Does D&O Insurance Cover Fee Awards to Derivative Plaintiffs?

A frequent component of derivative litigation resolution is an award to the plaintiffs of the fees and expenses the plaintiffs incurred in pursuing the suit. A contentious, recurring question is whether D&O insurance covers fee awards to derivative litigation plaintiffs. This issue received a through going over in a February 17, 2011 opinion from a five judge panel of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.

 

In the opinion (here), a three-judge majority held, over the dissent of two judges, that a $8.8 million derivative plaintiffs’ fee award was covered under Loral Space & Communications D&O insurance policy, but all five judges held unanimously that the D&O policy did not cover the separate $10.7 million awarded for plaintiffs’ fees in a related action seeking damages for breach of fiduciary duty.

 

Background

The coverage suit arises out of litigation filed after Loral agreed to enter a financing transaction with MHR Fund Management. In the transaction, MHR agreed to provide Loral $300 million in exchange for convertible preferred stock Loral was to issue to MHR.

 

Two lawsuits ensure. First, a BlackRock fund filed a shareholders’ derivative action seeking to rescind the deal. Second, Highland Crusader Offshore Partners filed a damages action. Both actions alleged Loral had breached its fiduciary duty because the value to MHR of the proposed deal allegedly far exceeded $300 million.

 

The cases were consolidated. Following a trial, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded that the transaction was unfair to Loral, and reformed the deal terms so that MHR would receive nonvoting common stock rather than convertible preferred stock. The court awarded no damages and made no findings of fault.

 

Concluding that the plaintiffs’ actions had produced a substantial benefit for Loral, and applying the corporate benefit doctrine, the Court entered a fee award to BlackRock of $8.8 million and entered a fee award to Highland of $10.7 million. Loral paid these amounts and then sought coverage under its D&O insurance policy for the payments.

 

Loral’s D&O insurer denied coverage and commenced an action seeking a judicial declaration that their policy did not cover the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee awards. The trial court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in Loral’s favor. The insurers appealed.

 

The February 18 Order

On appeal, the insurers argued that the Highland fee award was not covered because the Highland action for damages was not a "securities claim" and therefore there was no coverage under the policy for any amount related to that action. The insurers argued that the BlackRock fee award was not covered because the BlackRock litigation produced a benefit for Loral and therefore the fee award did not represent covered "Loss since it was a cost the company incurred as part of procuring the benefit.

 

The five-judge panel unanimously agreed that there was no coverage for the $10.7 million Highland fee award, because the Highland damages action was neither a derivative suit nor did it allege violation of any securities law, and therefore it did not represent a securities claim as was required to bring the claim within the Policy’s coverage.

 

The panel split badly on the question whether or not the fee award in the BlackRock derivative action was covered under the D&O policy. The three-judge majority concluded that it was. Its reasoning turned it part on the policy’s definition of "Loss," which provides that "Loss" includes "damages, judgments, settlements or other amounts (including punitive or exemplary damages where insurable by law) and Defense Expenses in excess of the Retention that the Insured is legally obligated to pay."

 

The majority rejected the insurers’ argument that because the derivative suit produced a benefit for Loral, Loral had not suffered a "Loss." The majority perceived this argument as essentially a suggestion that the fee award should be offset against the nonmonetary benefit Loral received as a result of the restructured transaction. The majority found that while Loral received a benefit in that it no longer suffered the detriment that would have followed from the transaction as originally structured "it does not follow that Loral actually made a tangible profit."

 

The attorneys’ fee award, the majority found, "constitutes damages" and representing "other amounts" that Loral has become "legally obligated to pay" and therefore comes within the Policy’s definition of "Loss." The majority also noted that the Policy expressly covers derivative lawsuits and that "to declare that Loral has no coverage for derivative plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees would deprive Loral of the coverage for derivative lawsuits that it paid for and expected to receive."

 

The dissent objected to the majority’s conclusion about the derivative fee award. First, the dissent argued that the "legally obligated to pay" language in the definition of Loss followed and referred to "the Retention," not to "other amounts."

 

The dissent also argued that in order for the derivative fee award to be covered, it would have to represent "an actual loss, not an expense or the cost of doing business." The dissent reasoned that in this case, Loral "did not sustain a loss but rather benefitted from the judgment."

 

A fee award a derivative suit, the dissent observed, represents "the equitable entitlement of the successful derivative plaintiff to recover the expenses of his/her attorneys’ fees from all the shareholders of the corporation on whose behalf the suit was brought." The dissent observed that "if not spreading the cost of attorneys’ fees sounds in unjust enrichment, the obvious corollary is that shifting the cost to shareholders as a group cannot be characterized as a loss."

 

Discussion

The insurers in this case did not come away empty, as the appellate court unanimously agreed that because there was no coverage under the policy for the Highland damages claim, the $10.7 million Highland fee award was not covered under the Policy.

 

This holding was not preordained as at least one court has recently held that a fee award can represents damage for which there can be coverage under a D&O policy even if there is no coverage under the policy for the underlying litigation. In a February 9, 2010 ruling (here), the District of Minnesota held that a derivative lawsuit fee award represented "damages" and could be covered under a D&O insurance policy even where the underlying claim itself was not covered under the policy.

 

With respect to the question of coverage for the BlackRock derivative fee award, the insurers did manage to persuade two of three judges that because of the nature of the outcome of the underlying case and the nature of the derivative fee award, the award did not represent a loss to Loral and therefore is not covered under the policy.

 

The narrowness of split between the majority and the dissent on this issue suggests that this dispute is far from resolved. Even just in this case, there seems a substantial likelihood for further appellate proceedings in the New York Court of Appeals. And in general, given the close split, the underlying issue is likely to continue to be debated in other cases.

 

The carriers assert their position on these issues with conviction. Policyholders find the insurers’ rationale on this issue obscure and unpersuasive (those are among the milder adjectives, actually) – although obviously the insurers were able to persuade two judges of the appellate court of their position, so clearly there is something to their position on this issue.

