The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

The current financial crisis involves a potent witches’ brew of bankruptcies, mortgage bailouts, failed banks, blame assignment, and liquidity issues. Because every one of these ingredients contributes in some important way to the total mix of current woe, this post briefly references each one of these issues and concludes with a video that manages to find humor despite the current dismal circumstances.

Bankruptcies Double: Though it is early yet, one of 2009’s stories of the year has to be the surge in corporate bankruptcies. According to recently published data (here), bankruptcies this year by publicly traded companies are running at more than twice their 2008 pace. Bankruptcies of companies with assets over $1 million are fueling the surge.

According to the data, there have been 46 bankruptcy filings (under Chapter 11 or Chapter 7) by public companies in 2009, with total combined assets of $74 million. As this point last year, there were only 21 bankruptcies totaling $11 billion.

Some context is required for these numbers, however. This year’s bankruptcy pace is still below that of 2002, a "record-breaking" year in which there were 60 bankruptcies by early March.

The financial market turmoil is producing numerous casualties. Indeed, Blackstone Chairman Stephen Schwarzman was quoted today (here) as saying that "between 40 and 45 percent of the world’s wealth has been destroyed in little less than a year and a half." Give the staggering scale of market losses, even optimists will recognize that further bankruptcies undoubtedly lie ahead.

My recent post discussing D&O insurance issues arising from bankruptcy can be found here.

A Successful Mortgage Bailout: As depressing as the current circumstances are, a sucessful bailout from an earlier era may provide reason to hope that it may be possible to manage our way out of the current mortgage crisis.

A March 6, 2009 post in the Harvard Business Review Editors’ Blog entitled "The Mortgage Bailout That Worked (here) describes a "remarkably similar catastrophe" that "happened during the real estate boom of the 1920s." In that earlier time, an investment frenzy developed over "guaranteed mortgage certificates" that were issues, in denominations as small as $100, for shares in residential mortgages and groups of mortgages. The certificates were issued by guaranty companies and backed by the state of New York.

Investor demand for the certificates soon outstripped the supply of mortgages, in turn fueling a demand for even more mortgages, whether or not the mortgages were compliant with regulatory requirements. The frenzy to supply investors with more certificates also encouraged the guaranty companies to assume borrowers’ loan fees and offer bonuses to brokers for mortgages. Ultimately, to protect their own investments, the guaranty companies swapped good mortgages out of customers’ certificates and transferred them to their own certificates. (Sound familiar?)

Eventually, the scheme collapsed and the state of New York stepped in and "amazingly, managed to clean up the bulk of the mess in just four years of hard, hard work." The state formed a Commission, which eventually had over 1,000 employees, to "take over the guaranty companies and sort out the certificates." What they did was to "preserve the value of the certificates by preserving the value of the underlying real-estate assets."

The process the Commission followed, which was designed to work out the mortgage or dispose of the property in some productive way, could be a useful model for today. The lesson for the current circumstances from the prior effort, according to the HBR post, seems to be to "hire a sufficiently large group of people to track down and preserve the value of the assets underlying all of our current toxic real-estate securities" in a similar manner. It certainly worked in the earlier era; the Commission "recouped 84% of the value of the certificates" and brought "order out of chaos."

Are Bank Failures a Necessary Recovery Prerequisite?: Some readers may have noted that this past Friday night, the FDIC took control of yet another bank, Freedom Bank of Georgia (as noted here). Prior to its closure, the bank, which was located in Commerce, Georgia, had assets of $173 million. This latest bank closure brings the year to date total of failed banks to 17, and the number of banks that have failed just since July 1, 2008 to 39. The FDIC’s complete list of banks that have failed since October 2000 can be found here.

While bank failures are one among the more disturbing parts of the current economic turmoil, they may also be a necessary part of the recovery as well. A March 7, 2009 Washington Post article entitled "Every Bank Failure is Also a Beginning" (here) states that the increase in bank closures is "a sign of the nation’s economic distress," but it is also a "first step toward revival." According to the article, "in wiping away problem loans and brining in new investors, the government is creating the necessary conditions for new lending."

The Post article explains the FDIC’s bank closure process, including its efforts to transfer the bank’s existing banking relationships to a healthier institution. The process is not without its pitfalls, but it is, according to the article, essential to ensuring that a community has banking resources available despite the closed bank’s failure.

The Post article focuses on the events surrounding the closure of the Community Bank of Loganville, Ga., which failed in November 2008 (refer here). Last Friday’s bank closure involved yet another bank from Georgia, the seventh bank in Georgia to fail since October 2007. Many of the failed banks were located in or around Alphretta, Georgia, which earlier this year the Wall Street Journal referred to (here) as "Bank-Failure Central."

