The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

The individual defendants in the various Stanford Financial-related SEC enforcement and criminal proceedings have been engaged in a long-running and procedurally complicated battle over whether the firm’s D&O insurers must advance the individuals defense expenses. In a sweeping January 26, 2010 opinion (here), Southern District of Texas Judge David Hittner rejected the grounds on which the insurers sought to avoid coverage and ruled that the insurers must advance the individuals’ defense costs.

Background and the January 26 Opinion

The defense fee dispute has a complex procedural history but for purposes of the January 26 opinion the critical fact is that on November 16, 2009, the insurers sent the individuals letters "retroactively declining to extend coverage for costs." The insurers contended that coverage was precluded by the Policy’s "money laundering" exclusion. The exclusion precludes coverage for loss "arising directly or indirectly as a result of or in connection with any act or acts (or alleged act or acts) of Money Laundering," as that term is defined in the policy.

In his opinion, Judge Hittner noted that the carrier’s were not seeking to avoid coverage based on the exclusion precluding coverage for fraud or criminal misconduct, because that exclusion has a requirement of an "adjudication" that the precluded conduct had occurred. The money laundering exclusion has no "adjudication" requirement, leaving, the insurers’ argued, the determination that money laundering has in fact occurred, to the insurers.

Judge Hittner also noted parenthetically that the insurers urged this position even though only one of the twenty-one counts in the criminal action alleges money laundering or conspiracy to commit money laundering. (The insurers argued that the policy’s definition of money laundering was broad enough to encompass all of the allegations.)

The plaintiffs first opposed the insurers’ position based on the "eight corners" rule, arguing under Texas law that in determining an insurer’s defense obligations, a court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the policy and the four corners of the complaint. Judge Hittner found that despite the insurers’ arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court of Texas "never has recognized an exception to the eight corners rule."

Judge Hittner was in any event strongly against a broader view of what a court properly might consider in determining the insurers’ obligations.

If a contemporaneous duty to advance or reimburse defense costs were judge on an "actual facts" basis, an insurer’s contractual obligation to pay defense costs could change on a daily basis as additional "facts" are developed. Essentially, coverage that directors and officers relied upon and expected when the Policies were purchased on their behalf could be withdrawn at the insurer’s whim. If, as Underwriters suggest, the Policies afford Underwriters absolute discretion to withhold payments whenever charges of intentional dishonesty are leveled against directors and officers, then insurers will be able to withhold payment in virtually every case at their discretion. That would leave directors and officers in an extremely vulnerable postion , as any allegation of dishonesty, not matter how groundless, could bring financial ruin on a director or officer. Essentially an insurer could act as judge and jury and convict its own insureds, thus avoiding any further financial responsibility for the insureds’ defense. This simply cannot be the case. (Citations omitted.)

The court found in applying the eight corners rule that the allegations were insufficient to establish that the precluded conduct had occurred. The insurers nevertheless sought to argue that the individuals refusal to testify in support of the application for a preliminary injunction is proof enough that the allegations against the individuals are true. The insurers sought to argue that the refusal to testify supported an inference that money laundering did in fact occur.

Judge Hittner held that the "given the magnitude, complexity and nature of the charges," he declined to draw the inference, and that in any event, because of the eight corners rule, the insurers’ reliance on the supposed inference from the individuals refusal to testify is "misplaced."

Judge Hittner, applying the standard required for a preliminary injunction motions ruled that though the money laundering exclusion does not require a judicial determination to apply, the exclusion’s requirements "also may mean much more than an insurer’s own determination." He said that he need not decide what level of factual determination must be made, and instead ruled only that plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits at trial, satisfying the standard for awarding preliminary injunctive relief.

