The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

As the dramatic events in the financial marketplace during fall 2008 recede further into the past, the wave of related litigation activity has also clearly started to slow. But a newly filed lawsuit arising directly from the financial crisis suggests that there may still be further credit crisis cases yet to come, particularly as plaintiffs’ lawyers continue to initiate class action litigation with proposed class period cut-off dates well in the past.

As reflected in their November 10, 2009 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have launched a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against certain former officers VeraSun Energy Corp., a of South Dakota-based ethanol producer that filed for bankruptcy on October 31, 2008.

According to the press release, the complaint (a copy of which can be found here) alleges that the defendants failed to disclose that:

(i) VeraSun was, in part, a speculative commodities trader in addition to an ethanol producer; (ii) VeraSun engaged in speculative and risky derivate transactions that exposed the Company to substantial financial and liquidity risk; (iii) VeraSun experienced substantial loses on speculative derivative transactions causing margin pressures on the Company; (iv) as a result of margin pressures from bad speculative derivative transactions, the Company sold out of a large short position in corn and incurred substantial losses; (v) the Company entered into highly risky "accumulator" contracts that obligated VeraSun to purchase increasing amounts of corn after the price of corn fell in price per bushel; and (vi) VeraSun’s financial condition and especially its liquidity were negatively impacted as a result of speculative commodity transactions, ultimately causing the Company to file for bankruptcy.

The complaint further alleges  that:

On September 16, 2008, VeraSun announced that it commenced a public offering of 20 million shares of its common stock to raise money for "general corporate purposes." The true purpose of this public offering was to raise capital in an effort to prevent a disastrous impact from the huge losses experienced by the Company as a result of its speculative trading and risky bets on the price of corn.

Not only are these events all well over one year ago, but the proposed class period also covers a segment of time that is also well past -- the complaint purports to be filed on behalf of a class of persons who purchased VeraSun shares between March 12, 2008 and September 16, 2008.

The complaint’s allegations resemble the facts and circumstances alleged in a number of credit crisis-related cases that were filed last fall, where (as described here) the defendant companies were alleged to have suffered significant financial reverses due to wrong way bets on commodities or currencies, often (as was the case with VeraSun) in connection with hedging transactions. In each case, the sudden and dramatic events in the financial markets during September and October 2008 produced a magnified impact on financial condition of these companies.

The prior lawsuits generally were filed closer in time to the events involved, while the VeraSun case has only just been filed. The lapse in time between the events alleged and the VeraSun lawsuit filing is, however, consistent with the filing pattern that has emerged during 2009, where (as noted here) numerous newly filed complaints have proposed class period cutoff dates that fall well before the filing date.

I have previously speculated that these seemingly belated filings may perhaps reflect a filing backlog that developed as plaintiffs’ lawyers were caught up in the rush of credit crisis related lawsuits and Madoff related litigation. The VeraSun case filing suggests that this apparent backlog may even include yet to be filed credit crisis-related lawsuits, which in turn suggests that there there may be more credit crisis suits yet to come.

The VeraSun case is also the latest example of a securities class action lawsuit arising in the wake of a corporate bankruptcy. The surging numbers of business-related bankruptcies may further contribute to the further instigation of securities class action litigation. The possibility of these kinds of cases arising, like the VeraSun case, well after the bankruptcy date suggests these cases could continue to arrive for some time to come.

All of which suggests to me that, even of the pace of new credit crisis-related securities lawsuit filings have declined, the litigation fallout from the global financial crisis is likely to continue to accumulate in the months ahead.

I have in any event added the VeraSun case to my list of credit crisis related cases, which can be accessed here.

Another Options Backdating-Related Securities Suit Settlement: Another one of the remaining options backdating-related securities lawsuits has settled. As reflected in their October 15, 2009 stipulation of settlement (here), the parties to the Sonic Solutions options backdating-related securities suit have agreed to settle the case for $5 million.

A complete list of the options backdating-related lawsuit resolutions can be accessed here.

Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog has been tracking (here) the options backdating related settlements.Adjusting his data to take account of the Sonic settlement would mean that 30 of the 39 options backdating-related securities class action lawsuits have now been resolved, with nine of these cases having been dismissed and twenty-one of them having been settled. Prior to the Sonic settlement, the average settlement amount was $77.8 million – or $33.23 million if the outsized UnitedHealth settlement is disregarded.

UPDATE: The Securities Litigation Watch has updated its options backdating settlement tally and analysis to reflect the Sonic settlement, here.

My Dinner with Bill: I am in Chicago this week at the PLUS International Conference, where the keynote speaker was none other than Bill Clinton. Let me just say that he though he is now "only" a former President, he retains all of his rhetorical powers. His speech was entertaining, thought-provoking, funny and serious, and impressive.

During the Q&A, one of the questions he was asked is a rather conventional parlor game question: if you could have dinner with any historical figure, who would you choose and why? Perhaps because it was a conventional question, he gave a rather conventional, almost undergraduate-approval-seeking type answer. And being a politician, he couldn’t name just one person – he named three: Socrates, Jesus, and Genghis Kahn. Clinton had his reason for each of the three.

I will grant you that Genghis Kahn is an interesting answer, but the other two are safe, predictable and, well, kind of boring. I will stipulate that everyone if they had a chance would want to meet Jesus. Socrates is pretty much in the same category. (Same with Gandhi and Winston Churchill) So if we all agree that Jesus and Socrates (and Gandhi and Churchill) are not available, which historical figure would you want to have dinner with?

Because Clinton gave himself three choices, I am going to give myself three as well.

First, I would choose Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, also known as the Bishop of Autun. Talleyrand lived through some of the most interesting events in all of human history and somehow not only managed to be involved in them all, but what is perhaps a more impressive feat, to have survived them all. He was involved in the French revolution from the start and even acted as foreign minister to the revolutionary government. He later managed to become a key advisor to Napoleon, until they fell out over policy. Ultimately, he became one of the key players in the Bourbon restoration. Though often reviled as unprincipled and cynical, I believe he may have been one of the most interesting people in the grand march of history, and he certainly led one of the most interesting lives.

Second, I would choose Moshe ben Maimon, now known as Maimonides, the Jewish theologian, physician and philosopher. He also lived at an incredibly interesting time, having been born in Islamic Spain in the twelfth century and then fled persecution through Northern Africa. His wisdom, scholarship and knowledge of languages have shaped European thought up until this very day. He was among the first Europeans both to appreciate and advocate Aristotle. His rationalist philosophy would still appeal to most moderns, which to me is a reflection of what an original and powerful thinker he was.

Having chosen two historical figures, I feel I should be a little bolder and unconventional with my last choice. So my third selection is John Lennon. He was a radical advocate for peace whose art and originality touched the lives of millions.

A dinner with all three of these persons simultaneously would be chaos. But a dinner with any one of them (language and cultural issues aside) would be fascinating.

So, now you have Bill Clinton’s choices and my choices. Who would you choose? And why? If you are attending the conference and you have views on this question, I hope you will stop me and let me know your thoughts. And if you are not at the conference, I hope you will use the comment function on this blog to let me and other readers know what you think.

The one final thought I have to add is that , after having heard Bill Clinton speak today, honestly, I think a dinner with him would be pretty damn interesting, too.  I suspect we could talk about Talleyrand and Maimonides and even John Lennon or Genghis Kahn and it would be memorable and entertaining.

UPDATE: My friend and former colleague Marty Hacala provided the following e-mail answer to my dinner guest question: 

I agree that Clinton's answer was boring and conventional. We are after all talking about a dinner party and not a lecture. Who wants to listen to a failed carpenter and a suicidal Greek talk about the hereafter while picking at their food? Genghis Khan is an interesting choice if only because he might tire of the conversation and dispatch the first two before dinner has even begun.

My invitations would go to Oscar Wilde, Abraham Lincoln and Groucho Marx. (I could substitute Churchill for Lincoln, but I fear the alcohol wouldn't last and so the meal would end on an unhappy note.) Just imagine the stories they would tell? I see myself sitting there mesmerized listening to Wilde and Marx trade high and low-brow barbs, while Lincoln tells long stories of how they remind him of mostly made up characters from his youth. It would be an evening to remember. 　

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It is always useful to look at aggregate securities lawsuit filing data to try to determine what trends and themes can be discerned, but occasionally it is also useful to look at a single new filing whether it might suggest anything. To choose one example, a closer look at a new securities class action lawsuit filed on October 14, 2009 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Advanta Corporation and certain of its directors and officers seems to reflect a variety of different securities litigation tendencies and motifs.

Advanta at one time was the country’s largest issuer of Visa and MasterCard credit cards, through its subsidiary, Advanta Bank Corp. As reflected in the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ October 14, 2009 press release (here), the lawsuit alleges that the defendants failed "to disclose the impact of the economic environment and the deteriorating credit trends on its business and that the Company failed to adequately and timely record losses for its impaired loans and customer delinquencies, causing its financial results to be materially false."

Specifially, the complaint (which can be found here) alleges that:

(a) Advanta’s assets contained tens of millions of dollars worth of impaired credit card receivables for which the Company had not accrued losses; (b) prior to and during the Class Period, Advanta had been extremely aggressive in granting credit to customers without verifying the customers’ ability to pay, to such a degree that by the summer of 2009, Advanta customers’ default rate would be almost six times worse than industry average; (c) Advanta’s manipulation of its cash rewards program angered customers and caused the Company to lose good, creditworthy customers; (d) Advanta’s credit receivables were unduly risky due to the Company’s practice of issuing credit cards to small business owners without, in many instances, verifying income; (e) defendants failed to properly account for Advanta’s continuing delinquent customers and the credit trends in the Company’s portfolio, resulting ultimately in large charges to reflect impairments; and (f) the Company was not on track to be profitable in 2008.

The complaint alleges that the company’s share price plunged after its October 2007 disclosure that it was experiencing a higher rate of delinquencies. The complaint alleges that thereafter the news only got worse, and in May 2009 the company announced in May 2009 the cancellation of "millions of cards held by small businesses." On June 30, 2009, the FDIC entered a cease and desist order (here) against Advanta Bank following allegations of unsafe and unsound banking practices.

Though the complaint references these more recent events, the putative class period proposed in the complaint runs from October 31, 2006 through November 27, 2007.

This complaint is of course a reflection of the specific circumstance alleged with respect to this one company and its banking subsidiary. Nevertheless, the complaint also reflects a number of different securities litigation themes and trends, some of which are well-established and some of which may only just be emerging.

First, this case is yet another example of the kinds of litigation that may emerge in connection with the growing numbers of troubled banks. As I have noted in numerous posts (most recently here), though the level of litigation involving failed and troubled banks is still well below what might be expected given the number of distressed institutions, a number of lawsuits have begun to emerge and there may yet be more in the future.

Second, while I have noted elsewhere that as 2009 has progressed the wave of subprime and credit crisis related litigation definitely seems to have slowed (or even just merged into larger litigation developments to the point that it may no longer be its own separately identifiable category of litigation), this case suggests that it is far too early to declare that the litigation wave has ended. Obviously, there may yet be other cases that raise similar credit related lawsuits in the months ahead.

This case also demonstrates with respect to the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave that the lawsuits encompass a wide variety of kinds and categories of credit, including, as shown here, credit card debt. As noted here with respect to the litigation involving American Express, there have been prior credit crisis securities lawsuits filed with respect to issues concerning credit card debt.

Third, the 23-month gap between the end of the proposed class period and the filing of this lawsuit is yet another example of the significant number of filings in the second and third quarter of 2009 that involve class period cutoff dates in the distant past. As noted in prior posts (most recently here), this phenomenon might suggest that while the plaintiffs’ lawyer were previously preoccupied filing numerous credit crisis and Madoff related lawsuits, they developed a backlog of cases that they have now started to work off.

Indeed, just in the past several days there have been several other cases with long past class period cutoff dates, including the lawsuit recent filed involving RHI Entertainment (filed on October 8, 2009, class period cutoff of June 19, 2008); Men’s Wearhouse (filed on October 8. 2009, class period cutoff date of January 9, 2008); and EnergySolutions (filed October 9, 2009, class period cutoff date of October 14, 2008).

Apparently, as the Advanta case suggests, the backlog may even include other credit crisis cases, which is yet another reason that, as noted above, there may be still other credit crisis cases yet to come.

In any event, I have added this case to my list of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be found here. If this case is any indication, there could be others credit crisis securities cases yet to come.

Courtroom Drama: While we all remain interested in the developments in the ongoing trial in the Vivendi securities class action lawsuit, there is certainly nothing new about courtroom drama, and some of the most compelling courtroom tales have an ancient and venerable pedigree.

A particularly engaging tale of courtroom drama is told in The Life and Times of Constantine the Great, a biography of the Roman emperor by D.G. Kousoulas. During Constantine’s reign, Athanasius, the bishop of Alexandria and one of the protagonists in the long-running Arian controversy, was accused by his foes of murder. An inquest of bishops and imperial officials was convened.

At the inquest, the accusers presented their case against Athanasius, and even produced a blackened hand, allegedly that of the victim, Arsenius. Kousoulas describes the scene:

After the accusers had enjoyed a moment of triumph as they passed the blackened hand around, Athanasius asked in a quiet voice if any of those present knew Arsenius personally. A number of bishops claimed to have known the murdered bishop well. Would they recognize him if they saw him, Athanasius asked. Certainly, they replied, "if he were alive." At that point Athanasius signaled to a man who was standing near the doorway, his face covered with his cloak. The man, his face still covered, moved to the front. "Lift your cloak," Athanasius said. The man removed the cloak and [as a contemporary account noted] "lo and behold it was Arsenius himself." Athanasius moved closer and drew first one and then the other sleeve. Aresenius had both of his hands. "Has God given a man more than two hands?" Athanasius asked with a sarcastic smile.

***

For a moment there was stunned silence. Then one of the accusers declared loudly that all this was sorcery and devil’s work. The man was not Arsenius although he had his face, he was not even human but an illusion produced by Athanasius with his knowledge of black magic. Athanasius asked the bishops to come and touch the man he was accused of having murdered. The meeting turned into a brawl, and Dionysius, the imperial officer attending the meeting on orders from Constantine, had to hurry Athanasius out to save his life.

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By now it is not news that the current credit crisis and related litigation wave have both spread far beyond the residential real estate sector in which they both first began. But the details surrounding the extension remain interesting and may even contain hints about what may lie ahead, as suggested by a recent lawsuit.

As reflected in their February 20, 2009 press release (here), plaintiffs’ attorneys have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against American Express and its CEO and CFO. The complaint (which can be found here) is filed on behalf of those persons who purchased the company’s securities between March 1, 2007 and November 12, 2008.

According to the complaint, American Express is the world’s largest issuer of charge cards. The complaint alleges that during the class period, the company "deviated from its historical strategy" of targeting the "premium market sector" and instead "engaged in riskier lending," while it "reassured investors and analysts that it did not engage in such riskier transactions."

The complaint alleges that the defendants "mislead investors by falsely representing American Express’s exposure to the riskiest credit card holders." The complaint alleges that the defendants repeated these reassurances to "artificially support" the company’s share price "as the building credit crisis in the market punished most companies that dealt with risky customers."

The complaint further alleges that as a result of the company’s "shift to risky card business," its brand has been "cheapened" and its stock has dropped over 65%. The complaint also alleges that the company won approval to convert to a bank holding company in order to qualify for TARP money – "a capital infusion required to save the Company from its risky endeavors."

On the one hand, it is hardly surprising in this environment that any credit lending facility should be experiencing difficulties or that those difficulties might result in litigation. But on the other hand, this new lawsuit does demonstrate both how far afield from the original subprime-related problems that triggered the current crisis, and how diverse the credit problems are that are now driving the related credit crisis litigation wave.

For some time now, the spreading subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave has spread to encompass sectors of the credit marketplace beyond just subprime lending. Some time ago, for example, student lenders were drawn in (refer here), as were commercial construction companies (refer here). The involvement of a credit card company represents just another category of the credit marketplace to be drawn into the litigation wave.

But even though this new lawsuit may be just an extension of previously existing trends, it still has some ominous overtones. For one thing, American Express may be one of the largest providers of consumer credit, but it is far from the only one. Many businesses, other than just credit card companies, depend at some level upon the extension of consumer credit as part of their business model. The financial troubles these companies are now facing could also mean vulnerability to possible future litigation.

Another troubling note suggested by American Express’s woes is that a great deal of consumer debt, like the residential real estate debt, was packed into securities backed by the debt. The challenges facing the mortgage-backed securities market are at this point well known. Deteriorating conditions in the consumer credit arena could have significant implications for securities backed by the consumer debt.

In the meantime, American Express seems to be taking matters into its own hands to try to avoid further defaults as the recession deepens. According to February 23, 2008 news reports (here), American Express has offered to pay some cardholders $300 to pay off their outstanding balances and close their accounts by April 30, 2009. According to the news reports, analysts are concerned that credit card defaults could reach 11 percent by year end. One commentator is quoted as saying that what the company is trying to do is to "move to the front of the line in terms of getting paid back."

In any event, I have added the American Express complaint to my running tally of the subprime and credit crisis related securities litigation, which can be accessed here. With the addition of the American Express complaint, the current litigation tally now stands at 162, of which 19 have been filed so far in 2009. A spreadsheet reflecting the 2009 cases can be found here.

Special thanks to Adam Savett at the Securities Litigation Watch for the link to the American Express Complaint.

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I have previously tried to anticipate the future direction of the credit crisis litigation wave (refer, for example, here), but what I failed to foresee is that as the credit crisis itself has entered the remedial phase – or what we all hope turns out to be the remedial phase – there also would be litigation arising from the administration of the remedies. A recent securities lawsuit demonstrates how circumstances surrounding the government’s bailout efforts can lead to litigation.

As reflected in their February 9, 2009 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama against Colonial BancGroup and certain of its officers. Colonial is a bank holding company that operates Colonial Bank, N.A., which has 347 bank branches in Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Nevada and Texas, and over $26 billion in assets.

The lawsuit relates to Colonial’s efforts to obtain TARP money, and in particular to the company’s December 2, 2008 and January 27, 2009 press releases discussing the company’s TARP-related efforts. A copy of the complaint can be found here. Special thanks to Courthouse News Service for the complaint.

In its December 2, 2008 press release entitled "Colonial BancGroup Received Preliminary Approval from the U.S. Treasury for $550 Million in Capital" (here), Colonial announced that it had "received preliminary approval" to participate in the Treasury Department’s capital purchase program, pursuant to which Colonial "will receive $550 million from the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008."

In the December 2 press release, Colonial also stated that in exchange for its investment, the Treasury was to receive preferred shares paying a 5% dividend for the first five years. If the preferred shares are not redeemed within five years, the dividend rate increases to 9%. The press release also stated that the Treasury will also receive warrants to purchase shares of Colonial.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ February 9 press release, in response to Colonial’s December 2 announcement, Colonial’s share price "surged over 50 percent from its $2 per share close on December 1, 2008 to close at $3.08 per share on December 2, 2008."

However, the complaint alleges that the defendants failed to disclose that "Colonial would be required to raise additional outside capital of $300 million before it could receive the $550 million in TARP funding." The complaint further alleges that Colonial "belatedly disclosed" this requirement after the markets closed on January 27, 2009. The complaint alleges that in response to the company’s January 27 announcement, Colonial’s share price declined 45%, from $1.58 per share to $0.85 per share.

Colonial’s January 27, 2009 press release, which can be found here, stated that Colonial’s participation in TARP is "subject to Colonial’s increasing equity by $300 million." The January 27 press release also states that Colonial is "actively pursuing a variety of capital raising alternatives to increase equity by $300 million, which should satisfy this condition of the TARP preliminary approval."

As discussed in a February 6, 2009 Birmingham Business Journal article (here), Colonial’s announcement that it must raise $300 million of additional funds to qualify for TARP "is raising eyebrows among some banking analysts and banking experts." The article quotes one commentator as saying that this item represents "a pretty significant omission" on Colonial’s part in its announcement of the TARP funding. The article also quotes an analyst as saying she felt "deceived" by the bank because it "withheld important information."

The Colonial lawsuit is far from the first credit crisis-related securities lawsuit in which governmental intervention of one sort or another is involved. For example, the government’s role in brokering Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch features prominently in the securities lawsuit recently filed against BofA (about which refer here). The need for governmental rescues has also featured in a number of other credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, including for example, the lawsuits filed against Fortis (refer here), ING (refer here), and the Royal Bank of Scotland (refer here). But so far as I know, the Colonial case is the first securities lawsuit where the allegations are tied directly to the TARP funding program.

I supposed that after more than two years of credit crisis litigation, as well as massive governmental involvement in the financial markets, it should come as little surprise that we have reached the point where lawsuits relating to the bailout efforts themselves are starting to arise. I suppose we should start getting ready now for the inevitable stimulus-related lawsuits which undoubtedly will follow not long after Congress finishes its current efforts.

The Colonial lawsuit does raise an interesting categorization issue, which is whether the case properly should be counted as credit crisis-related and grouped with the previously filed credit crisis-related securities lawsuits. After reviewing Colonial’s press releases and considering the reasons why the company needed TARP money in the first place, I have concluded that the lawsuit is related to the ongoing credit crisis and therefore it belongs in my running tally of credit crisis related securities lawsuits.