 

The danger for all involved is that this issue will continue to come up over and over again. A colleague in the industry suggested to me in a note about the Loral case that eventually this issue may have to be addressed in the policy, along the lines of the way the industry developed a policy solution to the contentious issue that Section 11 settlements were not covered under the Policy. The way the industry addressed that issue is that it became standard to include in public company D&O policies language stating that the insurer would not take the position that a settlement of a ’33 Act case was not covered under the Policy. Perhaps, the colleague suggested, the industry will adopt a similar approach on this derivative lawsuit fee award issue.

 

I am interested in readers’ thoughts on these issues. I hope readers will add their observations to this post, using the blog’s comment feature.

 

Many thanks to the several readers who sent me a copy of the Loral decision.

 

I am Word Power: In a column in the February 28, 2011 issue of The New Yorker entitled "Who Am I" (here), Demetri Martin wrote "I am bravery. I am courage. I am valor. I am daring. I am holding a thesaurus."

 

The Top Ten D&O Stories of 2010

2010 was an eventful year in the world of D&O liability. Congress passed massive financial reform legislation, the Supreme Court issued landmark decisions in important cases and numerous claims emerged as the litigation landscape continued to evolve. With so much going on, it is a challenge to narrow the year’s events down to just the ten most significant developments.

 

With appropriate humility about the limitations of all year-end inventories, here is my list of the top ten D&O developments of 2010.

 

1. Securities Suits Pick Up in Year’s Second Half: As I detailed in my 2010 securities litigation overview (here), after a filing downturn in the year’s first half, the number of securities lawsuit filing picked up in the last six months of the year. Among other things, as the year progressed, filing activity shifted away from credit crisis-related cases and toward a broader range of other types of cases.

 

Although at least some of the litigation activity in the year’s second half was driven by limited or short term events (as was the case, for example, in the rash of cases filed against for-profit education companies and against Chinese domiciled companies), the shift away from credit crisis cases could suggest that the heightened pace of securities suit filings may continue as we head into 2010.

 

2. The Changing Mix of Corporate and Securities Lawsuits: As insurance information firm Advisen has well documented, the mix of corporate and securities lawsuits has been evolving over the past several years. The most important feature of this changing mix of cases has been the decreasing prevalence of class action securities lawsuits as a percentage of all corporate and securities cases.

 

As the percentage of class action securities lawsuits has declined, other types of lawsuits, particularly breach of fiduciary duty cases, have grown in relative frequency. Many of these breach of fiduciary duty cases are related to mergers and acquisitions activity. Indeed, as I noted in my year-end review of 2010 securities lawsuit filings, even many of the cases that are categorized as securities class action lawsuits involve merger objection cases.

 

 

It is important to keep this changing mix of cases in mind when considering the various year end reports on securities litigation activity. These reports will show that overall 2010 securities class action lawsuit filings are down compared to post-PSLRA averages. However, it would be mistake to conclude that the relatively reduced number of securities class action lawsuits means that claims activity in general is down. To the contrary, overall claims activity is actually up. The mere fact that securities class action lawsuits are down does not mean that fewer companies are being sued or that overall claims exposure has diminished, either for companies or insurers. Rather, what is happening is that the claims exposure is changing, away from securities class action lawsuits and toward other types of claims.

 

This shift away from traditional securities class action lawsuits as a percentage of all claims activity has important implications for the insurance marketplace. The shift toward higher frequency, lower severity type of claims could have a significant impact both on primary and excess carriers. Primary carriers may experience an increase in overall claims frequency, with consequences for their loss experience. Excess carriers, particularly higher excess carriers, may experience relatively fewer claims piercing their layers, possibly producing a positive impact on the excess carriers’ results.

 

 

3. Banks Fail, Lawsuits Loom: 157 banks failed during 2010, the largest annual number of bank failures since 1992. The total number of bank closures since January 1, 2008 is 322. In addition, in the FDIC’s most recent Quarterly Banking Profile (refer here), the FDIC identified 860 banks, or about one out of nine of all banks, as "problem institutions."

 

Given the magnitude of these problems in the banking industry, it is hardly surprising that litigation involving failed and troubled banks is increasingly significant. Indeed, 13 of the 177 securities class action lawsuits filed in 2010 involved failed or troubled banks. In addition, aggrieved investors in failed or troubled privately held banks also filed a variety of other lawsuits, primarily in state courts.

 

It may be anticipated that the FDIC will also actively pursue claims against failed banks’ former directors and officers. However, to date, the FDIC has instituted only two D&O claims as part of the current round of failed banks (refer here and here).

 

It appears that it will only be a matter of time before the FDIC launches further suits against former officials of failed banks. Widely circulated news reports have quoted FDIC officials as saying that the FDIC has authorized civil actions against more than 80 directors and officers of failed banks. In addition, the Wall Street Journal reported in November that the FDIC is conducting fifty criminal investigations against directors, officers and employees of failed banks.

 

While we may hope that the current round of bank failures may begin to wane as we head into 2011, it appears that the failed bank litigation may only just be getting started.

 

4. Credit Crisis Lawsuit Settlements: The Dog that Didn’t Bark This Year: The subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave will be heading into its fifth year early in 2011. Since 2007, there have been over 230 subprime and credit crisis related securities lawsuits filed. Many of these cases continue to work their way through the system.

 

As some of these cases have survived the preliminary motions, they have moved toward settlement. There were several noteworthy credit crisis related securities class action lawsuit settlements during 2010, including Countrywide ($624 million, refer here), Schwab Yield Plus ($235 million , refer here), and New Century Financial ($124 million, refer here).

 

But while there have been a few noteworthy settlements of these cases this year, the more striking observation is how few of these cases have settled so far, particularly given how far along we are in the subprime and credit crisis litigation wave.

 

By my count, only 17 of the over 230 subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuit have settled, and only eight of these 17 settlements were announced in 2010. (My list of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit resolutions can be accessed here.)