Among other things, commentators cited in the Journal article ascribed the rash of bank failures in Georgia to "overabundant home building, years of risky lending and one of the most relaxed environments in the U.S. for starting new banks." The Journal article also states that the failures "reflect an unusually dense concentration of go-go optimism run amok."

Credit Agency Focus: When assigning blame for the current crisis, many commentators often cite the credit rating agencies. Indeed, Time Magazine’s list of the 25 people to blame for the current financial debacle included Kathleen Corbet, who ran S&P for most of the last decade. Whether or not the credit rating agencies are blameworthy is one question; whether they can be held liable for it is yet another, as this blog has previously noted (here).

A recent memorandum by the Jenner & Block firm entitled "Credit Rating Agencies in the Spotlight: A New Casualty of the Mortgage Meltdown" (here) admirably summarizes the legal issues that investor litigation against the credit rating agencies might present. One noteworthy observation in the memo is the possibility federal preemption of state regulatory action under the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. In addition to discussing other defenses that may be available to the credit rating agencies, the article also helpfully cites a lists a number of cases currently pending against the firms.

A recent post in which I discussed the partial denial of the motion to dismiss in the securities lawsuit that Moody’s shareholders filed against the company, and the ruling’s possible implications for the rating agencies’ potential liability for their ratings activities, can be found here.

Liquidity Issues Affect Everything: A company’s inability to access cash when needed can raise a host of complications, including even with respect to pending securities class action lawsuit settlements. As reflected in its March 10, 2009 press release (here), due to liquidity constraints, Korean semiconductor company Pixelplus is unable to fund its agreed $1 million cash contribution to the settlement of the securities class action lawsuit that had been filed against the company.

According to the press release, the court has approved an addendum to the parties’ settlement stipulation with respect to the company’s agreed settlement contribution. The press release states that the company could not make its contribution "due to the economic turmoil in Asia arising from the global financial crisis and the world-wide recession, which continues to have a severe negative impact on the financial position and business operations of the company."

In lieu of the company’s contribution, its insurance carrier is paying about $331,000 (at current exchange rates). The company will make up the difference "if and when such funds become available."

There may be implications here for the growing wave of subprime and credit crisis-related litigation. A cause of action is not worth much if the target company can’t even fund an eventual settlement. There may be more than a few target companies that might eventually prove unable to fund their portion of any eventual settlements.

Citi of the Future: Citigroup’s shares were up today on relatively positive news. However, according to an article in today’s Wall Street Journal (here), "barely a week after the third rescue of Citigroup," U.S officials are weighing "what fresh steps they might need to take if its problems mount." The bank’s continuing problems have, among other things, fueled rampant speculation that the government eventually will be forced to nationalize Citigroup.

The prospect of a nationalized Citigroup might have been unimaginable even a short time ago, but now some at least some folks apparently have no trouble imaging what a government-owned Citibank might be like, as reflected in the following video. (Sensitive readers should be forewarned that this video makes rather promiscuous use of the F-bomb and may otherwise be offensive. On the other hand, it is also very funny.)

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In the lists of those supposedly responsible for the current financial mess, the rating agencies are among those usually featured prominently. Numerous investors have in fact sued the rating agencies claiming the ratings misled them into making their investment (about which refer, for example, here). Whether these investor actions will succeed remains to be seen, but in a recent ruling, at least one court has held that much of the subprime-related securities lawsuit brought against Moody’s by its own shareholders can go forward.

Background

In 2007, Moody’s shareholders sued the company and several of its directors and officers in a series of lawsuits that ultimately were consolidated in the Southern District of New York. (For the background of the case, refer here.)

The consolidated amended complaint alleged that the defendants had falsely claimed that the company was an independent and impartial body, while in fact the company’s arrangements for rating asset-backed securities and other structured investments put it in a conflict of interest and compromised its independence. The amended complaint also alleged that the company falsely claimed to have verified the quality of the underwriting practices at the loan originators whose mortgages were consolidated into the securities being rated.

The amended complaint further alleged that the company misrepresented that the rating scale used for the structured investments was equivalent, and reflected the same risk of default, as the company’s rating scale for traditional financial instruments. Finally, the amended complaint alleged that the defendants had falsely represented that the company derived its revenue from legitimate business practices.

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs’ initial complaint had been filed after the statute of limitations had expired; that the amended complaint failed to adequately allege misrepresentations and materiality; and also that the amended complaint failed adequately to allege loss causation and scienter.

The Court’s February 18, 2009 Order

In a February 18, 2009 order (here), Judge Shirley Wohl Kram denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part, with leave to amend. The practical consequence of the court’s order is that a significant portion of the plaintiffs’ case will now be going forward.