My running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits can be accessed here. With the addition of the Colonial lawsuit, the tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits that have been filed during the period 2007 through 2009 now stands at 156, of which 15 have been filed in 2009. A spreadsheet showing the 2009 credit crisis related securities lawsuits can be accessed here.

One final note about TARP -- the Bank Lawyer's Blog reports (here) that some banks in the Dallas area are advertising the fact that they haven't taken TARP money because they don't need to. That line of analysis could get awfully murky under the Treasury department's proposed updated bailout approach, under which banks will be "stress tested" and only the likeliest to survive will receive aid.

Madoff Update: Regular readers know that in addition to my running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, I have also been maintaining a separate tally of Madoff-related litigation. The Madoff-related litigation register, which can be accessed here, is subdivided into multiple tables, reflecting the various types of litigation that has arisen out of the Madoff scandal.

I recently updated the Madoff lawsuit register by adding a number of new Madoff lawsuits, based on excellent information, materials and links provided by several readers, including in particular Jon Jacobson of the Greenberg Traurig law firm. My special thanks to all for the contributions.

And Finally: Describing it as "the beginning of a long process," the SEC Actions blog has a post (here) discussing the partial settlement that Bernard Madoff has reached with the SEC. The WSJ.com Law Blog also has a post here describing the partial settlement. A link to the SEC’s litigation release regarding the partial settlement can be found here.

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The credit-crisis securities litigation wave, which began with the filing of the first subprime mortgage-related lawsuits in early February 2007, is about to enter its third year. Though the wave has evolved during the intervening period, it shows no sign of slowing down. The more interesting question going forward will be whether the litigation, which up until now has largely been concentrated in the financial sector, will spread to encompass companies in the wider economy.

The Wave’s History – So Far

The current subprime and credit crisis-related securities litigation wave began on February 8, 2007, with the filing of a securities lawsuit against New Century Financial Corporation and certain of its directors and officers. (Refer here for my most recent post on the New Century case.) Two years later, there have been 152 separate subprime or credit crisis-related lawsuits filed against companies and other entities, as reflected in my running tally of the suit, which can be accessed here.

The initial cases during 2007 were largely filed against subprime loan originators, banks, mortgages companies, home builders and residential real estate investment trusts. However, by year end 2007, a number of lawsuits had also been filed against investment banks, investment advisors, and rating agencies.

During 2007, there were a total of 40 subprime-related securities lawsuits filed.

In 2008, the lawsuits against banks and other mortgage originators continued to mount, but the litigation activity spread beyond just residential mortgage and real estate issues. The litigation also involved student lenders, commercial construction companies, commercial real estate investment trusts, bond insurers, and mortgage guaranty insurers. As I noted at the time (refer here), by early 2008, the litigation activity was no longer just about the subprime meltdown but had by that time become a credit crisis litigation wave.

The litigation wave also picked up considerable momentum during 2008, driven in part by the onslaught of cases involving auction rate securities. A total of 21 separate auction rate securities lawsuits were filed in 2008, against broker dealers, security issuers and mutual funds, among others. There were also a significant number of separate securities lawsuits filed on behalf of preferred shareholders and subordinated debtholders, which represents a relatively unusual securities litigation development, as discussed here.

The crisis in the global financial markets during fall 2008 also significantly affected the litigation wave. As I noted here, as a result of the financial market turmoil, the litigation wave reached an "inflection point" during the third quarter of 2008, where companies began to find themselves exposed to litigation not because of their own direct vulnerability to the credit crisis, but because of the companies’ exposure to other companies that were experiencing credit crisis-related issues.

During 2008, a total of 101 subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits were filed.

As 2009 has begun, the litigation wave has shown no sign of slowing down. Indeed, during January 2009 alone, there were eleven new credit crisis-related securities lawsuits. A spreadsheet of the 2009 cases can be found here.

One important consequence of the litigation wave’s evolution over time is that it has become increasingly difficult to maintain absolute definitional clarity about what should be included in the category. This challenge has become even more difficult now that the financial crisis basically encompasses the entire global economy. It has become progressively tricky to determine whether or not newly filed lawsuits logically ought to be group together with the earlier suits, or whether they represent something entirely different. This categorization challenge has made simply "counting" the subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits increasingly more difficult over time.

Financial Sector Concentration

Though the litigation has evolved and become more diverse, the litigation activity has largely been concentrated in the financial sector. Of the 152 subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits that have been filed as of February 4, 2009 and that involved companies or other entities that have assigned standard industrial classification codes (SIC Codes), fully 117 of them have involved companies or other entities with SIC Codes in the 6000 series (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate).

Moreover, the 18 entities that have been sued but that have no SIC Code designated are also almost exclusive concentrated in the financial sector. These entities include mutual funds, private equity firms, hedge funds, and foreign firms whose shares do not trade on U.S. exchanges (e.g., Fortis and Société Générale).

Of the financial companies, the SIC Code categories with the largest number of lawsuits were SIC Code 6021 (National Commercial Banks) and SIC Code 6798 (Real Estate Investment Trusts), both of which had 16 lawsuits. Other categories with a significant number of securities lawsuits include SIC Code 6211 (Security Broker Dealers), which had 13 lawsuits; SIC Code 6189 (Asset Backed Securities), which had 12 lawsuits; and SIC Code 6035 (Savings Institutions, Federally Chartered), which had 11 lawsuits.

Has the Wave Entered a New Phase?

But while the litigation activity has largely been concentrated in the financial sector, there has more recently been a "new wave" of credit crisis lawsuits, as discussed at greater length here. These new wave lawsuits involved companies exposed to some of the credit crisis casualties (Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, American International Group, etc); that made wrong-way bets on commodities or currencies; and companies outside the financial sector whose balance sheets are laden with auction rate securities or other troubled assets.

The interesting question these new wave cases present is how far outside the financial sector these kinds of cases will spread as we go forward.

How are the Cases Faring?

Even though the subprime and credit crisis-securities litigation wave is about to enter its third year, most of the cases are still only in their earliest stages. There has really been only one significant settlement, the recent massive $550 million settlement involving Merrill Lynch (about which refer here). The few other settlements have been considerably more modest (refer here).

Only a handful of these cases have even reached the motion to dismiss stage. Among the cases where dismissal motions actually have been addressed, there have been several notable cases in which the dismissal motions were denied – for example, the New Century case (refer here) and the Countrywide case (refer here).

On the other hand, there have also been a handful of cases in which the motions to dismiss have been granted, and at least some courts have seemed skeptical that the target companies financial woes were the result of fraud (about which refer here).

My complete list of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuit settlements, dismissals and dismissal denials can be found here.

Looking Ahead

Even though the litigation wave is about to enter its third year, it is clear that we have still only just begun. With the cases already filed only in their earliest stages and with new lawsuits continuing to pour in, the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave is likely to continue to remain an important feature of the litigation landscape for years and years to come.

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The growing problems surrounding option adjustable-rate mortgages (Option ARMs) are a concern I have previously noted (here). But it now appears that the problems may be far worse even than previously feared. These problems not only represent a growing threat to borrowers and lenders alike, but the also present the increasing likelihood for further shareholder litigation.

According to a January 30, 2009 Wall Street Journal article entitled “Option ARMs See Rising Defaults” (here), nearly $750 billion in Option ARMs were issued from 2004 to 2007. Unfortunately, as of December 2008, 28% of Option ARMs were in default or foreclosure, and an additional 7% involved properties that have already been take back by lenders. A chart accompanying the Journal article shows that the Option ARM default rate is already far greater now than was the subprime default rate at the beginning of 2008.

Borrowers holding Option ARM mortgages now find themselves having to play a particularly unattractive hand. In particular, as a result of the way these loans are structured, borrowers that have been paying only the minimum have likely seen their principal amount due increase as a result of so-called “negative amortization.”

At the same time, housing values around the country have declined. The Journal article reports that more than 55% of borrowers with Option ARMs owe more than the current value of their homes.

Think that sounds bad? Things are about to get worse. A lot worse.

As detailed in a lengthy January 4, 2009 post on the Seeking Alpha blog (here), the interest rates on billions of dollars are due to reset in 2009 and 2010. The problems that likely will ensue “are expected to be more pronounced than the subprime crisis since the economy is already nearing its trough, the consumer confidence has slumped to an all time recent history low and financial markets are in a gridlock.”

In explaining why the problems associated with the Option ARM resets could be so bad, the Seeking Alpha blog post goes through a detailed analysis of the timing and likely magnitude of the resets. In explaining the problems that could follow, the author notes:

The potential average payment increase on the loans recast is 63%, representing an additional $1,053 due each month on top of the current average payment of $1,672. These large payment increases could cause delinquencies to increase, and increase dramatically, after the recast. The fact that only 65% of borrowers have elected (or are able) to make only minimum payments underscores the magnitude of the potential problem. The potential payment shock combined with the continuous deteriorating outlook for home prices and lack of refinancing opportunities could be a negative cause of concern for investors in Option ARM securities. Even more ominous, is pall cast upon the banks that hold these assets and are additionally exposed to other forms of consumer credit, ie. HELOCs, credit card debt and other unsecured loans.

As a result of these problems and possibilities, sources quoted in the Journal article estimate that more than half of all option ARMs outstanding will default, and that nearly 61% of options ARMs originated in 2007 will eventually default.

These looming problems not only represent a threat to borrowers, investors and lenders, but they also present the possibility for even further litigation.

Problems arising from Option ARM mortgages have already been the source of considerable securities litigation. The most recent lawsuit involves Triad Guaranty, which provides private mortgage insurance products to residential mortgage lenders and investors in the United States.

As reflected in their January 29, 2009 press release (here), plaintiffs’ attorneys have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Middle District of North Carolina against Triad and certain of its directors and officers. According to the press release, the complaint (which can be found here), alleges that

beginning in late August 2007 and continuing throughout 2008, Triad began to acknowledge serious issues surrounding its exposure to anticipated losses and defaults related to its book of business for its Alt-A and pay-option adjustable rate mortgage (“ARM”) products written in 2006 and 2007 due to a failure to engage in proper underwriting practices, resulting in a decline in Triad’s stock price. Then, on November 10, 2008, Triad issued its financial results for the third quarter of 2008, reporting a net loss for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 of $160.1 million. On this news, Triad’s stock price dropped $0.11 per share to close at $0.70 per share on November 11, 2008.

The complaint further alleges that the defendants concealed from the investing public that:

(a) the Company was not adequately accounting for its loss reserves in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, causing its financial results to be materially misstated; (b) the Company failed to engage in proper underwriting practices for its book of business related to insurance written in 2006 and 2007, including the insurance related to its Alt-A and pay-option ARM products; (c) the Company had far greater exposure to anticipated losses and defaults related to its book of business related to insurance written in 2006 and 2007, including its Alt-A and pay-option ARM portfolios, than it had previously disclosed; (d) the Company lacked effective internal controls to detect fraud and misrepresentations in the underwriting process; and (e) the Company failed to disclose the true risks associated with its ability to continue to write new business and, given rating downgrades and capital limitations, the Company would be forced to liquidate its Canadian subsidiary and stop writing new insurance policies and transition the business to run-off.

Even before this recent lawsuit was filed against Triad, there had already been a number of securities lawsuits raising allegations concerning Option ARMs, including for example cases filed against Wachovia (refer here), Washington Mutual (refer here) and Downey Financial (refer here).

All of those prior lawsuits involved either companies that issued the Option ARMs or the issuers’ successors in interest. Triad, by contrast, is not an issuer but rather is a mortgage insurer. Triad’s involvement in a securities lawsuit raising Option ARM-related allegations highlights the potential for extensive further litigation, involving not just the issuers themselves but other types of companies as well.

I have in any event added Triad to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities litigation, which can be accessed here. With the addition of the Triad lawsuit, the current tally of subprime and credit crisis related securities litigation filed during the period 2007 through 2009 now stands at 150, of which eight have been filed in 2009. A spreadsheet reflecting the 2009 lawsuits can be found here.

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As has been well-publicized, within a matter of weeks of closing its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, Bank of America announced previously undisclosed 4Q08 operating losses at Merrill of $21.5 billion that required BofA to obtain an emergency $20 billion cash injection from the U.S. Treasury, as well as an additional $118 billion asset backstop. BofA’s stock market valuation has dropped more $100 billion since the day before the merger was announced through the company’s January 16 earnings release.

As the Wall Street Journal reported (here), questions immediately arose following BofA’s announcement of the Merrill losses, such as why BofA’s CEO Kenneth Lewis "didn’t discover the problems prior to the Sept. 15 deal announcement" and "why he didn’t disclose the losses prior to the vote on the Merrill deal on Dec. 5 or before closing the deal on Jan. 1."

With these kinds of questions circulating, it comes as no surprise that plaintiffs’ attorneys have initiated litigation. There were actually two different lawsuits announced on January 21, 2009 relating to these circumstances. Both of the lawsuits purport to be filed on behalf of persons who held BofA securities on October 10, 2008, the record date for the December 5, 2008 special meeting of shareholders to approve the merger.

The first of these two lawsuits was filed in the Southern District of New York, as described in the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ January 21 press release (here). The second was filed in the Northern District of Georgia, as described a separate January 21 press release (here). The complaint in the N.D.Ga. action can be found here.

Both complaints name as defendants Bank of America and certain of its directors and officers. The S.D.N.Y. action also names Merrill’s CEO John Thain as a defendant as well. Both lawsuits allege that the defendants made materially false and misleading statements in the proxy materials in order to secure sufficient proxies to approve the merger. The defendants are alleged to have known that excessive losses at Merrill should have been disclosed to allow shareholders a well-informed vote on the merger.

Of all the interesting issues surrounding these circumstances, the most significant is the question of when BofA became aware of the magnitude of Merrill’s losses. (A related question is when Merrill became aware of the losses, but don’t expect any Merrill shareholders to raise the concern, as the completion of the merger was clearly in their best interest.)

The Journal article linked above reports that BofA now asserts that it learned of the magnitude of Merrill’s losses after the Dec. 5 shareholder vote, and that by Dec. 17, Lewis was so alarmed by the losses, which he reportedly characterized as "monstrous," that he traveled to Washington for an emergency meeting with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.

What happened at this Dec. 17 meeting presents its own interesting set of issues. Paulson and Bernanke apparently told Lewis that, according to the Journal, "failing to complete the Merrill acquisition would be disastrous" and would "further destabilize markets" and "hurt the bank" and potentially set off a "ripple effect that would exacerbate a fragile situation." The government officials also promised Lewis the backstop protection if the losses proved to be as significant as Lewis feared.

The meeting raises a host of questions, as discussed in the January 20, 2009 Wall Street Journal article entitled "BofA’s Merrill Deal Exposes Myth of Transparency" (here). The article suggests that "by most any reasonable measure, if the Merrill losses were concrete enough to seek a government lifeline, they were concrete enough to report to the company’s shareholders." The question is whether Lewis kept mum about the losses and the promised lifeline at Bernanke and Paulson’s request; the article asks whether perhaps the government was "complicit in nondisclosure."

While there may have been a marketplace interest in keeping the deal on track, there is no existing law that would relieve the company of its disclosure duties for the benefit of larger marketplace interests. The January 20 Journal article raises the question whether "a new legal standard could eventually emerge, sort of a ‘national interest’ doctrine absolving companies of governance actions that may be potentially harmful, but are important to an economic or defense emergency."

These are interesting questions. However, it should be noted that they arguably are irrelevant to the recently filed lawsuits, as the December 17 meeting took place well after the December 5 shareholder vote. There is of course always the possibility of a separate lawsuit on behalf of persons who acquired BofA shares, for example, between the December 17 meeting and before the company’s recent announcement of the Merrill-related losses. UPDATE: In the day immediately after I added this post, additional lawsuits came flooding in, including at least one (here) that is filed against, among others, a subclass of claimants who purchased Bank of America securities between January 2, 2009 and January 16, 2009.

Regardless whether or not other lawsuits in fact emerge, two questions will be paramount: when did the magnitude of the Merrill losses become apparent, and when did BofA have a duty to disclose this information to its shareholders?

Whatever else might be said about these circumstances, the certainly do underscore the magnitude of the problems confronting the economic and banking systems, as well as the challenges facing the incoming administration as it struggles to address these problems while taking up the reins of government.

These circumstances also raise serious questions about whether or not there are or should be exceptions to the transparency principles on which our entire system of securities and market regulation is based. It doesn’t require much imagination to picture the bedlam that could have ensued if the Merrill deal had fallen apart just before Christmas. The system can ill afford any more of the kind of chaos that enveloped the markets in September and October last year.

On the other hand, BofA’s shareholders might well feel that any analysis concluding that information was properly withheld from them for the sake of the overall market improperly negates their rights and expectations as shareholders.

It may or may not get addressed in a court in connection with the litigation involving the Merrill deal, but the question whether or not there is "national interest" exception to the standard disclosure principles is surely a very interesting question.

Professor Larry Ribstein discusses the question whether there is a national interest exception to the securities laws in his Ideoblog, here.

I have in any event added the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch litigation to my running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here. With the addition of this new litigation, the current tally of these cases now stands at 146, of which five have been filed in 2009.

More Madoff Litigation: The Madoff-related litigation wave has also continued to roll on. For example, on January 21, 2009, plaintiffs’ lawyers announced (here) that they had initiated a class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of persons who purchased between 2003 and the present variable universal life insurance issued by Tremont International Insurance Limited or Argus International Bermuda Limited.

The complaint (which can be found here) alleges that the insurer, an entity owned by Tremont Capital Management had breached its duties by offering Tremont-related funds as investment options for the variable investment account component of the policies. The complaint further alleges that the Tremont-related funds were heavily invested in Madoff funds.

The complaint alleges that the defendants violated a number of legal duties. The complaint does not, however, assert a violation of the federal securities laws. As a result I have included in the list of "other" litigation in my table of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

This latest lawsuit not only demonstrates that the Madoff litigation continues to roll in. It also shows what an incredible diversity of individuals and investors were harmed by losses from Madoff’s fraudulent scheme. It also shows how incredibly complicated it all is going to be to unwind this whole mess.

And Finally: Readers who registered the question posed on my preceding blog post whether President Obama had completed the oath of office as required by the Constitution will be relieved to know that the issue has been resolved.

On the apparent theory that there is nothing in the Constitution against do overs, Obama and Chief Justice reprised their roles in another rendition of the oath of office in a considerably less formal ceremony at the White House on the evening of January 21, 2009, as reported here.

That certainly is a load off my mind.

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We are barely into the New Year, but all signs are that two of the critical securities litigation trends of 2008 – the subprime/credit crisis related litigation wave and the Madoff-related litigation wave – remain significant factors and apparently will continue to drive new lawsuit filings as we head into 2009, as the recent lawsuit filings discussed below suggest.

The New RBS Lawsuit

First, with respect to the credit crisis litigation, on January 12, 2009, plaintiffs’ lawyers issued a press release (here) stating that they had initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Series S American Depositary Shares (ADSs) of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group and related entities and certain directors and officers. The complaint also names as defendants the offering underwriters that conducted the June 2007 offering of the shares.

The Complaint (which can be found here) alleges misrepresentations and omissions in the offering documents, which incorporated the Company’s 2004, 2005 and 2006 financial statements. The Complaint alleges that the company "ultimately announced huge multi-billion pound impairment charges associated with its exposure to debt securities, including mortgage-related securities tied to the U.S. real estate markets, causing the price of RBS’s Series S ADSs issued in the Offering to decline." The ADSs, which were originally offered at $25/share, now trade around $10/share.

According to the Complaint, the offering documents omitted that:

(a) defendants’ portfolio of debt securities was impaired to a much larger extent than the Company had disclosed; (b) defendants failed to properly record losses for impaired assets; (c) the Company’s internal controls were inadequate to prevent the Company from improperly reporting its debt securities; (d) the Company’s participation in the consortium which acquired ABN AMRO would have disastrous results on the Company’s capital position and overall operations; and (e) the Company’s capital base was not adequate enough to withstand the significant deterioration in the subprime market and, as a result, RBS would be forced to raise significant amounts of additional capital.

RBS is actually the second company from the ill-fated consortium that was the "successful" bidder in the ABN AMRO buyout to get dragged into U.S. securities litigation.

As I noted here, another consortium member, Fortis, was also hit with a securities class action lawsuit in October 2008. As I noted in that prior post, "it is one more of those amazing things about the current circumstances that, despite the size of the ABN AMRO calamity, it is effectively just background noise in the larger cataclysm." (An abridge version of the ABN AMRO debacle can be found here.) Both RBS and Fortis have also been the recipients of massive bailout efforts from their respective governments.

The ABN AMRO losses to RBS continue to amount. For example, on January 12, 2009, Bloomberg reported (here) that, as a result of loans RBS acquired as part of the ABN AMRO deal, RBS is the biggest lender to bankrupt U.S. chemical maker Lyondell Chemical Co., and may face losses on its $3.47 billion of loans. The loans were part of the $20.5 billion raised to finance Bassell AF’s 2007 leveraged buyout of Lyondell.

More Madoff Litigation

According to their release (here), on January 12, 2009, plaintiff’s counsel initiated another Madoff-related securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of investors in the Herald USA Fund, Herald Luxemburg Fund, Primeo Select Funds, and Thema International Funds, against the Funds, Medici Bank, Bank Austria Creditianstait, Unicredit S.A., Pioneer Alternative Investments, HSBC Holdings plc and Ernst & Young LLP, as well as Medici Bank’s founder Sonja Kohn and its former CEO Peter Scheithauer. A copy of the complaint in the case can be found here.