 

NERA Economic Consulting stated in its year-end report on securities litigation that of the approximately 230 credit crisis securities suits, only 8% have settled, 29% have been dismissed, and 63% remain unresolved.

 

Of the 63% of unresolved cases, some of course will wind up being dismissed. But many more will settle, eventually. Given the now long duration of the credit crisis litigation wave, it can be anticipated that there may be many more settlements of these cases in 2011. The likelihood is that D&O insurers’ aggregate claims losses for these claims will mount, perhaps rapidly.

 

The question is whether the materialization of these losses will come as a surprise or has already been fully anticipated in the carriers’ prior years’ loss reserves. This answer to this question could have important implications for the D&O insurers’ 2011 calendar year results.

 

5. Megasettlements of Shareholders’ Derivative Lawsuits Surge: There was a time when the settlement of a shareholder derivative lawsuit involved the payment of little or no money, other than in connection with the payment of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. However, one of the more striking developments in recent years has been the emergence of jumbo settlements of shareholders derivative lawsuits, in which millions of dollars are paid to or on behalf of the company involved.

 

This emerging trend continued to develop in 2010, with at least two huge shareholder derivative lawsuit settlements: the $90 million AIG/Greenberg settlement (about which refer here) and the $75 million Pfizer settlement (refer here).

 

These 2010 settlements join a growing list of other jumbo derivative settlements in recent years, including the UnitedHealth Group settlement ($900 million, refer here); Oracle ($122 million, refer here); Broadcom ($118 million, refer here); and the first AIG derivative settlement (refer here).

 

The striking thing about these settlements is not only their size, but also the fact that in each case the company involved is solvent. The significance of this fact is that these settlements represent instances in which the companies’ D&O insurance potentially could have been called upon to fund an A Side loss outside of the insolvency context. These kinds of settlements provide concrete evidence of the value to policyholders of Side A insurance protection even outside of the insolvency context, and underscore the importance of added Side A protection in a well-designed D&O insurance program.

 

From the carriers’ perspective, these settlements suggest that Side A losses can mount outside of insolvency. Only the carriers themselves can answer the question whether or not they are actually pricing their Side A products for this loss exposure.

 

One final note about the Pfizer derivative lawsuit settlement concerns the unusual funding mechanism the settlement implemented. In many derivative lawsuit settlements the companies involved agree to institute corporate governance reforms. What was unusual about the Pfizer settlement is that the settlement agreement created a dedicated fund intended to finance the company’s agreed upon governance reforms. If the advance funding of corporate governance reforms were to become a standard feature of derivative lawsuit settlements, the cash cost of derivative settlements could increase substantially. This is a potential development worth watching closely.

 

6. Rare Securities Lawsuit Trials Result in Plaintiffs’ Verdicts: Very few securities class action lawsuits actually go trial. Most are settled or dismissed. But in 2010, two cases made it all the way through to jury verdicts. In January, the jurors in the Vivendi case entered a verdict on behalf of the plaintiffs against the company (about which refer here), and in November, the jurors entered a verdict for the plaintiffs in the BankAtlantic subprime-related securities suit (refer here).

 

In addition to these jury verdicts, in June 2010, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion overturning the trial court’s post trial ruling in the Apollo Group case, a ruling that had set aside the jury’s $277.5 million jury verdict in that case. Refer here regarding the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Apollo Group case.

 

All three of these cases remain subject to further proceedings. The Vivendi case in particular is the subject of significant post-trial motions having to do with the composition of the plaintiffs’ class in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case (about which refer to these prior guest blog posts, here and here. See also item 10, below).

 

The defendants in the Apollo Group case have filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari (about which refer here). And the BankAtlantic case has now moved on to post-trial motions, and depending on the motions’ outcome, possible appeal.

 

But while the ultimate outcome of these cases remains to be determined, it is striking that all three of these cases not only involve rare trials, but all three resulted in jury verdicts for the plaintiffs. To be sure, there have also been recent securities lawsuit trials that have resulted in defense verdicts, as was the case for example in the JDS Uniphase trial (about which refer here).

 

According to information compiled by Adam Savett, the Director of Securities Class Actions at the Claims Compensation Bureau, there have now been ten securities class action lawsuit trial post-PSLRA and involving post-PSLRA facts. The scoreboard currently reads: Plaintiffs 6, Defendants 4. The scoreboard is of course subject to revision pending further proceedings. Nevertheless, the juries themselves seem to have been favoring the plaintiffs, a phenomenon that may make plaintiffs’ threats to push a case to trial represent a particularly threatening tactic.

 

7. Assessing Coverage for "Bump Up" Claims: As noted above, a significant and growing number of corporate and securities lawsuits arise out of merger and acquisition activity. Often, the goal of this litigation is to try to increase the transaction consideration. One recurring question is the availability of D&O insurance coverage for amounts paid in settlement of so-called "bump up" claims.

 

In October 2010, the First Circuit entered an opinion in coverage litigation involving Genzyme Corporation, discussing the question of the preclusive effect of a D&O policy’s "bump up" exclusion. The First Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision that had held that the company’s D&O insurance policy did not provide coverage for additional amounts paid to claimants who asserted they did not received adequate consideration in a share exchange.

 

Though the First Circuit reversed the lower court’s holding of noncoverage, the First Circuit did not invalidate the bump up exclusion and agreed that the exclusion precluded entity coverage for bump up amounts.

 

The First Circuit remanded the case to the lower court for further allocation proceedings (that is, because the First Circuit held that the bump up exclusion precluded coverage only under the policy’s entity coverage provision, further proceedings are required to determine whet portion if any of the underlying settlement is allocable to settlement of liabilities of persons insured under other insuring provisions of the policy).

 

Of critical importance is that the First Circuit found that exclusion is enforceable and is effective to preclude coverage according to its terms. The holding clearly will be relevant to questions of coverage in future cases involving settlements of "bump up" claims, at least where the implicated D&O insurance policies include bump up exclusions.

