from the record are that the insureds devoted substantial efforts to attempt to settle the underlying action and decided to address allocation and insurance matter later.” There is, Judge O’Neill found “no evidence that the insureds used ‘best efforts’ to agree to an allocation.”

 

Judge O’Neill went on to reject the company’s argument that the final sentence of the allocation provision, allowing for a 100% defense cost allocation, obligated the carrier to pay 100% of defense costs. He found that the sentence obligated the insurer to pay only 100% of the defense costs of insured persons, but that the carrier has no obligation to pay the defense costs of persons who are not insured under the policy. Since the company and RPP III mounted a joint defense, the carrier is entitled to allocate the defense fees to remove the fees incurred on behalf of insured persons. Since the company “offered nothing meaningful” to “challenge” the carrier’s proposed allocation, and since “nothing in the record reveals that [the carrier’s] one-third allocation to the insureds was unreasonable or out of line with the insured’s potential liability,” he confirmed the carrier’s one-third allocation.

 

Judge O’Neill then turned to an unusual feature in the policy, which provided that the carrier’s determination as to reasonableness of claims expenses “shall be conclusive on the Insured.” He rejected the company’s argument that this provision is unconscionable, noting that “there is no conscience shocking that an insurer would seek to control defense and limit them to a reasonable range,” adding that the company was sophisticated and had the assistance of a full-time risk manager and broker, who bargained for the policy on the company’s behalf. He went on to note that “the insureds fail to demonstrate that [the carrier] was precluded legally to set the rates it would pay or that [the rates] were objectively unreasonable.”

 

Discussion

There are a number of lessons from this dispute, which I review below. There are also a number of noteworthy holdings that are worth highlighting before moving on the moral of the story.

 

First, it is interesting and important that Judge O’Neill rejected the company’s efforts to try to rely on the “reasonably related” standard and instead enforced the allocation provisions in the policy. The “reasonably related” standard harkens back to an earlier time and place when D&O policies did not have express allocation provisions. Judge O’Neill’s enforcement of the provision shows that the allocation provisions themselves control – although his interpretation of the 100% Defense Cost provision is also interesting, in effect holding that the 100% allocation does not operate to require the insurer to pay the defense costs of parties who are not insured under the policy. In effect, he held that the 100% defense cost allocation applied only when there are both covered and non-covered matters, but not when there are both covered and non-covered parties. (Those involved in counseling policyholders on policy placement will want to consider this distinction in thinking about the optimal wording for these kinds of provisions.)

 

Second, Judge O’Neill enforced the unusual (and frankly onerous) provision giving the insurer’s determination of reasonableness presumptive weight. It may have been that he felt that a sophisticated company with competent advice had to accept the contract it had negotiated. (Again, those involved in negotiating policy placements for policyholders will want to note and watch out for this type of unusual provision.) By accepting the carrier’s presumptive right on the reasonableness issue, Judge ONeill avoided getting into the issue of whether or not the carrier’s insistence on its maximum hourly rates was reasonable. Too bad, that is an issue that in my view could use some ventilation.

 

Third, and perhaps most significantly in terms of the dollars involved, Judge O’Neill held that the carrier had no obligation to pay (even according to the allocation) for the defense fees and expenses to which the carrier had not consented.

 

This last point leads to the moral of the story – which is the importance of communication with the insurer at the beginning, during the course of, and at the end of the claim. A significant number of the problems the company faced in the coverage dispute were due to the way the company communicated with the carrier. Indeed, Judge O’Neill emphasized, and even quoted twice from, the deposition testimony of the company’s CEO that during the claim and amongst all of the other business challenges the company was facing he considered the questions the insurer was raising to be a “distraction.” 

 

But the first of the lessons out of this coverage dispute comes from the deliberate move the company made at its insurance renewal to remove RPP III as an insured under its policy. This decision directly led to all of the allocation issues. The move clearly was not fully thought through because as soon as the claim came in naming both the company and RPP III, the company expected RPP III’s defense expense to be paid under the policy. This sequence shows the importance of thoughtfully addressing all potential coverage issues at the time of placement. Something as basic as who should be insured under the policy should be the subject of close consideration, and should be stress tested against likely claims scenarios. It isn’t just hindsight to say that even at the time of the renewal it was apparent that if there were to be a claim involving , say, Park 41, that both RPP III and the company would be named as defendants, and that both would require a defense. The company can bemoan the outcome of Judge O’Neill’s allocation analysis, but there wouldn’t have been an allocation in the first placed if RPP III had not been removed as a named insured under the policy.

 

The more generally applicable lesson is the importance of communicating fully and continuously with the carrier. The company here clearly understood that the carrier’s consent to defense expenses was required, yet failed to take the steps to obtain the carrier’s consent to the involvement in the defense of the Allen Matkins firm or of the third-party vendors who provided services in connection with the defense. This oversight was not a small matter since the fees of the Allen Matkins firm and the fees of the third party vendors together amount to almost half of all of the defense expenses that the company incurred. (It is probably worth noting that the company not only failed to keep the carrier informed but  misstated the role of the Allen Matkins firm as being related to expert testimony, while disclaiming the firm’s involvement in the defense.)

 

The company may well have viewed the carrier’s questions and concerns as a “distraction,” but in the end the company paid a price for disregarding the carrier’s concerns. It certainly did not help the company that Judge O’Neill could find “no evidence” that the company used its best efforts to try to negotiate an allocation. By the same token, it clearly hurt the company that it did not voice its objection to the carrier’s proposed maximum rates as well as to the allocation. In the end, Judge O’Neill’s conclusions that the allocation and rates were reasonable were eased by the fact that while the claim was pending the company evinced little objection to the carrier’s positions in the regard.

 

Of course it is always easier to say in hindsight what a company should have done. I do not mean to find fault within anyone. But I think it is clear that the better course is to keep the carrier fully informed; to confront and address issues as they come up, not after the fact; and to work out as many issues as possible at the time, rather than later. It may not always be possible to avoid disputes, but dealing with issues as they come up may reduce the number of issues in dispute. And it will certainly help to avoid any later suggestion that “best efforts” were not used to try to work the issues out.

 

Finally, the best way to avoid unwelcome coverage outcomes is to make sure as many issues as possible are addressed in advance, at the time of the policy placement. As this case show, critical issues like the identity of named insured and the presence of unusual provisions (like the presumption of reasonableness for the carrier in this policy) are best addressed at the time the coverage is placed, to avoid problems later. This lesson in turn underscores the importance of the involvement in the policy placement process of knowledgeable and experience professionals who understand the kinds of issues that may be involved if claims later arise.

 

Special thanks to Michael Goodstein of the Bailey Cavalieri firm for providing me with a copy of Judge O’Neill’s opinion. The Bailey Cavalieri firm represented the carrier in this case. I hasten to add that the views expressed in the post are exclusively my own and should not be imputed to any other person, living, dead or otherwise.

 

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During the twelve months ending June 30, 2011, at least 32 Chinese companies were hit with U.S. securities suits. In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has initiated a number of enforcement actions and other proceedings against U.S.-listed Chinese companies, issued a formal bulletin warning investors about the risks of investing in Chinese companies that have gone public through reverse merger transactions, and launched a task force to investigate U.S.-listed Chinese companies that have sold stock to investors in the U.S.

 

These developments have significant D&O insurance implications for the directors and officers of these firms. In a July 14, 2011 Client Advisory from the Pillsbury Winthrop law firm, Pillsbury partner Peter M. Gillon and I review the current litigation exposure facing U.S.-listed Chinese companies and examine the questions that officials at these firms should be asking about their D&O insurance.

 

The Client Advisory can be found here.

 

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An insurance broker’s settlement of claims for disgorgement of undisclosed contingent commissions does not represent covered loss under a combined lines professional liability insurance policy, according to a December 3, 2010 decision of the Illinois (Cook County) Circuit Court. A copy of the December 3 opinion can be found here.

 

Background

Aon Corporation was first sued in 1999 in a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of its customers who alleged the firm had acted improperly with respect to its receipt of certain contingent commissions from insurance carriers. This class action lawsuit came to be known as the Daniel action. Aon was also the subject of certain regulatory investigations from several states’ Attorneys General based on the same allegations.

 

As originally pled, the Daniel action sought damages as well as other relief. However, the Daniels action was amended multiple times. As ultimately pled, the Daniel action sought only a disgorgement into a constructive trust of the amounts allegedly improperly received.

 

On March 4, 2005, AON entered into a settlement with the Attorneys’ General in which it agreed to deposit $190 million into a fund to be paid to former clients of the firm. The agreement specified that the firm would not seek indemnification from its insurers for the funds paid in the settlement.

 

On March 9, 2005, AON entered a separate settlement in the Daniel action, in which the firm agreed to pay an additional $38 million. The Danies action was approved by the Court.

 

Aon sought indemnification from its insurers for the amounts paid in settlement of the Daniels case as well as defense expenses incurred in the Daniel case and the Attorneys General action.

 

Aon’s insurance program included a Combined Lines Policy which combined certain lines of professional liability insurance, including directors and officers liability insurance, errors and omissions insurance and other lines as well. The Combined Lines Policy insurance program consisted of a layer of primary insurance and multiple layers of excess insurance.

 

In August 2006, AON initiated an action in Illinois (Cook County) Circuit Court seeking a judicial declaration of coverage under the Combined Lines Policy for loss incurred in connection with the Daniels action and related matters. The parties filed cross motions seeking to establish whether or not the Danies settlement and the defense costs incurred in the Daniel and the Attorneys General actions represented covered loss under the Combined Lines Policy.

 

The December 3 Order

In arguing that there was no coverage under the Combined Lines Policy for the settlement and defense expenses, the carriers argued that "Loss" covered under the Policy does not include "disgorgement of an ‘ill-gotten’ gain, that is, money of property an insured allegedly had no right to receive in the first place." The insurers argued that the Daniel plaintiffs sought only a constructive trust, not individualized damages, making it clear "that they were seeking disgorgement as their only remedy." The carriers also argued that it would be against Illinois public policy to allow the firm to pay restitution or fund a constructive trust with insurance proceeds.

 

AON in turn argued that there were genuine issues of material fact whether or not the remedies the Daniel plaintiffs sought were restricted solely to restitution. AON argued further that even if the pleadings as amended sought only restitutionary relief, the original pleadings had sought damages, and therefore the firm was entitled to its costs of defending the original pleadings. AON also argued that there was a genuine issue of fact whether the Attorneys General actions sought only restitutionary relief.

 

In her December 3 opinion, Judge Kirie Kinnaird rejected AON’s arguments and held that the relief sought in the Daniel action was "restitutionary and not an insurable loss." Judge Kinnaird rejected the firm’s contention that it was entitled to the defense expenses incurred before the pleadings were amended to remove the damages allegations, since the ultimately operative complaint, and the one to which AON filed its motion to dismiss, sought only restitutionary relief.

 

Judge Kinnaird also rejected AON’s argument that because there had been no determination in the Daniel action that the contingent commissions were "ill-gotten," the commissions represented amounts the firm was entitled to receive, and therefore the Daniels settlement represented covered "Loss." Judge Kinnaird said:

 

Insurability does not depend on whether a claim has merit, but rather what the settled claim sought….This Court will not make a finding or determination of whether AON’s alleged actions in the Daniel litigation were "ill-gotten gains" or unlawful. The lawfulness of collecting contingent commissions was not at issue in the Daniel litigation and is not relevant here. It was the Daniel plaintiffs’ allegation that AON failed to disclose its eligibility to receive the contingent commissions and the retention thereof that gave rise to AON’s potential liability.

 

Finally, Judge Kinnaird held that the firm was not entitled to recover its expenses incurred in defending the Attorneys General actions because the matters were in the nature of disgorgement and restitution. Judge Kinnaird rejected AON’s argument that the way that the claims were characterized in the settlement documents altered this conclusion. Because the underlying claims were not covered, the expenses incurred in the defending the matters likewise were not covered.

 

Discussion

There is an extensive body of case law holding that D&O insurance does not cover disgorgement or amounts incurred that are restitutionary in nature. What makes this holding interesting is Judge Kinnaird’s express observation that the question of coverage for the amounts AON sought does not depend on whether or not the amounts themselves were "ill-gotten."

 

Rather, the Judge held, the question of coverage for the amounts sought depending solely on the fundamental nature of the relief sought. Because the relief sought in both the Daniel action and the Attorneys General action was fundamentally restitutionary in nature, there was no coverage under the policy at issue.

 

The part of Judge Kinnaird’s holding worth thinking about is the ruling with respect to defense expenses. I think most would accept that liability insurance can’t be used as a way for insured’s to finance their repayment of amounts that were not the insured’s in the first place. However, the determination of noncoverage for the amounts incurred in defending against wrongful acts may or may not be as obviously reasonable to many observers.

 

I would be interested in knowing readers’ thoughts on the defense expense question. I think there may be some difficult issues there to consider, especially with respect to individual defendants (particularly in the bankruptcy context).

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of the AON decision.

　

SafeNet’s Excess Carrier’s Rescission Action to Go Forward: On December 7, 2010, Southern District of New York Judge Naomi Buchwald denied the motion to dismiss an action to determine whether or not there is coverage under SafeNet’s excess D&O insurance policy for the settlement of the company’s options backdating related securities class action lawsuit. A copy of the opinion can be found here.

 

The excess carrier’s action seeks to rescission. In her December 7 opinion, Judge Buchwald held that neither the underlying carrier nor individual directors and officers who had not been named as defendants in the rescission action were indispensible parties to the rescission action.

 

Judge Buchwald also rejected the argument that the rescission action was not yet ripe, because the primary policy had not yet been exhausted by payment. She held that the rescission action represented a ripe controversy notwithstanding the fact that the underlying limit had not been exhausted because the securities class action lawsuit settlement presented the "practical likelihood" that the excess limits would be called upon.

 

Semtech Options Backdating Securities Class Action Lawsuit Settles: On December 8, 2010, Semtech announced that it had settled what is one of the last remaining options backdating-related securities class action lawsuits. As reflected in Semtech’s December 8 press release, which can be found here, the case has settled for $20 million.

 

I have added the Semtech settlement to my running tally of options backdating related class action lawsuits, which can be accessed here.

 

According to data compiled by Adam Savett of the Claims Compensation Bureau, of the 39 options backdating related securities class action lawsuits, seven (or 18% were dismissed) and 31 have been settled or partially settled. The total value of all options backdating related securities class action lawsuit is $2.38 billion. The average settlement is $68.7 million, and the median settlement is $14 million. Savett’s data also reflects average and median insurer settlement contributions.

　

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Settlement is the critical goal in every claim that cannot be resolved otherwise. It terminates the open dispute, it provides the parties with finality, and, perhaps, most importantly, it provides the parties with repose. After a settlement is final, everyone is free to get on with their lives.

 

Notwithstanding these fundamental settlement values, are there times when a D&O insurer may nevertheless seek to recoup from its own insured the amount the insurer previously paid in settlement of a third-party claim? A November 22, 2010 Eastern District of Virginia decision, applying Kansas law, in a case involving Sprint Nextel Corporation, addressed this issue. The court held that an excess D&O insurer could not, two years after a settlement was final and based upon post-settlement case law developments, recoup from its insured the amount the insurer paid toward settlement.

 

Background

In February 2004, Sprint Nextel’s board voted to recombine the company’s two separate tracking stocks, leaving a single surviving equity interest. The holders of shares to be retired received, in exchange for their shares, additionally issued shares of the surviving share class.

 

In March 2004, investors who had held shares of the retired class of stock filed class action lawsuits alleging that the company’s board breached its fiduciary duty by implementing a conversion ratio that undervalued the retired shares.

 

Sprint Nextel provided notice of claim to its D&O insurers. At the time of the shareholder claims, Sprint Nextel carried a total of $100 million in D&O insurance, which was written over a $25 million self-insured retention. The first three layers of the D&O insurance program consisted of three layers of $15 million each, arranged between a primary layer of $15 million, and two excess layers of $15 million.

 

In 2007, as a result of mediation, the parties to the shareholder litigation agreed to a $57.5 million settlement. The settlement was to be funded by Sprint Nextel’s payment of the $10 million remaining under the deductible, as well as full $15 million contributions from the primary, first excess and second excess carriers. The fourth level excess carrier contributed the remaining balance.

 

The second level excess carrier agreed to pay its limit but sought in its letter of consent to "reserve its rights to deny coverage and seek repayment."

 

The carriers ultimately funded their respective contributions toward the settlement. On December 12, 2007, the court entered final judgment in the shareholder litigation. The second level excess carrier closed its claim file.

　

However, in December 2009, after the District of Massachusetts issued its opinion, in the Genzyme case, the second level excess carrier filed a complaint against Sprint Nextel in the Eastern District of Virginia against its insured, seeking to recover the $15 million it had paid in the 2007 settlement.

 

As I discussed in a prior post, here, the district court held in the Genzyme case that under Massachusetts law Genzyme’s D&O insurance did not cover amounts Genzyme paid to settle the claims of individuals who asserted they had received inadequate consideration in an exchange for their tracking shares of an internal Genzyme division.

 

The second level excess carrier and Sprint Nextel filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

 

The November 22, 2010 Decision

In seeking to recover its settlement payment, the second level excess carrier argued that the settlement did not represent covered loss under the policy because it represented a delayed payment of a preexisting obligation (in that the company had preserved the Board’s right to decide to recombine the two separate classes of tracking stock into a single class). The second level excess carrier also argued that the settlement represented a mere redistribution of assets among different classes of Sprint shareholders.

 

In making these arguments, the second level excess carrier relied on the Massachusetts District Court’s September 28, 2009 opinion in the Genzyme case. As I as discussed at length here, the district court’s opinion in Genzyme was overturned by the First Circuit on October 13, 2010.

 

In rejecting the second level excess carrier’s argument that the settlement merely represented a preexisting obligation, Judge Claude Hilton wrote that "it is no understatement to say that one of the principal reasons for D&O insurance is to cover D&Os when they are alleged to have breached such preexisting obligations. The mere existence of generalized obligations to follow the law and honor one’s fiduciary duty does not render uninsurable a lawsuit alleging that corporate directors failed to do so."

 

Judge Hilton also rejected the second level excess carrier’s further argument that there is a general public policy against insuring this type of settlement. Judge Hilton also noted that the second level excess carrier only decided to file its recoupment action after the Massachusetts District Court entered its opinion in Genzyme, which the second level excess insurer characterized as "a case of first impression" – which contention, even if true, is inconsistent with the notion that there is a clear and pervasive public policy against payment of these types of settlements.