Austrian regulators took control of Bank Medici after the bank revealed that it had invested as much as $3.2 billion in funds managed by Bernard Madoff and his firm. Bank of Medici is 25% owned by Unicredit. As reported here, one of the Bank’s largest customers was Unicredit’s Pioneer Investments, which invested as much as €805 with the Funds. Further background can be found here.

According to the press release, the Complaint alleges defendants caused the Funds "to concentrate almost 100% of their investment capital with entities that participated in the massive, fraudulent scheme perpetrated" by Madoff and his firm.

Run the Numbers: With the addition of the RBS case, the total number of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits going back to 2007 now stands at 143, of which two have been filed already in 2009. My updated tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related cases can be accessed here.

The new lawsuit on behalf of the Bank Medici Funds investors brings the total of Madoff-related securities class action lawsuits to eight, as reflected on my running tally of the cases, which can be accessed here.

Keeping Count: In my analysis (here) of the recently released Cornerstone/Stanford Clearinghouse report regarding the 2008 securities litigation, I noted that the report’s count of new 210 securities lawsuit filings through December 15, 2008 contrasted with my own count of 224 securities lawsuits through December 31, 2008. As I noted in my analysis, the additional lawsuits filed between December 15 and December 31 were critically important in understanding fully 2008 filing trends, as they significantly affect relative and absolute filing numbers during the year.

The Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website has now updated its count through year’s end, bringing their 2008 tally to 226. The Stanford website can be accessed here.

On further review of their figures, my account appropriately should be adjusted from 224 to 226.

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In the latest ruling on a motion to dismiss in a subprime-related securities lawsuit, on December 22, 2008, Judge Legrome Davis of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the suit that plaintiffs’ filed in August 2007 against RAIT Financial Trust and certain of its officers and trustees. The opinion can be found here.

Judge Davis’s ruling largely denied defendants’ motions, other than with respect to the plaintiffs’ ’33 Act claims concerning the company’s July 2007 secondary offering, which were dismissed due to the plaintiffs’ lack of standing. Otherwise, Judge Davis ruled in plaintiffs favor. The plaintiffs’ remaining ’33 Act claims and all of the plaintiffs’ ’34 Act claims will now go forward.

Background

RAIT is a real estate investment trust providing debt financing to home builders, mortgage lenders and other real estate companies. As more fully set forth here, plaintiffs’ complaint relates to the July 30, 2007 failure of American Home Mortgage to make a payment due under certain trust preferred securities, resulting in a net equity exposure to RAIT of at least $95 million. Shortly thereafter, the company disclosed that it had $373 million of similar exposures. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to disclose its exposure to these types of investments and failed to reserve adequately for the risk of nonpayment or default.

The plaintiffs’ complaint asserts claims under both the ’33 Act and the ’34 Act. The defendants in the ’33 Act claims include the offering underwriters that facilitated RAIT’s January 2007 common stock offering and July 2007 preferred stock offering, as well as the company’s auditor, Grant Thornton. The defendants’ moved to dismiss.

The December 22 Opinion

First, the court dismissed the ’33 Act claims relating to the July 2007 preferred stock offering due to lack of standing, because none of the named plaintiffs purchased securities traceable to the offering.

However, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the ’33 Act claims raised in connection with the January 2007 offering. Judge Davis found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged falsity and materiality, and rejected defendants’ contentions that the plaintiffs’ arguments represented nothing more than "fraud by hindsight." Judge Davis also rejected the defendants’ contentions that the alleged misrepresentations "bespoke caution" or were "mere puffery."

Judge Davis also found that his rulings that the plaintiffs had adequately pled falsity and materiality applied to the plaintiffs’ ’34 Act claims as well.The defendants nevertheless sought to have the ’34 Act claims dismissed, arguing that the plaintiffs had not adequately pled scienter.

Judge Davis found that "despite the demanding standard of recklessness imposed in pleading a strong inference of scienter," the plaintiffs nevertheless had adequately pled scienter. His ruling depended on the "core business operations" theory, with respect to which he stated:

Because the alleged misstatements involved RAIT’s core business operations and because the Officer Defendants had ample reason to know of the falsity of the statements, there is a strong inference of scienter in this case.

Judge Davis also found that though the core business operations allegations alone were sufficient, other allegations also supported the inference of scienter, including "the sheer size of the impairment eventually taken by RAIT," which he found adds to "the imputation" that defendants "must have had some awareness that problems were brewing." Judge Davis also found that "familial and business relationships involved" in a RAIT acquisition were "relevant in our consideration of scienter."

Discussion

Other than the ’33 Act claims relating to the July 2007 offering (which was dismissed for lack of standing), the plaintiffs largely prevailed on the dismissal motions. Judge Davis’s ruling is significant not only because it seems to run counter to the early trend other courts arguably have established (albeit with some notable exceptions) of general skepticism toward subprime-related allegations. Judge Davis’s ruling is noteworthy in that regard for its rejection of the defendants’ "fraud by hindsight" arguments.

Judge Davis’s opinion is perhaps most noteworthy in its acceptance of the "core business operations" theory in concluding that the plaintiffs had adequately pled scienter. Though earlier courts had rejected this theory as inconsistent with the PSLRA’s pleading requirements, more recently courts, for example, in the Ninth Circuit (refer here) and the Seventh Circuit (refer here), have taken it up. As noted in a recent commentary by the Katten Muchin law firm entitled "Reform Act Under Attack?" (here), the core operations theory "has made a comeback in 2008," which the authors contend is inconsistent with the PSLRA’s meaning and intent.

Were other courts similarly willing to take up the core operations doctrine, it could substantially impact the many pending dismissal motions in various subprime-related securities lawsuits.

In any event, I have added the RAIT opinion to my table of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuit settlements, dismissals, and dismissal denials, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for alerting me to the RAIT opinion.

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Securities lawsuit filings reached a six-year high in 2008, according to a year-end report released today by NERA Economic Consulting. The report, entitled "2008 Trends in Securities Class Actions" (here), was written by NERA economists Stephanie Plancich and Svetlana Starykh, and reports that through December 14, 2008, there were 255 securities class action filings, up from only 131 filings in 2006 and 195 filings in 2007. NERA's December 18, 2008 press release regarding the report can be found here.

If the "atypical" cases (e.g., IPO laddering) are excluded from the comparison, the 2008 filings are "on pace to reach a 10-year high." The filings are also on pace for a 37% increase over 2007 and the highest annual increase since 2002 (the year of the corporate scandals).

The report attributes the "surge" in filings to the credit crisis. Of the 255 YTD filings, 110 were credit crisis related, and almost 50% of cases involved defendants in the financial sector, as compared to only 16% of cases in the 2005-06 period. (My table of the credit crisis-related securities lawsuit filings can be accessed  here.)

But while the financial sector saw increased litigation activity, "other sectors also saw continued filing activity." For example, though lawsuits against companies in the health technology sector declined as a percentage of all filings, the absolute number of filings against companies in the health technology sector increased, as there were 29 filings against health technology companies in 2008, compared to only 19 in 2006.

The 2008 filings have been concentrated in the second and ninth circuits. The second circuit filings were increased by the large number of filings in the Southern District of New York, particularly financial companies domiciled there.

Though the pattern of increased filing activity in 2008 is clear, "there have been no clear increasing or decreasing trends in the patter of resolutions." The report notes that median settlements have "remained relatively stable." The 2008 median settlement of $7.5 million is slightly below the 2007 median of $9.4 million, but above the 2006 median of $7.0 milllion.

Average settlements, which can be substantially affected by large settlements, were up in 2008 relative to 2007. The average settlement in 2008 was $38 million, up from $31 million in 2007, but well below the post-Sarbanes Oxley average from 2003 to 2008 of $45 million. (The annual average settlement has ranged from $21 million to $82 million during this six-year period.)

The report does observe that over time there has been an increase in the dollar value of claimed investor losses, from about $120 million ten years ago, to around $340 million during 2008. However, the ratio of median settlement to median investor losses has "stayed relatively steady in the 2-3% range over the past few years."

Looking forward, the report notes that there could be "two opposing factors" that could determine whether or not average or median settlements will increase in the future. On the one hand, investor losses associated with the credit crisis lawsuits in 2008 are very large, which could be "an indicator of big settlements to come." On the other hand, the credit crisis has "dramatically shrunk the size of many defendants’ pockets." Lower financial wherewithal might operate as a downward force on settlement values.

The report concludes that "only time will tell if the huge investor losses for credit crisis filings may put upward press on median settlements in the future, or if the financial distress faced by defendant companies may pull median settlement values down."

My own observations on the 2008 securities litigation activity will be detailed in my year-end analysis, which will be forthcoming after the first of the new year. UPDATE: My year end analysis can be found here. For now, I note a few things.

First, this has been an extraordinarily difficult year in which to just try and count the cases. For example, many litigation targets have been sued multiple times by different claimants, whether they are shareholders who acquired their shares over different time periods, or they are security holders with different classes of equity interests. Whether a new filing should or should not be "counted" has been difficult. Further complicating this has been the large number of state court filings, which are difficult just to find. I emphasize this point simply because there is going to be a significant variation in the various commentators’ year-end reports about how many filings there were this year. My own count is lower than NERA’s.

Second, while the 2008 filings were significantly increased by filings against companies in the financial sector, as the year has progressed and the impact of the credit crisis has become more widespread, the credit crisis-related filings have spread outside the financial sector (refer for example here).

Third, you may see comments elsewhere that the 2008 filings were inflated by one-time sector events, like the auction rate securities lawsuits. While this is true, the recent surge of litigation activity involving the Madoff victims demonstrates that in many ways the pace of securities litigation activity is simply a reflection of a series of supposed one-time events. The mere fact that there is an identifiable event arguably may be irrelevant to analyses of current or future filing trends.

Fourth, the NERA report makes no projections about what is likely to happen to the pace of filing activity in 2009. My own view is that the current active filing pace is likely to continue well into 2009 and perhaps beyond. Among other things, filing activity has been elevated over the last several weeks, which is unusual for December, historically a slow month. The continued spread of credit crisis filings outside the financial sector is likely to continue in 2009. Moreover, the impacts of the financial downturn will begin to emerge as company’s report their 2008 results and as the year progresses, which could contribute to litigation activity.

As I said, my own report will be forthcoming. I am very interested in hearing readers’ thoughts and reactions in the interim.

Special thanks to Ben Seggerson of NERA for providing me with a copy of the NERA report.

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If today’s filings are any indication, a huge wave of Madoff victim lawsuits could be coming. Madoff investors were quick to sue Madoff and his firm, with the first complaint filed last Friday (as noted here). But with Madoff’s firm in liquidation and the money likely long gone, investors who lost money as a result of Madoff’s scheme are casting around for other targets from whom to try to recover their losses. Early returns suggest that investment firms and Madoff "feeder funds" could find themselves facing substantial Madoff victim litigation.

UPDATE: Please note that a regularly updated table of Madoff investor litigation, including "feeder fund" litigation can be accessed  here.

First, as reflected in their December 16, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed a securities lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against investment partnership Ascot Partners L.P., its founder and general partner (Merkin), and its auditor, BDO Seidman. The class members are persons who purchased limited partnership interests in Ascot.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that Ascot and Merkin

caused and permitted $1.8 billion -- virtually the entire investment capital of Ascot -- to be handed over to Madoff to be "invested" for the benefit of plaintiff and the other limited partners of Ascot. Plaintiff's investment in Ascot has been wiped out, as a direct result of: (a) defendant Merkin's abdication of his responsibilities and duties as General Partner and Manager of Ascot and its investment funds and; (b) the failure of Ascot's auditor Seidman, in light of "red flags" indicating a high risk to Ascot from concentrating its investment exposure in Madoff as sole third-party investment manager for all of the Partnership's assets, to perform its audits and provide its annual audit reports in conformance with generally accepted auditing standards.

The press release states that the complaint alleges ’34 Act violations as well as related statutory and common law breaches. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

UPDATE: On December 16, 2008, investors also filed a separate lawsuit against a different fund affiliated with Merkin, Gabriel Partners. A copy of the December 17, 2008 press release can be found here.  A copy of the complaint can be found here.  A WSJ.com Law Blog post about the Ascot and Gabriel lawsuits can be found here.

Second, and also on December 16, another plaintiffs’ firm initiated a separate securities lawsuit in the Central District of California. The lawsuit is filed against Madoff and his firm, but also names as defendants Brighton Company, a California limited partnership and a so-called "feeder fund," and its principal ( Stanley Chais). The firm’s press release (here) states that Brighton was "one of the many feeder funds that directed investor capital" to Madoff and his firm. The press release says that Chais "managed several investment groups [including Brighton], the monies for which were given to Madoff" and his firm.

The complaint (here) alleges that the plaintiff invested money through CMG Ltd., a California limited partnership. The complaint alleges that CMG provided all of its investment capital to Chais as general partner for Brighton, which in turn invested all of CMG’s money with Madoff. The complaint alleges that "all defendants contributed to the false, misleading, unlawful, unfair and fraudulent acts and practices associated with the Ponzi scheme."

The purported class consists of two groups; all persons who invested capital with Chais and Brighton, and all persons who invested with Madoff and his firm. The complaint alleges violations of the ’34 Act.

The press release also states that "the firm is investigating the actions of other feeder firms on behalf of investors." The December 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal has an article (here) discussing Stanley Chais and his investment funds'  (and charitable organizations') relation to Madoff
 

Given the magnitude and widespread dispersion of the Madoff losses, and given the fact that there appears to be little money left with Madoff and his fund, it seems highly likely that there will be other (perhaps many other) investment funds, "feeder funds," hedge funds, funds of funds, and other entitles, targeted by Madoff victims. The attention in the press (for example, here) to alleged failures of investment firms to catch supposed red flags or to conduct due diligence will only increase the likelihood of this kind of litigation. The inclusion of the auditor in the Ascot lawsuit suggests that some of these claims could range pretty far afield.

A December 16, 2008 Business Week article discussing the likelihood of Madoff investor claims against hedge funds and others, also discussing the Ascot lawsuit, can be found here.

The Wall Street Journal is helpfully collecting a list of Madoff’s victims here. It is a long list but it is also clearly incomplete; for example, Fairfield Greenwich Advisors may have been hit with $7.5 billion in losses, but those amounts in reality represent the losses of Fairfield’s own investors. The list would be substantially longer if all of these and other fund investors and customers were listed individually. The fund investors are the ones, like the plaintiffs in the cases described above, that will likely target the investment funds.A December 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled "Fairfiled Group Forced to Confront its Madoff Ties" (here) conveys some pretty strong suggestions along those lines.

In any event, going forward, the number one question D&O insurance underwriters will be asking financial institution applicants will be whether the applicant invested funds with Madoff.

Meanwhile, the Credit Crisis Litigation Wave Churns On: It seems as if the plaintiffs’ lawyers have kicked it into high gear as the year end approaches. There has been a flood of new securities lawsuit filings so far in December. By my informal count, there have already been at least 20 new securities lawsuit filings so far this month (if you count the two cases described above), an unusually high number for December, which historically is a quiet month for securities filings.

And though the filings have included a diversity of cases (as I discussed here), the filings have also included a number of new subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits, including at least four new cases that have been filed or become public this week.

For example, as reflected in their press release (here) on December 16, 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against investors in the C-Bass Trust Certificates backed by residential mortgage loans and issued by Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securitization LLC. The defendants include C-Bass, the issuing trusts, and the offering underwriters. The complaint, which can be found here, asserts claims under the ’33 Act.

In addition, on December 4, 2008, plaintiffs’ initiated a securities class action on behalf of investors who purchased AIG shares in shelf offerings conducted during the period 2003 to 2007. The complaint (here) asserts claims against AIG, certain of its directors and officers, and its offering underwriters under the ’33 Act.

And on December 8, 2008, defendants removed to federal court a lawsuit that previously had been filed in New York County (New York) Supreme Court against Residential Asset Securitization Trust (which issued certain residential mortgage pass-through certificate), its offering underwriter, and two rating agencies. A copy of the removal petition, to which the original complaint is attached, can be found here.

Finally, plaintiff shareholders have initiated a securities class action lawsuit (here) against private equity firm American Capital Ltd. in the District Court of Maryland, alleging among other things that the firm failed to disclose its exposure to disruptions in the credit market.

I have added these new lawsuits to my running tally of subprime and credit-crisis related litigation, which can be accessed here. With the addition of these new lawsuits, the running tally of subprime and credit-crisis securities lawsuits now stands at 138, of which 98 have been filed during 2008.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for providing information and links about these new lawsuits.

And Finally: Before writing this post, I had no prior acquaintance with the phrases "Madoff victims" and "feeder funds." I guess I better get used to them.

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In the latest preliminary ruling in a subprime or credit crisis-related securities lawsuit, Southern District of Florida Judge Ursula Ungaro in a December 11, 2008 opinion (here) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint, with leave to amend.

Background

BankAtlantic Bancorp is a bank holding company that offers consumer and banking lending services, through its wholly-owned subsidiary. The plaintiffs complaint alleged securities law violations against the holding company and five present and former directors and officers of the holding company or of the subsidiary. The plaintiff purports to represent persons who purchased the holding company’s stock during the period November 9, 2005 though October 25, 2007. Background regarding the case can be found here.

As summarized in the December 11 opinion, the complaint alleges that the company "sought to capitalize on the Florida real estate boom through expansion of its commercial real estate loan portfolio." To fuel the growth, the company "cut corners" including "ignoring the Company’s internal lending guidelines." The company also allegedly "failed to adequately reserve for loan losses" in its commercial real estate loan portfolio, "resulting in material misstatements in the Company’s financials." After the Florida real estate market "entered a free fall in 2007," borrowers "began defaulting" and the company was "forced to reveal the true extent of the Company’s exposure in its real estate portfolio."

The Opinion

In her December 11 opinion, Judge Ungaro held that the complaint "adequately alleges misrepresentations and omissions in a manner sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss," and that the complaint "is legally sufficient in so far as it pleads loss causation." However, she found that the complaint did not adequately allege scienter.

As a preliminary matter, Judge Ungaro addressed the complaint’s reliance on confidential witness statements. She found that "there is no specific information as to the confidential witnesses’ positions in the Company, their employment duties, the foundation or basis for their knowledge, or whether they were even employed with the company during the relevant time period." Accordingly, she concluded that she is "unable to give any significant weight to the allegations made by those confidential witnesses.

She then considered the scienter allegations against the individual defendants. With respect to the allegations against the Vice Chairman, the current CEO and the Chairman, she found that the "factual allegations do not give rise to a strong inference of scienter." She said that even assuming the confidential witness statements could be given weight, the allegations are insufficient; "the confidential witness’s vague and conclusory assertion that it was ‘common knowledge’ that the Company had risky loans on its books is not the type of particularized allegations required under the PSLRA."

She also noted that the defendants’ "knowledge of the company’s lending or accounting practice by virtue of their high-level positions…does not create a strong inference of scienter." She also found that the fact that these individuals received "Exception Reports" establishes "nothing about what these Defendants knew or should have known about the Company’s lending practices."

Judge Ungaro also rejected the contention that the defendants’ $7.8 million in insider stock sales established scienter, because the complaint "does not allege that the amount or percentage of shares sold …were unusual," nor does the complaint alleged "that the sales were inconsistent with their prior trading history."

With respect to the scienter allegations against the company’s former and its current CFO, Judge Ungaro concluded that the complaint "does not contain factual allegations that would support a finding that [the defendants’] statements were made with scienter." The complaint "lacks particularized allegations" that these two officials "played a role in approving loans or in setting loan loss reserves," and the complaint does not allege that they were "presented with information that would have shown the falsity of the Company’s financial statements or that they were confronted with concerns regarding the Company’s lending practices or loan loss reserves."

Finally, with respect to the company (but without reference to more generalized theories regarding "collective scienter"), Judge Ungaro held that the plaintiff "has not adequately pled scienter as to any of the Individual Defendants; therefore, Plaintiff has failed to adequately pled [sic] scienter as to BankAtlantic."

The court’s grant of the defendants’ dismissal motion is without prejudice and the plaintiffs have 20 days in which to file an amended complaint.

Discussion

The BankAtlantic case joins a growing list of subprime and credit crisis related securities cases that failed to survive preliminary motions. To be sure, the dismissal motions in the Countrywide subprime securities case (refer here) and the New Century Bankcorp subprime securities case (refer here) were both recently denied in strongly worded opinions. But as reflected in my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuit settlements, dismissal and motion denials (which can be accessed here), a greater number of dismissal motions have been granted than denied.

It should be noted that at this point only a handful of dismissal motions have been resolved one way or the other. And many of the dismissals that have granted have been without prejudice. The plaintiffs in these cases may yet successfully amend their complaints and survive a subsequent motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the early returns seem to suggest that many of these cases are facing judicial resistance.

On a related note, I have observed elsewhere (refer here) that the growing wave of bank failures could lead to an increased number a new wave of "dead bank" litigation. To the extent these cases do emerge, the Bank Atlantic opinion may suggest that the cases could face significant pleading hurdles.