 

8. D&O Insurance Coverage for Informal SEC and Internal Investigations: Among the perennial D&O insurance issues are the questions of coverage for informal SEC investigations and for internal investigations. In either case, the question is whether or not there is a "claim" as required to trigger coverage under the policy.

 

In one of the year’s most noteworthy D&O insurance coverage decisions, Southern District of Florida Judge Kenneth Marra, applying Florida law in a summary judgment ruling in coverage litigation involving Office Depot, held there is no coverage under the company’s D&O insurance policies for either of these categories of expenses.

 

Though the holding in the Office Depot case is direct reflection both of the specific policy language involved and the facts presented, the decision nevertheless could be influential in future claims involving questions of coverage for informal SEC investigations and internal investigations. The Office Depot decision suggests that policy definitions of the terms "Securities Claim" and "Claim" are critical, particularly with respect to the definitional references to "investigations" and "proceedings." Refer here for a more detailed discussion of the case and the decision.

 

The Office Depot ruling is hardly the final word on these issues, but it clearly will loom large in future consideration of questions of coverage for these kinds of expenses. Insurers undoubtedly will seek to rely on the decision to try to preclude coverage for costs incurred in connection with informal SEC investigations and internal investigations.

 

On a related note, a separate court held in the MBIA coverage case that there is coverage under the D&O insurance policy at issue for special litigation committee expenses, as discussed here. 

 

9. Is a Whistle the Sound of the Future?: The massive Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 enacted in July will affect virtually every aspect of our financial system, in ways that may only become clear over time. But among the Act’s innovations that seem likeliest to have a significant litigation impact are the Act’s new whistleblower provisions.

 

The whistleblower provisions include the creation of a new whistleblower bounty pursuant to which persons who first bring securities law violations to the attention of the SEC will receive between 10 percent and 20 percent of any recovery in excess of $1 million.

 

Give the magnitude of the fines paid in many recent SEC enforcement actions, particularly those involving Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations (about which refer here), the prospective size of potential bounties is enormous. These bounty provisions seem likely to encourage a flood of whistleblower reports to the SEC. This could create an administrative nightmare for the SEC, and the agency is already struggling with funding limitations that may constrain its ability to implement the whistleblower requirements. On the other hand, the SEC, under pressure to rehabilitate its regulatory credentials after its failure to detect the Madoff scheme, will face significant pressure to pursue whistleblower claims.

 

Another 2010 development that seems likely to encourage an entirely different sort of whistleblower activity is the series of WikiLeaks disclosures. The extensive media attention give to the disclosures, as well as the suggestions of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange that future disclosures will expose corporate misconduct, raise the possibility of that other self-appointed corporate scourges will launch similar guerilla campaigns involving the disclosure of internal corporate communications.

 

These two types of prospective whistleblower risks arguably represent an entirely new level of corporate exposure that could leave companies and their senior officials susceptible to claims of wrongdoing based on public or regulatory disclosures by persons inside the company with access to sensitive information. Indeed, companies and their senior officials could even be susceptible to claims for the alleged failure to implement and maintain sufficient controls to prevent embarrassing or harmful disclosures. Regardless, companies could face the prospect of significant risks involving person inside (or with access to) their own operations.

 

10. Foreign Companies, U.S. Courts: In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case, holding that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies only to transactions taking place on the U.S. securities exchanges, or domestic transactions in other securities.

 

Among other things, the Morrison decision seems to represent the end of so-called "f-cubed" claims, involving foreign claimants who bought their shares in foreign companies on foreign exchanges.

 

Lower courts are now wrestling with Morrison’s implications, including, for example, the question of whether or not Morrison precludes claims under the U.S. securities laws against companies whose American Depositary Receipts trade on U.S. exchanges. (Surprisingly, at least one court has held that case has that effect, as discussed here.) Other courts have struggled to determine what falls within Morrison’s second prong relating to "domestic transactions in other securities." Clearly, there will be much further lower court activity as these kinds of issues are sorted out.

 

In the meantime, one consequence that seemed likely in the wake of Morrison is that there might be fewer (or at least only narrower) cases filed in U.S. courts involving non-U.S. companies. Contrary to expectations, however, there were quite a number of securities cases filed in U.S. courts involving foreign-domiciled companies in 2010, including many filed after the Supreme Court issued its Morrison opinion.

 

As reflected in my recent year-end analysis of 2010 securities lawsuit filings, there were 19 new securities class action lawsuits filed in 2010 involving foreign domiciled companies, representing 10.7% of all 2010 securities lawsuit filings. Of these 19 cases, 12 were filed after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morrison.

 

One possibly temporary factor driving many of these filings is the rash of new cases filed against Chinese- domiciled companies. There were ten new lawsuits against Chinese companies in 2010, eight of which were filed post-Morrison. It should be noted that the shares of many of these Chinese companies trade on U.S. exchanges and in fact many of the cases directly relate to the companies’ securities offerings in the U.S., facts which made these companies susceptible to securities lawsuits in this country even under Morrison.

 

The lower courts will continue to interpret and apply Morrison in the months ahead. In the meantime, it seems that lawsuits involving non-U.S. companies will continue to arise, at least where the companies’ shares trade on U.S. exchanges.

 

A Final Note: Readers of this blog post may also be interested in my September 2010 post entitled "What to Watch Now in the World of D&O," which can be found here.

