The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

In a ruling with potential significance for the other remaining auction rate securities lawsuits, on September 17, 2009, Southern District of New York Judge Lewis A. Kaplan granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, with leave to amend, in the auction rate securities lawsuit pending against Raymond James Financial and certain of its subsidiaries. A copy of Judge Kaplan’s opinion can be found here.

There have been prior dismissals granted in the many pending auction rate securities lawsuits. For example, dismissal motions have been granted in the auction rate securities lawsuits filed against UBS (refer here) and against Northern Trust (refer here), as well as in the auction rate securities lawsuit involving Citigroup (refer here, scroll down).

The Citigroup case had been based on a market manipulation theory rather than on a misrepresentation theory, and is noteworthy in that respect, but the dismissal of the Citigroup case based on the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately plead market manipulation is less relevant to the many other auction rate securities cases – including the one filed against Raymond James—that are based on misrepresentation theories.

Judge Kaplan’s September 17, 2009 dismissal in the Raymond James auction rate securities case is noteworthy in its own right and by contrast to the prior dismissals in the UBS and Northern Trust cases, because in the Raymond James, by contrast to UBS and Northern Trust, had not entered into regulatory settlements involving its investors. Indeed, Raymond James has been the target of certain high profile media criticism (refer here) as a "holdout" for its resistance to entry into a regulatory settlement.

Because Raymond James has not entered a regulatory settlement, the defendants in the Raymond James auction rate securities case were unable to seek dismissal on the same "absence of recoverable damages" theory as did the defendants in the Northern Trust and UBS cases. Thus, by contrast to the dismissals in those other two cases that turned on the existence of the regulatory settlements, the dismissal in the Raymond James case actually related to the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations on the merits, and therefore may be of greater potential significance for other auction rate securities cases, particularly those relating to other defendant companies that have not entered regulatory settlements.

In granting the dismissal motions, Judge Kaplan very carefully distinguished the allegations that had been made against the various corporate defendants, and he carefully assessed the adequacy of the allegations as to each.

Judge Kaplan determined that many of the alleged misrepresentations were made by or on behalf of Raymond James Financial Services (RJFS), the parent company’s retail sales subsidiary that actually sold to investors the auction rate securities that other corporate subsidiaries had underwritten or managed the related auction processes. Judge Kaplan found that there were insufficient allegations concerning the alleged misrepresentations supposedly made to the plaintiff or as part of the overall scheme to be able to attribute misrepresentations as to defendants other than RJFS. He stated that the complaint "fails to allege how the remaining two defendant entities are responsible for the omissions."

Although this failure to attribute the alleged misrepresentations to the defendants other than RJFS alone would have been sufficient to dismiss the defendants other than RJFS, Judge Kaplan further considered the plaintiffs’ scienter allegations and concluded that the insufficiency of the scienter allegations provided an independent basis on which to dismiss the defendants other than RJFS, as well as for dismissing the complaint as a whole.

For reasons similar to those he expressed with respect to his ruling on the misrepresentation issue, Judge Kaplan concluded that the lack of particularized allegations of scienter were "fatal" to the claims against the defendants other than RJFS.

Judge Kaplan further found that plaintiffs’ scienter allegations in general were insufficient. First, he concluded that the plaintiff had not adequately pled "motive and opportunity." He first found that plaintiff’s allegations based on motivations to profit were insufficient. He allowed that plaintiff "comes closer" with her allegation that "defendants’ motive was to unload their excess and soon to be illiquid ARS inventory on unsuspecting customers."

Even these allegations, about the defendants’ supposed motive to unload excess inventory, were found to be insufficient because, Judge Kaplan held, they presumed that "there was a shared knowledge of the entire scheme" among all the defendants – yet the complaint failed, for example, to show that RJFS has knowledge of the issues surrounding the auctions or the securities inventory at the other subsidiaries.

Judge Kaplan noted that in effect the plaintiff sought to "aggregate the knowledge of two or more separate corporate entities on the basis that they share the same corporate parent and nothing more" – which Judge Kaplan found insufficient.

Finally, Judge Kaplan concluded that the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged "conscious misbehavior or recklessness." Among other things, he found that:

The Court cannot infer that RJFS was aware it was marketing ARS to potential investors fraudulently because there is no showing that RJFS or insiders had access to the underwriters’ "unique" knowledge of the ARS market. Indeed, the complaint itself states that RJFS’s agents, the financial advisors who allegedly made the misrepresentations to investors, "lacked a rudimentary understanding about the auction rate securities and how the auction rate securities market functioned."

The September 17 dismissal is without prejudice. The plaintiff has until October 16, 2009, to submit an amended complaint. Whether or not the plaintiff in this case is successful in curing the pleading defects Judge Kaplan noted remains to be seen. But even if the plaintiff is able to overcome the pleading hurdle, Judge Kaplan’s analysis suggests that other auction rate securities plaintiffs may face significant challenges, even with respect to the defendant companies that have not entered regulatory settlements.

Many if not most of the auction rate securities lawsuits, like the one against Raymond James, involve multiple corporate subsidiaries as defendants, each of which touched a separate part of the auction rate securities process. Unless the plaintiffs in those cases are able to allege that the different subsidiaries had knowledge of the activities and operations of the other subsidiaries, the plaintiffs may, like the plaintiff in the Raymond James case, have difficulty establishing pleading sufficiency for their complaint’s allegations of misrepresentations and scienter against some or all corporate defendants.

To be sure, there may well be cases where plaintiffs can show – or at least allege—that, for example, the sales subsidiary was aware of the difficulties in the auction rate process or with excess inventory. But to the extent the plaintiffs failed to make or establish these connections in their complaint, their complaint may well be dismissed on the same grounds as in the Raymond James case.

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Earlier this year, when the auction rate securities lawsuit against UBS was dismissed (refer here), the obvious question was whether the dismissal signaled the end of the auction rate securities litigation. Certainly, the growing number of companies that, like UBS, had entered regulatory settlements (the basis of the UBS dismissal) or otherwise agreed to redeem the ARS seemed to suggest that the auction rate securities lawsuits pending against other financial companies would suffer the same fate as the UBS suit.

But while this anticipated effect is now being realized in some cases, the end of at least a major chunk of the auction rate securities litigation may be nowhere near.

There are recent significant developments regarding the possibility that the ARS regulatory settlements and repurchase agreements may mean further auction rate securities lawsuits dismissals. Along those lines, on August 6, 2009, Southern District of New York Judge Victor Marrero granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Northern Trust auction rate securities lawsuit. Judge Marrero’s opinion can be found here. Background regarding the case can be found here.

In granting the motions to dismiss, Judge Marrero ruled, citing the decision in the UBS auction rate securities lawsuit dismissal, that the plaintiff had "not alleged recoverable damages," owing to the fact that the plaintiff had "already received compensation for losses suffered as a result of the alleged misstatement or omissions." (In December 2008, the plaintiff had "received par value" for his ARS investments under Northern Trust’s ARS repurchase program.)

The UBS and Northern Trust dismissals do seem to suggest that the auction rate securities litigation could be coming to an end -- at least for companies that have entered regulatory settlements or repurchase agreements.

But not all of the targeted firms have agreed to repurchase the ARS.

For example, as reflected in an August 1, 2009 New York Times article (here), Raymond James Financial is "among the holdouts." According to the article, the firm’s clients currently hold approximately $800 million (presumably, par value) of illiquid securities that the first sold them. The firm is working to try to reduce these investor holdings, primarily through issuer redemptions. However, the article, reports that the firm has stated in its disclosure documents that it does not "at present" have the "capacity" to redeem all of the securities.

As reflected here, Raymond James is the subject of a pending auction rate securities lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. However, without having made a redemption offer, Raymond James will not be in a position to seek dismissal on the same basis as did UBS and Northern Trust.

In addition to the firms that have not redeemed securities, there are the investors whose securities have not yet been redeemed.

For example, many of the regulatory settlements either do not extend to institutional investors or only provide for the redemption of institutional investors securities at a later date (in some cases, a much later date.) As a result of the continuing illiquidity of these investors’ securities, many of these investors have filed and are continuing to file lawsuits against the firms that sold them the securities.

A very recent example of this type of suit is the lawsuit filed on August 5, 2009 – the day before the Northern Trust dismissal – in the Southern District of New York, by Teva Pharmaceutical Industries and affiliated companies against Merrill Lynch and related entities. The complaint, which can be found here, alleges that Teva purchased CDO action rate notes and other auction rate securities that Merrill Lynch structured and underwrote. The complaint alleges that as a result of the failure of the ARS market, the plaintiffs now holds ARS for which it paid $273 million that now have a market value of less than $10 milllion. (Among the CDO auction rate notes in which Teva invested is the infamous Mantoloking CDO, about which I wrote here.)

Nor is Teva alone in its predicament. Teva is just one of several public companies cited in a July 15, 2009 CFO Magazine article entitled "Buyer’s Remorse" (here), which describes the continuing woes of many companies that invested in auction rate securities. Among other things, the article cites a source as saying that nonfinancial public companies still have $24 billion (par value) of ARS on their books. Many of these companies, like Teva, have sued the firms that sold them the securities. A prior post in which I discuss other recent examples of institutional investor auction rate securities litigation can be found here.

But a lawsuit by the company against the firm that sold them the securities is not the only litigation possibility involved here. As I previously noted (here), some public companies have been hit with lawsuits by their own investors who claim they were misled about the companies’ exposure to auction rate securities in which the companies had invested.

If nothing else, the recently filed Teva lawsuit signals that we may be nowhere near the end of the auction rate securities litigation, even if some of the cases (like those against UBS and Northern Trust) are dismissed. The continuing illiquidity of the securities, the complexity of the transactions and the sheer quantity of dollars involved suggest that at least some of the auction rate securities litigation could and probably will go on for some time to come.

I have in any event added the Northern Trust dismissal to my running register of credit crisis-related lawsuit resolutions, which can be accessed here.

An Interesting Note: According to his official biography, Judge Marrero filed the seat on the Southern District of New York previously occupied by the newly confirmed Supreme Court Justice, Sonia Sotomayor, prior to her appointment to the Second Circuit.

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In prior posts (most recently here), I have noted the continuing litigation efforts of institutional investors excluded from the various auction rate securities regulatory settlements to try to compel their broker-dealers to buy back the investors’ ARS. In a complaint filed on May 13, 2009 in the Southern District of New York by Monster Worldwide against RBC Capital Markets (here), Monster raises the novel theory that RBC’s settlement-related offer to repurchase ARS from "eligible investors"is a "tender offer" that RBC must extend to all investors -- including institutional investors like Monster.

Between May 2007 and February 2008, Monster acquired $71.6 million of student loan backed ARS from RBC that Monster was left holding when the ARS market collapsed. In October 2008, RBC entered a regulatory settlement in which it agreed repurchase ARS from "its individual customers, charities, non-profits and government entities with less than $25 million on deposit." Pursuant to this arrangement, RBC will repurchase more than $850 million in ARS from "eligible investors." News reports regarding the regulatory settlement can be found here.

On December 1, 2008, RBC initiated an offer pursuant to the settlement to repurchase the ARS from eligible investors. Monster characterizes this repurchase offer in its complaint as a "tender offer," which offer was not extended to Monster and other institutional investors.

In its complaint, Monster describes its exclusion from RBC’s regulatory settlement as "arbitrary and unlawful," and alleges that RBC’s limitation of the "tender offer" only to "eligible investors" as a "clear violation" of Section 14(d) of the Exchange Act, giving rise to a claim for relief.

Monster also alleges that the repurchase offer violates SEC Rule 14d-10(a)1, the "All Holders" Rule, which provides that "No bidder shall make a tender offer unless … The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer."

Finally, Monster alleges violations of the securities laws and common law in connection with RBC’s representations regarding the ARS.

Monster’s "tender offer" theory is unique and creative. By characterizing RBC’s repurchase offer, Monster seeks to secure for itself the benefit of a settlement from which it was excluded. The court will be challenged in addressing these allegations, because were the court to accept Monster’s theory, the floodgates could be opened for investors excluded from the other regulatory settlements to seek to bring themselves within the repurchase requirements. The critical question will be whether or note Monster is able to sustain its theory that RBC’s repurchase offer pursuant to the settlement is in fact a tender offer. This case will be very interesting to watch.

Special thanks to Thom Weidlich of Bloomberg for providing a copy of the Monster complaint.

Apologies: I would like to extend my deepest apologies to all readers who have experienced difficulties trying to access The D&O Diary over the last couple of days. A series of extended service outages at the blog’s hosting service has interrupted access to the site. I sincerely hope that these extremely annoying and frustrating service outages will not recur.

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The collapse of the market for auction rate securities (ARS)  has generated a flood of litigation, mostly brought by angry ARS investors against the broker dealers who sold them the securities or against the mutual funds that allegedly failed to disclose that their assets were invested in these kinds of securities. More recently (refer for example here), companies that invested in ARS and carried the securities on their balance sheet have been sued by their own shareholders in connection with the companies’ ARS disclosures.

A recently filed lawsuit presents yet another variant of ARS litigation – in this most recent case, the directors and officers of a student loan originator that issued ARS have been sued by the company’s own shareholders for failing to disclose the company’s dependence upon and susceptibility to the weaknesses of the ARS marketplace.

Until it filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy on February 9, 2009, MRU Holdings was an originator and holder of federal and private student loans which it marketed through its consumer brand My Rich Uncle. MRU collected its loans into student loan pools that were packaged and sold by broker-dealers (including Merrill Lynch) to investors. The interests in the pool were issued as auction rate securities. This securitization process freed up capital to make new loans and also generated fee income and other revenues. During its fiscal year ended on June 30, 2007, 58% of the company’s income came from securitizations, more twice the income the Company earned on interest from student loans.

On April 15, 2009, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York against four of MRU’s former directors and officers on behalf of persons who purchased MRU’s shares between July 9, 2007 and September 19, 2008. A copy of the complaint can be found here. The company itself, which is in bankruptcy, was not named as a defendant.

The complaint alleges that the company failed to disclose that the ARS market was illiquid and depended on the illusion of liquidity created by the broker-dealers’ undisclosed interventions to prop up the marketplace and prevent failures of the auction process. The complaint alleges that this illusion "allowed the Company to pay a lower interest rate" in the notes issued in connection with the company’s 2007 securitization, and that the spread allowed the company to realize a $16.3 million gain.

The complaint also alleges that the Company failed to disclose that once the "true nature of the ARS market became known," the Company’s future securitizations would not be as favorable and that "without the favorable terms available in the ARS market as a result of the manipulation by broker-dealers, the Company would not have sufficient capital to originate loans, making the Company’s business model untenable."

The complaint alleges that the Company failed to disclose the impact that the February 2008 collapse of the market for ARS would have on its ability to depend on securitizations to sell loans and free up capital. The complaint further alleges that on July 3, 2008, the Company announced the pricing of a $140 million private student loan securitization; however, on July 7, 2008, the Company further announced that the bonds to be issued in the pending securitization would be sold at a discount, and that rather than generating income, "the securitization would result in a significant write-down of assets."

Thereafter, the company’s share price declined, and Moody’s subsequently downgraded the company’s ARSs. On September 5, 2008, the Company announced that it would "pause" its student loan program. On September 19, 2008, the Company announced that its September 15, 2008 audit report contained a going concern opinion. The company later filed for bankruptcy.

As noted above, this new complaint against the former MRU directors and offices differs from prior ARS lawsuits, both in terms of who the plaintiffs are and in terms of the allegations raised. In the vast bulk of the ARS lawsuits filed under the securities laws, the plaintiffs are ARS investors who are suing broker-dealers who sold them the securities and whom the investors allege made misrepresentation in connection with the ARS. Similarly, mutual fund investors have sued the funds for failing to disclosure the funds’ investments in ARS. More recently, shareholders of companies that were ARS investors and that suffered balance sheet write-downs (and ensuing share price declines) have sued the companies because of the companies’ investment in ARS.

By contrast to those other case, the plaintiffs are neither ARS investors nor shareholders of companies that invested in ARS instruments. Rather, the plaintiffs in the MRU case are shareholders of a company that put loans into pools out of which the securities were issued.

And again by contrast to the other cases, the misrepresentation alleged in the MRU case are not about the nature of the ARS investments (as in the broker dealer cases}, or even about a balance sheet exposure to ARS investments (as in the prior public company cases), but rather about the company’s alleged dependence on the availability of the artificially favorable ARS marketplace as a way to generate income and as a way to free up capital.

While the MRU case may represent a new variant on the ARS theme, more cases of the now familiar forms of ARS litigation have continued to accrue.

For example, on April 16, 2009, Ashland Inc. filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Kentucky against Oppenheimer & Co. (copy of complaint here), in which Ashland alleged that Oppenheimer convinced Ashland to hold and to continue to invest in ARS "at a time when Oppenheimer knew the market for those ARS was collapsing."

The Ashland complaint alleges that after August 2007 disturbances in the marketplace for ARS based on municipal government bonds, that Oppenheimer steered Ashland toward ARS based on student loan obligations ("SLARS"). The complaint alleges that after the market for SLARS collapsed in 2008, Ashland was left "with approximately $194 million of illiquid Oppenheimer-brokered SLARS."

In a separate complaint also filed on April 16, 2009, Braintree Laboratories and related entities sued Citigroup Global Markets in the District of Massachusetts (complaint here). Braintree alleges that between June 2008 and August 2008, Citigroup sold Braintree approximately $33.3 million of ARS, which Citigroup allegedly had referred to not as ARS but as "seven day rolls" and as "government backed ‘money market’ investments."

Braintree alleges that despite its admissions in its various regulatory settlements, Citigroup has refused Braintree’s demand for rescission of the transactions. Among other things, Braintree alleges that in connection with the sale of the ARS to Braintree, "Citigroup acted with criminal and flagrant indifference to the rights, interests and property of the Braintree Entities and the public" and that the sales "resulted from ongoing fraudulent practices."

The Braintree complaint also alleges that the ARS sales to Braintree "fell close in proximity to Citigroup erasing recordings of conversations involving employees at its auction rate desk." The complaint alleges that "when engaging in these acts of spoliation of evidence and obstruction of justice, Citigroup acted willfully and with scienter."

If nothing else, the one thing that is absolutely clear about the breakdown of the auction rate securities marketplace is that it has proven to be an absolute litigation generating machine.

The Ashland and Braintree cases also demonstrates, as I have argued elsewhere (refer here), that neither the dismissal of the UBS auction rate securities lawsuit nor the ARS regulatory settlements marked the end of ARS litigation. As I noted more recently (here), the ARS litigation has continued to come in – and as the Braintree lawsuit demonstrates, interesting new allegations (such as the spoliation charge) continue to emerge.

The MRU lawsuit also shows that the auction rate securities litigation wave has continued to evolve as it has continued to grow. Further lawsuit variants seem likely as the wave continues to progress.

I have in any event added the MRU lawsuit to my table of credit crisis related class action securities litigation, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for providing a copy of the MRU complaint.

A Tribute to Susan Boyle: If you have not yet seen the video of Susan Boyle, an unemployed 47 year-old, singing a song from Les Miserables on the April 11, 2009 episode of Britain’s Got Talent, then you must drop everything and watch the video right now. Due to YouTube restrictions, I can’t embed the actual video in this post, but the video can be seen here.Take the time to watch the entire video; it is worth the seven minutes it takes to watch it. (Hat tip to the Drug and Device Law Blog, here, for the link.)

The video is even more moving if you follow the lyrics of the song she is singing, which are as follows (thanks to the Conglomerate blog, here, for the lyrics):

I dreamed a dream in time gone by,
When hope was high and life, worth living.
I dreamed that love would never die,
I dreamed that God would be forgiving.

Then I was young and unafraid,
And dreams were made and used and wasted.
There was no ransom to be paid,
No song unsung, no wine, untasted.
 

But the tigers come at night,
With their voices soft as thunder,
As they tear your hope apart,
And they turn your dream to shame.
 

And still I dream he'll come to me,
That we will live [our lives] together,
But there are dreams that cannot be,
And there are storms we cannot weather!
 

I had a dream my life would be
So different from this hell I'm living,
So different now from what it seemed...
Now life has killed the dream I dreamed...
 

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Earlier this week, I suggested (here) that the UBS auction rate securities lawsuit dismissal did not spell the end of the auction rate securities litigation. Two of the categories of likely future litigation involving auction rate securities I mentioned were lawsuits involving institutional investors (who are not covered, at least immediately, by many of the regulatory settlements) and lawsuits involving auction rate securities buyers that are targeted by their own investors.