In any event, I have added the BankAtlantic opinion to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements, dismissals and dismissal denials, which can be accessed here.

Court Rejects KLA-Tencor’s Special Litigation Committee’s Motion to Dismiss Backdating Case: In a December 11, 2008 opinion (here) that is extensively redacted due to its reliance on evidence submitted under seal, Judge James Ware of the Northern District of California denied the motion of KLA-Tencor’s Special Litigation Committee (SLC) to dismiss the options backdating derivative lawsuit pending against the company, as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and officers.

The plaintiffs had filed a complaint alleging that the defendants "permitted senior KLA insiders to unlawfully manipulate the grant dates associated with KLA stock options, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars of losses to KLA." (Background regarding the options backdating allegations at KLA-Tencor can be found here.) In response to the filing of the complaint, the company’s board formed the SLC and appointed two directors to serve as its members. The SLC prepared a report and filed a motion to dismiss the derivative action, concluding that the derivative action "is no longer in the interests of KLA or its shareholders."

Judge Ware considered the motion under Delaware law. Because of the redactions in his opinion, his reasoning is not always entirely evident. Basically, he was concerned that one of the SLC members "was on the Board and on the Audit Committee at a time when continued backdating may have been occurring at KLA." This raises the "possibility" that the one SLC member was "tasked with investigation corporate malfeasance that he had previously, if unintentionally, approved," which in turn raised questions about his independence.

Because of the independence concerns, the Court was also "concerned by the overall size of the SLC, as it consisted of only two members." On these grounds, the court found that the SLC had not carried its burden, noting that

Although no single factor is dispositive in the Court’s determination, evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, including the size of the SLC, questions surrounding its independence, and the depth and focus of its inquiry leads to this conclusion.

Accordingly, the court denied the SLC’s dismissal motion, denied certain individual defendants’ proposed (unspecified) settlements, and scheduled the case to go forward.

Without having statistical evidence to support the observation, I note that it is relatively unusual for a court to reject an SLC’s recommendation to drop a derivative case. On the other hand it is also unusual for an SLC to have only two members, and these two unusual features wound up being related. A December 17, 2008 Law.com article discussing these aspects of Judge Ware's opinion can be found here.

In any event, I have added the KLA-Tencor decision to my table of options backdating related lawsuit settlements, dismissal and dismissal denial, which can be accessed here. KLA-Tencor’s $65 million settlement of the options backdating securities class action lawsuit that had been filed against the company is discussed here.

Are European Investor Groups Turning to U.S. Court for Subprime Claims?: A December 16, 2008 post (here) on PomTalk, the blog of the securities plaintiffs’ firm Pomerantz Haudek Block Grossman & Gross, noting that "pension funds around the globe have lost hundreds of billions of dollars" in the credit crisis, as a result of which "increasingly, they are turning to U.S. courts to seek recovery of losses."

The article notes that "in recent years, European funds have begun to play a more prominent role" in U.S. class actions, and that according to a U.K. pension fund group, "23% of British pension funds have now actively participated in a U.S. securities class action."

The article suggests that European funds "will be particularly affected by three categories of suits": suits against financial services companies; suits involving structured financial instruments; and suits involving agency obligations and preferreds (this latter category is a reference to the securities of government sponsored entities). The article concludes by noting that "European funds are certain to remain a fixture in U.S. securities class action."

Readers of this blog may be interested to read the article’s observations in connection with litigation against financial services companies:

A major question in suits against banks is whether they have the ability to satisfy a large judgment or enter into a reasonable settlement. Many banks have already gone under or are hanging by a thread. But even failed banks generally have D&O insurance, and there may be other viable defendants like underwriters.

Ah, yes. Round up the usual suspects. Be sure to frisk them for insurance, as well as the presence of any professional advisors.

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As the year end approaches, various commentators will be issuing their retrospectives on the year’s securities litigation activity. The lead story undoubtedly will be that the wave of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits continued to flood in during the year. With some 94 new subprime and credit crisis related securities lawsuits so far in 2008 (by my count, which can be accessed here), the litigation wave undoubtedly is an important part of the story. But it is not the whole story. The danger is that the wave of credit crisis-related litigation has become so predominant that other important developments may be overlooked.

This past week illustrates my point. There were seven new securities class action lawsuits filed during the week of December 8, which is noteworthy in and of itself, as December historically is a slow month for securities class action lawsuit filings.

Among this past week’s seven new securities lawsuits was one new credit-crisis related filing. On December 11, 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a class action lawsuit against GS Mortgage and certain of its directors and officers, on behalf of purchasers of mortgage pass-through certificates and asset-backed securities the company issued. (GS Mortgage is an affiliate of Goldman Sachs, which is also named as a defendant.)

According to the plaintiffs’ press release (here), the GS Mortgage complaint alleges a variety of misrepresentations in the instruments’ offering documents, including with respect to the underwriting standards and appraisals used in the origination of the underlying mortgages.

But while the seven lawsuits filed last week did include this one subprime-related lawsuit, the other six lawsuits appear completely unrelated to the subprime or credit crisis-related events.

The remaining six companies named include a Canadian mining company, Crystallex International, allegedly facing regulatory issues in Venezuela (about which refer here); two medical device companies, Medtronix and Atricure (refer here and here); a media conglomerate, CBS Corporation, that announced non-cash impairment charges to intangible assets and goodwill (refer here); a laser and technology manufacturer, GSI Corp., that restated its financials due to revenue recognition issues (refer here), and a Chinese agricultural company, China Organic Agriculture, facing allegations regarding its development of organic products (refer here).

These six lawsuits represent a diverse mix of companies and allegations. The point here is that none of these six lawsuits is related to the subprime meltdown or credit crisis. Similarly, during the past year, while there have been a host of credit crisis-related lawsuits filed, there have also been many other lawsuits that are totally unrelated to the credit crisis.

Given the nature and magnitude of the financial developments this year, it is hardly surprising that there has been significant litigation activity involving the financial sector. What may be even more noteworthy is that notwithstanding the predominance of the financial events, there have been a significant number of lawsuits having nothing to do with the credit crisis or the financial sector.

I will detail these observations in my own forthcoming year-end analysis of securities litigation activity. In the interim, particularly as the various year-end reports emerge, it is important to keep in mind that 2008 securities litigation activity was not just about the credit crisis alone, nor was it confined just to the financial sector.

Does This Sounds Familiar?: Our age is not the first to have to contend with the consequences from cultural excess fueled by speculation, debt and deficit spending enabled by “financial wizardry.” A similar pattern also appeared in the events leading up to the French Revolution. In his book, Revolutionary France, 1770-1880 (here), historian François Furet details the country’s astonishing accumulation of indebtedness, and the consequences that followed.

In particular, Furet explores the way the French monarchy, led by Finance Minister Jacques Necker, financed its participation in the American war of independence by increasing state-guaranteed life annuities, fueling a speculative bubble and enabling borrowing backed by inflated values. Furet writes:

In total, between 1776 and 1781, 530 million in loans of all kinds fed the Treasury and financed a war that was all the more popular because it was painless. Money continued to flow in, and the resale of annuities enriched Parisian speculation. Even if the state was seriously compromising its future, Necker retained his popularity. In 1781, to counter-attack court intrigues … he published the Compte rendu, a statement of accounts which concealed the expenditure of the extraordinary budget and revealed an apparent surplus revenue of ten million livres.

As Furet observed, “after three years of war and no new taxes, that was truly  financial wizardry!” The problem is that, contrary to Necker’s assurances, “the real deficit lay in the region of eighty million.”

Similar deficit financing by Necker’s successors furthered the French government’s financial challenges. A successor minister, Charles Alexandre de Calonne, “found, out of 600 million livres in annual revenue, 176 million committed in advance, 250 million absorbed by debt service, and 390 million in accounts in arrears to be settled.” What was Calonne’s response? “He borrowed money on all sides, even more and at a higher rate than his predecessors.”

Among other things, this massive indebtedness enabled the illusion of prosperity; “one would need to reconstruct the entire circuit of money borrowed by Calonne to understand how these years were without doubt the most dazzling in court civilization.” But, as Furst notes, “sinking borrowed money into the parasitic round of court life proved eventually to be the downfall of this aristocratic sleight of hand.” This “artifice” unleashed “one of the most gigantic crashes in history.”

As we face the consequence of the collapse of our own era of debt-fueled prosperity, with its accompanying speculation, asset-valuation bubbles and financial wizardry, there is something sobering in realizing that once again the response consists of “borrowing money on all sides.” The ever-cumulating deficits have reached the point where figures of billions and trillions have lost all meaning. I am sure I am not the only one with the uneasy  feeling that we may be sinking borrowed money into parasitic hands and that we could be “seriously compromising our future.”

PLUS D&O Symposium: The Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) will be holding its annual D&O Symposium on February 25 and 26, 2009, at the Marriott Marquis in New York City. I will be co-Chairing the event again this year, along with my good friends, Tony Galban of Chubb and Chris Duca of Navigators Pro. There will be a terrific line up of speakers, including the keynote speakers Madeline Albright and New York Insurance Commissioner Eric Dinallo .

The panels will include all of the familiar favorites, such as the securities litigation update panel, to be chaired again by Boris Feldman of the Wilson Sonsini firm, and View from the Top panel, featuring the heads of the leading D&O underwriting facilities. Other panels will also address issues surrounding the governmental bailouts and increased business failures. An added bonus is that the fascinating video The Rise and Fall of Bill Lerach will be shown during the conference. (View a trailer of the video here).

Further information about the 2009 PLUS D&O Symposium, including registration information, can be found here. This event sells out every year, so early registration is advised.

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All litigants face the challenge of managing lawsuit expenses and exposures. The Reserve Primary Fund investor litigation defendants have crafted a novel approach to addressing these challenges – they apparently intend to finance their defense as well as any indemnity out of funds due to investors -- that is, the funds of the very people on whose behalf the claims are being asserted.

Background

In September, the Reserve Primary Fund ("the fund") gained notoriety when the money market fund "broke the buck," as massive redemptions and the fund’s exposure to Lehman Brothers’ securities drove the fund’s per share net asset value below one dollar. Due to the magnitude of the redemption requests, the fund’s trustees voted to liquidate the fund and distribute the assets to investors.On December 8, 2008, the Wall Street Journal ran a front page article (here) detailing the events behind the fund's woes.

Meanwhile, investors initiated a number of securities lawsuits against the fund, its directors and officers, its investment advisor and related parties. (Refer here for background regarding the lawsuits.) The lawsuits allege, among other things, that the defendants’ selective or inaccurate disclosure regarding the fund’s troubled assets enabled certain institutional investors to avoid losses to the detriment of other investors. The lawsuits also alleged that the fund failed to disclose its vulnerability due to its alleged overexposure to Lehman. The lawsuits also allege that the Lehman Brothers investments were inappropriate for a money market fund, and that the fund deviated from its stated investment approach.

The Liquidation Plan

On December 3, 2008, the fund’s trustees issued a "Plan of Liquidation and Distribution of Assets" (here). Among other things, the Liquidation Plan provides a plan for distribution of fund assets through "interim payments." The interim payments are to include distribution amounts "up to the amount of a special reserve, which would include amounts that would be required to satisfy disputed claims."

As the Liquidation Plan explains, this special reserve will be used to finance "costs and expenses of the Fund, its officers and Trustees"; "pending and threatened claims against the Fund"; and claims, "including but not limited to claims of indemnification that could be made against plan assets." Were the fund to distribute its assets without the special reserve, investors could expect about 98.5 cents per share. However, the special reserve, the amount of which has yet to be determined, will reduce this per share distribution.

As a December 5, 2008 New York Times article entitled "Embattled, Fund Shifts Costs to Investors" (here), put it, investors might hope to get 98.5 cents on the dollar, but "if they continue to wage legal battles against the fund managers, the company will use investors’ own money to defend itself against allegations or mismanagement and deception." Moreover, the Liquidation Plan makes it clear that the special reserve is not just for litigation expense, but also to "satisfy disputed claims." The December 8 Journal article cited above states that the fund has told investors "the fund will use some if its assets to fight suits investors have filed, which could reduce the money available to return to them."

Insurance and Indemnification

Readers who like me wonder whether there isn’t D&O liability insurance available to pay these amounts will be interested to learn that there is insurance, just not very much. According to the Liquidation Plan, the fund has a directors’ and officers’ liability insurance policy with a $10 million aggregate limit of liability.

Not only does the fund only have a $10 million D&O policy, but it is a "joint" policy, insuring not just the fund and its directors, officers and trustees, but also its investment advisor, its corporate parent, and other affiliated parties and person, many of whom are co-defendants with the fund and its directors and officers in the mass of investor lawsuits that have been filed.

In other words, though the fund has D&O insurance, its limits are, well, limited, and are also subject to erosion or depletion due to competing interests of multiple parties in the policy proceeds. It should be emphasized that under most D&O policies, defense expense reduces the amount of insurance remaining under the policy, meaning that there could be little or no insurance available to satisfy investors’ claims if the various cases are actively litigated.

The rights of the fund’s individual officers, directors and trustees to indemnification are not eliminated merely because of the allegations raised in the lawsuits (indeed, the outbreak of litigation is precisely the circumstances that trigger the operation of indemnification rights). Angered investors who may want to contend that the individual’s supposed misconduct should forfeit their rights to indemnification can try to argue based on Section 17(h) of the Investment Company Act that the fund cannot indemnify the individuals for "willful malfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence, or reckless disregard."

The problem for any investor inclined to make that argument is that the only way to establish that the statutory indemnification prohibitions have been triggered is to litigate the issue – which, as the Times article notes, is "the very act that could reduce the return to investors." In order to establish that the disqualifying conduct occurred, investors would have to pursue their case all the way to verdict, and arguably through appeal as well, a process that would be as uncertain as it would be costly and protracted.

Discussion

So basically the message seems to be, you want to litigate, investors? Fine, knock yourselves out. It’s your money. As the Times article puts it, the choice offered investors under the Liquidation Plan "struck some legal experts as brazen."

The fund’s insurance limits are also worthy of comment. The fund had assets of approximately $64 billion. In that light, some may find the fund’s $10 million D&O insurance limits, well, surprising, particularly given that the limits insure not just the fund and its directors, officers and trustees, but also the fund’s investment advisor and other affiliated parties and person. Reasonable minds might well question the fund’s limits selection.

These circumstances also highlight the risks associated with widely shared limits. The number and diversity of entities and person who will be depending on the limits, along with the apparent seriousness and extent of the litigation involved, raises the probability that the litigation expense will quickly erode if not altogether deplete the available limits. The risk of limits erosion associated with these kinds of shared limits further underscores the fact that reasonable minds might well question the fund’s insurance limits selection.

In any event, the circumstances, particularly the Liquidation Plan, present investors with some difficult decisions. It will be interesting to see their next move, and whether they try to challenge the Liquidation Plan.

Special thanks to Kelly Rehyer for the link to the Times article.

And Speaking of Threats to Litigating Investors: As I noted in a prior post (here), investors have sued the Bank of America, challenging the loan modifications to which the bank agreed in connection with mortgages issued by Countrywide. The litigation has apparently caught the attention of FDIC chairman Sheila Bair.

As reported in a December 4, 2008 Los Angeles Times article (here), Bair told a consumer group gathering that "there is an obligation to modify mortgages," and that "investors should take a hard look at what they are advocating." She also said that "the harder investors push, the more there’s going to be a backlash here." She suggested that Congress may step in and change the legal obligations of mortgage services toward investors.

Interestingly, Bair did not state that the investors’ opposition to the mortgage makeovers is illegitimate or unmeritorious, only that their assertion of their interests represents an obstruction to policy goals she advocates. It certainly can be inconvenient when concerned parties insist on asserting their rights, but the threat of a Congressional backlash could strike some as heavy-handed.

Call it a hunch, but Bair’s remarks seem likelier to embolden rather than to discourage investors, as her remarks suggest that she recognizes the potential significance of their claims. In any event, whether or not Congress has the power or political will to set aside the agreements on which the investors are relying, if Congress were to take such a step it would do little to restore investor confidence in mortgage marketplace mechanisms, which would seem to be an indispensible part to restoring stability to the mortgage lending industry.

And Speaking of the FDIC: In yet another Friday-night special, on December 5, 2008, First Georgia Community Bank of Jackson, Georgia became the twenty third U.S. bank failure this year, after state regulators closed the bank and the FDIC was named receiver. The closure is Georgia’s fourth bank failure this year.

The FDIC’s December 5, 2008 press release can be found here. The FDIC’s updated list of bank failures can be found here. My prior post about the significance of the accumulating bank failures can be found here, and my prior post about the prospects for a new wave of "dead bank" litigation can be found here.

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In a recent post (here), I described the "new wave" of credit crisis lawsuits, in which the companies involved were damaged by their exposures to other companies experiencing credit crisis losses. The latest of these new wave lawsuits to be filed involves the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or "Farmer Mac" as it is more familiarly known.

Freddie Mac is a government sponsored entity that was established to support a secondary market for agricultural real estate and rural housing mortgage loans. According to their December 5, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers have initiated a securities lawsuit against Farmer Mac and certain of its directors and officers in federal court in the District of Columbia. According to the press release,

a) defendants were inflating Farmer Mac's results through manipulations relating to the characterization of impairment costs and/or depreciation expenses which inflated the Company's reported cash flows, gross margins and Core and GAAP-earnings; (b) the Company's financial results were inflated by defendants' use of overly optimistic assumptions of asset valuations and investments, which were also reflected in defendants' misuse of mark-to-market accounting; (c) the Company's exposure to investment losses and credit problems of trading partners such as Lehman Bros. and Fannie Mae was much greater than represented; and (d) the Company was not on track to meet or exceed guidance sponsored or endorsed by defendants.

Investors only first learned the truth about Farmer Mac on September 12, 2008, when its shares closed at $16.56, from an open of $23.78, losing over 30% of their value in one day after the Company filed documents with the SEC saying it would incur significant charges due to its exposure to Fannie Mae securities. Further, shares of the Company continued to trade down thereafter to close to $2.00 per share following announcements concerning the resignation of its Chairman of the Board and losses related to debt issued by Lehman Brothers.

The involvement of the allegations relating to the company’s Fannie Mae and Lehman Brothers investments is the reason I have characterized this case as a new wave credit crisis lawsuit. That is, it was its exposure to these other companies that caused Farmer Mac’s problems, at least in part.

However, because of the allegations relating to Farmer Mac’s own asset valuations, including its alleged misuse of mark-to-market accounting, the lawsuit also has characteristics of the more conventional subprime and credit-crisis related type of litigation that has accumulated over the last two years.

In any event, I have added the Farmer Mac lawsuit to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here. With the addition of the Farmer Mac lawsuit, the current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits now stands at 132, of which 92 have been filed in 2008.

And Speaking of Credit Crisis Litigation: One of the more noteworthy events during the current credit crisis was the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 (which already seems like a long time ago, doesn't it?) and its acquisition by JP Morgan Chase.

Following JP Morgan’s March 16, 2008 agreement to acquire Bear Stearns, shareholders of Bear Stearns filed a New York (New York County) Supreme Court lawsuit against both Bear Stearns and JP Morgan, alleging that the $10 per share consideration JP Morgan paid for Bear Stearns was inadequate. The plaintiffs sought damages from Bear Stearns’ directors for claimed violations of their fiduciary duties and from JP Morgan for its allegedly tortious conduct in effecting the merger.

In a December 4, 2008 opinion (here), Judge Herman Cahn granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenges to the deal, holding that the business judgment rule applied, and that under the rule, the court could not second guess the board:

In response to a sudden and rapidly-escalating liquidity crisis, Bear Stearns’ directors acted expeditiously to consider the company’s limited options. They attempted to salvage some $1.5 billion in shareholder value and averted a bankruptcy that may have returned nothing to the Bear Stearns’ shareholders, while wreaking havoc on the financial markets. The Court should not, and will not, second guess their decision.

In a December 5, 2008 post on the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog (here), the attorneys that represented JP Morgan in the Bear Stearns case discuss the decision in greater detail, noting that "as the credit crisis continues and evolves, boards will continue to face serious challenges. The Bear Stearns opinion confirms, however, that the directors that act diligently and in good faith should not have exposure for their actions."

The suggestion that the Bear Stearns opinion represents a precedent in support of the protection of directors arguably has already been borne out in a North Carolina court.. As Francis Pileggi discusses on his Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog (here), the North Carolina court considering shareholders’ challenges to the merger of Wachovia and Wells Fargo has dismissed the action, with reference to  the New York court’s decision in the Bear Stearns case. The Wachovia and Wells Fargo merger was arranged in similarly unusual circumstances in light of the economic turmoil that in very short order saw some of the countries largest financial institutions "go under" or need "bailouts."

A December 6, 2008 Charlotte Observer article describing the ruling in the Wachovia case can be found here.

Fake ID: In a recent post (here), I analyzed the problems associated with credential inflation and reviewed famous examples of identity misrepresentation. However, a recent episode involving prominent attorney Marc S. Dreier, the name partner of Drier LLP, may represent a whole new level of identity misrepresentation.