 

To the contrary, Judge Hilton found, Kansas public policy "favors enforcement of D&O insurance policies" and the second level excess carrier had not identified any grounds that would justify restitution or recoupment of the settlement payment.

 

Judge Hilton specifically noted that though the D&O policy allows the reinsurer to seek repayment of defense costs if the costs were not covered, "there is no basis under the policies for an insurer to make a settlement advance and later to seek its return."

 

Judge Hilton said that he would not allow the second level excess carrier "to retroactively amend its policy by trying to infer a recoupment right or attempt to circumvent the policy’s terms by invoking restitution." Although the carrier may have made its payment "grudgingly," there "can be no question that the payment was made voluntarily." Judge Hilton also found there was no excuse for the second level excess carrier’s delay in brining its action.

 

Discussion

I can certainly see the argument that amount paid in the underlying settlement represents nothing more that a payment by or on behalf of the company to make up for the inadequate consideration the company allegedly paid to the holders of the retired shares in the share recombination.

 

But in the end, I don’t think that Judge Hilton’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sprint Nextel necessarily depended on the merits of the second level excess carrier’s arguments about the nature of the settlement amount or even on the fortuity that the Genzyme decision was reversed after the second level excess carrier filed this action.

 

I think the summary judgment ruling is best understood as a reflection of the second level excess carrier’s timing. It might have been one thing if the second level excess carrier had asserted its position and resisted its settlement obligation while the underlying claim was still pending. The simple fact is that the second level excess carrier did not bring its recoupment action until two years after the settlement of the underlying claim was final.

 

Moreover, as Judge Hilton noted, the grounds on which the second level excess carrier sought to recover the amounts it had paid in settlement was not "fraud, duress or mistake of fact," which might justify setting a prior settlement aside and requiring a restoration of funds. Rather, the second level excess carrier’s bid to recoup funds was based solely on a district court opinion entered two years after the underlying claim was finally settled.

 

If carriers were able to seek the return of settlement payments years after the fact based on nothing more than post-settlement case decisions, the case resolution process could be seriously compromised. Settlements could become nothing more than a contingent arrangement, a state of affairs which frankly is in no one’s interest.

 

Whatever else might be said about second level excess carrier’s decision to pursue this belated action, one can only hope that the outcome of this case and the impression it makes might deter other carriers from seeking to recoup settlement payments long after the fact, at least in the absence of fraud or other similar factor.

 

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Directors and officers can expect their company’s D&O insurance policy to provide them with a claim defense, but only for claims against them for actions made while they are acting in an "insured capacity." The question is whether the determination of the capacity in which the individual was acting depends on the claimant’s allegations, or does it depend on the individual’s actions, regardless of what may be alleged?

 

An October 20, 2010 unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion (here) held that "an insured would reasonably expect coverage for actions taken in the capacity of director or officer of an insured company, whether or not that capacity was alleged by the third-party plaintiff."

 

Frederick Goerner was CEO of TransDimension, and was insured under the company’s D&O insurance policy, which provided coverage for claims against insured persons for "any actual or alleged error" committed by an insured individual "in [his] capacity as such".

 

In litigation to determine whether the company’s D&O insurer had an obligation to provide a defense to Goerner for claims that had been asserted against him, the district court had held that the because the underlying complaint did not specifically allege that Goerner had been acting in his capacity as TransDimension CEO, but rather asserted that he action on behalf of two other industries in the same industry, coverage under the policy was not triggered. Goerner appealed.

 

On appeal, the carrier argued that because the underlying complaint did not specifically allege that the claimant’s losses resulted from action Goerner took in his capacity as TransDimension’s CEO, there was no coverage.

 

A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that, because the carrier’s position, if valid, would preclude coverage even for actions in his insured capacity if the claimant failed to allege in the complaint that the actions were in an insured capacity, the carrier’s position "defeats the purpose of the insurance coverage."

 

The Ninth Circuit said that the guiding consideration is whether "the insured would reasonably expect a defense by the insurer," and that the specific question here is whether the actions at issue in the complaint "could have been taken by Goerner in his capacity as CEO of TransDimension."

 

Finding that Goerner had shown that TransDimension had business dealings "with all of the individuals and companies at issue in the underlying complaint" and that TransDimension’s board "authorized and paid for Goerner’s travels to meet with those two companies in Asia," the Ninth Circuit concluded that Goerner had presented facts that "give rise to the possibility of coverage" and that the carrier therefore was obligated to provide Goerner with a defense.

 

Discussion

Questions of insured capacity are not infrequent in litigation involved senior corporate officials, particularly where the individuals involved wear multiple hats. A not uncommon question, for example, is whether an individual, who is affiliated with a private equity firm and who is serving on the board of the PE firm’s portfolio company, was acting in a capacity for which the individual is insured under the portfolio company’s policy.

 

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case clarifies that the allegations in the complaint alone are not conclusive of the issue. Rather, courts should look at what is reasonable to expect under the circumstances given the nature of the misconduct alleged against an individual defendant.

 

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling ensures that an insured person’s rights under a D&O policy are not subject to the vagaries involved with a third-party plaintiffs’ pleading peculiarities. Basically, insured persons ought to be able to count on their insurance to respond in the kinds of situations for which the insurance was intended to respond. The problem of course is that at the outset of a claim, often all there is to go on is the complaint. Answering the capacity question at the outset may require parties to be flexible and keep an open mind, in order to avoid protracted disputes of the kind involved here.

 

It is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case was designation "not for publication." Nevertheless the opinion may still be cited. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32.1, circuit courts may no longer prohibit the citation to opinions designated, inter alia, "not for publication."

 

A November 17, 2010 memo from the McGuire Woods law firm discussing this case can be found here.

 

The recurring issue of insured capacity is one of the basic coverage issues that can complicate claims handling. Readers interested in getting a handle on the basics of D&O insurance coverage may want to refer to my multipart-series on the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance, which can be accessed here.

 

D&O Liability Insurance Conference: On November 30 and December 1, 2010, I will be co-chairing with my friend Michael Early of the Chicago Underwriting Group the American Conference Institute’s 16^th Annual Summit on D&O Liability in New York. The D&O Diary is a media partner for this event. The conference brochure can be found here. I hope readers who will be attending the event will make a point of greeting me at the conference, particularly if we have not previously met.

　

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In a June 30, 2010 opinion (here), a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling that coverage under a directors and officers liability insurance policy for an underlying claim was precluded by the policy’s "insured vs. insured" exclusion, holding that the D&O policy at issue was "ambiguous" under Virginia law.

 

Background

Prior to May 2004, Community Research Associates, an Illinois corporation, was controlled by three shareholders, referred to in the coverage action as the Legacy Shareholders. In May 2004, CRA was reorganized as a Delaware corporation as part of a stock purchase agreement by which Sterling Investment Partners became the majority shareholder, and the Legacy Shareholders became minority shareholders. The pre-transaction entity was referred to in the coverage litigation as CRA-Illinois and post-transaction entity was referred to as CRA-Delaware.

 

The May 2004 transaction contemplated several events occurring simultaneously at the time of the transaction closing. Among other things, the Legacy Shareholders were to assume positions as officers or directors of CRA-Delaware in order to sign the paperwork to complete the reorganization plan. In addition, as a condition of closing, the Legacy Shareholders were required to resign their positions as directors of CRA-Delaware in order to close the merger.

 

In October 2004, CRA-Delaware purchased D&O Insurance policy. In its application for insurance, CRA-Delaware stated, among other things:

 

On May 3, 2004, the company had a merger with an investment entity. A new Chairman and Chief Executive Officer was installed. The prior ownership remained in a minority capacity but were no longer participants on the Board or officers of the corporation. On August 2, 2004 a new Chief Financial Officer was hired.

　

In August 2005, CRA-Delaware approved a merger whereby all of CRA-Delaware’s stock was sold to a third-party, CRA Acquisitions Corp. The Legacy Shareholders filed a lawsuit against certain directors and officers of CRA-Delaware, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the August 2005 merger. The breach of fiduciary duty action ultimately settled for $3 million.

 

The CRA-Delaware directors who were sued in the breach of fiduciary duty action filed a claim under the company’s D&O insurance policy for the losses incurred in connection with the claim. The D&O insurer denied coverage for the claim in reliance on the policy’s "insured vs. insured" exclusion, and coverage litigation ensued.

 

The district court in the coverage action granted the carrier’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the "insured vs. insured" exclusion was unambiguous and that because the Legacy Shareholders were all former directors and officers of CRA-Delaware, having assumed those roles briefly in order to effectuate the merger, the losses from their claim fell within the Policy’s exclusion.

 

The Second Circuit’s Opinion

The Second Circuit first found that when the district court had concluded that the Legacy Shareholders "briefly assumed" the role of directors of CRA-Delaware in order to effectuate the merger, the district court "assumed[ed] the answer without addressing the parties’ argument."

 

The coverage claimants argued that CRA-Delaware "did not exist as an entity until after the closing of the merger." The Second Circuit said that "at the very least, the question should have gone to a jury to determine whether CRA-Delaware existed prior to the merger or, if it did, whether it was the same entity that existed after the merger for purposes of policy coverage."

 

In reaching this conclusion the Second Circuit, referenced CRA-Delaware’s policy application, which was attached to and, by the Policy’s terms, incorporated into the policy. The Second Circuit found that the application, which the Court emphasized was part of the policy, described the May 2004 transaction in a way that raised these questions about when CRA-Delaware came into existence, and in particular about whether the Legacy Shareholders were ever officers or directors of CRA-Delaware as such.

 

Citing Virginia law, the Second Circuit held that "the Policy, when read in its entirety, can reasonably be ‘understood in more than one way’ and is thus ambiguous." Both of the parties’ interpretations of when CRA-Delaware came into existence "rely only on language of the Policy and are reasonable in light of the various provisions of the Policy."

 

Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court "to undertake any additional fact finding to interpret the Policy provisions in light of the facts to be found."

 

Discussion

At first impression, this case is a bit of head-scratcher, since the record does seem to suggest that the Legacy Shareholders were briefly directors of CRA-Delaware in order to effectuate the merger, which is exactly what the district court found.

 

On further reflection, however, the question may not be quite as straightforward as the first impression might suggest. There is a question about exactly when CRA-Delaware first came into existence, and whether the Legacy Shareholders were ever directors of CRA-Delaware when it came into existence. The application itself, which was incorporated in to the policy, seemingly suggests that the Legacy Shareholders were not officers or directors of CRA-Delaware as such.

 

Significantly, the Second Circuit did not affirmatively say that there was coverage here under the D&O policy, only that further findings of fact were required before it could be determined whether or not the insured vs. insured exclusion applied.

 

At some level, this coverage dispute may simply be a reflection of a very specific and arguably unique set of facts. However, the parties’ dispute is a reminder of the complexities that can sometimes arise in connection with the application of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion, which is frequently the source of contentious coverage issues.

 

That said, I don’t think the Second Circuit was saying the insured vs. insured clause in and of itself was ambiguous. Rather, the finding of ambiguity turned on the fact that the policy application was incorporated into the Policy – that is, by the Policy’s terms, the application was a part of the policy. The finding of ambiguity related to the interaction between the application as part of the policy and the insured vs. insured exclusion. In essence, the Second Circuit said that because of the ambiguous relation between these two parts of the policy, further fact finding is required.

 

My prior posts on the Insured vs. Insured exclusion can be found here and here.

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One of the recurring D&O insurance coverage issues is the question of excess D&O insurers’ obligations when the underlying insurers have paid less than their full policy limits as a result of a compromise between the underlying insurers and the policyholder.

 

In the latest of a growing line of recent cases examining these issues, Judge Wayne Anderson of the Northern District of Illinois, in a June 22, 2010 opinion applying Illinois law, held that the "plain language" of the excess D&O insurance policies at issue required the actual payments of full policy limits in covered claims before the insureds could access the excess insurance.

 

Background

During the relevant period, Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation carried a total of $50 million in D&O insurance arranged in five layers of $10 million each, between a primary insurer and four excess insurers. Bally and certain of its directors and officers were named as defendants in a securities class action lawsuit (about which refer here) in connection with which Bally incurred $33 million in defense expenses, for which Bally sought coverage under from its D&O insurers.

 

The primary insurer initiated an action in the Northern District of Illinois seeking a judicial declaration of noncoverage. Bally joined the excess insurers to the action as third-party defendants. Ultimately the primary insurer and the first and second level excess insurers reached a compromise by which they agreed to contribute a total of $19.5 million toward Bally’s defense expenses. The first level excess insurer settled for $8 million, $2 million less than its full policy limit. The second level excess insurer settled for $1.5 million.

 

The third and fourth level excess insurers refused to settle or otherwise contribute toward Bally’s defense expense. These two excess insures argued that the conditions precedent to coverage in their excess insurance policies had not been triggered. In making this argument, the third level excess insurer relied on its policy’s language that its payment obligations are triggered "only after the insurers of the Underlying Policies shall have paid, in the applicable legal currency, the full amount of the Underlying Limit." The fourth level excess insurer relied on language in its policy specifying that its payment obligations apply "only after all Underlying Insurance has been exhausted by payment of the total underlying limit of insurance."

 

The Court’s June 22 Opinion

In his June 22 opinion, Judge Anderson granted the third and fourth level excess insurers’ motions for summary judgment, finding that the plain language of their policies requires that the underlying insurers each "make actual payments of $10 million each in covered claims before Insureds can access coverage provided by the Third and Fourth Layer Excess Policies."

 

The insureds had argued that the third and fourth level excess policies were "ambiguous" as to whether the underlying policies had to make actual payment of a full $10 million each to trigger the top level excess carriers’ coverage. The insureds argued that the third and fourth level excess carriers had contracted to pay claims in excess of specified levels "regardless of who makes payment for covered claims" below those levels.

 

Judge Anderson considered the case law on which the insureds relied, particularly the 1928 Second Circuit decision in Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.. In examining this line of cases, Judge Anderson concluded that "if an excess insurance policy ambiguously defines exhaustion, as in Zeig, courts generally find that settlement with an underlying insurer exhausts the underlying policies." However, Judge Anderson went on, "in cases where the policy language clearly defines exhaustion, the courts tend to enforce the policy as written."

 

Judge Anderson went on to find that the third and fourth level excess policies clearly defined how the underlying insurance must be exhausted prior to the insureds accessing coverage. Accordingly, and because the underlying insurance had not been exhausted by the underlying insurers’ payment of covered loss, Judge Anderson granted summary judgment in the third and fourth excess insurers’ favor.

 

Discussion

As a result of rising settlement levels and escalating defense costs, excess D&O insurance has become increasingly important in D&O claims resolutions. As more and more claims get pushed into the excess layers, more and more questions are arising, including this recurring question of whether the excess carriers’ payment obligations are triggered when the policyholder has compromised with the underlying carriers.

 

Judge Anderson’s holding in the Bally Total Fitness case joins a line of several recent cases in which courts have similarly held that, given the excess policy language at issue, the excess carriers’ payment obligation were not triggered when the underlying carriers paid less than their full policy limits as a result of a compromise with the policyholder. These recent cases include the July 2007 Eastern District of Michigan decision in the Comerica case (about which refer here) and the March 2008 California intermediate appellate court decision in the Qualcomm case (about which refer here).

 

The outcome of these various coverage disputes is a direct reflection of the excess policy language involved, and in particular the language specifying what is required in order for excess insurers’ payment obligations to be triggered. These cases underscore the critical importance of the language describing the payment trigger in the excess policy.

 

In recent months, and in large part as a reaction to these cases, excess carriers increasingly have been willing to provide language that allows the excess carriers’ payment obligations to be triggered regardless whether the underlying amounts were paid by the underlying insurer or by the insured. (I note as an aside that this language was not generally available at the time that Bally Total Fitness purchased the D&O insurance at issue in this case.)

 

The potential importance of the excess insurance payment trigger language, and the availability of language alternatives in the current insurance marketplace, in turn underscores the importance for policyholders of involving a knowledgeable and experienced D&O insurance broker in their acquisition of D&O insurance. The presence of the most favorable excess trigger language, among many other critically important policy language issues, could make a significant difference in the availability of coverage in the event of a claim.

 

Speedy Justice: According to Judge Wayne Anderson’s official biography (here), the Judge is the co-holder of the record for the 100-yard dash at Harvard University, from which he graduated in 1967.

　

　

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The SEC has made it clear that it intends to use Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to "clawback" compensation from CEOs and CFOs of companies that restate their financial statements, even if the individuals are not alleged to have engaged in any wrongdoing. A recent district court opinion confirms that the statute gives the SEC the authority to proceed on that basis. These actions raise complex D&O insurance coverage concerns that arguably suggest certain necessary policy adjustments.

 

Section 304 provides that if a company restates its financials, the company’s CEO and CFO, who certified the financial statements under Sox Section 302, "shall reimburse" the company for any bonus compensation received during the 12 months following the restated period, as well as any stock sale profits earned during those twelve months.

 

There is no requirement in Section 304 that the CEO or CFO from whom reimbursement is sought have any involvement in the events that necessitated the restatement; indeed, the statute doesn’t require any showing of wrongdoing or fault.

 

The SEC’s first use of this statutory provision to clawback compensation from a corporate official against whom no wrongdoing is alleged was the enforcement action filed in July 2009 against Maynard Jenkins, the former CEO of CSK Auto. I first wrote about this enforcement action in a prior post, here.

 

CSK Auto had restated its financial statements for the fiscal years 2002 to 2004. The SEC filed separate enforcement actions against the company and four company officials for securities law violations in connection with the restatements. However, Jenkins is not among the company officials alleged to have violated the securities laws.

 

The SEC’s action, filed in reliance on Section 304, seeks to compel Jenkins to reimburse CSK Auto for more than $4 million he received in bonuses and stock sale profits "while CSK was committing accounting fraud." Jackson not only is not alleged to have had any role in or awareness of the alleged scheme, but the SEC has actually alleged in its separate enforcement action against the other CSK officials that the others concealed their scheme from Jenkins.

 

Jenkins moved to dismiss the SEC’s clawback action on numerous grounds, arguing that he cannot properly be forced to disgorge compensation in the absence of any personal wrongdoing.