The court, in further consideration of the preliminary injunction standard, noted that the plaintiffs would suffer "irreparable harm" if the relief they sought was withheld. He noted that it is "unmistakable and cannot be seriously disputed" that the harm the individuals will suffer is "real, immediate and irreparable." He rejected the insurers contrary position that, he said, would "essentially require [the individuals] to prove their innocence." Judge Hittner commented that
 

Underwriters’ position is absurd because these circumstances are precisely why corporations procure D&O insurance on behalf of their directors and officers. Indeed, it would contravene the very purpose of the Policies – as well as the policy language itself – to require Plaintiffs to prove their innocence before being entitled to funds for their defense.

Judge Hittner found the harm to the insurers from granting the preliminary injunction was relatively slight and that public interest also weighed in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. He finally held that the individuals did not have to post a bond.

Discussion

Given the nature of the allegations against the individuals and the notoriety of the circumstances, as well as the number of people who lost money as a result of the collapse of Stanford Financial, the tone and temperature of Judge Hittner’s words are a little surprising. If nothing else is clear, Judge Hittner was certain that individuals needed to be able to defend themselves, and the insurers were obliged to provide the defense. The depth of Judge Hittner’s discussion of these defense cost issues are such that his words may prove useful for other individuals who are seeking to have their defense expenses paid under their policies.

You do get the sense that Judge Hittner ducked the hard issue – that is, if the money laundering exclusion, unlike the fraud exclusion, doesn’t have an "adjudication" requirement, then an adjudication can’t be required, so what is sufficient? Given Judge Hittner’s certainty that the eight corner rule is absolute under Texas law, there might be no way to meet the requirement. It does make you wonder whether it matters from a practical perspective whether or not there is an "adjudication" requirement.

Even though the usefulness of Judge Hittner’s determinations for others seeking insurance coverage arguably might be limited to those jurisdictions that also absolutely enforce the eight corners rule, the breadth of his pronouncements about the limitations on insurers’ ability to make preclusive coverage determinations virtually guarantees that his phrases will appear in the legal briefs of other individuals who are seeking defense cost coverage. His unwillingness to allow the individuals’ refusal to testify on their own behalf in the preliminary injunction proceeding may also prove helpful to other policyholders.

Because of the tone of Judge Hittner’s rhetoric and the high profile nature of the case, I suspect there may be some strong views about this decision. I invite readers who have thoughts about this decision to add their views to this post using the blog’s comments feature.

A January 26, 2010 Bloomberg article about Judge Hittner’s ruling can be found here.

Special thanks to Bill Schreiner of the Zuckerman Spaeder law firm for providing me with a copy of the decision.

Vivendi Watch: The Vivendi securities class action case went to the jury on January 11, 2010, but still no verdict. The parties are anxiously awaiting the verdict and in the meantime debating what the length of the jury deliberations may mean, according to a January 26, 2010 article by Andrew Longstreth on AmLaw Litigation Daily (here). The article also reports that almost regardless of the verdict, there will likely be an appeal, if for no reason that because of the potential jurisdictional implications of the National Australia Bank case now pending before the Supreme Court. Stay tuned (to the second power, apparently).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Seventh Circuit Weighs In on State Court ’33 Act Jurisdiction and Removal: A January 5, 2009 Seventh Circuit decision in the Katz v. Gerardi case (here) may make it more difficult for plaintiffs to pursue ’33 Act litigation in state court, at least in the Seventh Circuit -- and possibly elsewhere, too.

As I detailed in a recent post (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have proven keenly interested in pursing subprime and credit crisis-related litigation in state court, apparently for forum shopping type reasons. Defendants generally have sought to remove these cases to federal court, relying, among other things on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).

However, this past summer, the Ninth Circuit held in the Luther v. Countrywide case that the nonremoval provision in Section 22 of the ’33 Act (which provides concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction for ’33 Act cases) effectively trumps the more recently enacted SLUSA and CAFA because it more specifically relates to securities lawsuits. My discussion of the Luther v. Countrywide case can be found here.

An October decision in the Second Circuit in the New Jersey Carpenters’ Fund v. Harborview Mortgage case had refused to remand to state court a ’33 Act case, as is more fully discussed on the 10b-5 Daily blog (here). The Harborview decision was primarily based on the fact that the underlying securities lawsuit did not involve "covered securities" for which SLUSA created an explicit removal exception; because the exception did not apply, the case could appropriately be removed to federal court notwithstanding the nonremoval provision in Section 22.