As reported on December 5, 2008 on the City Room blog (here), earlier last week Toronto police arrested Drier for "fraudulent impersonation." A December 8. 2008 Law.com article (here) reports that at a meeting in the offices of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan with representatives of Fortress Investment Group and involving a multimillion dollar deal between the two organizations, Drier "pretended to be Michael Padfield, senior legal counsel for investments at Ontario Teachers." The Wall Street Journal reports (here) that Dreier passed out Padfield's business card and signed documents as Padfield. When Padfield himself arrived at the meeting, police were called.

As if that were not enough, three attorneys from the Wilson Sonsini firm have been retained "to examine firm operations and finances, including escrow accounts." Whether or not these concerns are related to Drier’s arrest is not specified. However, the Above the Law blog reports here that as much as $38 million is missing from the Dreier firm’s client escrow account.

The Journal also reports that federal prosecutors are looking into concerns raised by Solow Realty, a former client of the firm, "that Mr. Dreier allegedly was selling to hedge funds fraudulent documents falsely purporting to be debt instruments of Solow without Solow's authority."

The firm’s holiday party, planned to take place last Thursday night at the Waldorf Astoria, was cancelled. I guess it is hard to party when your name partner is (or was) in jail and your client escrow account is missing tens of millions of dollars.

I doubt even John Grisham could have made this one up.

UPDATE: The Marc Dreier story just keeps getting weirder and weirder. In a totaly bizarre development, on December 8, 2008, the SEC filed a complaint against Dreier in which it accused him of "fraud in connection with an elaborate scheme that raised at least $113 million from the sale of bogus promissory notes." Read the SEC's press release here. The press release that Dreier has already admitted his involvement with the phony note sale. The WSJ.com Law Blog reports (here), that the DoJ has also filed a criminal complaint against Dreier and that he was arrested upon his return to the U.S. on Sunday. The firm's lender has also sued the law firm because the firm is in default on its line of credit.

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In an earlier post (here), I suggested that the credit crisis litigation wave had reached an inflection point, and in subsequent posts, I identified additional "new wave" credit crisis lawsuits.

The exact contours of this "new wave" is admittedly amorphous, but the basic concept is that it involves, first, companies that were not themselves undermined by the credit crunch but rather as result of their exposure to companies that were. The most prominent examples are companies that suffered losses due to their exposure to Lehman Brothers. One specific example is Constellation Energy, which, as noted here, is the target of a securities lawsuit alleging among other things that the company insufficiently disclosed its exposure to Lehman Brothers securities.

That there will be other lawsuits in the "exposed to others’ misfortunes" category is demonstrated by the lawsuit initiated on December 3, 2008 in the Southern District of New York against Chinese solar cell manufacturer JA Solar Holdings and certain of its directors and officers. According to the plaintiffs’ counsel’s December 3 press release (here), the Complaint alleges that the defendants failed to disclose that:

JA Solar purchased from a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers Inc. ("Lehman Brothers") a three month, $100 million note (the "Lehman note") on or about July 9, 2008. At the time of this purchase, Lehman Brothers, which guaranteed the Lehman note, was under severe financial distress. According to the complaint, defendants failed to disclose: (i) that JA Solar had made a material, highly speculative investment in a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers, an entity that was then undergoing a credit crisis and under significant financial distress; (ii) that the value of JA Solar’s investment in the Lehman note had diminished considerably; and (iii) that, as a result of the foregoing, defendants’ positive statements concerning JA Solar’s financial performance, outlook and earnings guidance were materially false and misleading and without reasonable basis.

Ultimately, at the end of the Class Period, JA Solar wrote off its $100 million investment in the Lehman note. After JA Solar fully disclosed and recorded an impairment in the value of its investment in the Lehman note, on November 12, 2008, JA Solar’s stock closed at $2.38 per share, a price that represented a decline of more than 87% from the high during the three month Class Period.

A copy of the JA Solar complaint can be found here.

Constellation Energy and JA Solar are far from the only companies experiencing losses as a result of the onslaught of bankruptcies and bailouts. Many companies have experienced huge losses as a result of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AIG, Washington Mutual, and the other recent massive failures. There undoubtedly will be further lawsuits like the ones filed Constellation Energy and JA Solar.

Another category of "new wave" credit crisis litigation relates to companies that made wrong way bets on commodities and currencies, as I noted in a prior post (here). These companies have experienced significant losses as commodities prices and currency exchange rates suddenly and unexpectedly reversed direction this fall. Some of these companies have also been hit with securities lawsuits, as I noted in my prior post, and as also illustrated in the lawsuit recently filed against Aracruz Cellulose (about which refer here).

As discussed in a December 3, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled "Rapid Price Decline in Commodities Turns Some Offsets into Big Losses" (here), a number of companies "have taken hedging-related losses in the third quarter as a result of the rapid decline in commodities costs." But, the article emphasizes, "it isn’t over, either." Companies hedge their costs a few quarters in advance, so hedges taken more recently "are going to hurt profits for many in the fourth quarter and beyond." The article specifically mentions Campbell Soup, Kraft Foods, Pilgrim’s Pride, and Southwest Airlines.

The reference to Pilgrim’s Pride is particularly noteworthy as part of this discussion, because as I previously noted (here), the company has already been hit with a securities lawsuit based among other things on the company’s wrong way bet on corn prices. As the Journal notes, there will be other companies reporting losses after the end of the fourth quarter and even beyond on wrong way commodities and currency bets. Some of these companies likely will also face securities lawsuits.

The final category (or at least final until a new category emerges) involves auction rate securities. I refer here not to the mass of litigation filed earlier this year by auction rate investors against the broker-dealers that sold them the auction rate securities. Rather, I am referring to the cases where investors have sued companies because of losses the companies suffered as a result of the companies’ investment in auction rate securities.

An example of this auction rate case is the one involving NextWave Wireless (about which refer here) in which it is alleged, among other things, that the company "failed to timely disclose that it had invested all of its marketable securities in extremely illiquid auction rate securities."

There are a host of other companies facing distress due to their exposure to illiquid auction rate securities. For example, a December 3, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled "LandAmerica’s Collapse Leaves Investors Looking for Cash" (here) describes the failure of title insurance company LandAmerica Financial Group, which came about because one of the company’s subsidiaries had put funds held for real-estate investors in auction rate securities. Land America filed for bankruptcy last week.

There undoubtedly will be other companies facing liquidity crises as a result of their exposure to auction rate securities, and some of these companies, like NextWave Wireless, will face securities litigation as a result.

One final point about the evolution of the credit crisis litigation wave is that many of the companies involved in these various "new wave" categories identified above are outside the financial services sector. To the extent these new wave lawsuits continue to accumulate, this evolutionary process could be the means by which the credit crisis litigation wave spreads outside the financial sector to the larger economy.

Premonition of War Foretold: As we wonder how we got into the mess, one of the things that is becoming obvious is that the sober voices were silenced and mocked, and the dialog was dominated by the voices of those who had spent far too much time at the punch bowl.

The following video compiles of series of clips from the period 2006 through 2007, showing both how many foolish things were said, and also showing the prescience of Peter Schiff of Euro Pacific Capital. I don't know what is more amazing about this video, that Schiff's predictions were so uncanny or that the others, who mocked and even laughed at him, so badly misperceived what was happening, especially with respect to housing prices. I guarantee you will shake your head in disbelief at some of the things that are said in this video. Schiff in the meantime sounds like a man who had access to a crystal ball.

Hat tip to Joe Nocera of the New York Times in his Executive Suite blog (here) for the link to the video.

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The credit crisis recently entered a dark new phase, and this new darker phase has also already produced its own distinctive round of lawsuits. Like the ominous economic circumstances, the new litigation phase also seems darker and more threatening.

In the latest issue of InSights (here) -- entitled "Has the Credit Crisis Litigation Wave Reached an Inflection Point?" – I briefly review the subprime litigation wave as it developed over the past two years and then examine the dramatic events that occurred in the financial marketplace beginning in September 2008. The article then examines the recent wave of litigation surrounding these events and concludes with an assessment of what these developments may signify going forward.

No Avalanche After All?: Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s February 2008 decision in the LaRue case (about which I wrote here), in which the court recognized an individual’s right to pursue a breach of fiduciary duty claims for mismanagement of their 401(k) plan, there was significant speculation that the decision could unleash an avalanche of lawsuits. The avalanche may yet materialize. But in the meantime it is worth noting that despite his victory in the Supreme Court, LaRue himself has voluntarily dismissed his case in the district court, where the case was on remand after the Supreme Court’s decision.

As reflected in the October 21, 2008 Consent Order of Dismissal in the case (here),LaRue withdrew his complaint after he "decided that it is not financially feasible to continue to pursue his claim."

As Professor Paul Secunda noted on the Workplace Law Prof Blog (here), LaRue’s withdrawal of his case shows that "these types of claims are still extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prevail upon" and "all the doomsday prognostications to the contrary seem just a tad off."

Just In Case Those Bank Lawsuits Do Materialize: In a recent post (here), I speculated that we may be entering a new phase of litigation involving failed banks. Apparently I am not the only one who anticipates that we may be seeing more failed bank litigation. In an October 23, 2008 memorandum entitled "Failed Financial Institution Litigation: Remember When" (here), the Willkie Farr & Gallagher law firm observes that the recent dramatic financial institution failures "are likely to fan the flames for myriad government agencies to pursue litigation against all parties associated with the financial institutions."

The Willkie Farr memorandum takes a comprehensive look at the potential failed financial institution litigation that may emerge, referring to the litigation that unfolded during the S&L crisis as a guide. The memo examines likely litigants, including in particular the probable defendants. The memo also reviews the factual and legal issues that are likely to arise, including some issues that may be different in the current era than previously– for example, with respect to circumstances involving credit default swaps.

The memorandum also briefly reviews the D&O insurance issues that are likely to arise in connection with claims against the directors and officers of the failed financial institutions. Among other issues, the memorandum review issues in connection with the regulatory exclusion (about which I previously wrote here), and in connection with the insured vs. insured exclusion (which I wrote about here).

The Willkie Farr memorandum is thorough and comprehensive, and is a good resource to keep at hand in the event the "dead bank" litigation does in fact materialize.

An Insurance Professional Takes A Look Back: It may surprise those outside the industry, but the insurance business really is full of a wide assortment of interesting, amusing and entertaining people. Many of their stories are humorously retold by industry veteran Larry Goanos in his new book Claims Made and Reported: A Journey Through D&O, E&O and Other Lines of Insurance (here). Larry’s book examines the careers of some of the luminaries of professional lines insurance industry and provides valuable insights for business success.

While writing the book, Larry apparently interviewed over 400 people, some of whom started in the industry back in the 1940s and 1950s. Many of the stories Larry recounts have become legendary in the industry, such as the tale of the broker whose suit was seemingly in flames during a meeting while he continued to talk or the mid-level executive who bought a Rolls Royce as his company car --on his lunch hour. The book is written with in the same spirit of friendship and good humor that characterizes the best side of our industry, and will be enjoyable for anyone who is a part of or is interested in the industry.

Congrats to Larry on his book. He obviously had a lot of fun writing it, and a lot of people are going to have fun reading it. It is worth noting that Larry intends to split the proceeds from the book’s sales among four charities, including the PLUS Foundation and Grateful Nation Montana.

What the Hell is the Point of 36 Watches -- Or, For That Matter, Three Mirrored Disco Balls?: In an October 29, 2008 Wall Street Journal article (here) describing unexpected challenges facing lenders that foreclosed on properties, the article details issues arising in connection with Indianapolis developer Christopher T. White and his business, Premier Properties USA:

Indianapolis prosecutors charged Mr. White in June with theft and fraud for writing a $500,000 check to Premier for payroll purposes on a nearly empty account. Mr. White's defense attorney counters that the developer believed money was arriving to cover the check. A lender seized Mr. White's personal property and in August auctioned items including five Vespa scooters, 15 flat-panel televisions, 36 watches and three mirrored disco balls.

"Where the Hell is Matt?": If you have not yet seen this latest viral Internet video, you have to take four minutes and watch it right now. Absolutely guaranteed to make you smile. Matt really does seem to have visited (and danced in) all the places depicted, which kind of makes you wonder how long it took to make this video. While he was dancing, the rest of us were sitting at our desks doing much more productive things...

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The calamity that began as a U.S.-based subprime mortgage meltdown has now grown into a global financial crisis that has resulted in bankruptcies and bailouts involving some of the world’s largest financial institutions. Along the way, these financial institutions’ investors have seen their investment interests damaged or destroyed, leaving many angry and aggrieved. If a new lawsuit is any indication, investors aggrieved by their lost investments in global financial institutions may be turning to the U.S. courts for redress.

As reflected in their press release (here), on October 22, 2008, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed a purported securities class action in the Southern District of New York on behalf of investors who purchased securities of the recently nationalized Belgium-based financial services company, Fortis N.V. , related entities, and certain of its directors and officers.

According to the press release, though the company portrayed itself as stable and largely immune to the turmoil that was sweeping financial markets, "the Company was practically insolvent at all relevant times and needed to sell assets at fire-sale prices and raise capital at extraordinarily high rates to remain viable."

The press release states that the company’s balance sheet was impaired by assets acquired in connection with the company’s October 2007 acquisition of ABN AMRO.

On September 29, 2008, the governments of Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg agreed to bailout the company, but only if it were to sell its troubled stake in ABN AMRO. A September 30, 2008 Wall Street Journal article about the action of the three governments, and the role of the ABN AMRO transaction, can be found here. Even though the deal was in the form of an emergency infusion of 11.2 billion Euros ($16.9 billion), it was "not enough to stem Fortis’ continued decline."

On October 4, 2008, the Dutch government took over the company’s operations for 16.8 billion Euros ($23 billion). As the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release puts it, "news that the famed financial giant was in ruins and required nationalization further punished Fortis’ already bruised stakeholders." An October 6, 2008 Wall Street Journal article describing the government takeover, including the sale of Fortis banking and insurance assets to BNP Paribas, can be found here.

The plainitffs' lawyers' press release adds:

On October 14, 2008, Fortis traded on the Brussels exchange at the lowest levels that it had ever seen since it was formed 18 years ago, after selling most of its operations to three governments and BNP Paribas SA. Fortis, which resumed trading after a six-day suspension, declined 78 percent to 1.22 euro, valuing the Company at 2.86 billion euros ($3.91 billion).

The complaint in this case, which can be found here, apparently purports to be filed on behalf of  ALL investors who bought Fortis shares between January 28, 2008 and October 6, 2008, and not just U.S. domiciled investors or those who bought their shares on exchanges in the U.S. (where Fortis shares trade over the counter). The complaint specifically alleges that Fortis shares trade on the Brussels, Euronext and Luxembourg stock exchanges, as well as in the U.S.

To the extent the class action purports to be filed on behalf of foreign-domiciled investors who bought their shares in Belgium-domiciled Fortis on foreign exchanges, the case appears to present a classic instance of the so-called "f-cubed" problem (the reference is to the three foreign connections – foreign corporate domicile, foreign investor domicile, and foreign exchange location).

This case does not present the extreme situation represented in the lawsuit filed against EADS (and about which I wrote here) in which the foreign company's shares did not trade in the U.S. at all, but it nevertheless does present all the jurisdictional problems associated with subjecting foreign domiciled companies to potential liability under U.S. securities laws. As I noted here in connection with the recent ruling in the AstraZeneca case, courts increasingly are showing reluctance to project U.S securities liability in connection with f-cubed claims.

There is of course a well-established pattern of foreign domiciled companies becoming involved in U.S. securities litigation. Indeed, just in connection with the current subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave, there have been U.S. securities lawsuits that have been filed against, Société Générale, Swiss Re, Deutsche Bank, and UBS, among many others.

What sets this most recent lawsuit against Fortis apart from these prior cases, at least in my mind, is that it relates so directly to the dramatic actions of foreign governments to try to salvage the company. These circumstances involve a magnitude, a depth of clearly foreign involvement and interests, and a combination of purely global financial circumstances that could be far beyond the purview of a U.S based court. To be sure, there may well have been misrepresentations made in connection with these events (the complaint certainly makes numerous allegations to that effect), and there may well of course have been misrepresentations of a kind for which the U.S. laws are designed to provide provide relief, which of course will have to be determined at a later date.

The case also involves such a vivid example of the momentous events that have moved across the global financial stage in recent weeks. The litigants will of course present their arguments about whether and to what extent a U.S. court is the appropriate forum here. Those of us not directly involved in the case may ask whether U.S. courts appropriately should perform roving inquests on the bailouts and bankruptcies that emerge around the globe as a result of the current financial crisis.

In any event, the Fortis lawsuit may represent another example of the new wave of credit crisis-related litigation, where the connection to the subprime meltdown is indirect, and the events that triggered the lawsuit are related to the catastrophic events in the financial market place that began to unfold in September 2008. My most recent prior post on this new litigation wave can be found here. On the other hand, it may also be argued that the problems Fortis faced are simply the result of the subprime mortgage exposure and subprime-related investments of the company it acquired, much the same as, for example, Wachovia was exposed to the subprime-related problems from Golden West, which Wachovia acquired.

Here Be Dragons: The ill-fated ABN AMRO transaction is a veritable treasure trove of excesses, extremes and subsequent moral lessons. Undoubtedly a book will be written some day about how the investor consortium led by Royal Bank of Scotland, and including Fortis, outbid (to the consortium’s eternal regret) the prior ABN AMRO bid of Barclays. Until the book comes out, readers may want to refer to the highly abridged version of events on Wikipedia, here.

Were there not so many other current events, the financial pages undoubtedly would be full of what-went-wrong retrospectives on the ABN AMRO deal. It is one more of those amazing things about the current circumstances that, despite the size of the ABN AMRO calamity, it is effectively just background noise in the larger cataclysm.

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After the close of business on Friday, October 10, 2008, the FDIC announced (here and here) that state regulators had closed two banks, Meridian Bank of Eldred, Illinois, and Main Street Bank of Northville, Michigan. The closure of these two banks brings the 2008 total number of bank closures to 15.

By way of comparison, there were only three bank closured during all of 2007. Indeed, there were none at all between June 25, 2004 and February 2, 2007. (An FDIC table showing all bank closures since 2000 can be found here.) According to an October 11, 2008 Bloomberg article (here), the 15 bank closures during 2008 already represents the highest annual total since 1993, which of course was the tail end of the last era of failed banks.

Nor is this current wave of bank failures over. Conditions in the housing market continue to deteriorate, and job losses associated with the anticipated recession could only accelerate this process. A slumping economy will challenge borrowers across all lines of credit. This June 30, 2008 FDIC chart (here) graphically illustrates the dramatic growth in troubled loans over recent periods, and both trendlines and headlines suggest that this will only continue.

Moreover, the balance sheets of many banks are already under pressure because of the banks’ extensive holdings in securities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and, to a lesser extent, Washington Mutual, AIG, and Lehman Brothers. Banks dependent on short term interbank loans may also be experiencing liquidity issues as a result of the current disruption in the credit markets.

As of the end of the second quarter 2008, the FDIC listed (refer here) 117 banks on its "Problem List," which represents a 30 percent jump since the end of the first quarter. The "Problem List" numbers through the end of the third quarter are not yet available, but significant further deterioration seem probable given third quarter events, and developments already in the first two weeks of the fourth quarter certainly have not helped.

UPDATE: Consistent the hyperspeed circumstances that have come to characterize recent events, the announcement this evening after the close of the market that the U.S. will buy stakes in the Nation's largest banks (refer to WSJ article here), along with related disclosures, potentially impacts the foregoing analysis as well as much that follows. In particular, the Journal is reporting that "one central plank of these new efforts is a plan for the Treasury to take approximately $250 billion in equity stakes in potentially thousands of banks." This obviously could impact the issue whether or not or to what extent other banks will fail. As these details are only now emerging (after I wrote this entire blog post, wouldn't you know it), and as it will take some time before the details become clear, much less that the government acts, the discussion in this post may remain relevant. How relevant remains to be seen, depending on the specifics of the government's plan and its implementation.

A significant part of the last era of failed banks was the appearance of a flotilla of lawsuits, in which investors and regulators sought to assign blame and recover losses. There already has been extensive litigation filed in connection with the two most prominent bank failures of 2008, IndyMac (refer here and here) and Washington Mutual (refer here).

The follow-on failed bank litigation has started to emerge in connection even with the lower profile failures, as illustrated by the recent lawsuit filed in connection with the failure of Integrity Bank of Alphretta, Ga.

State banking regulators closed Integrity on August 29, 2008, and the FDIC was appointed as its receiver (about which refer here). The bank’s deposit liabilities and some of its assets were sold to Regions Financial Corp. Prior to a March 2008 delisting, shares of Integrity’s holding company, Integrity Bancshares, traded on Nasdaq.

On September 12, 2008, Integrity shareholders filed a purported class action in Georgia (Fulton County) Superior Court against the holding company and four Integrity officers. On October 7, 2008, the defendants removed the case to the Northern District of Georgia. A copy of the removal petition, to which the state court complaint is attached, can be found here.