 

In a June 9, 2009 order (here), District of Arizona Judge G. Murray Snow held that the SEC’s complaint against Jenkins alleges facts sufficient to state a claim under Section 304, stating further that "the text and structure of Section 304 require only the misconduct of the issuer, but do not necessarily require the specific misconduct of the issuer’s CEO or CFO."

 

Judge Snow elaborated by saying that "the misconduct of the issuer is the misconduct that triggers the reimbursement obligation of the CEO and the CFO." Before reimbursement can be required "the issuer’s misconduct must be sufficiently serious to result on material noncompliance with a financial reporting requirement."

 

The SEC has already made it clear that it intends to use Section 304 to try to clawback compensation from other CEOs and CFOs who are not alleged to have done anything wrong. For example, just a few days ago, the SEC settled a Section 304 filed against Walden O’Dell, the former CEO of Diebold, even though, as noted in the SEC’s June 2, 2010 litigation release, the SEC’s complaint does not allege that O’Dell engaged in the alleged fraud at Diebold.

 

Judge Snow’s opinion in the Jenkins case confirms that the SEC may properly pursue Section 304 clawbacks even against corporate officials who are not alleged to have engaged in personal wrongdoing (although he did leave open the question whether the statute could be used in ways that would be unconstitutionally punitive).

 

Though statutorily authorized, the statute’s use to effect a forfeiture without culpability or fault raises troubling questions, including even basic questions of fairness. On the other hand, it might also fairly be asked whether the CEO or CFO ought to be able to retain benefits accumulated at a time when the investing public was being misled, by financial statements that the CEO and CFO certified, about the company’s financial condition.

 

Beyond these issues, these kinds of actions may also raise complex D&O insurance coverage questions.

 

A Section 304 claim potentially would raise at least two possible coverage concerns – first, whether the claim involves an allegation of a "wrongful act" as required to trigger coverage; and second, whether coverage for the claim is precluded by the "profit or advantage" exclusion.

 

D&O insurance typically is only triggered by a claim made against an insured person for an actual or alleged wrongful act. Under a Section 304 claim in which no personal wrongdoing is alleged, the question would arise whether a wrongful act has been sufficiently alleged to trigger coverage under the policy.

 

I think it could fairly be argues that a Section 304 claim does involve a wrongful act even if no personal wrongdoing is alleged against the individual defendant. As Judge Snow’s opinion in the Jackson case emphasized, a prerequisite to a Section 304 claim is misconduct by the issuer (which is an "insured" under the typical public company D&O insurance policy’s "entity coverage" provision).

 

Given the statutory prerequisite of issuer wrongdoing, a Section 304 claim necessarily involves a claim for a wrongful act, even if the wrongful act alleged is not that of the targeted individual. The typical D&O policy emphatically does not say that the claim must be made against an insured person for that insured person’s own wrongful act – to the contrary, the typical policy requires only that the claim be made for "an actual or alleged wrongful act," without specifying whose act it must be.

 

Nevertheless, I can still imagine a carrier bent upon denying coverage urging that this policy provision requires a wrongful act by the insured person against whom the claim has been made, which may indicate the need for certain policy revisions, as detailed below.

 

Even if the wrongful act concern can be overcome, there is still the policy exclusion to be dealt with. The typical D&O policy excludes coverage for any loss based on a claim for any "profit or advantage" to which the insured is not legally entitled. A carrier might attempt to rely on this provision not only to deny coverage for the amount of any reimbursed compensation, but also to try to deny coverage for the costs of defending the claim.

 

One way to try to circumvent this concern about Section 304 defense costs is to amend the exclusionary provision to required a judicial determination in the underlying claim that the insured was not legally entitled to the "profit or advantage," which would at least allow defense costs to be advanced up until there has been such a judicial determination. The limitation of this approach is that once there has been a judicial determination, the carrier might seek to be reimbursed for the advanced defense costs.

 

The point here is that the question of D&O insurance coverage for the costs of defending a Section 304 clawback claim could be problematic. One approach to try to address these concerns would be to amend the policy to provide that the "profit or advantage" exclusion will not be applied to the costs of defending a Section 304 act, and to further amend the policy to provide that the carrier will not take the position that a Section 304 action does not allege a wrongful act.

 

At least one insurer has taken an alternative approach to address the Section 304 defense cost issue in its revised policy form. Under this approach, the costs of defending a Section 304 claim are expressly included in the policy’s definition of Loss.

 

It is not my intention here to debate the merits of these alternative approaches (which indeed may not be mutually exclusive) or of any other alternative approaches that might exist. My purpose here is simply to point out that this issue has reached the point where the question of Section 304 defense expenses ought to be addressed in the D&O policy form.

 

Just as a few years ago, the D&O insurance industry quickly adapted express policy language designed to address concerns arising from SOX whistleblower claims, it may now be time for the industry to adapt express policy provisions addressing Section 304 defense costs. Policyholders should not have to wait until the claim has been filed to find out what the carrier’s position will be on Section 304 defense expenses.

　　

2010 World Cup: Some Early Notes:

1. Vuvuzela: Did the site selection committee know about those damned vuvuzela horns when they chose South Africa as the 2010 World Cup venue? What an awful, idiotic noise. (There are reports that the event organizing committee is considering a ban.)

 

2. Remember, The Beautiful Game is Fast, Too: England was up on the U.S. by a goal before I even had a chance to turn the T.V. on.

 

3. U.S. Goal Inspires Headline Writers Everywhere: Here’s my entry – "English Green’s Gift Gaffe Gives Yanks a Goal."

 

4. Most Underappreciated: Tim Howard ought to be one of the most celebrated athletes in the U.S. He certainly is one of the most talented.

 

5. Go Figure: The official nickname of the Australian team is the "Socceroos." Discuss.

 

6. Self-Destruction (and Team Takeout, Too): Substitute Algerian striker Abdelkader Ghezzal entered his team's game against Slovenia in the 58th minute (which was a scoreless tie at the time). Approximately five seconds later he was given a yellow card for an aggressive tackle. Then in 74th minute, he earned his second yellow (and an automatic red card, requiring his ejection from the game) for a flagrant hand ball . Within minutes, his shorthanded team conceded Slovenia's winning goal.

 

7. Divided By a Common Language: The "pitch" is the playing field. A "side" is a team. A "strike" is a shot. To "win a cap" is to be selected to play for your country’s team. "Nil" means zero. "Draw" means tie. And "nil-nil draw" (usually preceded by the word "dreaded") means a scoreless tie. The phrase "argy bargy" is not susceptible to translation. 

　

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The problems facing many banks in the current economic environment are well-documented. For troubled banks’ directors and officers, the banks’ D&O insurance may represent a last line of protection. But what if the insurers could just cancel the policies? Surprisingly, many bank D&O insurers have that right under their policies, and while cancellation is rare, it is not unprecedented, and some insurers are now invoking that right to shed the risks associated with failing or problem institutions.

 

As reflected in a January 24, 2010 FinCri Advisor article entitled "Your D&O Insurer Might Be Scouring Your Call Report Looking to Cancel Coverage" (here), the policy forms of many bank D&O insurers have cancellation clauses that permit the insurer to cancel the policies mid-term, either because there is a "material change in the risk" or for any reason at all.

 

Many of these clauses are found only in policies that were issued on a multiyear basis, but even some single-year bank D&O insurance policies contain cancellation clauses. While many policies also specify that the insurer must give the policyholder 60 days (or more) notice so that the policyholder can try to replace coverage, the fact is that if something serious enough to cause the insurer to cancel coverage has occurred, it likely will be a very difficult time for the policyholder to try to find replacement coverage.

 

For D&O insurance practitioners who don’t venture into the Financial Institutions arena (or FI as it is known), the very existence of these clauses in bank D&O policies may come as a surprise, since these clauses do not appear in most mainstream commercial D&O insurance policies.

 

The obvious question is how did a cancellation clause get into bank D&O policies when it is rarely if ever seen in other kinds of D&O insurance policies? Part of the answer is that, particularly with respect to community banks, the D&O insurance marketplace has over the years become both very specialized and intensely competitive.

 

Before the current troubled bank era began, D&O insurance for community banks became increasingly less expensive. But as buyers became increasingly (or even exclusively) focused on price, some carriers looked for ways to trim coverage. And so a term such as the cancellation clause that isn’t seen in other D&O insurance policies found its way into the basic forms of several community bank D&O insurance carriers.

 

A neutral observer might question the value of a contract that one party can simply cancel unilaterally. The promise to provide insurance seems tenuous indeed if the insurer can walk away because problems have emerged – which is of course the very circumstance for which buyers purchase insurance in the first place.

 

All of this does raise the question of why any buyer would agree in the first place to accept a policy that has a cancellation clause. The answer is either that the buyer is unaware the clause is there or the buyer has no other choice.

 

Given the number of bank D&O insurers that have cancellation clauses in the policy forms, there undoubtedly are many banks whose policies have these clauses. I am guessing only a very small number of these banks (many of whom may have purchased their insurance on a direct basis) have any idea the clauses are there.

 

The problem is that the market for D&O insurance for banking institutions is in turmoil now due to the number of failed and troubled banks. For banks that are struggling, it may be challenging in the current environment to obtain a policy without a cancellation clause. Or, if they can a policy without a cancellation clause, the coverage afforded may otherwise be restricted (as for example, by the inclusion of a regulatory exclusion or the absence of past acts coverage).

 

Healthy financial institutions in many instances can still get coverage on a relatively attractive basis. Healthier banks should not have to accept a policy with a cancellation clause. However, even the healthy banks can only avoid the cancellation clause and other undesirable policy features if their advisor is well-informed and knows what to look and ask for.

 

One added note is that even some bank D&O policies that do not have cancellation clauses have other undesirable features that are almost as bad. For example, the policy form of at least one D&O insurer that is active with community banks does not allow the policyholder the option of purchasing extended reporting period coverage, even in the event of nonrenewal, which could have a similarly negative impact on a bank whose D&O insurance is not renewed. Again the presence or absence of an extended reporting period option is a term that the bank’s D&O insurance advisor will, if well-informed and knowledgeable, be looking for.

 

For the banks whose D&O insurers hit them with a notice of cancellation, the only recourse may be for the banks to provide their insurers with a "laundry list" notice of circumstances that may give rise to a claim – always a challenging proposition because of the uncertainty of knowing what claims may arise later. But the laundry list may be the only chance the bank has to lock in coverage before it is unilaterally taken away.

 

All of this underscores the critical importance for banks and for all insurance buyers of involving a knowledgeable and experience advisor in the acquisition of D&O insurance. Without informed advice, policyholders can be left with inadequate insurance protection when problems arise.

 

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The individual defendants in the various Stanford Financial-related SEC enforcement and criminal proceedings have been engaged in a long-running and procedurally complicated battle over whether the firm’s D&O insurers must advance the individuals defense expenses. In a sweeping January 26, 2010 opinion (here), Southern District of Texas Judge David Hittner rejected the grounds on which the insurers sought to avoid coverage and ruled that the insurers must advance the individuals’ defense costs.

 

Background and the January 26 Opinion

The defense fee dispute has a complex procedural history but for purposes of the January 26 opinion the critical fact is that on November 16, 2009, the insurers sent the individuals letters "retroactively declining to extend coverage for costs." The insurers contended that coverage was precluded by the Policy’s "money laundering" exclusion. The exclusion precludes coverage for loss "arising directly or indirectly as a result of or in connection with any act or acts (or alleged act or acts) of Money Laundering," as that term is defined in the policy.

 

In his opinion, Judge Hittner noted that the carrier’s were not seeking to avoid coverage based on the exclusion precluding coverage for fraud or criminal misconduct, because that exclusion has a requirement of an "adjudication" that the precluded conduct had occurred. The money laundering exclusion has no "adjudication" requirement, leaving, the insurers’ argued, the determination that money laundering has in fact occurred, to the insurers.

 

Judge Hittner also noted parenthetically that the insurers urged this position even though only one of the twenty-one counts in the criminal action alleges money laundering or conspiracy to commit money laundering. (The insurers argued that the policy’s definition of money laundering was broad enough to encompass all of the allegations.)

 

The plaintiffs first opposed the insurers’ position based on the "eight corners" rule, arguing under Texas law that in determining an insurer’s defense obligations, a court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the policy and the four corners of the complaint. Judge Hittner found that despite the insurers’ arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court of Texas "never has recognized an exception to the eight corners rule."

 

Judge Hittner was in any event strongly against a broader view of what a court properly might consider in determining the insurers’ obligations.

 

If a contemporaneous duty to advance or reimburse defense costs were judge on an "actual facts" basis, an insurer’s contractual obligation to pay defense costs could change on a daily basis as additional "facts" are developed. Essentially, coverage that directors and officers relied upon and expected when the Policies were purchased on their behalf could be withdrawn at the insurer’s whim. If, as Underwriters suggest, the Policies afford Underwriters absolute discretion to withhold payments whenever charges of intentional dishonesty are leveled against directors and officers, then insurers will be able to withhold payment in virtually every case at their discretion. That would leave directors and officers in an extremely vulnerable postion , as any allegation of dishonesty, not matter how groundless, could bring financial ruin on a director or officer. Essentially an insurer could act as judge and jury and convict its own insureds, thus avoiding any further financial responsibility for the insureds’ defense. This simply cannot be the case. (Citations omitted.)

 

The court found in applying the eight corners rule that the allegations were insufficient to establish that the precluded conduct had occurred. The insurers nevertheless sought to argue that the individuals refusal to testify in support of the application for a preliminary injunction is proof enough that the allegations against the individuals are true. The insurers sought to argue that the refusal to testify supported an inference that money laundering did in fact occur.

 

Judge Hittner held that the "given the magnitude, complexity and nature of the charges," he declined to draw the inference, and that in any event, because of the eight corners rule, the insurers’ reliance on the supposed inference from the individuals refusal to testify is "misplaced."

 

Judge Hittner, applying the standard required for a preliminary injunction motions ruled that though the money laundering exclusion does not require a judicial determination to apply, the exclusion’s requirements "also may mean much more than an insurer’s own determination." He said that he need not decide what level of factual determination must be made, and instead ruled only that plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits at trial, satisfying the standard for awarding preliminary injunctive relief.

 

The court, in further consideration of the preliminary injunction standard, noted that the plaintiffs would suffer "irreparable harm" if the relief they sought was withheld. He noted that it is "unmistakable and cannot be seriously disputed" that the harm the individuals will suffer is "real, immediate and irreparable." He rejected the insurers contrary position that, he said, would "essentially require [the individuals] to prove their innocence." Judge Hittner commented that
 

 

Underwriters’ position is absurd because these circumstances are precisely why corporations procure D&O insurance on behalf of their directors and officers. Indeed, it would contravene the very purpose of the Policies – as well as the policy language itself – to require Plaintiffs to prove their innocence before being entitled to funds for their defense.

 

Judge Hittner found the harm to the insurers from granting the preliminary injunction was relatively slight and that public interest also weighed in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. He finally held that the individuals did not have to post a bond.

 

Discussion

Given the nature of the allegations against the individuals and the notoriety of the circumstances, as well as the number of people who lost money as a result of the collapse of Stanford Financial, the tone and temperature of Judge Hittner’s words are a little surprising. If nothing else is clear, Judge Hittner was certain that individuals needed to be able to defend themselves, and the insurers were obliged to provide the defense. The depth of Judge Hittner’s discussion of these defense cost issues are such that his words may prove useful for other individuals who are seeking to have their defense expenses paid under their policies.

 

You do get the sense that Judge Hittner ducked the hard issue – that is, if the money laundering exclusion, unlike the fraud exclusion, doesn’t have an "adjudication" requirement, then an adjudication can’t be required, so what is sufficient? Given Judge Hittner’s certainty that the eight corner rule is absolute under Texas law, there might be no way to meet the requirement. It does make you wonder whether it matters from a practical perspective whether or not there is an "adjudication" requirement.

 

Even though the usefulness of Judge Hittner’s determinations for others seeking insurance coverage arguably might be limited to those jurisdictions that also absolutely enforce the eight corners rule, the breadth of his pronouncements about the limitations on insurers’ ability to make preclusive coverage determinations virtually guarantees that his phrases will appear in the legal briefs of other individuals who are seeking defense cost coverage. His unwillingness to allow the individuals’ refusal to testify on their own behalf in the preliminary injunction proceeding may also prove helpful to other policyholders.

 

Because of the tone of Judge Hittner’s rhetoric and the high profile nature of the case, I suspect there may be some strong views about this decision. I invite readers who have thoughts about this decision to add their views to this post using the blog’s comments feature.

 

A January 26, 2010 Bloomberg article about Judge Hittner’s ruling can be found here.

 

Special thanks to Bill Schreiner of the Zuckerman Spaeder law firm for providing me with a copy of the decision.

 

Vivendi Watch: The Vivendi securities class action case went to the jury on January 11, 2010, but still no verdict. The parties are anxiously awaiting the verdict and in the meantime debating what the length of the jury deliberations may mean, according to a January 26, 2010 article by Andrew Longstreth on AmLaw Litigation Daily (here). The article also reports that almost regardless of the verdict, there will likely be an appeal, if for no reason that because of the potential jurisdictional implications of the National Australia Bank case now pending before the Supreme Court. Stay tuned (to the second power, apparently).

 

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Last fall, the New York Department of Insurance ignited a firestorm when it issued an opinion that a D&O insurance policy may not place the duty to defend on the insured. As I discussed in an earlier post (here), the opinion is contrary to both the uniform practice of the D&O insurance industry and the unambiguous preference of public company D&O insurance buyers.

 

On February 26, 2009, following his keynote address at the the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) D&O Symposium, New York Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo acknowledged the industry’s reaction to his department’s opinion, and indicated that the department would reconsider the issue and address it through the issuance of a new regulation. He also invited the industry to help his department to shape the new regulation.

 

Based on the Superintendent’s invitation, PLUS is now working with the American Insurance Association (AIA). The AIA has drafted proposed revised regulatory language that is now being circulated among its members. PLUS has also invited its member companies to comment on the draft regulatory proposal. PLUS will compile the comments and share them with the AIA and the New York Department of Insurance.

 

One representative from each PLUS member company can obtain a copy of the draft proposed regulatory language by contacting PLUS’s Executive Director, Derek Hazletine, dhazeltine@plusweb.org.  