In the recent Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote that the provisions of the more recently enacted statutes, particularly CAFA, trump Section 22. Judge Easterbrook expressly rejected Luther v. Countrywide’s conclusion that the more specific securities statute prevailed. However, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, like the Second Circuit opinion in Harborview, also depended in part on the fact that the investment instruments involved are not "covered securities" (i.e., do not trade on a national exchange), and therefore did not come within one of CAFA’s removal exceptions.

In addition, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion does seem to have been influenced significantly by the fact that the plaintiff in the case was really a seller of the investments involved, rather than a buyer, and therefore lacked a legal basis to assert a ’33 Act claim. Although the opinion nevertheless examined the removal/jurisdictional issues as if the plaintiff had a legal right to assert the claim, the opinion’s starting point arguably influenced the outcome of its analysis.

In any event, the Seventh Circuit’s recent opinion, together with the Second Circuit’s Harborview opinion, clearly could create substantial jurisdictional hurdles (at least outside the Ninth Circuit) for the numerous plaintiffs now seeking to pursue ’33 Act claims in state court. Many (if not all) of the various subprime and credit crisis-related cases filed in state court related to investment instruments that are not traded on national exchanges and therefore are not "covered securities." Accordingly, contrary to the title of one of my prior posts, Section 11 cases may not be "coming soon to a state court near you" after all.

A January 12, 2009 Law.com article discussing the Seventh Circuit opinion can be found here.

Collins & Aikman Defendants Criminal Charges Dropped: On January 9, 2009, prosecutors dropped securities fraud and other criminal charges against former Collins & Aikman CEO David Stockman and three others. As reported in the January 10, 2009 Wall Street Journal (here), the U.S. Attorney’s office said further prosecution "wouldn’t be in the ‘interests of justice’ following a renewed assessment of the case."

While the individuals involved undoubtedly are relieved to have the prosecutorial threat removed, the government’s action comes only after the now-defunct company’s directors and officers insurance was entirely exhausted by defense fees, as I discussed at length in a prior post (here). Unfortunately for these individuals, they continue to face SEC enforcement proceedings as well as civil litigation (about which refer here), now without any further insurance available to fund their defense in these proceedings, not to mention any settlements or judgments that may follow.

A criminal prosecution has such an enormous potential to cause harm. On the one hand, it is commendable that the government was willing to reassess the case and to drop it before any further harm was done. On the other hand, even though the prosecution is over, it has done material damage to the individuals who were unfortunate to be subject to a prosecution that lacked an adequate basis. It is extremely regrettable when the government uses its enormous power when it is unwarranted. In this instance the government can drop the case and walk away without so much as an apology, but the unfortunate consequences of an unjustified prosecution continue for the individuals involved.

University of Denver law professor Jay Brown has extensively covered the Collins & Aikman criminal prosecution on the Race to the Bottom blog (here), including in particular his discussion (here) of how the criminal prosecution exhausted the company’s D&O insurance. The SEC Actions blog has a good summary description (here) of the criminal case and raises the question whether the SEC will proceed with the civil enforcement proceeding in light of the discontinuance of the criminal case. All of the key pleadings in the criminal case can be found on the University of Denver Law School’s corporate governance website, here.

2008 Delaware Case Law in Review: Francis Pileggi of the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog has released the2008 installment of his annual review of key Delaware opinions. Pileggi’s report, which is must reading for anyone who wants an overview of important legal developments in Delaware’s court’s during 2008, is entitled "Selected Key Corporate and Commercial Delaware Decisions in 2008" and can be accessed here.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

For many companies, one of the most challenging parts of the Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance procurement process is determining how much insurance to purchase. Against a backdrop of basic affordability, the company must consider complex issues such as limits adequacy – that is, how much insurance is enough?