The court first reached the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The defendants had argued that the plaintiffs were put on "inquiry notice" about the supposed fraud due to "storm warnings" as early as 2003. However, the court found that the statements on which the defendants sought to rely "refer to the credit rating industry in general terms and make no specific reference to Moody’s" and there is in any event "no mention of fraud." The court also found that Moody’s management’s "words of comfort preclude a finding of inquiry notice."

The court next determined that the amended complaint adequately alleged material misrepresentations in connection with Moody’s assertions of independence and also with respect to its statements about its assessment of the quality of loan originator underwriting as part of its ratings process.

However, the court found that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged material misrepresentations in connection with the company’s statements about the equivalence of its structure finance rating system to its corporate finance rating system, and about the company’s statements concerning the sources of its revenue.

Even though the court found that the amended complaint’s "poor organization…dilutes Plaintiffs’ allegation of loss causation," the court found that the complaint alleges "sufficient corrective disclosure" to survive a motion to dismiss on the loss causation issue. The court also held that because the defendants failed to establish that Moody’s share price had declined as part of an industry-wide downturn, the defendants had failed to establish a "direct intervening cause" for the share price decline.

Finally, the court held that the amended complaint adequately pled scienter on the part of the company’s CEO as well as the company itself, finding that the CEO’s statements in a confidential slideshow were "revealing" of the CEO’s knowledge that the company "was not truly independent." With respect to the company itself, the court found that the plaintiffs had "alleged specific statements indicating that various top officials knew that Moody’s independence, ratings and methodology had been compromise," and that "consequently" the allegations of the amended complaint "sufficiently plead" the company’s scienter.

The court did however find that the amended complaint had not adequately pled scienter as to the other two individual defendants, the company’s COO and the Managing Director of the Asset Finance Group.

Regarding the claims and defendants with respect to which the motion to dismiss was granted, the court allowed plaintiffs leave to amend, directing them to file their amended complaint by March 18, 2009.

Discussion

The court’s opinion in the Moody’s case is significant in and of itself, as yet another subprime-related securities lawsuit that has survived the motion to dismiss, if only in part. Though the nature of the allegations against Moody’s may be somewhat distinct from those raised in many of the other subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuit, and though the dismissal motion was in fact granted in part, the outcome of the dismissal motion ruling nevertheless underscores that some of the many pending subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits will be going forward.

The ruling, even if based on factual circumstances that arguably are specific to Moody’s, may be of particular significance to the separate securities lawsuits brought by the shareholders of McGraw-Hill (corporate parent of S&P) and by the shareholders of Fimalac (corporate parent of Fitch’s).

The more interesting question is what significance any of the court’s order in the Moody’s case may have for the many lawsuits brought against the rating agencies not by the agencies’ own shareholders but rather by investors who claim to have made their investments in reliance on the integrity and quality of the agencies’ ratings. These other investor lawsuits raise categorically different factual and legal issues that the suits brought by the agencies’ own shareholders.

Nevertheless, even given the differences between the two sets of claimants and the two categories of cases against the rating agencies, the ruling in the Moody’s case may at least provide some context for the investor lawsuits, particularly with respect to the court’s holdings that the shareholder plaintiffs adequately alleged that Moody’s had made material misrepresentations about its independence and processes, and had sufficiently alleged scienter as to the company’s CEO and the company itself. These particular holdings could be relevant in the separate investor lawsuits, at least on those issues.

I have in any event added the court’s February 18 ruling in the Moody’s case to my table of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuit settlements, dismissals and dismissal motion denials, which can be accessed here.

A February 23, 2009 Reuters article regarding the court’s ruling in the Moody’s case can be found here.

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The subprime scapegoating process has resulted in a round up of the usual suspects, including directors and officers of publicly traded companies. But among other targets many aggrieved parties seem particularly keen to blame in the subprime debacle are the rating agencies.

In prior posts (most recently here), I have noted the securities claims that some investors are trying to assert against the rating agencies, notwithstanding the substantial legal barriers (about which refer here) that may exist to the rating agencies’ liability.

The urge to try to hold the rating agencies responsible has reached a creative new level in the action filed on November 17, 2008 by the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, a national coalition of over 600 community-based housing advocacy organizations, against Fitch’s and Moody’s. The complaint was filed with the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) fair housing and equal opportunity unit.

The complaint, which can be found here, purports to be brought under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and alleges that the defendants "facilitated, encouraged and profited from subprime loans that were designed to fail, due to unfair payment terms and borrower income levels that could not sustain home ownership based on those payment terms."

The complaint further alleges that the defendants "unlawful actions caused a disproportionate adverse impact on African Americans and Latinos." The defendants are alleged to have "facilitated…predatory real-estate transactions" through their "unwarranted ratings, which fueled and sustained subprime lending."