 

I am setting all of this information out in a separate blog post because the deadline for comment to be received is next Monday, March 23, 2009, so companies that want to participate will have to move quickly.

 

In his Feb. 26 presentation, Dinallo indicated that he intends to act quickly on the proposed regulations and that he hopes to have the regulations in place by late spring.

 

Insurers Must Disclose Climate Change Exposures: On March 17, 2009, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners adoped a "mandatory requirement that insurance companies disclose to regulators the financial risks they face from climate change, as well as the actions the companies are taking to respond to those risks." According to the NAIC's press release (here), all insurance companies with annual premiums of $500 million or more will be required to complete an annual Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey with an initial deadline of May 1, 2010. 

 

In the Survey, insurers will be required to report on "how they are altering their risk-management and catastrophe risk moedline in light of the challenges posed by climate change" and they will also be required to report  on "steps they are taking to engage and education policymakers and policyholders on the risks of climate change" as well as "whether and how they are changing their investment strategies." 

 

These reporting requirements could have a singificant impact, not just on insurers disclosures, but on their conduct as well. The requirement to disclose what the carriers are doing to "engage and educate" policymakers seems to suggest that the NAIC expects carriers to become proactive on the legislative and regulatory front regarding climate change. The disclosure regarding investment strategies potentially could influence insurers'' investment decisions. The clear implication of the NAIC's rule is that the regulators expect the disclosure requirements will motivate the carriers to become proactive in these areas.

 

 

The web page for the NAIC's Climate Change and Global Warming Task Force, including a link to the draft language of the new disclosure requirements, can be found here.

 

The Hits Just Keep on Coming: Bernard Madoff may now be in jail following his recent guilty plea, but that does not seem to have slowed the flow of new Madoff-related lawsuits. As the new suits have come in, I have added the new suits to my running tally of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

 

The litigation register has now grown to be quite lengthy. Madoff’s fraudulent scheme may have cost investors billions, but he has stimulated a heaping stack of litigation.Special thanks to the many readers who have been sending me the new complaints as they have come in, especially Jon Jacobson of the Greenberg Traurig law firm. Readers may be interested to know that Jon is also reporting on the new cases on Twitter (here) as they come in.

 

Speaker’s Corner: Next week I will be in London speaking at the C5 D&O Liability Insurance Conference. The specific panel on which I will be speaking is entitled "Current Litigation Trends in Europe and the U.S.: Are Class Actions on the Horizon?" The conference, which will take place March 24 and 25, 2009 at the Grange City Hotel., will feature a diverse array of speakers on a wide variety of D&O insurance related topics. The entire program agenda can be found here.

 

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The initiation of a criminal investigation against a company or its directors and officers can be a watershed moment in the life of any company. In addition to the question of how it will respond, the company must also determine how it will fund the associated legal expense. It is at this critical juncture that the company confronts issues surrounding the availability and limitation of D&O insurance in connection with criminal investigations.

 

These issues are explored in a December 2008 article by Patricia Bronte of the Jenner & Block firm entitled "D&O Coverage for Corporate Criminal Investigations" (here). As Bronte notes, the availability of coverage for a criminal investigation depends upon the particular language in the applicable policy, particularly the policy’s definition of the term "claim." The critical question will be whether or not the particular circumstances presented constitute a "claim."

 

The article opens with a review of case law from an earlier era, when D&O policies did not routinely define the term "claim." However, as the article discusses, the typical D&O policy now defines the term and includes within its definition a specific reference to a "criminal proceeding," which usually is further defined as having been "commenced by the return of an indictment."

 

One of the useful things Bronte’s article does is that by reviewing the early case law, she shows how the carriers came to insert the language limiting coverage for criminal proceedings to post-indictment matters. Prior cases where carriers were compelled to fund a wide range of expenses related to investigations and other pre-indictment matters clearly led to this change.

 

However, Bronte’s article also illustrates the difficulties, from the policyholder’s perspective, of this post-indictment limitation of coverage for criminal matters. That is, "a corporation’s best hope for a favorable outcome – and sometimes the best way to avoid disaster – is to persuade the prosecutor not to file any formal criminal charges at all."

 

As a consequence of this need to try to avert indictment, the corporation can incur considerable expense pre-indictment in respond to subpoenas, addressing a grand jury investigation, or otherwise attempting to answer the investigative threat. Costs incurred in connection with these efforts represent defense expenses, whether or the investigation ultimately results in an indictment.

 

Disputes over these kinds of legal costs are among the perennial battles in the D&O claims arena. Invariably, policyholders will argue that these expenses were indispensible to their post-indictment defenses, or even that they helped avert an indictment. Further complicating these discussions is the fact that these expenses associated with the pre-indictment criminal investigation often are being incurred at the same time that the company is also incurring legal expense in connection with an SEC investigation and also separate civil litigation. These various proceedings may be covered in whole or in part under the policy.

 

Because all of these various legal matters are going forward simultaneously and usually pertain to a single set of circumstances, sorting out which legal expenses relate to which proceeding (and therefore which expenses are covered under the policy) can become a vexing problem and source of tension between the policyholder and the carrier.

 

Exacerbating these problems is the fact that among all these proceedings, the criminal matter usually looms the largest and therefore may consume the larges amount of legal effort and expense. This is particularly true if, as is often the case, the individuals involved each retain separate counsel. The potentially massive expense associated with the criminal investigation underscores why these issues can be so critical.

 

In light of these considerations, the article offers some practical suggestions. Bronte notes:

 

Brokers and risk managers should press for "claim" definitions and coverage limits that adequately protect the corporate entity from the expense of criminal investigations, which almost inevitably involve multiple teams of lawyers defending the corporation and its employees.

 

In that regard, many D&O insurers now include within the definition of the term "claim" not only a reference to post-indictment (or post-information) criminal proceedings, but also a separate explicit reference to "investigations" (including criminal investigations), usually delimited in some way around the requirement for the naming of an insured person as a target of a possible indictment. The precise wording of the definitional provisions relating to "investigations" potentially could be critical.

 

In addition, at least one major carrier now has a form that removes any reference to an indictment requirement, and instead refers simply to "criminal proceedings." The removal of the indictment requirement, together with the reference to "proceedings," at least potentially opens the door to coverage for grand jury investigations, subpoenas, and other matters. While this alternative wording is not universally or even widely available, it does present an alternative for consideration.

 

The article also notes, in connection with efforts to secure coverage for criminal proceedings that "policyholders do not advance their position if they or their brokers characterize the criminal investigation as merely a ‘potential claim.’" An alternative possibility is to refer to the matters involved as a claim, or, in the alternative, a potential claim.

 

The article correctly points out that "the high cost of defending against accusations of criminal wrongdoing is one of the reasons that corporations purchase D&O insurance." Nevertheless, the extent of coverage for criminal proceedings remains one of the perennially disputed claims issues. The further development of D&O policy wordings that better address policyholder expectations is a continuing challenge for the D&O insurance industry and one on which there are fruitful areas for further discussion.

 

More About NERA’s Year-End Securities Litigation Study: In a prior post (here), I linked to NERA Economic Consulting’s year-end report on 2008 securities litigation activity. (The report itself can be found here). In a December 19, 2008 post (here), the Securities Docket has an interesting interview with the report’s authors, my good friends Stephanie Plancich and Svetlana Starykh. Among other things, the interview quotes the authors as saying, with respect to their projections for litigation activity in 2009:

While our paper does not forecast trends into the next year, our best guess is that filing activity will remain high into 2009. As mentioned above, there have been a number of new filings in late December — traditionally a slow time for litigation activity — indicating that the rate of filings has yet to decrease.

And while the first credit crisis cases were concentrated in the financial industry, there has been an emerging trend of credit crisis- and recession-related filings emerge outside of the financial sector.

 

Ghost of Christmas Preset, 2008 Version: With apologies to Charles Dickens, I excerpt below an imagined version of his holiday classic, updated for current circumstances. We can only hope that the Ghost of Christmases Yet-to-Come bears happier tidings. 

 

And taking Scrooge by the arm, the Spirit lifted him high above the financial landscape. Below him, Scrooge could see a parade of spectacles he scarcely could have imagined: the largest bank failure ever; the largest bankruptcy ever; the largest government bailout; the collapse of the housing market and the near-collapse of the entire financial system. 

"Spirit!" said Scrooge. "Show me no more! Conduct me home. Why do you delight to torture me?"

"One Shadow More!" exclaimed the Ghost.

And below, in the mist, Scrooge could see an avuncular man. Oddly and incongruously, the man wore a baseball cap. 

"Who is that man, Spirit?" Scrooge asked.

"Those who used to think of themselves as his friends called him ‘Bernie’" the Spirit said.

"No more!" cried Scrooge. "No more, I don’t wish to see it. Show me no more!"

 

Break in the Action: I think we could all use a break. I will discontinue my regular publishing schedule for the next few days. Regular publication will resume after the New Year.

 

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We interrupt our regularly scheduled stream of dispatches from the credit crisis front to provide a quick update on the now seemingly remote options backdating scandal. Even though the whole world has moved on and though options backdating pales by comparison to what followed, many options backdating cases continue to grind on. At least a couple of these cases recently settled, and there appear to be many more yet to come.

 

First, on December 11, 2008, Amkor Technologies announced (here) that it had reached an agreement to settle the option backdating-related securities class action lawsuit that had been filed against the company and certain of its current and former directors and officers in connection with the company’s historical stock option practices. Background regarding the lawsuit can be found here.

 

According to the company’s press release, the plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss the case in exchange for a payment of $11.25 million. The company said that its directors and officers liability insurance carrier has agreed to pay $9 million of the settlement amount and the company will pay the balance.

 

Second, and also on December 11, 2008, the parties to the options backdating-related shareholders’ derivative suit filed against Foundry Networks, as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and officers, filed a notice of a proposed settlement (here). According to the parties’ filing, the company will receive cash payments of $2.117 million, of which $1.637 represents payments from the individual defendants and $400,000 represents payments from the company’s insurer. Certain shares granted to certain individuals have been repriced and the company also agreed to certain governance changes. The company also agreed to pay plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and expenses of $1.2 million.

 

I have added these two settlements to my running table of options backdating-related lawsuit settlements, dismissals and motion denials, which can be accessed here. The Amkor settlement is, by my count, the sixteenth options backdating-related securities lawsuit settlement, and approximately six of the cases were also dismissed. Given that there were according to my count (refer here) 39 options backdating-related securities lawsuits filed in total, there still may be as many as 17 of these cases yet to be resolved.

 

The individuals’ cash contribution toward the Foundry Networks settlement, if not indemnified, would represent an unexpected element, as it remains an unusual settlement element for directors and officers to make cash settlement contributions out of their own assets.

 

OK, enough about that. We now resume our regularly scheduled programming, which is already in progress.

 

California Countrywide Subprime-Related Derivative Case Dismissed: In a December 11, 2008 order (here), Judge Mariana Pfaelzer dismissed the Countrywide subprime-related derivative case pending in the Central District of California.

 

Judge Pfaelzer previously had denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the derivative case, in a strongly worded May 2008 opinion (about which refer here). However, in July 2008, Bank of America acquired Countrywide in a stock for stock merger. As a result, and as discussed here, in October 2008, the Delaware federal court dismissed the parallel Countrywide subprime-related derivative case pending in that court, because of the plaintiffs’ lack of standing to pursue the claim owing to the plaintiffs’ inability to show "continuous ownership" due to the BoA transaction.

 

The plaintiffs in the California Countrywide subprime-related derivative case argued that, notwithstanding the merger, they could still satisfy the "continuous ownership" rule and therefore still had standing based on a merger-related exception to the rule recognized in the Ninth Circuit. After detailed consideration of Erie Doctrine issues, Judge Pfalzer declined to exercise equitable powers associated with the merger-related exception, and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the derivative claims due to the plaintiffs’ lack of standing.

 

Judge Pfaelzer’s ruling on the derivative claims was without effect on the plaintiffs’ merger related class claims, which she previously had stayed in favor of parallel proceedings pending in Delaware Chancery Court. In addition, the Countrywide subprime-related securities class action lawsuit remains pending before Judge Pfaelzer, as a result of her recent dismiss motion denial in that case, discussed here.

 

In any event, I have added the dismissal of the California Countrywide Derivative lawsuit to my list of subprime lawsuit settlements, dismissals and motions denials, which can be accessed here.

 

Special thanks to Michael Delhegan of the Tressler Soderstrom firm for providing a copy of Judge Pfalzer’s December 11, 2008 opinion.

 

Standalone Insurance for Independent Directors: In prior posts (most recently here), I have noted the considerations that may militate in favor of standalone insurance protection for independent directors. In a December 12, 2008 memorandum entitled "Independent Directors Require Additional Protection in Financial Crisis Litigation" (here), the Baker & McKenzie firm suggests that "there is an increasing interest by independent directors in coverage that protects only a company’s independent or outside directors, not its officers."

 

The memo reviews the origins of IDL insurance and examines why "it may be a useful tool for both attracting high quality independent directors, and as a means of protecting and retaining the best talent." Among other reasons suggesting the need for IDL protection is the increasing susceptibility of traditional D&O insurance limits to erosion or depletion through defense expense or indemnity protection for other persons insured under the D&O policy, a phenomenon on which I previously commented here.

 

More About the NY Insurance Commissioner’s Recent Opinion: In a recent post (here), I commented on the recent opinion of the New York Insurance Commissioner’s office requiring D&O insurance policies to incorporate a duty to defend. The opinion and its implications are reviewed at greater length in a December 2008 Client Advisory from the Edwards, Angell, Palmer & Dodge law firm entitled "The New York Insurance Department Will No Longer Approve D&O Policies Lacking ‘Duty-to-Defend’Coverage Feature" (here).

 

This memo contains a detailed analysis of the opinion and raises a number of important considerations about what the opinion does and does not mean. The memo also notes difficulties that carriers may face as the attempt to adapt to the opinion, and also suggests alternative responses available to the carriers, including seeking legislative relief.

 

Special thanks to John McCarrick of the Edwards Angell firm for sending along a copy of the memo.

 

And Finally: By far the best thing I have seen written on the Madoff scandal is the column that Wayne State Law Prof. Peter Henning wrote as a guest column on the DealBook blog, here.

 

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A recent appellate court opinion interpreting a D&O liability insurance policy securities exclusion carries some important reminders both about policy wording precision and about exclusionary language, and also raises some critical questions about the scope of coverage for securities claims generally.

 

In an October 27, 2008 opinion (here), the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, held in the In re SRC Holding Corp. case that there is no coverage under a D&O liability insurance policy containing a securities claims exclusion for claims made against a financial services company and certain of its directors and officer for alleged wrongful acts in connection with the company’s underwriting and sale of certain municipal bonds.

 

Following a description below of the case’s background and the appellate court’s holding, I discuss the implications of the Eighth Circuit’s decision.

 

Background

Between 1996 and 1999, Miller & Schroeder (M&S), a securities underwriter and broker, underwrote and sold $140 million of municipal bonds. The bonds later defaulted and the bond investors initiated lawsuits and arbitration proceedings against M&S and certain of its directors and officers, alleging breaches of federal securities laws and other violations. M&S ultimately went into bankruptcy.

 

M&S’s D&O insurance carrier denied coverage for the claims. The bankruptcy trustee initiated a lawsuit against the D&O insurer alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration of coverage. The individual M&S directors and officers intervened in the trustee’s action.

 

The bankruptcy court held that the policy exclusion on which the insurer relied to deny coverage did not preclude coverage for all of the claims and that the carrier must defend the individuals against all claims. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling and the carrier appealed.

 

The Eighth Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, the carrier argued that the district court erred in finding that the policy required the carrier to provide the directors and officers with defense cost coverage and indemnification for the bond investors’ claims.

 

The carrier relied on Endorsement No. 3 to the policy, which provides that:

 

In consideration of the premium charged, this Policy does not apply to any Claim based on, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from, in consequence of, or in any way involving any actual or alleged violation of:

(1) the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, any other federal law, rule or regulation with respect to the regulation of securities, any rules or regulations of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, or any amendment of such laws, rules or regulations; or

(2) any state securities or "Blue Sky" laws or rules or regulations or any amendment of such laws, rules or regulations; or

(3) any provision of the common law imposing liability in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of securities.

 

The district court held that this exclusion precluded coverage only for M&S’s sale of its own securities, but not otherwise. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied in part on the testimony of the insurance broker who sold the policy, who testified, according to the appeals court, that "this standard-form securities exclusion is typically intended to exclude coverage for liability resulting from the insured’s sale of its own stock."

 

As the appeals court paraphrased the district court’s logic, because the provision had a "typical effect," the meaning of the provision "must accord with that typical effect." The district court said that this was the only interpretation that "makes sense."

 

The appeals court held, however, that the district court erred in relying the broker’s testimony. Because the district court held (correctly in the appellate court’s view) that the provision is unambiguous, it was erroneous as a matter of Minnesota law for the court to rely on extrinsic evidence in interpreting the provision.

 

The Eighth Circuit said that "the effect of [the securities exclusion] as it may be generally applied in practice is not the legal authority that governs our coverage inquiry here; it is the mutually agreed-upon policy’s plain language that binds [the parties] in the first instance." The appeals court noted that

 

Sophisticated business entities who rely on experts to advise them are best suited to determine what makes the most economic sense and the language they have mutually negotiated and agree to is the best evidence of what those parties intended.

 

The appeals court held that the endorsement is "not limited to claims arising out of M&S’s sale of its own securities," as such a limitation "is nowhere to be found in its language."

 

The appeals court also rejected the suggestion that this interpretation was inconsistent with other provisions in the policy.

 

The insureds argued further that in any event coverage for claims against them for alleged violations of NASD rules were not precluded, and therefore that the carrier was obliged to fund the defense, even as to non-NASD proceedings.

 

The appeals court rejected this argument as well, in reliance on the Endorsement No. 3’s broad preamble ("based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from, in consequence of, or in any way involving…"), as well as the policy’s provisions broadly treating interrelated matters as a single claim.

 

Because the alleged NASD violations "arise out of, flow from and have their origins in the same set of operative facts" as the claims alleging violations of the securities laws, for which coverage is broadly excluded under the policy, they fall "well within the ‘arising out of’ exclusionary language of Endorsement No. 3."

 

The Wiley Rein law firm, which represented the carrier before the appellate court, has a detailed memorandum here summarizing the Eighth Circuit’s decision is greater detail.