As if to prove my point about the likelihood for continuing auction rate securities litigation, two significant auction rate securities lawsuits have arrived just since I added my post earlier this week.

First, in a lawsuit against an auction rate securities buyer, on March 31, 2009, PIMCO mutual fund investors filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Central District of New York against the funds’ investment manager and the funds’ sub-advisor, certain of the managers’ directors and officers (including bond investing guru Bill Gross). A copy of the complaint can be found here.

The complaint alleges that the funds concealed from the investors that

(a) The Funds lacked effective controls and hedges to minimize the risk of loss and risk of liquidity from auction rate securities ("ARS") which affected a large part of their portfolios; (b) The Funds lacked effective internal controls to ensure that the Funds would remain in compliance with restrictions and limitations related to their investment portfolios and strategies; (c) The extent of the Funds' liquidity risk due to the illiquid nature of a large portion of the Funds' portfolios, including ARS, was omitted; and (d) The extent of the Funds' risk exposure to ARS was misstated.

The PIMCO mutual fund lawsuit joins recent lawsuits filed against Perrigo Company (about which refer here) and NextWave Wireless (refer here), as examples of cases in which auction rate securities buyers are targeted by their own investors for their exposure to the instruments. These lawsuits differ from the more standard auction rate securities lawsuits, in which the auction rate securities buyers were the plaintiffs and the defendants were the broker-dealers or others that had sold the instruments.

PIMCO’s woes with its funds’ investments in auction rate securities have been well-documented in the press in recent days, as the funds’ managers have struggled to manage problems stemming from the investments. A recent Wall Street Journal article discussing the funds’ woes can be found here.

The second of the two new auction rate securities lawsuits involves an institutional investor buyer, brining an action against the broker-dealers that sold the company the instruments. On April 1, 2009, Texas Instruments filed an Original Petition in Texas (Dallas County) District Court against Citigroup Capital Markets, BNY Capital Markets and Morgan Stanley, in connection with the company’s purchase of $524 million of auction rate securities backed by student loans. A copy of the Petition can be found here.

The Petition alleges that despite the defendants’ "assurances of liquidity and low risk," the company is now stuck with auction rate securities that it "cannot liquidate." The Petition alleges that the defendants "downplayed any risk of failed auctions" and "misrepresented the market demand" for the securities by omitting to disclose "the extent to which the entire ARS market depended on continued bidding and purchasing by the Defendants and other broker-dealers."

Beyond these more general allegations, the complaint contains some very case specific allegations relating to the defendants’ alleged failure to disclose that as 2007 progressed securities issuers (including issuers of securities that Texas Instruments held) were waiving the maximum interest rate limitations in connection with auctions of their securities. The company alleges that had it been advised of these waivers, it would have been alerted to the weakening demand for the instruments. The company alleges these omissions and affirmative reassurances induced it to continue to buy and hold the securities.

The Petition alleges violations of the Texas securities laws and seeks rescission of the securities purchase transactions as well as prejudgment interest.

Interestingly, the Petition does not mention the various regulatory settlements that Citigroup and others have reached with respect to the auction rate securities, presumably because the settlements do not provide relief (at least not immediately) to an institutional investor like Texas Instruments.

In any event, it is evident that the auction rate securities litigation is far from over.

Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service for the link to the Petition. Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch for a link to the PIMCO lawsuit.

Dismissal Motion Ruling in Options Backdating-Related Securities Lawsuits: The options backdating cases continue to grind through the courts. On March 27, 2009, District of Arizona Judge Robert Broomfield issued a 138-page ruling (here) on the pending dismissal motion in the options backdating-related securities lawsuit against Apollo Group and several of its directors and officers. (Background regarding the case can be found here).

Judge Bloomfield’s ruling is very painstaking and detailed. He parsed the allegations against each of the defendants extremely finely. The outcome is rather complex, and it would require a spreadsheet to explain with respect to each of the plaintiffs' substantive claims which defendants have been dismissed with prejudice, which have been dismissed without prejudice, and which have had their dismissal motions denied. The most critical aspect of his ruling is that the Court denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under Section 10(b) against the Company and its most senior officers.

Apollo Group was also involved in a separate, rather notorious securities class action lawsuit that resulted in a January 2008 plaintiffs’ jury verdict that was overturned by the trial judge in August 2008 on a post trial motion. Refer here for background on this separate case.

I have in any event added the Apollo Group decision to my table of settlements, dismissals, and dismissal motion denials, which can be accessed here.

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A federal judge has ruled that securities class action plaintiffs who availed themselves of UBS’s auction rate securities regulatory settlement cannot separately maintain claims for damages against UBS. But while this ruling would seem to represent at least the beginning of the end for many similarly placed plaintiffs, we may still be a long way from the end of the auction rate securities litigation, despite the regulatory settlements.

Background

UBS was one of the 21 different companies named as defendants in the wave of auction rate securities lawsuits filed during 2008. The names of all of the auction rate securities lawsuit targets can be accessed here. Background regarding the case against UBS can be found here.

Essentially the plaintiffs alleged that UBS had failed to disclosure the liquidity risks associated with the auction rate securities, and also failed to disclose that UBS and other broker dealers regularly intervened in the market for the securities to maintain trading --and allegedly to manipulate the market as well. When the broker-dealers simultaneously stopped supporting the market on February 13, 2008, the market for the securities collapsed and investors were left with securities for which there was no active market.

On August 8, 2008, UBS announced a nearly $20 billion settlement with regulators regarding the auction rate securities (about which refer here). In the settlement, UBS agreed to buy the securities back from retail investors at par value, or to make up the difference to retail investors who had already sold for less than par.

The plaintiffs in the UBS auction rate securities settlement took advantage of the regulatory settlement and redeemed their securities as par. The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit on that basis.

Judge McKenna’s Ruling

In a March 30, 2009 opinion (here), Southern District of New York Judge Lawrence McKenna granted the defendants’ dismissal motion, with leave to amend. Judge McKenna found that

Given that Plaintiffs have availed themselves of the relief provided in the Regulatory Agreement, Plaintiffs cannot now allege out-of-pocket damages. When Plaintiffs elected to have UBS buyback their ARS at par value, they received a full refund of the purchase price. Therefore, Plaintiffs have already been returned to the position they were in before they purchased the ARS and before any fraud ensued….Plaintiffs’ out-of-pocket damages are necessarily zero because after choosing to rescind the ARS purchases, Plaintiffs have effectively paid nothing for their ARS.

Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled damages despite the regulatory settlement because "UBS’s fraudulent acts prevented Plaintiffs from receiving a sufficiently high rate of interest or dividends to compensate them for the risk of illiquidity associated with their ARS investments." Essentially, they were arguing that if they had been appropriately informed about the securities’ liquidity risk, they would demanded and would have been paid higher interest rates or otherwise have enjoyed a higher investment return.

Judge McKenna rejected this argument because plaintiffs in securities actions must choose among prospective remedies, between rescission and out-of-pocket damages. Having elected rescission, the plaintiffs "may not now seek additional interest or dividends as benefits of ARS purchases they have already elected to disavow."

Finally, Judge McKenna found that the class plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to asset claims on behalf of "class members who purchased UBS-underwritten ARS from brokerage firms other than UBS and investors who transferred to another brokerage firm ARS they purchased from UBS before October 2007."

Discussion

Judge McKenna’s ruling might seem to suggest that the regulatory settlements represent the end of the auction rate securities lawsuits. However, conclusions along those lines could well prove to be premature.

First, Judge McKenna granted the motion with leave to amend. Although there is ample reason to doubt that these plaintiffs can circumvent Judge McKenna’s concerns in an amended pleading, the case itself is not over yet.

Second, other courts may decline to follow Judge McKenna’s conclusions. Indeed, in a March 31, 2009 AmericanLawyer.com article (here) Alison Frankel quotes the plaintiffs’ attorney from the UBS case as saying "we’re not convinced other courts will rule the same way."

Third, there are still the claims of those erstwhile class members who were frozen out of the UBS regulatory settlement, such as those who bought the auction rate securities from a non-UBS broker or who transferred their account away from UBS. As the plaintiffs’ lawyer from the UBS case also is quoted as saying in the American Lawyer article, "the key to the auction rate securities litigation is plaintiffs whose securities were not bought back by the banks."

This category of investors who were shut out of the regulatory settlements also includes the investors who bought their securities from banks or broker dealers who have not yet entered regulatory settlements.

Fourth, in all the regulatory settlements, institutional investors’ interests were treated differently. For example, in the UBS settlement, institutional investors cannot hope to have their investment redeemed until at least 2010. These investors’ liquidity issues continue to give rise to new litigation; for example, I described in recent post (here) the lawsuit that KV Pharmaceuticals filed in late February against Citigroup, in which the company alleged that the illiquidity of its auction rate securities investments was, among other things, forcing the company to lay off workers.

And finally, there is the separate category of litigation that has arisen against auction rate securities investors, rather than against the auction rate securities sellers. These cases involved companies whose balance sheet exposure to auction rate securities has harmed their financial condition, and who face litigation from their own shareholders who claim the companies failed to disclose their exposure. The most recent of these cases, involving Perrigo Company, is discussed here.

In short, while Judge McKenna’s opinion unquestionably represents a significant milestone, it by no means represents the finish line for auction rate securities litigation. Unfortunately, these cases likely will be around for some time to come.

All of that said, Judge McKenna’s opinion does hold out the hope that a large portion of these cases can eventually be cleared out, and the problem at least reduced over time, perhaps to more manageable levels.

I have in any event added the UBS dismissal to my roster of settlements, dismissals and dismissal motion denials in connection with the subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits. The roster can be accessed here.

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Last year, investors filed numerous lawsuits against the investment banks and broker dealers who sold the investors auction rate securities. However, in a recent lawsuit, the targeted company was not an auction rate securities seller; rather, it was an auction rate securities buyer, which is alleged to have misrepresented to its own shareholders its exposure to auction rate securities in which it had invested.

According to their March 11, 2009 press release (here), the plaintiffs’ attorneys have initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against Perrigo Company, a Michigan-based pharmaceutical manufacturer and distributor, and certain of its directors and officers. The complaint (which can be found here) alleges that Perrigo had invested in $18 million in auction rate securities and that until September 15, 2008, the company had a reasonable expectation of redeeming its auction rate securities.

However, the complaint alleges that on September 15, Lehman Brothers, which had underwritten and sold Perrigo’s auction rate securities, went bankrupt. The complaint alleges that

On November 6, 2008, the beginning of the Class Period, defendants reported the "fair value" of Perrigo’s ARS as $14,500,000, but concealed the impact of Lehman’s bankruptcy on Perrigo’s ARS. Then just three months later, on February 3, 2009, defendants disclosed, for the first time, that Lehman had underwritten and sold the ARS to Perrigo. They also announced that the Company was writing off the entire value of its ARS, wiping out over a third of Perrigo’s earnings in the quarter. As a result of this disclosure, the stock price plunged 18% that day, causing massive losses to investors.

Although the allegations brought against Perrigo as an auction rate securities investor may seem unusual, the Perrigo complaint is actually not the first to assert securities fraud in connection with a company’s disclosures concerning its investment in auction rate securities. Indeed, as noted here, shareholders raised allegations against NextWave Wireless in connection with that company’s auction rate securities investment.

Nor is Perrigo the first company to be exposed to securities litigation as a consequence of Lehman’s bankruptcy. As I noted in prior posts, Constellation Energy (about which refer here), Reserve Fund (here), JA Solar (here), and Farmer Mac (here) have all found themselves hit with securities lawsuits in part due to the impact on them from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.

All of these cases represent what I previously called (here) the new wave of subprime and credit crisis-related securities litigation, in which the thrust of the allegations is not that the target companies themselves are exposed to subprime-related risks, but rather that the companies were exposed to other companies or assets that were themselves exposed to the subprime or credit risk.

The fact that this lawsuit is filed against Perrigo, a pharmaceutical company, underscores a point I have previously noted about the new wave of subprime and credit crisis related litigation, which is the potential for this new wave to bring the credit crisis litigation wave, which up until now has been largely restricted to the financial sector, to companies throughout the larger economy.

In any event, despite the much ballyhooed auction rate securities settlements, lawsuits related to the frozen auction rate investments continue to flow in. Indeed, on March 10, 2009 Careerbuilder LLC filed an action (here) in Illinois (Cook County) Circuit Court against Bank of America, alleging that even though BofA has reached at least two prior regulatory settlements regarding the auction rate securities, Careerbuilder remains stuck with the $32 million in auction rate securities that BofA sold them.

Yet Another Form of Credit Drawn in the Litigation Wave: As I have previously noted (most recently here), the current litigation wave long ago ceased to be just about subprime debt and has expanded to encompass a wide variety of different kinds of lending. The most recent example of this spread to other kinds of lending is the lawsuit filed on March 11, 2008 against Corus Bankshares.

According to their press release (here), plaintiffs’ counsel filed the suit against Corus and certain of its Chief Executive Officer in the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint (which can be found here) alleges that the company’s disclosures were misleading because they failed to disclose

(i) that Corus was failing to recognize losses on its condominium loans in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"); (ii) that Corus and/or its affiliates was purchasing condominiums in developments Corus had financed in an attempt to: (a) inflate the appraised values of condominiums to delay having to recognize losses on financing for such condominiums; (b) inflate developers’ sales figures to increase the likelihood of successful future sales; and (c) create the illusion of successful sales histories in order to inflate appraisal values for the condominiums to ensure inflated future prices for the condominiums; and (iii) that Corus was involved in detailed and in-depth negotiations with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Office of the Comptroller of Currency regarding its deteriorating pool of condominium loans.

The complaint alleges that when on the company released its financial results on January 29, 2009 and disclosed that "Corus is suffering from the extraordinary effects of what may ultimately be the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression," the company’s shares fell nearly 47% to close at $.59 per share on February 2, 2009.

So add condominium loans to the kinds of lending that has become involved in the subprime and credit crisis related litigation. I have added the Perrigo and Corus lawsuits to my running tally of the subprime and credit crisis related securities class action lawsuits, which can be accessed here. A spreadsheet with the 2009 subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuits can be found here.

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Even though I was not even away a full week for the recent PLUS D&O Symposium, there was a flood of noteworthy developments while I was gone. Here is a roundup of last week’s news and notes.

Subprime-Related Derivative Lawsuit Largely Dismissed: In a detailed and painstaking February 24, 2009 opinion (here), Chancellor William Chandler dismissed the bulk of the consolidated subprime-related derivative suit pending against Citigroup, as nominal defendant, and certain of the company’s directors and officers, in Delaware Chancery Court. A very thorough review of the opinion can be found on the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog, here.

Chancellor Chandler dismissed all but one of plaintiffs’ claims for failure to adequately plead demand futility. He did, however, allow plaintiffs’ claims of waste concerning the compensation and benefits package for Citigroup’s CEO to continue.

The most interesting part of Chancellor Chandler’s opinion relates to the plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants failed to monitor the company’s business risk with respect to Citigroup’s exposure to the subprime mortgage market. Chandler characterized this claim as an assertion that "the director defendants should be personally liable to the Company because they failed to fully recognize the risk posed by subprime securities."

Chandler noted that Delaware case and statutory law places "an extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim for personal director liability for failure to see the extent of a company’s business risk." Chandler concluded that in light of this burden, plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations (and thus their failure to plead particularized facts) were insufficient to excuse demand.

Among other things, Chandler noted that the "oversight duties under Delaware law are not designed to subject directors, even expert directors, to personal liability for failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk."

Chandler did take pains to distinguish the recent Chancery Court decision in which the "failure to monitor" claim against the directors and officers of AIG survived a motion to dismiss. (The February 10, 2009 opinion in the AIG case can be found here.) In that case, unlike the Citigroup action, the defendants "allegedly failed to exercise reasonable oversight over pervasive fraudulent and criminal conduct." The Citigroup case, by contrast, involved only alleged failure to recognize the extent of the company’s business risk.

Both because of the high-profile nature of the Citigroup case as well as Chancellor Chandler’s detailed review of the applicable provisions of Delaware law, his opinion could prove to be particularly influential in other pending subprime and credit crisis-related derivative suits. The basis on which he distinguished the AIG case could also prove to be an important distinguishing characteristic in the determination of which derivative suits will survive and which may be dismissed.

I have in any event added the Citigroup opinion to my table of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit settlements, dismissal and dismissal denials. The table can be accessed here. A list of the subprime and credit crisis-related derivative suits themselves can be found here.

One final observation about the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog, which I referenced above. If you have any inclination or desire to follow the important legal trends affecting the potential legal liabilities and responsibilities of corporate directors and officers, you will find the Delaware litigation blog absolutely indispensible. I would rank the blog among the few truly must-read resources in this area on the Internet. The blog’s post on the Citigroup case is just one example why.

More Stanford Financial Developments and Litigation: In addition to the initiation of criminal charges against former Stanford Financial Group investment officer Laura Pendergast-Holt for obstructing the SEC’s investigation (about which refer here), last week’s developments regarding the Stanford scandal included the SEC’s filing late Friday night of an amended enforcement complaint in the matter.

According to the SEC’s amended complaint (which can be found here), R. Allen Stanford and his firm’s CFO, James M. Davis, operated a massive Ponzi scheme and misappropriated at least $1.6 billion of investor money in bogus personal loans to Stanford. An unspecified additional amount was also put into speculative investments, which by the end of 2008 made up the bulk of the Stanford Financial Group’s investments, though the company marketed its portfolio as a "well-diversified portfolio of highly marketable securities."

The amended complaint also alleged that Stanford and Davis fabricated portfolio’s investment performance, deciding each month on the return to be reported and "reverse engineering" the financial statements to reflect investment income that was never earned.

A February 28, 2009 New York Times article describing the criminal charges and the amended SEC complaint can be found here.

In addition to these criminal and regulatory developments, the Stanford Group was also hit with an additional civil lawsuit, this time involving a case filed in a Canadian Court. According to a February 27, 2009 article in the Financial Post (here), on February 25, 2009, Calgary-based furniture manufacturer has initiated a class action lawsuit in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench against Allen Stanford, Stanford International Bank, Stanford Group Company, Stanford Capital Management LLC, James M. Davis and Laura Pendergast-Holt.

The company alleges that it invested $1 million in certificates of deposit issued by the bank. The complaint, which seeks class action status, seeks damages for misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, conversion, fraudulent conveyance and breach of trust. The complaint also asserts fraud in connection with other Stanford investments.

I have added the new Canadian lawsuit to my running tally of the Stanford related litigation, which can be accessed here.

More Madoff Litigation, Too: During the past week, additional litigation related to the Madoff scandal also continued to flow in. I have added multiple new cases to my running tally of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here. Special thanks to the several readers who have alerted me to new Madoff cases, particularly to loyal reader Jon Jacobson.

One of the more interesting new cases is the one filed on February 24, 2009 in the District of New Jersey. Though this case raises allegations similar to those asserted in prior cases, the complaint asserts claims neither against Madoff and firm nor against the Madoff feeder funds. Rather, the sole defendant in the case is Peter Madoff, Bernard Madoff’s brother.

According to the complaint in the case (which can be found here), Peter Madoff and his brother "have worked side by side" for "nearly 40 years," and their offices "were only a few feet from each other." The complaint alleges, among other things, that Peter Madoff was responsible for "regularly verifying and accurately reporting the financial condition" of the Madoff firm, as well as establishing and monitoring internal controls and detecting and reporting any legal violations. The complaint asserts claims under Sections 10(b) and 20 of the ’34 Act, for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation.

Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service for the Peter Madoff complaint.

Auction Rate Securities Litigation Continues to Amass: As I have previously noted (here), the various massive auction rate securities settlements do not seem to have stemmed the tide of auction rate securities litigation, and cases involving institutional and entity investors, who are not part of the regulatory settlements, continue to file new lawsuits.

The latest example of this phenomenon is the complaint filed on February 25, 2009 in the Eastern District of Missouri by KV Pharmaceutical Company against Citigroup Global Markets. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

The complaint alleges that between May 2005 and February 2008, Citigroup counseled KV into investing $72 million in auction rate securities that are now illiquid. Among other things, the complaint alleges that the securities can now be sold, if at all, at substantial discounts to par value. The complaint alleges that "holding $72 million of illiquid ARS exacerbates KV’s current cash crisis, which is requiring KV to seek borrowed capital and engage in overall cost-cutting by, among other things, eliminating approximately 700 jobs."