The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the defendants misled investors about the bank holding company’s health during 2006 and 2007, as a result of which the plaintiffs allege violation of state securities laws, common law fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The complaint specifically alleges that the defendants understated or failed to disclose "the nature and degree of risk associated with the following conditions":

(i) a loan portfolio comprised almost entirely on real estate acquisition, development and construction, which risk was further by an unreasonable concentration of such toasts its borrower relationship (the "Related Loans"), (ii) a loan portfolio principally collateralized by real estate, (iii) operating with a Board of Directors that failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to Bank management (iv) operating with inadequate management not sufficiently experienced in or Knowledgeable of good lending practices, (v) operating with inadequate equity capital and reserves in relation to the volume and quality of assets held by the operating with a large volume of poor quality loans, (vii) operating with inadequate allowance for loan and lease basses, (viii) operating with hazardous loan and administration practices, (ix) banking regulations concerning safe lending practices, (x) the potential for cross-defaults with respect to some or all of the Related Loans, (xi) potential difficulty in and realizing on loan collateral in market conditions, (xii) the potential and severity of losses from deteriorating market affecting borrowers, and (xiii) the adverse affect of losses from such loan defaults on the Bank’s liquidity, capital resources and operations.

The Integrity lawsuit is not the only complaint to be filed in connection with the current wave of bank failures. In addition to the Washington Mutual and IndyMac lawsuits cited above, investors also filed a securities class action lawsuit in connection with the failure of NetBank, about which refer here. The FDIC’s press release about the September 28, 2007 closure of NetBank, which coincidentally was also based in Alphretta, Georgia, can be found here.

The failure of additional banks, while not inevitable, seems more likely than not. (I doubt there are many informed observers now who would assert that there will be no further bank failures.) To the extent more banks fail, there undoubtedly will also be further related litigation. And to the extent the pace of bank closures quickens, which certainly is within the range of possibilities, there could be a surge of "dead bank" litigation comparable to the flood of lawsuits that kept so many lawyers employed during the late 80s and early 90s (including, it should be noted, your humble correspondent).

If the earlier era is any guide, the lawsuits that may arise will include not just investor lawsuits like the one involving Integrity, but also actions by regulators as well. And again, if the earlier era is any guide, the defendants will include not only the financial institutions’ directors and officers, but also the financial institutions’ outside professionals, particularly the auditors and attorneys.

During the competitive D&O insurance marketplace conditions that have prevailed in recent years, many financial institutions were able to procure D&O insurance policies without a so-called regulatory exclusion (for further background about which refer here). It may be that in light of current conditions in the banking industry, the regulatory exclusion could be poised for a comeback.

In any event, community banks and other small to medium-sized banks, which have enjoyed a competitive D&O insurance marketplace for several years may now face rapidly changing and less advantageous conditions. Certainly, the D&O insurance underwriters will undoubtedly approach these kinds of accounts with a great deal more caution than in recent years.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for providing a copy of the Integrity removal petition.

That Goes for Subordinated Investors Too:  In a prior post, here, I suggested that the dramatic failure of several prominent companies was drawing preferred shareholders into securities class action litigation. It appears that these events may be having the same effect on investors in subordinated securities as well.

According to the plaintiffs’ October 10, 2008 press release (here), a purported class action lawsuit has been filed in the Southern District of New York on behalf of person who purchased securities in the December 11, 2007 offering of 7.70% Series A5 Junior Subordinated Debentures of AIG, against certain AIG directors and officers, as well as the offering underwriters. The complaint alleges that the offering documents did not accurately represent AIG’s financial condition, and in particular misrepresented the company’s exposure to loss associated with credit default swaps.

As I noted in my earlier post, the massive investment losses associated with the collapse of these prominent financial companies is drawing many new classes of litigants who previously would not have become involved in securities litigation.

Run the Numbers: With the addition of the Integrity and the AIG subordinated debenture lawsuits, my current tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits now stands at 124, of which 84 have been filed in 2008. The lawsuit tally can be accessed here.

When They Are Done in Reykjavik, Would They Be Willing to Come to Wall Street?: An October 13, 2008 Financial Times article entitled "Icelandic Women to Clean Up 'Male Mess'" (here) reports that two women, Elín Sigfúsdóttir and Birna Einarsdóttir, are set to become chief executives of two nationalized banks the Icelandic government created in the wake of the recent banking crisis. A government official quoted in the ariticle said that these appointments were "an attempt to signal a new culture within the banking system"

The article quotes a banker who blames the Icelandic banking system's collapse on "young and predominately male bankers" whose "eyes were bigger than their stomachs." A government official is quoted as saying that "now the women are taking over. It's typical, the men make the mess and the women come in to clean it up."

Meanwhile, Iceland may run out of food, or at least imported food. Bloomberg reports (here) that due to the unwillingness of banks outside the country to trade in Iceland's currency, the krona, the country's foreign trade has come to a standstill. As a result, the country's food shelves are being stripped bare, and they may not soon be replenished.

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On October 7, 2008, in a decision that could affect other litigation relation to Countrywide Financial, Judge Sue Robinson dismissed the consolidated shareholders’ derivative lawsuit pending in Delaware federal court against the company, as nominal defendants, and ten of its former directors and officers. A copy of the October 7 opinion can be found here.

The plaintiffs in the Delaware federal court derivative lawsuit had alleged that the individual defendants had violated the federal securities laws’ disclosure requirements, and also had committed state law violations of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. As Judge Robinson noted in her October 7 opinion, the plaintiffs’ "most serious allegation" was that the defendants caused Countrywide to repurchase $2.37 billion worth of the company’s common stock "concomitant to the sale of $373 million worth of shares personally owned by members of the Board who were in possession of non-public, materially adverse information."

The defendants had moved to dismiss the amended complaint based, among other things, on the plaintiffs’ failure to make demand on the Board prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

However, on January 11, 2008, Countrywide and Bank of America announced that Bank of America was acquiring Countrywide in a stock for stock transaction. Bank of American’s press release announcing the merger can be found here. On July 1, 2008, the merger closed and all outstanding shares of Countrywide were exchanged for Bank of America shares. Banks of America’s July 1, 2008 press release can be found here. Countrywide became a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank of America.

Defendants thereafter filed a further motion to dismiss, arguing that as a result of the merger, the plaintiffs were no longer Countrywide shareholders and therefore lacked standing to pursue the derivative lawsuit.

Judge Robinson granted the defendants’ motion, stating that "the Delaware Supreme Court has unequivocally declared that plaintiffs in derivative suits lose standing post-merger."

Notwithstanding several creative arguments plaintiffs raised trying to avert this outcome, Judge Robinson’s decision is unremarkable given Delaware law on the issue. The more interesting question is the impact Judge Robinson’s ruling may have on the other pending Countrywide litigation.

The most immediate impact may be on the Countrywide derivative lawsuit pending before Judge Mariana Pfaelzer in the Central District of California. Readers may recall that on May 14, 2008, Judge Pfaelzer issued a blistering opinion in that case largely denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss and granting plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint regarding the few portions of the case that were dismissed. My prior post discussing Judge Pfaelzer’s opinion can be found here.

Among other thing, Judge Pfaelzer said in her May 14 opinion that plaintiffs’ allegations in that case create a "cogent and compelling inference that the individual defendants misled the public with regard to the rigor of Countrywide’s loan origination process, the quality of its loans, and the Company’s financial situation – even as they realized that Countrywide had virtually abandoned its own loan underwriting process."

The defendants in the California derivative litigation have now moved for judgment on the pleadings based on the same lack of standing argument that the defendants in the Delaware lawsuit had raised. Indeed, the parties in the California derivative litigation have already filed competing pleadings (here) with respect to the dismissal of the Delaware action. In view of the nature and tone of Judge Pfaelzer’s May 14 opinion in the case, it will be interesting to see whether she follows Judge Robinson’s ruling on post-merger lack of standing.

An even more interesting question is what effect, if any, these developments will have on the consolidated Countrywide subprime securities litigation, which is also pending before Judge Pfaelzer (and about which refer here). The Bank of America acquisition of Countrywide should have no impact on the standing of the securities class action plaintiffs. However, outcome of the dismissal motions in the California derivative litigation potentially could affect the context within which Judge Pfaelzer considers the motions to dismiss in the securities litigation, especially given the strong views Judge Pfaelzer previously expressed in her prior derivative lawsuit dismissal denial.

Oral argument on the pending securities litigation dismissal motions is upcoming.

Very special thanks to a loyal reader for providing copies of Judge Robinson’s October 7 opinion and related pleadings.

You Could Put ‘em on a List: I have added the Countrywide Delaware Derivative lawsuit dismissal to my table of subprime and credit crisis-related securities and derivative lawsuit case dispositions, which can be accessed here.

A Sign of the Times: In connection with a school assignment, my son conducted a census of Obama and McCain lawn signs in our community. He found that the sign that appeared on the highest number of front lawns said "For Sale." 

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The full consequences of the dramatic recent events in the financial markets may take years to emerge, but one direct effect has already appeared – the collapse of several large financial institutions has turned preferred shareholders into securities class action plaintiffs.

Historically, securities class action lawsuits have been pursued on behalf of common shareholders, and to a lesser extent, the holders of public debt securities. Preferred shareholders only infrequently became involved in this type of litigation, for several interrelated reasons.

In the United States, the issuance of preferred shares largely has been limited to REITs, financial institutions and utilities (as noted here). Investment in these types of securities generally is limited to institutional investors. Moreover, the offering of these kinds of securities is even further limited as a practical matter to companies regarded as likely to fulfill their preferred dividend commitments (although less financial stable companies can still attempt a preferred stock offering by including a higher dividend rate).

Companies issuing these securities, therefore, are typically financially stable companies in industries with historically lower securities class action frequency levels. Moreover, institutional investors, who typically buy preferred securities, were, at least until the last several years, less likely to become involved in this kind of litigation. (To be sure, these generalities are not invariable, and there are certainly prior examples of securities litigation involving preferred shareholders.)

The remarkable recent failure of several of the most prominent financial institutions apparently has changed all that, and within the space of a few short weeks, there has been a sudden influx of securities class action lawsuits filed on behalf of failed financial institutions’ preferred shareholders.

Here are the four specific cases to which I am referring:

1. Fannie Mae Preferred Stock, Series T: The first of these recent lawsuits was filed on September 17, 2008 in the Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Federal National Mortgage Association’s ("Fannie Mae") May 13, 2008 offering of 8.25% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series T. The complaint names as defendants the five offering underwriters and four directors and officers of Fannie Mae. Background regarding this case can be found here.

2. Freddie Mac Preferred Stock, Series Z: On September 23, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation’s ("Freddie Mac") November 29, 2007 offering of 8.375% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series Z. The complaint names as defendants only the three offering underwriters. For background, refer here.

3. Lehman Brothers Preferred Series J Stock: On September 24, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of purchasers of Lehman Brothers’ February 5, 2008 offering of Preferred Series J Stock. The complaint names as defendants certain Lehman Brothers directors and officers and the offering underwriters. For background, refer here.

4. Fannie Mae Preferred Stock, Series S: On October 8, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of investors who between December 14, 2007 and September 5, 2008 purchased Fannie Mae’s 8.25% Fixed-to-Floating Rae Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series S. The complaint names as defendants several former Fannie Mae directors and officers as well as the offering underwriters. For background, refer here.

These four lawsuits have several things in common, in addition to the fact that each plaintiff represents a class of preferred shareholders. All of these lawsuits involved companies that failed shortly before the lawsuits were filed. They were all filed in the Southern District. All of the lawsuits assert claims under the ’33 Act (the fourth of the lawsuits also asserts claims under the ’34 Act).

Another common thread of these lawsuits is that they all involve companies that already had been hit with one or more securities lawsuits filed on behalf of common shareholders. The existence of a separate plaintiff class at least potentially represents an opportunity for a different plaintiffs’ firm that may be shut out of the earlier class lawsuit to participate in the litigation assault on the affiliated persons left standing following the companies’ collapse. The existence of the separate class potentially represents a bite at the apple for these plaintiffs’ firms.

In earlier posts (here and here), I suggested that the volcano of events in the financial markets that began in September 2008 potentially could represent an "inflection point" in the ongoing subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave. I suggested that as a result of these events a new group of defendants potentially could be drawn into the litigation wave. The four cases described above further suggest that a whole new group of litigants also could become involved as plaintiffs, starting with the emergence of preferred shareholders and other investor classes as class action litigants. The sheer magnitude of the losses sweeping through the marketplace undoubtedly will draw out these new classes of claimants, as these aggrieved parties seek to shift their losses "upstream" (a process I discussed here).

In the interests of accuracy, I should acknowledge that preferred shareholders class actions are not unknown. Indeed, just a few months ago, in June 2008, investors in Fremont General Corporation’s 9% Trust Originated Preferred Securities filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Central District of California (about which refer here). One might argue that this earlier case merely represents the advance guard for the squadron of lawsuits that came later.

While there may have been prior preferred shareholder lawsuits, the filing of four preferred shareholder class actions lawsuits in quick succession as a direct result of the collapse of several larger financial institutions represents a separately identifiable and categorically distinct phenomenon. It also undeniably represents a direct consequence of the unprecedented turmoil in the financial markets that began in September 2008.

The massive investment losses triggered by these September (and following) events are distributed across a wide variety of types and classes of investors, representing individuals and institutions, as well as holders of many types of debt and equity in many different forms and classes. Some of these aggrieved persons will seek to recover their losses in court. Further company failures (a distinct possibility) will only amplify these trends. All of which reinforces the view that one of the consequences of the enormous events of the past several weeks is a litigation wave "inflection point."

Run the Numbers: With the addition of the most recently filed lawsuits, my running tally of subprime and credit-crisis related securities class action lawsuits (which can be accessed here) now stands at 122, of which 82 have been filed in 2008.

In addition, I have added to my list of subprime and credit crisis-related derivative lawsuits (which can be accessed here), the shareholders’ derivative lawsuit filed on October 7, 2008 against Perini Corp., as nominal defendant, and several of its directors and officers. A copy of the Perini derivative complaint can be found here. (Hat tip to Courthouse News for the Perini derivative complaint.) I previously wrote here about the securities class action lawsuit that was filed earlier against Perini.

With the addition of the Perini complaint, my current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related derivate lawsuits now stands at 25.

One thing that has happened as the credit crisis has grown, spread and become a more generalized financial crisis. That is, it has become increasingly more difficult to proceed with definitional certainty about exactly what I am "counting." As the economic downturn affects more and more companies in an ever broader variety of ways, and as the general conditions become increasingly remote from the subprime-related causes, the related lawsuits are becoming less and less categorically distinct. At some point, the distinctions may no longer exist, and the counting exercise will have to be redesigned or even cease all together.

Who could have anticipated where all of this would lead when the subprime litigation wave first started to emerge back in February 2007?

Are State Court ’33 Act Cases Removeable to Federal Court?: In prior posts (most recently here), I have discussed the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ have been filing subprime related ’33 Act cases in state court, in reliance on the ’33 Act’s concurrent jurisdiction provisions.

Lyle Roberts notes on his 10b-5 Daily blog (here), that on September 24, 2008, the Southern District of New York refused to remand the Harborview Mortgage case (which I previously discussed here) back to state court. Roberts does note that this holding is contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Luther v Countrywide earlier this year. I discuss the Luther case here.

With this split in the decisions there is now fertile ground for further jurisdictional wrangling. Even less clear is the reason why plaintiffs are so intent on pursuing a federal securities lawsuit in state court in the first place.

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According to news reports (here), MBIA has filed a lawsuit breach of contract lawsuit in New York state court against Countrywide Financial Corp. (now part of Bank of America) alleging that Countywide made fraudulent misrepresentations about is loan underwriting standards in connection with the securitization of over $14 billion of securities for which MBIA provided default insurance and that were backed by mortgages and home equity loans that Countrywide originated.

MBIA alleges that based on Countrywide’s representations about its mortgage lending practices and lending guidelines, MBIA provided "credit enhancements" in connection with the mortgage backed securities, in the form of billions of dollars of trust obligation guarantees.

The complaint alleges that contrary to Countrywide’s representations in connection with the transactions, during the period 2005 to 2007 Countrywide engaged in a "systemic pattern and practice of abandoning its own guidelines for loan origination" as part of the company’s attempt to expand its market share, as a result of which the risk profile of Countrywide’s mortgage portfolio "fundamentally changed." The complaint further alleges that "Countrywide deliberately abandoned its own guidelines to drive up revenues from increased origination fees, securitization fees and origination fees – no matter what the cost to borrowers, investors or guarantors like MBIA."

The complaint further alleges that MBIA has already paid out more than $459 million on it guarantees of the securitized loans and "is exposed to claims in excess of several hundred million dollars more."

The Seeking Alpha blog notes (here) that this lawsuit "may be the beginning of what may be a long battle by bond insurers MBIA and AMBAC to recover losses from those responsible, a process they refer to as remediation." Both insurers have said they expect substantial recoveries "due to misrepresentations and breaches of warranty with respect to securities that they have insured."

The Seeking Alpha blog further notes that these kinds of efforts may be a "painful and necessary" part of the process of putting responsibility where it belongs: "Every fraudulent transaction needs to be pushed back along the chain of perpetrators to its original source, if that person or entity can be located. As much as possible, those whose dishonesty caused the losses must bear them."

There have been multiple other recent attempts to by other litigants to assign blame, as part of the process that seeks to upstream losses back to their source. I discuss a couple of additional examples below.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for links concerning the MBIA lawsuit.

Wisconsin Schools Sue Over CDO Losses: On September 29, 2008, five Wisconsin school districts filed a lawsuit (here) in Wisconsin state court seeking to rescind and to recoup their losses on the $200 million the school districts invested in three synthetic CDOs. The lawsuit alleges that Stifel Nicholaus & Co. and Royal Bank of Canada and their respective related entities omitted or misrepresented the true nature of the investment and of the risks involved.

In 2006, the school districts invested largely borrowed funds into the CDOs to help pay their non-pension retiree benefits. Stifel Nicolaus & Co. and affiliated entities allegedly brokered the deal, while Royal Bank of Canada devised the instruments and determined their value.

The investments have lost approximately $150 million, or three quarters of their value. The lawsuit alleges that the investment was "complex, convoluted, and opaque, and as Stifel and RBC then well knew, beyond the investment knowledge or experience of the School Districts, their school board members, and their administrators."

The complaint also alleges that contrary to the defendants’ representations, the CDOs were collateralized by subprime mortgage loans. The CDOs also allegedly issue credit default swap protection as an additional source of income, which increased the CDOs credit default risk, which risk the lawsuit alleges was not fully disclosed.

The school districts seek rescission of the CDO transaction plus damages.

As losses accumulate, more and more aggrieved persons will join in this process of upstreaming losses back to their source. As I have noted many times, the litigation arising the subprime meltdown is likely to take years to unfold. As these cases illustrate, the litigation is also likely to involve an ever broader array of litigants, asserting an ever more diverse range of claims.

The SEC Pursues a Subprime Related Claim: Private litigants are not the only ones that will participate in this process of assigning blame. The SEC also clearly intends to get into the act, as reflected in its October 3, 2008 filing (refer here) of an enforcement action against five representatives of World Group Securities. The action alleges that the defendants fraudulently sold unsuitable securities to persons whose acquisitions were financed by mortgage refinancings.

The SEC’s complaint alleges that the defendants moved the customers, many of whom had little education and spoke little English, from fixed-rate mortgages to "subprime adjustable-rate negative amortization mortgages." The refinancing proceeds were then invested in variable universal life insurance and other unsuitable securities.

The defendants are alleged to have "misrepresented the expected returns from the securities, the liquidity of the securities, and the nature of the securities and the terms of the new mortgages while failing to disclose material facts about the products."

At one level this new SEC enforcement proceeding may seem unrepresentative of the larger subprime meltdown owing to its particular facts. The SEC action does share several common elements with the cases described above. Like the Wisconsin school suit, the SEC action contains both disclosure and suitability allegations, and like the MBIA lawsuit, the SEC action alleges misrepresentation of the true conditions.

Many of the subprime-related losses are on a much larger scale than that involved in the SEC action, but the SEC action underscores how widespread and diverse the losses are. Because of the degree of excesses involved and the overall magnitude of the losses involved, the blame assigning process yet to come will be complex and protracted. The lawsuits will continue to arise and the losses continue to emerge.

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Allegations that the defendant companies and their senior managers failed to disclose the hazards associated with the company’s risky investments. Allegations that management failed to account for losses on high risk investments in a timely or complete manner. Allegations that company management minimized the deteriorating values of high risk investments in piecemeal damage control statements to the marketplace.

Sound familiar?

You may be surprised to learn that these allegations do not come from a lawsuit filed as part of the recent wave of subprime and credit crisis litigation. Instead these allegations appear in a case filed against American Express and certain of its directors and offices in July 2002. Background regarding the case can be found here.

On September 26, 2008, Judge William H. Pauley of the Southern District of New York, considering the case on remand from the Second Circuit, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in an opinion (here) that may have considerable significance for the more recently filed subprime and credit crisis securities lawsuits.

The plaintiffs had alleged that in the late 90s, the company began investing in "high-risk, high yield debt securities such as below-investment grade bonds and collateralized debt obligations." The complaint alleges that in early 2001, the company recognized $123 million in losses during the preceding fiscal year in losses on the High Yield Debt Portfolio, and that during the first calendar quarter of 2001, the defendants became aware that the portfolio was "deteriorating rapidly." In April 2001, the company announced an additional $185 million in portfolio losses.

During the second calendar quarter of 2001, the second amended complaint alleges, the defendants became aware that "even the investment grade CDOs" were "damaged due to defaults in the underlying bonds." In July 2001, the company announced a $826 million pre-tax charge to recognize additional write-downs to the High Yield Debt Portfolio.