 

Discussion

The Eighth Circuit’s ruling is noteworthy in and of itself, as a federal appellate court decision vigorously holding that insurance policies negotiated between sophisticated parties must be interpreted strictly according to their terms.

 

The opinion also represents a cautionary tale for practitioners in this area, and it is well worth considering more fully in that light.

 

None of my remarks are meant in any way as a criticism of the broker involved. Clearly, the broker’s view of how this policy should operate had a substantial basis, as both the bankruptcy court and the district court adopted the broker’s interpretation.

 

However, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is a harsh reminder that, notwithstanding what the common understanding may be about the meaning or operation of policy provisions, ultimately courts will look at a policy‘s actual language. As the Eighth Circuit’s opinion demonstrates, a court’s policy interpretation may or may not coincide with common understandings or expectations. For practitioners in this area, the appellate court’s ruling underscores that what matters is wording not intent.

 

In addition, the court’s reliance on the breadth of Endorsement No.3’s exclusionary preamble is a reminder of the inclusive nature of this type of omnibus language. The Eighth Circuit found that the use of this broad preamble substantially extended the reach of the provision’s exclusionary effect, which represents its own reminder to practitioners of the critical importance of the way in which policy provisions are framed, particularly policy exclusions.

 

A critical part of the coverage dispute here relates to the fact that the securities violations alleged arose not in connection transactions involving the insured company’s own securities. This aspect of the dispute raises a more general question about how, in the absence of a securities claim exclusion, D&O insurance policies should respond to claims of securities law violations asserted by persons other than the insured company’s own shareholders.

 

There have been some high profile 2008 examples of securities lawsuits filed by persons other than the defendant company’s own shareholders. The numerous auction rate securities claims represent one example. Another example is the securities class action lawsuits filed against, among others, Hexion Specialty Chemical and certain of its directors and officers by shareholders of Huntsman Corporation. The Huntsman shareholders alleged that the Hexion defendants "deceived the investing public regarding Hexion’s efforts and intentions with respect to the merger with Huntsman." (Refer here for further background about the Hexion claim).

 

These recent examples, as well as the M&S case discussed above, underscore the possibility of securities allegations by persons other than a company’s own shareholders. These kinds of claims can arise not only in connection with financial companies, like M&S and the companies involved in the auction rate securities cases, but can also involve non-financial companies, like Hexion.

 

Questions of policy coverage for these types of securities lawsuits potentially could be significant not only in connection with the type of exclusionary language in the M&S case, but also in connection with the definition of "securities claim" found in the typical D&O insurance policy.

 

There are standard formulations for the definition of the term "securities claim." One formulation is oriented toward claims arising under the securities laws and the other is oriented toward claims involving the issuer’s securities or the issuer’s securities holders.

 

Definitions of the term "securities claim" oriented toward the securities laws themselves will extend more broadly without respect to who has asserted a claim and are more likely to encompass securities lawsuits filed by persons other than a company’s own shareholders.

 

Definitions of the term "securities claim" tied to claims involving the company’s own securities, rather than more broadly to claims involving the securities laws generally, could be interpreted more narrowly with respect to securities lawsuits brought by persons other than the company’s own shareholders.

 

All of which begs the question: how should the policies respond to securities lawsuits against insured persons filed by claimants other than the company’s own shareholders? In my view, because these claims allege wrongful acts by persons insured under the policies, they represent precisely the kind of litigation for which the policy should provide coverage. Of course, whether any particular policy will respond to this kind of claim depends on the actual policy language.

 

Financial Collapse: The Board Game: According to a November 28, 2008 Financial Times article entitled "Icelanders Collapse in Laughter" (here), some Icelanders, tapping into their typically "darkly ironic sense of humor" have developed a board game "that takes a grimly comical swipe at the financial crisis that has devastated the economy."

 

Players roll dice and move around the game board while drawing cards that, for example, allow them to buy a private jet or obtain a foreign loan, or perhaps go bust. Icelanders have been suggesting additional content for the cards via the Internet. Among other cards suggested is one reading "Go to demonstrate at parliament, stop to buy some eggs to throw, only to realize that prices have gone up so much you can’t afford them."

 

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For many companies, one of the most challenging parts of the Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance procurement process is determining how much insurance to purchase. Against a backdrop of basic affordability, the company must consider complex issues such as limits adequacy – that is, how much insurance is enough?

 

Determining limits adequacy is even more challenging in light of today’s escalating claims severity. Recent developments underscore the fact that in addition to rising settlement levels, growing defense expense is an increasingly important part of the limits adequacy analysis.

 

 

In the September 2008 issue of InSights (here), I review recent D&O claims defense expense developments and consider their ramifications for purposes of both limits selection and insurance program structure. The article concludes with a brief review of claims management implications arising from these defense expense issues.

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In what is, according to news reports (here), the largest settlement to date in a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit in Delaware Chancery Court, four former AIG executives and former AIG managing general agent C.V. Starr today reached a $115 million settlement in the 2002 AIG derivative lawsuit.

 

The lawsuit was filed by the Teachers’ Retirement System of Louisiana in 2002 against AIG, as nominal defendant; certain former AIG directors and officers (many of whom were later dropped from the case); and Starr.

 

According to news reports (here), the plaintiff alleged that half of the $2 billion AIG paid C.V. Starr between 2000 and 2005 "represented sham commissions for work that, in some cases, was done by AIG employees." The lawsuit also questioned "why some executives were allowed to serve simultaneously as officers of C.V. Starr, a closely held insurance agency, while profiting from business between the two companies." The complaint also alleged that Starr gave the individual defendants bonuses on fees from AIG. In effect the complaint alleged that the commissions were a mechanism for the defendants to "line their pockets."

 

The case was scheduled to go to trial on September 15, 2008. The four settling individual defendants include former AIG Chairman and CEO Maurice Greenberg; former AIG CFO Howard Smith; former Vice Chairman of Investments Edward Matthews; and former director and Vice Chairman of Insurance Thomas Tizzio.

 

The vast bulk of the settlement -- $85.5 million – is to be paid by AIG’s D&O insurance carriers. A list of the carriers on AIG’s D&O program can be found here.

 

The more interesting question is where the remaining $29.5 million will come from. Some of the news reports give the impression that the individuals are funding the settlement. However, it appears that the individuals themselves are funding only a small portion of the remaining $29.5 million.

 

Greenberg’s counsel’s statements to the press (for example, here) are quite emphatic that Greenberg himself will not be contributing anything the settlement. One news report (here) does suggest that Tizzio "is expected to pay between $1 million and $5 million," Smith and Matthews "would pay very small amounts, if anything."

 

It appears that the bulk of the $29.5 million will be paid by C.V. Starr. According to Greenberg’s counsel, Starr "expects to contribute between $20 million and $30 million."

 

The details about who will be paying what seem surprisingly imprecise. In particular, the wide potential variance in Tizzio’s contributions seem odd to me, as even a wealthy individual generally would require a more precise determination of how many millions of his dollars are going to be required. Which makes me wonder whether perhaps Tizzio has an individual source of insurance that may be contributing on his behalf.

 

There are a variety of other odd features to this settlement, at least as it is described in the news reports, the most striking of which is that Tizzio apparently will be making a material settlement contribution but apparently Greenberg will not. To be sure, C.V. Starr, of which Greenberg is still Chairman and CEO, will be making a more than $20 million contribution, raising the question whether the amount of Starr’s contribution and the fact that Greenberg himself is not contributing to the settlement are linked.

 

And even with respect to C.V. Starr’s contribution, certain questions arise. For example, given the fact that some or all of the individual defendants apparently were also officers of C.V. Starr, is Starr’s D&O carrier funding some or all of Starr’s contribution to the settlement?

 

It should also be noted with respect to Starr’s payment to AIG that Starr is in fact AIG’s largest shareholder. As of July 15, 2008, Starr owned 10.5% of AIG’s outstanding shares, which represents Starr’s largest asset. Maybe that is just context, but it is an interesting context nonetheless.

 

I also have questions concerning the $85.5 million contribution from AIG’s D&O carriers. Beyond sheer curiosity about how much of AIG’s D&O insurance tower was depleted by defense expense, I also wonder whether the insurer’s settlement contribution to this derivative settlement drew upon the insurance program’s Side A coverage, which provides protection for nonindemnifiable loss. You would not expect the $85.5 million payment to AIG to be indemnifiable in the absence of insurance, so all else equal the amount would seem to represent a Side A loss. The same would also seem to be true with respect to the individuals’ own separate contribution to the settlement.

 

My question about which D&O policy coverage funded the settlement may require some context. Given the size of this derivative settlement, as well as other recent large derivative settlements (including, for example, the $50 million Hollinger derivative settlement), there seems to be a growing threat of very large derivative settlements, which is a relatively new development.

 

Many companies, particularly large financial services companies, often have D&O insurance programs built exclusively or predominantly of Side A-only protection. These kinds of programs have become increasingly common in recent years, but in general losses have really not yet caught up to this coverage to a significant degree.

 

The options backdating derivative cases presented the possibility of significant potential losses for these types of coverages, but it is my understanding that the Side A-only losses from these cases really have not yet significantly materialized. There has been speculation that the subprime litigation wave might also produce significant Side A losses, but those cases are only in their earliest stages yet, so the losses have yet to fully develop.

 

The possibility of derivative settlements of the magnitude of the recent AIG settlement may represent the most significant threat to these Side A programs and coverages, at least outside of the bankruptcy context. Which is why I am curious to know which policy coverage funded the AIG D&O insurers’ portion of the AIG settlement.

 

Finally, I am curious about how likely coverage issues were dealt with in connection with this settlement. I expect that the insurers would have raised the personal profit exclusion typically found in most D&O policies as at least a potential defense to coverage. I am guessing that the existence of this issue complicated the settlement process (or at least the insurers’ contribution to the settlement). The absence of a judicial determination that the individuals had improperly profited undoubtedly ameliorated this potential impediment. The individuals' desire to avoid any determination that might preclude coverage may have helped precipitate settlement on the eve of trial.

 

As always, I am interested if any readers can shed any light on the details. I am particularly interested details involved with the individuals’ contributions; around the extent of insurance funding for C.V. Starr’s contribution; and concerning AIG’s insurers’ contributions. Anonymity will be scrupulously protected.

 

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Each fall for the last two years, I have taken a look at the current trends and hot topics in the world of D&O. There are of course certain perennial topics that are always critical, but this overview is intended  to focus on the issues the most significant current interest for D&O insurance professionals and their clients. Here is my list of the current issues to watch:

 

1. Limits Adequacy: The question of limits adequacy has long been one of the more challenging parts of the D&O acquisition process. Against a backdrop of basic affordability, the company must try to determine how much insurance is "enough"?

 

Several recent developments have surrounded these issues with even greater urgency. The most dramatic of these developments arises from the claims surrounding the collapse of auto parts supplier Collins & Aikman. The company carried $50 million D&O insurance limits, but the cumulative expense of the various civil, regulatory and criminal proceedings arising from the company’s demise have entirely exhausted the $50 million insurance program, leaving individual defendants to face ongoing criminal prosecutions and civil litigation without insurance available to fund their defense. (Refer here and here for further discussion of the Collins & Aikman case.)

 

There have been several other recent examples where astronomical defense expense has exhausted or substantially depleted entire D&O insurance programs.

 

The escalating cost of defense is only one of several factors raising limits adequacy concerns. The steady rise in average and median claims severity, as well as the growing threat of separate opt-out litigation following the settlement of class litigation (about which refer here), also underscore the growing complexity of limits adequacy issues.

 

In light of these developments, particularly the catastrophic potential for defense expense to deplete policy limits, it may be time to rethink traditional notions of limits adequacy, because past assumptions may no longer be sufficient.

 

2. Insurance Structure: For several years now, conversations in connection with the D&O insurance transaction have included the discussion of additional Side A insurance to provide additional protection for individuals’ liability and defense expense that is not indemnifiable due to insolvency or legal prohibition. In recent months, interest in Side A protection and other auxiliary D&O insurance structures has recently taken on increased urgency, as a result of two developments.

 

The first derives from the preceding topic; that is, concerns about limits adequacy inevitably lead to questions about structure, because even substantially increased limits may not be sufficient to address all concerns, given the potential for defense expense to consume available limits.

 

One way for corporate officials to ensure they are not left without insurance to protect them is through the creation of an auxiliary insurance structure dedicated solely to their protection. There are a number of different auxiliary D&O insurance products available to address these concerns. Most of these structures have been available in various forms for some time now. What has changed is the level of interest in these insurance structures.

 

A separate legal development is also driving interest in auxiliary insurance structures. In March 2008, a Delaware Chancery Court opinion in the Schoon v. Troy Corporation case held that a Delaware corporation may retroactively eliminate former directors’ advancement rights. (Refer here for my prior discussion of the case). The possibility that former directors could lose their rights to indemnification or advancement after the end of their board service may come as unwelcome news to many directors.

 

The typical D&O insurance policy provides coverage for former directors and officers. Under most circumstances, a former director from whom corporate advancement and insurance has been withheld would still be able to seek defense expense protection and indemnification under the company’s D&O insurance policy.

 

Directors who are concerned that events following their departure from the board could conspire to leave them unprotected (for example, if limits were exhausted or substantially depleted , as discussed above), yet another auxiliary insurance product is now available. A retired director insurance policy is dedicated solely to the protection of the named individual and cannot be terminated or discontinued by the action of others.

 

The point is that directors and officers rightly are more concerned about the availability of insurance protection when they need it most. As a result, interest in the wider variety of auxiliary insurance structures has increased.

 

3. Excess Insurance: For reasons that should be clear from the first point above, excess D&O insurance is an increasingly important part of the D&O claims resolution process. Perhaps because of excess D&O insurance’s increasing involvement, there have been a series of D&O insurance coverage disputes involving excess D&O insurance. These disputes have highlighted the importance of two particularly important issues concerning excess D&O insurance.

 

The first of these issues involves the excess policy’s language describing the circumstances under which the excess policy’s payment obligations are triggered. This language can become critically important if the policyholder reaches a compromise with an underlying insurer as a result of which the underlying insurer pays less than its full policy limits, leaving an insurance "gap" to be funded by the policyholder.

 

In two recent decisions, one involving Comerica (refer here) and one involving Qualcomm (refer here), courts interpreting policy language providing that the excess insurer’s obligations are triggered only if the underlying insurance is exhausted by the underlying insurer’s payment of loss held that the excess insurer’s obligations were not triggered even if the policyholder funded an insurance "gap."

 

These case developments have increased the awareness of the importance of excess insurance exhaustion language and coverage triggers. Alternatives now available in the marketplace allow payments by policyholders funding "gaps" as sufficient to trigger excess insurance payment obligations.

 

The second of the excess insurance issues involves coverage issues that so-called "follow form" excess insurers. The particularly troublesome issues arise when excess insurers raise policy defenses that the underlying insurers did not assert. Each policy of course represents a separate contract, but policyholders obviously expect each layer of a single insurance program to respond similarly to the same set of claims circumstances.

 

These issues have drawn even greater scrutiny in recent cases in which "follow form" excess insurers contend that their policy contains exclusions not found in the underlying policies, or that the excess insurer has policy application defenses different from the underlying insurers.

 

Although excess insurance frequently is described as "follow form," the increasing frequency of coverage defenses raised only by excess insurance suggest that, regardless of how the policy is characterized, the operation of excess insurance can be something substantially different than "follow form." The factors described above regarding escalating defense expense and increasing average and median claims severity ensure that these excess insurance issues are likely to be increasingly important.

 

4. Subprime Claims and The Cost of D&O Insurance: Largely as a result of the litigation activity surrounding the subprime meltdown, D&O claims activity has in recent months returned to historical levels after a period of reduced activity. Because much of the subprime litigation has been high profile, there is a frequent assumption that the cost of D&O insurance must be increasing.

 

As I noted in a recent post (here), so far, except with respect to certain marketplace segments such as the financial sector, D&O insurers generally have not restricted capacity, reduced coverage or raised prices. These buyer-friendly conditions are largely the result of the relatively positive results insurers have enjoyed in recent years. The insurance marketplace remains competitive.

 

The subprime litigation wave is continuing to spread. The risk for insurers is that in a competitive environment, pricing can fall below risk-related requirements, leading to an eventual correction. To the extent the current litigation wave produces significant insurance payouts, the current competitive conditions could change quickly, particularly if the litigation wave spreads beyond the financial sector. However, at this point, these possibilities continue to appear remote and the marketplace remains competitive.

 

Afterword: There are other developments that I think are important and worth watching, such as the growing potential for possible climate change disclosure issues (about which refer here) and the emergence of civil litigation arising from corrupt practices enforcement proceedings (about which refer here). These and other developing concerns still fall more in the category of emerging issues rather than current trends. The one thing that is clear is that the world of D&O continues to be characterized by constant change.

 

I have set out above what I consider to be the critical current issues but I am certain that others may have a different view of what the hot topics are in the current environment. I would like to encourage readers to use the comment function to add their own views about the current hot D&O insurance topics. Please note that comments can be added anonymously.

 

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Observers outside the D&O insurance industry frequently comment to me that with all the subprime-related litigation, D&O pricing must be skyrocketing. These observers are often puzzled when I respond that the D&O marketplace remains generally competitive and pricing advantageous to buyers. This same conversation recurs with sufficient frequency that if may be worth exploring in greater depth. It may also be worth considering whether or not current marketplace conditions may be vulnerable to abrupt change.

 

With respect to the litigation activity, there have indeed been a significant number of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits, as detailed further below.

 

 

Nevertheless, except with respect to certain marketplace segments (such as the financial services industries), D&O insurers generally have not restricted capacity, reduced coverage or raised prices. As IRMI noted in its September 2008 publication The Risk Report (here, subscription required), it may seem “counterintuitive” but “most companies, particularly those outside the financial sector, continue to enjoy ample capacity and relatively advantageous terms and conditions.”

 

 

The most important reason for the competitive marketplace conditions is that historically low securities class action activity levels prevailed during most of the period 2005 through 2007. Insurers’ D&O results for those claim reporting periods undoubtedly appear favorable. At the same time, insurers overall results during that same period were also favorable, due to low levels of catastrophe claims after the hurricane intensive period in 2004 and 2005.