The defendants are also alleged to have "facilitated discriminatory conduct" because their "inflated ratings…allowed discriminatory securitized subprime loans to be originated, brokered and serviced." The defendants’ alleged role was "central" because "investors purchased securities based on their ratings," as a result of which the defendants "profited significantly." Further, the defendants "knew or should have known that the predatory practices permeated the subprime securitization market."

The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the rating agencies violated the FHAA, a permanent injunction requiring the agencies to "take all affirmative steps necessary to remedy the effect of the illegal, discriminatory conduct"; and to award NCRC compensatory damages "for the frustration of mission and diversion of resources" the defendants’ conduct allegedly caused.

In its November 18, 2008 press release announcing the complaint (here), NCRC states that if HUD "does not adequately address the issues in the complaint," then the NCRC "will consider civil litigation."

According to a November 29, 2008 Washington Post article describing the complaint (here), the complaint did not name S&P as a third defendant, because the NCRC is "in discussions" with S&P. However, the article also quotes an NCRC source as saying that if discussions with S&P are "unsatisfactory," the NCRC could institute a separate proceeding against S&P.

The NCRC complaint belongs in a category with the nuisance lawsuit the City of Cleveland filed against the major investment banks (about which refer here). Both actions involve novel legal theories, and both attempt to scapegoat downstream deep pockets for the consequences of upstream transactions. Both depend entirely on simplistic causation analyses that disregard the multitude of causes that contributed to the subprime mess.

These blame casting exercises may gratify claimants or even provide catharsis, but these exercises in creative lawyering (and I do not mean that as a compliment) will do little, other than contributing friction costs, to affect the current deplorable conditions in the housing market. To be sure, there are no easy solutions in these circumstances, but simplistic litigation definitely does not help.

Where Were the Auditors?:  A December 1, 2008 CFO.com article entitled "Subprime Suspects" (here) takes a look at the likelihood that litigants will seek to blame auditors for the financial meltdown. The article notes that while claimants undoubtedly will pursue the auditors, "it’s far from clear what burden they will bear – or even what they did wrong."

One school of thought claims the auditors "are at fault for overlooking inflated asset valuations during the mortgage bubble." The other camp says that the "auditors were doing fine until they forced banks to take overly severe write-downs on assets, based on fears that they would face punishment from regulators."

The article suggests that the audit firms "may yet prove bulletproof" because of the difficulty even proving misconduct at their financial institution clients. The firms, however, are likely to face further litigation and are in any event facing their own challenges as a result of the disruptions in the financial and economic marketplace.

Investors Sue Over Mortgage Loan Workouts: In an earlier post (here), I noted the objections investors have raised to the various mortgage modification proposals designed to provide relief to distressed homeowners. I specifically noted concerns investors had raised about the Bank of America’s regulatory settlement in which the bank proposed to restructure over 400,000 mortgages the Countrywide Financial Corporation had originated prior to being acquired by BoA.

As discussed in a December 1, 2008 Business Week article (here), mortgage investors have now initiated a purported class action lawsuit alleging that the proposed modification of the Countrywide mortgages is illegal. The article quotes the lawsuit plaintiff as saying "while these loan adjustments may help to keep struggling borrowers in their homes," the alterations "run the risk of permanently damaging the secondary market for housing finance."

The investor 's lawsuit in New York (New York County) Supreme Court seeks a judicial declaration that under the terms governing the mortgage trust holding the securitized mortgages, "Countrywide is required to purchase any loans on which it agrees to reduce the payments." A copy of the state court complaint can be found here.

Special thanks to David Grais of the Grais & Ellsworth firm (which represents the plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action) for providing a copy of the state court complaint.

The investors clearly are committed to having their concerns about the mortgage modifications heard. The political pressure to provide mortgage relief is substantial. However, there does seem to be reason to be concerned whether future investors will be interested in investing in this class of assets if the investment agreements can be unilaterally altered.

Lehman Excavation: The November 30, 2008 issue of New York Magazine has a cover article entitled "Burning Down His House" (here) about the fall of Lehman Brothers and the role of Lehman CEO Richard Fuld in the firm’s collapse. The article raises the question whether Fuld is a dupe or a victim; the article says:

He held on to 10 million shares of Lehman stock until the end and lost almost $1 billion – "He drank the Kool Aid," said one executive. And consensus grows that the Lehman fall was one of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s and Fed chairman Ben Bernanke’s biggest mistakes.

Professor Ribstein, on his Ideoblog (here), citing the article’s statement that Lehman was "in a financial condition that was even worse than critics suspected," interprets the article as suggesting that Fuld may be the "next loser in the corporate crime lottery."

Hat tip to the Securities Docket blog (here) for the link to the New York Magazine article.

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Those eager to try to hold the credit rating agencies responsible for supposedly enabling the subprime mess will undoubtedly be encouraged by a July 8, 2008 SEC Report identifying rating agency “shortcomings.”