 

Ten Top Ten Lists: Top ten surveys proliferated at year end, and so it seems like a list of ten top ten lists would be the appropriate accompaniment to The D&O Diary’s own top ten list:

The Year’s Top Ten Insurance Coverage Decisions

Top Ten YouTube Videos of 2010

Top Ten Annoying Things British Men Do While Abroad

Top Ten New Species (International Institute for Species Exploration)

Top Ten Goals from the 2010 World Cup

Top Ten TV Commercials of 2010

Top Ten Encyclopedia Britannica Queries 2010

Top Ten Must-Reads in the Law, 2010

Princeton Review Top College Ranking 2010-2011

Time Magazine’s Top Ten of Everything List

 

 

Pfizer's D&O Insurers Fund Unusual $75 Million Derivative Settlement

In the wake of Pfizer’s record-setting September 2009 $2.3 billion settlement of charges that it had engaged in off-label marketing of Bextra and other drugs, Pfizer investors filed shareholders derivative lawsuits against the company, as nominal defendant, and 19 of the company’s directors and officer, alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing to detect and prevent the illegal marketing.

 

The parties have now entered a $75 million settlement of the derivative lawuits. The settlement has several interesting features, particularly with respect to the insurance, which is funding the entire settlement amount. The settlement is subject to court approval.

 

Background

On September 2, 2009, the Department of Justice announced that Pfizer had agreed to pay a total $2.3 billion dollars in settlment of the off-label marketing allegations.. In its press release describing the settlement, the DoJ said that the settlement – which represented a criminal fine of $1.195 billion and a civil False Claims Act settlement of $1 billion, as well as certain additional civil forfeitures – represented the largest health care fraud settlement in the DoJ’s history.

 

Following the announcement of this settlement, investors filed a number of shareholder derivative lawsuits, which ultimately were consolidated in a single action in the Southern District of New York before Judge Jed Rakoff. Background regarding the derivative litigation can be found here. The plaintiffs’ consolidated amended complaint can be found here.

 

The Settlement

On December 2, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of the derivative litigation. The motion, to which the settlement stipulation is attached, can be found here (Hat tip to the Seeking Alpha blog for the settlement documents.).

 

In the settlement, Pfizer and the other defendants have agreed to set up a Regulatory and Compliance Committee to report to the company’s board and to take appropriate steps to prevent future drug marketing violations. Among other things the committee will review compensation policy and practices to ensure they are consistent with the compliance objectives.

 

One of the things that makes this settlement unusual is the way the committee’s activities are to be funded. As part of the settlement, a pool of funds – to be financed entirely by insurance – will be used to pay for the committee’s activities for five years.

 

Under the settlement stipulation, four of the company’s D&O insurers "shall pay a total of $75 million into an escrow account under the control of Pfizer." After payment of fees and expenses, the remaining escrow funds "shall be subject to the exclusive control of the Regulatory Committee for funding activities of the Regulatory Committee for its initial five years." If the committee spends more than the funds available, Pfizer will make up the difference. If the committee spends less that the remaining funds, unspent amounts are to be returned to the insurers. (The four insurers involved are listed on page 9 of the settlement stipulation.)

 

A further provision of the settlement stipulation specifies that settlement contribution by the fourth of the four insurers is subject to arbitration. Pfizer may have to pay the insurer up to $20 million depending on the outcome of the arbitration.

 

An exhibit to the settlement stipulation specifies that the plaintiffs' lawyers will seek attorneys' fees of $22 million plus costs of $1.9 million. The amount of the plaintiffs’ fees awarded is to come out of and thereby reduce the $75 million. If plaintiffs are awarded the full amount of fees and costs sought, the net funds remaining of the original $75 million would be $51.1 million.

 

At least one news report suggests that the company’s entry into this derivative settlement, together with the earlier DoJ settlement, may have hastened or even directly led to the abrupt departure of Pfizer CEO Jeff Kindler.

 

Discussion

A frequent component of derivative lawsuit settlements is the company’s agreement to adopt certain governance reforms or to implement certain corporate therapeutics. So from that perspective, Pfizer’s agreement as part of this settlement to set up a compliance committee to ensure good behavior is not unusual.

 

One of the things that is unusual about this arrangement is that, among other things, there is a specific pot of money that is to be set aside to fund the compliance reforms to which the company has agreed as part of a derivative settlement.

 

And what is even more unusual, and arguably unprecedented, is that the funds to be set aside for these activities are to be provided for exclusively by the company’s D&O insurers.

 

I am sure the D&O insurers’ contribution toward this settlement was the subject of extensive negotiation. I can certainly imagine the carriers taking the position that the cost of the company’s compliance or governance activities represents corporate overhead expenses and as such is not covered loss under the company's D&O liability insurance. I expect these kinds of questions had to be sorted out in the course of the negotiation of this settlement. (The fact that one of the four D&O insurer’s contribution toward the settlement is subject to arbitration suggests further that these questions were not fully sorted out as part of the settlement negotiations.)

 

On the other hand, the idea behind the settlement may be that the individual defendants nominally agreed to pay for the remedial measures, and the insurers are simply paying on the individuals’ behalf. From that perspective, the prospect of the D&O insurers undertaking to pay those amounts on the individuals’ behalf may make the arrangement more consistent with the D&O insurance policy’s basic proposition.

 

But while this latter analysis may make the insurers’ contribution explainable in insurance terms, the fact that the insurers are basically paying for corporate governance reforms arguably represents something of a novel development and may represent a noteworthy precedent going forward.

 

Another noteworthy aspect of this settlement of this settlement is its sheer size. The $75 million dollar value of the settlement makes it one of the largest shareholders derivative settlements of which I am aware, exceeded only by a very small handful of other derivative settlements, including the UnitedHealth Group settlement ($900 million, refer here ); Oracle ($122 million, refer here), Broadcom ($118 million, refer here), AIG ($115 million, refer here), and the AIG/Greenberg settlement ($90 million, refer here).

 

There was a time when a significant cash payment was not a part of shareholders’ derivative lawsuit settlements. However, as this growing list of jumbo settlements underscores, derivative suit settlements involving a large cash component are becoming increasingly common – which , among other things, has important implications for D&O insurers and their policyholders.

 

Along those lines, one thing the Pfizer settlement has in common with these other jumbo derivative settlements is that each of these settlements involves solvent entities. The relevance to me from the fact that Pfizer is solvent derives from the added fact that this settlement almost certainly represented a payment of the Side A of the company’s insurance program – indeed, the identity of the insurers involved strongly suggests that this settlement represents a Side A insurance loss.