 

 

Insurers’ business-writing capabilities are directly proportionate to their “policyholder surplus” (which is, in simple terms, the insurance company financial reporting equivalent to shareholders’ equity). As a result of insurers’ strong results in recent reporting years, property and casualty insurers’ industry-wide policyholder surplus is at or near record levels. The insurers’ business-writing capability is correspondingly high – and so the marketplace for most lines of insurance, including D&O, is competitive.

 

 

These are of course exactly the conditions that drive the insurance cycle, as ability to write business translates into an appetite for business, with price as the primary means of competition. Eventually, pricing falls below the risk related requirements, results deteriorate, and, when surpluses and redundancies are exhausted, the marketplace corrects.

 

 

The current heightened claim activity level is exactly the kind of circumstance that can lead to deteriorating results, particularly to the extent that there is a mismatch between pricing and the risk exposure. Indeed, IRMI noted in its recent report that if the current litigation wave “produces significant loss payouts, and spreads beyond the financial sector” the current wave could “ultimately affect the larger D&O marketplace.”

 

 

The ultimate outcome will of course only be revealed in the fullness of time. But in addition to policyholder surplus levels, there are a variety of other factors that could be mitigating the impact of the current litigation wave on the D&O insurers.

 

 

First, insurance may not even be involved in many of the highest profile subprime-related claims. Many of the largest banks, for instance, self-insure for their D&O exposure or only carry so-called Side A coverage for nonindemnifiable loss. At least for those banks that have not gone insolvent, these Side A policies are unlikely to be triggered.

 

 

Second, much of the current claims activity may not involve losses to which D&O insurance even applies. For example, the buybacks at the center of the recent high-profile auction rate securities settlements (about which refer here) may not involve insurable losses. To the extent that there are damages paid (for example, if the losses must pay investors’ consequential damages), the losses are likely to be more in the nature of investment bank errors and omissions losses than D&O losses.

 

 

Third, although the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave has spread, the vast majority of the lawsuits have been concentrated in the financial services sector. There are certain D&O carriers that are more exposed to this space than others, but many other carriers have long shunned this space. As a result many carriers may not be experiencing the current heightened claims activity levels, and the ones bearing the brunt of the activity arguably are larger and more diversified.

 

 

Fourth, a certain amount of the litigation wave involves companies domiciled (and, most likely, insured) overseas – for example, UBS, Swiss Re, RBS, RBC, Fimalac, Societe Generale, and so on. Losses related to these claims, which represent a significant portion of the subprime related litigation, may not impact the domestic D&O insurance market.

 

 

Fifth, although I have on this blog, and even in this post, referred to the current litigation as a “wave,” one could argue that although the current activity exceeds the claim level of the preceding three years, the current level is not far above historical claims activity levels. I suspect there are senior insurance executives whose D&O unit managers are telling them that current claims activity levels are within expected ranges. (Some of these managers may have different employers three to five years from now.)

 

 

Sixth, but perhaps most importantly, most of these claims are only in their earliest stages. Carriers’ case reserves may not yet be fully developed. There is also the danger that aggregate loss reserve picks are skewed by several years of better than average results. Carriers may feel confident they have a handle on this situation and fully understand their ultimate exposure, and their confidence may be warranted. It will of course be years before they know for sure.

 

 

Earlier on as the subprime litigation wave was just gaining steam, there were a number of dramatic pronouncements (refer, for example, here) about how large the large the potential loss for the insurance industry from the subprime meltdown could be. It has been awhile since anyone has ventured any similar pronouncements, probably because the sky has not yet fallen. But while prognosticators may have become more circumspect, there remains an abiding danger in the current circumstances.

 

 

Despite -- or maybe because of -- all of the foregoing, the subprime and credit-crisis litigation wave remains highly dangerous for the D&O insurance industry. Among other things, there is the possibility that the most significant danger could be underestimation of its long-run significance.

 

 

Thanks to the several readers with whom I have spoken and corresponded on these topics in recent days. And very special thanks to Bob Bregman at IRMI for permission to quote The Risk Report.

 

 

Another State Court Subprime Class Action Lawsuit: In an earlier post (here), I noted that as part of the current subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave, plaintiffs’ lawyers have seemed increasingly interested in filing actions under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 in state court. In the latest example of this phenomenon, on August 26, 2008, a plaintiff filed a purported Section 11 class action lawsuit against National City Corporation and several of its directors and officers in Florida (Palm Beach County) Circuit Court. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

 

The complaint is brought on behalf of the former shareholders of Fidelity Bankshares who acquired National City stock in connection with National City’s acquisition of Fidelity, which was completed in January 2007. The complaint alleges that the offering documents “concealed billions of dollars of risky construction loans” that National City made to finance residential real estate construction, in Florida and elsewhere.

 

 

Among other things, the complaint alleges that the construction loans were plagued by “bad product design” and were susceptible to “the high likelihood of default and extreme loan loss severity.” Many of the loans “featured the worst qualities of subprime” though National City supposedly represented its loans as “prime” and “conforming.” The complaint also alleges that the offering documents misrepresented other aspects of National City’s financial condition, including its “nonperforming assets” and its loan loss reserves.

 

 

This new lawsuit is merely the latest lawsuit filed against National City regarding subprime-related issues (refer here and here). In any event, I have added this latest lawsuit to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here. With the addition of this latest complaint, the current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits now stands at 109, of which 69 have been filed in 2008.

 

 

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch for providing a copy of the National City/Fidelity Bankshares complaint.

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It remains to be seen whether the current economic turmoil will result in significant additional bank failures. But if history is any guide, to the extent that there are further bank failures, there likely will also be follow-on lawsuits in which the regulators pursue claims against the failed institutions’ former directors and officers. As these claims emerge, there may also be disputed issues regarding the applicability of the failed institutions’ D&O insurance policies.

 

As I noted in a recent post (here), among the issues that may arise is the applicability of the regulatory exclusion. In addition, another issue that may arise relates to the potential applicability of the so-called “insured v. insured” exclusion found in most D&O insurance policies.

 

The “insured v. insured” exclusion typically precludes coverage for claims by or on behalf of the insured corporation, its affiliates or directors and officers against other insured persons. Over the years, the standard exclusion has been modified to provide coverage carve-backs for certain types of claims for which coverage would otherwise be precluded, such as derivative claims and employment practices claims.

 

During the S&L crisis in the late 80s and early 90s, the federal banking regulators actively pursued claims against the failed institutions’ former officials. As described in a July 29, 2008 memorandum from the Latham & Watkins law firm entitled “The ‘Insured v. Insured’ Exclusion in D&O Policies” (here), many of these regulator claims implicated the insured v. insured exclusion.

 

As the law firm’s memorandum explains, in many instances the regulators were able to argue successfully that the exclusion should not apply to preclude coverage for their claims, because the lawsuits were not the “collusive” type disputes for which the exclusion historically was meant to preclude coverage. However, as the memorandum also notes, there were cases in which the exclusion was held to bar coverage for the regulators’ claims, on the grounds that the regulator was in effect “standing in the shoes” of the failed institution.

 

The memorandum correctly points out that the “insured v. insured” exclusion is “heavily litigated” and “continues to be at the heart of many coverage disputes.” There are a number of reasons why coverage disputes involving the exclusion are so frequent.

 

First, over the years, the scope of persons insured under the typical D&O policy has expanded – for example, to include “employees” within the definition of insured persons for purposes of securities claims. In addition, many companies for their own reasons have sought to schedule additional named insureds to the policy by endorsement. While these policy extensions may be desirable from the policyholder’s perspective, problems can arise later if the extensions are not also coordinated with the language and operation of the “insured v. insured” exclusion.

 

Second, companies may take on forms or structures that raise fundamental questions about who is an insured under the policy. For example, insolvent companies may continue in business as a debtor-in-possession or may have its activities taken over by a receiver. These and other situations have raised and continue to raise a myriad of contentious questions about the scope and applicability of the insured v. insured exclusion.

 

Third, in many lawsuits, the plaintiffs’ claims may be based on information or assistance provided by former company officials. The former officials’ involvement may run afoul of the wording in the typical insured v. insured exclusion, which specifies that for claims to be covered they must be “instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of” any insured person.

 

The question whether a former official’s litigation involvement falls within one of these precluded categories is a frequent source of contentious coverage disputes. (Refer here for discussion of a recent case involving these issues.) In order to try to reduce the opportunities for these types of disputes, many carriers will now agree upon request to add wording providing that the exclusion will not apply in the event of the involvement of former officials whose departure was more than a specified amount of time before (typically, four years).

 

As the Latham & Watkins memorandum discusses, one of the issues frequently disputed in these cases is whether the underlying claim must be “collusive” in order for the exclusion to be triggered. As the Latham & Watkins memo explains, the exclusion’s original intent was to bar coverage for collusive claims. However, not all courts have required collusion for the exclusion to be applied (refer, for example, here), although there are many jurisdictions in which collusion has been held to be required.

 

The importance of the “insured v. insured” exclusion and the opportunities to revise the standard wording to reduce the exclusion’s preclusive effect highlights the importance of addressing these basic wording issues at the time the policy is purchased. As the Latham & Watkins memorandum notes, each company “should seek the assistance of an insurance broker to attempt to limit the exclusion’s breadth.” The potential significance of these issues underscores the need for companies to enlist the assistance of an experienced and knowledgeable broker in their acquisition of D&O insurance.

 

Duties of Outside Directors Under Delaware Law: As noted by the ever-vigilant Francis Pileggi on his Delaware and Commercial Litigation Blog (here), on July 29, 2008, the Delaware Chancery Court issued an opinion in the Ryan v Lyondell Chemical Company case (opinion here) that has important implications for the duties and potential liabilities of outside directors in the merger and acquisition context.

 

The court held that the outside directors were not entitled to summary judgments and would have to stand trial for their role in the sale of the company, as Pileggi notes, “despite selling the company to the only known buyer for a substantial premium.”

 

As explained in the opinion, when the Lyondell board received the offer, it delegated much of the negotiations to the company’s Chairman and CEO; never conducted a “market check to determine whether a better price could be obtained; agreed to a deal that included protective rights, including a “no-shop provision.” Moreover, “the whole deal was considered, negotiated, and approved by the Board in less than seven days.”

 

The Chancery Court held that the Board could not invoke the exculpatory provisions under the company’s charter and the Delaware Code because “the Board’s apparent failure to make any effort to comply with the teachings of Revlon and its progeny implicates the directors’ good faith and, thus, their duty of loyalty, thereby, at least for the moment, depriving them of the benefit of the exculpatory charter provision.”

 

Pileggi’s post does an admirable job explaining the implications of the decision. Further valuable analysis of the decision can be found on the Legal Profession Blog (here).

 

Monster Settlement, Dude: As reflected in its July 31, 2008 press release (here), Monster Worldwide has reached a settlement in the options backdating related securities action lawsuit pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers. As reflected in the press release, the settlement consists of “a payment to the class by the defendants of $47.5 million in full settlement of the claims asserted in the securities class action. The Company's cost is anticipated to be approximately $25 million (net of insurance and contribution from another defendant).”

 

The Monster settlement is only the latest of the options backdating related securities class action settlements. A full list of settlements and case dispositions in the options backdating related litigation can be accessed here.

 

A WSJ.com Law Blog post describing the Monster settlement (and containing a nice link to The D&O Diary) can be found here.

 

The Securities Litigation Watch blog as updated its detailed analysis of the options backdating securities class action lawsuits, which can be found here.

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The recent news (here) that federal regulators had seized IndyMac Bank in one of the largest bank failures in history brought back memories from the late 80’s and early 90’s, when numerous financial institutions around the country met a similar fate. The litigation surrounding the financial institutions’ collapse kept legions of lawyers profitably employed for years, including your humble correspondent.

 

Among the many types of cases litigated in that era were D&O insurance coverage disputes, and in particular, disputes involving the applicability of the so-called “regulatory exclusion.” The regulatory exclusion typically precludes coverage for claims brought by any governmental, quasi-governmental, or self-regulatory agency.

 

In the competitive underwriting environment that has prevailed in recent years, the regulatory exclusions has become an infrequent part of financial institutions’ D&O insurance policies, a development that has seemed unremarkable as the prior failed bank era has receded into the past. However, with the dramatic news of IndyMac’s regulatory seizure, and the consequent concern that further financial institutions failures may lie ahead (refer here), the issues surrounding the regulatory exclusion could once again become relevant.

 

Undoubtedly in response to these very issues, on July 21, 2008, the Latham & Watkins law firm issues a memorandum entitled “D&O Policies – Regulatory Exclusions” (here). The memorandum briefly reviews the issues that were debated concerning the regulatory exclusion in the last era of failed banks.

 

Among other things, the memorandum correctly recollects that it was not just the insured persons who disputed the regulatory exclusion’s applicability, but it was the governmental agencies as well. The agencies “fought regulatory exclusions clauses using mainly public policy arguments” because the exclusions “impair the ability of the government to seek redress in the situation of a failed bank.”

 

The memorandum notes that the courts found that the “freedom to contract overrode the government agency’s right” to bring claims against individuals. The courts also found that it would not have been against public policy for banks to purchase no D&O insurance at all, so therefore “excluding optional coverage in certain situations would clearly not fall against public policy.”

 

The government also tried to argue that the exclusions were ambiguous. But the courts read the exclusions broadly and in the context of the policy as a whole, and on the basis did not find them to be ambiguous. The courts found that the exclusions applied whether the government was pursuing claims as a regulator or as a liquidator, and regardless whether then government actually brought or was merely maintaining the claims.

 

It remains to be seen whether or not there will in fact be further financial institution failures, and if there are, whether the regulators will pursue claims against the failed institutions’ former management. Even if the government does pursue these kinds of claims, it is relatively unlikely that many of the institutions current policies contain a regulatory exclusion that would preclude coverage for these claims.

 

But the spate of bad news that banks have reported in recent days is a vivid reminder of the challenging circumstances that banks face. D&O underwriters are monitoring these developments with mounting anxiety. As conditions continue to deteriorate, and in particular if there are any further significant financial institution failures, D&O insurers relatively benign approach to the regulatory exclusion could change. The regulatory exclusion could once again become a more common part of D&O coverage for some financial institutions.

 

Of course, all of these things will be revealed in the fullness of time. But the IndyMac bank failure sure does have a familiar ring to it. As Mark Twain famously said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” Along those lines, the current circumstances could start to sound more and more like the prior era of failed banks, and it could involve many of same endings.

 

Oy, Canada: The subprime litigation wave has been sweeping the U.S. for now well over a year. But now the wave finally seems to have spread to our neighbors to the north.

 

On July 23, 2008, a Canadian law firm announced (here) that it had launched a securities class action lawsuit in the Ontario Court of Justice against the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and certain of its directors and officers.

 

According to the press release, the Complaint alleges that:

CIBC misrepresented the magnitude and level of risk associated with its U.S. subprime residential mortgage investments. In particular, CIBC represented during the class period that its total exposure in USSRMM investments, including both hedged and unhedged investments, was "not a major issue" when, in fact, the bank had exposure to billions of dollars of losses, as was only subsequently disclosed.

Further, CIBC failed to disclose that one of its principal hedge counterparties, ACA Financial, was woefully undercapitalized with an asset to guarantee ratio of "1-180" and was far from able to provide any meaningful hedge protection to the bank's USSRMM investments

CIBC had previously been named as a defendant in a U.S. securities class action lawsuit (as detailed here), but that prior lawsuit involved investments and disclosures by CIBC’s MFS family of mutual funds, and did not relate to CIBC’s own disclosures or activities.

 

In addition to CIBC, another Canadian company, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), was also previously named as a defendant in a U.S.-based securities class action lawsuit (refer here), but that lawsuit relates to the sales of auction rate securities by RBC’s affiliate, RBC Dain Rauscher, and does not relate to RBS’s own disclosures or activities.

 

So far as I am aware, the recent lawsuit filed against CIBC in the Ontario Court of Justice represents the first subprime-related securities class action lawsuit to be filed against a Canadian company for the company’s own disclosures or activities.

 

A July 23, 2008 Bloomberg article describing the CIBC lawsuit can be found here.

 

UPDATE: In response to my comment above about Canadian subprime litigation, Ari Karoly of NERA Economic Consulting sent along the following observation: "I wanted to point out that the FMF capital class action which settled last year (refer here) was a class action brought against a US company in Canadian courts with respect to alleged misrepresentations made by FMF regarding subprime exposure and risks. You were technically correct because FMF was a US company which traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, but I still wanted to bring that case to your attention."

Now We Know Where the Airline Industry Found Its Service Model:  According to a complaint filed on July 18, 2008 in the Hamilton County (Tenn.) Circuit Court (here), when a resident of the Shallowford Trace luxury apartment homes complained of being unable to find a parking place, an employee of the apartment company put a gun between the resident’s eyes and stated “You f***ing b**ch, I’ll blow your f***ing brains all over this concrete” and also “Please give me a reason. I’ve got a permit. I’ll blow your brains out.”

The permit makes everything nice and legal. You wouldn't want someone without a permit putting a gun between your eyes.

Hat tip to Courthouse News (here) for the Shallowford complaint.

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On June 26, 2008, Judge Gerard Lynch of the Southern District of New York issued another opinion (here) in the D&O insurance coverage litigation arising out of the Refco debacle (My recent post discussing Judge Lynch’s prior opinion in the case discussing insurance application issues can be found here.)

 

In yet another judicial decision that resonates with significance for excess D&O insurance issues, Judge Lynch, hearing an appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling, addressed the question whether an excess insurer may withhold advancement of defense costs based on its determination that an exclusion in its policy precluded coverage. Judge Lynch held that even if the excess policy has the distinct exclusions, the policy's terms do not  affect the operation of the applicable defense cost advancement provisions, and the advancement provisions should be enforced according to their terms.

 

The background of the case can be found in my prior post. Of significance here, the primary insurer’s $10 million limit and the first level excess insurer’s $7.5 million were exhausted in payment of defense expense. As also discussed in the prior post, the second level excess insurer disputes coverage on a number of grounds. The second level excess insurer also disputes that it has any obligation to advance defense costs pending a determination of coverage.

 

The parties agree that the advancement provisions in the primary policy control the advancement issue; they dispute how the provisions apply in the context of the second level excess carrier’s policy.

 

The primary policy specifies that:

The Insurer will pay covered Defense Costs on an as-incurred basis. If it is finally determined that any Defense Costs paid by the Insurer are not covered under this Policy, the Insureds agree to repay such non-covered Defense Costs to the Insurer.