Clearly the auction rate securities market’s continued failure to function is causing enormous stress for the persons and entities unfortunate enough to have been stuck holding these instruments when the music stopped last February.

Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service for the KV Pharmaceutical complaint.

More Failed Banks: Add two more banks to the growing list of 2009 bank failures. On Friday, February 27, 2009, the FDIC took control of the Heritage Community, Glenwood, Illinois (about which refer here), and of the Security Savings Bank of Henderson, Nevada (refer here). Prior to its closure, the Heritage Community Bank had assets of $232.9 million, and Security Savings Bank had assets of $238.3 million.

The closure of these two banks brings the total number of  banks closed during February 2009 to ten, and the 2009 year to date total to 16 (compared to 25 during all of 2008). The FDIC's complete list of failed banks can be found here.

As I recently noted (here), a significant number of the 2009 bank failures, including the two most recent examples, involve smaller community banks. These troubling developments raise serious concerns both for the banking community and for the larger economy. The rash of bank closures also raises the likelihood that there will be increased litigation involving the failed banks and their former directors and officers.

Did the Milberg Kickback Scheme Hurt Class Members?: Those readers who were fortunate enough to have attended the PLUS D&O Symposium among other things heard interesting comments from St. John’s University law professor Michael Perino about the fascinating video, "The Rise and Fall of Bill Lerach" (to see the video trailer for which, refer here). Perino mentioned in his discussion the research he had completed about the impact on shareholder class members from the kickback payments the Milberg firm made to the paid plaintiffs.

In light of Professor Perino’s remarks, I thought readers might appreciate having a link to the Professor’s research paper, which can be found here. As reflected in the paper’s abstract, Perino concluded that not only were the firm’s fee requests and awards overall higher in the cases identified in the indictment, but that these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that class members were harmed.

An interesting commentary on the paper can be found on Professor Ribstein’s Ideoblog, here.

Insurance Persons of the Year: The LexisNexis Insurance Law Center is receiving nominations for the "Insurance Law Persons of the Year." The Center will be making four awards: the Policyholder Attorney of the Year; the Insurer Attorney of the Year; the Insurance Regulator of the Year; and the Insurance Jurist of the Year. In each case, the award will go to the person in each area that had the most impact in insurance law during 2008.

The deadline for nominations is March 6, 2009. Nominations can be sent to Karen Yotis the following address: karen.yotis@lexisnexis.com.

My New All-Time Favorite Headline: The table I have assembled regarding the Stanford Financial Group litigation, which I mentioned above, has proven to be a popular addition to this blog. I am grateful that a number of other blogs and sites have linked to the post in which the table can be accessed.

But as nice as it is for other blogs to recognize my post, nothing can top the article posted on February 24, 2009 on the American Lawyer website (here), entitled "D&O Diary Launches Stanford Financial Litigation Tally; Kevin LaCroix is Our Hero." That one even impressed my wife (I think), which is really saying something.

My thanks to AmLaw reporter Alison Frankel for this nice but undeserved accolade.

And Finally: Just a reminder to all my readers that I continue to report additional items between blog posts on Twitter. Among other things, I am increasingly active in retweeting interesting items from other Twitterers. Readers interested in monitoring my "tweets" are encouraged to click on the Twitter button in the right-hand column above to follow my Twitter posts.

In addition, I remain interested in connecting with readers on LinkedIn. I have recently become much more active in various LinkedIn groups and I would like to draw other readers into the dialog. I encourage readers interested in connecting with me on LinkedIn to click on the button in the right hand column above and join my network.

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In a February 12, 2009 FINRA Dispute Resolution Award, a panel of three arbitrators ruled that Credit Suisse must pay ST Microelectronics more than $400 million based on the company’s claims that Credit Suisse misled the company into buying subprime-exposed auction rate securities. A copy of the award can be found here.

The FINRA Award

As I detailed in an earlier post (here), ST Microelectronics had filed the FINRA claim against Credit Suisse (USA) LLC, while also separately filing a civil lawsuit against Credit Suisse Group, the U.S. affiliate’s Switzerland-based parent. The separate lawsuit complaint can be found here.

According to the February 12 Award, the FINRA complaint against the U.S. affiliate asserted claims under Section 10 of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5, alleging that the claimant "requested investments in student loan securities backed by U.S. government guarantees" but that instead their funds were invested in what the civil lawsuit complaint described as "illiquid, risky and unsustainable auction rate securities consisting of collateralized debt obligations and credit linked notes, some of which were backed by subprime real estate loans." (The separate complaint alleged that Credit Suisse had an "intentional strategy" of "dumping into the accounts of unsuspecting clients some of the worst ARS on the market.")

The Award makes no specific findings of fact but instead simply species the amounts to be awarded to ST Microelectronics. Credit Suisse is ordered to pay the claimant "compensatory damages" of $400 million, which is to be "paid immediately in exchange for Claimant’s entire portfolio." The award also orders the payment of certain of fees and costs, interest, and $3 million attorney’s fees.

Discussion

The FINRA award has a number of significant implications, the most immediate of which may be those relating to Credit Suisse itself. The separate lawsuit complaint filed against the Credit Suisse parent company alleges that "at least a dozen other multinational corporations are victims of the same scheme," carried out by two Credit Suisse brokers who, in fact, are the subject of a current criminal prosecution (about which refer here). The complaint alleges that the supposed scheme involves "more than $2 billion of these clients’ money."

A July 31, 2009 Wall Street Journal article (here) listed ten overseas companies (including ST Microelectronics) that have initiated arbitration proceedings against Credit Suisse-affiliated companies based on auction rate securities. The February 12 FINRA Award may bode ill for Credit Suisse in these other proceedings.

In addition, the outcome, magnitude and prominence of the February 12 Award could also spur similar claims by other aggrieved parties against other broker-dealers, particularly other aggrieved institutional investors. By and large, institutional investors were excluded from the massive auction rate securities regulatory settlements that have been announced to great fanfare. These excluded investors may be encouraged by ST Microelectronics’ success, and seek to pursue their own claims. A February 13, 2009 Bloomberg article (here) discussing the Award quotes one observer as saying "this decision will likely lead to either more arbitrations or settlements between investors and broker-dealers."

To be sure, the circumstances relating to Credit Suisse’s involvement with auction rate securities may be distinct. As noted above, criminal proceedings have arisen from its brokers’ activities. Other prospective claimants’ claims may not be as sympathetic.

It is important to emphasize that while the Award itself describes the relief granted as "compensatory damages," what it actually accomplished is a rescission of the underlying securities transaction. Credit Suisse basically has to buy back the company’s securities at face value. (In that regard, the Award itself noted that what the claimant had requested was "relief equivalent to rescission" – which appears to what the claimant got.) Though the Award provides for the payment of other fees and costs, it does not award any other type of damages. The Award expressly denied the claimant’s request for punitive damages.

The absence of the award of other damages potentially could affect other prospective claimants. That is, while these cases may provide an avenue of relief, there is nothing about this Award to suggest that that a claim of this type is going to produce some kind of a bonanza. On the other hand, for many prospective institutional investor claimants, the opportunity to return their auction rate securities for face value at this point would be more than enough incentive for them to pursue a claim.

The Award does provide one very particular kind of encouragement for these kinds of claims. The panel’s award of $3 million in attorneys’ fees undoubtedly will capture the imagination of many would-be claimants’ attorneys. The prospect of this kind of fee recovery undoubtedly will encourage many attorneys to seek out and pursue these claims.

It is unclear from the Award what preclusive or superseding effect the Award might have on the separate federal court lawsuit ST Microelectronics filed against the Credit Suisse corporate parent. It seems that the company secured the relief it sought. What reason or even opportunity there might be to continue to prosecute the civil case is not immediately apparent.

Hat tip to the WSJ.com Law Blog (here) for the link to the FINRA Award.

Don’t Tell Me How to Fix It, Just Tell Me Who to Blame: If you missed it, you may want to take a look at the list of the "25 People to Blame" (here) in the February 23, 2009 issue of Time Magazine. The magazine’s attempt to identify the individuals responsible for the current financial mess is actually kind of interesting, even thought provoking.

The list includes the usual suspects: Dick Fuld, Jimmy Cayne Angelo Mozillo and Stan O’Neill.( I agree that Angelo Mozillo of Countrywide also belongs on the list, although I don’t think I would have put him first, as Time Magazine did.) Time also included, correctly in my view, Fred Goodwin of Royal Bank of Scotland, whose ill-fated and ill-time take over assault on ABN AMRO is record setting in a number of extremely negative ways.

The list also recognizes others who rightfully should shoulder some of the blame, but who sometimes elude the harsh spotlight. In this category I would put Marion and Herb Sandler, whose Golden West Savings bank initiated the Option ARM mortgage. Sandy Weill also (correctly, in my view) appears on the list for the mess he made of Citigroup.

A couple of U.S. Presidents make the list -- Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Alan Greenspan, Hank Paulson and Chris Cox are also there. There is also one former Prime Minister, Davíð Oddsson of Iceland, and one Premier, Wen Jiabao of China.

There are a several interesting names on the list. For example, John Devaney appears as a sort of a stand in for the whole hedge fund industry, and Lew Ranieri gets belated recognition for having fathered mortgage securitization. Kathleen Corbett, the former head of rating agency Standard & Poor’s also gets a nod for the plethora of triple-A rating on mortgage backed securities that encouraged so much misdirected investment. Joe Casano gets due recognition for basically taking down AIG.

There are others whom I think are misplaced on this list. For one thing, what is Bernie Madoff doing there? He may have been a big crook, but in the end he is just a crook.

There are also at least two very significant omissions from the list.

First and foremost, the U.S. Congress deserves to be recognized for its encouragement of housing policy that was misguided and disproportionate to the requirements and limitations of sound principles. Congress is great at holding hearings and making speeches when things go wrong. Their own abysmal record of implementing policies that prevent problems warrants its own set of hearings. I’d like to put some of them in the dock and subject them to the same kind of sneering cross-examination that they have been imposing on others in recent days. (To be fair to the list-makers, they did slot former Texas congressman Phil Gramm at No.2 on the list, which arguably is a Congressional designation by proxy.)

And finally, why isn’t the American Homebuyer on the list? Yes, the American Consumer is recognized, but I think we need to be specific here. Within the larger group of well-intentioned home buyers are those who were driven by some weird form of housing lust to buy gigantic houses they couldn’t afford. There also appear to have been some who were all too willing to hide or even misrepresent their true financial condition to secure credit. Sure, the lenders were complicit, but as long as we are assigning blame, let’s put some everywhere that it belongs.Of course, many homeowners who are now struggling had nothing to do with any of this kind of conduct, but there are also those who were involved.

When you come right down to it, there is no shortage of culprits. Sadly, there are many, many victims. Some of them are even the same people.

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Though multi-billion dollar auction rate securities settlements were announced to great fanfare some months ago, litigation involving auction rate securities continues to mount (as I previously noted, here). Two recently filed proceedings highlight the fact that notwithstanding the settlements, many investors’ grievances are yet to be addressed.

As a result, while regulatory authorities continue to press for additional settlements, other investors may feel that the settlements do not remedy their particular claimed harm, and may seek to pursue individual litigation, in effect opting out of the regulatory settlements already reached.

I note that I raised the possibitliies for these further disputes when the settlements first emerged, here.

The Hutchinson Auction Rate Securities Lawsuit

First, on November 14, 20008, Hutchinson Technology filed a securities lawsuit in Minnesota federal court against UBS and related entities, accusing the defendants of fraud in connection with their purchase on Hutchinson’s behalf of approximately $70 million in illiquid auction rate securities under a discretionary cash management agreement.

Hutchinson’s complaint, which can be found here, alleges that UBS sought to protect its own balance sheet by seeking “secretly to shift the risk from its swelling inventory of ARS onto clients like Hutchinson by pitching ARS as safe, liquid, ‘cash equivalent’ investments while knowing that, in fact, the purported liquidity of the ARS had become an illusion.”

The complaint quotes extensively from UBS e-mails and other internal documents allegedly showing that the defendants had conflicts of interest with their own clients to whom they sold the securities, as well as a growing awareness of the dangers associated with a failing ARS marketplace. The complaint alleges that the defendants violated federal and state securities laws as well as other state statutory and common law duties.

What makes the Hutchinson complaint of particular interest is that it expressly acknowledges UBS’s August 2008 auction rate securities settlement, which the complaint also implicitly acknowledges applies by its terms to Hutchinson. However, the complaint alleges that the settlement “does not resolve the dispute between Hutchinson and UBS” in that the settlement’s terms “do not return Hutchinson to the position it would otherwise be in but for UBS’s fraud.”

Though the settlement contains UBS’s commitment to redeem the securities as par, “the purchases will take place over several years, and corporations with positions of more than $10 million (like Hutchinson) will not be able to start selling their position to UBS until June 30, 2010.” And thought the settlement required UBS to provide “liquidity loans,” any borrowing client would “remain obligated to repay the loan on demand even if the value of the ARS declines.”

Hutchinson’s complaint cites several alleged deficiencies with these arrangements. First, “it is uncertain whether UBS will have the means to satisfy its obligations or indeed survive as a firm.” (Ouch.) Second, Hutchinson “has needs for liquidity well in advance of that date,” including, for example, the need to redeem $150 million in convertible notes due in March 2010. Third, the value of Hutchinson’s ARS has “dropped considerably,” causing the company to mark down the securities on its balance sheet, with further writedowns potentially ahead, which in turn could have the effect of “potentially negatively impacting the price of its stock.”

Hutchinson is basically attempting to opt out of UBS’s regulatory settlement regarding the auction rate securities. Though the settlement promises eventually to make Hutchison whole, it is the word “eventually” that is giving Hutchinson concern. Hutchinson’s litigation objective may be discerned from its offer in its complaint to tender its auction rate securities investments “at par value plus all interest accrued.” Hutchinson wants its own deal, without having to wait, in effect contending that the delay itself constitutes an additional form of harm.

Hutchison may or may not succeed. Many of the harms it claims have not yet occurred, but merely threaten. But to the extent other investors perceive, like Hutchinson, that their interests are better served or will be advanced by separately litigating their claims rather than participating in the settlements, the utility of the regulatory settlements could be substantially undermined.

Because of this risk, UBS may have to vigorously contest Hutchison’s claim (and other claims like it) or face the prospect of a multitude in individual disputes and pressure to enter a multitude of individual deals that could bleed the company on a timetable accelerated from the more leisurely scheme contemplated in the regulatory settlements.

This potentially could become a process for the administration of a thousand cuts – and it potentially affects not just UBS, but Citicorp, Wachovia, Merrill Lynch and the other large institutions (or their successors in interest) that tried to effect a comprehensive solution to the auction rate securities debacle.

The Massachusetts Regulatory Action Against Oppenheimer

While the financial firms that have reached regulatory settlements could face continued litigation notwithstanding the settlements, other firms that have not yet reached settlements could face continued regulatory pressure to do so.

For example, on November 18, 2008, the Massachusetts Securities Division filed a complaint (here) to initiate an adjudicatory proceeding against Oppenheimer for alleged violations of state securities laws in connection with the company’s sales of auction rate securities to the firm’s clients in the state.

The complaint alleges that Oppenheimer “significantly misrepresented not only the nature of the ARS, but also the overall stability and health of the market when marketing the product to clients.” The complaint further alleges that “Oppenheimer executives and ARS Department personnel sold their own ARS as they learned that the market was in danger of imploding.”

The complaint, which was filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, seeks an order among other things, “requiring Oppenheimer to offer rescission of sales of ARS at par” and “requiring Oppenheimer to make full restitution to investors who already sold these instruments at less than par.” Basically, the complaint seeks to compel Oppenheimer to provide substantially the same relief as other firms previously have agreed as part of their regulatory settlements.

The one thing that is clear from these two new proceedings is that, despite the high profile settlements earlier this year, litigation surrounding the auction rate securities continues to mount. First, there are firms like Oppenheimer that have not yet reached regulatory settlements that will face pressure to do so. But second, there are continuing disputes, like those raised by Hutchinson, that continue even with respect to the firms that have already reached regulatory settlements.

If nothing else, it seems likely that the auction rate securities litigation will churn on for some time to come, with no end yet in sight.

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When the various broker dealers and investment banks recently announced their agreements with government regulators to buy back auction rate securities, the announcements raised questions about the continuing need for the pending auction rate securities litigation. But, at least based on a recently filed lawsuit, it now appears that the settlements may have opened the door for a whole new round of securities litigation related to the settlements themselves.

On October 3, 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers initiated a securities class action lawsuit in New York (New York County) Supreme Court on behalf of investors who purchased bonds and preferred securities in various offerings conducted pursuant to Merrill Lynch’s March 31, 2006 shelf registration. A copy of the complaint can be found here. The complaint, which asserts claims under Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the ’33 Act, names as defendants Merrill Lynch and related entities; certain current and former Merrill Lynch directors and officers; the underwriters that conducted the various offerings; and Merrill Lynch’s auditor.

The complaint alleges that the offering documents "misstated Merrill’s financial condition and failed to disclose that the Company bore massive exposure to losses from investments tied to subprime and other mortgages, and was responsible for significant liability arising from its participation in the market for auction rate securities (ARS). Further Merrill improperly valued mortgage-backed assets on its books, and failed to account for its contingent obligations in the ARS market."

The complaint alleges that as a result of later disclosures about the company’s "true financial condition," the value of the securities sold in the referenced offerings declined materially. The complaint specifically refers to, regarding the company’s true financial condition, Merrill Lynch’s August 7, 2008 announcement (here) that "it would repurchase $12 billion in ARS from investors due to the failure of the ARS market."

Merrill Lynch previously was the target of what I will call a "conventional" auction rate securities lawsuit. Background regarding this prior lawsuit can be found here and regarding the prior auction rate securities lawsuits generally can be found here.

This new Merrill Lynch lawsuit complaint differs from the prior conventional auction rate securities lawsuit in a variety of ways. The most important distinction is who is represented in the plaintiff class. The prior auction rate securities lawsuits were brought on behalf of auction rate securities investors – that is, the people who bought the actual auction rate securities. The plaintiffs in the Merrill Lynch lawsuit are not persons who bought auction rate securities, but who bought Merrill Lynch’s own securities in the referenced offerings.

The misrepresentations alleged are different as well. In the conventional auction rate securities lawsuits, the allegation is that the risks of the auction rate securities were insufficiently disclosed. In this new lawsuit, the allegation is not about the risks of auction rate securities themselves, but rather that Merrill Lynch did not disclose its own susceptibility to contingent liability in connection with its issuance or sale of the auction rate securities.

One other peculiarity of the prior auction rate securities lawsuits is that those suits generally did not name any individual defendants. The new Merrill Lynch complaint names a couple of dozen individual defendants, as well as several dozen offering underwriters.

Given the number and identities of the various defendants, this lawsuit will keep a lot of lawyers employed for a long time. Among the preliminary issues on which the lawyers will be engaged is the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs elected to file their lawsuit in state court pursuant to the concurrent jurisdiction provisions in Section 22 of the ’33 Act. The defendants undoubtedly will seek to remove the lawsuit to federal court, and the plaintiffs in turn will seek to have the case remanded to state court.

As I noted in a prior post (here), the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the decision of the district court in the Luther v. Countrywide case to remand a ’33 Act case back to state court, where it originally had been filed before being removed to federal court. However, as the 10b-5 Daily blog recently noted (here), a judge in the Southern District of New York refused to remand New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust, which had been removed to federal court. Among other things the court in the Harborview case held that the provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act trumped the jurisdictional provisions of the ’33 Act.

In view of the fact that the new Merrill Lynch case likely will be remanded to the Southern District of New York (the same court in which the Harborview case is pending), it will be interesting to see whether the plaintiffs are able to have the case remanded back to the New York state court where they initially filed the new Merrill Lynch complaint.

As I have previously noted, along with the question whether or not a ’33 Act case properly can be removed to federal court is the more practical question of why the plaintiffs want to proceed in state court in the first place. Some day someone will explain to me why the plaintiffs’ bar suddenly has developed this fascination with pursuing ’33 Act claims in state court. Is it, as I have supposed, an effort to circumvent the procedural requirements of the PSLRA?

In any event, I have added the new Merrill Lynch complaint to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here. With the addition of the new lawsuit, the current tally now stands at 125, of which 85 have been filed in 2008. Of these, 21, including the new Merrill Lynch lawsuit, are auction rate securities lawsuits.