The Report, entitled “Summary Report of Issues Identifies in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Selected Credit Rating Agencies” (here) reflects the SEC’s efforts to “evaluate whether the three leading rating agencies “adhered to their published methodologies for determining ratings and managing conflict of interest.” According to the Commission’s July 8 press release (here), the SEC was “particularly interested in the rating agencies’ policies and practices in rating mortgage-backed securities and the impartiality of their ratings.”

According to a July 8, 2008 CFO.com article about the Report (here), about 50 Commission staffers reviewed more than 100,000 pages of internal records and more than two million E-mail messages, mostly concerning rating activities related to Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) during the period 2002 through 2006. The SEC’s massive review of electronic communications unearthed exchanges that, while not necessarily incriminating, do not reflect well on the overall integrity of the rating process, to say the least.

The SEC’s Report, which does not cite any particular rating agency by name, concludes that the rating agencies “struggled significantly with the increase in the number and complexity of these securities.”

As evidence that the rating agencies struggled with the transaction volume, the Report cites a number of e-mail communications, including one stating that “our staffing issues, of course, make it difficult to justify our fees.”

As evidence that the rating agencies struggled to keep up with the deal complexity, the Report cites another e-mail communication in which an analyst expressed concern that her firm’s model did not capture “half” of the deal’s risk, but that “it could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”

The Report also examines the “issuer pays” conflicts at length. Under this payment approach, the entity that issues the security pays the rating agency for the rating. The Report found that while each of the rating agencies had policies that prohibited rating analysts from discussing fees with the issuers, “these procedures still allowed key participants in the rating process to participate in the fee discussion process.” The Report also found that the rating agencies “do not appear to have taken steps to prevent considerations of market share and other business interests” that “could influence ratings or ratings criteria.”

Along those lines, the SEC found evidence to suggest that analysts were concerned that specific rating actions might affect business or cost market share. The Report quotes one analyst’s email message as stating “I am trying to ascertain whether we can determine at this point if we will suffer any loss of business because of our decision and if so how much.”

The Report also found that there are particular aspects of the RMBS and CDO rating process that may exacerbate some of these “issuer pays” conflicts. For example, the Report noted that the deal “arranger” is “often the primary designer of the deal and as such has more flexibility to adjust the deal structure to obtain the desired credit rating as opposed to managers of non-structured asset classes.”

The high concentration of this business among a very small number of “arrangers,” together with the high profit margins associated with the business, potentially could allow or encourage influence on the use, application and revision of credit rating processes.

The SEC said that it found no evidence that these kinds of considerations affected “rating methodology or models.” However, the Report quoted emails inferentially suggesting that analysts at least turned a blind eye to concerns. One email referring to CDOs as a “monster” and went on to observes that “Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters.”

The Report noted a number of other deficiencies, including the lack of disclosure about rating processes; insufficient documentation of process and of deviations from models to adjust ratings; and lagging surveillance in updating previously issued ratings.

As a result of September 2007 congressional action, the rating agencies must now register with the SEC as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations” (NRSRO). In addition, in June 2008, the SEC issued a set of proposed rules that are designed to address many of the kinds of issues identified in the Report, particularly regarding conflicts of interest, documentation and report transparency. Because the SEC has only been regulating the rating agencies since 2007, it is unclear whether or not the SEC has the authority to file enforcement proceedings against the rating agencies in connection with the conduct described in the report, even if the SEC were otherwise so inclined.

Regulatory processes may well be underway to prevent the recurrence of the kinds of “shortcomings” identified in the Report. The Report also notes a variety of other remedial efforts already underway at the rating agencies themselves. But the Report also catalogs a litany of past practices that clearly may have played a role in the events that led up to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. The ratings shortcomings apparently accompanied (and, it may be argued, enabled) the flood of mortgage securitizations that contributed to the subprime meltdown.

I recently noted (here) that investors and their counsel are starting to try to hold the rating agencies responsible for their investment losses. These claims may well face formidable obstacles (refer here). But, even though the report does not attribute statements or actions to specific rating agencies or to particular transactions, the tenor and content of the SEC’s Report undoubtedly will encourage those who want to try to hold the rating agencies responsible.

Of course, the SEC was able to muster formidable resources and undertake a massive review of electronic communications while passing the cost along to U.S. taxpayers. Those eager to exploit the same communications in separate civil litigation against the rating agencies may be forced to undertake a massive expense just to try to establish whether or not these or similar communications related to the agency or transaction they have targeted.

A July 9, 2008 Wall Street Journal article discussing the Report can be found here. Bloomberg’s July 8, 2008 article about the Report can be found here.