The second level excess insurer [hereafter in this post, simply “the insurer”] contended that notwithstanding this language, it has no obligation to advance defense costs. In making this argument, the insurer relied on the word “covered” in the first sentence of the advancement provision, qualifying the type of defense costs that the provision requires to be paid on an as-incurred basis.

 

The insurer’s argument is based on its contention that its policy’s conduct exclusions, unlike the primary and first level excess policies’ exclusions, do not have an adjudication requirement. The insurer argued, according to the court, that because the conduct exclusions in its policy have no adjudication requirement, “prior to a court determination, [the insurer] has the unilateral right to determine whether defense costs are ‘covered,’” and that it has made a “good faith determination” that the insureds’ claims are precluded under its policy.

 

As the court paraphrased the insurer’s position, the insurer contended that the terms of its contract “authorize it to apply its exclusions to deny coverage unilaterally – and thus to refuse to advance defense costs – unless and until a court determines that the costs are ‘covered’” under its policy.

 

The insureds contend in their counterclaim in the coverage litigation that the exclusions on which the insurer relies to deny coverage “are not, in fact, part of the policy.” With respect to the advancement issue, the insureds argued that the advancement provisions require the insurer to advance defense expense, contending that as long as the claim “falls within the policy’s insuring agreement, it is covered unless and until there is a final determination that an exclusion applies.”

 

The insureds also argued that nowhere in the insurer’s policy does it state that the insurer can unilaterally withhold defense expense absent a court determination, and nothing in the insurer’s policy states that its exclusions are not subject to the “final determination” language in the second sentence of the advancement provisions.

 

In his June 26 opinion, Judge Lynch observed that “in essence, the central dispute among the parties centers on who bears the burden regarding whether defense costs are ultimately covered.” Judge Lynch, while noting that the insurer’s position regarding advancement “is not unreasonable on its face,” also noted that the insurer’s interpretation “places enormous emphasis on the word ‘covered.’” Judge Lynch said that the word’s inclusion in the advancement provisions “can hardly be said to make an unambiguous change in the provision’s literal meaning,” and “seems, at best, an unusual way to effectuate a fundamental change in the parties’ expectations.”

 

Because the court found the wordings to be ambiguous, it interpreted the provision in favor of the insureds – a result that the court noted “makes eminent sense, as adopting [the insurer’s] interpretation … would effectively render the advancement obligation worthless.” Judge Lynch concluded by saying that if the insurer “wants the unilateral right to refuse a payment called for in the policy, the policy should clearly state that right.” (citations omitted)

 

Whatever else might be said about the court’s opinion, it is certainly a sharp reminder of the importance of inclusion of adjudication requirements in the D&O policy’s conduct exclusions. If, in the absence of an adjudication requirement, the insurer may contend (as did the insurer in the Refco coverage litigation) that it has the unilateral right to determine coverage and withhold policy benefits, then the omission of adjudication requirements is perilous indeed for insureds.

 

But the crux of the dispute is whether the second level excess insurer’s policy contains exclusions not found in the primary or first level excess policies. The insureds apparently dispute that the exclusions are part of the second level excess policy (although the precise nature of that dispute is not clear from the face of the opinion). Assuming that the distinct exclusions are in fact part of the second level excess insurer’s policy, it does suggest that the insurance program is something less than pure “follow form” insurance. Indeed, many insurance programs that are characterized as “follow form” in fact have characteristics that may make them something less than follow form, a consideration that may sometimes be overlooked in the insurance transaction process.

 

It is of course true that each policy in a tower of insurance represents a separate contract. Excess insurers have every right to insist on terms differing from the underlying layers. The Refco coverage dispute highlights the pitfalls that can arise when (or perhaps if) an excess policy has terms that differ from the underlying policies. Indeed, the arguments raised by the second level excess insurer in the Refco coverage litigation show that differences in wording between the layers potentially can cause the different layers to operate quite differently, potentially in ways that may not necessarily be apparent or anticipated.

 

One final note has to do with the parties’ apparent dispute whether the exclusions are in fact part of the second level excess policy. It is hard to tell from the face of the opinion, but this dispute may be due to the process issues discussed briefly in my prior post. At least until the merits are sorted out, it may be premature to try to draw any conclusions. But as I noted in my prior post, and to the extent the dispute is due to process issues, this case may be a reminder of the opportunities for and the dangers of ambiguities in insurance placement process communications. From the perspective of every process participant, after a serious claim has arisen is a very difficult time to have to try to sort out, for example, whether or not exclusions are part of a policy.

 

Special thanks to Kelly Reyher for providing me with a copy of Judge Lynch's June 26 opinion.

 

And Finally: For those of us laboring in the salt mines of the blogosphere, it is always exciting when a fellow blogger steps out in some dramatic way. And so I was delighted to see in the July 16, 2008 Wall Street Journal that Mark Herrmann of the Drug and Device Law Blog published a book review critically analyzing the recent book "Side Effects" by Alison Bass. Kudos to Mark for his excellent and well written review.

May all new media practitioners continue to prosper and succeed. Gradus ad Parnassus.

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In a development that is in my experience absolutely unprecedented, Phillip Bennett, the former CEO of defunct futures trader Refco, after having pled guilty to criminal charges, is actively cooperating with the lead plaintiffs’ counsel in the civil securities lawsuit pending against the company and its former directors and officers. As discussed below, Bennett’s conduct, in addition to being highly unusual, could also raise some potentially significant insurance coverage questions.

 

A detailed description of the circumstances surrounding Bennett’s cooperation in the class action can be found in a May 28, 2008 article (here) by Bloomberg News reporter Thom Weidlich. The circumstances are also discussed in a WSJ.com Law Blog post (here).

 

Within weeks after it went public in August 2005, Refco announced that Bennett had hidden $430 million in bad debts from the company’s auditors and investors. The details of the scandal can be found here. IPO investors initiated securities class action lawsuits almost immediately. (Refer here for background regarding the class action lawsuit; a website devoted to the lawsuit can be found here.).

 

On February 15, 2008, Bennett pled guilty to bank fraud, conspiracy, money laundering and 17 other charges.

 

In connection with Bennett’s upcoming June 19, 2008 sentencing, counsel for the lead plaintiffs in the class action lawsuit – Sean Coffey of the Bernstein Litowitz firm and Stuart Grant of the Grant & Eisenhofer firm – submitted a letter to the court to provide information they hope “proves helpful as the Court considers the appropriate sentence.” A copy of their letter can be found here.

 

According to the attorneys’ letter, after Bennett pled guilty, his lawyer approached the class counsel to offer cooperation in connection with the civil case. According to their letter, “Bennett has helped to advance our understanding about matters within Refco, providing insights not readily discernable from our ongoing review of documents or cross-examination of deposition witnesses who are almost universally aligned with the defendants.” The letter goes on to report that Bennett has identified “‘red flags’ and other circumstances that would have alerted a diligent gatekeeper that things at Refco were not what they appeared to be.”

 

The letter states that Bennett’s cooperation has “materially strengthened the class claims against a number of defendants.” The defendants specifically mentioned in the letter are Thomas H. Lee, the IPO Underwriters, Grant Thorton, and Mayer Brown. The letter states that:

 

In the opinion of Lead Counsel, his assistance has substantially enhanced the ability of Lead Plaintiffs to hold those defendants more fully accountable for their role in the events resulting in the devastating losses suffered by Refco investors.

 

The Bloomberg article and the WSJ.com Law Blog post linked to above contain remarks from several commentators as to whether the letter will benefit Bennett as his sentencing.

 

There are a number of interesting things about the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ letter. Among other things, Bennett’s cooperation holds the prospect of shifting to Refco’s outside professionals some of the financial consequences for Bennett’s own criminal misconduct, based on their supposed failure to stop or catch him.

 

Another interesting thing, interesting to me at least, is the potential effect from Bennett’s behavior on the D&O insurance coverage that might otherwise be available for other former Refco directors and officers in connection with the Refco securities lawsuit. I emphasize at the outset that I have no direct knowledge of Refco’s D&O insurance program, and I am expressing no views about the availability of coverage under its D&O insurance. My comments here are strictly to note a potential coverage issue that might arise as a result of Bennett’s cooperation with the plaintiffs’ attorneys.

 

The specific insurance issue relates to the possibility that Bennett’s cooperation might trigger the so-called “Insured vs. Insured” exclusion (or IvI as it is more commonly known) that is found in most D&O insurance policies. A typical IvI exclusion provides, among other things, that the insurers is not liable for any loss in connection with a claim “which is brought by any security holder or member of an Organization, whether directly or derivatively, unless such security holder or member’s claim is instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of, any Executive.”

 

Bennett’s extensive cooperation with the plaintiffs – the significance and materiality of which the plaintiffs’ lawyers expressly acknowledged – would appear at least potentially to implicate this D&O policy exclusion. Now, as a result of his criminal plea, Bennett himself would likely no longer have coverage under the policy, as would appear to be the case for other Refco officers who were criminally convicted in April of this year. But the other former Refco directors and officers, if any, who remain as defendants in the civil lawsuit and who have not pled guilty or been criminally convicted, may still hope to have remaining D&O insurance limits available to fund their defense and indemnity. (A number of the individual defendants have already entered settlements with the class, as described here.) Bennett’s cooperation with the plaintiffs could at least potentially raise coverage concerns, to the extent coverage is otherwise available to these persons.

 

In other words, Bennett’s cooperation not only represents a threat to Refco’s former outside advisors, but could also have serious adverse consequences for the company’s former directors and officers.

 

These events, as noted, are highly unusual and unlikely to recur. Nevertheless, the potential insurance issues that Bennett’s conduct could trigger are a reminder that there claims resolution is a complicated process, with a host of potentially significant consequences at every point. Although sometimes overlooked, the insurance issues can sometimes be particularly significant.

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Company managers are increasingly sophisticated about D&O liability insurance. Largely as a result of the corporate scandals from earlier in this decade, what used to be a peripheral and disfavored topic is now a top agenda item in many C-suites and boardrooms. But even as company officials have developed a deeper appreciation for the importance of D&O insurance, many misunderstandings about D&O underwriting persist. One thing that is frequently misunderstood is what D&O underwriters are looking for.

This post is intended to provide an overview of the key components of public company D&O underwriting. Of course, the underwriting concerns for different specific companies could vary substantially. In addition, there are many D&O insurers, and underwriting practices vary significantly between (and, regrettably, even within) insurers. That said, there are certain common elements that will likely be part of the D&O underwriting for any company. These elements are listed below. A great deal more might be said about each of these items, but in the interest of brevity, I have provided a summary description only.

1. The Company’s Basic Characteristics: First and foremost, the underwriter must understand the company’s basic profile. Specifically, the underwriter will want to know the company’s size (by market capitalization) and industry. These factors may seem basic and obvious, but they will nonetheless have a significant impact on an underwriter’s willingness to accept a risk, as well as on the price, terms and conditions likely to be offered.

2. The Company’s Financial Picture: A basic component of D&O underwriting is developing an understanding of the company’s financial circumstances, particularly its key income statement components (revenue, expenses and expense ratios, etc.) and balance sheet items (especially cash and other liquid assets, debt, and reserves/accruals). Although there are many important financial issues, the key question is whether or not the company has sufficient cash or available credit to fund its operations and service its debt during the proposed policy period.

3. The Company’s Accounting Practices: A very specific component for underwriters in developing an understanding of the company’s financial picture is developing an understanding of the company’s accounting policies and practices. The most important issue here is usually revenue recognition, but depending on the kind of company at issue, other critical issues may be the company’s practices regarding reserves and accruals, and these days, asset valuation.

4. The Company’s Corporate History and Structure (Including M&A): Because share offerings, financing activities and M&A activity are the kinds of events that often generate claims, the underwriter will want a complete understanding of the company’s involvement in all of these kinds of activities.

5. Continuity Risk (Things That Have Already Happened): An underwriter will want to establish whether the company has already experienced events or circumstances that could lead to subsequent claims. The list of potential problems could be infinite, but the kinds of things that will particularly attract the underwriter’s concern are things like significant stock price drops, earnings disappointments, regulatory setbacks, product recalls, adverse litigation developments, officer resignations, and so on.

6. Going Forward Risk/Vulnerabilities: A key risk attribute for any company is whether or not the company is susceptible to a single event or change that could substantially alter the company’s fortunes. These kinds of vulnerabilities include such things as: dependence on a single customer, contract, product or supplier; a looming regulatory milestone for a company with a single product in development; or a company-dependent debt obligation with a single-trigger acceleration clause or covenant.

7. Stock Price Volatility: A company that has a share price that dramatically registers even small events is capable of producing large shareholder-style damages. For that reason, companies with volatile stock prices represent a disfavored risk class for many underwriters. 

Some underwriters go so far at to make stock price volatility the most important component in their risk selection and stock price algorithms. I have always felt this analysis represents both an oversimplification and a confusion of correlation and causation. Simply put, while many companies involved in securities class action lawsuits have volatile stock prices, not all companies with volatile stock prices are involved in securities lawsuits. In my view it is the presence or absence of the above identified factors are more indicative of risk than volatility alone.  

8. Company Management and Executive Compensation: The background and experience of the company’s senior management and board members is important information. Underwriters will be particularly interested in any changes in the lineup, and in particular will want to understand the reasons for any changes.

A significant issue related is executive compensation. Some industry observers go so far as to assert that outsized executive compensation is the single most reliable risk marker, as it usually invites a host of dangerous (and sometimes destructive) behaviors. Certainly, many of the most egregious corporate scandals in the last several years have involved excessive executive compensation. Accordingly, underwriters will consider executive compensation information as an important component of the risk analysis.

9. Insider Trading: The most dangerous component of a serious securities class action lawsuit is the presence of significant insider trading at suspicious time and in suspicious amounts. A skilled underwriter will plot the timing of insider trades on the company’s stock graphs to understand who is trading and when. The corollary of this point is that the underwriter will also be interested in the company’s insider trading policy, and in particular will look to see that the company has well-established trading windows and rational trading blackouts, as well as an effective compliance officer.

10. Disclosure practices: The nature, content and tone of the company’s public disclosures are important risk indicators. Underwriters are concerned about companies that devote a lot of energy to generating hype. They are also focused on companies that are very publicly setting and straining to meet very specific short-term earnings estimates. Again, the corollary is that companies with conservative disclosure practices, particularly those that avoid specific, short-term earnings guidance, are viewed more favorably.

11. Corporate Governance: A detailed review of a company’s corporate governance practices is an important part of public company underwriting. However, most underwriters understand that standard corporate governance practices alone are no guarantors that a company will not be involved in a claim. But by the same token, underwriters understand that companies that are actively implementing best practices are the kinds of companies that are interested in trying to play by the rules and perhaps less likely to have problems elsewhere – and better able to defend themselves if a claim does arise.

There is obviously a lot more that might be said about each of these items. In addition, there are a host of other factors that could be relevant to any specific company or to companies in certain industries.

A common misconception is that the D&O underwriting process is like picking a stock. (Frustratingly, some underwriters labor under the misimpression, too.) Many company officials think that their role in the underwriting process is to tout the company and its prospects, as if they were on a road show speaking to prospective investors and analysts. Because most underwriters are by nature suspicious of hype, an underwriting meeting characterized by a high level of salesmanship can be counterproductive.

Underwriters generally do not care whether or not a company’s stock is a good investment, as such. Companies that are mediocre investments are often (although not always) attractive D&O risks, and companies that are Wall Street darlings are sometimes rotten D&O risks. Underwriters are trying to figure out if a company is susceptible to a claim during the policy period, which is often a very different question than whether or not the company’s stock is doing or will do well.

Another common misunderstanding is the expectation that if the company does or does not do certain things, the company ought to get a discount of a certain type or amount. In the soft insurance market that has persisted in recent years, risk specific discounts are hard to isolate, since many companies are enjoying favorable pricing. But more to the point, because underwriting is an uncertain science, the most important factors in determining the price, terms and conditions to be offered are the company’s outward characteristics, which are categorical attributes.

Which is not to say that better managed companies will realize no benefit. But rather than a discount, the benefit is often in the form in the absence of a debit. Or, to put it another way, companies presenting certain specific negative risk factors will be debited, even in the current underwriting environment.

All of that said, there unquestionably are things companies can do to advance their interests during the underwriting process. Working with a skilled insurance professional, a company can identify and address likely underwriting concerns, in an effort to inoculate the company against adverse underwriting perceptions. Moreover, it will be useful for every company to adopt a systematic, timely and business-like approach to the underwriting process, as these practices will expedite the process, remove potential impediments, and encourage efficiencies that benefit all process participants.

The foregoing is merely a summary; there is a great deal more that could be said about all of the above. There are good resources available to supplement the above. One very good resource is the curriculum materials created by the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) entitled “Public/Financial D&O Insurance” and available on the PLUS website (here).

Because this is one of those topics on which a great deal more might be said, I would like to encourage readers and observers to post their comments to this blog. I always welcome audience participation but I am particularly interested in readers' comments on this topic.

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Over the past several weeks, several industry observers and analysts have tried to put a number on the insurance industry's aggregate subprime-related loss exposure. At one end, Bear Stearns on January 24, 2008 estimated the industry's exposure at $8-9 billion (refer here). By contrast, on February 8, 2008, Lehman Brothers estimated (here) that the insurance industry's losses might range up to $3 billion, and on February 6, 2008, Advisen announced (here) that it will be releasing a report estimating that the industry's ultimate losses at $3.6 billion.

I don't envy these experts whose job it is to try to quantify something as big, amorphous and evolving as the subprime-related litigation wave. Nor do I profess to have any particular insight into whose estimate is more accurate or what the ultimate number will be. I do have some observations about some considerations that are or should be being taken into account in making these kinds of estimates, in light of the circumstances surrounding the evolving subprime meltdown. (I should add that in making these observations, I have not had the benefit of reading the entire Advisen report, which as of this writing is not yet available; I have only had an opportunity to review the press release summary.)

In general, I think the various estimates have correctly noted that a potentially large portion of the amounts to be paid in settlements or judgments in the subprime litigation may not represent insured loss. In particular, the observers have correctly noted that many of the largest commercial and investment banks that are involved in the subprime-related litigation carry very large self-insured retentions and also often carry only Side A insurance programs (covering only nonindemnifiable loss, unlikely to occur here for these entities) or in some cases no insurance at all for certain exposures. These various observers have made a number of other valid observations concerning other factors that could restrict the impact of subprime losses for D & O insurers.