 

If as I assume to be the case this settlement represents a Side A insurance loss, this settlement represents yet another case in which insurers have been called upon to fund a substantial Side A loss outside of the insolvency context. (Please see my discussion of the Broadcom settlement, here, for a more detailed review of the significant of the Side A loss payment outside of the insolvency context.)

 

These kinds of settlements provide concrete evidence of the value to policyholders of significant amounts of Side A insurance even outside of the insolvency context.

 

These settlements also underscore the fact that even Excess Side A insurers are exposed to potential losses – even outside of the insolvency context – and that this exposure seems to be increasing over time. Only the insurers themselves can answer the question of whether or not they are actually pricing their products for the risk of Side A losses outside the insolvency context. 

 

UBS Will Take No Action Against Former Company Officials and Other Web Notes

In a public report that makes for some interesting reading, UBS on October 14, 2010 released a statement disclosing that though its own investigation had concluded that "what happened should not have been allowed to happen," the company will take no legal action against its former directors and offices for losses the company suffered during the U.S subprime meltdown that forced a government bailout of the company. The company’s write-down of mortgage related assets exceeded $50 billion.

 

The company’s October 14 statement can be found here and the report itself, which was undertaken pursuant to the May 2010 recommendation of the Swiss Federal Assembly, can be found here.

 

The report includes a number of critical findings, including an assessment that the company’s "growth strategy" was "not planned in a sufficiently systematic manner," which contributed to the bank’s losses. The management incentives at the time encouraged company officials to seek revenue "without taking appropriate consideration of the risks."

 

The report also concludes that there company lacked a "uniform approach" to risk and that risk control was "based too heavily on statistical models." As a result, and "despite warning," the company "falsely believed" that is U.S. real estate investments were both valuable and sufficiently hedged, though there was "no comprehensive or continuous assessment" of the overall risk profile of the cross-border wealth management business.

 

The report also concluded that there were "failures with regard to the training and instruction" of some employees, and that the company "did not implement an effective system of supervisory and compliance controls necessary to convey a clear and consistent expectation that full compliance with applicable internal controls and U.S. legal requirements."

 

Despite these shortcomings, the company’s Board concluded, as part of the reporting process, that it is not in the company’s interests to pursue legal claims against the former directors and officers.

 

In its October 14 statement, the company explains that among the reasons the Board decided not to pursue claims is that "the chances of any such proceedings being successful" is "more than uncertain." The Board also took into account that these kinds of actions "last many years, generate high costs, lead to negative informational publicity and thus hamper UBS’s efforts to restore its good name.’

 

The statement also notes that pursuing claims against "could weaken UBS’s legal position in pending cases, regardless of whether the former management is ever found to be liable." The report itself goes on to note that UBS is the subject of class action proceedings in the U.S. and that "by litigating against its former directors and officers inSwitzerland, UBS would negatively impact its position in these class action proceedings in the US, in particular because, under US rules, the US plaintiffs could claim that thisis an admission that they had in fact acted improperly."

 

The report emphasizes that there had been no findings of criminal misconduct. The report states finally that "the Board of Directors is opposed to any attempt by third parties to file actions against former directors and officers or to pursue actions at the company’s expense. In the event that individual shareholders were to propose a vote at the general meeting for a resolution in favor of filing a claim at the company’s expense, the Board would consider it its duty to recommend that such a proposal be rejected."

 

Finally, the report is accompanied by an external report prepared by University of Zurich Law Professor Peter Forstmoser, who concluded that though there is "a sufficient basis to initiate legal proceedings against former individual directors or officers," the Board’s decision not to pursue legal claims is not only "appropriate," but it is also "necessary," taking into account the overall interests of the company and its shareholders.

 

The Dow Jones Newswire October 14, 2010 article about the UBS report notes that two UBS executives have returned pay from the 2007 to 2009 time frame totaling $73.7 million. The article also quotes a representative of one shareholder group as "disappointed" that the UBS Board decided not to pursue a civil lawsuit against the former directors.

 

Discussion

I can imagine a school of thought amongst a certain type of investor who might be outraged that the company is doing nothing to pursue claims against the individual former directors and officers who were responsible for the operational shortcomings identified in the report as having caused the bank’s enormous losses. I can also imagine this same type of investor complaining that this is the type of cozy, protect-your-old-buddies mentality that allow problems to arise the first place.

 

But at the same time, there is something quite instructive and perhaps even refreshing in the report’s consideration whether the postulated claim would actually help or hurt the company. There is something to the idea that this type of litigation, which can drag on for years and can be enormously expensive, does more harm than good. Indeed, if all prospective corporate and securities litigation were forced to endure this same type of scrutiny, and had to withstand the question whether the lawsuit would help or hurt the company and its investors on whose behalf it supposedly is filed, there would almost certainly be significantly less corporate and securities litigation.

 

The report’s justification for taking no action against the former company officials is of course pertinent to the company and to investors who remain invested in the company and interested in the company’s future. Investors who lost money as a result of the events analyzed in the report and who are no longer invested in the company may continue to feel aggrieved, but they can hardly complain that the company has refused to pursue any claims since those investors would not have benefited either.

 

Where investors may be most concerned is the Board’s statement that the Board will oppose any shareholder proposals seeking claims against the former officials. That is really the point where this report and the Board’s conclusions do seem defensive. On the other hand, if the Board really believes it is not in the company’s interest for those kinds of claims to be pursued, then the Board’s statement on this issue is simply consistent with the overall conclusion about where the company’s interests lie.

 

The Hits Just Keep on Coming: One of the most distinct trends to emerge in connection with recent securities lawsuit filings was the sudden surge during 3Q10 in securities class action lawsuits filed against for-profit education companies. On Friday, October 15, 2010, plaintiffs; lawyers announced the filing of yet another securities suit involving a for-profit education company, in this case Strayer Education.