Auditor Liability Cap Alternative: George Washington Law School Professor Larry Cunningham has an interesting post on the Concurring Opinions blog (here) in which he reiterates his proposal for a market-based solution to manage the potentially ruinous liability exposures of auditors. In the post, Professor Cunningham reviews his suggestion that the audit firms “issue bonds in debt markets to provide a backstop against the big judgment,” paying interest commensurate with the risk. I have previously commented on Professor Cunningham’s proposal here.

In his most recent blog post, Professor Cunningham argues persuasively that the auditor liability cat bonds are “a practical, cost-effective solution to the risk that another large auditing firm could disappear.” He also argues that making auditor liability cat bonds a serious point of public debate would reveal the “true stakes” involved in the auditor liability debate.

Special thanks to Professor Cunningham for the link to the blog post.

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About the UnitedHealth Group Class Action Settlement: UnitedHealth Group announced on July 2, 2008 (here) that it reached an agreement to settle its high profile options backdating-related securities class action lawsuit for $895 million. A July 3, 2008 Law.com article discussing the settlement can be found here.

Not only is this settlement the largest options backdating related securities lawsuit settlement to date, it is one of the largest securities settlements ever. The settlement does at least provide some counterweight to the view that some have expressed (refer here) that the options backdating related lawsuits may be settling low compared to historical standards.

This settlement, together with the $750 million Xerox settlement announced in March 2008 (including $80 million from the company’s auditor) and the flood of high profile, high stakes subprime-related litigation, may also undercut the view that has been expressed that overall settlements may begin to decline as the cases from the era of corporate scandals cycle out of the system.

It is probably worth noting that, as reported in the July 3, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here), the UnitedHealth settlement has not yet been completely resolved, as the settlement does not include United ealth’s former CEO William McGuire, nor does it include its former General Counsel, David Lubben.

Although it has not received nearly as much attention, it is also noteworthy that in its July 2 press release UnitedHealth also announced that it had also settled for $17 million the options backdating related ERISA lawsuit pending against the company and certain of its officials. As far as I am aware, this is the roughly half dozen options backdating related ERISA lawsuit to have settled. (To see a complete list of options backdating related ERISA lawsuits, refer here.)

Derivative litigation related to the options backdating woes at UnitedHealth previously resulted in the largest reported derivative settlement, as I discussed in a prior post, here.

I have added the UnitedHealth options backdating securities class action lawsuit settlement and ERISA lawsuit settlement to my table of the options backdating related settlements and dismissals, which can be accessed here.

Credit Rating Lawsuits: As I discussed in a recent post (here), even though the credit rating agencies’ conflicted role has been a central topic in the discussions surrounding the subprime meltdown, the plaintiffs’ lawyers have largely avoided drawing the credit rating agencies into the subprime litigation. However, lawsuits filed just in the past several days suggest that this may be changing, in addition to the lawsuit discussed in my prior post.

Though the plaintiffs’ lawyers had not generally been targeting the credit rating agencies for their rating activities, they have previously filed lawsuits on behalf of the shareholders of Moody’s (refer here) and  of The McGraw Hill Company, parent of Standard & Poor’s (refer here), alleging misrepresentation in their financial disclosures.

As described in a July 1, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have now initiated a shareholder securities class action lawsuit against Fimalac, S.A., the corporate parent of Fitch’s rating agency. According to the press release, the complaint (which can be found here) alleges that the defendants failed to disclose with respect to Fitch’s ratings of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) that:

(i) the information upon which Fitch based its ratings of RMBS and CDOs was misleading and in many cases fraudulent; (ii) to continue to collect fees for its ratings, Fitch was applying lax standards or no standards at all when issuing its RMBS and CDO ratings; and (iii) Fitch was failing to monitor the credit quality of RMBS and CDOs after issuing its initial ratings, as Fitch was obligated to do, and many of these securities had deteriorated badly after Fitch had issued its ratings. Fitch is now under investigation by the New York Attorney General, the Connecticut Attorney General, the Ohio Attorney General and the SEC as a result of its practices of rating billions of dollars of securities without a reasonable basis for doing so and Fimalac’s stock is trading at approximately 50% of its Class Period high.

But the new Fimilac shareholder lawsuit is directed against Fimilac as a reporting company, not directly against the company for Fitch’s rating agency activities. As I noted in my prior post, plaintiffs' lawyers have largely avoided allegations against rating agencies for their rating activities. However, in a lawsuit initiated in New York state court on June 3 , 2008 and removed to federal court on June 23, 2008, plaintiffs have alleged that entities affiliated with Credit Suisse, and the Moody’s, S&P  and the Dominion Bond Rating Service (DRBS) rating agencies misrepresented the values of Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates issued by the Home Equity Mortgage Trusts. (Refer here for background regarding the lawsuit.)