Determining limits adequacy is even more challenging in light of today’s escalating claims severity. Recent developments underscore the fact that in addition to rising settlement levels, growing defense expense is an increasingly important part of the limits adequacy analysis.

In the September 2008 issue of InSights (here), I review recent D&O claims defense expense developments and consider their ramifications for purposes of both limits selection and insurance program structure. The article concludes with a brief review of claims management implications arising from these defense expense issues.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The 2007 settlement of an Ontario securities class action may suggest the eventual direction of many of the lawsuits in the current subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave. Even though the lawsuit was filed in a Canadian court and involved a company (FMF Capital Group Ltd.) whose shares traded only on a Canadian exchange, the lawsuit did arise from the early stages of the subprime mortgage meltdown in the U.S. And although the lawsuit preceded the current litigation wave, many of the allegations raised in the lawsuit have also arisen in the more recent U.S. subprime lawsuits.

Through an affiliate, FMF offered residential mortgages to subprime borrowers. According to the company (here), FMF originated mortgage loans throughout in 39 of the 50 United States and the District of Columbia. FMF resold packages of these mortgages to institutional buyers.

As summarized in a recent memorandum (here) written by NERA Economic Consulting, which served as the Ontario court’s damages expert and settlement consultant, in March 2005, FMF conducted a $197.5 million IPO. Following the offering, the securities issued in the IPO traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. According to later news reports (here and here), the company apparently sought the Canadian listing as a way to obtain favorable treatment as a Canadian income trust.

In November 2005, just eight months after its IPO, FMF announced that it was suspending the monthly distributions due to investors in connection with its publicly traded securities. Within two trading days of the announcement, the company’s securities had declined 76.8% from their preannouncement price.

In January 2006, plaintiffs initiated a securities class action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice against FMF and certain of its directors and officers, the offering underwriters, and FMF’s auditors. Background regarding the lawsuit can be found here.

As described in NERA’s memorandum, the plaintiffs alleged that the company "dismantled" its underwriting standards in order to maintain growth in its loan originations, and that the defendants concealed the company’s degraded underwriting standards and poor loan quality. FMF contended that its woes were due to industry-wide factors including interest rates and increased defaults, which undermined its ability to conduct securitizations and finance distributions.

According to co-counsel for the class (here), the class action ultimately was settled for over CAN$28 million. US$21 million of the settlement was funded by FMF’s insurers and by FMF’s privately-held affiliate. The remaining CAN$4.55 million of the settlement was to be paid by the IPO offering underwriters and FMF’s auditors.

According to NERA, the settlement, which the Court approved on April 11, 2007, is "the largest settlement in a class action securities case in Canadian history."

In addition to its status as the largest Canadian securities settlement ever, the settlement may be significant in a number of other respects as well, due to the circumstances surrounding the lawsuit.

That is, even though the lawsuit was filed in a Canadian court and involved a Canadian listed company, the lawsuit arose out of the meltdown in the U.S. subprime mortgage market. The claimants’ allegations about the lender’s deteriorating loan underwriting standards and poor loan quality, and the alleged failure to disclose these factors, are substantially similar to the allegations raised in class actions now pending in U.S courts against numerous other mortgage lenders. The company’s attempt to blame macroeconomic factors for its demise also mirrors the response of many defendants in the U.S subprime lawsuits.

Indeed, given these similarities, NERA described the FMF case as "the proverbial ‘canary in the coal mine’ for the current credit crisis." The similarities between the FMF case and many of the cases in the current subprime litigation wave suggest that the outcome of the FMF case could be a harbinger of things to come in the current subprime cases.

None of the securities lawsuits that have been filed in the current litigation wave have yet been settled, which makes the FMF lawsuit and its settlement at least potentially significant, for what it might indicate about the outcomes of the lawsuits in the current wave.