But at the same time, it seems to me that there are a number of other considerations that these observers have undervalued or even overlooked in assessing the possible impact of the subprime meltdown on insurers.

First and foremost, I think it is important to stress that we are only at the very earliest stages of the emergence of the subprime-related litigation. To be sure, there are (as documented here) already 43 subprime-related class action lawsuits, as well as nine subprime-related ERISA lawsuits, but before all is said and done, there are going to be many, many more of these and other kinds of lawsuits. We have not even completed the first round of subprime loss truth-telling (refer here), and it is probable that there will be even further deterioration in the mortgages underlying the subprime-backed assets as homeowners find it easier to walk away that to continue to pay down debt on a house that is declining in value (about which refer here).

As Couglin Stoia attorney Sam Rudman observed at last week's PLUS D & O Symposium, there are likely to be more securities class action lawsuits in 2008 than any year since the passage of the PSLRA (Rudman is himself already involved as plaintiffs' counsel on many of the subprime-related lawsuits).The subprime-related litigation wave is likely to continue to emerge well into 2009 and possibly beyond (just as the options backdating litigation wave continues to emerge). The possible extent of this future litigation threat may be discerned from the recent litigation commenced against the Cadawalader firm (about which refer here), in which the allegations relate to commercial mortgage securitization documents the firm prepared in 1997. In other words, any dollar estimate of the possible subprime-related insurance losses should be accompanied by a healthy appreciation of how little of the ultimate amount of subprime-related litigation we can currently even see. Since we still don't know how big of an event this ultimately will be, and because it is likely to be years before we have clear idea, any attempt at quantification should carry some very substantial caveats.

Second, many of these estimates seem to presume that the insurance industry's subprime-related losses will be limited to the financial institutions sector. I do not think this is a conservative assumption. To the contrary, I think it should be assumed that the subprime-related litigation wave will both spread beyond subprime and beyond the financial sector (as I discuss at greater length here). The recent securities class action lawsuits against student loan company SLM Corporation (about which refer here) and Levitt Homes (about which refer here) underscore that the claims have already spread. Bristol Myers Squibb's recent $275 million write-down for subprime-related investment losses (refer here) further highlights that the credit crisis is no longer just about the financial sector. The possibility of further credit-related losses in many sectors outside the financial sector, and for ensuing claims, at this point seems likely -- or at least that would appear to be the conservative assumption.

Third, much of the analysis of the insurance industry's exposure has been concentrated largely (although, it must be recognized, not exclusively) on potential losses for D & O insurers. To be sure, the growing number of subprime-related securities class action lawsuits represents a very substantial threat to the D & O insurance industry. But the potential for insured losses in coverage lines outside of D & O could also be very substantial. By way of illustration, State Street's recent $618 million charge for anticipated subprime-related litigation expenses was in connection with lawsuits that do not (as discussed in my recent post, here) appear to implicate D & O coverage, but that could present significant fiduciary liability or even investment management E & O losses.

By the same token, the recently revised complaint in the subprime-related securities litigation involving Countrywide (about which refer here) added accountant liability claims, as well as claims against Countrywide's offering underwriters. Other professionals undoubtedly will find themselves caught up in subprime related litigation, including, for example, lawyers; hedge fund and pension fund managers; mortgage brokers; appraisers and surveyors; real estate brokers; and insurance agents, among many others. The cumulative losses from claims against other professionals could be very substantial, and at this early stage particularly difficult to prognosticate.

Even with respect to the analysts' breakdown of the likely D & O losses, the breadth of the current and likely future claims may or may not be being fully taken into account. That is, while it is true that some of the lawsuits against the largest financial institutions may not, because of the way that these entities structure their insurance, involve the prospect for insured losses, most of the current and likely future subprime litigation defendants do not have these types of insurance arrangements. As the claims spread to secondary players and targets in the hinterlands (about which refer here), the claims are hitting defendants that have more traditional insurance structures. Those (far more numerous) claims may involved a greater percentage of insured losses than (the relatively few claims, as a percentage matter) against the largest banks and financial institutions.

Fourth, I am well aware that one of the issues with which these analysts have had to grapple is the need to try and put the subprime meltdown into context. The challenge is not just to say how it compares, for example, to the S & L crisis or the bursting of the dotcom bubble, but also to come up with a figure for those prior events in order to compare the current subprime crisis. I don't have data for those prior events, but I do know that the still unfolding options backdating scandal may present a useful comparison. As I have detailed in another post today, the options backdating losses, on the few cases that have been resolved so far, already represent in aggregate some very impressive numbers. There are many more options backdating cases yet to be resolved. The total options backdating related losses are likely to by very substantial. Given that just about everyone assumes that the subprime related crisis represents an even greater threat to insurers than the options backdating scandal, the implication is that the subprime related losses could be very significant indeed.

Fifth, whatever else might be said, nothing meaningful about the extent of the subprime threat can be derived from the D & O insurers' current marketplace behavior. My comment here relates specifically to the comment in the Lehman Brothers report linked above that "if insurers were concerned about suffering multi-billion dollar subprime D & O losses that could spread outside financial institutions sector, the market would tighten significantly." If the D & O industry had a long track record of skillfully adjusting its prices to changing exposures, this remark might have greater validity. Unfortunately, the industry's consistent history suggests that the industry is only capable of disciplining itself when losses become so painful that it is forced to change its ways. The current D & O pricing environment is a reflection only of the amount of available capacity, not of any calibration to emerging exposures. The marketplace will remain competitive until cumulating losses force the changes of necessity, and then any changes would be abrupt and disruptive -- as they have always been in the past.

Sixth, as most of the analysts have noted, the defense expense associated with the subprime cases in and of itself could be staggering. As an example of how expensive these cases can be, Apollo Group recently reported (here) that it had spent $25 million dollars taking the securities lawsuit pending against the company through trial. Because of the legal and factual complexity surrounding the subprime cases, they could be extremely costly to defend. Much of the associated defense expense, other than for the large investment bank defendants, is likely to be covered loss. For each of the securities cases, the defense expenses are likely to be many millions of dollars, and, for the cases in the aggregate (including those already filed and those yet to be filed), to be many hundreds (and possibly thousands) of millions of dollars. To these costs must be added the costs of defending the claims raised against other professionals.

Finally, it would be unfortunate if the subprime hype were to obscure the fact that the subprime-related litigation is only one of several very important current developments affecting D & O insurers' exposure. As I have noted elsewhere (refer here) securities litigation levels would be elevated compared to the prior two years' activity levels even without the subprime-related litigation. The Securities Litigation Watch blog recently noted (here) that January 2008 securities activity remained at elevated levels, only in part because of the subprime related litigation. None of this could be discerned from D & O insurers' current conduct. It has been ever thus.

Blog Warning: This week I hope to be making some long needed adjustments to The D & O Diary. While these changes are taking place, I will not be adding any new blog posts (although the current posts will remain available). These adjustments should result in several improvments to The D & O Diary. I will report further on the adjustments once they have been completed.

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In an earlier post (here), I discussed the March 14 , 2007 ruling (here) in the CNL Resorts case, in which the federal district court held that an issuing company's settlement of a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 did not constitute covered "loss" under the company's D & O liability insurance policy. In that prior case, the court did say that Section 11 settlements are not per se uninsurable, and noted that "in a Section 11 case, if an entity makes a payment that constitutes something other than disgorgement of its ill-gotten gains, it has suffered a loss."

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With the year-end fast approaching, it is time to take a look back and review the top D & O stories of 2007. It was an eventful year, with some important developments that will have implications for the year ahead, and perhaps for years to come. Here are the top stories, with the year's most important story leading the way.

1. Subprime Meltdown Launches Litigation Wave: When I first started tracking subprime-related litigation in April (here), I already knew that the subprime meltdown was going to be an important story. By July (here), I knew that the subprime story was "this year's model"--that is, the hot litigation trend being driven by the business scandal most prominent at the time. By August, I wrote (here) that the developing story had become "All Subprime, All the Time." But even at that point, I don't think I really appreciated what the subprime story would become. I certainly didn't envision that it would lead to a surge of lawsuits against some of the giants of the financial services world, such as Merrill Lynch (refer here), Citigroup (refer here), Washington Mutual (refer here), and UBS (refer here).

As of year end, my current tally (refer here) of subprime-related lawsuits stands 34; the recently released NERA year-end securities litigation survey (here) put the number at 38. The litigation includes lawsuits against accountants (here), real estate brokers (here), and many others. The securities lawsuits have come not just against the lenders and the investment banks, but home builders, bond insurers, credit rating agencies, mutual funds, and a host of others. Even more ominously, there is an unmistakable sense of foreboding that the worst may lie ahead (refer here). But whatever may actually lie ahead, there is no doubt that the litigation resulting from the subprime meltdown is the 2007 D & O story of the year.

2. Two-Year Lull in Securities Filings Comes to an End: In mid-year 2007 studies, NERA (here) and Cornerstone (here) both observed that securities filings had been well below historical averages since mid-2005. Stanford Law Professor Joseph Grundfest questioned (here) whether or not there might have been a "permanent shift" to a lower level of securities lawsuit filings.

But as I detailed more thoroughly here, and as further documented in NERA's recent 2007 year end survey (here), the two-year lull came to an end in the second half of 2007. Indeed, the 81 securities lawsuits filed during the period between August 1, 2007 and November 30, 2007 represents the highest level of lawsuit filings in a four-month period since June-October 2004, and the 25 new securities lawsuits filed in November 2005 represents the highest monthly total since January 2005.

Perhaps even more noteworthy is the fact that the new lawsuit activity is not being driven exclusively by the subprime litigation wave; while the subprime lawsuits collectively represent one important factor, the lawsuits are actually hitting a wide variety of companies for a wide variety of reasons, many having nothing to do with the subprime meltdown. The likelihood of continued financial marketplace volatility suggest that litigation levels may remain elevated for some time to come.

3. Supreme Court Issues Tellabs Decision: The Supreme Court does not take many securities cases; for that reason, and because the Tellabs case had the potential to significantly affect the threshold resolution of many securities cases, the Supreme Court's opinion in the Tellabs case was much anticipated. When the Tellabs opinion finally came out in June 2007, it was a victory for defendants, although perhaps not as extensive a defense victory as it could have been, as detailed further here and here.

The Tellabs opinion reversed the Seventh Circuit's ruling and held, interpreting the securities lawsuit pleading standards described in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, that for an inference that a defendant acted with scienter to be "strong," the inference "must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent." The majority opinion expressly rejected the position urged by concurring Justices Scalia and Alito that "the test should be whether the inference of scienter (if any) is more plausible than the inference of innocence."

While the Tellabs court's more balanced approach seemed less likely to have a dramatic impact on dismissal motions as would the position urged by the concurring justices, the early returns suggest that the Tellabs case has made it more difficult for securities cases to survive a motion to dismiss (as discussed on this post on the 10b5-Daily blog, here). The Tellabs case has, in fact, proven to be an important factor in many of the motions to dismiss in the options backdating cases (about which refer here). The Tellabs decision and the Supreme Court's 2005 opinion in the Dura Pharmaceuticals case are now important tools for defendants to try to use at the motion to dismiss stage in securities class action litigation.

4. Top Plaintiffs' Lawyers Face Criminal Woes: Even a short time ago, who would have thought that the two leading securities plaintiffs' attorneys would face criminal prosecution? Yet on October 29, 2007, Bill Lerach entered a guilty plea (refer here), and on September 20, 2007, Mel Weiss was indicted on criminal charges (here). (For more about Lerach's criminal charges, refer here; for Weiss's, refer here).

The impact of the criminal issues involving the two leading securities plaintiffs' lawyers is perhaps incalculable, but it does not seem a mere coincidence that shortly after Lerach left his former law firm (now reconstituted as Coughlin, Stoia,Geller, Rudman & Robbins) the firm seemingly went into high gear, filing numerous new securities class action lawsuits. The Milberg Weiss firm, meanwhile, which also faces its own criminal charges, has essentially filed no new lawsuits since 2005.

While there are many opportunistic lawyers hoping to capitalize on the changes at the leading plaintiffs' firms, it remains to be seen whether any of these firms can duplicate the role that the erstwhile leading firms have played in the past.

5. Largest Derivative Settlement Ever in UnitedHealth Option Backdating Case: The 2006 D & O story of the year undoubtedly was the options backdating scandal. The story has faded from the headlines in 2007 as the subprime scandal has emerged, but the numerous backdating lawsuits (refer here for a complete tally) are now working their way through the system. Although many of the options backdating lawsuits have been dismissed or have settled for relatively nominal amounts (refer here for a complete list of options backdating case dispositions), there have been some exceptions. The most exceptional outcome is the record settlement in the UnitedHealth Group options backdating derivative lawsuit, which apparently represents the largest derivative settlement ever.

As detailed here, in the settlement, former UnitedHealth CEO William McGuire and several other former UnitedHealth directors and officers agreed to a combination of surrender or relinquishment of stock others and other interests; repayment of certain compensation; and the repricing of other stock option awards, all of which collectively represents a value to the company in excess of $900 million. The value of McGuire's contribution alone reportedly was valued at more that $600 million.

The sheer magnitude of these values makes this settlement noteworthy. The more interesting question is the extent to which this settlement will affect the resolution of the options backdating cases that remain pending, as well as future shareholders' derivative lawsuit resolutions.

6. Stoneridge Case Argued: The Tellabs decision was not the only important D & O story out of the Supreme Court this year. On October 9, 2007, the Supreme Court head argument in the Stoneridge v. Scientific Atlanta case. At the time, the case was described as the "business case of the year." How important it will ultimately be remains to be seen, but it could have a very significant impact, as detailed at greater length here.

The case will determine the extent to which a third-party that did not actually make a misrepresentation or misleading statement can be held liable under for securities fraud under Section 10 of the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The seemingly likeliest outcome is a narrow holding that does not expand the scope of Section 10(b) liability. The Court's opinion will be released some time before the end of the current Supreme Court term in June 2008. Until the outcome is known, the possibility (however remote) that the Court might overturn the Eighth Circuit and find an expansive basis for "scheme liability" makes this an important case to watch.

7. Global Warming Disclosure Issues Heat Up: Because global warming is one of the predominant social, political and economic issues of our age, it is almost inevitable that it would be come an important D & O issue as well. As I discuss at length here, the Supreme Court's April 2007 decision in the Massachusetts v. EPA case provided a new context within which global warming has emerged as a concern for corporate officials. Existing disclosure requirements and activists' proxy ballot initiatives ensure that this issue will remain as a significant corporate challenge.

Several developments that emerged as the year progressed underscore that global climate change is likely to remain a hot button issue for the foreseeable future, as detailed further here. The first occurred on September 14, 2007, when the New York Attorney General subpoened (refer here) five energy companies demanding that they disclose the financial risks of their greenhouse gas emissions to shareholders. The second is the petition submitted to the SEC by 22 different groups seeking to have the SEC require companies to assess and fully disclose their financial risks from greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change.

The activists' focus on disclosure issues has serious implications because issues surrounding are at the heart of most D & O claims. Because this issue is likely to grow in importance in coming years, companies may face even greater disclosure pressures and a corresponding increase in liability exposures.

8. Busted Buyouts Beget Litigation: The bursting of the private equity buyout bubble has not only left a raft of busted buyouts in its wake, but has also led to a host of new securities lawsuits. Disappointed target companies that have not become the target of securities class action lawsuits included Radian (about which refer here), Harman Industries (refer here), United Rentals (refer here), and Genesco (refer here). Disappointed target companies that have also lawsuits against their erstwhile acquirers include United Rental's unsuccessful lawsuits against Cerberus Management Company (refer here) and Genesco's lawsuit against Finish Line (refer here).

There are a host of other deals that are dead or on life support, as detailed on the M & A Law Prof blog (here). There may be one or more of the companies on this list that may yet find themselves with a securities lawsuit to complement their woes. In any event, the busted deal securities lawsuits collectively represent just one more factor driving the increase in securities lawsuits in 2007.

9. Qwest Opt-Out Settlements Exceed Amount of Class Action Settlement: There have always been opt-outs from securities class action settlements, but during 2007, a number of separate and very substantial opt-out settlements raised potentially important implications for future class action settlements, as well as for D & O insurers' severity assumptions and policyholders' views of limits adequacy.

The case with the highest dollar value of publicly reported opt-out settlements is the AOL Time Warner securities litigation, where the nine publicly disclosed opt-out settlements total $795 million, as detailed here. But perhaps even more significant is the Qwest securities litigation, where the $411 million aggregate value of the collective opt-out settlements exceeded the $400 million class action settlements, as further detailed here. When the value of the opt outs settlements tops the value of the class settlement, you know you've got a problem.

The emergence of the opt-out settlements presents a host of potentially complicating problems for current and future securities class action litigants, particularly if significant opt-out settlements become a regular part of securities litigation. These developments could increase litigation expense and aggregate settlement expense in civil securities litigation, and even further complicate efforts to resolve class action lawsuits.

10. Section 11 Settlement Held Not Covered "Loss": Although there had been a prior case holding that a Section 11 settlement is not a covered "loss" under a D & O policy, the prior decision was an intermediate state appellate court decision from Indiana, and was viewed as an anomaly in some quarters. So there was quite a reaction when, on March 14, 2007, Judge Gregory Presnell of the United Stated District Court for the Central District of Florida held (refer here) that the $35 million settlement to which CNL Hotels & Resorts agreed to resolve Section 11 claims does not constitute covered "loss" under a D & O policy and was not insurable as a matter of law.

While at one level, Judge Presnell's decision was merely an extension of existing case law, it did pose a challenge for the D & O insurance industry to address Section 11 settlement issues in the policy itself. Judge Presnell did specifically note that Section 11 settlements are not "per se" uninsurable. Since the CNL Hotels & Resorts opinion came down, the industry has been scrambling to come up with a policy-based solution, to address policyholder expectations of coverage for Section 11 settlements. The industry is still struggling toward equilibrium on this issue, which remains potentially very important for insured companies and their directors and officers.

Top Top Ten Lists: What could top a top ten list but a list of top top ten lists-- Time Magazine has compled fifty top ten lists for 2007 here.

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