The basis of the claims of liability against the rating agencies in the Home Equity Mortgage Trust lawsuit, as alleged in paragraph 87 of the complaint (here), is that  the rating agencies  “prepared valuations, i.e., assigned ratings to the Certificates, in connection with the Offering, as defined in Section 11 (a)(4) of the Securities Act.” These allegations are similar to the allegations against the credit rating agencies in the HarborView case discussed in my prior post.

Whether or not these cases against the credit rating agencies for their rating activities ultimately go forward remains to be seen. As I have previously discussed (here), the credit rating agencies will contend that their rating activities are protected by the First Amendment.

In addition, it remains to be seen whether the Home Equity Mortgage Trust case will go forward in state or federal court. As discussed at length in my prior post (here), the ’33 Act expressly provides for concurrent state court jurisdiction and also expressly proscribes removal of state court ’33 Act actions to federal court. As discussed here, in at least one case, a federal court has concluded that a ’33 Act claim that has been initiated in state court and removed to federal court must be remanded back to state court.

One More Note About the Fimalac Lawsuit:  Fimilac is a foreign-domiciled company whose shares do not trade on U.S. exchanges. Many of its shareholders obviously are domiciled outside the United States. If these non-U.S. shareholders were to be included in the class, the new class action complaint against Fimilac might present the complicated f-cubed litigant problem (which I discussed most recently here). However, the plaintiffs’ counsel in the Fimilac case purport to represent a class composed solely of U.S. residents, apparently as a way of avoiding the f-cubed litigant problem.

As I discussed in my recent post relating to the new securities class action filed against EADS (refer here), these attempts to plead around the issues involving foreign-domiciled  plaintiffs still test the outer limits of the jurisdictional reach of U.S. securities laws against foreign-domiciled companies whose shares do not trade on U.S. exchanges. The case against Fimilac will be interesting to watch for reasons other than the involvement of a credit rating agency.

And Finally: The news about the dismissal of the lawsuit against Richard Grasso has gained a great deal of press attention. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal, in a July 3, 2008 editorial (here), congratulates Grasso and fellow defendant Kenneth Langone for their success in fighting the lawsuit, which the Journal viewed as an example of the overreaching of former New York AG Eliot Spitzer.  

The Journal’s editorial is perhaps closest to the mark in its observation that “Mr. Grasso is fortunate he had the resources to fight back.” Had Grasso not had the wherewithal to resist, he might never have tasted vindication. Readers of this blog will be particularly interested to know that it was insurance funds – a very large amount of insurance funds – that ultimately allowed Grasso to succeed.

According to Langone, and as reported on Bloomberg (here), in defending themselves against the lawsuit, Grasso, Langone and the NYSE directors “spent more than $70 million fighting the case, all covered by insurance.”

So Grasso is indeed fortunate that he had the resources to fight back, but perhaps contrary to the Journal’s suggestion, and even Grasso’s own prior comments (refer here) it was not his own treasure that financed the fight.

The expenditure of the mind-boggling sum of $70 million in litigating this case is yet another reminder of the extraordinary costs associated with the kind of high stakes litigation in which directors and officers can become involved. As I recently noted (here), the escalating expense associated with this kind of litigation has important implications for limits adequacy assumptions.

While it may be that only extraordinary cases consume these astonishing quantities of money, a company’s D&O program is expected to be able to respond even to catastrophic claims. As seems to be increasingly apparent, the costs associated with just defending a catastrophic claim could exhaust many insurance programs. All of this may suggest the need to reexamine conventional assumptions about limits adequacy.

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As the subprime crisis has unfolded, one of the recurring themes has been the conflicted role of the rating agencies. Last week’s announcement (here) of a negotiated resolution of the New York State regulatory investigation of the rating agencies reflects one aspect of the recurring questions surrounding the rating agencies’ role in the current crisis. These questions are likely to persist in light of the recent revelation (here) that Moody’s continued to assign mortgage-backed securities investment grade ratings despite a whistleblower’s alarm about potential problems with the ratings.

But while the questions about the rating agencies’ role have persisted, and while the agencies own shareholders have sued the rating agencies over the agencies’ own disclosures (about which refer here and here), to date subprime investors have not targeted the rating agencies for their rating activities, to the best of my knowledge.

As discussed in a prior post (here), case law suggests that the rating agencies enjoy First Amendment protection for their rating opinions and activities. And, as also discussed in my prior post, while thoughtful commentators have suggested bases on which these defenses might be overcome with respect to the rating agencies subprime-related investment rating activity, subprime investors have not targeted the rating agencies. Until now.

In a lawsuit filed on May 15, 2008 in New York Supreme Court (New York County), the New Jersey Carpenters’ Vacation Fund has filed a securities class action lawsuit under the ’33 Act on behalf of investors in the three HarborView Mortgage Loan Trusts. In a petition dated June 3, 2008, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. A copy of the notice of removal, to which the original complaint is attached, can be found here.