By my analysis at least, the FMF litigation settled for a fairly significant percentage of the company’s market capitalization loss. The company’s IPO raised $197.5 million at $10/share. The company’s share price declined by $5.21/share in the two days following the company’s announcement that it was terminating the income distributions. There undoubtedly are a number of ways the investors’ losses might be quantified, but by any measure, the eventual settlement of more than CAN$28 million appears to represent a significant percentage of alleged investor loss.

Because of the FMF lawsuit’s Canadian connection, litigants in the current U.S.-based subprime related litigation wave may or may not consider the case a relevant reference point. But to the extent it is relevant, the magnitude of the settlement as an apparent percentage of investor loss may point toward some very large settlements in the current U.S. subprime lawsuits, where the dollars involved are in many instances significantly greater than in the FMF case. Whether or not the FMF case does have significance for the eventual outcome of the current U.S cases, it is nonetheless interesting because the case has settled and been concluded while most of the recent U.S. cases are only in their earliest stages.

A prior post in which I discussed subprime related securities litigation in Canada, including a brief mention of the FMF lawsuit, can be found here.

More About Defense Expense and Limits Adequacy: In a prior post (here), I discussed the limits adequacy and program structure implications arising from the threatened depletion -- solely as a result of accumulating defense expense -- of the Collins & Aikman D&O Insurance program. As noted on the Race to the Bottom blog (here), counsel for one of the individual defendants has now advised the court that the remaining limits in the company’s $50 million D&O insurance program have been completely exhausted.

In his blog post, Professor Jay Brown of the University of Denver Law School, spells out what the depletion of the policy’s limits means for one of the minor defendants. The individual, Paul Barnaba, has now petitioned the court for the appointment of a legal aid attorney. Fortunately for Barnaba, it appears that his own counsel, whose fees previously had been paid by the now depleted insurance, is willing to accept the derisory legal aid fee rate. The other defendants may not be so fortunate.

The complete exhaustion of $50 million of D&O insurance solely through the accumulation of defense expense is a nightmare scenario for any director or officer. The individual defendants in the Collins & Aikman case, or at least those that are not independently wealthy, must now face serious criminal charges in a complex financial with only legal aid counsel to protect them. In addition, they continue to face significant civil litigation as well, again without any insurance remaining to fund a settlement.

As I noted in my prior post about the Collins & Aikman case, these developments may have important implications for traditional notions of limits adequacy. In addition, it is also clear that in order to make sure that individuals are not left to face serious litigation or even criminal charges without insurance, the consideration of alternative insurance structures should be an important part of every D&O insurance transaction.

They Stab it With Their Steely Knives, But They Just Can’t Kill the Beast:  The D.C. Circuit  rejected an attack on the constitutionality of SOX (here). OK, now everybody get back to work.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On June 26, 2008, Judge Gerard Lynch of the Southern District of New York issued another opinion (here) in the D&O insurance coverage litigation arising out of the Refco debacle (My recent post discussing Judge Lynch’s prior opinion in the case discussing insurance application issues can be found here.)

In yet another judicial decision that resonates with significance for excess D&O insurance issues, Judge Lynch, hearing an appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling, addressed the question whether an excess insurer may withhold advancement of defense costs based on its determination that an exclusion in its policy precluded coverage. Judge Lynch held that even if the excess policy has the distinct exclusions, the policy's terms do not  affect the operation of the applicable defense cost advancement provisions, and the advancement provisions should be enforced according to their terms.

The background of the case can be found in my prior post. Of significance here, the primary insurer’s $10 million limit and the first level excess insurer’s $7.5 million were exhausted in payment of defense expense. As also discussed in the prior post, the second level excess insurer disputes coverage on a number of grounds. The second level excess insurer also disputes that it has any obligation to advance defense costs pending a determination of coverage.

The parties agree that the advancement provisions in the primary policy control the advancement issue; they dispute how the provisions apply in the context of the second level excess carrier’s policy.

The primary policy specifies that:

The Insurer will pay covered Defense Costs on an as-incurred basis. If it is finally determined that any Defense Costs paid by the Insurer are not covered under this Policy, the Insureds agree to repay such non-covered Defense Costs to the Insurer.