Motion to Dismiss Granted in Subprime Securities Lawsuit: On September 29, 2008, Judge John Steele of the Middle District of Florida granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, without prejudice, in one of the more unusual subprime related securities lawsuits. A copy of the opinion can be found here.

As detailed here, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants (First Home Builders of Florida and two residential real estate brokerage firms, as well as successor entities), in violation of the federal securities laws, had fraudulently induced plaintiffs to purchase real estate investment properties by promising that defendants would procure lease-to-own tenants for the investors’ properties; that the tenants rental payments would cover all of the investors’ out-of-pocket costs; and that investors would receive a guaranteed 14% return on the investment in the first year.

Judge Steele granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that as a result of the plaintiffs’ failure "to allege who made what misrepresentations," the plaintiffs’ fraud allegations failed to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Judge Steele declined to rule on the plaintiffs’ group pleading theory. He allowed plaintiffs 30 days to file an amended complaint.

I have added the First Home Builders of Florida dismissal to my table of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit case dispositions, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) both for the Merrill Lynch complaint and for the opinion in the First Home Builders of Florida case.

Note from Ohio: I want to know how the Saturday Night Live scriptwriters managed to get the whole  "Joe the Plumber" schtick inserted into tonight's actual Presidential debate. But the one thing I do know is that after tonight's debate, my fellow Ohioan, Joe the Plumber, is moving to Canada, where he will be left in peace because their national election is already finished.

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Since the earliest days of the subprime litigation wave, one of the recurring questions has been whether the wave would spread beyond the financial sector. The question remains, but allegations in a new securities lawsuit suggest that circumstances arising from the subprime crisis are affecting a diverse variety of companies, and by extension the claims asserted against them.

According to their press release (here), on September 16, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California against NextWave Wireless and certain of its directors and officers. NextWave is a mobile broadband and multimedia technology company that develops, produces and markets mobile multimedia and wireless broadband products. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that:

Defendants issued materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company’s business and financial results. As a result of defendants’ false statements, NextWave stock traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period, reaching as high as $10.10 per share in June 2007.

On August 7, 2008, after the market closed, Nextwave issued its second quarter 2008 financial results, announcing it only had $71.1 million in cash and similar instruments available as of June 30, 2008 and, unless it raised money, its cash would run out at the beginning of October 2008. As a result, the Company was seeking financing that would give the Company enough money to operate through June 2009. On this news, NextWave’s stock fell $1.90 per share to close at $0.95 per share, a one-day decline of 67%.

According to the complaint, the true facts, which were known by the defendants but concealed from the investing public during the Class Period, were as follows: (a) NextWave did not have adequate sources of liquidity to continue operations as it executed its growth strategy and continued making aggressive worldwide acquisitions; (b) defendants had no reasonable basis to make favorable statements that the Company’s WiMAX semiconductor products would be available for commercial sale in the first half of 2008; (c) NextWave’s growth and acquisition strategy was not financially successful and did not provide the basis for continued growth or financial success because it was straining NextWave’s fragile liquidity position and NextWave did not have the financial resources to continue to operate its world-wide operations through the end of 2008; (d) NextWave failed to timely disclose that it had invested all of its marketable securities in extremely high-risk and illiquid auction rate securities; and (e) NextWave’s ability to continue as a going concern was seriously in question by reason of the facts alleged in subparagraphs (a)-(d) above.

The most interesting part about these allegations to me is the reference to the company’s investment in auction rate securities. The complaint itself further alleges with respect to these "extremely high-risk and illiquid auction rate securities" that NextWave "had misrepresented these investments as marketable securities on its balance sheet included in its financial statements disseminated in its Form 10-K and 10-Q and press release."

There have of course been many prior lawsuits against investment banks and broker-dealers in which it is alleged that the financial institutions misrepresented the risks of auction rate securities. But this new lawsuit against NextWave represents the first instance of which I am aware in which an auction rate investor has been sued for failing to disclose its exposure to auction rate securities investments. Obviously, there are a lot of other allegations in the lawsuit, but the auction rate investments allegations are an important part of the complaint and, if nothing else, are noteworthy.

The allegations about the company’s alleged balance sheet misclassification of its auction rate investments is of particular concern. Many companies (and other entities) hold auction rate securities investments, and all of these entities have been struggling both with valuation issues and with balance sheet classification issues. These classification and disclosure issues affect not just auction rate related investments but subprime and other mortgage-backed investments as well. At least theoretically, plaintiffs’ lawyers could allege similar investment disclosure and asset classification issues in connection with these companies.

Perhaps I am getting ahead of myself, but I also wonder whether similar "failure to disclose investment exposure" allegations might be alleged against companies that will be reporting significant write-downs in their holdings of securities of, for example, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, and AIG. Admittedly, this may be a far-fetched possibility at this point. But some companies’ write-downs of their investments in those assets could be material, which in turn could affect the reporting companies’ own stock market valuations. If the impact is significant, angry investors might consider their litigation alternatives.

Another Credit Crisis Lawsuit: There was also a more conventional credit crisis lawsuit filed today. According to the plaintiffs’ counsel’s September 16, 2008 press release (here), plaintiffs have filed a securities class action lawsuit against BankUnited Financial Corp. and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that

Defendants made false and misleading statements about BankUnited. Specifically, defendants misrepresented: (a) the losses the Company was likely to suffer due to BankUnited’s poor underwriting standards, which losses would occur once interest rates reset on the billions of dollars of pay-option arms (adjustable rate mortgages where borrowers had the ability to choose their payment amount during the initial period of the loan); (b) BankUnited’s sketchy appraisal process, which permitted borrowers to obtain mortgages in excess of their ability to pay and in excess of the value of the underlying property; and (c) BankUnited’s policies with regard to "piggy-back" loans, which are essentially second mortgages made at the time a home is purchased to fund a down payment.

The BankUnited lawsuit is the latest to raise allegations involving Option ARM mortgages, which I have discussed in prior posts, most recently here.

Run the Numbers: Many readers know that I have been tracking subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits. My running tally can be accessed here. As time has gone by, definitional issues have become increasingly challenging. The NextWave lawsuit may present the most significant definitional challenge to date, because the auction rate investment allegations arguably are a peripheral part of the complaint.

I could go either way on this one, but after some thought, I have decided to include the NextWave lawsuit in my count, simply due to the fact that the company’s financial problems apparently were due in part to its investments in auction rate securities. Reasonable minds could differ on whether or not to include the lawsuit.

But with the addition of the NextWave and BankUnited lawsuits, the current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits now stands at 114, of which 74 have been filed in 2008.

Dear Bob, you might not remember me, but I used to work at AIG: If you have not yet seen it, you must read the September 16, 2008 letter (here) that Maurice "Hank" Greenberg, AIG’s former Chairman and CEO and current Chairman and CEO of C.V. Starr, to now-former AIG Chairman and CEO Robert Willumstad.

I can’t imagine why Greenberg thinks Willumstad might have been concerned that Greenberg would "overshadow" him. Willumstad undoubtedly was reassured that, although Greenberg did feel compelled to note "you and the Board have presided over the virtual destruction of shareholder value built up over 35 years," it was not Greenberg’s "intention to point fingers or be critical."

Hat tip to the Wall Street Journal for the link.

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As the subprime litigation wave has churned on, many of the more recently filed lawsuits have been similar to previously filed suits. But amidst the repetition, there has also been some innovation, or at least variation, as a result of which the subprime litigation wave has continued to evolve. Two recently filed subprime and credit crisis- related lawsuits demonstrate both of these elements.

Fannie Mae Secondary Offering Litigation: First, on August 7, 2008, plaintiffs filed a purported securities class action under Section 12(a)(2) of the ’33 Act, in the New York (New York County) Supreme Court, in connection with the May 9, 2008 secondary offering of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) A copy of the complaint can be found here.

The complaint purports to be filed on behalf of all purchasers who bought Fannie Mae shares in the May 9 offering, in which the company sold approximately 94 million shares at $27.50 a share. (The shares closed today at $7.69.) Interestingly, Fannie Mae itself is not named as a defendant. The plaintiffs have named defendants only the offering underwriters, Lehman Brothers, J.P. Morgan and Citigroup.

The complaint alleges that the offering documents failed to disclose a pending change to FAS 140, which change if adopted, the complaint alleges, "could require the Company to raise as much as $46 billion of capital in order to remain in compliance" with its regulatory capital requirements. The complaint alleges that FAS 140 had previously allowed Fannie Mae to account for its liabilities for mortgage-backed securities issued by the company as if the company had sold the securities, even though the company was still obligated to guarantee the securities against defaults in the underlying assets. The supposed pending changes would require Fannie Mae to account on its balance sheet for these now off-balance sheet liabilities.

The complaint alleges that the offering documents had stated that upon the successful completion of the offering, the company’s capital requirements would be reduced. The complaint alleges that in July 2008, well after the offering’s completion, an analyst for Lehman Brothers (which was also one of the offering underwriters) issued a report disclosing the pending changes and the supposed impact on the company’s need for as much as $46 billion additional capital. The complaint alleges that in the week following the report, Fannie Mae’s share price dropped from $18.76 per share to $7.07 a share.

There are a number of curious things about this complaint. The first is that the complaint names only the offering underwriters as defendants; it does not name Fannie Mae itself. I expect this is because in connection with this firm commitment offering, the offering underwriters were the actual "sellers." (The complaint alleges that the underwriters, who directly bought the shares from the company, were "directly responsible for the offering and sale" of the shares to the market.) This would perhaps explain why the plaintiffs sought to pursue their Section 12 claim only against the underwriters, but it does not clarify why the plaintiffs did not also include in their complaint a Section 11 claim against Fannie Mae or other defendants.

UPDATE: Please note the reader comment below explaining that the May offering was an unregistered equity offering, and as such there was no registration statement -- hence no Section 11 claim. As an aside, I note that I am always grateful when a reader provides this kind of clarifying information. I hope that all readers will lelt me know when statements on this blog are in need of clarification or correction.  

The other interesting thing is that plaintiffs have chosen to proceed in state court rather than federal court. I have previously noted (here) the apparent interest of some plaintiffs’ lawyers as part of the current litigation wave to pursue ’33 Act claims in state court, and I have also noted that plaintiffs have had some success in having these cases remanded back to state court in opposition to defendants’ efforts to remove them to federal court. Even though this most recent lawsuit asserts claims only under Section 12, it apparently continues the developing trend of plaintiffs pursuing ’33 Act actions (primarily Section 11 actions) in state court.

Jurisdiction for ’33 Act actions is concurrent, meaning that plaintiffs have a choice and they are consciously choosing to proceed in state court. I have previously speculated (here) that the decision to proceed in state court represents some form of forum shopping, or perhaps a bid to avoid the requirements of the PSLRA. Whatever the reason, the court selection appears calculated and tactical, much like the decision in this case to assert claims only against the offering underwriters and only under Section 12.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch for the complaint in this Fannie Mae Secondary Offering lawsuit.

Stifel Financial Auction Rate Securities Litigation: The second of these two recent lawsuits is a purported securities class action lawsuit filed in the Eastern District of Missouri on behalf of all persons who purchased auction rate securities from Stifel Financial (or its affiliate, Stifel Nicolaus & Company) between June 11, 2003 and February 13, 2008. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

As I have noted (here), there have been many of these auction rate securities class action lawsuits filed. By my count, about which refer below, Stifel and its affiliate are the eighteenth different set of defendants to be separately named in an auction rate securities class action lawsuits.

What makes this complaint noteworthy is not its allegations, which are virtually identical to those raised in the earlier auction rate securities lawsuits. Rather, what makes this complaint noteworthy is its timing. There were a flood of these auction rate securities lawsuits filed in March and April 2008, but the filings tapered off after that. The most recent of these auction rate securities class action lawsuits, as near as I can determine, was filed in May 2008.

The other interesting element of the lawsuit’s timing is that it comes now, shortly after the largest financial institutions have entered settlements in which the big banks have agreed to massive buy backs of these securities from retail investors (refer here). As I noted in a recent post (here), even though these settlements might have seemed to suggest that the auction rate securities mess was winding wrapping up, the lawsuits relating to the securities continue to accumulate. Notwithstanding the settlements involving the largest banks, problems with these securities continue, and the related lawsuits continue to be filed.

A copy of an August 13, 2008 St. Louis Business Journal article relating to the new Stifel Financial lawsuit can be found here.

 Run the Numbers: In any event, I have added these two new lawsuits to my running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here.

With the addition of these two new lawsuits, the current tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits now stands at 105, of which 65 were filed in 2008. As noted above, there have been 18 separate sets of defendants sued in auction rate securities class action lawsuits.

Subprime Coverage: Accompanying this litigation wave is the related question of insurance coverage for these lawsuits. Matthew Jacobs, Lorelie Masters and David Weiner of Jenner & Block have written an article in the July/August 2008 issue of Coverage entitled "Insurance Coverage and the Subprime Crisis: A Broad Overview" (here), which provides a comprehensive overview of the subprime litigation and the related insurance issues, from a policyholder perspective. The article is comprehensive and well-written, and raises a number of useful and interesting observations about the subprime-related coverage issues.

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The headlines on the business pages have been dominated in recent days by the news of the blockbuster Citigroup and UBS auction rate securities settlements (about which refer here). But as noted in an August 8, 2008 CFO.com article (here), at the same time, a number of other leading banks have been hit with regulatory subpoenas as problems surrounding auction rate securities become “the crisis of the day for the large global financial services companies.”

In addition, investor litigation against the banks related to auction rate securities continues to accumulate. For example, on August 6, 2008, STMicroelectronics sued Credit Suisse Group in the Eastern District of New York, alleging that Credit Suisse placed $450 million of the chipmaker’s securities in unauthorized auction rate securities. A copy of the complaint can be found here. An August 7, 2008 Bloomberg article describing the lawsuit can be found here.

The complaint’s tone is blistering. The complaint alleges that in August 2007, when the company sought to liquidate what it thought was a portfolio of “liquid, safe and authorized student loan securities,” it discovered that Credit Suisse had actually invested in “illiquid, risky and unsustainable auction rate securities consisting of collateralized debt obligations and credit linked notes, some of which are backed by subprime real estate loans.”

Not stopping there, the complaint further alleges that “at least a dozen other multinational corporations are victims of the same scheme,” allegedly carried out by the same Credit Suisse brokers. The complaint alleges that this supposed scheme “involves more than $2 billion of these clients’ money.” The complaint further alleges that Credit Suisse “furthered the fraud by keeping it hidden from victims, governmental authorities and the investing public” and by “refusing to follow instructions to liquidate the assets.”

The complaint also alleges that Credit Suisse had an “intentional strategy” reducing its own exposure to auction rate securities and that it accomplished that goal by “dumping into the accounts of unsuspecting clients some of the worst ARS on the market.”

According to the complaint, ST has separately filed a FINRA arbitration against Credit Suisse Securities (USA), but because Credit Suisse Group itself is not a member of FINRA, it is not subject to its arbitration requirements, and therefore is not a party to the FINRA action, which remains pending. As a result, the newly filed civil lawsuit presents the spectacle of one Swiss domiciled company suing another Swiss domiciled company in U.S. federal court.

With relation to the matters alleged in the ST complaint, it is interesting to note that on July 9, 2008, the Wall Street Journal reported (here) that federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York are “investigating whether two former Credit Suisse Group brokers lied to investors about how they placed their money into short-term securities.” Prosecutors are investigating whether investors were “misled about the nature of the auction rate securities they bought.”

The July 9 article quotes a statement from Credit Suisse as saying that the two employees, who resigned in September 2007, had “violated their obligations to Credit Suisse and to our clients.” The Credit Suisse statement added that “we promptly notified regulators when this matter arose last year and we have continued to work closely with them”

In addition, the Wall Street Journal reported in a front page article on July 31, 2008 (here) that one of the two brokers under investigation, a 35-year old broker named Julian Tzolov, “has left the U.S. and could have fled to his native Bulgaria.” The July 31 article also lists ten overseas companies (including ST Microelectronics) that have initiated arbitration proceedings against Credit Suisse affiliate companies based on auction rate securities companies.

On U.S. Market Competitiveness: Consider Departing Foreign Companies: Would-be reformers cite concerns that U.S financial markets are losing out to other countries’ markets due to concerns about U.S regulatory burdens and litigiousness (about which refer here). But if these concerns were as significant as the reformers suggest, you would expect that foreign companies cross-listed on U.S. exchanges would see a positive boost in their share price when they eliminate their U.S. listing. Recent academic suggest the opposite may be true.

In an August 2008 paper entitled “Why do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets”  (here), Andrew Korolyi and Rene Stulz of Ohio State and Craig Doidge of the University of Toronto took at look at the 59 foreign companies that chose to deregister their U.S. listings after the SEC enacted Rule 12h-6 in March 2007, making it easier for such companies to do so.

Their study produced two essential findings. First, they found that the 59 companies as a group “experienced significantly lower growth and lower stock returns than other U.S-exchange listed foreign firms in the years preceding the decision.” Second, they found that there is only “weak evidence that firms experience negative stock returns when they announce deregistration and stronger evidence that the stock price return is worse for firms with higher growth.”

The authors said their finding “support the hypothesis that foreign firms list shares at the lowest cost to finance growth opportunities and that, when those opportunities disappear, a listing become less valuable to corporate insiders so that firms are more likely to deregister and go home.”

As discussed here, the authors’ prior research substantiates that overseas firms benefit, through lower cost of capital, when they choose to list their shares on U.S. exchanges, and their shares trade for higher prices than do those of similar companies that do not choose to list here. One theory for this “listing premium” is the “bonding hypothesis,” which speculates that investors put more confidence in companies complying with American disclosure requirements and accounting standards. The authors’ more recent research suggest that the only companies punished for delisting from the U.S. exchanges are those that continued to have growth opportunities and a need to attract American capital. Other companies, who lack those opportunities, delist with impunity.

Perhaps ironically, current efforts to make the U.S. markets more competitive arguably may be undercutting the “listing premium,” which might be the U.S. markets’ greatest competitive advantage. As discussed in Floyd Norris’s August 8, 2008 New York Times article entitled “Reasons Some Firms Left the U.S.” (here):

By letting companies walk away easily, the advantage of an American registration is reduced, Mr. Stulz has argued. The S.E.C. is moving to allow foreign companies to use international accounting rules, so any advantage from confidence in U.S. accounting rules will vanish. And the commission is making it much easier for brokers to sell unregistered foreign shares to Americans.

“I think there is a grave risk that the advantage may be lost because of the continued chipping away at the rock,” Mr. Karolyi said. “It just doesn’t seem like the right time or the right place to be engaged in a serious deregulation of financial markets.”

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After New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced (here) earlier today that Citigroup had agreed to a blockbuster settlement regarding auction rate securities, it certainly seemed like the deal would put pressure on other investment banks to adopt similar measures. So perhaps it was not unexpected later in the day that Merrill Lynch announced (here) that it too would "buy back at par auction rate securities sold by it to its retail clients."

If Merrill Lynch’s response is any indication, other banks and broker-dealers may also now find themselves pressured to buy back auction rate securities from their retail clients at par. UPDATE: It appears that UBS got the memo, too; the August 8, 2008 headlines include reports that UBS will be entering its own deal today with state and federal regulators (refer here). There were quite a number of other features to Citigroup’s settlement beyond the retail investor buy back. In addition, Citigroup not only settled with the NY AG, but also preliminarily settled with the SEC as well, as discussed in the SEC’s August 7, 2008 press release (here).

Other companies that want the same degree of resolution as Citigroup may have to swallow many if not all of the terms to which Citigroup agreed, so the entire package is worth a closer look.

Without access to all of the settlement documents, it is not possible to obtain a complete understand of everything to which Citigroup agreed. But there is a great deal of information in NYAG’s and SEC press releases linked above, as well as Citigroup’s own press release about the settlement (here).

The major components of the deal are that Citigroup will buy back at par $7.5 billion in auction rate securities that it sold to individual investors, small business and charities. In addition, Citigroup agreed to use its "best efforts" to liquidate another $12 billion in auction rate securities sold to retirement plans and institutional investors by the end of 2009.

Citigroup also agreed to pay the state of New York a civil penalty of $50 million, and to pay a separate civil penalty of $50 million to the North American Securities Administrators, which, according to the NYAG’s press release, has had a task force conducting investigations into the marketing and sale of auction rate securities.

Beyond these basic outlines, there are a number of other terms designed to make investors whole.

First, Citigroup will, according to the NYAG, "fully reimburse all retail investors who sold their auction rate securities at a discount after the market failed."