The defendants in the lawsuit include the three HarborView mortgage pass-through certificate trusts; the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (“RBS Group”) and its subsidiary, Greenwich Capital Holdings and related entities, including Greenwich Capital Acceptance (“GCA”) and five individual directors of GCA; and the three rating agencies, Fitch’s Ratings, Moody’s Investor Services, and McGraw Hill, as corporate parent for Standard & Poor’s Rating Services.

The three trusts were issuers of bonds (the mortgage pass-through certificates) created by RBS Greenwich Capital. The offerings were collateralized with loans originated and underwritten by Countrywide Home Loans. The complain alleges that the Registration Statement issued in connection with the offerings failed to disclose “the true impaired and defective quality of the loans collateralizing the Bonds” and that the “loans were not originated pursuant to the underwriting guidelines stated in the Registration Statement.”

The complaint alleges that the rating agency defendants “failed to conduct due diligence and willingly assigned the highest ratings to such impaired instruments since they received substantial fees from the issuer.” The complaint alleges further that the rating agencies “issued the ratings based on an outdated methodology designed in about 2002.” The ratings were alleged to be misleading because the rating agencies “presumed that the loans were of high credit quality issues in compliance with the stated underwriting guidelines, when, in fact, Countrywide had systematically disregarded its stated Underwriting Guidelines.”

The rating agencies later downgraded the mortgage-backed securities. The complaint alleges that the rating agencies “admission that they had not used an appropriate rating methodology …resulted in a substantial decline in the value of the Bonds.” The plaintiff itself claims that its investment in the instruments has declined by 55 percent.

All of the claims asserted in the Complaint are based on the ’33 Act. In Count I of the Complaint, the plaintiff specifically alleges (in paragraph 98) that the rating agencies “served as appraisers” as defined in Section 11(a)(4) of the ’33 Act. The paragraph further alleges that the rating agencies “purportedly reviewed and analyzed each offering and provided the credit rating for each tranche of the HarborView Bonds.” The paragraph further alleges that the service of providing the ratings “was essential to pricing and marketing the Bonds,” and that the ratings were contained in the Prospectus.

As far as I am aware, the plaintiffs’ complaint in the HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust lawsuit represents the first occasion as part of the current subprime litigation wave where subprime investors have sought to hold the rating agencies liable for their ratings. The plaintiff’s allegations will face a number of hurdles, including the jurisdictional issue discussed below.

In addition, the rating agencies will undoubtedly assert a number of substantive defenses, including the First Amendment defense discussed in my prior blog post (here), as well as whether the rating agencies even owed the plaintiff any duties. The rating agencies will particularly dispute the plaintiffs’ attempt to rely on Section 11(a)(4) of the ’33 Act as a basis for the rating agencies’ liability.

The jurisdictional issue pertains to the plaintiff’s initiation of the lawsuit in state court pursuant to the concurrent state court jurisdiction in Section 22 of the ’33 Act. The HarborView case is just the latest of the state court ’33 Act lawsuits arising as part of the current subprime-related litigation wave, as discussed in my prior post (here). In each case, the defendants have sought to remove these cases to federal court, notwithstanding the express prohibition in Section 22 of removal of state court cases to federal court. In at least one of the prior cases, the federal court has remanded the case back to state court in reliance on Section 22’s express removal prohibition (refer here for a discussion of the prior remand case).

It remains to be seen whether or not these cases will go forward in state or federal court. Although it is not altogether clear why the plaintiffs have sought to pursue these cases in state court, the plaintiffs clearly perceive some advantage in doing so. In any event, the success of the plaintiffs’ attempts to hold the rating agencies liable for their investment in subprime-related securities will be interesting to watch. It will also be interesting to see if other investor plaintiffs similarly seek to hold the credit rating agencies liable.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for providing a copy of the HarborView removal petition.

Run the Numbers: I have added the HarborView case to my running tally of subprime-related securities class action lawsuits. (My tally can be accessed here). According to my count, the addition of this case, as well as the case filed late last week against Franklin Bank Corp. (about which refer here), the current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuits now stands at 88, of which 48 have been filed in 2008.

Speakers’ Corner: On June 19 and 20, 2008, I will be co-Chairing the Mealey’s Subprime Mortgage & Insurance Coverage Litigation Conference at the Ritz-Carlton in Pentagon City, Virginia, with my good friend Matt Jacobs of the Jenner & Block law firm.

The agenda (which can be found here), includes many distinguished speakers and panelists, such as Andrew Carron of NERA Economic Consulting, Adel Turki of Cornerstone Research, Samuel Rudman of the Lerach Coughlin firm, Dan Bailey of Bailey & Cavalieri, John McCarrick of Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge, David Hensler of Hogan & Hartson, and Mitchell Dolin of Covington & Burling.

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