The second level excess insurer [hereafter in this post, simply “the insurer”] contended that notwithstanding this language, it has no obligation to advance defense costs. In making this argument, the insurer relied on the word “covered” in the first sentence of the advancement provision, qualifying the type of defense costs that the provision requires to be paid on an as-incurred basis.

The insurer’s argument is based on its contention that its policy’s conduct exclusions, unlike the primary and first level excess policies’ exclusions, do not have an adjudication requirement. The insurer argued, according to the court, that because the conduct exclusions in its policy have no adjudication requirement, “prior to a court determination, [the insurer] has the unilateral right to determine whether defense costs are ‘covered,’” and that it has made a “good faith determination” that the insureds’ claims are precluded under its policy.

As the court paraphrased the insurer’s position, the insurer contended that the terms of its contract “authorize it to apply its exclusions to deny coverage unilaterally – and thus to refuse to advance defense costs – unless and until a court determines that the costs are ‘covered’” under its policy.

The insureds contend in their counterclaim in the coverage litigation that the exclusions on which the insurer relies to deny coverage “are not, in fact, part of the policy.” With respect to the advancement issue, the insureds argued that the advancement provisions require the insurer to advance defense expense, contending that as long as the claim “falls within the policy’s insuring agreement, it is covered unless and until there is a final determination that an exclusion applies.”

The insureds also argued that nowhere in the insurer’s policy does it state that the insurer can unilaterally withhold defense expense absent a court determination, and nothing in the insurer’s policy states that its exclusions are not subject to the “final determination” language in the second sentence of the advancement provisions.

In his June 26 opinion, Judge Lynch observed that “in essence, the central dispute among the parties centers on who bears the burden regarding whether defense costs are ultimately covered.” Judge Lynch, while noting that the insurer’s position regarding advancement “is not unreasonable on its face,” also noted that the insurer’s interpretation “places enormous emphasis on the word ‘covered.’” Judge Lynch said that the word’s inclusion in the advancement provisions “can hardly be said to make an unambiguous change in the provision’s literal meaning,” and “seems, at best, an unusual way to effectuate a fundamental change in the parties’ expectations.”

Because the court found the wordings to be ambiguous, it interpreted the provision in favor of the insureds – a result that the court noted “makes eminent sense, as adopting [the insurer’s] interpretation … would effectively render the advancement obligation worthless.” Judge Lynch concluded by saying that if the insurer “wants the unilateral right to refuse a payment called for in the policy, the policy should clearly state that right.” (citations omitted)

Whatever else might be said about the court’s opinion, it is certainly a sharp reminder of the importance of inclusion of adjudication requirements in the D&O policy’s conduct exclusions. If, in the absence of an adjudication requirement, the insurer may contend (as did the insurer in the Refco coverage litigation) that it has the unilateral right to determine coverage and withhold policy benefits, then the omission of adjudication requirements is perilous indeed for insureds.

But the crux of the dispute is whether the second level excess insurer’s policy contains exclusions not found in the primary or first level excess policies. The insureds apparently dispute that the exclusions are part of the second level excess policy (although the precise nature of that dispute is not clear from the face of the opinion). Assuming that the distinct exclusions are in fact part of the second level excess insurer’s policy, it does suggest that the insurance program is something less than pure “follow form” insurance. Indeed, many insurance programs that are characterized as “follow form” in fact have characteristics that may make them something less than follow form, a consideration that may sometimes be overlooked in the insurance transaction process.

It is of course true that each policy in a tower of insurance represents a separate contract. Excess insurers have every right to insist on terms differing from the underlying layers. The Refco coverage dispute highlights the pitfalls that can arise when (or perhaps if) an excess policy has terms that differ from the underlying policies. Indeed, the arguments raised by the second level excess insurer in the Refco coverage litigation show that differences in wording between the layers potentially can cause the different layers to operate quite differently, potentially in ways that may not necessarily be apparent or anticipated.