 

According to the press release, the Complaint, which was filed in the Middle District of Florida against the company and certain of its directors and officers, alleges that the defendants:

 

failed to disclose that: (i) the Company had engaged in improper and deceptive recruiting and financial aid lending practices and, due to the government’s scrutiny into the for-profit education sector, the Company would be unable to continue these practices in the future; (ii) the Company failed to maintain proper internal controls; (iii) many of the Company’s programs were in jeopardy of losing their eligibility for federal financial aid; and (iv) as a result of the foregoing, defendants’ statements regarding the Company’s financial performance and expected earnings were false and misleading and lacked a reasonable basis when made.

 

The allegations in the Strayer lawsuit are similar to the allegations in the actions previously filed against other for-profit educational institutions in recent months. As detailed further here, these cases all relate back to a congressionally-initiated investigation involving federally backed student loans.

 

By my count, a total of seven different for-profit education companies have been sued in securities class action lawsuits since mid-August. These seven securities suits represent about five percent of the roughly 136 securities class action lawsuits that have been filed so far in 2010.

 

Yet Another Mortgage Mess: The headlines on the business pages have been dominated recently with tales of the mortgage documentation mess that is choking the mortgage foreclosure process. But according to Felix Salmon’s October 13, 2010 post on his Shedding No Tiers blog, there is yet another mortgage-related mess, relating to disclosures surrounding the mortgage-backed securities that the investment banks sold to investors at the peak of the housing bubble.

 

According to Salmon, it "turns out that there’s a pretty strong case" that the investment banks "lied to investors in many if not most of these deals."

 

Salmon comments relate to a process the investment banks followed as they assembled the pools of mortgages for securitization. As the banks acquired mortgages, they relied on outside service providers to test the mortgages in effect reunderwriting the mortgages according to the standards the origination entities were supposed to have used in creating the mortgages.

 

In reviewing documents submitted to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, what Salmon determined is that in reunderwriting the mortgages, the outside service providers sometimes rejected the mortgages at an astonishingly high rate – in the specific example Salmon cites, the reviewer rejected 45% of the mortgages reviewed.

 

It is what happened next that really troubled Salmon. According to Salmon, rather than telling the originator that the pool wasn’t good enough, the investment banks would instead renegotiate the amount of money they were paying for the pool. And, Salmon adds dramatically, "this is where things get positively evil."

 

Salmon contends that because the investment banks knew they would be selling the mortgages rather than keeping them, they "had an incentive to buy loans they knew were bad," because the banks could go back to the originator and get a discount. The advantage afforded the investment banks is that "the less money they paid for the pool, the more profit they could make when they turned it into mortgage bonds and sold it off to investors."

 

The "scandal," according to Salmon, is that "the investors were never informed of the results" of the outside service providers’ tests. The banks didn’t pass the discounts along to the investors, who were "kept in the dark" about the tests, about the poor results, and about the discounts. The banks, according to Salmon, were "essentially trading on inside information about the loan pool: buying it low (negotiating a discount from the originator) and then selling it high to people who didn’t have that crucial information."

 

Salmon followed up his initial provocative post with some an interesting follow-up post as well.

 

More Failed Banks: This past Friday night, the FDIC took control of three more banks, bringing the 2010 year-to-date number of failed banks to 132. The latest three were not in any of the real estate disaster areas like Georgia, Florida, Illinois or California, but rather involved banks in America’s heartland. Two of the three were in Missouri and the third was in Kansas.

 

Since January 1, 2008, there have been a total of 297 failed banks. During that period, there have been six bank failures in Kansas and ten in Missouri. The states that lead with the highest number of failed banks during that period are Georgia (44), Florida (41), Illinois (37) and California (32).

 

Options Backdating Settlement News: Apple and UnitedHealth

According to news reports (here), on September 8, 2008, Judge Jeremy Fogel of the Northern District of California preliminarily approved the settlement of the Apple options backdating derivative litigation.

 

As reflected in the parties’ Stipulation of Agreement of Settlement (here), the plaintiffs in the consolidated Apple derivative action agreed to dismiss the action subject to the defendants agreement to pay $14 million to the company; the defendants’ agreement to pay the plaintiffs’ counsel’s various attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $8.85 million; and the company’s agreement to adopt certain corporate governance reforms. According to the Stipulation, the various derivative lawsuits "were a material factor in obtaining the $14 million payment from Apple’s liability insurers." The total cash value of the various payments is $22.85 million.

 

UPDATE: An alert reader has raised an important question about my statement that the total cash value of this settlement is $22.85 million. The reader said the following in an e-mail to me: "You describe the settlement as involving a cash payment of $22.85 million based on the $14 million D&O settlement paid to Apple and the $8.85 million fee award expense payment made by Apple to the plaintiffs. However, as a practical matter aren't you 'double counting' since, presumably, the plaintiff fee awared was paid by Apple from the D&O proceedsit received from its carriers?"

 

Assuming this reader's analysis is correct, this is a very important distinction. The Stipulation of settlement is consistent with the reader's hypothesis, but not definitive. The Stipulation is clear that the $14 million payment is coming from Apple's D&O carriers. It also says that the $8.85 million is to be paid by Apple. It is not clear whether or not the D&O insurers will be reimbursing Apple for the $8.85 million or if the $14 million is the only payment that the D&O insurers will be making in connection with the settlement. It would be helpful if any reader with more specific knowledge of the insurance arrangements pertaining to this settlement would let me know.

This reader's question also suggests another component that is relevant to these insurance issues but that is not addressed in the Stipulation, and that is the question of defense expense. In a case like this where there are regulatory proceedings and special litigation committee activities as well as civil litigation, there frequently are disputes about which defense fees are covered and which are not. In a case like this one, the aggregate amount of all fees could well exceed $10 million. To the extent the insurer's $14 mllion payment is the total amount of insurance remitted to Apple, leaving the company to absorb both the $8.85 million of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses as well as all of the related defense expense, the $14 million payment could even be less than the amounts for which the company itself is reponsible.