The plaintiffs sought to pursue claims on behalf of persons who had purchased the company’s shares between July 18, 1999 and July 17, 2001. Their second amended complaint alleged three categories of fraud: (1) false and misleading statements that the company had adopted risk management policies; (2) failure to properly account for investment losses; and (3) mischaracterizations of developments relating to the High Yield Portfolio.

Judge Pauley granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complain on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a strong inference that the defendants had acted with scienter.

Judge Pauley found that the allegations that the defendants were motivated to commit fraud by the senior managers’ aggressive income targets and incentive compensation "were not entitled to any weight."

Judge Pauley also rejected plaintiffs’ contention that defendants were "reckless" in not knowing the risks of the high yield investments and that the public disclosures of the company about those investments misrepresented that risk. Those allegations, the court concluded, "do no more than state in conclusory fashion what Defendants should have known, they are not entitled to any weight."

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations based on confidential sources, holding that:

None of the confidential sources specifically states that any Individual Defendants had information or access to information indicating that Amex was not properly valuing the High Yield Debt, that is risk control policies were inadequate, that Amex was violating GAAP, or that contradicted the Company’s statements in 2001.

With respect to plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants minimized the deteriorating asset valuations through piecemeal disclosures, Judge Pauley focused on the internal efforts the Company was making to evaluate its deteriorating assets and found that "the more compelling inference is that Defendants were not acting with intent to deceive, but rather attempting to quantify the extent of the problem before disclosing it to the market."

Judge Pauley also found that the allegations about defendants’ examination of the High Yield Debt Portfolio "suggest that the Defendants upheld their duty to monitor," which "precludes any inference of recklessness."

The SEC Actions blog has a detailed analysis of the opinion, here.

The allegations in the American Express case contain many parallels with many of the lawsuits in the current litigation wave. Indeed the nature of the investment assets involved, including in particularly the investment grade CDOs, and the causes of the valuation declines (including the deteriorating of the bonds underlying the CDOs) bear an uncanny resemblance to many of the allegations in the more recent subprime and credit crisis related litigation.

With the insertion of the words "subprime mortgages," the case arguably would be indistinguishable from many of the more recent cases. Many of the more recent cases allege, like the American Express lawsuit, that the defendant companies lacked internal controls, failed to account for declining investment valuations, and soft-pedaled the seriousness of the valuation declines through piecemeal write-downs.

Because of these similarities, the failure of the American Express lawsuit to survive a motion to dismiss is potentially significant with respect to the more recent lawsuits. Of course, every lawsuit has its own distinct allegations, and the differences in any given case could well be sufficient to produce a different outcome.

Nevertheless, Judge Pauley’s scienter analysis may be particularly important to many of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, in view of the fact that a very large percentage of the recent cases have been filed in the Southern District of New York, where the American Express case was also pending.

Special thanks to Neil McCarthy of LawyerLinks (here) for providing a copy of the American Express opinion.

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In my preceding post, I wrote about a possible new wave of credit crisis lawsuits, where the defendant companies are not themselves directly affected by credit crisis fallout, but instead suffer from exposure to other companies that have been directly affected. In a litigation example of these circumstances at work, plaintiffs’ lawyers today initiated another securities class action against a company suffering the effects of Lehman Brothers’ collapse.

In a September 22, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers announced their filing in the Southern District of New York of a securities class action lawsuit against Constellation Energy Group and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that

In July 2008, the Company reported favorable financial results and reaffirmed EPS guidance of 5.75 per share for 2008. In August 2008, analysts questioned Constellation’s accounting and the implications of a credit downgrade. Then, on September 15, 2008, investors and the market became aware of Constellation’s exposure to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s (“Lehman”) bankruptcy, which affected the Company’s ability to engage in energy-related trades. With this news, Constellation’s shares plunged to $47.99, a 50% drop from the Company’s Class Period high of $97.34 per share.

The complaint specifically alleges that: 

(a) defendants were inflating Constellation’s results through manipulations relating to the characterization of depreciation expense which inflated the Company’s reported cash flows; (b) the Company’s financial results were inflated by overly optimistic assumptions which were reflected in mark-to-market accounting; (c) the Company’s exposure to credit problems of trading partners was much greater than represented – in fact, one of Constellation’s key trading partners, Lehman, was having severe financial problems; and (d) the Company was not on track to report 2008 EPS of $5.25+ per share.

This lawsuit raises a number of different allegations against the defendants, and the allegations relating to Lehman’s collapse are only part of this lawsuit. Nevertheless, this lawsuit demonstrates that the reverberations from the most recent phase of the credit crisis are spreading far beyond the high profile financial services companies whose names have dominated recent headlines. As Constellation’s circumstances show, the financial companies’ turmoil has also affected their “trading partners,” adding to their partners’ difficulties, and, at least in the case of Constellation, leading to litigation.

One of the questions I have long been asking about the subprime and credit crisis litigation wave is whether it will eventually spread beyond the financial sector. There may not yet be quite enough evidence to declare that the wave has done so. But the allegations against Constellation, and the fact that a company like Constellation has been sued, does suggest the way the litigation wave could well spread outside the financial sector, if it eventually does in any numerically significant way.

In my previous post, I described this potential new class of credit crisis litigation as representing the “second derivative” of the credit crisis litigation wave – that is, the companies targeted may not themselves have been directly affected by the credit crisis, but other companies to which they are exposed have been directly affected, as a result of which even the company seemingly remote from the direct credit crisis turbulence winds up experiencing and suffering from its effects.

It remains to be seen whether this new wave of credit crisis litigation becomes widespread. The one thing I know for sure is that the consequences from last week’s event are enormous and are continuing to ripple through the financial markets and the entire economy. Many companies are likely to be affected and some will be sued.

Some readers may recall that Constellation was also in the news last week in connection with the announcement that Constellation is to be acquired by Berkshire Hathaway affiliate company MidAmerican Energy. Indeed, MidAmerican has agreed to buy Constellation in a transaction valued at about $4.7 billion (refer here). Investors’ reaction to this transaction may be assessed from the per share acquisition price of $26.50, which is less than half the company’s market value just a week previously. At latest word (refer here), a competing bidder is weighing an alternative bid despite the fact that Buffett’s company has already injected $1 billion in cash into Constellation.

Ripple in Still Waters: In another illustration of the wide dispersion of the economic consequences from the large financial institutions’ failures, the September 23, 2008 Wall Street Journal reports in an article entitled “Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Takeovers Cost U.S. Banks Billions” (here), that about a quarter of the nation’s banks lost a combined $10 to $15 billion due to the mortgage giants’ government takeover.

According to the Journal, the American Bankers Association reports that approximately 2300 banks hold Fannie and Freddie preferred shares, which are likely worthless. 85% of the affected institutions are community banks with assets less than $1 billion. The irony is that many of these banks themselves steered clear of subprime lending excesses, and at the same time considered Fannie and Freddie, as the Journal states, “rock solid investments.”

For most of the affected banks, the losses will be small and manageable. Nevertheless, the dispersion of the losses shows how widespread are the effects from recent events. The impact on companies that were not themselves directly involved in subprime lending illustrates the way these consequence are spreading the effects of the credit crisis to the larger economy.

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Since the earliest days of the subprime litigation wave, one of the recurring questions has been whether the wave would spread beyond the financial sector. The question remains, but allegations in a new securities lawsuit suggest that circumstances arising from the subprime crisis are affecting a diverse variety of companies, and by extension the claims asserted against them.

According to their press release (here), on September 16, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against NextWave Wireless and certain of its directors and officers. NextWave is a mobile broadband and multimedia technology company that develops, produces and markets mobile multimedia and wireless broadband products. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that:

Defendants issued materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business and financial results. As a result of defendants’ false statements, NextWave stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period, reaching as high as $10.10 per share in June 2007.

On August 7, 2008, after the market closed, Nextwave issued its second quarter 2008 financial results, announcing it only had $71.1 million in cash and similar instruments available as of June 30, 2008 and, unless it raised money, its cash would run out at the beginning of October 2008. As a result, the Company was seeking financing that would give the Company enough money to operate through June 2009. On this news, NextWave’s stock fell $1.90 per share to close at $0.95 per share, a one-day decline of 67%.

According to the complaint, the true facts, which were known by the defendants but concealed from the investing public during the Class Period, were as follows: (a) NextWave did not have adequate sources of liquidity to continue operations as it executed its growth strategy and continued making aggressive worldwide acquisitions; (b) defendants had no reasonable basis to make favorable statements that the Company’s WiMAX semiconductor products would be available for commercial sale in the first half of 2008; (c) NextWave’s growth and acquisition strategy was not financially successful and did not provide the basis for continued growth or financial success because it was straining NextWave’s fragile liquidity position and NextWave did not have the financial resources to continue to operate its world-wide operations through the end of 2008; (d) NextWave failed to timely disclose that it had invested all of its marketable securities in extremely high-risk and illiquid auction rate securities; and (e) NextWave’s ability to continue as a going concern was seriously in question by reason of the facts alleged in subparagraphs (a)-(d) above.

The most interesting part about these allegations to me is the reference to the company’s investment in auction rate securities. The complaint itself further alleges with respect to these "extremely high-risk and illiquid auction rate securities" that NextWave "had misrepresented these investments as marketable securities on its balance sheet included in its financial statements disseminated in its Form 10-K and 10-Q and press release."

There have of course been many prior lawsuits against investment banks and broker-dealers in which it is alleged that the financial institutions misrepresented the risks of auction rate securities. But this new lawsuit against NextWave represents the first instance of which I am aware in which an auction rate investor has been sued for failing to disclose its exposure to auction rate securities investments. Obviously, there are a lot of other allegations in the lawsuit, but the auction rate investments allegations are an important part of the complaint and, if nothing else, are noteworthy.

The allegations about the company’s alleged balance sheet misclassification of its auction rate investments is of particular concern. Many companies (and other entities) hold auction rate securities investments, and all of these entities have been struggling both with valuation issues and with balance sheet classification issues. These classification and disclosure issues affect not just auction rate related investments but subprime and other mortgage-backed investments as well. At least theoretically, plaintiffs’ lawyers could allege similar investment disclosure and asset classification issues in connection with these companies.

Perhaps I am getting ahead of myself, but I also wonder whether similar "failure to disclose investment exposure" allegations might be alleged against companies that will be reporting significant write-downs in their holdings of securities of, for example, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, and AIG. Admittedly, this may be a far-fetched possibility at this point. But some companies’ write-downs of their investments in those assets could be material, which in turn could affect the reporting companies’ own stock market valuations. If the impact is significant, angry investors might consider their litigation alternatives.

Another Credit Crisis Lawsuit: There was also a more conventional credit crisis lawsuit filed today. According to the plaintiffs’ counsel’s September 16, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs have filed a securities class action lawsuit against BankUnited Financial Corp. and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that

Defendants made false and misleading statements about BankUnited. Specifically, defendants misrepresented: (a) the losses the Company was likely to suffer due to BankUnited’s poor underwriting standards, which losses would occur once interest rates reset on the billions of dollars of pay-option arms (adjustable rate mortgages where borrowers had the ability to choose their payment amount during the initial period of the loan); (b) BankUnited’s sketchy appraisal process, which permitted borrowers to obtain mortgages in excess of their ability to pay and in excess of the value of the underlying property; and (c) BankUnited’s policies with regard to "piggy-back" loans, which are essentially second mortgages made at the time a home is purchased to fund a down payment.

The BankUnited lawsuit is the latest to raise allegations involving Option ARM mortgages, which I have discussed in prior posts, most recently here.

Run the Numbers: Many readers know that I have been tracking subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits. My running tally can be accessed here. As time has gone by, definitional issues have become increasingly challenging. The NextWave lawsuit may present the most significant definitional challenge to date, because the auction rate investment allegations arguably are a peripheral part of the complaint.

I could go either way on this one, but after some thought, I have decided to include the NextWave lawsuit in my count, simply due to the fact that the company’s financial problems apparently were due in part to its investments in auction rate securities. Reasonable minds could differ on whether or not to include the lawsuit.

But with the addition of the NextWave and BankUnited lawsuits, the current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits now stands at 114, of which 74 have been filed in 2008.

Dear Bob, you might not remember me, but I used to work at AIG: If you have not yet seen it, you must read the September 16, 2008 letter (here) that Maurice "Hank" Greenberg, AIG’s former Chairman and CEO and current Chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr, to now-former AIG Chairman and CEO Robert Willumstad.

I can’t imagine why Greenberg thinks Willumstad might have been concerned that Greenberg would "overshadow" him. Willumstad undoubtedly was reassured that, although Greenberg did feel compelled to note "you and the Board have presided over the virtual destruction of shareholder value built up over 35 years," it was not Greenberg’s "intention to point fingers or be critical."

Hat tip to the Wall Street Journal for the link.

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The current securities litigation wave first arose out of the collapse of the residential real estate subprime mortgage market. As I have previously noted (here), the wave long ago ceased to be just about subprime mortgages, as the litigation as expanded to encompass the fallout from a more general credit crisis. As demonstrated in a recent lawsuit, the wave now includes litigation arising from disruptions in major development construction project financing.

According to their August 20, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs’ counsel have initiated a purported securities class action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Perini Corp. and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that Perini, a company that offers general contracting, construction management and design-build services to private clients and public agencies worldwide, failed to disclose:

(a) that the developer of Perini’s Las Vegas, Nevada projects, including the CityCenter Project, was experiencing financial problems because it failed to secure financing for the entire project and was dependent upon raising the remainder of the financing from the expected sale of residential units. However, the proceeds from the residential unit sales were based on unrealistic and aggressive prices at a time when the condo market in Las Vegas, Nevada was extremely weak; (b) that the Company’s Las Vegas projects were being delayed, and could possibly be halted; (c) that the developer was in risk of defaulting on its construction loan; (d) that the Company’s future revenue and profit was dependent upon the Las Vegas projects since the projects consisted of approximately 20% of its backlog; and (e) as a result of the foregoing, the Company’s ability to maintain its profit margins was in serious doubt.

Then, on January 17, 2008, the Company issued a press release announcing that Deutsche Bank "delivered a notice of loan default to the developer of the Cosmopolitan Resort and Casino project under construction in Las Vegas, Nevada." In response to this announcement, shares of the Company’s common stock fell $10.05 per share, or 27%, to close at $27.65 per share, on heavy trading volume.

The general economic downturn is now affecting a broad variety of companies in diverse industries. As I have previously noted (most recently here), in all likelihood, in the weeks and months ahead, other companies will be finding that transactions entered in more clement circumstances now appear troubled. As more companies stumble on these troubled transactions, further lawsuits undoubtedly will emerge. And as is the case with the Perini lawsuit, most of these lawsuits will have little to do with subprime mortgages directly.

In any event, I have added the Perini lawsuit to my list of subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuits, which can be accessed here. With the addition of the Perini lawsuit, the current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits now stands at 108, of which 68 have been filed in 2008.

For those who are curious, information about the CityCenter Las Vegas project can be found here. Background about the Cosmopolitan Resort and Casino can be found here.

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While I have been keeping track of the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation as it has accumulated (refer here), it has been some time since I have undertaken a detailed litigation overview. Fortunately, NERA Economic Consulting, in a July 3, 2008 report entitled “Subprime Securities Litigation: Key Players, Rising Stakes and Emerging Trends” (here), has taken care of it, with an excellent analysis of the subprime litigation to date.

The NERA Report, written by my friend Dr. Faten Sabry and her colleagues Anmol Sinha and Sungi Lee, observes that the growing wave of subprime lawsuits has swept up an increasingly diverse array of plaintiffs and defendants. With respect the defendants, the Report notes that:

Almost every market participant in the securitization process—which transforms illiquid assets such as mortgages, auto loans, and student loans into tradable securities—has been named as a defendant. The list of defendants includes lenders, issuers, underwriters, rating agencies, accounting firms, bond insurers, hedge funds, CDOs, and many more.

The Report also describes the way that the litigation has evolved, noting that:

The majority of the early lawsuits have been against mortgage lenders. As various other market participants reveal the extent of their losses and exposure, they too are being dragged into litigation. The plaintiffs include shareholders, investors, issuers and underwriters of securities, plan participants, and others.

The NERA Report specifically discusses the subprime-related lawsuits that have been filed against lenders, issuers, rating agencies, bond insurers and asset management companies. The Report also observes (as has been noted on this blog, here) that as the litigation has accumulated, it has spread far beyond just subprime-related issues, and has encompassed parties and circumstances “in the context of the trouble in the broader markets.”

The Report notes that as the subprime litigation has evolved, the broader “credit crunch” litigation has encompassed a wider variety of lawsuits and litigants, including lawsuits involving asset-backed commercial paper, lawsuits related to failed deals, lawsuits related to corporate debt losses, and lawsuit related to asset-backed securities.

The NERA Report was clearly intended to be descriptive and not exhaustive, so it is no criticism of the report  for me to add some additional observations. There are, in fact, a few notes I would add to the report’s overview.

In addition to the categories of litigants the NERA Report discusses, there are some additional categories I think merit attention. The first relates to hedge funds. While the NERA Report does reference hedge funds, I think the involvement of hedge funds is worth of separate comment. Hedge funds have become involved both as plaintiffs (refer here) and as defendants (refer here and here). The likelihood of additional litigation involving hedge funds seems strong.

One group not specifically mentioned in the NERA report is the mutual fund industry. By my count, there have been at least five subprime securities lawsuits against mutual funds and mutual fund families. (Refer for example here and here.) These lawsuits are brought by investors claiming that the mutual funds misrepresented the relative stability of their investment strategy and assets.

The NERA report does specifically discuss the litigation against the credit rating agencies. The only thing I would add is that the credit rating agency litigation falls into two categories. The first involves lawsuits brought by the credit rating agencies’ own shareholders, for allegedly inadequate disclosures (refer, for example, here). The second involves investor lawsuits brought against the rating agencies for the rating company’s actual rating activities (about which refer here).

Yet another industry group that has been hit with subprime lawsuits is the mortgage insurance industry, in which all of the leading participants – including MGIC (refer here), The PMI Group (refer here), and Radian (refer here) – have all been hit with securities lawsuits. Indeed, the Blackstone Group was also hit with a securities lawsuit (refer here) for alleged disclosure issues relating to its investment in mortgage insurer FGIC. As discussed in a July 11, 2008 Wall Street Journal article (here), the mortgage insurers’ woes are one of the litany of problems besetting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac has also itself been the target of a subprime-related securities class action, as noted here.

The NERA Report specifically acknowledges the fact that the litigation wave has long since moved past subprime lending alone. For example, the NERA report specifically mentions lawsuits involving corporate debt (as I also noted, here). An important corollary of this observation is that even with respect to residential real estate lending, the litigation wave has swept far beyond subprime lending alone; for example, it has also encompassed Option ARM loans, as I discussed here. IndyMac, the lending institution whose dramatic collapse over the weekend may potentially signal a dark new inflection point in the evolving credit crisis, was focused on so-called Alt-A loans.

In addition, other kinds of debt have also been the source of credit crunch litigation. For example, in addition to corporate debt, problems arising from student loans have also been the source of litigation, as discussed here and here.

Finally, I do think it is noteworthy that at least one credit crisis lawsuit, involving MoneyGram International (refer here), relates to the company’s disclosures about its investments in subprime-related assets. Many companies, including many companies outside the financial sector, have balance sheet exposure to subprime assets, and therefore there is the potential at least for this kind of litigation to spread far beyond the financial sector. I have discussed this issue at length in prior posts (most recently here), but I recognize at this point that it remains to be seen whether or not there will be substantial credit crisis-related litigation outside the financial sector. As I recently noted in my mid-year review of securities litigation (refer here), the vast bulk of credit crisis-related litigation has been in the financial sector.

The NERA report concludes with the observation that “most of the lawsuits are still in their initial stages and it is too early to predict the outcomes,” but that “given the continuing turmoil in the financial markets, the mounting losses, and the growing list of lawsuits, this story is far from over.” I couldn’t agree more, and as the story continues to evolve, I will continue to track the lawsuits – the securities and ERISA lawsuits here, and the derivative lawsuits here. I will also continue to track subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit case dispositions, here.

Rubble Without a "Cause"?: I was struck by the reports in the press coverage surrounding the regulatory seizure of IndyMac Bank, for example in the July 12, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here), that Office of Thrift Supervision director John Reich blamed the bank’s failure on “comments made in late June by Senator Charles Schumer, who sent a letter to the regulator raising concerns about the bank’s solvency.” Spooked depositors reportedly withdrew $1.3 billion in 11 days. The Journal reports that “Mr. Reich said Sen. Schumer gave the bank a ‘heart attack.’”  A July 14, 2008 Wall Street Journal article (here) also quotes Reich as saying that "Schumer sparked a deposit run that 'pushed IndyMac over the edge.' "

Schumer is reported to have responded that if the regulator had done its job and prevented the bank’s “poor and loose lending practices,” we “wouldn’t be where we are today.”  (This is of course the same Senator Schumer who barely a year ago urged that regulatory standards should be loosened in order for America’s financial markets to be more competitive globally.)

The sharp exchange between Reich and Schumer dramatically highlights the fundamental question of causation that surrounds so many problems arising from the entire subprime meltdown. While Senator Schumer’s letter may well have undermined IndyMac depositor confidence, it was also merely one link in a chain of events leading up to the bank’s failure. The bank’s very business model, built around so-called Alt-A loans, in which borrowers are not required to fully document income or assets, arguably could be a more fundamental cause. Or if plaintiffs’ allegations are to be believed, the bank’s failure to follow its own underwriting standards also could have led to the bank’s failure.

Indeed, it is arguably possible to take the causal chain even further back. Here, I have in mind several driving trips I made during 2005 and 2006 on the I-10 corridor between LA and Palm Springs. It seemed as if on each trip, yet another roadside hilltop even further east than the last had been scraped bare and festooned with hundreds of cookie-cutter monstrosities “attractively priced in the low 500,000s."

The continuing emergence of these self-described “lifestyle” communities depended in the end on ever-rising house prices, record low interest rates, and two dollar a gallon gas. When all of these circumstances changed, the construct collapsed. (A more technical summary of this analysis can be found in a July 14, 2008 Wall Street Journal article, here, entitled "Continuing Vicious Cycle of Pain in Housing and Finance Ensnares Market.")

The ensuing defaults may or may not have been inevitable but they surely were a latent possibility built into lending arrangements borrowers had to stretch to afford. Every participant in the process contributed and accepted some part of this risk. In other words. it could plausibly be argued that the ultimate cause of the subprime meltdown (even if not the collapse of IndyMac) was cultural, or perhaps social. Call it cultural complicity.

Theorists would contend that the cultural context was merely a causally relevant condition but not the proximate cause either of the subprime meltdown or of IndyMac’s collapse, and perhaps they would be correct. Indeed, in a society that insists on assigning legal blame, proximate causation may be the only relevant inquiry.

But on that score, it may be worth noting that Reich, the OTS official, is reported to have asked rhetorically, “Would the institution have failed without the deposit run? We’ll never know the answer to that question”

Reich’s rhetorical inquiry, technically a “counterfactual,” poses a causal inquiry based on possible consequences from alternative facts. An interesting recent discussion of counterfactuals in the securities litigation context appears in yet another recent NERA Economic Consulting paper, entitled “Shareholder Class Actions and the Counterfactual” (here). This interesting June 24. 2008 paper poses questions that may prove particularly provocative in the context of the subprime meltdown.

The courts will eventually assign blame for IndyMac’s collapse. (Somehow, I doubt the blame will ultimately be placed on Senator Schumer.) But, the legal inquiry aside, it is possible that the final answer to the question of ultimate causation may be found only at the bottom of a bottomless well.

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The subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave has come a long way since the first of the subprime lawsuits was filed in February 2007. Now that the litigation phenomenon is now nearly a year and a half old, the rulings on the motions to dismiss are finally starting to accumulate. It appears to be time for The D&O Diary to initiate the latest in its ongoing and ever-popular series of lists, this most recently created one to track the accumulated subprime and credit-crisis related lawsuit dismissals and dismissal motion denials.

The D&O Diary’s newly created list of subprime and credit crisis-related dismissals and motion denials can be found here.

As befits the relatively early stages of most of this litigation, the list of case dispositions is, as of the time of the list’s initial creation, pretty sparse. I will endeavor to update the list as new dismissal motion rulings emerge, and wherever possible I will provide a link to the actual ruling. As I update the list, I will indicate at the top of the list the date of the list’s most recent revision.

The more complete the list is, the more useful it will be for everyone, so all readers are strongly invited and encouraged to let me know about any subprime and credit crisis related lawsuit dismissal motion rulings that are not already on the list.

As of the date of the creation of this post, I am not aware of any subprime or credit-crisis related lawsuit settlements. The settlements will emerge sooner or later, and when the do, I will created a supplemental document tracking the settlements.

Readers who may be unaware of the other lists that I am maintaining may be interested to know about the following lists:

1. The List of Subprime and Credit Crisis-Related Securities Class Action Lawsuit Filings (which may be accessed here).
2. The List of Subprime and Credit Crisis-Related Derivative Lawsuits (here).
3. The List of Options Backdating-Related Lawsuit Filings (here)
4. The List of Options Backdating-Related Dismissals, Denials and Settlements (here).
5. The List of Securities Class Action Opt-Out Settlements (here).

I am always interested in any additional information or correcting information that is required to make these lists more accurate or complete. I am also always interested in readers’ thoughts and comments, about these lists or anything else.

Welcome Back: Serial blogger Bruce Carton is back at it again, with his new blog, Unusual Activity, which can be found here. The blog describes itself as "The Securities Litigation and Enforcement Reporter."  Many readers will recall that Bruce is the founder and long-time author of the Securities Litigation Watch blog. Bruce more recently wrote the Best in Class blog. Everyone here welcomes Bruce back to the blogging circuit, and we look forward to reading his new blog.

Speakers's Corner: On June 19 and 20, 2008, I will be co-Chairing the Mealey's Subprime Mortgage & Insurance Coverage Litigation Conference at the Ritz-Carlton in Pentagon CIty, Virginia, with my good friend, Matt Jacobs, of Jenner & Block.

The agenda (which can be found here), includes many distinguished speakers and panelists, such as Andrew Carron of NERA Economic Consulting, Adel Turki of Cornerstone Research, Robert Rothman of the Lerach Coughlin firm, Dan Bailey of Bailey & Cavalieri, John McCarrick of Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge, David Hensler of Hogan & Hartson, and Mitchell Dolin of Covington & Burling.

Registration instructions and other intormation about the conference can be found here.

And Finally: If you have never heard of the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), then you will want to review the article yesterday's New York TImes (here) discussing the latest in academic anxieties. It used to be all publish or perish, but it is now all about the downloads and links. And you thought your job was competitive.

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 As I have previously observed, the current credit crisis is about more than subprime loans. Among the other kinds of credit are so-called Option ARMs, which frequently involve prime borrowers. These loans are adjustable rate mortgages where the borrower has the option of paying less than the full amount of interest due, with the unpaid balance added to the principle (that is, the loan can negatively amortize). My prior post describing and discussing the nature of Option ARM loans can be found here.

This negative amortization payment feature of Option ARMs only makes sense (if at all) at a time of rising home prices. At a time of declining home values, it can quickly put the borrower in a position where they owe more than the value of their home. As unattractive as this position is, it can get worse when the interest rate adjusts upwards, leaving the borrower in a position of paying even more to stay in a home that is worth less than the mortgage debt.

Unsurprisingly, borrowers are having difficulties with Option ARM loans, which in turn is leading to problems for lenders with Option ARM portfolios. These problems in turn are leading to litigation.

The latest company to be sued in a securities class action lawsuit arising out of problems with Option ARM loans is Wachovia Corporation, which was sued, together with certain of its directors and officers, on June 6, 2008 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs’ lawyers’ June 9, 2008 press release about the lawsuit can be found here. The complaint can be found here. UPDATE: As correctly noted in the reader comment, this case is actually pending in the Northern District of California, rather than the Central District as original text incorrectly stated.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that:

Defendants misled investors by falsely representing that Wachovia had strict and selective underwriting and loan origination practices and a conservative lending approach that set it apart from other lenders. Such reassurances were repeated by defendants throughout the Class Period in order to artificially support Wachovia's stock price in the midst of a weakening mortgage market. In response to increased market concern with the mortgage lending industry, and Wachovia's option ARMs in particular, Wachovia falsely represented that its loan underwriting practices were much better than at other banks and that this would allow it to prosper while lenders with less exacting standards and procedures would fare much worse. In reality, Wachovia's actual lending practices differed materially from the description of those practices in statements made to investors. The Company's ability to weather the deterioration in the real estate and credit markets was grossly exaggerated by Defendants, at precisely the worst time, when analysts began to ask tough questions. The Company, moreover, had inadequate loan loss reserves and falsely represented that its capital position was sufficient to fund its dividend.

Shortly after last assuring the market of its liquidity, the strength of its underwriting practices, and the adequacy of its reserves, Wachovia reported a surprise quarterly loss, undertook emergency measures to increase capital, and cut its dividend. On April 14, 2008, before the open of ordinary trading, Wachovia reported a loss of $350 million, or $0.20 per share, for the first quarter of 2008. The Company attributed the results to: (1) a $2.8 billion increase credit loss reserves, including $1.1 billion specifically for ``Pick-A-Pay'' reserve build, the lending program highly touted by the Company during the Class Period. The need to increase Pick-A-Pay reserves was attributed to Wachovia's adoption of a ``refined reserve modeling'' that resulted in ``higher than expected loss factors on Pick-a-Pay''; and (2) $2 billion in mark-to-market losses for mortgage backed securities, including a ``$729 million loss on unfunded leveraged finance commitments.'' In order to shore-up its capital, Wachovia announced the following steps: (1) reduce the dividend 41% to $0.375; and (2) plan to raise capital by $7-8 billion through public offerings.

Wachovia is only the latest company to become embroiled in securities litigation arising out of Option ARM problems. Companies previously sued in securities lawsuits involving Option ARM allegations include Washington Mutual (about which refer here) and Downey Financial (refer here). It seems highly unlikely that these companies will be the only ones to become involved in lawsuits involving these concerns.

Indeed, as bad as the situation involving Options ARMs may now appear, circumstances are likely to deteriorate in the months ahead. As discussed in the June 5, 2008 Business Week article entitled “The Next Real Estate Crisis” (here), foreclosures on Options ARMs have already tripled in the last year, but could further hasten as “monthly options recasts are expected to accelerate starting in April 2009, from $5 billion to a peak of about $10 billion in January 2010.” The Option ARM loan defaults “could accelerate next year even if subprime defaults subside.”

The possibility of further Option ARM related securities litigation seems likely.

In any event, I have added the new Wachovia case to my running tally of subprime and credit-crisis related securities class action lawsuits, which can be accessed here. The current tally now stands at 89, of which 49 have been filed in 2008.

It is probably worth noting that this new case is the third in which Wachovia has become involved as part of the current credit-crisis related litigation wave. In addition to the new lawsuit, Wachovia was previously sued in an auction rate securities lawsuit (refer here), and in a Prospectus Liability case arising out of the company’s offering of certain Trust Preferred Securities (about which refer here).

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In my preceding post, I quoted recent reassuring words from Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson about the current credit crunch. Billionaires Warren Buffett and George Soros apparently have a less sanguine view, and there is in any event substantial recent evidence to support the view that, whether or not the worst is over, the effects will be felt for some time to come.

According to news reports (here), Warren Buffett told reporters in Europe yesterday that “I don’t necessarily think we’re halfway through or necessarily a quarter of the way through the effects throughout the general economy. The initial effects are felt by people who really did the silliest things, but you can have a whole bunch of domino-type effects that eventually can get to people who are doing fairly sound things.” Buffett added that “I think there will be rippling secondary, tertiary effects.”

Soros, while willing to concede (here) that the “acute phase” of the crisis may have passed, also said that “now we have to feel the effects,” which he said might “almost inevitably” include recessions in the U.S. and U.K.

An even more pessimistic voice is that of Meredith Whitney, the analyst for Oppenheimer who correctly predicted disaster for Citigroup and others last fall. She recently said (here) that "the credit crisis is far from over" and "what lies ahead will be worse that what is behind us." Dang.

There are already a wide variety of effects that are rippling through the economy and affecting a diverse array of companies, even outside the financial sector. For example, on May 19, 2008 Bloomberg reported (here) that “more than 300 companies are struggling to value auction rate bonds” that they are carrying on their balance sheets. These companies’ auction rate securities investments were valued at $98 billion as recently as January 1, 2008.

“About half” of these companies have “reported losses totaling $1.8 billion as the markets for securities, sold as higher-yielding alternatives to money markets, seized up.” Among the companies the Bloomberg article names as having taken auction-rate securities-related write-downs are UPS, Google, HCA and Teva Pharmaceuticals. But while half of the companies holding these assets may have recognized the valuations issues, the other half have not, and even the companies that have taken some recognition have the issue of whether or not they got it right.

The wide dispersion of these and other credit crunch-related exposures throughout the economy puts pressure on many companies to recognize the risk; companies that delay or avoid recognition may be laying in problems down the road. As one commentator said in another Bloomberg article (here), “the smart people are the ones who’ve identified the problems, put them out there in full transparency, and addressed them by raising more capital. There is still billions of dollars of crap out there that hasn’t worked its way through the system.”

The May 19, 2008 Bloomberg article in which this latter statement appeared is entitled “Banks Keep $35 billion Markdowns Off Income Statements” (here). The article describes multiple financial institutions that are “failing to acknowledge their in their income statements at least $35 billion of additional write-downs included in their balance sheets.” A commentator in the article notes that “keeping the markdowns off income statements just delays the realization of losses.” Indeed, the article suggests that ignored bad debt and postponing the inevitable losses is one of the reasons behind Japan’s decades long economic slump.

Behind every postponed day of reckoning is an optimistic hope that the reckoning might not just be delayed but perhaps avoided altogether. And perhaps things will come right. But the kinetic potential for the kinds of secondary and tertiary ripple effects Buffett projected inheres within every one of these postponements, laying the potential for further disruption when the day of reckoning arrives.

The consequences of these secondary and tertiary effects inevitably will include litigation, as is perhaps illustrated by the lawsuit, described in today’s Wall Street Journal (here), in which Fifth Third Bank has sued an insurer and a brokerage firm that arranged an investment for the bank in the Citigroup Falcon Strategies hedge fund. (A copy of the complaint can be found here.)

Fifth Third’s investment involved a complex life insurance investment, in which the aggregate premiums were invested in a diversity of assets. The complaint alleges that the defendants failed to monitor and manage Fifth Third’s $612 million investment, particularly when changing conditions (triggered by the credit crunch) should have triggered a reallocation of assets. This lawsuit demonstrates the range of potential litigation issues and the breadth of potential litigation targets that may become involved in future litigation. 

In a post on this blog last December (here), I discussed “the truth telling yet to come” in connection with the subprime meltdown. In many ways, the phrase is even more apt now. The dynamic possibilities of the truth telling yet to come include the litigation yet to come, as well. And as Buffett said, we are not necessarily even a quarter of the way through this yet.

A June 1, 2008 article in Corporate Counsel entitled “Wipeout!” (here) describes the credit crisis-related litigation to date and the litigation yet to come. Among other things, the article quotes one commentator as saying that “we haven’t seen most of the litigation yet.”

Top Ten Securities and Corporate Law Review Articles: The Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) has reproduced (with hyperlinks) the list of the Top Ten Corporate and Securities Law Review articles of the year. I was very pleased to see that my good friends Tom Baker and Sean Griffith's article "The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liabiltiy Insurer" (here) made the list. I discussed Professor Baker and Griffith's article at length in an earlier post, here.

A Big Fee Anwhere (But Especially in Tajikistan): A May 20, 2008 Financial Times article about lawyers’ fees entitled “Time to Stop the Lawyers’ Clock from Ticking” (here), noted that observers had

expressed concern about the £50m in fees that Herbert Smith, another top firm, expects to bill on behalf of Tajikistan in a dispute over alleged corruption at a state-owned aluminum smelter.

The projected costs, revealed at a High Court hearing in April, would represent 2.7 per cent of the central Asian nation’s gross domestic product, where the average monthly wage stands at a paltry $63.

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Add corporate debt to the type of lending caught up in the current credit crisis, and add both commercial real estate financing companies and private equity firms (or at least one that recently completed a high profile public offering) to the kinds of companies now ensnared in the current wave of lawsuits. The latest round of lawsuits suggests just how far afield these cases may spread before all is said and done.  

The iStar Lawsuit: The lawsuit filed on April 14, 2008 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against iStar Financial and certain of its directors and officers represents these latest variants in the evolving course credit crisis litigation wave. A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release about the iStar lawsuit can be found here, and the complaint can be found here.

The iStar lawsuit is brought on behalf of shareholders of the company who bought their shares in the company’s December 13, 2007 secondary offering, in which the company raised more that $227 million. According to the complaint, the offering documents failed to disclose that the company was at the time of the offering experiencing negative effects from the credit market turmoil and failed to recognize more that $200 million of losses on its “corporate loan and debt portfolio.”

On February 28, 2008, the company reported (here) a fourth quarter 2007 loss of 478.7 million, due in part to $134.9 million in charges associated with the “the impairment of two credits that are accounted for as held-to-maturity debt securities in its Corporate Loan and Debt portfolio.” and due to the fact that the company had increased its loan loss provisions by $113 million.

The Blackstone Lawsuit: In another example of the far flung effects from the current market turmoil, investors who bought shares of The Blackstone Group, L.P in the firm’s June 25, 2007 IPO have filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the company and certain of its directors and officers.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ April 15, 2007 press release (here), the complaint alleges that the offering documents failed to disclose that Blackstone’s “portfolio companies were not performing well and were of declining value and, as a result, Blackstone’s equity investment was impaired and the Company would not generate anticipated performance fees on those investments or would have fees ‘clawed-back’ by limited partners in its funds.”

The complaint (which can be found here) alleges that in the company’s March 10, 2008 announcement (here)of fourth quarter and year end financial results, the company announced “announced that it was writing down its investment in Financial Guaranty Insurance Company by $122 million.”

Financial Guaranty Insurance Company is a bond insurer that has been struggling due to downgrades of its own credit rating. FGIC’s travails have already resulted in a prior securities class action lawsuit against the company’s other significant investor, The PMI Group. My prior discussion of The PMI Group securities litigation can be found here.

These events and ensuing lawsuits represent the latest extension of the circumstances that originated with the subprime lending meltdown but now are increasingly widespread. I recently highlighted (here) the turmoil (and ensuing litigation) that had affected the student lending sector. The extension of the effects and of the litigation, first to the commercial lending sector and to a commercial real estate financing company, and next to a private equity firm that went public only a short while ago amidst great hoopla and now has been sued for it, are merely the latest developments in what clearly promises to be an increasingly encompassing phenomenon.

As I have noted before, observers who persist in viewing the credit crisis and ensuing litigation as an exclusively “subprime”-related problem will not only fail to comprehend what has already occurred, but will likely underestimate what may lie ahead.

Another Auction Rate Securities Lawsuit: Another related recent development in this area is the lawsuit filed on April 14, 2008 on behalf of auction rate securities investors against Wells Fargo & Co. The plaintiffs’ attorneys’ press release can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

With the addition of the iStar, Blackstone and Wells Fargo lawsuits, my current tally of credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here, now stands at 73, 33 of which have been filed in 2008. Thirteen of 73 lawsuits are brought on behalf of auction rate securities investors.

More Suits Against Securitzers: In earlier posts (here and here), I noted the emergence of securities class action lawsuits brought on behalf of investors against the investment banks and related entities that securitized mortgages and other types of debt into financial instruments in which the investors invested and in which they lost money.

The latest of these lawsuits was brought on March 19, 2008 in New York Supreme Court by the City of Ann Arbor Employees’ Retirement System on behalf of investors who purchased Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as part of a December 12, 2006 offering of the instruments. Named as defendants are Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, which organized the offering of certificates backed by pools of mortgages, and 18 mortgage loan trusts, in which the mortgages were held. The defendants have removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Background regarding the lawsuit can be found here. A copy of the removal petition, to which the complaint is attached, can be found here.

The complaint alleges that the offering documents misrepresented the underwriting standards used in connection with the mortgage origination, and also misrepresented the various criteria used to qualify loans and properties. As a result, the complaint alleges, the offering documents misrepresented the risk profile of both the secured assets and the certificates.

The Citigroup lawsuit is substantially similar to the lawsuits previously brought against affiliates of Nomura (about which refer here), Countrywide (refer here) and Wachovia (refer here). This latest complaint is also similar to those prior complaints in that the plaintiffs (who in each case are represented by the Coughlin Stoia firm) sought to initiate each lawsuit in state court. My detailed analysis of the jurisdictional issues involved can be found in the post linked above regarding the Nomura lawsuit.  

Though the defendants have uniformly sought to remove these cases to federal court, in the Countrywide case, the earliest of these cases to be filed, the federal court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the cases to state court. As noted in my discussion of the Countywide remand decision here, the federal court’s remand of the case to state court was based on the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to state courts for ’33 Act liability cases, a jurisdictional grant the federal court found has not been eliminated by subsequent legislation.

I have previously speculated that the plaintiffs’ strategy for pursuing these cases in state court is to avoid the requirements of the PSLRA, an impression that is reinforced by the fact that the plaintiffs’ lawyers did not issue a press release at the time they filed these state court complaints. Whether other defendants’ attempts to remove these lawsuits to federal court will ultimately prove to be successful remains to be seen, but the prospect of significant nationwide securities litigation going forward in state court seems fraught with the potential for uncertainty, opacity and complexity.

You’re Such a Lovely Audience, We’d Like to Take You Home With Us: As your reward for reading this far, I am going to share a wonderful little secret with you. Stanford Law School, which has long maintained its excellent Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (here) has now started the Stanford Global Class Action Clearinghouse (here). The new site is devoted to tracking the development of class action litigation throughout the world. While the site is new and is only just getting started, it already has very interesting materials and shows great promise. We can only hope its sponsors and guardians develop and maintain this new site as well as the predecessor.

Hat Tip to my good friends at the Drug and Device Law Blog (here) for the link to the new site.

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