One final note has to do with the parties’ apparent dispute whether the exclusions are in fact part of the second level excess policy. It is hard to tell from the face of the opinion, but this dispute may be due to the process issues discussed briefly in my prior post. At least until the merits are sorted out, it may be premature to try to draw any conclusions. But as I noted in my prior post, and to the extent the dispute is due to process issues, this case may be a reminder of the opportunities for and the dangers of ambiguities in insurance placement process communications. From the perspective of every process participant, after a serious claim has arisen is a very difficult time to have to try to sort out, for example, whether or not exclusions are part of a policy.

Special thanks to Kelly Reyher for providing me with a copy of Judge Lynch's June 26 opinion.

And Finally: For those of us laboring in the salt mines of the blogosphere, it is always exciting when a fellow blogger steps out in some dramatic way. And so I was delighted to see in the July 16, 2008 Wall Street Journal that Mark Herrmann of the Drug and Device Law Blog published a book review critically analyzing the recent book "Side Effects" by Alison Bass. Kudos to Mark for his excellent and well written review.

May all new media practitioners continue to prosper and succeed. Gradus ad Parnassus.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a prior post (here), I commented on former Refco CEO Phillip Bennett’s extraordinary cooperation with the Refco class action plaintiffs, following his entry of a guilty plea in the criminal case against him. As might have been anticipated, Bennett is hoping that his cooperation with the class plaintiffs, as well as the Bankruptcy Trustee, will win him leniency in his June 19, 2008 criminal sentencing. The government opposes leniency, arguing in reliance upon, among other things, Bennett’s acceptance of D&O insurance proceeds to pay his defense expenses.

In February 2008, Bennett entered a guilty plea, without a plea agreement, to all 20 counts against him, including conspiracy, securities fraud, filing of false statements, wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering and lying to Refco’s auditors. He faces a statutory maximum of 315 years’ imprisonment.

In Bennett’s June 1, 2008 sentencing memorandum (here), which was made public on June 12, his lawyers urged the judge to impose a sentence “for a term of years well short of the remainder of Mr. Bennett’s life.” His lawyers cited, among other reasons supposedly warranting leniency, that Bennett has “offered his cooperation to both the Litigation Trustee of the Refco Estate and the Refco Civil Class Action Plaintiffs, in their efforts to return hundreds of dollars to those who lost money in the Refco bankruptcy.” His lawyers further argued that his cooperation in those cases is “an indication of the extent to which Mr. Bennett has sought to make amends for the harm he has caused, and further reason to impose a sentence well below an actual or de facto term of life in prison.”

In its June 6, 2008 response (here), also made public on June 12, the government urged that “given the duration and intensity of the fraud, Bennett should receive no leniency.” In urging the maximum, the government pulled out all rhetorical stops; the government argued:

Bennett’s willful frauds on Refco’s investors, purchasers, customers, counterparties, banks, the public and others resulted in countless victims being defrauded of billions of dollars, causing uncompensated losses, even after the dissolution of Refco’s assets and large legal settlements of well over $1.5 billion, and of course drove Refco into bankruptcy. The defendant’s criminal conduct, motivated by greed that drove him to lie and scheme in ways previously unimaginable, brought him wealth that has scarcely been seen before in a … fraud case, launching Bennett into the rarefied air of a billionaire. In terms of scope, length, sophistication, harm, and criminal benefit, Bennett stands on a plateau of criminality that frankly makes comparisons difficult. Accordingly, the Government respectfully submits that an appropriately stiff term of imprisonment, consistent with the sentences imposed in the similar cases discussed above, should be imposed in order to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just and fair punishment, and deter potential corporate criminals.

In this same vein, the government showed little respect for Bennett’s plea for leniency made in reliance on his cooperation with the civil claimants (or at least “some” of the civil claimants, as the government emphasizes). The government said only that while the Court is not prohibited from considering such putative cooperation, “that does not mean that the Court necessarily should give the defendant credit for such cooperation.”

