Auction Rate Securities Lawsuit Claims Survives Dismissal, In Part

Even though substantial parts of the case have been knocked out, at least one part of the auction rate securities case filed against Raymond James Financial and related entities has survived a renewed dismissal motion, making it the first of the auction rate securities cases to survive the preliminary motions – even if it only did so in limited part.

 

The ruling came in a September 2, 2010 order (here) from Southern District of New York Judge Lewis Kaplan. A September 8, 2010 Bloomberg article by Thom Weidlich about the ruling can be found here.

 

As detailed here, the plaintiffs sued Raymond James and two of its operating subsidiaries alleging that the defendants engaged in a scheme to defraud auction rate securities investors by knowingly misrepresenting the securities as highly liquid investments. The plaintiffs purport to represent investors who purchased the securities between April 8, 2003 and February 13, 2008.

 

As discussed at length in a prior post, in September 2009, Judge Kaplan granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ initial complaint, holding that that the plaintiffs had failed specifically to attribute the allegedly actionable statements to any defendant and to plead with particularity any defendants’ scienter. The dismissal was without prejudice, and the plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint. The defendants renewed their dismissal motions.

 

In his September 2 order, Judge Kaplan granted the defendants’ renewed motions as to all of the plaintiffs’ renewed claims, with one exception. That is, he found that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged both scienter and misrepresentation with respect to part of the Section 10(b) claims against one of Raymond James’ operating units, Raymond James & Associates (RJA). The claims against Raymond James itself and the other operating unit defendant, as well as the other claims against RJA, were otherwise all dismissed.

 

In attempting to allege that RJA had acted with scienter, the plaintiffs had argued that the unit was motivated, following turmoil in the auction rate securities market in 2007, to try to unload its own inventory of the securities, and that in fact it had provided its broker with financial incentives to sell those securities. Judge Kaplan found that these allegations were insufficient to establish scienter prior to November 2007, but "the period November 2007 through February 2008 stands differently."

 

Judge Kaplan said, with respect to that later period, that "given the deterioration of the ARS market that began in August 2007 and RJA’s wish to reduce its own position from November 2007 forward, it is quite reasonable to infer that RJA then had a motive to conceal the ARS liquidity risk from customers to whom it hoped to sell ARS from its own portfolio." Judge Kaplan held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged scienter as to RJA for the period November 2007 through the end of the class period in February 2008.

 

Judge Kaplan also found that actionable misrepresentations had been made to one of the plaintiffs by an RJA broker. The amended complaint alleged that the broker had told the plaintiff that ARS were safe, liquid investments. However, the amended complaint further alleges that the broker did not tell the plaintiff that the appearance of a liquid market for the securities was only maintained by "extensive and sustained" interventions in the market place by various broker dealers.

 

Judge Kaplan said that "a trier of fact would be entitled to find that it would have been important to a reasonable investor, in deciding whether to buy or sell ARS, that the ARS – supposedly liquid investments – were liquid only because auction brokers routinely intervened in the auctions to ensure their success. Accordingly, RJA was under a duty to disclose this information."

 

Judge Kaplan rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations that the specific alleged misrepresentations made by individual brokers to the named plaintiffs were part of a larger scheme to defraud. As Judge Kaplan noted, other than with respect to the two brokers who interacted with the named plaintiffs, the amended complaint "does not allege any specific statement made to any investor."

 

In the absence of scheme allegations, the claims on behalf of an investor class may prove challenging, as the only supposed misrepresentations that survived the motion to dismiss were made only to one of the named plaintiffs and not to the class the plaintiffs are purporting to represent. Accordingly, the plaintiffs may yet face significant challenges even on the claims that survived, particularly at the class certification stage.

 

Nevertheless, even if narrow, Judge Kaplan’s ruling is noteworthy, as it represents the first occasion in an auction rate securities case in which a court has held that a plaintiff has adequately alleged misrepresentation and scienter.

 

The case against Raymond James may be somewhat distinct from the cases that had been pending against other large investment banks. In many of those cases, the defendant firms had separately entered regulatory settlements for the benefit of many of their auction rate securities investors. These regulatory settlements had served as the basis for dismissal of the auction rate securities cases pending against these banks, including for example the cases pending against UBS (refer here) and Northern Trust (refer here).

 

Raymond James, by contrast to these other firms, had not entered a regulatory settlement involving its investors. Indeed, the firm has been the target of certain high profile criticism (refer here) as a "holdout" for its resistance to entry into a regulatory settlement. Without a regulatory settlement, Raymond James was not able to move for dismissal on the same "absence of recoverable damages" theory as did the defendants in the Northern Trust and UBS cases.

 

I have in any event added the Raymond James decision to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

 

Now, Lawsuits Concerning the Auction Rate Securities Settlements?

When the various broker dealers and investment banks recently announced their agreements with government regulators to buy back auction rate securities, the announcements raised questions about the continuing need for the pending auction rate securities litigation. But, at least based on a recently filed lawsuit, it now appears that the settlements may have opened the door for a whole new round of securities litigation related to the settlements themselves.

 

On October 3, 2008, plaintiffs’ lawyers initiated a securities class action lawsuit in New York (New York County) Supreme Court on behalf of investors who purchased bonds and preferred securities in various offerings conducted pursuant to Merrill Lynch’s March 31, 2006 shelf registration. A copy of the complaint can be found here. The complaint, which asserts claims under Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the ’33 Act, names as defendants Merrill Lynch and related entities; certain current and former Merrill Lynch directors and officers; the underwriters that conducted the various offerings; and Merrill Lynch’s auditor.

