Guest Post: The Lloyd's Claims Transformation Programme

For policyholders whose interests are insured in London, it can be critically important to understand the Lloyd’s claims processes. In the following guest post, my good friend Perry Granof  (pictured) takes a look at recent changes to the Lloyd’s claims processes effective January 1, 2012 that will affect a wide variety of professional liability claims.  Perry is Managing Director of Granof International Group LLC, an insurance consulting and claims service firm specializing in global executive, professional and financial institutions liability. He is also also Of Counsel at the Williams Kastner law firm in Seattle, Washington.

 

 

Many thanks to Perry for his willingness to publish his article here. I welcome guest posts from responsible commentators on topics relevant to this blog. Any readers who are interested in publishing a guest post on this site are encouraged to contact me directly.

 

 

Here is Perry's guest post.  

 

 

 

 

I travelled to London in late November 2011 where I met with Lloyd’s claims representatives and first learned about the Lloyd’s Claims Transformation Programme (CTP). According to Lloyd’s, CTP is intended to provide improved customer service and greater flexibility for managing agents.

 

 

CTP was introduced to the Lloyd’s market on January 1, 2010, as a pilot program for marine hull, property, and casualty treaty classes of business. The pilot was deemed successful, achieving a 40% average improvement in claims transaction time.  According to Market Bulletin Y45221, dated September 30, 2011, the program was expanded to new claims in Financial Institutions (FI), Professional Indemnity (PI), which includes D&O, and medical malpractice, to be effective as of January 1, 2012.

 

 

CTP is intended to modernize, add quality and streamline the Lloyd’s claims handling process. However, it may give way to new disputes and potential opportunities for conflict resolution. Among the various procedural guidelines introduced by CTP is a streamlining of the triage categories from three to two. They are now “Standard” and “Complex” claim categories. The threshold is a specified dollar amount of exposure plus a sundry of other factors such as a potential or actual denial of coverage or allegations of fraud.

 

 

All complex claims, unlike Standard claims under the new Lloyd’s protocol, additionally have a second tier lead Managing Agent called a “Second”, which functions in conjunction with the “Lead” Managing Agent. Previously the Second underwriter only played a claims agreement role in certain circumstances, and an oursourced service provider represented the interests of the followers on every claim. The Second helps to ensure that an appropriate strategy is in place to help facilitate a proper resolution of the claim and that the other Managing Agents on the slip that make up the following market are fully represented and kept abreast of developments.

 

 

The Second  reviews the documentation and other considerations, which the Lead relied on in its recommendations to the market, and confers with the Lead in connection with: the “Handling of the Claim”; the “Ongoing management of the Claim”; the “Contingent Financial Planning (Reserves, Costs, etc.)”; Experts” and the “Settlement Process." The protocol also makes it clear that the “Followers”, are entitled to “contact the Lead (or Second) to raise queries or share their views on the proposed strategy to resolve the claim.”

 

 

A review of the relevant Market Bulletins, in particular Ref: 4522 and 4531, certainly justifies Lloyd’s optimism in touting the advantages of CTP. CTP will lead to an open and more effective claims handling regime among syndicates engaged in the adjustment of Complex claims. However, it could also lead to an increase in conflicts arising between the Lead, the Second and the Follower Lloyd’s syndicates, by giving non-Lead syndicates more voice and responsibilities.

 

 

Under the CTP, non-Lead syndicates clearly have standing to raise queries and share their views and can offer platforms for followers in which to dissent to positions offered by Lead carriers. Some emerging conflicts that I can foresee, especially in the PI/FI and D&O classes of business include drop down issues. When an exposure potentially exceeds the available insurance program, a lead insurer may propose a drop down arrangement to save policy limits for itself and possibly throughout the entire tower of coverage. A Second or Follower may respond arguing that the Lead must fully exhaust its coverage before the rest of the market begins contributing to the resolution of the claim. This issue has recently been addressed in the case of Citigroup, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 10-20445, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16316 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2011). In Citigroup, the Court held that the excess policies unambiguously required that the primary carrier pay its full policy limit as a condition precedent to the excess carriers filling the gap by dropping down and providing coverage. Still, Citigroup is only binding in the 5th Circuit and the case was determined by the specific policy wordings at issue.

 

 

Another source of conflict could involve situations where a Lead, a Second or Followers disagree over the placement of claims in an insurance tower covering one particular policy year, over another. This may become contentious where participating insurers have different reinsurance treaties covering different policy years, impacting their net exposures. Also, if the exposure is significant, it can become a dispute, which may not be easily soluble.

 

 

A third source of conflict could involve situations where Second and Followers may perceive a given policy limits claim, directed by the Lead resulting in disproportionate and inequitable payments of insurance proceeds, constituting a waste, and possibly giving rise to extra - contractual damages.

 

 

All of these situations, and others that I am unable to currently foresee, may require an efficient and effective dispute resolution mechanism to insure that disagreements among the syndicate companies to a tower are resolve quickly cheaply and confidentially. In reviewing Section 5.0 "Resolution of Disagreements" under Market Bulletin Ref: Y4531, which describes the 2010 “Claims Scheme Process Guidelines," there does not appear to be any mention of a disputes resolution process, other than a meet and confer provision. Also Lloyd’s underwriters are required to use their best endeavours to reach a consensus under Market Bulletin Ref: Y4522 which also makes reference to a mediation and arbitration process as "prescribed by Lloyd's from time to time". These provisions are designed to make it easier for Lloyd’s co-insurers as opposed to non-Lloyd’s co-insurers to resolve issues amongst themselves without recourse to formal dispute resolution proceedings. Although it represents an effort to address future disputes among Lloyd’s co-insurers, this may not entirely avoid the risk of formal proceedings, especially considering the types of disputes that could arise from the issues I set forth above.

 

 

The CTP may require a new and expedited regime to resolve FI, PI & D&O coverage disputes among Lloyd’s carriers, quickly, quietly and efficiently, minimizing any disruptions of the claims handling process. This may ultimately give rise to mediation and arbitration opportunities in the United States and abroad to resolve disputes among Lloyd’s syndicates in connection with US and non-US venued claims.

 

 

Cornerstone Releases M&A Related LItigatoin Study: Iin a recent post (here), I previewed a then-forthcoming study from Cornerstone Research with regard to M&A related litigation. Cornerstone Research has now released its study, entitled "Recent Developments in Sharholder Litigation Involving Mergers and Acquisitions" (here). The final report contains additional information beyond the specific items I reviewed in my prior blog post. Special thanks to Cornerstone Research for sending me a link to the final report.

 

 

 

The North Korean Kindergarten Quintet: For today’s music interlude we are featuring a video that is simultaneously impressive and deeply disturbing. Watch these children perform and see if, in addition to being slowly but completely creeped out, you don’t find yourself gaining a little insight into the reason there were real tears when Kim Jong-Il died in December. The more basic question is why they aren’t crying all the time.

 

Public Company Bankruptcies Declined in 2011

The number of publicly traded companies that filed for bankruptcy protection under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 declined in 2011, compared to the year prior, although the 2011 bankrupt companies collectively  listed greater amounts of pre-petition assets than 2010 bankrupt public companies did, according to data recently released by BankruptcyData.com (here).

 

According to the report, 86 publicly traded companies filed for bankruptcy protection in 2011, compared to 106 in 2010, and compared to 211 in 2009. The number of 2011 filings represents a 17% decline from the prior year, and nearly a 60% decline from 2009. Though the number of public companies filing for bankruptcy declined in 2011, the 2011 public company bankruptcies represented aggregate pre-petition assets of $104 billion, compared to $89.1 billion in assets in 2010. The 2009 public company bankruptcies represented $281 billion in assets.

 

The company average pre-petition assets rose to $1.2 billion in 2011 from $840 million in 2010. The increase in aggregate and average assets that the 2011 bankruptcies represent is largely a factor of two very large public company bankruptcies during the year: the $40.5 billion asset MF Global bankruptcy and the $25 billion AMR Corporation bankruptcy. Those two bankruptcies alone represented more than close to two thirds of all of the aggregate 2011 asset value. The MF Global bankruptcy represents the eighth largest U.S. bankruptcy of all times. None of the bankruptcies in 2010 are among the top ten. The two large 2011 public company bankruptcies had the effect of driving up the average bankruptcy size during the year.

 

The report notes that the increase in aggregate and average pre-petition asset size during 2011 is “all the more striking considering the low number of financial company bankruptcy filings” during the year. Bankruptcies in the Banking & Finance industry “typically reflect a higher pre-petition asset figure than other industries.” But there were only four public company bankruptcies in the sector during 2011, compared with 2010, when 21 of the 106 public traded bankruptcies involved companies in the Banking & Finance sector.

 

The sector with the largest number of 2011 bankruptcies was Health Care & Medical, which had a total of 11 bankruptcies; followed by Technology and Energy which each had nine filings each.

 

Though the number of public company bankruptcies has declined in each of the last two years, the public company bankruptcies remained at elevated levels. The 86 public company bankruptcies in 2011, though below the annual totals in 2010 and 2009, are above the totals in the years preceding the credit crisis and going all the way back to 2005, when there were also 86 public company bankruptcies.

 

In terms of what may lie ahead, the report includes the comments of one observer, George Putnam III, the founder of New Generation Research, BankruptcyData.com’s parent company, as saying that, “I expect to see an increase in bankruptcies in 2012 as some of the massive amount of debt that was issued before 2008 begins to come due.” These comments about the likely bankruptcy levels are consistent with other public commentaries (refer here) that have also suggested that 2012 could be a busy year for business bankruptcies.

 

A January 10, 2012 Los Angeles Times article about the public company bankruptcy data can be found here.

 

The Top Ten D&O Stories of 2011

The year just ended was eventful in many ways. Earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, blizzards and droughts were scattered across the globe, and political unrest shook many countries. In a year filled with such significant developments, events in the world of D&O liability pale by comparison. But even if there were no earth-shaking events, 2011 was nevertheless an eventful year in the directors and officers’ liability arena. Here is my selection of the top ten stories from the world of D&O.

 

1. M&A Litigation Becomes the Lawsuit of Choice for Plaintiffs’ Securities Attorneys: The traditional focus for any discussion of D&O litigation exposure has been federal securities class action litigation. But in recent years, there has been a shift in the mix of corporate and securities litigation filings. Taking into account both federal and state lawsuit filings, M&A-related lawsuits now outnumber federal securities lawsuit filings and M&A-related litigation is now the lawsuit of choice for many plaintiffs’ securities attorneys.

 

As a result of legislative changes and U.S. Supreme Court case law developments, “dispossessed plaintiffs’ lawyers” (as one academic recently put it) have been forced to seek an alterative business model. And M&A litigation appears to be an attractive business model for many plaintiffs’ lawyers. Corporate defendants, eager to complete the underlying business transaction, often are keen to settle these cases quickly. Settlements often include a not insignificant provision for plaintiffs’ fees.

 

The attractions of this business model is drawing competition, as increasingly each merger transaction is attracting  multiple separate lawsuits, often filed in differing jurisdictions. The jockeying between the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the competing cases in multiple jurisdictions has led to procedural complications and rapidly increasing costs of defense. Delaware, the traditional forum for this type of litigation, arguably now faced with “market share” competition, is according to some under pressure to show that it is not inhospitable to these kinds of lawsuits, and even to support plaintiffs’ fee awards (about which see more below).

 

Not only are both defense expenses and plaintiffs’ fee awards in merger objection suits mounting, but it is increasingly common for M&A-related cases to result in cash settlements on an order of magnitude often seen only in traditional securities class action lawsuits. Thus, the Kinder Morgan case, settled in August 2010 for $200 million (refer here); the Del Monte case settled in September 2011 for $89 million (refer here); the May 2010 ACS settlement was $69 million (refer here); and the 2011 Intermix Media settlement was $45 million (refer here).

 

The new M&A litigation model represents both a high frequency and a high severity risk. The severity risk is particularly acute given the exacerbating effects of escalating defense expenses and rising plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. The bottom line is that it is no longer sufficient to focus just on federal securities class action litigation. M&A related litigation is an increasingly important part of the overall mix of corporate and securities litigation. For anyone whose tasks include understanding the risks and exposures associated with corporate and securities litigation, this is an important development with significant implications. 

 

2. Chinese Take-Out: U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies Hit With Class Action Securities Litigation: Every year there seems to be one group or sector of companies that draws the unwanted attention of plaintiffs’ securities attorneys. During 2011, the hot sector was U.S.-listed Chinese companies. There were 39 different U.S.-listed Chinese companies hit with securities class action lawsuits during 2011, representing nearly one-fifth of all securities class action lawsuit filings during the year. Since January 1, 2010, there have been securities class action lawsuits filed against 49 different Chinese companies.

 

This surge of litigation involving Chinese companies has arisen out of accounting scandals, many of which were first revealed by online analysis, many of whom have short positions in the companies they are attacking. The Chinese companies have attempted to deflect the assertions by charging that the attacks are merely rumors started by interested parties with a financial incentive to drive down the companies’ shares prices. Fair or not, the online reports seem to be leading directly to shareholder litigation, as in many cases the shareholder plaintiffs’ are simply quoting the online analysts’ reports in their complaints.

 

Obviously not all of these cases are meritorious and indeed some of them have been dismissed (refer for example here). On the other hand, other cases have survived the initial dismissal motions (refer for example here). Even in those cases in which the plaintiffs’ claims survive the initial pleading threshold, their claims stiff face substantial challenges, not the least of which are problems involved with effecting service of process and in conducting discovery in China, as well as deriving from the geographic distances and language issues involved. (Refer here).

 

Eventually the plaintiffs’ lawyers will simply run out of Chinese companies to sue, but for now the phenomenon shows no sign of letting up. During the second half of 2011, there were a total of 13 Chinese companies sued in securities class action lawsuits in the U.S., including two in December alone.

 

The recent litigation against the U.S.-listed Chinese companies is a reminder of circumstance-specific events that can drive securities class action lawsuit filings. Countless things determine litigation activity levels, many of which cannot be captured or predicted in historical filing data. Simply put, the numbers vary over time, because, for example, contagion events and industry epidemics happen.

 

3. Massive Settlements Emerge as the Subprime and Credit-Crisis Litigation Wave Slowly Plays Out: The subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave is about to enter its sixth year. Though there were additional credit crisis-related lawsuit filings during 2011, the arrival of new cases seems to have largely come to an end. However, there is still a massive backlog of cases filed over the last five years that is yet to be resolved. During 2011, a number of these cases were settled, and in some cases the settlements were massive.

 

The 2011 settlements include the largest so far in subprime and credit crisis-related cases, the $627 million Wachovia bondholders settlement, about which refer here. Other settlements include the following: Merrill Lynch Mortgage Backed Securities, $315 million (refer here); Lehman Brothers offering underwriters settlement, $417 million (refer here); Washington Mutual, $208.5 million (refer here); Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities, $125 million (refer here); National City, $168 Million (refer here); Colonial Bank, $10.5 million (refer here); and Lehman Brothers executives, $90 million (refer here) and E*Trade, $79 million (refer here).

 

If you include the Lehman Brothers’ offering underwriters’ settlement, the various subprime and credit crisis lawsuit settlements total about $4.432 billion. The average settlement so far is about $110 million, although that figure is clearly driven upward by the largest settlements. If the Countrywide, Wachovia bondholders and Lehman offering underwriters’ settlements are removed from the equation, the average settlement drops to about $74.7 million.

 

As impressive as these settlement numbers are, there are still many more cases pending. Of course, a certain number of the pending cases will ultimately be dismissed. But many will not, and eventually those remaining cases will be settled. Although it is impossible to conjecture how large the total tab for all these cases ultimately will be, the implication from the cases that have settled is that the total amount will be massive. 

 

The possibilities here may have significant implications for D&O insurers. Of course, not all of these amounts will be covered by D&O insurance. But a significant chunk will be. Indeed, a number of the recent settlements will be funded entirely or almost entirely by D&O insurance, including the D&O portion of the WaMu settlement, the Colonial Bank settlement, the E*Trade settlement and the Lehman Brothers executives’ settlement. Interestingly, the Lehman executives’ settlement will come close to exhausting what is left of Lehman’s $250 million insurance tower.

 

In other words, the D&O insurers have had some very large bills to pay. Signs are that there will be further amounts due in the months ahead.

 

4. Costs Incurred in Connection with Informal SEC Investigation Held Not Covered: One of the perennial D&O insurance coverage questions is whether or not a D&O insurance policy provide coverage for defense expenses and other costs incurred in connection with an informal SEC investigation. In October 2011, in a case that was closely watched in the D&O insurance industry, the Eleventh Circuit  issued a per curiam opinion affirming a lower court holding that costs Office Depot had incurred in connection with an informal SEC investigation and investigating an internal whistleblower complaint were not covered under its D&O insurance policies.

 

The sheer dollar value of the costs for which Office Depot had sought coverage underscores the extent of the problems involved. Office Depot had incurred tens of millions of dollars in expense before the SEC investigation became formal. Under the circumstances presented and based on the policy language at issue, the district court held and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that Office Depot did not have insurance coverage for these costs. The holding was a reflection of the specific policy language at issue, but D&O insurers undoubtedly will try to rely on the holding in other circumstances in which coverage is sought for costs incurred in connection with informal SEC investigations.

 

Meanwhile, the insurance marketplace has evolved in recognition of policyholders’ interest in having insurance coverage for the costs of informal SEC investigations. Recently, some carriers have been willing to provide coverage for costs individuals incur in connection with informal SEC investigations. In addition, at least one carrier now offers a separate insurance product that provides coverage for costs that the entity itself incurs in connection with an informal SEC investigation. Although this entity protection for informal SEC investigative costs is subject to a large self-insured retention and to coinsurance, the fact remains that if such a policy had been available to Office Depot and if Office Depot had had such a policy in place, at least a significant part of Office Depot’s costs of responding to the informal SEC investigation might have been covered.

 

Policyholder advocates undoubtedly will take the position that the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in the Office Depot case does not represent the final word on the question of D&O insurance coverage for costs incurred in connection with informal SEC investigation. In making these arguments, the policyholder advocates undoubtedly will seek to rely on the Second Circuit's July 2011 opinion in the MBIA case, in which the court held that costs incurred in voluntarily responding to a governmental investigation are covered. (The MBIA case is itself also a reflection of the policy language involved and circumstances presented, including in particular the fact that most of the costs at issue were incurred after the SEC had issued a formal investigative order, by contrast to the Office Depot case, where most of the costs were incurred before the investigation was formalized.)

 

These questions undoubtedly will continue to be disputed and even litigated. But it will be interesting to see how the marketplace continues to evolve as the industry continues to try to craft solutions to this recurring problem.

 

5. FDIC Litigation Against Failed Bank Directors and Officers Slowly Emerges: Since January 1, 2008, there have been 414 bank failures, including 92 in 2011 alone. Though the number of bank closures this past year represents a decline from the prior year’s total of 157, the likelihood is that there are further bank failures ahead in 2012, albeit at a reduced pace from recent years. (The January 3, 2012 Wall Street Journal comments that “failures will be a part of the landscape for many months, maybe years, as weak banks take a long time to recover or fail.”) But even if the number of new bank failures may finally be starting to decline, the FDIC’s pursuit of litigation against the directors and officers of failed banks may just be getting started.

 

During 2011, the FDIC stepped up its failed bank litigation activity. The FDIC filed 15 lawsuits against directors and officers of failed banks in 2011, bringing the total number of FDIC failed bank lawsuits to 17. Signs are that the number of FDIC lawsuits will continue to grow in the months ahead. According to the FDIC’s website, as of December 8, 2011, the FDIC has authorized suits in connection with 41 failed institutions against 373 individuals for D&O liability for damage claims of at least $7.6 billion. These figures representing the authorized lawsuits contrast starkly with number of lawsuits that the agency has actually filed: So far, the agency has filed only 17 lawsuits against 135 former directors and officers of 16 failed financial institutions. Given the discrepancy between the number of suits authorized and the number of suits filed, there clearly are many more suits in the pipeline, with even more lawsuits likely to be authorized in the months ahead.

 

As the FDIC’s failed bank lawsuits have begun to emerge, settlements of these cases are also slowly developing. The most noteworthy of the settlements so far is the well-publicized resolution of the FDIC’s lawsuit against three former WaMu officers. Although widely reported as having a value of $64.7 million, the cash value of the settlement was actually about $40 million, as discussed here. All but a very small portion of the cash component was paid for out of WaMu’s directors and officers’ insurance coverage. Although it is interesting that the individual defendants were called upon to contribute out of their own assets toward the settlement, the fact is that D&O insurance represented almost all of the cash component of the settlement.

 

The point here is that as the FDIC failed bank lawsuits accumulate in the coming months and as the filed cases move toward resolution, D&O insurers could be called upon to contribute amounts toward defense and resolution of these cases that in the aggregate could be massive.

 

6. Eurozone Crisis Includes Corporate Liability Exposures: The financial crisis gripping the European economic community has many dimensions. As governments wrestle with concerns about sovereign debt of Eurozone countries, as well as unemployment and unrest, companies exposed to European sovereign debt face perils of their own. As the fallout from the collapse of MF Global demonstrates, the hazards these companies face include, among many other concerns, liability exposures stemming from the companies’ investments in European sovereign debt.

 

Among the many disturbing features of MF Global’s demise is the speed of its collapse. And inevitably its collapse was immediately followed by an onslaught of securities class action lawsuit filings against the firm’s directors and officers. MF Global collapsed because of its exposure to European sovereign debt. The company is of course far from the only enterprise exposed to European debt. A host of other financial institutions and banks are also exposed and many more enterprises are exposed to the companies with European debt exposure. The possibility of sovereign debt rating downgrades or even debt write-offs looms over the firms carrying these assets on their balance sheets. 

 

Though the larger problems for the global financial marketplace clearly are of a much higher order, these issues also pose a challenge for D&O insurance underwriters. As noted above, there is not just the question of whether or not a company is exposed to European sovereign debt. There is also the far more difficult to discern question of whether or not a company is exposed to a company that is exposed to European sovereign debt. If the European difficulties were to evolve from a crisis to a disaster  – for example, though the withdrawal of one or more countries from the Euro – the aftereffects could be even more widespread. As MF Global’s rapid demise illustrates, these kinds of concerns are sufficient to quickly send a company into bankruptcy.

 

There is no way to know for sure, but I suspect strongly that as the New Year progresses, there will be a lot more to be said about European sovereign debt risk, at both the global and individual company levels.

 

7. Whistleblower Rules Go Into Effect, Whistleblower Lawsuits Emerge: The SEC issued its implementing regulations with respect to the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions in August 2011. In November 2011, the agency released its first report to Congress, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, on whistleblower activities, as of the end of the 2011 fiscal year end on September 30, 2011.

 

Though the SEC’s report reflected only a seven week time period, it revealed a heightened level of whistleblower reporting. In just the first seven weeks, the program recorded 334 whistleblower reports, which implies an annualized level of nearly 2,500 reports. Interestingly, about 10 percent of all whistleblower reports during the period reflected in the study originated outside the United States. The SEC made no whistleblower bounty payments during the period reflected in the study, as permitted under the Dodd-Frank Act. It seems likely that as the agency makes bounty payments additional whistleblowers will be motivated to come forward.

 

With the implementation of provisions for potentially rich whistleblower bounties under the Dodd-Frank Act, there have been concerns that the incentives will not only lead to increased numbers of reports and increased enforcement activity, but that the regulatory action will in turn generate follow-on civil litigation.  As discussed here, a December 2011 securities class action lawsuit filed against Bank of New York Mellon give a glimpse of how heightened whistleblower activity could lead to increased follow-on civil litigation.

 

The lawsuit followed whistleblower reports that the company engaged in a scheme to fraudulently overcharge its customers for foreign currency exchange transactions. Although the whistleblower allegations first emerged in separate whistleblower lawsuits, the foreign currency exchange allegations are also the subject of whistleblower reports to the SEC. In addition to the securities class action lawsuit, the whistleblower allegations have also triggered multiple regulatory actions. The train of events that the BNY Mellon whistleblower allegations set in motion shows how the revelation of whistleblower allegations can lead not only to significant regulatory action but also to significant follow on civil litigation.

 

Given the substantial bounties for which the Dodd-Frank Act provides, it seems likely there will be increased numbers of reports to the SEC, which in turn could mean increased levels of enforcement activity. Along with all other concerns these possibilities present, there is also the concern that the increased number of reports and increased enforcement activity could, following the same sequence illustrated in connection with the BNY Mellon whistleblowers, lead to a surge in follow-on civil litigation. As we head into 2012, we will have to watch whether increased whistleblowing will lead to increased follow-on civil litigation, similar to the suit against BNY Mellon.

 

8. Aggrieved Overseas Investors Seek Litigation Alternatives Outside the United States: For many years, the United States was the forum of choice for aggrieved investors to seek redress, regardless of whether or not the investors purchased their shares in the United States. However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank abruptly and unexpectedly eliminated access to U.S. courts for investors who purchased their shares outside the U.S. As a result, these investors increasingly are seeking alternative means to pursue their claims. Though we are still in the earliest days following the Morrison decision, there seem to be significant indications that aggrieved investors are developing a new playbook that includes resort to non-U.S. courts.

 

Investors’ pursuit of claims outside the United States was not long in coming after the Morrison decision and as its implications began to emerge in the lower U.S. courts. For example, in January 2011, after investors’ claims in U.S. court against Fortis were dismissed based on the Morrison decision, investors filed an action in Dutch court seeking remedies under Dutch law, but raising the same allegations that previously had been asserted in U.S. courts. Similarly, in December 2011, hedge funds and other investors whose action against Porsche had been dismissed from U.S. courts based on Morrison filed an action raising the same allegations against the company and its management in a German court.

 

Developments in other jurisdictions also reflect investors’ efforts to develop alternative remedies in the absence of access to U.S. courts. Among other things, at least two class actions pending in Canadian courts have not only survived dismissal motions but have had global classes certified. As discussed here, investors have also shown a willingness to pursue claims in a variety of other countries, including, for example, Germany and Australia. Recent statutory amendments in other countries (including, in particular, Mexico) may lead to investors in those countries to seek to pursue claims there.

 

Increased litigation and regulatory exposure outside the United States has a variety of implications, not the least of which concerns D&O insurance. As companies and their directors and officers face increased exposures on a global basis, D&O insurance policies will be called upon to respond in new and unusual situations. These developments in turn will require policies that are well adapted to the changing circumstances.

 

9. Judge Rakoff Rejects Settlement of SEC Enforcement Action Against Citigroup: Southern District of New York Judge Jed Rakoff’s November 2011 rejection of the $285 million settlement of the SEC’s enforcement action against Citigroup was not the first occasion on which Rakoff rejected a proposed SEC settlement. But this latest rejection has caused quite a stir, and not only because of the sharp rhetoric he used in rejecting the settlement (among other things, he derided the settlement because it “shortchanged” investors.) The most significant aspect of Rakoff’s rebuff is his refusal to accept a settlement in which Citigroup neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s allegations.

 

The SEC, perhaps stung by the Rakoff’s sharp words, and even more concerned about the possibility that it might be constrained from the entry into future no admit/no deny settlements, has appealed Rakoff’s ruling to the Second Circuit.  The SEC is right to be concerned about the implications of Judge Rakoff’s ruling. Following Judge Rakoff’s ruling, at least one other court has questioned a proposed SEC settlement that contained the “neither admit nor deny formulation.”

 

The problem for the SEC is that if proposed settlements cannot be approved unless the target defendants admit to wrongdoing, it may become significantly more difficult to settle cases and the SEC will be forced to take more enforcement actions to trial. This would not only put an enormous strain on the agency’s resources, but it could result in an overall reduction in the agency’s enforcement reach as it is forced to concentrate both more time and means on fewer enforcement actions.

 

The inability to enter into a no admit/no deny settlement presents a highly unattractive picture for target defendants as well. If fewer enforcement actions settle and more enforcement actions are forced to trial, the costs of defending an SEC enforcement action could escalate substantially. Target defendants unable to avoid the risks and uncertainty of trial without admitting wrongdoing will have to consider the possible effects of any admission on separate private civil actions. Any admissions in the enforcement actions could undermine their defenses in the separate civil actions. Moreover, depending on what is admitted, the admissions could have the further also undermine the target defendant’s insurance coverage by triggering a conduct exclusion on the defendant’s insurance policy.  

 

For these and a host of other reasons, the SEC’s appeal of Judge Rakoff’s ruling to the Second Circuit will be very closely watched. Crucially, however, the Second Circuit has not yet agreed whether or not it will actually hear the appeal of Judge Rakoff’s ruling. In additiona, there is always the possibility that Citigroup and the SEC will reach an agreement that Judge Rakoff finds acceptable (a footnote in his opinion rejecting the initial settlement does lay out a schematic for a settlement that would be acceptable to him, as I discuss here). Depending on how it all finally goes down, this case has the potential to be one of the top stories of 2012, as well.

 

10. A Big Fee Award in Delaware Gets Everybody’s Attention: Sometimes in litigation, a case that results in a big number is interesting in and of itself. And on that score, Delaware Chancellor Leo Strine’s October 2011 post-trial damages award of $1.263 billion in a lawsuit arising out of Grupo Mexico’s 2005 sale of Minerva Mexico to Southern Peru Copper Corporation certainly qualifies as interesting. (The later addition of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest increased the amount of the award to $2 billion). But what really has drawn attention to the case is Strine’s award to the plaintiffs’ of fees amounting to 15% of the damages and interest – that is, $300 million. A December 28, 2011 Wall Street Journal article entitled “Christmas Comes Early for These Lawyers” (here) describes the award.

 

As noted in a December 28, 2011 WSJ.com Law Blog post (here), the $300 million fee award may be the largest fee award ever in a shareholders’ derivative suit. Indeed it appears to be one of the largest fee awards in any corporate or securities case, approaching in order of magnitude the awards in the massive Enron and World Com cases (where the fees awarded were $688 million and $336 million, respectively).

 

Grupo Mexico undoubtedly will appeal both the damages award and the fee award. Whether or not the $300 million award ultimately withstands scrutiny, there are reasons to be concerned about the award. As noted above with respect to M&A litigation, Delaware’s courts are facing competition and appear to have been losing “market share” for corporate litigation. At least some interpreters have concluded, as reported in the Journal article linked above, that the plaintiffs’ fee award is a not-so-subtle signal to plaintiffs’ lawyers that Delaware’s courts are “open for business.” Other interpreters suggested that the fee award represents a “message to the plaintiffs’ bar.”

 

It is an obvious concern if Delaware’s judges feel obliged -- in order remain competitive in the jurisdictional competition and to try to preserve declining corporate litigation market share -- to prove that plaintiffs’ lawyers will be rewarded for resorting to the state’s courts.

 

Bloggers of the World, Unite!: Everyone here is pretty much reconciled to the fact that writing a blog is not exactly accorded equal dignity with, say, writing for The New Yorker. So we were all very gratified by the article in December 31, 2011 issue of The Economist entitled "Marginal Revolutionaries" (here), in whch the magazine reports that "the financial crisis and the blogosphere have opened up mainstream economics to new attack." Among other things, the article cites "the power of blogging as a way of getting fringe ideas noticed." The article recounts the experiences of the "invisible college of bloggers" whose revolutionary economic analyses have moved from the fringe to become part of the central economic dialog of our times.

 

In the immortal words of  the theme song of revolutionaries everywhere , "Allons enfants de la patrie, Le Jour de gloire est arrivé!" 

 

Perspective: Those worried about the troublesome events of the day may want to spend a few minutes contemplating "The Hisory of the Earth as a Clock" (here). In the grand scheme of things, the current crises are a mere passing cloud. (Source: UW-Geoscience).

 

 

D&O Insurance: "Disgorgement" Paid in SEC Settlement Held Not Covered

Carriers generally contend that  insurance does not cover amounts that represent “disgorgement” or that are “restitutionary” in nature. But what makes a particular payment a “disgorgement”?  In a December 13, 2011 opinion (here), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Department, First Division, held that amounts Bear Stearns paid in settlement of SEC late trading and market timing  allegations represented a disgorgement that is not covered under its  insurance program.  Because the appellate court’s decision reversed the lower court ruling that the settlement payment did not constitute a disgorgement, the case provides an interesting perspective of the question of what makes a particular payment a “disgorgement” for purposes of determining insurance policy coverage.

 

Background

In 2006, the SEC notified Bear Stearns that the agency was investigating late trading and market timing activities units of Bear Stearns had undertaken for the benefit of clients of the company. The agency advised the company that it intended to seek injunctive relief and monetary sanctions of $720 million. Bear Stearns disputed the allegations, among other thing arguing that it did not share in the profits or benefit from the late trading, which generated only $16.9 million in revenue.

 

Bear Stearns ultimately made an offer of settlement and --without admitting or denying the agency “findings” – consented to the SEC’s entry of an Administrative Order, in which, among other things, Bear Stearns agree to pay a total of $215 million, of which $160 million was labeled “disgorgement” and $90 million as a penalty.

 

At the relevant time, Bear maintained a program of insurance that, according to the subsequent complaint, totaled $200 million. Bear Stearns sought to have the carriers in the program indemnify the company for the company’s settlement with the SEC. However, the carriers claimed that because the $160 million payment was labeled “disgorgement” in the Administrative Order, it did not represent a covered loss under the insurance policies.

 

In 2009, J.P. Morgan (into which Bear Stearns merged in 2008) filed an action seeking a judicial declaration that the insurers were obliged to indemnify the company for the amount of the $160 million payment in excess of the $10 million self insured retention. The company’s supplemental summons and amended complaint can be found here. The company argued that notwithstanding the Administrative Order’s reference to the amount as “disgorgement,” its payment to resolve the SEC investigation constituted compensatory damages and therefore represented a covered loss under the insurance program. In support of this contention, the company further argued that Bear Stearns’ earned only $16.9 million in revenue and virtually no profit from the late trading and market timing activities, and therefore the SEC settlement amount could not have represented a disgorgement. The carriers moved to dismiss the company’s declaratory judgment action

 

The Lower Court’s September 14, 2010 Order

In an order entered September 14, 2010, (here), New York (New York County) Supreme Court Charles E. Ramos denied the carriers’ motion to dismiss. He held that the Administrative Order’s use of the term “disgorgement” did not conclusively establish that the settlement amounts were precluded from coverage.

 

In reaching this conclusion, he noted that the Administrative Order “does not contain an explicit finding that Bear Stearns directly obtained ill-gotten gains or profited by facilitated these trading practices,” and he found that the provision of the Order alone “do not establish as a matter of law that Bear Stearns seeks coverage for losses that include the disgorgement of improperly acquired funds.” He also found that the Order does not, as would be required to preclude coverage “conclusively link the disgorgement to improperly acquired funds.”  He noted in that regard that “there are no findings that Bear Stearns directly generated profits for itself as the result” of the alleged misconduct and for him to so conclude now “would be to resolve disputed issues of material fact.”



 

Because he found that he was “unable to conclude, on the basis of the language of the Administrative Order alone that the disgorgement is specifically linked to the improperly acquired funds,” he rejected the insurers’ argument that they were entitled to dismissal.

 

The December 13 Appellate Decision

A December 13, 2011 opinion written by Justice Richard Andrias of  the N.Y. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, reversed the lower court’s holding, granted the motions to dismiss and directed the entry of judgment in favor of the insurers. Contrary to Justice Ramos, the appellate court concluded that the sequence of events and allegations “read as a whole” are:

 

not reasonably susceptible to any interpretation other than that Bear Stearns knowingly and intentionally facilitated illegal late trading for preferred customers, and that the relief provisions of the SEC Order required disgorgement of funds gained through that illegal activity.

 

The Court went on to state that “the fact that the SEC did not itemize how it reached the agreed upon disgorgement figure does not raise an issue as to whether the disgorgement payment was in fact compensatory.” 

 

The Court further noted that in generating revenue of at least $16.9 million, “Bear Stearns knowingly and affirmatively facilitated an illegal scheme which generated hundreds of millions of dollars for collaborating parties and agreed to disgorge $160,000,000 in its offer of settlement.”  

 

Discussion         

Given that the SEC Administrative Order expressly identified the $160 million portion of the settlement as a “disgorgement,” it was always going to be an uphill battle to establish that the amount was not a disgorgement. The company argued essentially that the amount was not a disgorgement because the payment did not correspond to any specific pecuniary benefit that Bear Stearns received. The company argued in paying the amount it was not so much disgorging anything so much as it was paying damages. Justice Ramos concluded that the Administrative Order was not factual conclusive and that there was enough of an issue that dismissal was not appropriate.

 

The appellate court essentially concluded that the question was not so much whether Bear Stearns was disgorging an amount corresponding to its own specific pecuniary gain, but rather whether or not it was disgorging amounts that its “illegal scheme” had “generated.”  In effect, it was enough to show that there was a benefit from the illegal conduct, whether or not person making the disgorgement directly received that benefit.

 

This case is fairly fact specific, but it still a useful and interesting decision because it reaffirms the basic principles around the insurability of disgorgements and because it illustrates the issues to be considered in determining whether or not a specific amount represents a disgorgement or not.

 

All of that said, the company may still seek to appeal this decision to the New York Court of Appeals and so there may yet be more to be heard in connection with this case.

 

Chris Dolmetch’s December 13, 2011 Bloomberg article discussing the opinion can be found here.

 

Advisen Management Liability Journal: Although I suspect that most readers of this blog have already seen it, if you have not yet had a chance, you will want to take a look at the inaugural issue of the Advisen Management Liability Journal, which can be found here. The publication is attractive and interesting and it clearly represents a welcome addition to help in the exchange of ideas in the D&O insurance industry. My congratulations to everyone at Advisen for this inaugural issue, particularly my good friend, Susanne Sclafane, the publication’s senior editor. I am sure everyone in the industry is looking forward to future editions of this publication.

 

D&O Insurance: A Hornets' Nest of Defense Cost Coverage Issues

Among the most contentious D&O claims issues are questions surrounding defense cost coverage, including in particular questions such as the allowable billable rates or the involvement of multiple firms.  In a detailed November 8, 2011 opinion, Eastern District of California Judge Lawrence O’Neill, applying California law, addressed the hornets’ nest of problems involved when these kinds of questions arise. Though the disputes involved in this case are in some ways very case-specific, the case nevertheless provides (if only by way of negative example) a good illustration of how these questions might be avoided, managed or minimized. A copy of Judge O’Neill’s opinion can be found here.

 

Background

Lance-Kashian & Company is the general partner of River Park Properties III (RPP III), which in turn was general partner of Park 41, a real estate partnership.  In late 2008, Lance-Kashian’s D&O policy was up for renewal. The company’s risk manager directed that RPP III’s name be removed from the policy as a named insured. The D&O insurance policy that was in force for 2009 did not include RPP III as a named insured.

 

In late 2009, Lance-Kashian, RPP III, and certain Lance Kashian principals were sued in a bankruptcy court adversary proceeding by the Park 41 limited partner. The company notified its D&O insurer of the claim and asked the insurer’s permission to use the Cozen O’Connor law firm as defense counsel. In late December 2009, the insurer acknowledged receipt of the claim, reserved its right to deny coverage under the policy, and consented to the Cozen O’Conner firm’s involvement in the defense, but only at specified maximum rates (partner: $350/hour; associates: $250; paralegals, $150/hour). In light of the fact that RPP III was a defendant but was not an insured under the policy, the carrier proposed to allocate the defense fees between covered and non-covered parties, allocating one-third to the covered parties and two-thirds to the non-covered RPP III. The carrier argued in support of this proposed allocation that the bulk of the claims in the underlying complaint related solely or primarily to RPP III.

 

The carrier’s initial letter was the first in lengthy series of communications between the carrier’s counsel and the company’s risk manager. Judge O’Neill’s opinion details these communications, largely conducted by email. The parties later disputed the extent to which the communications either expressly or by silence amounted to the company’s assent to the allocation and defense counsel arrangements that the carrier has proposed.

 

At least part of the email exchange confirmed the carrier’s approval in the association in the defense of the Walter Wilhelm firm at the same specified maximum rates. In a separate email, the risk manager notified the carrier of the involvement of another firm, the Allen Matkins firm, which, the risk manager advised “would probably be used as an expert witness versus defense counsel.”

 

The company’s risk manager later submitted to the carrier invoices from the various law firms for payment. The invoices in turn set off an exchange about the aggregate level of fees, the involvement of multiple counsel, and concerns about the role of the Allen Matkins firm.

 

In January 2011, the underlying adversary proceeding finally settled. In connection with the subsequent coverage litigation, the risk manager submitted a declaration stating that the total defense expenses incurred in the case were “at least $1,557,295,” of which $618,251 was paid to the Allen Matkins firm; $475,000 was paid to Cozen O’Connor; $124,777 was paid to the Walter & Wilhelm law firm; and $144,133 was paid directly to third party vendors. At that point, the carrier had paid approximately $70,000 in connection with the defense.

 

The carrier initiated a civil action seeking a judicial declaration that it was only obligated to pay one third of the attorneys’ fees to which it had consented (that is, the Cozen  O’Connor fees and the Walter  Wilhelm fees) and only at the specified maximum hourly rates. The company disputed that the carrier was entitled to any type of allocation of the defense expenses or that any portion of the defense fees were not covered. The company counterclaimed, asserting claims of breach of contract and of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The company asserted several arguments in reliance on various parts of the California insurance code, which the company asserted governed in light of the carrier’s provision of the defense subject to a reservation of its rights. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

 

The November 8 Ruling

In his November 8 ruling, Judge O’Neill granted the carrier’s summary judgment motion “to the effect that [the carrier] reasonably set and allocated defense costs for counsel to which it had consented.” First, Judge O’Neill concluded that while the carrier had consented to the involvement in the defense of the Cozen O’Connor firm and the Walter Wilhelm firm at the specified hourly maximum rates, “the insureds point to no specific request accepted by [the carrier] for Allen Matkins’ retention.” 

 

Second, Judge O’Neill rejected the company’s argument that the carrier was obligated to reimburse all defense fees that were “reasonably related” to the insured persons’ defense. He concluded that the question was instead governed by the policy’s allocation provision, which specified that if a claim involved both covered and uncovered matters or parties, the insureds and the carrier would “use their best efforts to agree on a fair and proper allocation between insured and uninsured Loss.” The provision does go on to add: “However, [the carrier] shall not seek to allocate with respect to Claim Expenses and shall pay one hundred percent (100%) of Claim Expenses so long as a covered matter remains within the Claim.”

 

Judge O’Neill found that the record showed that the carrier “committed its best efforts to reach an allocation agreement, starting with the ROR letter and continuing with [its counsel’s] dogged efforts through numerous emails.” However, he added, “the same cannot be said for the insureds,” commenting further that “the inferences from the record are that the insureds devoted substantial efforts to attempt to settle the underlying action and decided to address allocation and insurance matter later.” There is, Judge O’Neill found “no evidence that the insureds used ‘best efforts’ to agree to an allocation.”

 

Judge O’Neill went on to reject the company’s argument that the final sentence of the allocation provision, allowing for a 100% defense cost allocation, obligated the carrier to pay 100% of defense costs. He found that the sentence obligated the insurer to pay only 100% of the defense costs of insured persons, but that the carrier has no obligation to pay the defense costs of persons who are not insured under the policy. Since the company and RPP III mounted a joint defense, the carrier is entitled to allocate the defense fees to remove the fees incurred on behalf of insured persons. Since the company “offered nothing meaningful” to “challenge” the carrier’s proposed allocation, and since “nothing in the record reveals that [the carrier’s] one-third allocation to the insureds was unreasonable or out of line with the insured’s potential liability,” he confirmed the carrier’s one-third allocation.

 

Judge O’Neill then turned to an unusual feature in the policy, which provided that the carrier’s determination as to reasonableness of claims expenses “shall be conclusive on the Insured.” He rejected the company’s argument that this provision is unconscionable, noting that “there is no conscience shocking that an insurer would seek to control defense and limit them to a reasonable range,” adding that the company was sophisticated and had the assistance of a full-time risk manager and broker, who bargained for the policy on the company’s behalf. He went on to note that “the insureds fail to demonstrate that [the carrier] was precluded legally to set the rates it would pay or that [the rates] were objectively unreasonable.”

 

Discussion

There are a number of lessons from this dispute, which I review below. There are also a number of noteworthy holdings that are worth highlighting before moving on the moral of the story.

 

First, it is interesting and important that Judge O’Neill rejected the company’s efforts to try to rely on the “reasonably related” standard and instead enforced the allocation provisions in the policy. The “reasonably related” standard harkens back to an earlier time and place when D&O policies did not have express allocation provisions. Judge O’Neill’s enforcement of the provision shows that the allocation provisions themselves control – although his interpretation of the 100% Defense Cost provision is also interesting, in effect holding that the 100% allocation does not operate to require the insurer to pay the defense costs of parties who are not insured under the policy. In effect, he held that the 100% defense cost allocation applied only when there are both covered and non-covered matters, but not when there are both covered and non-covered parties. (Those involved in counseling policyholders on policy placement will want to consider this distinction in thinking about the optimal wording for these kinds of provisions.)

 

Second, Judge O’Neill enforced the unusual (and frankly onerous) provision giving the insurer’s determination of reasonableness presumptive weight. It may have been that he felt that a sophisticated company with competent advice had to accept the contract it had negotiated. (Again, those involved in negotiating policy placements for policyholders will want to note and watch out for this type of unusual provision.) By accepting the carrier’s presumptive right on the reasonableness issue, Judge ONeill avoided getting into the issue of whether or not the carrier’s insistence on its maximum hourly rates was reasonable. Too bad, that is an issue that in my view could use some ventilation.

 

Third, and perhaps most significantly in terms of the dollars involved, Judge O’Neill held that the carrier had no obligation to pay (even according to the allocation) for the defense fees and expenses to which the carrier had not consented.

 

This last point leads to the moral of the story – which is the importance of communication with the insurer at the beginning, during the course of, and at the end of the claim. A significant number of the problems the company faced in the coverage dispute were due to the way the company communicated with the carrier. Indeed, Judge O’Neill emphasized, and even quoted twice from, the deposition testimony of the company’s CEO that during the claim and amongst all of the other business challenges the company was facing he considered the questions the insurer was raising to be a “distraction.” 

 

But the first of the lessons out of this coverage dispute comes from the deliberate move the company made at its insurance renewal to remove RPP III as an insured under its policy. This decision directly led to all of the allocation issues. The move clearly was not fully thought through because as soon as the claim came in naming both the company and RPP III, the company expected RPP III’s defense expense to be paid under the policy. This sequence shows the importance of thoughtfully addressing all potential coverage issues at the time of placement. Something as basic as who should be insured under the policy should be the subject of close consideration, and should be stress tested against likely claims scenarios. It isn’t just hindsight to say that even at the time of the renewal it was apparent that if there were to be a claim involving , say, Park 41, that both RPP III and the company would be named as defendants, and that both would require a defense. The company can bemoan the outcome of Judge O’Neill’s allocation analysis, but there wouldn’t have been an allocation in the first placed if RPP III had not been removed as a named insured under the policy.

 

The more generally applicable lesson is the importance of communicating fully and continuously with the carrier. The company here clearly understood that the carrier’s consent to defense expenses was required, yet failed to take the steps to obtain the carrier’s consent to the involvement in the defense of the Allen Matkins firm or of the third-party vendors who provided services in connection with the defense. This oversight was not a small matter since the fees of the Allen Matkins firm and the fees of the third party vendors together amount to almost half of all of the defense expenses that the company incurred. (It is probably worth noting that the company not only failed to keep the carrier informed but  misstated the role of the Allen Matkins firm as being related to expert testimony, while disclaiming the firm’s involvement in the defense.)

 

The company may well have viewed the carrier’s questions and concerns as a “distraction,” but in the end the company paid a price for disregarding the carrier’s concerns. It certainly did not help the company that Judge O’Neill could find “no evidence” that the company used its best efforts to try to negotiate an allocation. By the same token, it clearly hurt the company that it did not voice its objection to the carrier’s proposed maximum rates as well as to the allocation. In the end, Judge O’Neill’s conclusions that the allocation and rates were reasonable were eased by the fact that while the claim was pending the company evinced little objection to the carrier’s positions in the regard.

 

Of course it is always easier to say in hindsight what a company should have done. I do not mean to find fault within anyone. But I think it is clear that the better course is to keep the carrier fully informed; to confront and address issues as they come up, not after the fact; and to work out as many issues as possible at the time, rather than later. It may not always be possible to avoid disputes, but dealing with issues as they come up may reduce the number of issues in dispute. And it will certainly help to avoid any later suggestion that “best efforts” were not used to try to work the issues out.

 

Finally, the best way to avoid unwelcome coverage outcomes is to make sure as many issues as possible are addressed in advance, at the time of the policy placement. As this case show, critical issues like the identity of named insured and the presence of unusual provisions (like the presumption of reasonableness for the carrier in this policy) are best addressed at the time the coverage is placed, to avoid problems later. This lesson in turn underscores the importance of the involvement in the policy placement process of knowledgeable and experience professionals who understand the kinds of issues that may be involved if claims later arise.

 

Special thanks to Michael Goodstein of the Bailey Cavalieri firm for providing me with a copy of Judge O’Neill’s opinion. The Bailey Cavalieri firm represented the carrier in this case. I hasten to add that the views expressed in the post are exclusively my own and should not be imputed to any other person, living, dead or otherwise.

 

D&O Insurance: Allegations Alone Insufficient to Trigger Exclusion

One of the thorniest D&O insurance coverage issues is the question of the applicability of a policy exclusion when coverage preclusive conduct has been alleged – but not proven. In a November 14, 2011 opinion (here), District of Oregon Judge Ann Aiken held that the mere allegations in the underlying claim, even if otherwise sufficient to constitute precluded “bad faith” within the meaning of a policy exclusion, were insufficient to preclude coverage where the underlying claim settled and the allegations were not proven. Though the specific exclusion involved is unusual, the dispute itself raises a number of interesting issues.

 

Background

Summit Accomodators, Inc. was in the business of facilitating so-called “1031 exchanges.” The company experienced liquidity issues in late 2008 and filed for bankruptcy. In June 2009, the trustee for the Summit Accomodators Liquidation Trust filed a civil action against Umpqua Bank, alleging that the bank knowingly aided and abetted the principals of Summit in the perpetration of a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme.

 

Among other things, the trustee’s complaint alleged that “highest level of management at Umpqua Bank … became fully aware of the Ponzi scheme and the principals’ embezzlement. …Yet [the bank officials] continued to actively encourage and materially assist the Summit principals.” The bank is alleged to have aided the scheme by providing banking services including loans and by encouraging bank customers to use Summit’s services.  Additional lawsuits later arose. The suits were later consolidated and ultimately settled.

 

At the time the claims arose, the bank was insured under a D&O liability insurance policy. The insurer funded the bank’s defense in the litigation. However, the insurer disputed that the policy provided coverage for the underlying settlement. Ultimately, the insurer contributed 41% of the settlement amount. The bank sued the insurer for breach of contract (refer here for the bank’s complaint), seeking to recover the balance of the settlement amount from the insurer. The insurer answered the complaint and also counterclaimed for return of the 41% of the settlement that it had funded, arguing that there was no coverage under the policy for the settlement (refer here for the insurer’s Answer and Counterclaim).

 

In arguing that the policy precluded coverage for the settlement, the insurer relied on Policy Section V (illegal profit/payment exclusion):

 

The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss, other than Defense Costs, in connection with any Claim arising out of or in any way involving:

1. any Insured gaining, in fact, any profit, remuneration, or financial advantage to which the Insured was not legally entitled;

2. payment by the Company of inadequate or excessive consideration in connection with the purchase of Company securities; or

3. conflicts of interest, engaging in self-dealing, or acting in bad faith. 

 

In disputing coverage, the insurer relied principally on subsection 3 of this provision, the “bad faith” exclusion.

 

The insurer moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the applicability of the bad faith exclusion could be determined “based solely on the undisputed terms of the complaints in the underlying litigation against the bank.” (The insurer’s memorandum in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings can be found here). The bank filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

 

The November 14 Order

In her November 14, order, Judge Aiken denied the insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted in part the bank’s cross-motion for summary judgment. In making her ruling, Judge Aiken did not construe the phrase “acting in bad fait,” or determine whether the underlying allegations constituted “bad faith,” as she deemed it sufficient to determine whether or not the exclusion could be triggered by the mere allegations in the underlying litigation.

 

The insurer had argued that the egregious allegations of the bank’s complicity in the alleged Ponzi scheme were sufficient to trigger the exclusion. In support of its contention that allegations alone were sufficient, the insurer argued that the reference in the policy’s definition of Wrongful Act to an “actual or alleged” act, error or omission was incorporated into all of the policy exclusions, setting up an “allegations alone” trigger for all exclusions. The insurer also contrasted subpart 1 of the exclusion at issue, which expressly required an “in fact” determination that that the precluded conduct occurred, with the “bad faith” subpart, which has no such “in fact” determination requirement.

 

Judge Aiken rejected these arguments.  First, she found that, contrary to the insurer’s “surreptitious interpretation,” the exclusion “does not actually state that it is triggered by allegations of bad faith,” and that “the word ‘alleged’ is at no point used within the exclusion.” She added that “in its attempt to avoid its contractual duty to indemnify,” the insurer “erroneously substitutes the term ‘alleged act’” in its interpretation of the exclusion.

 

Judge Aiken noted further that when the insurer “intended the policy exclusions to be activated by mere allegations, it did so expressly within the actual text of the policy.” She noted in that regard that both the policy’s Pollution Exclusion and its Bodily/Personal Injury and Property Damage Exclusion both expressly reference “alleged” activity or conduct as triggering the exclusion.

 

Finally, she noted that “at the very least,” the insurer’s “imprecise drafting allows the Exclusion to have more than one reasonable interpretation,” and accordingly she was required to construe the policy in favor of coverage.

 

Discussion

A recurring problem D&O insurers face is the question of their coverage obligations in circumstances  involving alleged egregious misconduct, when the misconduct has not yet been the subject of formal proof. Two scandals currently on the front pages of the business sections illustrate this issue. The newspapers are full of stories suggesting that MF Global improperly applied customer funds. Olympus Corp. has actually admitted that it misrepresented certain transaction costs in order to mask certain investment losses.

 

The general movement in most D&O insurance policies in recent years has been toward an “after adjudication” standard for conduct exclusions, meaning that the exclusionary language does not preclude coverage unless and until there has been a judicial determination that the precluded conduct has occurred. To the extent that the conduct exclusions in the MF Global or Olympus insurance policies apply only after an “adjudication,” the exclusions in those policies would not presently operate to preclude coverage notwithstanding the allegations or admissions involving the companies. Indeed, because so few directors and officers liability cases actually go to trial, there are rarely “adjudications” and so the preclusive effect of the conduct exclusions is rarely triggered.

 

I refer to these contemporary examples to highlight the fact that, at least as most current D&O insurance policies are written, D&O insurers are often called upon to provide coverage even in the circumstances involving egregious underlying allegations. Clearly, in the Umpqua Bank case, the insurer was deeply troubled by the allegations in the underlying complaint of the bank’s complicity in the alleged Ponzi scheme. But as disturbing as the trustee’s allegations may be, the mere fact that these things were alleged does not mean that any of these things actually happened or that they happened the way the trustee alleged.

 

The exclusion at issue in the Umpqua Bank case contained no “adjudication” requirement. It did not even, as the insurer pointed out, contain an “in fact” provision requiring that the precluded conduct occurred.  The absence of these types of provisions allowed the interpretation of the exclusionary language that the carrier took in this case, and makes the carrier's position not unreasonable.

 

However, the exclusions’ lack of a specific trigger does not necessarily mean that mere allegations alone are sufficient to trigger the exclusion.Many (if not most) directors and officers liability complaints contain allegations asserting  “conflicts of interest, engaging in self-dealing, or acting in bad faith.” If those types of mere allegations alone were sufficient to preclude policy coverage, then the exclusion’s preclusive effect would reach so broadly that it would swallow up much of the intended coverage for which the policyholder purchased the policy in the first place. Certainly, it would seem that if the insurer was to narrow coverage so dramatically for mere allegations, then it ought to do so explicitly.

 

Indeed the potentially preclusive scope of this policy exclusion may explain why the exclusion is relatively unusual. Many purchasers and their advisors would find it better to avoid policies with this type of language, particularly given this insurer’s formulation of the language.

 

By the same token, the potential breadth of the exclusion’s preclusive effect is yet another reason to support Judge Aiken’s narrow interpretation. If the parties had intended mere allegations of  “conflicts of interest, engaging in self-dealing, or acting in bad faith” to preclude indemnity coverage, then the exclusion would have expressly included the word “alleged,” as was the case with the two other policy exclusions Judge Aiken referenced in her opinion. The presence of the word “alleged” in the other exclusions and its absence in the “bad faith” exclusion, at a minimum, allows, as Judge Aiken found, “more than one reasonable interpretation” of the question whether or not mere allegations are sufficient to trigger the “bad faith” exclusion.

 

Readers who are wondering why the name Umpqua Bank sounds familiar may recall that in an earlier post (here), I wrote about the derivative lawsuit that the shareholders of Umpqua’s holding company filed against company officials after t  62% of shareholders voted “no” in the advisory shareholder vote on the company’s 2010 executive compensation plan. The claims asserted in the lawsuit rely directly on the negative note.

 

FDIC Files Another Failed Bank Lawsuit: And speaking of bank litigation -- the FDIC has filed another lawsuit against the former directors and officers of a failed bank. On November 18, 2011, the FDIC filed an action in the Western District of Washington against eleven former directors and officers of Westsound Bank, which failed on May 8, 2009. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

In its complaint, the FDIC seeks to recover at least $15 million in principal losses the bank suffered on 28 commercial loans. The complaint alleges that the defendants failed to properly supervise the bank’s lending operations. The complaint alleges that certain loans were approved in violation of the bank’s lending policies and in disregard of regulatory warnings.

 

The complaint further alleges that 21 fraudulent loans to the Russian/Ukrainian community would not have been made if the defendants had heeded regulatory warnings and properly supervised lending operations. Finally, the complaint seeks to recover losses on preferential loans that were made to directors and director-led companies.

 

The FDIC’s complaint against the former Westsound Bank officials is the 17th the agency has filed against former directors and officers of failed banks as part of the current wave of bank failures. Like many of the suits the FDIC previously filed, this one came well over two years after the bank’s failure. The sheer number and timing of the bank failures during the current wave (which now total over 400) and the FDIC’s deliberate litigation approach suggests that there are many other lawsuits to come in the months and years ahead.

 

The FDIC recently updated its professional liability lawsuits page on its website to reflect that the agency has approved an increased number of lawsuits. The updated page (here) shows that as of November 14, 2011, the FDIC has authorized suits in connection with 37 failed institutions against 340 individuals for D&O liability with damage claims of at least $7.6 billion. Though the FDIC has authorized lawsuits involving 37 institutions, it has filed only 17 lawsuits involving 16 institutions so far – suggesting that there are many lawsuits yet to come, just taking into account the lawsuits authorized so far.

 

With more lawsuits likely to be authorized in the future, and with banks continuing to fail (two more were closed this past Friday evening), it seem probable that the number of lawsuits involving former directors and officers of failed banks will continue to accumulate for years to come.

 

Cybersecurity Disclosure: In the quarterly Advisen webinar last week, one of the topics discussed was the SEC’s new disclosure guidelines regarding cybersecurty risks and exposures. Readers interested in learning more about the SEC’s guidelines will want to refer to the November 17, 2011 memorandum from John Nicholson of the Pillsbury law firm, entitled “Accounting for Cybersecurity: SEC Guidance in Disclosures to Investors and Regulators” (here). The memo includes a detailed discussion of the new guidelines and the challenges that companies may face in trying to comply with the guidelines.

 

Eleventh Circuit: D&O Insurance Does Not Cover Office Depot's Informal SEC Investigation Expenses

One of the highest profile D&O insurance coverage decisions last year was the district court’s October 2010 opinion  holding that Office Depot’s D&O insurance policy does not cover defense expenses the company incurred in responding to an informal SEC investigation. The company’s appeal of the district court’s decision has been closely watched. On October 13, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit issued an unpublished per curium opinion affirming the district court, concluding that Office Depot did not have coverage under the language of the policy at issue for the defense expenses incurred in connection with the informal SEC investigation. A copy of the Eleventh Circuit opinion can be found here.

 

Background

In June 2007, Office Depot was the subject of news report suggesting the company had improperly disclosed material information to securities analysts in violation of SEC Regulation FD. In a July 17, 2007 letter, the SEC advised Office Depot it was "conducting an inquiry" to determine whether the securities laws had been violated, and requested certain information from Office Depot "on a voluntary basis." Office Depot provided documents and made its employees and officers available for sworn testimony. On July 31, 2007, the SEC requested that Office Depot preserve the records of numerous employees and offices. Office Depot forwarded the letter to its insurers. Office Depot’s primary insurer accepted the letter as a "Notice of Circumstances" that may give rise to a claim.

 

In addition, in July 2007, before it received the SEC’s informal inquiry, Office Depot received an internal whistleblower letter raising concerns relating to the timing of recognition of Office Depot’s vendor rebate funds. Office Depot self-reported the whistleblower allegations to the SEC, which expanded its inquiry to include the whistleblower allegations. The company’s audit committee conducted its own investigation of the allegations, retaining lawyers, accountants and consultants for those purposes. The internal investigation resulted in Office Depot’s restatement of its 2006 financial statements.

 

In November 2007, two shareholder derivative lawsuits and two securities class action lawsuits were filed against the company. The shareholder suits alleged misrepresentations in connection with the company’s financial reporting of vendor rebates. In January 2010, the defendants’ motions to dismiss the securities class action lawsuit were granted.The plaintiffs in the derivative lawsuits voluntarily dismissed those cases.

 

In January 2008, the SEC issued a formal "order directing private investigation" and during the course of 2008 subpoened the company and at least eight current and former Office Depot officers and directors, including several who previously voluntarily testified. The notice did not name any individuals as wrongdoers. In November and December 2009, the SEC issued Wells notices to three Office Depot officers. In December 2009, the company reached an undisclosed settlement with the SEC staff.

 

Office Depot requested reimbursement from its D&O insurers of the over $23 million the company had incurred in responding to the SEC, indemnifying individuals against defense expenses, and conducting an internal investigation of the whistleblower allegations.

 

The primary carrier acknowledged its obligation to reimburse Office Depot for defense costs incurred by officers and directors after having been served with SEC subpoenas and Wells notices, and for the costs incurred in the various securities lawsuits. However, the approximately $1.1 million of acknowledged expenses did not exceed the policy’s $2.5 million retention. The primary insurer denied coverage for the other expenses, and Office Depot filed an action alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration of coverage. Office Depot’s excess D&O insurer intervened in the action.

 

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. As discussed here, on October 15, 2011, Southern District of Florida Judge Kenneth Marra granted the insurers’ motions for summary judgment and denied Office Depot’s motion. Office Depot filed an appeal.

 

The Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

In an October 13, 2011 unpublished per curiam, a three judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Office Depot had sought to have the district court’s decision overturned on four separate grounds. The Eleventh Circuit rejected each of Office Depot’s four arguments.

 

First, Office Depot had argued that the insurers’ policies did not expressly exclude coverage for costs associated with SEC investigations, and that the “carve back” language in the definition of “Securities Claim” provided coverage for the costs. The “carve back” argument refers to language in the policy definition that, on the one hand said that a “Securities Claim” is a claim “other than an administrative or regulatory proceeding against, or investigation of an Organization,” but on the other hand also provided that the term “Securities Claim” shall “include an administrative or regulatory proceeding against an Organization, but only if and only during the time such proceeding is also commenced and continuously maintained against an Insured Person.”

 

The Eleventh Circuit noted that the first of these two definitional clauses eliminates coverage for two types of potential Securities Claims – that is, claims in the form of administrative or regulatory proceedings, and claims in the form of an administrative or regulatory investigation. The Court said that “the carve-back provision restores coverage for the former under certain circumstances. But it does not restore for the latter.” Accordingly, and “because the SEC’s requests for voluntary cooperation in furtherance of its pre-suit discovery constituted an ‘investigation’ rather than an ‘administrative or regulatory proceeding,’ Office’s Depot’s expenses incurred after the receipt of the SEC’s letters are excluded from coverage.”

 

Second, Office Depot argued that the SEC’s letters were sufficient to trigger a Claim under the policy because they were sufficient to constitute notice that insured persons could have proceedings commenced against them. In rejecting this argument, the Eleventh Circuit said that the SEC’s letters “do not allege that violations have occurred or identify specific individuals that could be charged in future proceedings,” and therefore do not trigger a “Claim” under the relevant policy definition.

 

Third, Office Depot argued that the district court had erred in concluding that the policy covered only defense expenses incurred after a “Claim” had been made. In essence, the company argued that the policy has no temporal limitation precluding policy coverage for pre-Claim expenses. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the policies’ “text unambiguously limits Defense Costs to those costs incurred after a Claim has been made.”

 

Finally, Office Depot argued that the “relation back” language in the policy’s notice of circumstances provision provides coverage for costs incurred after it provided notice to the carrier of circumstances that could give rise to a claim and before the Claim actually was made. These notice provisions specify that if the policyholder gives the insurer notice of circumstances that could give rise to a claim, and if a claim subsequently arises, then determination of the date on which the claim was first made will relate back to the date on which notice of circumstance was provided.

 

The Eleventh Circuit rejected Office Depot’s “relation back” argument, finding that the notice of circumstances provision simply “create a notification process” that allows a determination of when claim are “considered made … rather than expand[ing] coverage to the costs incurred before Claim is actually made.”

 

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “the policy does not cover the Defense Costs associated with the SEC investigation – which did not constitute a Claim against Office Depot until events such as the issuance of subpoenas and Wells Notices occurred.”

 

Discussion

The background circumstances of this coverage dispute dramatically highlight why the questions of coverage of expenses incurred in connection with informal SEC investigations is such a fraught issue. Office Max incurred tens of millions of dollars in defense expenses before the SEC commenced its formal investigative processes. Many other companies confronted with an informal SEC investigation similarly incur substantial costs voluntarily providing information. The sheer magnitude of these expenses ensures that policyholders will continue to try to argue that their D&O insurance covers these types of expenses, even after the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in the Office Depot case.

 

Insurers confronted with these coverage demands undoubtedly will seek to rely on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in taking the position that their policies do not cover costs incurred in connection with informal SEC investigations. In addition to arguable limitations arising from the fact that the opinion is designated “not for publication,” the insurers will also have to deal with the fact that the opinion is in many respects simply a reflection of the specific policy language at issue in the Office Depot case. In particular, the opinion rests heavily on the distinction in the relevant policy provisions between “proceedings” and “investigations.” Other policies do not contain these same distinctions or are otherwise worded differently, in reliance upon which other policyholders may attempt to distinguish their situation from the circumstances involved in the Office Depot case.

 

But while there may be grounds on which policyholders may attempt to argue that the Office Depot opinion is not absolutely determinative of questions whether or not there might be coverage under another D&O insurance policy for costs incurred in connection with an informal SEC investigation, the opinion nevertheless provides strong support for insurers taking the position that their policies do not cover these types of expenses.

 

One aspect of the opinion on which insurers are particularly likely to rely is the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the D&O policy at issue only provides coverage for defense expenses incurred after a claim has been made. Policyholders seeking to establish coverage for costs incurred in connection with an informal investigation often try to argue that the insurer should cover the costs because the policyholder would have incurred all of the same costs after the investigation became formal if it had not voluntarily cooperated. The policyholders’ argument is the coverage for the expenses should not depend on a mere matter of timing and the policyholders should not be penalized for cooperating with the SEC. The insurers doubtlessly will argue that in reliance on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion that its insurance obligations do not extend to pre-claim expenses.

 

There is the potentially troublesome issue of the fact that the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is designated “Do Not Publish.” In the current era of Internet communication, this designation seems meaningless. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit itself posted the opinion on its website. Clearly the opinion has been published despite the designation, even if the opinion will not appear in printed case reporters at some point in the future.

 

But beyond the question of whether or not this “unpublished” opinion in fact has been published, there is the question of whether or not the “Do Not Publish” designation could otherwise preclude carriers from relying on the opinion. While there was a time when attorneys were barred from citing unpublished opinions, revised Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1(a) specifically provides that a court may not prohibit or restrict citation to unpublished opinions dated after January 1, 2007. So there does not seem to be any problems for insurers attempting to rely on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, notwithstanding the fact that it is designated “Not for Publication.”

 

Given that the opinion is freely available on the Court’s website and given the fact that the opinion has every bit as much precedential value as if it were not designated “Do Not Publish,” you do kind of wonder what the point is of using the designation. I worry about what it implies about what the court itself thinks about the opinion. It is almost as if the court is saying “we don’t think enough of this opinion for it to be published,” as if they really didn’t give it enough of their focus to produce a publication worthy opinion.

 

In any event, it is worth noting that since the time that Office Depot purchased the policies at issue in this coverage dispute, the insurance marketplace has evolved. Recently, some carriers have been willing to provide coverage for costs individuals incur in connection with informal SEC investigations. In addition, at least one carrier now offers a separate insurance product that provides coverage for costs that the entity itself incurs in connection with an informal SEC investigation. Although this entity protection for informal SEC investigative costs is subject to a large self-insured retention and to coinsurance, the fact remains that if such a policy had been available to Office Depot and if Office Depot had had such a policy in place, at least a significant part of Office Depot’s costs of responding to the informal SEC investigation might have been covered.

 

The Wiley Rein law firm’s October 14, 2011 summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion.

 

SEC  Issues Disclosure Guidance on Cybersecurity: Based on the number of emails I received on the topic, I suspect that by now most readers are aware that on October 13, 2011, the SEC released Cybersecurity Disclosure Guidance, a copy of which can be found here. If you have not yet read the Cybersecurity Guidance, you may want to set aside a few minutes and read the document through. It makes for some very interesting reading.

 

First, the disclosure guidance is not just directed to those companies that have experienced a cyber attack. Rather, the guidance requires reporting companies to consider “on an ongoing basis, the adequacy of their disclosure relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents.” The SEC also proposes that reporting companies include a discussion of these matters in the Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) if known incidents or the risk of potential incidents represent a material risk, trend or uncertainty.

 

Second, readers of this blog will find it particularly interesting that among the items the SEC suggests reporting companies include in their “ongoing disclosure” is “a description of relevant insurance coverage.”

 

Third, if a reporting company or any of its subsidiaries are party to material pending legal proceeding involving a cyber incident, the registrant may need to disclose information regarding this proceeding.

 

Fourth, reporting companies are also required to disclose conclusions on the effectiveness of cybersecurity controls and procedures.

 

Although the primary objective of these disclosure guidelines is to try to ensure that investors are better informed on reporting companies’ cyber vulnerabilities, one obvious consequence is cybersecurity matters are about to become a much higher profile item for all reporting companies. In addition, the requirements about disclosures regarding the effectiveness of cybersecurity controls and procedures potentially sets the stage for shareholder claimants to later contend that the companies’ disclosures about its controls and procedures were misleading.

 

Finally, the specific reference in the SEC disclosure guidelines to cybersecurity insurance undoubtedly will lead many companies who may not have purchased this insurance in the past to consider the need for this insurance, if only to allow the company to supplement its cybersecurity disclosures to show that its precautionary measures include the purchase of insurance designed to protect the company from the harm caused by cybersecurity risks.

 

Insurance professionals whose clients include reporting companies will undoubtedly refer to this suggested disclosure item as part of the professionals’ efforts to advise their clients with respect to insurance issues.

 

What to Watch Now in the World of D&O: In the latest issue of InSIghts, I examine the current hot topics in the world of D&O. As should be clear from this post, there is a lot going on now in the world of directors’ and officers’ liability, with many additional issues on the horizon. The latest InSights issue can be found here.

 

EPL Insurance: EEOC Lawsuit Not a Covered Claim?

Every now and then, I run across a case that makes me stop and say, “What?” I had that experience recently when I read the September 21, 2011 opinion of Middle District of Tennessee Judge John T. Nixon in an insurance coverage dispute involving Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. In the opinion, which can be found here, Judge Nixon held, applying Tennessee law and based on the policy language involved, that an EEOC lawsuit brought following employees’ discrimination charges was not a “Claim” within the meaning of the EPL insurance policy at issue.

 

Background

Between December 1999 and March 2001, ten of the company’s employees filed charges alleging sexual or racial discrimination against the company with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC. The company later provided notice of these charges to its EPL insurer. Thereafter, the EEOC brought suit against the company for multiple alleged violations of federal civil rights laws. The EEOC’s lawsuit arose from allegations of harassment and discrimination against former and current employees of the company, including the original ten charging parties. The company provided its EPL insurer with notice of claim relating to the EEOC lawsuit. The company later entered into a settlement decree with the EEOC, which designated $2 million to be placed in a settlement fund. The company incurred over $700,000 in defending the EEOC lawsuit.

 

The company sought coverage from its EPL insurer in connection with the EEOC lawsuit, seeking inter alia, reimbursement for its defense expenses. The carrier -- in reliance on the Policy’s definition of the term “claim” as “a civil administrative of arbitration proceeding commenced by service of a complaint or charge, which is brought by any past, present or prospective employee(s) of the ‘insured entity’ against any ‘insured’” – took the position that the policy did not cover the EEOC lawsuit. The company filed a declaratory judgment action and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

 

The September 21 Opinion

In his September 21 opinion, Judge Nixon granted the carrier’s summary judgment motion and denied that of the company. The carrier had argued that the EEOC lawsuit was not a “claim” within the meaning of the EPL policy because it was not brought by a past, present or prospective employee of the company. The company argued that the definition should be understood to mean that the proceeding must merely be commenced by a complaint or charge by an employee.

 

In ruling for the carrier, Judge Nixon found that the definition of “claim” in the carrier’s policy is
“not ambiguous” and that “the definition of a ‘claim’ has a clear meaning that a covered proceeding must be brought by an employee.” Even though the EEOC lawsuit followed from the employees filing of charges, the EEOC lawsuit “was not ‘commenced by the service of’ a charge, according to the plain meaning of that language, even though it may have arisen because of previous administrative charges.” The fact that “the EEOC charges on which the EEOC partially based its decision to bring a lawsuit were brought by Plaintiff’s employees is irrelevant.” Judge Nixon held that because “the EEOC lawsuit was not brought by an employee,” the lawsuit is “not a ‘claim’ under the Policies.” Accordingly, he ruled that the carrier did not have a duty to indemnify the company for the settlement amount or for the company’s costs of defense.

 

Discussion

I think most readers’ initial reaction to this ruling will be surprise (at a minimum). The general expectation would be that the possibility of an EEOC lawsuit is among the very reasons companies buy EPL insurance. Indeed, as Judge Nixon noted in his opinion, the plaintiffs in this case argued that the insurance companies position that an EEOC lawsuit is not a covered claim “flies in the face of common sense,” as the company had purchased the EPL insurance “to protect itself from exactly the type of liability that results from EEOC actions,” which is, the plaintiff contended the “very purpose” of the coverage.

 

But what may seem like a surprising outcome may be nothing more that a reflection of the unusual wording in this policy. In his opinion, Judge Nixon noted that he had reviewed the language of EPL policies involved in other cases and that he had “found no instances where the relevant definition restricted claims to those ‘brought by an employee.’”

 


Indeed, my own quick review of the EPL policies of several other carriers show that many policies do not, as Judge Nixon noted, limit who must bring an otherwise covered claim. Other policies specifically include actions brought by the EEOC within the definition of claim, while yet others include the EEOC within the definition of a “claimant” whose action represents a “claim” under the policy. Many policies also allow that a claim may be brought “by or on behalf of” an employee. Judge Nixon found that in the absence of these kinds of provisions in the policy here, he could not interpret the provision as if it included that type of language, and that he “cannot find ambiguity where none exists merely because plaintiffs did not bargain for coverage that is expected.”

 

If nothing else, this outcome underscores the critical importance of policy wording. Where coverage for something as basic to EPL insurance as an EEOC lawsuit depends on the presence or absence of crucial words, policyholders must take steps to protect themselves, and in particular policyholders must enlist in their acquisition of insurance knowledgeable and experienced insurance professionals capable of ensuring that the policy language is matched to the policyholders’ needs and expectations. And while you wouldn’t think it would be necessary, it looks as if one item that should be attended to with particular care is to make sure that the EPL policy’s terms encompass EEOC lawsuit within the scope of covered claims.

 

More than once, I have suggested that part of the obligation of those who counsel insurance buyers is to develop a sort of league table for carriers’ claims handling practices. The carriers’ awareness of the maintenance of league tables might possibly encourage the carriers -- in considering whether or not to assert a particular coverage position -- to consider not only whether or not a particular position is analytically justified, but also consider how it might look to the insurance marketplace if the carrier were to take that position. Insurance professionals that maintain a claims handling practices league table may find it highly relevant that the carrier in this case was willing to take the position it took in this case.

 

An October 2011 memo from the Lowenstein Sandler law firm discussing this case can be found here.

 

LexisNexis Corporate & Securities Law Community 2011 Top 50 Blogs

Thank You for Your Support: The D&O Diary has been nominated as among the candidates for the LexisNexis Top 25 Business Blogs of 2011. The actual selection of the Top 25 blogs will take place at a later date. Among the considerations that will go into the selection will be the comments posted on the LexisNexis Corporate & Securities Law Communities site about the nominee blogs . Each comment is counted as a vote toward the supported blog. To submit a comment, visitors need to log on to their free LexisNexis Communities account.  If you haven’t previously registered, you can do so for free by following this link. The comment box is at the very bottom of the blog nomination page. The comment period for nominations ends on October 25, 2011. 

 

Excess D&O Insurers Not Required to Drop Down to Fund Insolvent Underlying Insurer Gaps

In a case involving multiple ghosts of long lost companies, a judge in federal court in Manhattan has held that excess D&O insurers do not have a duty to “drop down” to fill the gaps in coverage caused by the insolvency of underlying insurers. The court also held, based on the language of the excess policies at issue, that the excess insurers’ coverage obligations were not triggered merely because the insureds’ losses exceeded the amount of the underlying insurance, where the underlying insurance has not been exhausted by actual payment.

 

A copy of the Southern District of New York Judge Richard Sullivan’s September 28, 2011 opinion can be found here.

 

Background

This insurance coverage case arises out of the bankruptcy of Commodore International Limited (the manufacturer of the classic Commodore 64 personal computer, pictured above). In connection with the bankruptcy proceedings, numerous lawsuits were filed against the company’s former directors and officers. Most of these actions have been resolved, save only one proceeding remaining in the Bahamas where the claimants seek to recover $100 million. The defendants have so far incurred a total of $14 million in losses as a result of the various actions.

 

At the time of the bankruptcy, Commodore carried a total of $51 million of D&O insurance arranged in eight layers and involving six insurers. Unfortunately for the company’s former directors and officers, the first and fourth excess layers were provided by Reliance Insurance Company, and the third and sixth level excess insurance was provided by The Home Insurance Company. In 2001, Reliance went into a regulatory liquidation, and in 2003 so did The Home.

 

The primary layer of insurance was exhausted by payment of losses. However, due to Reliance’s insolvency, the individuals were unable to obtain insurance for losses that went into the next layer of insurance. The individuals then turned to the solvent upper level excess insurers, seeking to have them provide coverage for the individuals’ continuing defense fees and other losses. The solvent excess insurer that provided the second and fifth level excess insurance agreed to advance defense fees pursuant to an interim funding agreement and later filed an action (in which the other solvent excess  insurers joined) seeking a judicial declaration that there was no coverage under its excess policies as a result of the insolvent underlying insurers’ unpaid gaps. The individual directors and officers sought to establish that there was coverage under the solvent excess insurers’ policies, claiming that the excess insurers’ payment obligations had been triggered because osses exceeded the amount of the underlying insurance.

 

The policies of the solvent excess insurers all contained a similar provision essentially providing that “the Underlying Policies shall be maintained during the Policy Period ….Failure to comply with the foregoing will not invalidate this policy but the [excess insurance carrier] shall not be liable to a greater extent that if this condition had been complied with.” In addition, the excess policies all have provisions essentially providing that their policies are triggered only “in the event of exhaustion of all of the limit(s) of liability of such Underlying Insurance solely as a result of payment of losses thereunder.”

 

The September 28 Opinion

In his September 28 opinion, Judge Sullivan agreed with the excess insurers that they had no obligation to “drop down” to fill the insolvent insurers’ gaps, and he also concluded that the excess insurers’ obligations under their policies had not been triggered merely because the individuals’ losses exceeded the amount of the underlying insurance.

 

Judge Sullivan found that the laws of New York and Pennsylvania “clearly provide” that “an excess insurer is not required to fill gaps in coverage created by the insolvency of the underlying insurer.” He went on to note that

 

The Insurance Contracts themselves make no mention whatsoever of such an obligation. To the contrary, the policies expressly state that, in the event that Defendants fail to maintain underlying insurance, the insurers “shall not be liable to a greater extent than if this condition had been complied with.” This language expressly demonstrates that the coverage provided by the Excess Insurers will not be enlarged to compensate for gaps in underlying coverage.

 

In rejecting the individuals’ argument that the excess insurers’ payment obligations were triggered because the amount of the individuals’ losses exceeded the amount of underlying insurance, Judge Sullivan found that the “express language” in the excess insurers’ policies requiring exhaustion of the underlying limits by actual payment of loss in order to trigger coverage “establishes a clear condition precedent to the attachment of the Excess Policies,” and therefore it is “clear from plain language of the Excess Policies…that the excess coverage will not be triggered solely by the aggregation of Defendants’ covered losses. Rather the Excess Policies expressly state that coverage does not attach until there is payment of the underlying losses.”

 

In reaching this latter conclusoin, Judge Sullivan rejected the applicability of the 1928 Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insuance Co. casae, and similar cases. Judge Sullivan said these cases "provide not guidance because they involved circumstances where the insured had accepted partial insurance from the underlying carriers while making up the shorfall themselves. In this case and unike in Zeig, the carriers "have a clear bargained for interest in assuring that the underlying policies are exhausted by actual payment." 

 

Discussion

This case provides a sharp reminder that though insurance carriers fail infrequently, when they do it is a real mess. This reminder highlights the all-too-often overlooked importance of carrier solvency – and not just when coverage is bound but also at the time when a claim must be paid.

 

The mess created by the carriers’ insolvency, compounded by the excess carriers’ ability to avoid dropping down to fill the gap, leaves these individuals uninsured for their continuing expenses and exposures. Which in turn provides a vivid illustration of the value of a so-called Excess Side A/DIC policy, which  by its terms would drop down and provide coverage in the event of the insolvency of an underlying carrier.

 

Excess Side A/DIC policies were available at the time that Commodore procured its D&O insurance, but they were not nearly as pervasive as they are now. (The policies that were available at that time were somewhat more restrictive than those available today.) If Commodore’s insurance program had included an Excess Side A/DIC policy, the individual defendants might have been able to rely on that policy to defend themselves notwithstanding the gaps caused by the insurers’ insolvency

 

Judge Sullivan’s holding that the excess insurers’ payment obligations were not triggered even though the individuals’ losses exceed the amount of the underlying insurance is consistent with other recent decisions in which the courts have interpreted the excess insurer’s trigger language to require exhaustion of the underlying insurance by the actual payment of loss (refer for example here and here).

 

This case may also represent the first occasion on which a court applying New York law expressly declined to follow Zeig. However, the court never conclusively stated whether it was applying New York law; rather, Judge Sullivan said only that the outcome was the same whether New York or Pennsylvania law applied. He also distinguished Zeig rather than overtly declining to follow it.

 

It is worth noting that in the current D&O insurance marketplace excess insurance policies are available with trigger language that allows the amount of the underlying limits of liability to be paid either by the insurer or the insured, in order for the excess insurer’s payment obligation to be triggered. How this language would have affected the outcome of this case is not entirely clear, because it does not appear from the record whether or not the individuals have actually funded the shortfall themselves. (My impression is they did not.)

 

It is astonishing to note that ten full years after Reliance failed, problems from its failure continue to arise. It somehow seems appropriate that all of these ghosts from an earlier era have all gathered in this one locale, presided over by the specter of the late lamented Commodore 64. Clearly, the former directors and officers continue to be haunted by their former company’s remarkably unlucky choice of carriers. (This company doubled down on its bad luck, by managing to slot both of the eventually insolvent carriers in two different layers each in Commodore’s insurance program.)

 

One final note. Commodore’s primary insurance carrier has a name that would have been completely unknown to all concerned at the time Commodore procured its coverage. The primary insurer is a company now known as “Chartis” – a company that in that bygone era was known by a different name altogether.

 

Yes, there are all kinds of ghosts roaming around on the set of this production.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of Judge Sullivan’s opinion.

 

“As of Now, I am in Control”: There is at least one more ghost to mention here. Among Commodore’s former directors and officers was the late Alexander Haig, Jr. who among other things served as Secretary of State under Ronald Regan. Haig had a distinguished career of public service, but he will be most remembered for his unfortunate statements shortly after Reagan had been shot: “Constitutionally gentlemen, you have the president, the vice president and the secretary of state, in that order, and should the president decide he wants to transfer the helm to the vice president, he will do so. As for now, I’m in control here, in the White House, pending the return of the vice president and in close touch with him. If something came up, I would check with him, of course.”

 

Unfortunate News for Former Directors and Officers in Failed Bank Litigation: There’s some bad news for former directors and officers of failed banks defending themselves in FDIC litigation. On September 27, 2011, in the case the FDIC filed in the Central District of California against four former officers of IndyMac bank (in what was the first lawsuit the FDIC filed in the current round of bank failures, as discussed here), Judge Dale Fischer granted in part the FDIC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to certain of the defendants’ affirmative defenses.  A copy of Judge Fischer’s opinion can be found here.

 

Judge Fischer held that because the FDIC as receiver stands in the shoes of the failed bank, the defendants could not assert defenses based on the FDIC’s pre-receivership actions or omissions. Accordingly, she granted the FDIC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the individual defendants’ defenses of unclean hands, failure to mitigate and ratification. She did deny the FDIC’s motion as to other affirmative defenses, including the business judgment rule.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending me a copy of Judge Fischer’s opinion.

 

D&O Insurance: When Can Individuals' Fraudulent Misconduct be Imputed to the Insured Entity?

The typical D&O insurance policy precludes coverage for loss arising from fraudulent misconduct. But when an insured has been convicted of fraud, whose coverage is precluded? In the second case in recent days to address the consequences for the insured entity of the criminal conviction of one of the entity’s principals, Judge James L. Graham of the Southern District of Ohio held on September 16, 2011 that the criminal convictions of several principals of National Century Financial Enterprises preluded D&O insurance coverage not only for those individuals but for the insured entity’s successor in interest as well. Judge Graham’s opinion, which addresses a number of recovering issues, can be found here.

 

National Century had been in the business of purchasing accounts receivable at a discount from healthcare providers and then raising capital by issuing investment grade notes backed by the receivables. It later emerged that many of the accounts receivable were worthless or nonexistent, and the funds raised through the notes offerings were paid to healthcare companies in which principals of National Century held undisclosed ownership interest. The principals of the company caused National Century to issue financial reports that were entirely fabricated.

 

Eventually the multibillion dollar scheme collapsed and National Century filed for bankruptcy. Several of the principals of National Century were ultimately convicted of a variety of criminal charges. The principals appealed their criminal convictions and while their convictions on certain of the charges were overturned, their convictions were otherwise affirmed.

 

During the period March 28, 2002 to March 28, 2003, National Century had a $10 million D&O insurance program in place, arranged with a $5 million primary policy and an additional $5 million follow form policy excess of the primary $5 million. Though these policies were to expire on March 28, 2003, National Century exercised an option under both policies to purchase an additional one year of discovery coverage for claims that arose during the original policy period.

 

The Unencumbered Asset Trust (UAT), which was created by the bankruptcy court to pursue claims belonging to National Century and its subsidiaries, filed an adversary action against the company’s D&O insurance carriers seeking a judicial declaration that the policies were enforceable and requesting an equitable apportionment of the policies’ proceeds among the insureds. The primary carrier filed a motion to deposit its policy limits in the registry of the court and to obtain a discharge of its liability. The bankruptcy court granted this motion and later apportioned the $5 million primary policy among UAT (which received $1.5 million) and seven individuals (who received $500,000 each).

 

Contrary to the actions of the primary carrier, the excess carrier disputed coverage and filed a counterclaim seeking rescission of its policy and seeking a declaratory judgment that the excess policy was void. After additional proceedings, the parties to the insurance coverage action filed cross motions for summary judgment. UAT argued that the excess carrier was not entitled to rescission and in any event had waived its right to rescind. UAT also argued that the principals’ criminal conviction cannot be imputed to the entity, and therefore the fraud exclusion did not preclude coverage for the entity (and its successor in interest, UAT).

 

In his September 16, 2011 opinion, Judge Graham held, based on the misrepresentations in the company’s financial statements, which statements were incorporated by reference into the application and therefore into the policy, that the excess insurer had a substantial basis on which to rescind the policy. However, he found there was a genuine issue of material fact on the questions of whether the excess carrier had waived its right to rescission by agreeing to issue the discovery coverage and by accepting the premium for the discovery coverage. (By the time the discovery coverage was acquired, National Century had already filed for bankruptcy and allegations of misconduct had already come to light.)

 

Judge Graham had little difficulty concluding that, as a result of their criminal convictions, coverage under the excess policy for the convicted individuals’ loss was precluded by the policy’s fraud exclusion. Lance Poulson, the company’s founder and former President and Chairman, had tried to argue that the exclusion could not be applied to him because he still has the option of filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, and therefore the “adjudication” of his criminal misconduct was not yet “final.” 

 

Judge Graham rejected this argument holding that the “type of finality” that Poulson “espoused” is “not required to trigger the fraud exclusion.” Rather the exclusion requires only “a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to such Insured.” Judge Graham found that this provision “speaks nothing of exhaustion of appellate review.” Poulson’s criminal conviction alone was held sufficient to establish the applicability of the exclusion.

 

Judge Graham then turned to the question of whether or not these individuals’ fraudulent misconduct could be imputed to UAT, the entity’s successor in interest. Many policies have specific provisions designed to address to whom and how insured persons’ conduct will be imputed, but Judge Graham’s opinion does not reference any policy language in connection with the question whether or not the individuals’ fraudulent misconduct could be imputed to the entity. Instead, his analysis turned on various aspects of agency law addressing the question of whether and when the conduct an agent acting on his or her own account can be imputed to their principal. Judge Graham held that because the individuals so dominated the principal the principal itself had no separate existence or identity, and therefore their financial fraud must be imputed to the entity.

 

Discussion

Judge Graham’s conclusion here that the individuals’ fraudulent misconduct could be imputed to the entity (and its successor in interest) stands in interesting contrast to Southern District of New York Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald’s September 9, 2011 decision in the SafeNet coverage case (about which refer here), in which Judge Buchwald held that the criminal guilty plea of SafeNet’s CFO could not be imputed to SafeNet itself for purposes of determining the applicability to SafeNet of its excess D&O insurance policy’s fraud exclusion.

 

The difference in outcome between the two cases may be due in part to the fact that in the SafeNet case, Judge Buchwald was interpreting the imputation language in the policies at issue, whereas here Judge Graham was applying general agency law principles. In the SafeNet case, even though the relevant policy language provided that knowledge and facts could be imputed to company, the adjudication of the CFO’s criminal misconduct could not be imputed to SafeNet. That is, the imputation to the company under the policy’s language was limited to “facts” and “knowledge,” whereas here, Judge Graham found that the individuals’ fraudulent misconduct could be imputed to the company and its successor in interest.

 

I do wonder whether or not this apparent distinction really does explain the difference in outcome, though. The relevant exclusionary language at issue here precludes coverage for loss in connection with any claim against any insured “brought about or contributed to by any deliberately fraudulent or deliberately dishonest act or omission. by such Insured” but only “if a judgment or final adjudication adverse to such Insured establishes such a deliberately fraudulent or deliberately fraudulent dishonest act or omission.” (Emphasis added)

 

I don’t know whether the entity’s successor in interest raised this argument but it seems like it could have been argued that there had been no adjudication adverse to the entity as required in order for the exclusion to preclude coverage for the entity.  Even if as Judge Graham found that the individuals’ misconduct can be imputed to the entity and its successor as a result of the application of agency law principles, there does not seem to be anything that would impute the adjudication of those individuals’ misconduct to the entity. That was certainly the reasoning of Judge Buchwald in the SafeNet case.

 

It may be purely coincidental, but I do think it is noteworthy that in both the SafeNet case and this case the coverage issues were being raised not by the primary insurers but rather by the excess insurers. This is yet another example of a phenomenon I have noted before on this site, which is that so many of the litigated coverage disputes seem to involve excess carriers.

 

The procedural step taken by the primary carrier here may be particularly of interest in light of the issues recently raised in the Lehman Brothers case (about which refer here). The individual officers and directors of the Lehman subsidiary are trying to contend in the Lehman bankruptcy that they are entitled to some type of equitable apportionment of the remaining D&O insurance. The difference between that proceeding and what occurred here with respect to the primary carrier’s policy proceeds  is that here the primary insurer here  deposited its policy proceeds with the court (presumably through some type of interpleader). The Lehman bankruptcy court may lack an equivalent procedural context for the type of apportionment that the Lehman subsidiary executives seek. But it is nevertheless interesting to seen an example of a situation where a court provided for the equitable apportionment of insurance proceeds along the lines that the Lehman subsidiary executives are seeking in the Lehman bankruptcy.

 

In any event, it is probably worth noting that even though Judge Graham concluded that the fraud exclusion precludes coverage for the convicted individuals and for the entity’s successor in interest, that is not the end of this matter. There are other insured persons seeking the benefit of the policy proceeds. These persons include the company’s former outside directors and Poulson’s wife., who was also an officer of the company. These persons were not criminally convicted. So as a result of Judge Graham’s conclusion that the are genuine issues of material fact on the question of whether or not the excess insurer waived its right to policy rescission, this case must go forward in order to determine whether or not those individuals do or do not have coverage under the excess policy.

 

Hartford Financial Subprime-Related Securities Suit Dismissed: Speaking of Judge Buchwald, on September 19, 2011, she granted with prejudice the motion to dismiss of the defendants in The Hartford Financial Services subprime-related securities class action lawsuit.  A copy of Judge Buchwald’s opinion can be found here.

 

As discussed here, the plaintiffs filed suit against the company and certain of its directors and officers in March 2010, alleging that the company had failed to disclose its growing exposure to derivatives and hedging contracts, the deterioration of which had caused the company’s public statements about its financial condition to become inaccurate. The plaintiffs also alleged that the company used inflated valuations for mortgage-backed assets on the company’s balance sheet, which resulted in an overstatement of the company’s capital position.

 

In granting the defendants’ motion dismiss, Judge Buchwald noted that the plaintiffs’ allegations were “unusual” because they did not allege that the company had violated GAAP or even that the company’s regulatory filings contained a misrepresentation or omission. Instead, she noted, “plaintiffs base their entire complaint on a unilateral, and ultimately unsupported, interpretation of The Hartford’s insurance filing, and their belief about what this document reveals about defendants’ state of mind and valuation of assets.” The plaintiffs, she said, have made “an unfounded assumption about the year-end insurance filings and follow that with a series of equally unfounded extrapolations based on this flawed assumption.”

 

I have in any event added Judge Buchwald's ruling in The Hartford case to my running tally of subprime-related lawsuit dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here. Nate Raymond’s September 19, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article about the dismissal in The Hartford case can be found here.

 

FDIC Failed Bank Lawsuits Will Peak in 2012?: In yesterday’s post, I noted that the FDIC’s lawsuit filing activity picked up momentum in August. I also suggested that in light of the timing of bank closures and the seeming lag time between prior closures and later lawsuits, it appears that there will be many more lawsuits in the months ahead, particularly as we head into 2012.

 

In a September 19, 2011 post on the blog of the Joseph & Cohen law firm, Jon Joseph presents his analysis which he believes shows that the FDIC’s failed bank litigation filings are likely to peak in 2012. Joseph has a number of interesting observations about the cases the FDIC has filed so far as part of the current wave of bank failures and has some interesting speculations about what may lie ahead, in particular about how many lawsuits are yet to come and when they are likely to be filed. Among other things he speculates based on the current number of bank failures that there will be lawsuits in connection with about 80 additional failed banks, beyond the 14 lawsuits that have been filed so far.

 

D&O Insurance: Coverage for SafeNet Options Backdating Securities Suit Settlement Denied

The options backdating scandal may now be ancient history, but questions surrounding insurance coverage for the scandal’s consequences apparently continue to live on. In a September 9, 2011 opinion applying Maryland law, Southern District of New York Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald ruled in a coverage action brought by SafeNet’s excess D&O insurer that, among many things, there is no coverage under the policy for SafeNet’s $25 million options backdating-related securities lawsuit settlement.

 

The opinion addresses a number of recurring policy issues, including questions of claim interrelatedness and relation back; imputation of fraudulent misconduct; application of the consent to settlement provision; and imputation of application misrepresentations for purposes of policy rescission.  

 

Beginning in early 2006, SafeNet experienced a series of legal problems. These problems began with the company’s February 2006 announcement that it was restating prior financial statements. On May 18, 2006, the company announced it had received a subpoena from the U.S. Attorney as well as an informal inquiry from the SEC. Shortly thereafter, the company announced that it was forming a special committee to investigate its stock option granting practice. In September 2006 the company announced that the committee concluded that certain prior stock options had been accounting for using incorrect measurement dates and as a result its financial statements for the relevant periods would have to be restated.

 

These developments led to a variety of legal proceedings, including a securities class action lawsuits (about which refer here). There was also an SEC enforcement proceeding and a criminal investigation. The SEC proceeding resulted in the entry of a permanent injunction against the company’s former CFO, Carole Argo. Argo also pled guilty to a single count of securities fraud. The consolidated  securities class action litigation was later settled for $25 million.

 

For the period March 12, 2005 to March 12, 2006, the company carried $15 million of D&O insurance, arranged with a primary $10 million layer, and a $5 million layer of insurance excess of the primary. For the period March 12, 2006 to March 12, 2007, the company also carried $15 million of D&O insurance, arranged in the same way as the prior year.

 

On February 28, 2006, the company sent its primary carrier a copy of the initial financial restatement disclosure. Both the primary carrier and the excess carrier accepted this letter as a notice of circumstances that might give rise to a claim. The company advised the carriers of the various legal matters as they later arose. The carriers took the position that all of the subsequent notices and claims related back to the initial notice of circumstances and therefore the various matters implicated only the 2005-06 policies, regardless of when the later claims may have been made.

 

Later, after Argo entered her guilty plea, the primary carrier advised the company that it was no longer entitled to coverage under its policy. The excess carrier advised the company that due to the guilty plea, “a declination of coverage is in order in certain respects” under the excess policy, and that “rescission of the policy may be appropriate.” The excess carrier asked the company to enter a tolling agreement.

 

SafeNet later settled the securities class action lawsuit and paid the settlement amount. In the later coverage action, the parties stipulated that the company did not notify the excess carrier of the settlement negotiations and did not seek the excess carrier’s consent to settlement. In the later coverage action, the company contended that it spent more than $20 million in defense costs for itself and the directors and officers, including more than $10 million in defense costs for directors and officers other than Argo.

 

The excess carrier filed an action against Safeguard, Argo and the company’s former CEO, Anthony Caputo., seeking a judicial declaration of its coverage obligations and seeking a rescission of the renewal excess insurance policy. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing amount other things that the case could not proceed without the primary carrier as a party and arguing further that the case was premature because the primary policy had not been exhausted. In a December 7, 2010 order (discussed here, scroll down), Judge Buchwald denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

 

In her September 9 opinion, Judge Buchwald denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion and granted the excess carriers’ motion in part and denied the excess carrier’s motion in part. Among other things, Judge Buchwald agreed that all of the claims relate back to the 2005-06 policy and that only the 2005-06 policy was implicated; that any loss incurred by Argo was precluded from coverage by the policy’s fraudulent conduct exclusion, but that coverage for the company’s loss was not precluded by that exclusion; that because the company had failed to obtain the excess carrier’s  settlement approval, there was no coverage under the excess policy for the $25 million securities class action settlement; and that to the extent that there is coverage under the renewal excess policy, the excess carrier was entitled to rescind the policy as to Argo and the company based on Argo’s application misrepresentations.

 

In contending that they were entitled to coverage under the 2006-07 renewal excess policy, the defendants had argued that the various option backdating problems were not even discovered until the middle of 2006 and therefore could not relate  back to the February 2006 notification sent to the carriers. In rejecting these arguments, Judge Buchwald found that in the class action lawsuit, the financial irregularities disclosed in February 2006 and the stock options backdating were “part of an interrelated course of conduct.” 

 

With respect to the policy’s relation back language, Judge Buchwald said that “these provisions make clear that the relation back of a claim turns upon the nature of the allegations in a subsequent Claim, not simply on the relationship in fact between an earlier notice of circumstances and a later Claim.” Because of the interrelationship between the two types of conduct and the “broad-relation back language” in the policies, she concluded that the subsequent matters relate back to the original notification and therefore only the 2005-06 policy was implicated.

 

Although she concluded that the fraudulent conduct exclusion precluded coverage for Argo, she concluded that the exclusion did not preclude coverage for the company. Even though policy language imputed “facts” and “knowledge” possessed by Argo to the company for purposes of determining the applicability of the exclusion to the company, the exclusion still does not apply to the company unless there has been an adverse judgment against the company. There was no adverse judgment against the company, and the judgment against Argo cannot be imputed to the company. Accordingly, notwithstanding Argo’s guilty plea and the imputation to the company of the facts and knowledge possessed by her, the exclusion does not operation to preclude coverage for the company.

 

However, the fact that the exclusion did not apply to the company does not mean that the company is entitled to coverage under the policy. Judge Buchwald concluded that the company was not entitled to coverage under the policy for the $25 million settlement because it had failed to get the carrier’s prior consent to settle. She said further that the she “could not conclude that the company was excused” from complying with the consent to settlement provisions. 

 

As for the question of whether or not there was coverage under the policy for the more than $10 million the company incurred defending the directors and officers other than Argo, Judge Buchwald concluded that because there was no record evidence that the company had actually indemnified any particular director and officer and the state of the record is “undeveloped” she could not decide the question of coverage for the defense fees.

 

Finally, although she had concluded that SafeNet’s claims did not implicate the renewal excess policy, Judge Buchwald concluded that to the extent the renewal policy does apply, the excess carrier was entitled to rescission as to Argo and as to the company. She found that because Argo admitted to knowingly and with intent to defraud causing the company to file inaccurate public filing, the carrier was entitled to rescission was to her. Moreover, Argo’s knowledge was imputable to other insureds. And while the policy allows individual insureds to establish lack of actual knowledge, it does not allow the company to establish that it lacked knowledge.

 

Discussion

This case is a veritable textbook of D&O Insurance coverage issues and Judge Buchwald’s opinion contains a number of rulings that could be important in many other cases.

 

Her ruling that the subsequent legal proceedings all relate back to the date of the initial notice, and therefore that only the 2005-06 policy is triggered, is likely to be of particular interest in many of the credit crisis related cases, in connection with many of which the insurance carriers are arguing that all of the various lawsuits filed against a particular company all relate back to a single, earlier policy year. Indeed that is the position that the carriers are taking in connection the Lehman Brothers lawsuits, as discussed in a recent post. The broad reading Judge Buchwald gave to the interrelated claim and relation back language here could prove to be very helpful for the carriers in many of these cases.

 

On the other hand, Judge Buchwald’s interpretation of the fraudulent conduct exclusion, and the limitations on what she was willing to impute to the company, will likely motivate carriers to quickly review  their policy language to see whether the imputation provisions in their fraud exclusion require an adjudication of the fraudulent misconduct even when the fraud has been  imputed. I suspect it came as a surprise here that if there was an adjudication of fraud as to Argo and that fraud was imputed to the company that the company could still retain coverage under the policy if the adjudication itself was not imputed to the company or there was otherwise no adjudication of the company’s fraudulent misconduct. I suspect many carriers are going to want to hold up their fraud exclusion and compare them to the fraud exclusion applicable here to see whether their fraud exclusion might operate as the fraud exclusion did here

 

As an aside, it is probably worth noting that Judge Buchwald was satisfied that a guilty plea represented an “adjudication” sufficient to trigger the exclusion. Perhaps that is a common sense interpretation, but I can certainly imagine the argument that a guilty plea is different from an adjudication, since there was no separate determination by a finder of fact, but merely an admission. Judge Buchwald’s conclusion that the guilty plea was sufficient would seem to undercut the argument that the exclusion could have said that an admission was sufficient to trigger the exclusion, but instead it required an adjudicated determination, which is different from an admission.

 

On the other hand, with respect to the topic of imputation, in her analysis of the rescission issues, Judge Buchwald found that Argo’s knowledge was imputable to the company under the applicable policy language. Thus Argo’s knowledge of application misrepresentations was sufficient to rescind coverage not only for herself but for the company as well. What observers may find most noteworthy about this is not just the imputation to the company but the fact that the application misrepresentations to which the imputation applied were in the form of misstatements in the company’s financial filings. In other words, the very financial misrepresentations that might attract a lawsuit might also wind up removing the company’s insurance coverage – at least where as here a senior corporate official has pled guilty to knowing fraudulent misrepresentation.

 

The final determination of significance in Judge Buchwald’s opinion is her conclusion that the company’s failure to obtain prior consent to settlement precludes coverage under the policy for the settlement. While a number of court have recently reiterated the enforceability of the consent to settlement clause (refer, for example, here), what is noteworthy here is that she found that the failure to obtain consent was not waived even where the carrier has said it has grounds to deny coverage, is contemplating rescission and has asked for a tolling agreement. The company undoubtedly felt like it had been left by the carrier to do the best it could to look after its interests, yet Judge Buchwald had found that the consent requirement had not been waive.

 

Judge Buchwald’s willingness to enforce the consent requirement even in these circumstances is yet another reminder of the critical importance of communicating with the carrier even under these types of strained circumstances. One protective step the company might have been able to take to avoid triggering a consent problem would be to obtain the carrier’s agreement that it would not raise the consent issue as an additional defense to coverage beyond those the carrier had said it believed it had grounds to assert.

 

Ad Nauseum: I was flipping channels earlier this week and I stopped to watch part of a major league soccer game. The field on which the game was being played had a billboard that said “Infinitum.” I idly wondered what product or service  the billboard might be referring to, and then it hit me – the billboard is nothing less than an “ad infinitum.”

 

Fights Worth Watching: Lehman Execs Spar over D&O Insurance, SEC Pursues Chinese Co. Auditor

A group of former executives of a Lehman Brothers subsidiary   is seeking to block the bid by senior Lehman executives to use $90 million of the remaining D&O insurance proceeds to settle the cases pending against them. As discussed here, on August 24, 2011, the senior executives filed a motion with the Lehman bankruptcy court seeking access to $90 million in insurance funds to settle the securities suits pending against them. On September 8, 2011, seven executives of Lehman’s Structured Asset Securities Corp. (Sasco) objected to the requested $90 million drawdown, arguing that it would leave the Sasco executives without sufficient insurance funds remaining to settle the claims pending against them. A copy of the Sasco executives' opposition papers can be found here.

 

The Sasco executives, like the senior Lehman executives who seek the $90 million, are defendants in a number of securities class action lawsuits involving events leading up to Lehman’s collapse. As I detailed in my prior post about the senior Lehman executives request for the $90 million in insurance proceeds, defense expenses and other costs (including an arbitration settlement) have already significantly eroded the $250 million insurance tower. The Sasco executives claim they now have an opportunity to settle the $4 billion claims pending against them for $45 million. They contend that if the senior executives draw down the $90 million they seek, there will be insufficient remaining insurance funds to settle the claims against them.

 

In their opposition papers, the Sasco executives argue that the $90 million drawdown would represent a “disproportionate and inequitable portion” of the remaining funds. They argue that “permitting one class of insureds to use such tactics to divert a disproportionate share of insurance proceeds for their benefit to the exclusion of other classes of insureds is inequitable, contrary to the purpose of the available D&O insurance and would have an adverse economic impact on the Debtors’ estate.”

 

The Sasco executives note that the fight is with respect to Lehman’s 2007-2008 tower of insurance, which originally totaled $250 million. (This tower is described in detail in an earlier post about Lehman’s D&O insurance, here.) The Sasco executives contend that their claim actually implicated the separate $250 million 2008-2009 tower,  as it was during that policy period that the claims were first made against them. However, the carriers in the 2008-2009 D&O insurance tower apparently contend that the claims against the Sasco executives relate back to claims first  made during the 2007-2008 insurance tower’s policy period, and therefore it is the 2007-2008 tower that is implicated with respect to the claims against the Sasco executives. The Sasco executives dispute this position of the insurers, but they note in the motion papers that they cannot establish their entitlement to the proceeds of the 2008-2009 tower without protracted and expensive coverage litigation.

 

It is worth noting that the senior executives request for the $90 million drawdown would not in and of itself deplete the amounts remaining in the $250 million 2007-2008 tower. As discussed in my post about the settlement, it looks as if the drawdown would leave about $50 million remaining, which would seem to be enough to fund the Sasco executives’ proposed $45 million settlement. In their motion papers, however, the Sasco executives assert that the senior Lehman executives “will quickly attempt to settle other claims asserted against them, exhausting the remaining limits under the 2007-08 D&O policy,” contending that the senior executives “seek to appropriate all of the remaining proceeds …for their own benefit, to the exclusion of the Sasco defendants.”

 

The Sasco executives argue that they have “an equal right to insurance protection” as the senior executives and that it “would be inconsistent with the purpose of D&O insurance to permit one class to monopolize the protection.” The Sasco defendants seek to have the bankruptcy court deny the senior executives’ motion for the $90 million drawdown and to enter an order adopting an “allocation scheme” that more equitably divides the remaining proceeds. They note that they are not arguing that the proposed $90 million settlement is “unreasonable,” they simply object to the fact that the senior executives’ requested drawdown would leave them using the remaining proceeds to enter a settlement of the claims against them.

 

This situation represents a classic example of the too-many-insured, too-many-claims, not-enough-insurance problem. These problems come up in all sorts of contexts, although rarely in cases as high profile as this. The most basic problem is that even with $250 million in insurance, there is not nearly enough insurance to defend and settle all of the claims involving insured persons. The question is how the insufficient insurance proceeds should be applied.

 

There are procedural mechanisms available to deal with these types of situations, such as interpleader, where the insurer(s) simply deposit the insurance with the court and the court sorts out the entitlements. The insurers themselves would have to initiate an interpleader action. The Sasco executives are hoping to enlist the bankruptcy court to perform an equivalent allocation on an equitable basis. In their motion papers, they reference an earlier bankruptcy case where the D&O insurance policy proceeds were allocated in a pro rata basis. This type of scheme might well be equitable, but the problem is that given the number of individuals involved and the seriousness of the claims against them, a per capita allocation might leave everyone with insufficient funds to settle any of the claims against them.

 

The one thing that seems likely if the Sasco executives are unable to secure for themselves a portion of the 2007-08 insurance tower to settle the claims pending against them, they will be under pressure to try to establish that they are entitled to proceeds of the 2008-09 tower. Such a bid would involve very significant questions regarding the interrelatedness of the claims made against them with the prior claims on which the carriers are relying to argue that the claim against the Sasco executives do not involve 2008-09 insurance tower, but instead relate back to the 2007-08 tower.

 

It will in any event be interesting to see how the bankruptcy court responds to these competing claims to the proceeds of the D&O insurance coverage. The situation certainly underscores the fundamental tension that arises from the fact that the D&O insurance must provide protection for a significant number of individual directors and officers, and the fact that in the event of a catastrophic claim, the various individuals can find themselves in competition for the D&O insurance policy proceeds. One way to address this problem of course is to buy more insurance. But as the Lehman example shows, there may be limits to how much can be accomplished simply by buying more insurance. If $250 million is not enough insurance, higher limits is not going to solve much for most companies.

 

This may be one of those problems that may not be susceptible to solution, but one possible approach to ameliorate this situation is through program structure. For example, if the outside directors had their own separate tower of insurance, those amounts could be applied toward defending and settling the claims against them while the proceeds of the main policy could be applied toward the settlement of the claims against the officers. Of course, even this arrangement would not have eliminated the possibility of the kinds of problems that have arisen here. It is at least one way to try to address problems due to the fact that so many individuals are entitled to and would want the benefit of the proceeds of the main D&O insurance policy’s protection.

 

A September 10, 2011 Wall Street Journal article about the Sasco executives’ motion can be found here.

 

SEC Seeks to Enforce Subpoena Against Longtop Financial Auditor: The SEC is going on the warpath to try to enforce a subpoena that it served on Longtop Financial’s former auditor, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (DTT), which is the Shanghai-based affiliate of the global accounting firm, Deloitte Touche. As discussed here, Longtop is one of the many U.S.-listed Chinese companies to be caught up in accusations of accounting impropriety in recent months. DTT resigned as Longtop’s auditor earlier this year.

 

The allegations surrounding Longtop attracted the attention of the SEC, and at least according to news reports, the company recently received a Wells Notice from the SEC. The SEC also apparently tried to subpoena DTT in connection with its investigation of Longtop. As reported in the SEC’s Sept. 8, 2011 press release (here), DTT failed to produce the requested documents and so the on September 8 the SEC filed a motion with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia requiring DTT to comply with the subpoena. The SEC’s motion papers can be found here.

 

The SEC’s motion papers report that DTT’s U.S. counsel had sent a letter to the SEC asserting that (1) the firm could not be compelled to produce documents created prior to July 21, 2010, the effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, and (2) that in any event producing any documents could subject the firm to sanctions for violations of Chinese secrecy laws.

 

The SEC contends that DTT’s arguments are “apparently based on a misunderstanding of the legal basis for the subpoena,” arguing further that the subpoena was not dependent on the additional powers given the SEC in the Dodd-Frank Act but rather was based on the SEC’s long standing subpoena power. The SEC argued further DTT’s “vague assertions of possible conflicts with a foreign law provide no justification” for DTT’s “continued non-compliance with the Subpoena.” The SEC argued that DTT’s “speculative” assertion that compliance would subject it to sanctions is “illusory” and furthermore a risk DTT “knowingly accepted by availing itself of the U.S. securities markets.”

 

As detailed in Nate Raymond’s September 8, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article about the SEC’s motion to enforce the subpoena (here), this situation represents something of a test case for the SEC, as (according to one commentator quoted in the article) “the SEC for obvious reasons wants to know if it can get to these documents in the future.” Another commentator in a September 10, 2011 Wall Street Journal article (here) said that the SEC’s move to enforce the subpoena represents a “major escalation.” The Journal article also notes that the dispute also “highlights the shortcomings of regulation in China, which is complicated by vague laws, competing regulatory agencies and a tight rein on information.”

 

Whatever the significance of the SEC’s action ultimately may prove to be, it is clear that the SEC has ramped up its activity levels in seeking to take action in connection with the U.S.-listed Chinese companies caught up in the accounting scandals. In addition to the Wells notice recently served on Longtop, the SEC also recently served a Wells notice on the Chairman of another Chinese company, Puda Coal (about which refer here).