Among other reasons why it contends Bennett should received no leniency, the government specifically argued that “rather than limit the impact of his fraud, he knowingly accepted millions of dollars from Refco’s directors and officers insurance (the premiums for which, of course, were paid with fraud proceeds) to pay his legal bills, money that Bennett knew he had no right to claim.” The government added in a footnote that Bennett was also aware that in light of the government’s asset forfeiture case “there would be no money left to repay the insurance company upon his conviction. In substance, at the same time that Bennett was supposedly accepting full responsibility for his actions, he was in fact, taking millions of dollars from insurance companies under false pretenses. Notably, Bennett has not offered to cooperate with these civil litigants.”

Bennett may well deserve the maximum sentence as a result of his wrongdoing. The government may persuasively argue that Bennett only belatedly acknowledged his guilt, and that his late-arriving contrition ought not to be the basis of leniency, particularly where the delay exacerbated the harm he caused. But I wonder about the government’s attempt to bootstrap this argument by citing Bennett’s use of the D&O insurance proceeds to finance his defense.  

Let me just say as a preliminary matter that in expressing the views below, I am expressing no opinions about the carriers’ rights or interests. I am unfamiliar with the specifics of Refco’s D&O insurance coverage and none of the opinions below should be taken as opinion about Refco’s carriers’ coverage positions in this case. The carriers certainly  have their own grievances based on these circumstances, but I am not addressing those grievances here.  My opinions here relate solely to the government’s arguments against leniency based on Bennett’s use of the D&O policy proceeds.

My first concern with the government’s argument is the general principle it represents. The government may be justified in arguing that Bennett knew all along that his conduct was fraudulent. But take the principle on which the government seeks to rely outside the context of this specific case. Defending against a criminal charge is extraordinarily expensive, and one of the purposes of D&O insurance is to provide for the advancement of post-indictment criminal defense expense. For many criminally accused corporate officials, particularly those whose former company is bankrupt, the D&O insurance may be their only means of defending themselves. An insured forced to rely on this last line of defense should not be have to be concerned that accepting these contractual rights will put them at hazard that it might later be used against them if they ultimately face a criminal sentencing.

My second concern is that the circumstances Bennett’s case presents arguably are a product of the structure of D&O policies. The policies of course preclude coverage for loss based on criminal misconduct. But at the same time, the policies provide for the advancement of post-indictment criminal defense expense, subject only to an unsecured obligation to repay in the event a coverage preclusion is triggered.

In the course of events, it is inevitable that some insurance proceeds will be advanced in defense of insureds whose guilt is later established. The carrier can then seek to recover the advanced expense, which the insured is obliged to repay. But as an unsecured creditor, the carrier may not be able to recoup its costs in many instances. Bennett may well have known he would never be able to repay the amounts advanced, but I suspect that most criminal defendants know that, if called upon, they too could never hope to repay the amounts advanced in their defense. If awareness of an inability to repay is bar to seeking leniency, the ability to seek leniency would be unavailable to many corporate criminal defendants.

Carriers could refuse to cover criminal defense expenses or require more security before advancing criminal defense expense. Of course, any carrier trying to do either of these things would sell no more policies. D&O policies are structured as they are because that is what the marketplace requires for the policies to be commercially competitive. Presumably the carriers believe they are adequately compensated for the risks inherent in the structure.

The government may well be justified overall in arguing that Bennett should receive the maximum sentence. But I wonder: should an insurance outcome made possible as a result of the requirements of commercial competition really serve as a factor in the length of someone’s criminal sentence?

I suspect that some readers may have strong views on this topic. I hope readers will be willing to publish their views using the blog’s comment feature.

Hat tip to the White Collar Crime Prof Blog (here) for the links to the sentencing memoranda.

Speakers’ Corner: On June 17, 2008, I will be in Quebec City at the spring meeting of the Casualty Actuarial Society, speaking on a panel entitled “Subprime Issues for D&O.” The conference sessions agenda can be found here. My fellow panelists include Stephanie Plancich of NERA Economic Consulting and David Bradford of Advisen.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks (1)
• Share Link