Second, as described in the SEC press release, "until Citi actually provides for the liquidation of the securities…Citi will provide no-cost loans to customers that will remain outstanding until all the ARS are repurchased, and will reimburse customers for any interest costs incurred under any prior loan program."

Third, according to the SEC, "Citi will not liquidate its own inventory of a particular ARS before it liquidates its own customers’ holding in that security."

Fourth, in one of the deal’s more interesting components, Citigroup agreed that (according to the SEC press release, which has the best description of this component) with respect to any customer who contends that he or she has "incurred consequential damages beyond the loss of liquidity," that it will participate in a "special arbitration process that the customer may elect and that will be overseen by FINRA." In these proceedings, Citigroup "will not contest liability for its misrepresentations and omissions…but may challenge the existence or amount of any consequential damages." Customers who elect not to participate in these special procedures "may pursue all other arbitration or legal of equitable remedies available through any other administrative or judicial process."

Fifth, with respect to its investment bank clients, according to Citigroup’s press release, "Citi will refund refinancing fees to municipal ARS issuers that issued ARS in the primary market between August 1, 2007 and February 11, 2008, and refinanced those securities after February 11, 2008."

The SEC’s press release emphasizes that Citigroup’s settlement with the SEC is "preliminary" and that the company "faces the prospect of a financial penalty to the SEC after it has completed its obligations under the settlement agreement." The amount of the penalty if any will be based on an assessment "whether Citi has satisfactorily completed its obligations under the settlement," as well as the costs Citi incurred in meeting those obligations.

With respect to the issue of costs to Citigroup, the company itself noted that the financial impact it would sustain as a result of acquiring the $7.3 billion of its retail investors’ auction rate securities "is expected to be de minimus." The company estimates that the difference between the purchase price and the market price is ‘in the range of $500 million on a pretax basis," although the actual pre-tax loss will depend on market values at the time of purchase.

Citigroup did not attempt to estimate the costs to the company of its commitment to use its "best efforts" to liquidate its institutional investors $12 billion in auction rate securities. Nor does its press release reflect an estimate of the costs to the company of the various provisions designed to make its retail and investment bank customers whole. The "consequential damages" arbitrations could be particularly interesting in the respect, and I am guessing these proceedings will also involve some pretty elaborate allegations. Given the marketplace's reaction to the settlement announcement -- Citigroup's stock closed down 6.24% today -- the perception seems to be that the overall costs will something more than "de minimum."

It is worth noting that the $12 billion retail investor buy back that Merrill Lynch announced today, while clearly designed to try to ingratiate the company to regulators and to try to buy the company some room to maneuver, acknowledged only one part of the Citigroup’s multi-component settlement. Merrill’s initiative lacked any provision for liquidation of institutional investors’ holdings, and it similarly lacked any of the "make whole" components of the Citigroup settlement. Regulators will undoubtedly press Merrill for similar concessions.

Whatever the aggregate costs to Citigroup of the settlement announced today will ultimately be depends to an enormous extent on whether this settlement, and the others that undoubtedly will be reached in the coming days and weeks, are collectively enough to melt the frozen auction rate securities market. At this point, nobody is buying the securities because they don’t want to get stuck with an asset they can’t turn around and sell if they have to. But if confidence does return, the banks and other companies will be able either to hold these newly acquired assets on their balance sheets at par, rather than at a discount, or to sell the assets in an orderly marketplace at reasonable marketplace prices.

On the other hand, it is possible that all that is happening is that the problems are being shifted around. The banks will have to be taking on to their balance sheets a huge quantity of illiquid assets at a time when their balance sheets are already under pressure. All of them will face the same desire, and perhaps need, to sell these assets, at the same time that they will also be under pressure to use their "best efforts" to help their institutional investor clients unload their holdings. These arrangements address the retail investors problems (which is fair, appropriate and necessary, from both a practical and prudential standpoint), but the other problems are not yet solved, and they will not be finally solved until there are as many interested buyers as they are eager would-be sellers. And these arrangements certainly bake in a host of holders who will want to be sellers.

The key component of the settlement may be the "best efforts" provision pertaining to institutional investors, which Citigroup described in its press release as follows:

Citi will work with issuers and other interested parties to provide liquidity solutions for Citi institutional investor clients. In doing so, Citi will use its best efforts to facilitate issuer redemptions and/or to resolve its institutional investor clients' liquidity concerns through resecuritizations and other means. The New York Attorney General will monitor Citi's progress and, beginning on November 4, 2008, retains the right to take legal action against Citi with respect to its institutional investor clients. The other regulators have entered into a similar arrangement but with a December 31, 2009 date.

If these efforts prosper, they may go a long way toward restoring an efficient marketplace for these securities. The problem is that, without a funtioning marketplace, it is not immediately apparent (at least from this brief description), how institutional investors' "liquidity concerns" will be resolved, short of Citigroup itself buying out the institutional investors too --although to my eyes at least this "best efforts" stops short of a firm buyout commitment.

It may be that a Citigroup buyout of institutional investors is implied in this "best efforts" provision, especially given the looming threat of further state regulatory action, amoint to an implicit buyout commitment. To the extent other banks provide similar commitments, it might well be enough to unfreeze the marketplace for these securities. Which unquestionably would be a good thing for all concerned. The risk of course is that the banks could wind up holding a pile of assets nobody else wants.

There are many unanswered questions. One of the more practical questions is what the Citigroup settlement announced today will do for the private auction rate securities litigation pending against the company (about which refer here). The settlement clearly seems calculated to try to make at least the retail investors whole, and at least for those retail investors who are comfortable with the special "consequential damages" procedure, there would seem to be no point for continuing the class action (although I would be interested to know if readers have a different perspective). Institutional investors may well have another view, particularly until it is known whether Citigroup’s "best efforts" to liquidate the investors’ auction rate securities holding are successful.

The Citigroup settlement was discussed in a number of news articles today, including articles appearing on CFO.com (here) and Bloomberg (here).

Or is the Worst Yet to Come?: Coincidentally, my friends Kimberly Melvin and Cara Tseng Duffield of the Wiley Rein law firm published a memorandum today whose title seems even more provocative in light of today’s development. Their memo, entitled "Auction Rate Securities: Is the Worst Yet to Come?" (here), has a detailed overview of the outstanding claims involving auction rate securities that is informative and useful.

The memo was written prior to and therefore without awareness of the Citigroup settlement, The memo still makes for interesting reading. Among other things, the memo contains a number of interesting observations concerning the insurance implications of the ARS claims. The authors note that because many of the ARS claims arise out of the defendant companies’ investment sales activities, the claims likely do not represent D&O insurance losses; rather the claims "appear to represent primarily E&O exposures."

Finally, and pertinent to the Citigroup settlement, the authors note that "to the extent that the investment banks buy back or rescind their customers’ ARS, thereby receiving the securities in return for par value, issues exist regarding whether the banks have suffered a covered loss."

I Never Really Wanted to Sell CDOs, I Wanted to be a Lumberjack: And now, for something completely different, I recommend Mark Gilbert’s August 7, 2008 Bloomberg column entitled "CDO Market is Dead, Not Just Pining for Fjords" (here).

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Next up as targets in the ever-growing wave of subprime-related class action lawsuits are closed-end funds that issued auction preferred securities. The auction marketplace for these securities, like the market for auction rate municipal bonds, has broken down, and investors who bought the securities are now suing the closed end funds that issued the instruments.

First, some background. According to the Investment Company Institute’s web page describing and explaining closed end funds (here), closed end funds are managed investment companies that issue a fixed number of shares. The shares trade on the open market. In addition to these common shares, many closed end funds also issue preferred shares. The owners of the preferred shares are paid dividends, but they do not participate in the fund’s gains and losses. The sale of preferred shares gives the fund leverage, by permitting the fund to make additional investments, hoping to improve the common shareholders’ returns. For auction rate preferreds, the dividend rate is set through periodic auctions, typically held every seven or 28 days.

According to a March 9, 2008 New York Times article entitled “As Good as Cash, Until It’s Not” (here), the marketplace for municipalities’ auction rate notes is $330 billion, and the market for closed end fund auction rate preferred securities is $65 billion. But more to the point, investors in auction rate preferred securities, like investors in municipalities’ auction rate notes, have discovered that due to the February 2008 breakdown of the auction rate marketplace, investors find they are “stuck” with their investments and unable to sell them through the auction market.

But auction rate preferred investors are, according to the Times article, faring “far worse than investors stuck with municipal issues,” because many municipal note investors are receiving a penalty rate of up to 12 percent or more, a rate that is “much higher than the caps on closed-end notes, which are currently around 3.25 percent.” The closed end issuers “have no incentive to redeem their notes since the interest rate resulting from the failed auction is so low.”

A March 30, 2008 New York Times article entitled “If You Can’t Sell, Good Luck” (here) explains that auction rate preferred investors’ difficulties put the closed-end fund issuers “in something of a conflicted position,” because the common shareholders’ returns are enhanced by the leverage from the preferred securities investment. While the preferred holders would like their shares to be redeemed, the “common shareholders would lose out on extra income generated by the preferred share structure.”

Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the class action securities attorneys have now gotten involved. According to their press release (here), on April 21, 2008, the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ filed a purported securities class action lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Calamos Global Dynamic Income Fund, on behalf of investors who acquired “Auction Rate Cumulative Preferred Shares” (ARPS) in the fund’s September 17, 2007 offering of $350 million of the securities. The complaint, which can be found here, also names as defendants the two investment banks that led the offering.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that the offering documents omitted that:

(i) the purported “auctions” used by Calamos Fund to get the dividend rates were not bona fide auctions at all, but rather a mechanism to maintain the illusion of an efficient and liquid market for the ARPS so that the Calamos Fund could continue to earn fees from the so-called auctions and from the ongoing stabilizing of the market because of the lack of buyer demand; (ii) the default interest rate set as a consequence of a failed auction is less than the interest rate paid when auctions of certain competing municipal auction rate securities (“MARS”) offered directly by municipal issuers fail; (iii) the ARPS suffer from an additional disadvantage compared to MARS because the ARPS are securities which exist in perpetuity until such time as the Fund calls them due while MARS have a set due date; and (iv) the default interest rate as set would cause the ARPS to trade at a discount to their par value if, and when, the auctions began to fail.

The complaint further alleges that as a result of the auction rate marketplace failure “auction rate securities that were once offered as ‘cash equivalents’ are now illiquid, resulting in economic losses and severe hardships for investors.”

As I have previously noted (most recently here and here), there already is a growing wave of auction rate securities class action lawsuits. However, this most recent lawsuit differs from the prior actions, and not merely because it involves closed end fund auction rate preferred securities rather auction rate notes issued by municipalities. The new lawsuit is also different because it targets the issuer; in the prior auction rate lawsuits, the plaintiffs targeted the broker dealers that sold the securities, not the municipalities that issued the securities.

One thought I had while reviewing the Calamos complaint is that many of these auction rate lawsuits may present some interesting issues related to damages. In most instances, the instruments are continuing to pay interest according to their terms. With respect to the closed end fund notes, the securities are backed by real assets held in the funds, which would seem to suggest that the instruments retain substantial economic value. Even if the auction rate market itself proves to be permanently broken, it would seem that there should be strong economic incentives all the way around for a secondary market for these shares to develop. Of course, whether a fully functional secondary market emerges, and whether the marketplace requires a significant discount for these shares to trade, remains to be seen. But right now, calculating the alleged damages does seem to pose some challenging issues, particularly some mechanism to trade the shares develops while these cases are pending.  

Subprime Litigation Wave Hits Credit Suisse: On April 21, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel also initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Credit Suisse Group and certain of its directors and officers. According to the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ press release (here), the complaint alleges that the “defendants failed to write down known impaired securities containing mortgage-related debt.” Specifically, the complaint alleges that

(a) that defendants failed to record losses on the deterioration in mortgage assets and collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) on Credit Suisse’s books caused by the high amount of non-collectible mortgages included in the portfolio; (b) that Credit Suisse’s internal controls were inadequate to ensure that losses on residential mortgage-related assets were accounted for properly; and (c) that Credit Suisse’s traders had put incorrect values on CDOs and other debt securities, concealing the exposure the Company had to losses.

The complaint (which can be found here), also alleges that on February 19, 2008, the company announced (here) fair value reductions of $2.25 billion following its repricing of its asset-backed positions, triggering a sharp decline in the company’s share price.

The plaintiffs’ lawyers have engineered the purported class on whose behalf the action is brought, in a clear attempt to avoid jurisdictional challenges and other concerns. The purported class includes all shareholders who purchased Credit Suisse ADRs on the NYSE, and all U.S. residents or citizens who purchased Credit Suisse stock elsewhere. This purported class excludes non-U.S. investors who purchased their securities outside of the United States.

This class composition seems tailored to match the composition of the class recently certified in the Converium securities lawsuit (as discussed in greater detail on the Securities Litigation Watch blog, here). This class composition also avoids many of the so-called “f-cubed” litigant problems (involving foreign domiciled shareholders who bought their shares in a foreign company on a foreign exchange). Avoiding this issue could eliminate friction at the lead plaintiff, motion to dismiss, and class certification stages. It does raise questions about the foreign litigants and their apparent inability to seek class remedies of the type that other securityholders in the same company are able to pursue in the U.S. Whether that triggers these securityholders to file a bunch of individual actions, as happened after the foreign litigants were excluded from the Vivendi lawsuit (as also discussed on the Securities Litigation Watch blog, here), remains to be seen.

For further background about the “f-cubed” issue, refer to my prior posts, here and here.

Run the Numbers: With the addition of these two new lawsuits, the current tally of subprime and other credit crisis related lawsuits, which can be accessed here, now stands at 76, 36 of which have been filed in 2008. Of the 38 so far in 2008, 15 (including the Calamos lawsuit described above) are auction rate securities lawsuits.

Excess D&O Insurance Coverage Issues: In several posts (most recently here), I have examined the increasingly important emergence of coverage disputes involving excess D&O insurance. In the latest issue of InSights, entitled “Excess Liability Insurance: Coverage Disputes and Possible Solutions” (here), I take a more comprehensive look at the coverage issues involving excess D&O insurance.

Speaker’s Corner: On April 22, 2008 at 1:00 P.M. EDT, I will be participating in a one-hour webinar sponsored by Merrill Corporation entitled “The Subprime Ripple Effect: Preparing for the Wave of Litigation.” The other participants include Thomas Reilly, the former Massachusetts Attorney General and a shareholder in the Greenburg Traurig law firm, and Mark Kindy, EVP of Strategy and Operations for Merrill Corp. Registration (which is free) can be accessed here.

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Add corporate debt to the type of lending caught up in the current credit crisis, and add both commercial real estate financing companies and private equity firms (or at least one that recently completed a high profile public offering) to the kinds of companies now ensnared in the current wave of lawsuits. The latest round of lawsuits suggests just how far afield these cases may spread before all is said and done.  

The iStar Lawsuit: The lawsuit filed on April 14, 2008 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against iStar Financial and certain of its directors and officers represents these latest variants in the evolving course credit crisis litigation wave. A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release about the iStar lawsuit can be found here, and the complaint can be found here.

The iStar lawsuit is brought on behalf of shareholders of the company who bought their shares in the company’s December 13, 2007 secondary offering, in which the company raised more that $227 million. According to the complaint, the offering documents failed to disclose that the company was at the time of the offering experiencing negative effects from the credit market turmoil and failed to recognize more that $200 million of losses on its “corporate loan and debt portfolio.”

On February 28, 2008, the company reported (here) a fourth quarter 2007 loss of 478.7 million, due in part to $134.9 million in charges associated with the “the impairment of two credits that are accounted for as held-to-maturity debt securities in its Corporate Loan and Debt portfolio.” and due to the fact that the company had increased its loan loss provisions by $113 million.

The Blackstone Lawsuit: In another example of the far flung effects from the current market turmoil, investors who bought shares of The Blackstone Group, L.P in the firm’s June 25, 2007 IPO have filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the company and certain of its directors and officers.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ April 15, 2007 press release (here), the complaint alleges that the offering documents failed to disclose that Blackstone’s “portfolio companies were not performing well and were of declining value and, as a result, Blackstone’s equity investment was impaired and the Company would not generate anticipated performance fees on those investments or would have fees ‘clawed-back’ by limited partners in its funds.”

The complaint (which can be found here) alleges that in the company’s March 10, 2008 announcement (here)of fourth quarter and year end financial results, the company announced “announced that it was writing down its investment in Financial Guaranty Insurance Company by $122 million.”

Financial Guaranty Insurance Company is a bond insurer that has been struggling due to downgrades of its own credit rating. FGIC’s travails have already resulted in a prior securities class action lawsuit against the company’s other significant investor, The PMI Group. My prior discussion of The PMI Group securities litigation can be found here.

These events and ensuing lawsuits represent the latest extension of the circumstances that originated with the subprime lending meltdown but now are increasingly widespread. I recently highlighted (here) the turmoil (and ensuing litigation) that had affected the student lending sector. The extension of the effects and of the litigation, first to the commercial lending sector and to a commercial real estate financing company, and next to a private equity firm that went public only a short while ago amidst great hoopla and now has been sued for it, are merely the latest developments in what clearly promises to be an increasingly encompassing phenomenon.

As I have noted before, observers who persist in viewing the credit crisis and ensuing litigation as an exclusively “subprime”-related problem will not only fail to comprehend what has already occurred, but will likely underestimate what may lie ahead.

Another Auction Rate Securities Lawsuit: Another related recent development in this area is the lawsuit filed on April 14, 2008 on behalf of auction rate securities investors against Wells Fargo & Co. The plaintiffs’ attorneys’ press release can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

With the addition of the iStar, Blackstone and Wells Fargo lawsuits, my current tally of credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here, now stands at 73, 33 of which have been filed in 2008. Thirteen of 73 lawsuits are brought on behalf of auction rate securities investors.

More Suits Against Securitzers: In earlier posts (here and here), I noted the emergence of securities class action lawsuits brought on behalf of investors against the investment banks and related entities that securitized mortgages and other types of debt into financial instruments in which the investors invested and in which they lost money.

The latest of these lawsuits was brought on March 19, 2008 in New York Supreme Court by the City of Ann Arbor Employees’ Retirement System on behalf of investors who purchased Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates as part of a December 12, 2006 offering of the instruments. Named as defendants are Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, which organized the offering of certificates backed by pools of mortgages, and 18 mortgage loan trusts, in which the mortgages were held. The defendants have removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Background regarding the lawsuit can be found here. A copy of the removal petition, to which the complaint is attached, can be found here.

The complaint alleges that the offering documents misrepresented the underwriting standards used in connection with the mortgage origination, and also misrepresented the various criteria used to qualify loans and properties. As a result, the complaint alleges, the offering documents misrepresented the risk profile of both the secured assets and the certificates.

The Citigroup lawsuit is substantially similar to the lawsuits previously brought against affiliates of Nomura (about which refer here), Countrywide (refer here) and Wachovia (refer here). This latest complaint is also similar to those prior complaints in that the plaintiffs (who in each case are represented by the Coughlin Stoia firm) sought to initiate each lawsuit in state court. My detailed analysis of the jurisdictional issues involved can be found in the post linked above regarding the Nomura lawsuit.  

Though the defendants have uniformly sought to remove these cases to federal court, in the Countrywide case, the earliest of these cases to be filed, the federal court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand the cases to state court. As noted in my discussion of the Countywide remand decision here, the federal court’s remand of the case to state court was based on the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to state courts for ’33 Act liability cases, a jurisdictional grant the federal court found has not been eliminated by subsequent legislation.

I have previously speculated that the plaintiffs’ strategy for pursuing these cases in state court is to avoid the requirements of the PSLRA, an impression that is reinforced by the fact that the plaintiffs’ lawyers did not issue a press release at the time they filed these state court complaints. Whether other defendants’ attempts to remove these lawsuits to federal court will ultimately prove to be successful remains to be seen, but the prospect of significant nationwide securities litigation going forward in state court seems fraught with the potential for uncertainty, opacity and complexity.

You’re Such a Lovely Audience, We’d Like to Take You Home With Us: As your reward for reading this far, I am going to share a wonderful little secret with you. Stanford Law School, which has long maintained its excellent Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (here) has now started the Stanford Global Class Action Clearinghouse (here). The new site is devoted to tracking the development of class action litigation throughout the world. While the site is new and is only just getting started, it already has very interesting materials and shows great promise. We can only hope its sponsors and guardians develop and maintain this new site as well as the predecessor.

Hat Tip to my good friends at the Drug and Device Law Blog (here) for the link to the new site.

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Regular readers know that I have been tracking subprime-related class-action lawsuits (here). In a recent post, I noted my interest in trying to develop a similar list of subprime-related derivative lawsuits. In response to my request, a number of readers supplied helpful information, and as a result I have been able to develop a list of subprime-related derivative lawsuits, which can be accessed here.

The list is accurate but it may not be complete. Readers aware of any other subprime-related derivative lawsuits are encouraged to let me know, so that I can address any omissions. I will update the list as new lawsuits come in or as new information becomes available.

The table of cases I have compiled lists the companies that have been named as nominal defendants in shareholders’ derivative lawsuits. Some of the companies listed actually have been sued in multiple derivative suits, and some companies have been sued in multiple jurisdictions. However, where the allegations relate to substantially similar allegations, each company has only been listed once, regardless of the number of actual derivative lawsuits pending. Where I have been able to supply relevant links (in most cases to the actual complaint), the link pertains to the first filed suit.

As the list reflects, a total of 20 companies have been sued as nominal defendants in subprime-related derivative lawsuits. The derivative suits against seven of these companies were first filed in 2008, the rest in 2007. Most (but not all) of the companies named in the derivative suits have also been named in subprime-related securities class action lawsuits. Most of the companies sued in the derivative lawsuits are in the lending and banking industries, but the list also includes insurance companies, home builders, and REITs, among other.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch (here) for providing information and links to several of the lawsuits, and thanks to all readers who provided information and suggestions in response to my inquiry.

Another Auction Rate Securities Lawsuit: On April 8. 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed another purported securities class action lawsuit on behalf of auction rate securities investors against the companies that allegedly sold them the securities, in this case Raymond James Financial. A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ April 8 press release can be found here, and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

This brings the total number of auction rate securities lawsuits to eleven. My prior post discussing the auction rate securities lawsuits can be found here. I have been tracking the auction rate securities lawsuits as part of my running tally of subprime-related class action lawsuits, about which more below.

Adjusting the Subprime-Related Class Action Litigation Tally: Also as a result of my efforts to build the list of subprime-related derivative lawsuits, I received additional information regarding three previously filed securities class action lawsuits. In the past, I had determined that these three lawsuits were not appropriately categorized as subprime-related. However, upon further inquiry and based on conversations with some readers, I have now added these three additional lawsuits to my running tally of subprime-related securities class action lawsuits. The three added lawsuits related to Municipal Mortgage & Equity (about which refer here), WSB Financial Corp. (refer here), and CBRE Realty Finance (refer here).

With the addition of these three lawsuits, and with the addition of the Raymond James auction rate securities lawsuit referenced above, my running tally of subprime-related lawsuits now stands at 68. One unfortunate consequence of my decision to add these three cases is that now my running tally may no longer agree with others’ tallies, such as the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action website (here). There is an inherent categorization problem in trying to track the subprime lawsuits. Reasonable minds will disagree about whether a case is or is not appropriately categorized as subprime related. There are almost always going to be some disagreements at the margins.

Many thanks to the readers who supplied the information and commentary about the three class action lawsuits.

Subprime ERISA Lawsuit Update: As most readers know, I have also been tracking subprime-related ERISA lawsuits (here). As a result of my research and inquiries regarding subprime derivative lawsuits, I identified three additional subprime-related ERISA lawsuits of which I previously had been unaware. These three additional ERISA lawsuits pertain to Huntington Bankshares (refer here), National City Corp. (refer here), and Impac Mortgage (refer here).

With the addition of these three suits to my list, the number of subprime-related ERISA lawsuits now stands at 14, five of which have been filed in 2008, and the remainder of which were filed in 2007.

Two Options Backdating Case Developments: Two courts recently issued rulings on motions to dismiss in options backdating-related lawsuits.

First, on March 31, 2008, in the Juniper Networks option backdating-related securities litigation (about which refer here), Judge James Ware of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California largely denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, except that he granted the motion (with leave to amend) as to one individual defendants, and he granted the motion to dismiss all alleged misrepresentations that took place prior to July 14, 2001, as time barrred. A copy of the March 31 order in the Juniper Networks case can be found here.

Second, and also on March 31, 2008, in the Microtune options-backdating related derivative litigation, Judge Richard Schiff of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, albeit with leave to amend as to certain individuals on certain claims. A copy of the Microtune opinion can be found here. Judge Schell first concluded the Congress had not created a private right of action under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and dismissed that claim. Judge Schell also granted the dismissal with prejudice of claims of allegedly misleading proxy statements as to the individual defendants who were not on the board at the time of the proxy. The proxy allegations were dismissed without prejudice as to the remaining individual defendants. Similarly, the plaintiffs’ claims based on Section 10(b) were also all dismissed, but with prejudice as to some defendants and without prejudice as to others. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims.

I have added these two decisions to my table of options backdating related case dispositions, which can be accessed here. Readers are encouraged to let me know about case dispositions of which they become aware so that I can add them to the list.

Special thanks to Nick Even of the Haynes and Boone firm for the link to the Microtune decision.

New Century Updated: In an earlier post (here), I noted that the court had granted (with leave to amend) the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the first-filed subprime related securities class action lawsuit, involving New Century Financial Corporation. On March 24, 2008, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint (here), which names as defendants not only certain former directors and officers of the company, but also the company’s former auditor, KPMG, and the company’s offering underwriters.

Readers will recall that in connection with the New Century bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy examiner recently released a detailed report (about which refer here) in which, among other things, the examiner reviewed the question of the auditors’ and the company's directors and officers' potential responsibility for certain accounting practices and statements at the company. In light of the bank examiner’s report, the plaintiffs sought (and the defendants’ agreed not to oppose) leave to file a second amended complaint, which the court granted. The plaintiffs’ must file their second amended complaint by April 30, 2008. The court also set a briefing schedule for the anticipated motion to dismiss, to be argued September 8, 2008. A copy of the court’s order granting leave and setting the scheduling can be found here.

A German Securities Trial?: The Securities Litigation Watch has an interesting post (here) about the apparent mass securities lawsuits trial that has commenced in Germany involving Deutsche Telecom. An April 7, 2008 Business Week article discussing the trial can be found here.

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Add E*Trade and SunTrust Bank to the growing list of companies that have been sued in purported class action lawsuits on behalf of auction rate securities investors against companies that sold them the instruments. The plaintiffs’ attorney’s April 2, 2008 press release regarding the E*Trade auction rate securities lawsuit can be found here, and the complaint can be found here. The plaintiffs’ attorneys’ April 2, 2008 press release regarding the SunTrust lawsuit can be found here and the SunTrust complaint can be found here. With the addition of these two new suits, there have now been a total of ten companies sued in these auction rate securities class action lawsuits.

The auction rate lawsuits are interesting. Clearly the plaintiffs’ lawyers think they are worth pursing. And if the intensity of the auction rate securities investors’ anger is an accurate gauge, then the plaintiffs’ lawyers filing of these lawsuits ultimately could be justified. As a result of prior posts on this blog (here and here) about auction rate securities, I have received numerous emails and inquiries from upset auction rate securities investors. Notwithstanding the investor anger, it is probably worth noting that so far as I can tell the leading plaintiffs’ securities firms are not (at least not yet) active in this space. Most of the auction rate securities class action lawsuits thus far have been filed by two plaintiffs’ firms (refer here and here).

The allegations in these auction rate securities class action lawsuits are largely identical. Essentially the plaintiffs contend that the defendants failed to disclose material facts about the instruments. In particular, the defendants are alleged to have failed to disclose that the auction rate securities were not cash alternatives, but rather that there were only liquid at the time of auction. More to the point, the complaints allege that the defendants failed to disclose that the auction rate securities would become illiquid as soon as the broker-dealers stopped maintaining the auction market.

In each of these class action lawsuits, the complaint names as defendants a specific financial institution and its broker-dealer affiliate. No individual defendants are named. While each complaint contains substantially identical generalized allegations of misrepresentations or omissions, the complaints contain virtually no allegations about specific statements the particular defendants companies are alleged to have made.

And even though the complaints purport to allege breaches of Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act, the complaints’ only basis for alleging scienter are generalized allegations of knowing falsity; there are no allegations of insider trading, and no particularized factual allegations supporting the general allegations of knowing falsity. The complaints similarly depend on the failure of the auction rate market itself as satisfying the loss causation requirement, rather than referring to any alleged curative disclosures or anything else in particular about the specific securities in which the class members invested.

The defendants undoubtedly will argue that these generalized allegations are insufficient to meet the threshold pleading requirements, in reliance in particular on Tellabs and Dura Pharmaceuticals. But while the defendants may seek to have the actions dismissed, the plaintiffs’ lawyers clearly intend to keep filing these actions.

The lawsuits potentially may also raise some interesting D & O liability insurance coverage issues. Because the complaints do not name any individuals as defendants, the sole potential coverage under the typical D & O policy that these claims might trigger is the so-called “entity coverage” found in most policies. In most public company D & O policies, the entity coverage is strictly limited to “securities claims.” While the auction rate securities lawsuits purport to raise claims under the securities laws, these allegations may or may not trigger the potentially applicable entity coverage, depending on how the term “securities claim” is defined in the applicable policy.

There are two general variants of the “securities claim” definition. One variant defines the term “securities claim” by reference to the securities laws themselves, including within the definition claims that assert breaches of federal or state securities laws or their equivalent. The other definitional variation defines “securities claim” by reference to the claimants and securities allegation with respect to which would be recognized as a securities claim. For example, this latter category might limit a “securities claim” to claims brought by holders of the company’s securities, or alternatively, might limit a securities claim to alleged breaches in connection with trading of the company’s own securities.

Clearly this definitional distinction could make a difference in connection with these recently filed auction rate securities lawsuits, as these claims might assert a “securities claim” and trigger the entity coverage in policies that use the former variants, but may or may not trigger the entity coverage in the policies that have the latter variant.

It is probably also worth noting that a number of the companies (for example, E*Trade) that have been sued in these auction rate securities class actions have also separately been sued in securities class action lawsuits by the companies’ own shareholders. These companies’ available insurance coverage may be under significant pressure already.

With the accumulation of these lawsuits, whose numbers are likely to continue to grow, it may well be time for these lawsuits to be broken out into their own separate statistical category, much as the IPO laddering cases were when the were filed in 2001. The auction rate securities lawsuits clearly represent a litigation category distinct from the more typical securities class action brought by public company shareholders.

But with the addition of the two latest lawsuits, the total number of subprime related lawsuits, as reflected on my running subprime lawsuit tally (which may be accessed here), now stands at 64, of which 26 have been filed in 2008. As noted above ten of these 64 lawsuits represent lawsuits brought by auction rate securities investors. Two of the 64 were brought by asset-backed securities investors against the investment banks who created the instruments. Two of the 64 were brought by mutual fund investors against the fund companies and fund managers. The remaining lawsuits were brought by public company shareholders.

Subprime Derivative Lawsuits: In addition to securities lawsuits, some shareholders have also filed subprime-related shareholders’ derivative lawsuits against company management alleging breach of fiduciary duty and other legal breaches. The latest of these subprime-related derivative lawsuits was filed on April 1, 2008 in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against Municipal Mortgage & Equity (“Muni Mae”) , as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and officers (complaint here). Muni Mae has previously been sued in a subprime-related securities lawsuit (refer here).

The derivative suit against Muni Mae joins other subprime-related derivative lawsuits that previously have been filed against, among others, Countrywide, American International Group, Regions Financial, and Bear Stearns. I have not been separately tracking the subprime-related derivative lawsuits, basically because I failed to anticipate that shareholders would file as many subprime-related derivative actions as they have. In response to readers’ inquiries, I will now endeavor to track the subprime-related derivative suits.

Unfortunately, because I am coming at this task belatedly, I may fail to account for derivative lawsuits that were filed previously and of which I am unaware. I would be grateful if readers would let me know of any pending subprime-related derivative lawsuits of which they are aware, so that I can add them to my tally and the list will be as complete as possible.

Subprime Litigation Overview: The field of subprime-related litigation has continued to grow and expand, to the point where it is difficult to get an organized sense of the range of issues and litigants involved. An April 1, 2008 memorandum from the Gibson Dunn law firm entitled “Subprime-Related Securities Litigation: Where Do We Go From Here?” (here) provides a top-level overview of current exposures facing companies involved in subprime-related businesses. The paper identifies early trends and key defenses, takes a brief look at likely D & O insurance issues, and describes the factors that are likely to affect the likely future direction of this litigation.

A Canadian Backdating Lawsuit: Though the backdating scandal now seems like ancient history, it seems that the lawsuits are still continuing to come in, although the most recent instance involves a Canadian company sued in a Canadian court.

According to news reports (here), a shareholder of Savanna Energy Services Corp. has filed an action in Alberta’s Court of Queen’s Bench against eleven current or former directors and officers of the company, alleging that the defendants manipulated the company’s stock options in order to profit personally. The lawsuit seeks damages equal to the defendants’ ill-gotten gains and a ban on issuing options to the company’s executives. The plaintiffs’ complaint relies on an affidavit from Eric Lie, the University of Iowa professor whose research initially triggered the options backdating scandal. Lie’s affidavit reports “a high statistical probability” that individuals at Savanna backdated options between 2004 and 2007.

Because Savanna is a Canadian company whose shares trade only on the Toronto Stock Exchange and because it has been sued in Canadian court under Canadian law, I have not tried to shoehorn the case into my running tally of options backdating lawsuits (which may be accessed here). The Savanna lawsuit may represent its own unique category of one.

Delaware Corporate Law Update: Francis Pileggi has posted on his Delaware Corporate and Commerical Litigation Blog (here) an interesting series of posts (here, here and here) reporting on the proceedings at Tulane University's Corporate Law Institute, which took place this past week. The posts include a number of interesting commentaries from members of the Delaware judiciary. Francis's post (here) about Delaware law regarding the sale of companies is particularly noteworthy and interesting, particularly Vice Chancellor Strine's remarks about the duties of boards of companies in the process of the sale of a company.

Death by Blogging?: Readers who may not appreciate how stressful it can be to maintain a blog may want to review the April 6, 2008 New York Times article entitled “In Web World of 24/7 Stress, Writers Blog Till They Drop” (here), which surveys the toll that blogging is taking on some authors.

While no one here at The D & O Diary seems to be in any immediate danger, maintaining the blog is unquestionably stressful. The authors described in the Times article are (or rather, were) at least getting paid for their troubles, whereas The D & O Diary lacks even that consolation. Our blogging efforts defy Samuel Johnson’s sage words that “No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money” -- words that we frequently contemplate to our distress. Yet on we blog, as if by compulsion. A blog is indeed a harsh mistress.

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Driven by the growing wave of subprime-related litigation (particularly a spate of auction rate securities lawsuits), the number of new securities class action lawsuit filings surged in March 2008. The total number of new securities class action lawsuit filings -- 25 – matches the number of new filings in November 2007, which in turn represented the highest monthly total of new filings since January 2005.

The 25 new securities lawsuits in March included 14 new subprime-related suits, taking account the new auction rate securities filed against J.P. Morgan Chase on March 31, 2008 (about which refer here). Of the 14 subprime-related suits, eight (including the new J.P. Morgan Chase lawsuit) were brought on behalf of auction rate securities investors against the companies that sold them the instruments. The remaining lawsuits (both those that are subprime-related and those that are not) were brought on behalf of public company shareholders against the companies and their directors and officers, other than one lawsuit brought on behalf of mutual fund investors.  

Largely because of the subprime-related litigation, many of the March lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York – a total of 11 of March’s 25 new securities lawsuits were filed in the S.D.N.Y. Six of the new securities lawsuits filed in March involved companies domiciled overseas.

With the addition of the 25 new lawsuits in March, the total number of new securities lawsuits filed in the first quarter of 2008 totaled 52, of which 24 are subprime-related. All of the auction rate securities lawsuits were filed in March. (A complete list of the subprime-related lawsuits can be found on my running tally of subprime lawsuits, which may be accessed here.)

The 52 new securities class action filings in the first quarter of 2008, if extrapolated across four quarters, imply an annual filing rate of 208 new securities class action lawsuits, which is consistent with historical norms. (According to Cornerstone’s year-end 2007 securities analysis, here, the average number of securities class action filings during the period 1997 to 2006 is 1994). However, while this filing rate is consistent with historical levels, it is well above the annual levels seen in the most recent years, particularly 2006 (116) and 2007 (166).

Again, largely due to the number of subprime-related filings, the S.D.N.Y had the largest number of first quarter filings, with 21. The federal district with the next highest numbers of filings, D.Mass., had only five.

The companies sued in new securities lawsuits in the first quarter represented 31 different Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code categories, which might suggest that a broad diversity of companies were sued, but in most of those 31 categories only a single company was sued. The SIC Code categories with the largest numbers of companies sued were SIC Code category 6211 (Security Brokers and Dealers), with 7 companies sued, and 6021 (National Commercial Banks), with 6 companies sued. In all 29 companies in the 6000 SIC Code series (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) were sued in the first quarter.

Nine of the companies sued for the first time in the first quarter of 2008 were domiciled overseas, representing eight different countries (including Switzerland, in which two of the companies are domiciled; the other seven countries had only one each.)

Six on the companies sued for the first time in the first quarter of 2008 had completed an initial public offering less than 12 months before the date of the first-filed lawsuit.

A final word about my lawsuit count: I am largely dependent on publicly available sources for my information about securities class action filings, although I have been able to supplement my information with data and links supplied by readers. (I am always grateful when readers bring information to my attention). I have compared my count to the information available on the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website (here) and have elected to omit certain cases that the Stanford site has included, largely because at least three of the cases listed on the Stanford site do not involved publicly traded companies. I will say that the diversity and variation of cases that have arisen in the last few months have created some very difficult categorization issues, and reasonable minds clearly could differ as to whether any particular case should or should not be “counted.”

While the securities class action lawsuit filing rate has fluctuated since mid-2007, the evidence remains consistent that the "lull" in filings that occured between mid-2005 and mid-2007 is over. It does remain to be seen if the filings will continue at their current rate, especially whethter factors such as the auction rate securities crisis will continue to drive litigation. On the other hand, the litigation activity is being driven by so many different aspects of the current crisis, it seems probable that subprime and other credit-related litigation will continue to accumulate. The more interesting question may be the extent to whcih the credit crisis litigation will spread beyond the financial sector.

A Further Thought about Securities Class Action Settlements: Earlier today I posted about the new Cornerstone report on 2007 class action settlements. The report is interesting and includes useful analysis and information. But upon reflection, it occurred to me that it is increasingly the case that class action settlement data alone may not provide all of the information necessary to understand the costs involved in resolving securities lawsuits. As I have noted in numerous prior posts (refer here), class opt outs are an increasingly important part of securities lawsuit resolution, a development that gained considerable momentum during 2007. Indeed, as I note here, the aggregate amount required to settle the Qwest opt-out actions actually exceeded the amount of the class settlement, and the amount paid in settlement of other opt actions is also very substantial.

For that reason, any assessment of the total costs involved in securities case resolution cannot be limited to class action settlements alone. The costs involved with separate opt-out actions must also be considered.

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As the markets for various types of subprime-related assets have seized up, many companies find themselves faced with complicated issues concerning asset valuation and disclosure. These issues have in turn both subjected companies to the possibility of litigation and encouraged investors to target the entities and institutions that sold them the assets in the first place. The extent of the asset valuation and disclosure issues suggests that the turmoil, and the ensuing litigation, will continue to spread.

One example where the valuation and disclosure issues have already led to litigation involves the securities class action lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on March 28, 2008 against MoneyGram International and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ press release can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

The complaint against Moneygram relates to the company’s January 14, 2008 press release (here) in which the company stated that it had completed its valuation of its investment portfolio as of November 30, 2007, as a result of which the company said that it had “experienced net unrealized losses of $571 million from September 30, 2007, bringing cumulative net unrealized losses to $860 million.” The company also announced that it has commenced a process to “realign is portfolio away from asset-backed securities,” as a result of which it had realized in January a loss of $200 million on asset sales of $1.3 billion.

According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release, the complaint alleges that the defendants “concealed from the investing public” that:

(a) the Company lacked requisite internal controls to ensure that the reserves for the Company’s investments in asset-backed securities were adequate, and, as a result, the Company’s projections and reported results issued during the Class Period were based upon defective assumptions and/or manipulated facts; and (b) the Company concealed the extent of its potential losses arising from its exposure to asset-backed securities containing uncollectible debt.

The prospect of securities litigation arising from asset valuation and disclosure issues is a potentially very substantial problem, because so many companies are facing these same kinds of issues due to asset-backed securities in their investment portfolio. Similarly, companies holding auction rate securities are facing particularly challenging valuation and disclosure issues, and as I have previously noted (most recently here), these challenges are not limited to companies in the financial sector, but indeed are widely dispersed throughout the economy. For example, a March 28, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled “’Auction Rates’ Clip Tech Firms’ Profits” (here) discusses the financial impacts that a variety of technology companies are facing because of the companies’ inability to convert their auction rate securities holdings into cash.

One measure of the depth of the problems arising from the failure of the auction rate securities market is that it is not just companies whose balance sheets are under pressure. Many households and individuals are also now about to recognize their own personal balance sheet hits due to the auction rate problem. According to a March 29, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled “UBS Plans Auction-Rate Price Cut” (here), UBS is going to lower the values of the auction rate securities held by its customers. The reduced values, which will be based on computer models and “will range from a few percentage points to more than 20%” will be reflected on their customers’ forthcoming statements.

As I have previously noted (most recently here), investors have already filed a number of class action lawsuits against the companies that sold them auction rate securities, and on March 27, 2007, Citibank became the latest to be sued in a securities class action on behalf of investors for its sale of auction rate securities (see press release here and complaint here). The reduction of the carrying values of auction rate securities on investors’ statements will likely further bestir investors and could lead to even more litigation. But making no adjustments could create a different set of issues and lead to greater problems later.

The question of how best to reflect the valuation of assets for which there is no current market is one that potentially affect participants at all levels of the economy. And while there undoubtedly will be more lawsuits on behalf of investors against the companies that sold them the auction rate securities, a potentially greater litigation threat may arise from shareholders who may contend they were misled about a company’s balance sheet exposure to these kinds of assets. There could well be a great deal of litigation in which it is alleged, as asserted in the complaint in the MoneyGram case, that a company failed to disclose the “extent of its potential losses arising from its exposure to asset-backed securities containing uncollectible debt.”

The extent of the problem shall be revealed in the fullness of time. But meanwhile the subprime-related securities class action litigation still continues to accumulate. With the addition of the MoneyGram and Citigroup lawsuits, my running tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits (which can be accessed here) now stands at 61, 23 of which have been filed in 2008, and seven of which are filed on behalf of auction rate investors against the companies who sold them the securities.

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Add Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley to the growing list of companies that have been sued in securities class action lawsuits by investors for allegedly deceptive representation in connection with the sale of auction rate securities. According to the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ March 25, 2008 press release (here), the plaintiffs’ have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Merrill Lynch and its asset management company on behalf of investors who purchased auction rate securities from Merrill Lynch between March 25, 2003 and February 13, 2008.  A copy of the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, Merrill Lynch “offered and sold auction rate securities to the public as highly liquid cash-management vehicles and as suitable alternatives to money market mutual funds.” The complaint alleges that Merrill Lynch failed to disclose that  

(1) the auction rate securities were not cash alternatives, like money market funds, but were instead, complex, long-term financial instruments with 30 year maturity dates, or longer; (2) the auction rate securities were only liquid at the time of sale because Merrill Lynch and other broker-dealers were artificially supporting and manipulating the auction rate market to maintain the appearance of liquidity and stability; (3) Merrill Lynch and other broker-dealers routinely intervened in auctions for their own benefit, to set rates and prevent all-hold auctions and failed auctions; and (4) Merrill Lynch continued to market auction rate securities as liquid investments after it had determined that it and other broker dealers were likely to withdraw their support for the periodic auctions and that a “freeze” of the market for auction rate securities would result.

According to news reports (here), plaintiffs also filed a separate but substantially similar lawsuit against Morgan Stanley, raising more or less the same allegations on behalf of a class of investors who purchased auction rate securities from Morgan Stanley during the same class period as proposed in the Merrill Lynch lawsuit. I have not located the Morgan Stanley complaint itself, but will add a link when I get a copy.

UPDATE: A copy of the plaintiffs' lawyers' March 25, 2008 press release announcing the Morgan Stanley auction rate securities lawsuit can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here.

These two new lawsuits join a group of similar lawsuits, all filed by the same law firm on behalf of auction rate securities investors, against Deutsche Bank, Wachovia, TD Ameritrade and UBS. The law firm’s webpage describing these various lawsuits can be found here.

With the addition of these two new subprime-related securities class action lawsuits, my running tally of subprime related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here, now stands at 59, of which 21 have been filed in 2008. Two of these 59 represent lawsuits brought on behalf of investors against mortgage-backed asset securitizers, six are class action lawsuits on behalf of auction rate securities investors, two are brought on behalf of mutual fund investors, and the remaining 49 of which are brought on behalf of public company shareholders.

Subprime Litigation Wave Hits Regions: Birmingham, Alabama-based Regions Financial Corporation has been hit with a couple of different subprime-related lawsuits as the subprime wave continues to spread beyond New York, California, and Florida, the states where the subprime litigation originally was concentrated.

First, according to a March 25, 2008 Birmingham News article (here), the Catholic Medical Mission Board, a Regions shareholder, has filed a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit against Regions, as nominal defendant, and certain Regions directors and officers, alleging that the defendants failed to disclose the extent of Regions’ lending exposure to residential homebuilders, which permitted company insiders to sell their shares in company stock at inflated prices. According to the news report, the complaint alleges that "Regions Financial's stock was artificially inflated because the defendants directed the company to hide the true extent of its subprime exposure.’

The derivative complaint (which can be found here) asserts claims for breach of fiduciary duty, waste of corporate assets, unjust enrichment, and breach of Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act.

Second, Regions has also been hit with a lawsuit filed under ERISA on behalf of its participants in the Regions defined contribution plan. A copy of the complaint can be found here. The complaint alleges that the offered plan participants Regions stock and investment options in Regions Morgan Keegan funds “when it was imprudent to do so.” The complaint also alleges that the investment in Regions stock and the Regions Morgan Keegan funds was maintained “when it was no longer prudent to do so.”  The complaint alleges that the defendants knew or should have known that these investments were imprudent because of Regions and the funds heavy investment in or vulnerability to subprime mortgage investments, loans and securities. The complaint also alleges that the defendants failed to communicate the risks of investing in the plan and also failed to communicate conflicts of interest.

As noted on my running tally of subprime related litigation (which can be accessed here), with the addition of the Regions ERISA litigation, my running tally of subprime-related ERISA lawsuits now stands at 11.

I have not been keeping a running tally of subprime-related derivative litigation (basically because the primarily state court oriented litigation is hard to track), but there has been substantial subprime related derivative litigation, involving, among others, Bear Stearns, American International Group, and Countrywide.

Special thanks to alert reader Rob Lichenstein for the links to the two Regions lawsuits and the Birmingham News article.

About the Bear Stearns Deal: If as I do you find many of the articles discussing the updated Bear Stearns deal confusing, you will want to read a couple of interesting posts on the Conglomerate blog, that provide insight into a couple of points about the revised deal that have received significant press attention.

First, there has been a great deal of discussion in the press about the possibility that the improved buyout offer may have resulted in part from drafting errors in the initial deal documents. BYU law professor Gordon Smith deconstructs this issue in a detailed Conglomerate blog post here (here), with helpful citations and cross-references to other blogs. Smith’s analysis of the differences between the original and the revised deal documents raise some interesting questions about what J.P. Morgan seems to have sought by offering revised terms. Bottom line, in exchange for the improved merger price, J.P. Morgan has eliminated the provisions that would have kept the deal open for a full year, and also obtained a 39.5% ownership interest as a means to try to ensure that the deal is concluded.

Second, and with respect to that 39.5% ownership interest transfer, Smith has a separate post on Conglomerate (here), that explores the Delaware case law behind the 39.5% interest and the limitations on share transfers to lock in shareholder merger approvals. As Professor Smith’s post notes, there is no automatic cutoff under Delaware law whereby a company can sell up to 40% of itself without shareholder approval, and suggestions to that effect in the mainstream media are “what is known in the law biz as ‘wrong.’” Practitioners have evolved the 40% rule of thumb, but “none of this has been tested in court.”

More About the FCPA: Regular readers know that I have frequently commented (most recently here) on the growing importance of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement proceedings and follow on civil litigation. Two recent publications provide significant additional information on this topic.

First, a March 25, 2008 Law.com article entitled “Today, No Bribe is Too Small” (here), takes a look at the expanding reach of enforcement activities. As the title suggests, the article looks at some seemingly small corrupt transactions that have attracted regulatory attention. The article states that “it seems that no bribe is too small to earn the attention of the department.” The article also focuses on regulatory actions that have been taken by middlemen and third party contractors, and how those seemingly remote actors’ actions have come back to haunt the sponsoring company.

Second, in a much more detailed look at recent FCPA enforcement activity, Porter Wright attorney Tom Gorman has recently posted a running series on the issues involved in recent FCPA regulatory actions on his SEC Actions blog. The most recent post can be found here. Taken collectively, these posts present an excellent overview of the current state of FCPA regulatory actions.

Finally, readers who recall my recent post (here) about the civil litigation arising from potentially problematic activities involving Alcoa’s operations in Bahrain will be interested to note that the U.S. Department of Justice has initiated a criminal investigation of the activities, and in that connection has asked for the entry of stay in the civil proceedings,  as discussed in a March 21, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled “U.S. Opens Alcoa Bribery Probe” (here).

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The subprime litigation wave is growing in amplitude and volume, as four companies have found themselves the targets of a total of five new subprime-related securities class action lawsuits, joining the now quite lengthy list of companies that have been swept up in the wave. With the addition of these five new securities lawsuits, as well as the numeous other suits filed in just the last few days, it appears that the subprime litigation wave is building dangerous momentum

Wachovia:  The first of these new lawsuits was actually filed back on January 31, 2008, against Wachovia Corporation , certain of its officers and directors, a related Wachovia unit that issued certain securities involved in the lawsuit, and the offering underwriters that underwrote Wachovia’s May 2007 preferred securities offering. (As noted further below, Wachovia was also named in a separate securities lawsuit relating to auction rate securities).

The Wachovia lawsuit flew under the radar screen at the time that it was filed because the plaintiffs’ lawyers chose to file the lawsuit in New York Supreme Court (Nassau County), though the defendants have removed the action under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). A copy of the removal petition, to which the initial complaint is attached, can be found here.

The complaint assert claims based on allegedly false and misleading statements in the registration and prospectus issued in connection with Wachovia’s $750 million May 2007 offering of preferred securities. The complaint alleges that the registration statement failed to disclose that Wachovia’s "portfolio of collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") contained billions of dollars worth of impaired and risky securities, many of which were backed by subprime mortgage loans." The complaint also alleges that the defendants failed to "properly account for highly leveraged loans such as mortgage securities." Finally, the complaint alleges that the complaint failed to disclose that Wachovia was "heavily involved in option adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)…that would become toxic (for both Wachovia and the borrowers) once house prices stopped increasing at a rapid rate."

The complaint alleges claims only under the ’33 Act, and expressly asserts that the state court has concurrent jurisdiction under Section 22 of the ’33 Act in connection with plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff in the Wachovia law suit seems to be pursuing the same state court strategy that I discussed at length in my prior post (here) analyzing the class action securities lawsuits that investors have filed against the securitizers who created mortgage backed assets. Significantly, the Coughlin Stoia firm is involved in both those cases and the Wachovia case. Given the sophistication of the firm involved, one must assume that these state court filings are part of a conscious strategy on the firm’s part.

Though defendants have removed the Wachovia case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, it remains to be seen whether or not the plaintiffs will be able to have the case remanded to state court. As I noted here, the plaintiffs in the Luther v. Countrywide case, a ’33 Act class action lawsuit filed against mortgage backed asset securitizers, succeeded in having their case remanded back to state court. The court in Luther case concluded that concurrent jurisdiction provisions in the ’33 Act prohibit the state court’s case’s removal to federal court.

My theory on these state court lawsuits has been that the plaintiffs intend to argue that the provisions of the PSLRA to not apply to their state court ’33 Act lawsuits. The fact that the plaintiffs’ lawyers issued no press release at the time they filed the complaint tends to reinforce this impression. But regardless of their theory they seem to be making a comprehensive effort to bring these cases in state court. The involvement of state courts in these lawsuits will be very interesting to watch.

Lehman Brothers: On February 22, 2008, a Lehman Brothers shareholder filed a purported securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that Lehman Brothers made certain misrepresentations or omissions about its exposure to subprime mortgages during the class period from September 13, 2006 through July 30, 2007. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

There are a variety of very odd things about this lawsuit, and almost all of these odd features repeat the same odd attributes of the subprime-related securities class action lawsuit was previously filed against Morgan Stanley, as I discussed in my prior post here.

The first odd feature about this lawsuit is that it does not name the company, its directors or its senior managers as defendants in the lawsuit. The sole named defendant is the company’s Chief Financial Officer, yet no misrepresentations or omissions are attributed directly to him. The allegations against the CFO are attributed solely to his position within the company. There are no allegations that the CFO sold shares of stock. It is not particularly clear why the CFO should be named as defendant while other officials are not.

The allegations regarding the alleged misrepresentations are sparse, and are essentially limited to a few occasions when the company supposedly downplayed its exposure to subprime mortgages. The class period ends at an odd time, too; the class period end is not in January 2008, when the company said that it has lost $5.9 billion on its mortgage related positions, but on July 30, 2007, when an equity analyst downgraded the company.

The named plaintiff is also an odd representative for the purported class. Though the class period purports to run from September 13, 2006 to July 30, 2007, the named plaintiff did not even buy his shares until July 15, 2007, making him an unlikely representative for a class of that duration. Moreover, the complaint itself refers to events and statements at or about the same time that the plaintiff bought his stock which surely raised questions about subprime-related exposures in general and subprime exposures at Lehman brothers in particular.

The plaintiff also chose to file his complaint in the Northern District of Illinois, though Lehman’s headquarters are in Manhattan.

But regardless of the complaint’s numerous anomalies, the complaint does represent a subprime-related securities class action lawsuit, and so, as noted further below, I have added it to my running tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits.

Schwab: On March 18, 2008, plaintiffs filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the Schwab Corporation, certain of its directors and officers, and as well as the underwriter and investement adviser associated with two Schwab YieldPlus Funds. The lawsuit is filed on behalf of investors who purchased Schwab YieldPlus Investor Funds Investor Shares and Schwab YieldPlus Funds Select Shares during the period March 17, 2005 through March 18, 2008. A copy of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s press release can be found here.

The complaint alleges that the defendants issued untrue statements regarding the lack of diversification of the funds and the extent of the funds’ exposure to subprime-backed securities. The complaint alleges that while the funds advertised themselves as a safe alternative to money market funds, they were in fact critically exposed because more than 50 percent of the funds assets were invested in the mortgage industry. The plaintiffs allege that the funds have lost over 18 percent of their value since mid-2007 and 11 percent since January 2, 2008. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated Section 11 of the ’33 Act based in misrepresentations in the funds’ offering documents.

The Schwab funds are actually the second mutual funds to be sued in connection with the subprime crisis; as discussed here, the earlier lawsuit involved Morgan Keegan.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for copies of the Wachovia and Lehman Brothers complaints.

More Auction Rate Securities Litigation: As readers may recall, in an earlier post (here), I speculated that lawsuits related to  auction rate securities may represent the next wave in subprime securities litigation. Last week, I noted (here) the securities class action lawsuit that had been brought against Deutsche Bank on behalf of auction rate securities investors. Auction rate securities investors have now filed two additional securities class action lawsuits, one involving Wachovia, and the other involving TD Ameritrade.

With respect to TD Ameritrade, the plaintiffs filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of persons who purchased auction rate securities from TD Ameritrade and an affiliate between March 19 2003 and February 13, 2008 and who continued to hold the securities. A copy of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ March 19, 2008 press release can be found here, and a copy of the complaint can be found here

The complaint alleges that the defendants failed to disclose:

(1) the auction rate securities were not cash alternatives, like money market funds, but were instead, complex, long-term financial instruments with 30 year maturity dates, or longer; (2) the auction rate securities were only liquid at the time of sale because TD Ameritrade and other broker-dealers were artificially supporting and manipulating the auction rate market to maintain the appearance of liquidity and stability; (3) TD Ameritrade and other broker-dealers routinely intervened in auctions for their own benefit, to set rates and prevent all-hold auctions and failed auctions; and (4) TD Ameritrade continued to market auction rate securities as liquid investments after it had determined that it and other broker dealers were likely to withdraw their support for the periodic auctions and that a "freeze" of the market for auction rate securities would result.

With respect to Wachovia, the plaintiffs filed a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of all investors who purchased auction rate securities from Wachovia and an affiliate between March 19, 2003 and February 13, 2008 and who continue to hold the securities. A copy of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s March 19, 2008 press release can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here. The allegations against Wachovia are substantially similar to the allegations against TD Ameritrade.

An additional lawsuit has been brought on behalf of an investor in auction rate securities, although in this case it is an individual action rather than a class action. On March 18, 2008, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western Disrict of Texas against Wells Fargo and Wells Fargo Investments, alleging that the defendants violated the securities laws and breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the plaintiffs’ purchase of $2 million of auction rate market preferred shares. A copy of the complaint can be found here. (Hat tip to Courthouse News Service for a copy of the complaint.)

The plaintiffs contend that the Wells Fargo investment adviser referred to the securities as "bonds" that were "represented to be without risk." The plaintiffs claim that the defendants said that the securities could be redeemed on 7 days notice, but that when the plaintiffs sought to redeem the securities on March 11, 2008, they were told that no market exists for the securities. The complaint seeks recovery of $2 million plus punitive damages.

Some Observations and Tallies: Even for those that have been paying only intermittent attention, it is pretty clear that the pace of subprime-related litigation activity has picked up significantly over the last few days. Even without regard to these five new securities class action suits listed above, we had already seen a notable number of new subprime securities suits just in the last week, including for example, new lawsuits against SocGen, PMI Group, Deutsche Bank, and, most significantly, Bear Stearns. Adding these five new subprime-related securities class action lawsuits listed above to the list reinforces the impression that the litigation wave is gathering dangerous momentum, with the likelihood that even greater activity is yet to come.

With the addition of these new lawsuits to my running tally of subprime- related securities class action litigation, which can be accessed here, the current total of subprime securities lawsuits now stands at 56, of which 18 have been filed in 2008. Two of these 56 represent lawsuits by investors against mortgage backed asset securitizers, three are class action on behalf of investors in auction rate securities, and two relate to mutual funds, as noted above. The remaining 50 lawsuits were brought by shareholders of publicly traded companies.

More About Credit Default Swaps: In yet another prior post (here), I noted that problems arising from credit default swaps could be another source of litigation arising from the credit crisis. The March 20, 2008 Wall Street Journal is reporting (here) that Merrill Lynch has sued a unit of Security Capital Assurance, seeking to prevent SCA from avoiding its financial obligations to insure as much as $3.1 billion on seven credit default swaps.

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We knew it was coming but it sure got here fast. On March 17, 2008, plaintiffs’ counsel initiated a securities class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Bear Stearns and certain of its directors and officers. A copy of the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ press release can be found here, and the complaint can be found here.

According to the press release, the complaint alleges that during the class period between December 14, 2006 and March 14, 2008, defendants issued false and misleading statements, as a result of which “Bear Stearns stock traded at artificially inflated prices … reaching a high of $159.36 per share in April 2007.” The press release further states that:

In late June 2007, news about Bear Stearns’ risky hedge funds began to enter the market and its stock price began to fall. On March 10, 2008, information leaked into the market about Bear Stearns’ liquidity problems, causing the stock to drop to as low as $60.26 per share before closing at $62.30 per share. On March 13, 2008, news that Bear Stearns was forced to seek emergency financing from the Federal Reserve and J.P. Morgan Chase hit the market and Bear Stearns stock fell to $30 per share. Then, on Sunday, March 16, 2008, it was announced that J.P. Morgan Chase was purchasing Bear Stearns for $2 per share. By midday on Monday, March 17, 2008, Bear Stearns stock had collapsed another 85% to $4.30 per share on volume of 75 million shares.

The press release states that the defendants’ statements during the class period “due to defendants’ failure to inform the market of the problems in the Company’s hedge funds due to the deteriorating subprime mortgage market, which would cause Bear Stearns to have to rescue the funds, cause the Company and its officers possible criminal liability and hurt the Company’s reputation.”

The principals at JP Morgan clearly anticipated this development. According to a March 17, 2008 Law.com article (here), JP Morgan is “setting aside $6 billion to cover potential litigation” as well as other transaction and severance costs arising out of JP Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns JP Morgan’s own March 16 press release (here) announcing the transaction does not mention any reserve or set aside for transaction expenses, but the March 18, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here) also says that “J.P. Morgan plans to set aside about $6 billion in reserves to cover the potential exposure and other costs.”

(Perhaps it is an idle thought but one does wonder why the $6 billion was not applied directly to the acquisition price. …)

Yet another possibility that may yet arise is that individual Bear Stearns investors might choose to pursue their own litigation separately. According to the March 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here), there are individual investors whose losses from the Bear Stearns collapse approach $1 billion. According to the March 18, 2008 Wall Street Journal (here), “billionaire investor Joseph Lewis, one of Bear Stearns's biggest shareholders, with a 9.4% stake, rejected [J.P. Morgan’s] offer, saying it doesn't represent the true value of Bear Stearns. Mr. Lewis, though a spokesman, said the offer ‘is derisory, and I do not believe that shareholders will approve it.’” Certainly individual losses of that magnitude, if nothing else, raise the possibility of their proceeding on their own rather than as part of a larger shareholder class.

Update: According to news reports (here), an action has also been filed against Bear Stearns and its executives on behalf of Bear Stearns employees alleging that they "breached their fiduciary duties to plan participants by allowing their retirement savings to be invested in the company's stock despite knowing such an investment was imprudent."  The complaint alleges that the investment bank failed to disclose material adverse facts regarding its financial well-being, the potential consequences of its "substantial entrenchment in the subprime mortgage market," that the firm's stock price was artificially inflated and heavy investment of retirement savings in company stock would inevitably result in significant losses to the plan and its participants.

Securities Suit Against Deutsche Bank for Auction Rate Securities: On March 17, 2008, a different plaintiffs’ firm launched a securities lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Deutsche Bank and its wholly owned broker–dealer subsidiary, on behalf of a class of persons who purchased auction rate securities from Deutsche Bank and the broker dealer between March 17, 2003 and February 13, 2008, inclusive (the “Class Period”), and who continued to hold such securities as of February 13, 2008. A copy of the plaintiffs’ counsels’ press release can be found here and a copy of the complaint can be found here. 

According to the press release, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the securities laws “by deceiving investors about the investment characteristics of auction rate securities and the auction market in which these securities traded.” The press release states that the defendants failed to disclose that:

(1) the auction rate securities were not cash alternatives, like money market funds, but were instead, complex, long-term financial instruments with 30 year maturity dates, or longer; (2) the auction rate securities were only liquid at the time of sale because Deutsche Bank and other broker-dealers were artificially supporting and manipulating the auction rate market to maintain the appearance of liquidity and stability; (3) Deutsche Bank and other broker-dealers routinely intervened in auctions for their own benefit, to set rates and prevent all-hold auctions and failed auctions; and (4) Deutsche Bank continued to market auction rate securities as liquid investments after it had determined that it and other broker dealers were likely to withdraw their support for the periodic auctions and that a “freeze” of the market for auction rate securities would result.

The auction rate securities purchasers’ lawsuit against Deutsche Bank is not the usual class action securities lawsuits brought against a publicly trade company by its own shareholders. The Deutsche Bank auction rate securities lawsuit is, however, subprime-related and it is a class action that alleges violations of the federal securities laws. For those reasons, I have added it to my running tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits, which can be found here. On a going forward basis, I will try to keep the parallel tallies too, taking into account the different kinds of litigation within the larger running tally.

With the addition of the Bear Stearns and Deutsche Bank securities lawsuits, the current tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits now stands at 51, twelve of which have been filed so far in 2008. Of these 51, two are securities lawsuits filed by mortgage–backed securities investors against the asset securitizers, and one (as noted above) was filed by purchasers of auction rate securities. The remaining 48 are more traditional securities class action lawsuits by public company shareholders.

Bear Ironies and Morgan Echoes: Bear Stearns shareholders can be forgiven if they fail to appreciate it, but there is a certain irony that Bear Stearns was the bailout recipient last Friday. This weekend’s whirlwind meetings involving the Fed and the lions of Wall Street present an uncanny echo of the closed door meetings at the New York Fed on September 23 1998, when government officials and Wall Street bankers were struggling to avert the collapse of Long Term Capital Management that all feared might trigger global financial panic. As colorfully told in the prologue of Roger Lowenstein’s excellent book about LTCM, When Genius Failed (here), the government’s rescue efforts nearly aborted because one Wall Street bank refused to cooperate in the government’s rescue plan - none other than Bear Stearns, whose then CEO and current Chairman James Cayne refused to play along.

This past weekend’s events also harken back to an even earlier episode, one in which JP Morgan Chase’s founder and primary namesake played the central role. As described in Robert Bruner and Sean Carr’s readable recent book, The Panic of 1907 (here), a capital crisis that originated from a liquidity drain following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake culminated in October 1907 in runs on a series of New York banks. J.P. Morgan himself, in effect functioning as the central banker in the absence of any more formal institution, caused his firm to intervene to provide liquidity to the Trust Company of America, declaring, to his colleagues “This is the place to stop the trouble, then.”

A century later, his firm is once again playing a central role in an effort to avert a financial crisis, and while some may argue that an important difference is that in 1907 Morgan didn’t acquire any of the rescued banks, it is a fact that one of the steps Morgan took in 1907 was a U. S. Steel-led buyout of Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, a move claimed at the time was designed to avoid a collapse that could have undermined the stock market. The TCI & R rescue efforts, for which he and his firm were later criticized and subjected to a congressional investigation, ultimately proved to be good both for the Morgan firm as well as for the financial markets.

UPDATE: CFO.com has an excellent March 18, 2008 article entitled "J.P. Morgan Returns to Its Rescue Roots" (here) going into much greater detail about J.P. Morgan's storied past.

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There are a variety of different ways that the subprime-related litigation might be categorized. For example, the lawsuits might be grouped by type of defendant (as in my prior discussion of lawsuits against the mortgage-backed asset securitzers, here). The lawsuits might also be grouped by type of mortgage-backed asset involved (as in my discussion of lawsuits involving auction rate securities, here). Still another approach might be to look at lawsuits involving certain kinds of mortgages (as in my discussion of Option ARM mortgages, here).

An entirely different way to look at subprime-related litigation might be to follow the developments involving just a single mortgage related financial structure and to trace the litigation in which allegations relating to the structure have been raised. As shown below, just one financial structure has produced significant investor losses and left a spate of litigation in its wake.

The Mantoloking CDO: When the Mantoloking CDO 2006-1 was created in November 2006, it appeared as just one of many collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) listed in the December 4, 2006 Nomura Securities research report (here) describing recent structured finance pricings. As described in the report, the Mantoloking CDO was a $765 million CDO holding asset backed securities (ABS), on which the lead underwriter as Merrill Lynch.

Metro PCS: According to its subsequent court filing, on May 25, 2007, Metro PCS acquired $20 million in auction rate securities “consisting of Class A-2 Senior Priority Floating Notes from the Mantoloking CDO 2006-1, Ltd.” Metro PCS acquired the securities when Merrill Lynch, acting on as the company’s investment advisor, made the investment, as part of what eventually became approximately $134 million of CDO-related auction rate securities in which Merrill invested on the company’s behalf.

In the company’s October 18, 2007 Petition against Merrill Lynch filed in the Dallas County (TX) District Court (here), Metro PCS alleged that Merrill Lynch failed to advise of the company of the intended purchases prior to the acquisition of the Mantoloking securities. The company also alleges that the securities themselves were not authorized under the company’s investment guidelines. The company also alleged that Merrill Lynch had undisclosed conflicts of interest, in that it not only underwrote the initial CDO issuance, but continued to act as the sole dealer for the CDO. The company further alleges that Merrill Lynch itself had significant investments in the CDO and therefore had a vested interest in trying to maintain a market for the CDO’s securities, as a way to protect its investment.

In its February 27, 2008 financial release (here), Metro PCS disclosed that as a result of the latest round of write-downs, it was as of December 31, 2007 carrying the auction rate CDO securities investments for which it paid $134 million at a balance sheet valuation of only $36 million.

The Bear Stearns Hedge Funds: Investors in the Mantoloking CDO apparently also included the two now-bankrupt Bear Stearns hedge funds that are the center of so much controversy (and litigation). The October 22, 2007 Business Week cover article about the hedge fund’s collapse (here) reports that as the hedge funds’ condition and results deteriorated, the hedge funds’ managers “sought out increasingly esoteric bonds and other lightly traded securities that offered higher yields.” As a result, the hedge funds “were big buyers of so-called CDOs-squared – CDOs that invest in other CDOs.” The article reports specifically that “the funds at one time held $135 million of securities issued by the Mantoloking CDO, a CDO-squared.”

On December 19, 2007, when the hedge funds’ largest equity investor, Barclays Bank, sued Bear Stearns Asset Management and the two hedge funds’ individual managers (complaint here), Barclays alleged, among other things, that the hedge funds’ managers had caused the hedge funds “to become a dumping ground for especially risky assets, including numerous CDO-squared securities and other toxic assets.”

MIND C.T.I. Ltd.: The effects of the Mantoloking CDO spread far and wide, its reach including Israel-based communication services provider MIND C.T.I. Ltd.. In its February 27, 2008 filing on Form 6-K (here), MIND reported among other things that the company has as much as $20.3 million invested in asset-backed auction rate securities, on which the company had been unable to obtain third-party valuations, and for which the company may be taking asset-impairment charges in its forthcoming audited financial statements. The company noted that “the complexity of the valuation is derived from the fact that this security is collateralized by 126 structured finance transactions.”

The company’s 6-K also reports that on February 20, 2008, the company had filed a Statement of Claim with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and commenced an arbitration “against the international bank and certain employees thereof that invested …funds on behalf of the company.” According to the 6-K, the claim alleges, among other things, that:

the bank was supposed to invest the funds in highly liquid, highly safe, 28-day auction-rate securities, but -- without the Company's authorization -- invested the funds in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In particular, the claim alleges that the bank invested the funds in a security called "Mantoloking CDO" without telling the Company that this was a CDO investment until after the purchase had already occurred. The claim also describes how, after the fact, the bank advised that the security, which has a stated maturity date in the year 2046, had been rolled "due to failed auction."

According to the 6-K, the FINRA claim includes causes of action for fraud, violation of NASD rules (in particular NASD rules relating to suitability), violation of Section 10 of the ’34 Act, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. The 6-K reports that the claim seeks “damages and other relief from all the respondents, including return of all funds plus compensatory and punitive damages.” The 6-K does not identify the “international bank” named in the FINRA arbitration claim.

While the Mantoloking CDO seems to have generated considerable pain for its investors, the CDO was just one of many hundreds of CDOs launched into the marketplace in the last several years. Some of the investors in these other CDOs undoubtedly have experienced some of the same kind of pain the Mantoloking CDO investors have felt, and there likely will be more pain to come. If the sequence of events surrounding the Mantoloking CDO is any indication, the investors in other CDOs can also be expected to pursue litigation to redress their grievances. Just looking at how much litigation the Mantoloking CDO alone has spawned or contributed to, it certainly appears that a formidable amount of CDO-related litigation activity could be involved.

A prior post in which I discuss CDOs squared in much greater length, including the increased risk associated with CDOs squared, can be found here.

Very special thanks to Uri Ronnen of AccountingClues for the links above regarding the Mantoloking CDO.

More UBS Lawsuits: According to news reports (here), on March 5, 2008, Pursuit Partners, a Connecticut-based hedge fund, has initiated a Connecticut state court lawsuit against UBS alleging that the hedge fund made CDO investments last year based on “fraudulent concealment of material information.” The suit alleges that UBS had been in talks with Moody’s and as a result knew that changes in the rating agency’s rating methodology were imminent, yet UBS continued to market the CDOs as if the change would not occur.

The hedge fund contends that when the new rating methodology was announced on October 10, 2007, the $50 million in CDO securities in which the hedge fund has invested were “reduced to junk status,” which triggered a default clause in the underlying derivatives contract, and the hedge fund lost its entire investment. The hedge fund says that “UBS took both sides of a derivatives contract, allowing it to liquidate the CDOs without sustaining a loss of its own.”

The hedge fund’s allegations are similar to the allegations raised against UBS by HSH Nordbank (about which I previously wrote, here), in which HSH Nordbank claimed that UBS had structured a CDO-related transaction so that UBS could profit to the investor’s detriment. HSH Nordbank also claims that UBS’s Dillon Read unit had stuffed the CDO with troubled loans as a way to reduce its own losses.

In addition to the Pursuit Parnters and HSH Nordbank lawsuits, UBS has also been sued by a physician who claims that UBS sold him auction rate securities from a closed end mutual fund, Eaton Vance Limited Duration Funds. According to the March 9, 2008 New York Times article entitled "As Good as Cash Until It's Not" (here), UBS put all of the doctor's charitable foundation's $1.35 million cash in auction rate securities.  The doctor claims that the foundation now can no longer "help prevent AIDS in Africa or provide indigent people with laser vision correction ."

You certainly do start to get the impression that there are a lot of angry investors out there.

Subprime-Related Derivative Complaint: As I documented elsewhere (here), shareholders’ derivative lawsuits were a significant part of the options backdating-related litigation. By contrast, there have been relatively few shareholders’ derivative lawsuits filed in connection with the subprime meltdown. Perhaps the most notable subprime-related derivative lawsuit so far is the action filed last year against AIG, as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and officers (about which refer here).

On March 4, 2008, an investment fund manager filed a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit in Delaware Chancery Court against Bank of America, as nominal defendant, and certain of its directors and officers. The complaint (here) relates to the company’s January 22, 2008 announcement (here) that it would take a fourth-quarter 2007 write-down of $5.44 billion due to the devaluation of the company’s mortgage-backed securities, primarily CDOs.

The complaint alleges that the company underwrote and invested in CDOs but failed to inform investors of the associated risks, and failed to set aside adequate reserves for possible losses. The complaint also alleges that the company issued misleading disclosures about its exposure to subprime-related losses. The complaint further alleges that the company soft-pedaled its exposure to subprime mortgages.

The complaint alleges that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties, engaged in reckless and gross mismanagement, and wasted corporate assets.

It is not entirely clear why this lawsuit was brought as a derivative lawsuit rather than as a direct claim for damages. As a derivative claim, the lawsuit will be subject to certain defenses, including in particular the demand requirement.

Hat tip to the Courthouse News Service (here) for the copy of the complaint.

Now This: In addition to being the name of a CDO, Mantoloking is also the name of an oceanfront community in New Jersey, population 423 (2000 Census).  According to Wikipedia (here), Mantoloking is "the wealthiest community in the state of New Jersey," and its past residents included Katherine Hepburn and Richard Nixon. The current surfing conditions at Mantoloking can be viewed here.

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New York Subprime Lawsuit Between Two Foreign Banks: As I noted in prior posts (most recently here), mortgage-backed securities investors have already initiated several lawsuits against the investment banks and others that created the securities, some lawsuits filed as individual actions and some as class actions. A mortgage-backed securities investor’s individual lawsuit initiated this week in New York Supreme Court (Manhattan) presents some new twists on this evolving litigation category.

According to the company’s press release (here), on February 25, 2008, German state-owned bank HSH Nordbank AG sued UBS and UBS Securities LLC. The lawsuit relates to one of HSH’s constituent bank’s $500 million investment in 2002 in collateralized debt obligation (CDO) securities known as North Street 2002-4 that were created and managed by the Swiss bank. In its complaint, HSH described itself as a “regional German bank with little familiarity with international structured finance.” As described in a February 25, 2008 Wall Street Journal article (here), the HSH relation with UBS was “more complicated” because in addition to its investment in the CDO, HSH also provided UBS with insurance protection in the form of credit default swaps.  

As reflected in news coverage describing the complaint (here and here), HSH claims that UBS’s now-shuttered internal hedge fund division, Dillon Read Capital Management, selected inferior collateral and used the CDO as a dumping ground for troubled mortgage-backed securities as a way to profit from the credit default swap.

The complaint alleges that during 2007 Dillon Read made substitutions to the “reference pool” of securities linked to the CDO, bringing in securities lined to the ABX index of subprime mortgage instruments, thereby allegedly increasing the CDOs exposure to subprime mortgages “at a time when the outlook on subprime mortgages was already negative.”

HSHS claims that the structure, and in particular its position on the credit default swap, allowed UBS to realize profits of up to $275 million at HSH’s expense. As also reflected in the bank’s February 24 press release (here), HSH alleged that “UBS exploited the structure for its own ends, at HSH’s expense,” and that “UBS evidently regarded North Street 4 not as an investment platform but as an opportunity to defraud HSH.”

HSH alleges that UBS “knowingly and deliberately created a compromised structure.” HSH accuses UBS of breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.” HSH is demanding at least $275 million in restitution plus punitive damages.

There are several interesting things about this new lawsuit. The first is that it involved a New York state court lawsuit between two foreign-domiciled companies. This may be due in part to the role played by the now defunct UBS affiliate Dillon Read. But an even likelier explanation is the prospect of the remedies available under U.S. laws, which undoubtedly influenced HSH to pursue its claims in what would otherwise seem to be an inconvenient forum. It is, in any event, singular to find two foreign companies squaring off in a U.S courthouse.

The availability of alternative dispute resolution forums in which the case might also have gone forward may be seen from the fact that UBS itself has already filed a counterclaim against HSH, but (as reflected here), in London rather than in New York. According to news reports, the counterclaim itself has not been made available publicly.

Perhaps the most interesting thing about the HSH lawsuit is the core allegation. The prior lawsuits against the securitizers have essentially been disclosure-based lawsuits, in effect that the securitizers did not provide full or accurate information about the securities they initiated or about the assets underlying the securities. HSH’s complaint also contains these kinds of allegations, but the core of its complaint is not mere misrepresentation, but rather that UBS fraudulently manipulated the transaction structure to its own profit and to the investors’ detriment. These kinds of allegations clearly raise the stakes, and make this case most interesting to watch.

Finally, this is the first subprime-related case of which I am aware between counterparties on credit default swaps. Given the massive volume of credit default swap activity, there is an enormous potential for credit default swap counterparty litigation.

More Auction Rate Securities Write-Downs: In a prior post (here), I discussed the $275 million write-down that Bristol-Myers Squibb took related to its investment in auction rate securities. At the time, I wondered whether other companies would face similar write-downs, with particular interest in the possible impact on companies outside the financial sector.

At least two other nonfinancial companies have now taken their own subprime-backed asset write-downs, in examples that underscore that impact that the breakdown of the auction rate securities market is having on the value of those securities. These write-downs also highlight the fact that the impact of the subprime meltdown extends far beyond the financial sector.

On February 27, 2008, MetroPCS announced (here) in connection with its fourth quarter earnings release that it had recorded a fourth quarter charge of $83 million in unrealized loss on its $134 investment in auction rate securities. Including the company’s $15 million third-quarter write-down, the year-end value of its $134 investment was at $36 million. As I discussed in a prior post (here), MetroPCS has filed a lawsuit against Merrill Lynch in connection with the company’s investment in the auction rate securities. A copy of the complaint can be found here. It is worth noting that company’s reported fourth quarter loss of $47 million included the $83 million impairment charge.

And on February 21, 2008, SBA Communications reported (here) an impairment charge of $15.6 million on three auction rate securities the company held as short term investments. The company’s net loss for the quarter was $24.2 million including the asset impairment charge.

A February 27, 2007 CFO.com article discussing the MetroPCS write-down can be found here. A February 22, 2008 CFO.com article discussing the SBA Communications write-down can be found here.

Got Those Valuation Blues Again, Mama: A February 24, 2008 post on the Re:Balance blog (here) takes a look at the accounting and valuation issues arising out of the subprime crisis, and suggests that the mortgage asset-backed securities valuation problems that are currently emerging are not merely an attribute of the current disrupted market conditions but were inherent in the terms of the instruments at the time they were created.

Jim Peterson, the blog’s author, writes “the more candor and rigor are brought into this year’s audit process, the more stark will be the ultimate concession that the valuation models on which subprime was built were creatures of myth and unreality.” Peterson, who is the accounting columnist for the International Herald Tribune, adds that “the quality of accounting is an effect, not a cause – the level of its virtue and integrity is observable as a mirror held up to commercial society.”

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