 

The complaint alleges that the offering documents "misstated Merrill’s financial condition and failed to disclose that the Company bore massive exposure to losses from investments tied to subprime and other mortgages, and was responsible for significant liability arising from its participation in the market for auction rate securities (ARS). Further Merrill improperly valued mortgage-backed assets on its books, and failed to account for its contingent obligations in the ARS market."

 

The complaint alleges that as a result of later disclosures about the company’s "true financial condition," the value of the securities sold in the referenced offerings declined materially. The complaint specifically refers to, regarding the company’s true financial condition, Merrill Lynch’s August 7, 2008 announcement (here) that "it would repurchase $12 billion in ARS from investors due to the failure of the ARS market."

 

Merrill Lynch previously was the target of what I will call a "conventional" auction rate securities lawsuit. Background regarding this prior lawsuit can be found here and regarding the prior auction rate securities lawsuits generally can be found here.

 

This new Merrill Lynch lawsuit complaint differs from the prior conventional auction rate securities lawsuit in a variety of ways. The most important distinction is who is represented in the plaintiff class. The prior auction rate securities lawsuits were brought on behalf of auction rate securities investors – that is, the people who bought the actual auction rate securities. The plaintiffs in the Merrill Lynch lawsuit are not persons who bought auction rate securities, but who bought Merrill Lynch’s own securities in the referenced offerings.

 

The misrepresentations alleged are different as well. In the conventional auction rate securities lawsuits, the allegation is that the risks of the auction rate securities were insufficiently disclosed. In this new lawsuit, the allegation is not about the risks of auction rate securities themselves, but rather that Merrill Lynch did not disclose its own susceptibility to contingent liability in connection with its issuance or sale of the auction rate securities.

 

One other peculiarity of the prior auction rate securities lawsuits is that those suits generally did not name any individual defendants. The new Merrill Lynch complaint names a couple of dozen individual defendants, as well as several dozen offering underwriters.

 

Given the number and identities of the various defendants, this lawsuit will keep a lot of lawyers employed for a long time. Among the preliminary issues on which the lawyers will be engaged is the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs elected to file their lawsuit in state court pursuant to the concurrent jurisdiction provisions in Section 22 of the ’33 Act. The defendants undoubtedly will seek to remove the lawsuit to federal court, and the plaintiffs in turn will seek to have the case remanded to state court.

 

As I noted in a prior post (here), the Ninth Circuit recently upheld the decision of the district court in the Luther v. Countrywide case to remand a ’33 Act case back to state court, where it originally had been filed before being removed to federal court. However, as the 10b-5 Daily blog recently noted (here), a judge in the Southern District of New York refused to remand New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Harborview Mortgage Loan Trust, which had been removed to federal court. Among other things the court in the Harborview case held that the provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act trumped the jurisdictional provisions of the ’33 Act.

 

In view of the fact that the new Merrill Lynch case likely will be remanded to the Southern District of New York (the same court in which the Harborview case is pending), it will be interesting to see whether the plaintiffs are able to have the case remanded back to the New York state court where they initially filed the new Merrill Lynch complaint.

 

As I have previously noted, along with the question whether or not a ’33 Act case properly can be removed to federal court is the more practical question of why the plaintiffs want to proceed in state court in the first place. Some day someone will explain to me why the plaintiffs’ bar suddenly has developed this fascination with pursuing ’33 Act claims in state court. Is it, as I have supposed, an effort to circumvent the procedural requirements of the PSLRA?

 

In any event, I have added the new Merrill Lynch complaint to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here. With the addition of the new lawsuit, the current tally now stands at 125, of which 85 have been filed in 2008. Of these, 21, including the new Merrill Lynch lawsuit, are auction rate securities lawsuits.

 

Motion to Dismiss Granted in Subprime Securities Lawsuit: On September 29, 2008, Judge John Steele of the Middle District of Florida granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, without prejudice, in one of the more unusual subprime related securities lawsuits. A copy of the opinion can be found here.

 

As detailed here, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants (First Home Builders of Florida and two residential real estate brokerage firms, as well as successor entities), in violation of the federal securities laws, had fraudulently induced plaintiffs to purchase real estate investment properties by promising that defendants would procure lease-to-own tenants for the investors’ properties; that the tenants rental payments would cover all of the investors’ out-of-pocket costs; and that investors would receive a guaranteed 14% return on the investment in the first year.

 

Judge Steele granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, ruling that as a result of the plaintiffs’ failure "to allege who made what misrepresentations," the plaintiffs’ fraud allegations failed to meet the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Judge Steele declined to rule on the plaintiffs’ group pleading theory. He allowed plaintiffs 30 days to file an amended complaint.

 

I have added the First Home Builders of Florida dismissal to my table of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit case dispositions, which can be accessed here.

 

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) both for the Merrill Lynch complaint and for the opinion in the First Home Builders of Florida case.

 

Note from Ohio: I want to know how the Saturday Night Live scriptwriters managed to get the whole  "Joe the Plumber" schtick inserted into tonight's actual Presidential debate. But the one thing I do know is that after tonight's debate, my fellow Ohioan, Joe the Plumber, is moving to Canada, where he will be left in peace because their national election is already finished.