 

The settling defendants include the Company; its Chairman, Steven Jobs; and certain other present and former directors and officers of the company. Judge Fogel set a final settlement hearing for October 31, 2008.

 

I have already received inquiries from persons questioning the size of the Apple options backdating derivative lawsuit settlement. The questioners are concerned that the settlement amount is seemingly small, especially in light of who the company is and the nature of the allegations.

 

There is no doubt that the Apple options backdating allegations have been very high profile. In addition, parallel SEC enforcement proceedings did result in the payment of some significant fines. On August 14, 2008 former Apple general counsel Nancy Heinen agreed to pay $2.2 million to settle options backdating charges (about which refer here), and last year former Apple CFO Fred D. Anderson agreed to pay $3.5 million to settle SEC claims against him (about which refer here).

 

The consolidated amended complaint also contains some apparently serious allegations. As discussed here, the amended complaint raised certain options springloading allegations, including the allegation that three Apple executives received a windfall when they were granted options to buy over 2 million shares the day before the announcement of a significant technology investment and other developments sent Apple’s shares up 48 percent. The amended complaint also alleges that Jobs himself received backdated options that were later cancelled in exchange for restricted stock.

 

Despite these allegations and notwithstanding the SEC settlements, the plaintiffs’ case faced certain potentially significant challenges. First, in a December 19, 2007 opinion (here), Judge Fogel had dismissed the plaintiffs’ initial pleadings, with leave to amend. In issuing this ruling, Judge Fogel did not even reach the demand futility issue, deferring that to a later date.

 

The plaintiffs filed their consolidated amended complaint on December 18, 2006 (refer here), seeking to overcome the deficiencies in the original pleadings. However, just days later, on December 29, 2006, Apple announced the completion of the special investigative committee’s investigation of the company’s stock option practices.

 

A joint statement by the committee’s co-chairs, former Vice President Al Gore and audit committee chair Jerome York, stated that Apple’s board "has complete confidence in the senior management team." The company’s 10-Q issued the same day (here) stated that the committee "found no misconduct by current management." (The 10-Q did go on to say that the investigation had "raised serious concerns about the actions of two former officials"—presumably Heinen and Anderson).

 

It is no surprise to me that faced with an apparently skeptical court and an unhelpful (if also somewhat controversial at the time) investigative committee report, the plaintiffs’ found it expedient to settle. The questions I have received have not reflected concerns about the fact that the plaintiffs settled; the concerns have had more to do with the amount of the settlement.

 

If you disregard for a moment that a high-profile company like Apple is involved, there is nothing particularly unusual about the size of this options backdating derivative settlement, at least in the context of other options backdating derivative settlements. Setting to one side the UnitedHealth Group derivative settlement (about which refer here), the options backdating derivative lawsuit settlements to date have been relatively modest, and the total value of the Apple derivative settlement is well within range of the other settlements.

 

As reflected in my running table of the options backdating lawsuit case resolutions (which can be accessed here), the total value of very few of the options backdating derivative settlements has exceeded seven figures. Indeed, the Apple settlement is actually one of the larger options backdating derivative settlements. The total cash value of only three derivative settlements exceeds the Apple settlement: UnitedHealth Group; Cablevision ($34.4 million, about which refer here); and Electronics for Imaging ($24 million, refer here).

 

By and large the options backdating derivative settlements (in the cases that have not been dismissed outright) have been relatively modest, consisting in many cases only of a payment of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and the agreement to adopt certain governance reforms. Although there were a truly impressive number of options backdating derivative lawsuits filed (168 by my count, as reflected here), very few of them seem to be resulting in significant payouts.

 

As the options backdating scandal recedes in the rear view mirror, it definitely has started to seem like less and less of a big deal, particularly in the context of the current daily diet of government bailouts, floundering investment banks, and multibillion dollar securities buybacks – with one big exception, as noted below.

 

And Speaking of UnitedHealth: The UnitedHealth Group cases have definitely been the most notable big-dollar exception in the options backdating scandal. The company was back in the news again today with the announcement (here) from the options backdating securities lawsuit lead plaintiff, Calpers, that the company’s former CEO William McGuire had agreed to pay $30 million and its former general counsel David Lubben had agreed to pay an additional $500,000 in settlement of the options backdating securities claims pending against them. McGuire’s own press release about the settlement can be found here.

 

Taken together with the $895 million previously announced settlement (refer here) in the UnitedHealth Group options backdating securities lawsuit, the aggregate value of the options backdating securities settlements in the case now totals $925.5 million, certainly a large number by any measure. This settlement total is also in addition to the UnitedHealth options backdating derivative settlement, which had a total value of over $600 million.

 

Although the various press releases are not specific in this respect, the implication is that McGuire’s $30 million settlement payment will come out of his own personal assets, rather than insurance or corporate indemnity. If that is the case, this settlement would represent one of the larger individual payments of its kind.

 

Fifth Circuit Affirms Options Backdating Securities Lawsuit Dismissal: In a September 8, 2008 per curiam opinion (here), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an options backdating related securities lawsuits. (The district court’s October 4, 2007 dismissal can be found here. Background regarding the case can be found here.)

 

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on loss causation grounds. The holding is interesting because the company’s stock actually did drop on the date of the alleged corrective disclosure.

 

The Fifth Circuit held that the press release in question was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements to establish loss causation because "although the stock price dropped dramatically on the day of the 1 August 2006 press release, no new facts concerning Cyberonics’ stock-option accounting were disclosed in that release which demonstrated that the ‘truth became known’ about Cyberonics’ challenged financial statements." Therefore the Fifth Circuit concluded, "a causal connection between the material misrepresentations and the loss was not adequately pled."

 

Special thanks to Neil McCarthy of Lawyer Links for alerting me to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion.