European Collective Action Reform and the U.S Model: Compare and Contrast

There no longer seems to be a question whether European countries will adopt some form of collective action procedures. The questions now are what form the collective action mechanisms will take and to what extent will the processes will adapt or reject features of the U.S. class action model.

 

A November 6, 2008 article by NYU law professors Samuel Issacharoff and Geoffrey Miller entitled "Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?" (here) takes a look at these questions and examines whether current European reforms are, in light of the extent of the aversion to the U.S. model, "likely to be effective in realizing their stated aims."

 

The authors begin their analysis by noting that while class actions were long "decried as the perversity of rapacious Americans," class actions are now "the focus of significant reforms in many European countries and even at the level of the European Union." Indeed, a "consensus" has emerged that "aggregate litigation will soon be the norm" in Europe. But by the same token, there is also a consensus that the European model of aggregate litigation "will not replicate American class action litigation with its domination of entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys."

 

The European movement toward aggregate litigation models has advanced because of the "need to create ex post accountability mechanisms" and the create mechanisms for the "efficient resolution of numerous intertwined claims." Aggregate litigation also mobilizes "efforts to foster prevention through the prospect of civil litigation."

 

The authors note that the criticisms of the U.S. model in many ways correspond with concerns raised inside the U.S. But the authors also ask whether or not the categorical aversion to the U.S. model may leave European reform efforts without the means to achieve desired results.

 

In order to assess whether the European rejection of the U.S. model sweeps too broadly, the authors examine the recurring criticisms of U.S. class action litigation. Among other things, the authors suggest that by framing the debate this way, the discussion will reflect both the weaknesses and the strengths of the U.S. approach and allow the reform process to benefit from the beneficial aspects of the U.S. approach.

 

The four criticisms of U.S. class action litigation on which the authors focus are:

 

(1) the danger that mass settlements may overgeneralize, by treating differently situated claimants as if they were similar, particularly where "an unsolicited and effectively unsupervised" agent resolves the case on behalf of absent class members;

(2) the most significant recovery is "often by successful class counsel, not by any class member;

(3) the uneasy relation between entrepreneurialism and avarice (as evidenced most recently by the criminal pleas of leading plaintiff securities attorneys); and

(4) the manipulation of the judicial forum for litigation gain (particularly through serial exploitation of "judicial hellholes").

 

The authors observe that what unifies these four controversies is "the role of private entrepreneurial lawyers" – which, the authors note, is "precisely what troubles Europeans about American class action practice." Nevertheless, motivated lawyer action is the "engine that fuels American aggregate practice." The authors ask whether the comprehensive rejection of the U.S. model "throws the baby out with the bath water" and whether "the controversies that arise in a system build on self-interest can be mitigated without disabling the entire undertaking."

 

In order to examine these questions, the authors look at the common features of European collective action reform efforts. While the legal reforms represent a broad spectrum of initiatives, there are three common features: (1) the tendency to allow only organizations to represent consumers in class actions; (2) the interaction between rules on litigation funding and class action procedures; and (3) the preference for "opt-in" rather than "opt-out" systems.

 

The authors find that there are potentially significant limitations to each of these unifying features. The authors also note that the evolving European efforts attempt to realize the benefits of collective action, but are "limited in their conception of how these processes will be realized."

 

The threshold issue that current European reform efforts must address is who will "organize, fund and lead the collective efforts." Both the strength and weakness of the American collective approach has been the "willingness to entrust a great deal of social regulation to private initiative and common law forms of adjudication." The authors express their concern that the European "cultural revulsion" to "accepting the reality of legal enforcement as entrepreneurial activity may leave the reforms without the necessary agents of implementation."

 

Discussion

The excesses of the U.S. class action system are a familiar hobby horse for social critics, both in the U.S. and abroad. Nevertheless aggrieved parties continue to pursue relief and redress through class litigation -- and not just consumers whose interests critics contend are hijacked by self-interested lawyers, but also well-financed institutional investors that are fully informed about their interests and fully able to act independently.

 

While Europeans disdain the excesses of the U.S. model, there have been periodic outbursts over the past several years where the need for collective action mechanisms has been so obvious that the local legal systems had to respond. Among the various corporate scandals that came to light earlier this decade were several instances where large group of aggrieved European investors were adversely affected and collectively sought redress. The current credit crisis underscores these issues. The further European development of collective action mechanisms does, as the authors note, seem to be inevitable.

 

On the other hand, the limitations of the U.S. model have been painfully apparent lately. The criminal sentencing of the leading plaintiff securities attorneys certainly highlights the corrupting potential of class litigation where the agent controls or even selects the principal.

 

There is also recent evidence that aggrieved parties involved in U.S-based litigation increasingly may perceive their interests to be best served outside of class litigation. Significant securities class action opt-out actions, in which would-be class members proceed independently to maximize their recovery and even to reduce counsel fees (about which refer here), suggest deep concerns about the utility of class litigation.

 

The authors may be correct that class litigation is most effective if it is driven by motivated entrepreneurs who can drive the process and maximize class results. Nevertheless, the lessons of the recent past in the U.S. highlight clearly how important it is for strict controls over class counsel.

 

The recent lessons also suggest the need for some modesty in advocating the U.S. class counsel model to Europeans. Indeed, rather than expecting the success of the European reforms to depend on European’s willingness to adopt aspects of the U.S model (such as the involvement of entrepreneurial counsel), perhaps it will be the case that the improvement of the current flawed U.S. model will depend on the adoption in the U.S. of existing or yet-to-emerge European innovations that develop as part of current European reform efforts.

 

Hat tip to the Point of Law blog (here) for the link to the article.

 

Bad Economic Vibe Means More Securities Litigation?

In flush times, the balm from the boom economy covers a multitude of sins. But when the economy sours, even transactions that once appeared favorable can turn bad. When they do, lawsuits can, and usually do, arise. Two recently filed securities class action lawsuits illustrate this point and also suggest that adverse economic circumstances may fuel even further litigation.

 

The first of these two recent lawsuits involves FCStone Group. FCStone is “an integrated commodity risk management company providing risk management consulting and transaction execution services to commercial commodity intermediaries, end users and producers.” Basically, it helps those involved in commodities business to manage their exposure to commodities price fluctuations.

 

Plaintiffs filed a purported securities class action lawsuit against FC Stone and certain of its directors and offices in the Western District of Missouri on July 15, 2008. The plaintiffs’ counsel’s July 16, 2008 press release describing the lawsuit can be found here and the complaint can be found here.

 

According to the complaint, the lawsuit relates to “a misdescription of an important hedge instrument purchased by the Company.” According to the complaint, the hedge transaction provided net income to the company for the first two fiscal quarters of 2008, ending on February 29, 2008. The press release describing the lawsuit states:

In an conference call on April 10, 2008, the Company concealed the true nature of the Hedge, by failing to reveal that should there develop a significant spread between the U.S. based Fed Funds interest rate (the “Feds Funds Rate”) and the London Inter-Bank Rate (“LIBOR”), the Hedge would decline in notional value. Based on what the market was told, the investing public viewed the hedge as simply one to protect the Company from falling interest rates, and not one which was crucially dependent upon the spread between the Fed Funds Rate and LIBOR not widening.

The complaint alleges that in the company’s 2008 third fiscal quarter, a spread arose between the Fed Funds Rate and LIBOR and the company’s gains for the first two fiscal quarters were eliminated. The press release describing the lawsuit states:

On July 10, 2008, FCStone shocked the market by announcing third quarter earnings per share of 28 cents versus the expected 47 cents. Much of the deviation was due to the decline and sale of the Hedge. In addition, the Company announced previously unmentioned and significant bad debt expenses due to volatility in the cotton markets which had occurred in March. Nothing was said about this volatility and its adverse effects on the April 10, 2008 conference call. Upon revelation of this adverse news FCStone shares dropped over 41% wiping out over $300 million in shareholder value.

The second of the two lawsuits was filed in the Southern District of New York on July 17, 2008 based on the failure of Hexion Specialty Chemicals to follow through on its planned acquisition of Huntsman Corporation.

 

The Huntsman lawsuit arises out of the agreement announced on July 12, 2007 (here), that Hexion would acquire the company in a transaction valued at $10.6 billion. According to the original press release, Hexion is a portfolio company of Apollo Management. . The sale was approved by Huntsman’s shareholders on October 16, 2007 (here). On January 26, 2008, Hexion exercised its rights to extend the termination date of the merger agreement (here), to obtain regulatory approvals, and further extended the date in April 2008 (here). In its May 14, 2008 earnings release (here), Hexion provided a “transaction update” in which it noted that the parties had agreed, pursuant to the Merger Agreement, to allow additional time in order to obtain necessary regulatory approvals.

 

However, on June 18, 2008, Hexion issued a press release stating that the “transaction is no longer viable” and announcing that it had initiated a lawsuit in Delaware Chancery Court to declare its rights under the merger agreement. Huntsman later announced that it had counterclaimed to enforce the merger agreement in the Delaware lawsuit (here) and separately announced (here) that it had filed its own lawsuit against Apollo and two of its partners for fraud in inducing Huntsman to terminate its prior merger agreement with a separate merger partner, by presenting the Hexion merger proposal.  

 

On July 17, 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers, purporting to represent a class of Huntsman shareholders, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Hexion, its CEO and one of its directors. A copy of the plaintiff’s counsel’s July 17, 2008 press release announcing the filing can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

According to the press release,

On May 14, 2008, Hexion disclosed that it agreed to allow additional time to obtain the regulatory approvals. Unbeknownst to the public, defendants had determined to abort the merger and took steps to abrogate the Merger Agreement. Defendants retained the services of Duff & Phelps to render an opinion that the combined entity lacked financial viability. On June 18, 2008, Duff sent a letter to the Board of Directors of Hexion opining that the combined company’s assets would not exceed its liabilities, that it would not have the ability to pay its total debts and liabilities as they become due and that it would have an unreasonably small amount of capital. On that same date, defendants filed a complaint in the Delaware Court of Chancery, seeking abrogation of the Merger Agreement. The reaction in the marketplace was devastating to the price of Huntsman’s common stock. On June 19, 2008, the first day of trading after the June 18, 2008 actions by Hexion, the market price of Huntsman common stock fell approximately $8, or 40%, from $20.86 to close at $12.84, on enormous volume of approximately 43 million shares.

The complaint purports to be filed on behalf of the class of persons who purchased Huntsman shares between May 14 and June 18, 2008.

 

According to the complaint, Hexion started to try to back away from the agreement because the defendants “were disturbed by Huntsman’s financial results for the three quarters after the signing of the Merger Agreement as well as the state of the economic market and the global credit crunch.”

 

Interestingly, though the plaintiffs’ class consists of Huntsman shareholders, their lawsuit is filed against Hexion and two of its senior officials. The complaint does not allege secondary liability, but rather it alleges that the defendants violated their primary obligations under Section 10(b). Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that

Defendants failed to disclose the material facts that they had decided to abort the merger if possible and had taken affirmative steps to determine whether they could abort the merger and abrogate the Merger Agreement and retained the services of Duff to render an opinion that the combined entity lacked financial viability and Wachtell to draft and filed a complaint. These material misstatements and omissions had the cause and effect of creating in the market an unrealistically positive assessment that the merger would close by July 4, 2008 … causing the Huntsman’s common stock to be overvalued and artificially inflated during the Class Period.

The attempt by Huntsman shareholders to hold Hexion and its officials liable under the federal securities laws raises some unusual issues and will be interesting to watch. The unusual occurrence of a securities lawsuit brought by another company’s shareholders also potentially raises an interesting theoretical issue depending on the definition of “Securities Claim” in Hexion’s D&O insurance policy. There are two usual variants of this definition, one of which defines the term by reference to the kind of claims (that is, claims under specifies securities law), and one that defines the term by reference to the kind of claimant (that is, by reference to claims by holders of securities of the company).

 

I have no direct knowledge of Hexion’s insurance program, but because so-called entity coverage under D&O policies is typically limited to “Securities Claims,” the definition of that term in the Hexion policy could determine whether or not the company itself has coverage for the claims brought against them by the Huntsman shareholders. The availability of coverage for the claims against the entity could well depend on which variant of the definition of the term “Securities Claim” appears in the Hexion policy. To the extent the term is restrict to claims brought by holders of Hexion’s own securities, coverage potentially might not be available for the company itself for the Huntsman shareholders’ lawsuit.

 

Perhaps the circumstances involved in these two cases might have arisen even in more stable economic times, but the troubled transactions underlying the lawsuits seem symptomatic of the currently turbulent economy. Indeed, the Huntsman shareholders lawsuit specifically alleges that among the reasons why Hexion sought to back away from the merger were “the state of the economic market and the global credit crunch.”  In both of these instances, transactions that initially appeared favorable appeared unfavorable as circumstances changed.

 

The challenging circumstances that undermined these transactions are hardly unique to these two companies.  In all likelihood, in the weeks and months ahead, other companies will be finding that transactions entered in more clement circumstances now appear troubled. As more companies stumble on these troubled transactions, further lawsuits undoubtedly will emerge.

 

One final note. These is nothing about these lawsuits that make them subprime related, and it is only in the broadest sense that they lawsuits might be categorized as credit crisis related. If nothing else, these lawsuits at the outer edge of the current litigation wave demonstrate the complicated definitional problems involved with trying to track subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits. In the end, I have decided not to “count” these lawsuits in my running tally of subprime and credit crisis related litigation (which can be accessed here), because they seem to relate to much larger economic issues (such as interest rates and the adverse business climate). Reasonable minds may differ on this categorization.

 

Tellabs Not a Filing “Deterrent”: When the U.S. Supreme Court issued its June 2007 opinion in the Tellabs case, it was widely hailed as a significant defense victory. My own view at the time (refer here) is that the outcome was at most a draw, and in the end is unlikely to have a significant impact.

 

A July 2008 memorandum from the Jones Day law firm entitled “Tellabs Proves to Be No Deterrent to Securities Class Action Filings” (here) suggests that commentators predicting that Tellabs would have “little impact on future securities class action filings” were “the better prognosticators.”

 

The memorandum notes that in federal circuits (such as the First, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth) that actually had more demanding pleading standards than the one articulated by the Supreme Court in Tellabs, “cases are actually more likely to survive a motion to dismiss after Tellabs than before.” The memorandum goes on to note that “even in formerly less demanding circuits, Tellabs did not set the pleading bar at a level that deters filings.”

 

The memorandum concludes by stating that “Tellabs plainly has not operated to deter securities class action filings. To the contrary, the data confirms [sic] that filing opportunities remain wide open for plaintiffs.”

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for supplying a copy of the Jones Day memorandum.

A Closer Look at the 2007 Life Sciences Securities Lawsuits

In prior posts (most recently here), I noted that even during the two-year lull in securities lawsuits filings that prevailed between mid-2005 and mid-2007, filings against life sciences companies - and pharmaceutical companies in particular - continued more or less unabated. More recently I noted (here) that pharmaceutical companies in the Standard Industrial Classification Code category 2834 represented one of the two most frequently sued categories of companies among the 2007 securities lawsuits. Because of this heightened lawsuit frequency involving life sciences companies, it seems worthwhile to take a closer look at the 2007 life sciences securities lawsuits.

First a word about categorization. For purposes of this post, I am including under the heading "life sciences" any company in either SIC Code series 283 (Drugs) or SIC Code series 384 (Surgical, Medical and Dental Instruments and Supplies). Reasonable minds might differ about whether additional categories should be included, but I decided to go for simplicity here.

Companies within the SIC Code series 283 were particularly hard hit in 2007, especially companies in the 2834 SIC Code (Pharmaceutical Preparations), within which 14 companies were sued in 2007. In addition, two companies in SIC Code 2836 (Biological Products) and one company in SIC Code 2833 (Medicinal Chemical and Botanical Products) were also sued, bringing the total number of companies sued in 2007 from SIC Code Series 283 to 17. These 17 lawsuits compare to eight lawsuits in the SIC Code Series 283 among the 2006 securities lawsuits.

There were four companies sued in SIC Code series 384, including two within SIC Code 3841 (Surgical and Medical Instruments) and two within SIC Code 3845 (Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus).

The 21 total lawsuits against companies in these two SIC Code series categories means that lawsuits against life sciences companies represent roughly 12% of the 172 securities lawsuits filed in 2007. (Refer to my prior post here for a description of the data I am using in my analysis). This compares to 34, or slightly less than 20%, of the 2007 securities lawsuits related to the subprime meltdown. As I have said before, the subprime lawsuits were an important factor but by no means the only important factor in the increase of securities lawsuit filings in 2007.

The 2007 securities lawsuits against life sciences companies involved a wide variety of allegations. By far the most common contention is the allegation of unexpected or undisclosed set-backs in the regulatory or clinical trial process, which was raised against nine of the 21 life sciences companies sued. The next most prevalent type of allegation was related to disclosures surrounding product safety (five companies).

Other allegations included slowing sales or missed projections (two companies), misrepresentations regarding product efficacy (one company), disclosure of a criminal investigation (one company), failure to disclose merger-related information (one company), misrepresentations or omissions regarding sales practices (one company), and misrepresentations regarding the status of regulatory approvals (one company).

Of the 21 life sciences companies sued in securities lawsuits in 2007, five are foreign-domiciled, including two from France, and one each from Germany, Switzerland and the U.K.

As I noted in my prior posts regarding pharmaceutical company lawsuits (here), while life sciences companies have proved to be popular targets for plaintiffs' lawyers, they have not always proved to be easy targets. Many of the past securities lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies have been dismissed. The dismissal levels may have something to do with the prevalence of allegations regarding regulatory or clinical trial setbacks. While these setbacks may indeed rock the companies' stock prices, these kinds of setbacks are an almost inevitable attribute of the regulatory and scientific environment in which these companies operate. These risks are often comprehensively disclosed, creating a particular challenge for plaintiffs' attorneys.

While it is far too early to tell how the 2007 securities lawsuits against life sciences companies will fare, it will be interesting to monitor these cases to see how many go forward beyond the motion to dismiss stage.

The Return of the "Club Deal" Antitrust Case: According to news reports (here), plaintiffs' lawyers have filed an antitrust lawsuits against the leading private equity firms and investment banks, alleging that the 13 defendants conspired to fix prices in connection with seven specific private equity "club deals" between 2004 and 2007. In fall 2006, a different set of plaintiffs lawyers had originally filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York raising substantially similar allegations, but they withdrew their complaint after the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its May 2007 opinion, specifying a heightened pleading standard for antitrust cases, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombley. The new plaintiffs' counsel apparently feels they can meet the Twombley standard.

The new complaint, which can be found here, was filed in the District of Massachusetts, and alleges that the large buyout firms conspired to keep acquisition prices low by "clubbing together" rather than competing on large buyout deals. The private equity firm defendants include, for example, Bain Capital, Blackstone Group, KKR, and Thomas H. Lee Partners. The seven specific deals referenced in the complaint include Kinder Morgan, HCA and Freescale Semiconductor. The lawsuit also targets investment banks for the conflicted role they allegedly sometimes play as both advisers to the target companies and as lenders (or even co-investors) to or with the acquirers.

Special thanks to Ned Kirk of the Sedgwick Detert firm for a link to the news reports and for a copy of the Complaint.

Need for Speed: If you not yet seen it, you have to read the Wired Magazine article entitled "The Pedal-to-the-Metal, Totally Illegal, Cross-Country Spring for Glory" (here), which tells the tale of Alex Roy, who is consumed by a passion to recreate Cannonball Run and set the speed record for driving between Manhattan and Santa Monica (a feat Roy accomplished in an astonishing 31 hours and 4 minutes). You have to read it to believe it.

Special thanks to new reader Michael Barker the link to the article.