 

The other thing about the challenges the SEC is facing in trying to enforce its subpoena is that it shows how difficult it will be for any party to pursue legal action against many of these Chinese companies. If the SEC can’t even enforce a subpoena against an audit firm that is registered with the PCAOB, it obviously is going to be a challenge for private litigants to try to pursue discovery from China-based firms and individuals. Indeed, because many claimants have recognized these limitations, they have tried to focus their actions against the outside professionals (underwriters, auditors, attorneys) that have facilitated the Chinese companies’ entries into the U.S. securities markets. But as the SEC’s struggles to enforce its subpoena show, some of these professionals may also be difficult to pursue.

 

Lawyers’ Relief Act: If you have not had a chance to read Eric Dash’s September 8, 2011 New York Times article “Feasting on Paperwork” (here), I recommend taking a few minutes now to read it. Unbeknownst to the rest of us, the Dodd-Frank Act was actually a stimulus package intended to rescue lawyers from the impact of the economic crisis on their profession. The Act is, in the words of one commentator quoted in the article, “a full employment act” for lawyers and consultants. The article goes on to note that new regulation “has long been one of Washington’s unofficial job creation tools.”

 

I don’t know whether to be appalled at the brazen profit-extracting presumption that the lawyers quoted in the article unapologetically express or to be impressed by their naked opportunism. There is little wonder, as the article states, that lawyers and consultants “are salivating at the prospect of even more business opportunities.” The firms are, as noted by one lawyer quoted in the article, “only getting started.”

 

The overwhelming impression is the main consequence of the Act is the enrichment of a small number of professionals at the expense of the entire economy. And lawyers wonder why they do not enjoy a higher regard in our society. The article reminds me of the old joke about how research scientists are now going to use lawyers rather than rats in their scientific experiments -- there aren’t enough rats; there is no danger that the scientists will become emotionally attached to the lawyers; and there are some things that rats just won’t do.

 

The Moral of the Ducks: Even when you are completely blown away by unexpected events, the thing to do is to regroup, quickly get it back together, and march on.

What to Watch Now in the World of D&O

Every fall since I first started writing this blog, I have assembled a list of the current hot topics in the world of directors’ and officers’ liability. This year’s list is set out below. As should be obvious, there is a lot going on right now in the world of D&O, with further changes just over the horizon. The year ahead could be very interesting and eventful. Here is what to watch now in the world of D&O:

 

1. How Massive Will the Total Cost of the Subprime and Credit Crisis Litigation Wave Turn Out to Be?: Even though the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave is now well into its fifth year, only a small number of the cases have settled. But in recent weeks, a number of cases have settled in quick succession, and these settlements have been very substantial.

 

The recent settlements include the largest so far in subprime and credit crisis-related cases, the $627 million Wachovia bondholders settlement, about which refer here. Other settlements include the following: Washington Mutual, $208.5 million (refer here); Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities, $125 million (refer here); National City, $168 Million (refer here); Colonial Bank, $10.5 million (refer here); and Lehman Brothers executives, $90 million (refer here).

 

With these latest settlements (many of which are subject to court approval), there have now been a total of 29 settlements collectively representing a total of almost $3.4 billion, for an average settlement of $116 million (although that average is obviously skewed upward by the $627 million Wachovia bondholders settlement and the $624 million Countrywide shareholders settlement)

 

As impressive as these cumulative numbers are, there are still many more cases pending. Of course, a certain number of the pending cases will ultimately be dismissed. But many will not, and eventually those remaining cases will be settled. Although it is impossible to conjecture how large  the total tab for all these cases ultimately will be, the implication from the cases that have settled is that the total amount will be massive.

 

The possibilities here may have significant implications for D&O insurers. Of course, not all of these amounts will be covered by D&O insurance. But a significant chunk will be. Indeed, a number of the recent settlements will be funded entirely by D&O insurance, including the WaMu settlement, the Colonial Bank settlement and the Lehman Brothers settlement. Interestingly, the Lehman settlement will come close to exhausting what is left of Lehman’s $250 million insurance tower.

 

In other words, the D&O insurers have had some very big bills to pay and could have some even bigger bills to pay in the months ahead. To the extent the ultimate loss amounts are fully reserved, these funding requirements will not cause a problem. But to the extent the carriers have not adjusted their loss reserves in anticipation of these losses, the cumulative impact of the coming settlements could be disruptive.

 

2. How Extensive Will the FDIC’s Failed Bank Litigation Efforts Become?: Since January 1, 2008, 392 banks have failed, including 70 so far in 2011 (as of September 2, 2011).  Fortunately, though the closures are continuing to mount, it appears that the failures finally may be starting to wind down. Since the current wave of bank closures began, there have been concerns that, just as it did during the S&L crisis in the late 80s and early 90s, the FDIC will again aggressively pursue claims against the directors and officers of the failed banks. At least so far, the FDIC’s litigation activity has been relatively modest. However, the signs are that the FDIC has merely been gearing up, and that substantial numbers of failed bank lawsuits could be just ahead.

 

As of September 2, 2011, there have been a total of eleven FDIC lawsuits against the directors and officers of failed banks. A number of these were filed in quick succession in August, raising the possibility that the apparent backlog of FDIC lawsuit filings may finally be starting to work out. There clearly are more cases to come. The FDIC’s website states that the agency has authorized suits in connection with 30 failed institutions against 266 individuals for D&O liability with damage claims of at least $6.8 billion. The eleven cases the FDIC has filed so far involve only 77 individuals. Even just taking account of the lawsuits that have already been authorized, there are many more suits to come, and undoubtedly even more lawsuits will be authorized.

 

The latest round of failed bank litigation has been very slow to develop. But at this point it seems likely that for the next several years there is going to be a very significant amount of FDIC litigation involving the directors and officers of failed banks. Moreover, the litigation will not be limited just to cases brought by the FDIC. Many of the failed banks were publicly trade or otherwise have broad and diverse ownership, and in many instances the bank failures have been followed by shareholder litigation. These shareholder suits represent competing claims for the D&O insurance policy proceeds. The competing claimants will be vying to secure the dwindling limits, adding a layer of complexity both for the defendants and for the FDIC.

 

3. Will the Failed Bank Litigation Be Accompanied by a Wave of Coverage Litigation?: During the S&L crisis, the FDIC was involved in extensive litigation to try to establish coverage under D&O insurance policies. Many of the leading cases on the Insured vs. Insured exclusion arose out of this litigation (about which refer here), and the Regulatory Exclusion was also extensively litigated (refer here).

 

The signs are that there could be extensive coverage litigation this time around too. Indeed, when the FDIC recently filed a lawsuit against the former directors and officers of the failed Silverton Bank, it included the bank’s D&O insurers as named defendants. As discussed here, the FDIC’s claims against the D&O insurers in the lawsuit involve the insurers’ attempt to deny coverage for the claim under the Regulatory Exclusion.

 

The FDIC may not be the only litigant involved in D&O insurance coverage litigation. As multiple defendants struggle with the problems associated with too many claims and too many insured persons, the various defendants will want to sort out their entitlement to the policy proceeds. For example, as discussed here, a subsidiary of the failed IndyMac Bank, which is a defendant in a number of lawsuits arising out of the bank’s failure, recently attempt to obtain a judicial declaration of coverage in order to sort out who was entitled to what under the bank’s D&O policies. Although the subsidiary’s claims were dismissed for lack of standing, the case does show that a variety of parties may be interested in using litigation as a way to establish their rights to the proceeds of D&O insurance.

 

The coverage litigation will hardly be limited just to D&O insurance. A recent coverage action in Alabama involved the coverage disputes involving a failed bank’s bond (refer here). There are also likely to be coverage disputes involving errors and omissions insurance. And as other outside professionals, such as accountants and lawyers, get dragged into these cases, there will likely be coverage litigation involving their professional liability policies.

 

For those of us who were involved in the failed bank coverage litigation during the S&L crisis, the return of these types of coverage cases has a very familiar feeling.

 

4. Will the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions Lead to More Claims? And How Will the D&O Insurers Respond?: Among the parts of the Dodd-Frank Act that may have a significant impact on claims is the Act’s whistleblower provisions. The whistleblower provisions include the creation of a new whistleblower bounty pursuant to which individuals who bring violations of securities and commodities laws to the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission will receive between 10 percent and 30 percent of any recovery in excess of $1 million. The SEC recently promulgated rules implementing these provisions.

 

While it is too early to tell what impact the bounty provisions will ultimately have, most observers expect that the substantial incentives provided by the whistleblower provisions will lead to an increased number of whistleblower reports and that these reports will lead to investigations and enforcement actions. In some instances, the revelations in the whistleblowers’ reports will also lead to follow-on civil litigation, as aggrieved shareholders or others pursue claims for misrepresentation or mismanagement. These follow on claims represent one type of potential increase claims exposure arising from the whistleblower provisions. But the possibility of increased numbers of investigations and enforcement actions present their own sets of issues.

 

One of the perennial issues in D&O coverage litigation is the question of policy coverage for regulatory investigations. Individual directors and officers typically covered (depending on policy wording) for both informal inquiries and requests for information, and civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory investigations commenced by either the issuance of a Target Letter or Wells Notice, or after the service of a subpoena. The company itself rarely has coverage for these types of investigations, except when it was named with an individual directors and officer in a “formal” SEC investigation. There typically is no coverage for the Company for responding to informal inquiries and requests for information from the SEC.

 

Many of these issues were discussed in the Second Circuit’s July 1, 2011 opinion in the MBIA case (about which refer here), which held that, under the specific policy language at issue and under the circumstances presented, MBIA’s D&O insurance policies covered the investigative and special litigation expense the company incurred during a regulatory investigation of its accounting practices.

 

Recently, one D&O insurance carrier introduced a new insurance product intended to provide entity coverage for these costs of investigation, as discussed here.  Due to problems of cost, as well as to the high deductibles and coinsurance that the carrier is requiring, this product is still looking for widespread acceptance. But the product’s introduction shows that the D&O insurance industry is working to try to find insurance solutions to the growing need for solutions addressing the regulatory investigation risk. To the extent the new whistleblower provisions mean increased numbers of investigations, companies will be increasingly interested in finding insurance products that address these risks.

 

5. What Will be the Next “Hot” Litigation Target?: From time to time, a sector or industry will find itself as the target of plaintiff securities class action attorneys. Last summer, for a brief period, the hot sector was the for-profit education section. Since then, the hot target has been U.S.-listed Chinese companies. This year alone, there have been 32 cases filed against U.S-listed Chinese companies (through September 2, 2011).

 

This surge of litigation involving Chinese companies has arisen out of accounting scandals, many of which were first revealed by online analysts, many of whom have short positions in the companies they are attacking. The Chinese companies have attempted to deflect the assertions of accounting improprieties by charging that the online attacks were merely rumors started by those with a financial incentive to drive down the companies’ share price. Fair or not, the online reports seem to be leading directly to shareholder litigation, as in many cases the shareholder plaintiffs are simply quoting the online analysts’ reports in their complaints.

 

For now, the phenomenon shows no sign of letting up, as the lawsuits involving the U.S.-listed Chinese companies have continued to accumulate as the year’s second half has progressed. Indeed, between July 1, 2011 and September 2, 2011, there were a total of 6 of these Chinese companies sued in new securities class action lawsuits in the U.S.

 

The recent litigation outbreak involving the U.S.-listed Chinese companies is a reminder of circumstance-specific events that can drive securities class action lawsuit filings. Many things determine filing levels, many of which cannot be captured or predicted in historical filing data. As a result, it can be misleading to try to generalize from short term trends about future filing levels. Simply put, the numbers vary over time, because, for example, contagion events and industry epidemics happen.

 

6. Will M&A Litigation Continue to Surge?: One of the more interesting phenomena in the world of corporate and securities litigation has been the changing mix of litigation. As recently as just a few years ago, securities class action lawsuits represented a significant percentage of all corporate and securities lawsuits. The insurance information firm Advisen has documented that in more recent years, class action securities litigation has represented an increasingly smaller percentage of all corporate and securities lawsuits. One area that has been growing as a percentage of all corporate and securities litigation has been M&A related litigation.

 

According to Advisen, in 2010, there were 353 lawsuits challenging corporate mergers filed in state and federal courts, which represents a 58% increase over 2009. As of August 27, 2011, 352 M&A related lawsuits had already been filed, putting this year’s filings to far exceed last year’s.

 

As discussed in an August 27, 2011 Wall Street Journal article entitled “Why Merger Lawsuits Don’t Pay” (here), these lawsuits rarely produce substantial damage awards. Often, the most they succeed in accomplishing is a delay in the merger or slightly improved disclosures about the deal’s terms. The reason these lawsuits continue to be filed, and indeed continue to be filed in increasing numbers, is that these cases are good business for the plaintiffs’ firms. These firms can collect fees that range from $400,000 for typical cases to millions of dollars for bigger cases.

 

In the past, these types of cases have not represented a significant claims exposure for D&O insurers. However, now that so many more of them are being filed, and now that individual merger deals are now attracting multiple claims, these cases are becoming a much bigger problem for the D&O insurers, particularly those that are the most active as primary insurers. A basic assumption of the D&O insurance industry is that D&O claims represent a low frequency, high severity threat. But these M&A claims are exactly the opposite – they represent a high frequency, low severity exposure, for which the D&O insurers likely did not price and almost certainly cannot underwrite. And even if the typical case settles for relatively modest amounts, the claims costs including defense fees are now in the aggregate becoming an issue for the D&O insurers.

 

In the current competitive marketplace (about which see more below), the D&O insurers may not be able to do much about this problem, but this might among the first areas to which D&O insures turn if the market does start to firm. Among other things, the D&O insurers might require higher self-insured retentions for these types of claims, on the theory that they really represent a cost of doing business rather than a true third-party liability exposure.

 

7. Will the U.S. Supreme Court Continue Its Inexplicable Willingness to Take Up Securities Cases?: Years from now, when the history of the Roberts Court is finally written, perhaps the historians will be able to explain why during the second half of the first dozen years of the 21st Century, the Court was so eager  to take up securities cases. The Supreme Court is just coming off a term in which the Court heard three different securities cases, and it has already agreed to take up one more case in the term that is about to begin.

 

The case that the Court has already agreed to hear next year is the Credit Suisse Securities case, and it involves statute of limitations issues arising in connection with Section 16(b) claims for short-swing profits. This narrow, technical issue is unlikely to have widespread significance. But what is significant is that yet again this Court has taken up a securities case. There doesn’t seem to be any particular member of the Court that is driving the Court’s interest in securities cases. But for whatever the reason, the Court’s docket increasingly includes these types of cases. Though there is only one case now on the Court’s docket in the upcoming term, the Court can always choose to hear others – which is something the Court seems inclined to do.

 

The current Court does not always rule in the favor of the defendants. For example, this last term, in the Matrixx Initiatives case (refer here), the court rejected the defense argument that plaintiffs must show “statistical significance” in order to establish materiality in a securities lawsuit. In an earlier term, in the Merck case, the court rejected the defendants’ statute of limitations arguments (refer here). But many of the Supreme Court’s recent securities law decisions  have been in the defendants’ favor, and the Court’s rulings in recent terms in such cases as Janus Capital (refer here), Morrison (refer here), and Tellabs (refer here) represent significant defense victories that have or will have a significant impact in many cases on the plaintiffs’ ability to pursue securities claims.

 

The overall cumulative impact of the Court’s interest in taking up securities cases has been favorable to companies and unfavorable to plaintiffs. There is some speculation that the increased difficulty of successfully maintaining a securities class action lawsuit through the motion to dismiss may be one reason for the shift in the mix of corporate and securities litigation away from securities class action lawsuits and toward other types of litigation (like the M&A litigation, discussed above).

 

8. Will the Implementation of the U.K Bribery Act Mean Increased Anti-Bribery Enforcement Activity?: On July 1, 2011, the U.K Bribery Act became effective, as discussed here. The Act has a broad reach, regulating prohibited conduct that takes place within the U.K. or that involves a company or person that carries on business in the U.K., regardless of where the prohibited activity takes place. The Bribery Act is broader than the U.S.’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, reaching a broader range of prohibited activities and providing for greater possible liabilities for those at companies involved in these activities, even if not directly involved in the prohibited conduct.

 

From the time the Act received Royal Assent, one of its features that has been the focus of particular concern has been Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 creates a new offense which can be committed by commercial organizations that fail to prevent persons associated with them from committing bribery on their behalf. Commentators have been concerned that this provision seemingly would subject any firm --even non-U.K. companies that have operations in the U.K. – to liability under the Act for violative conduct taking place any where in the world.

 

Because the Act has only just become effective, it is not yet known how aggressively it will be implemented or what its overall impact will be. At a minimum, it seems likely that the Act will lead to an increase in enforcement activity. It is also possible that as has proved to be the case with enforcement actions under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, follow-on civil litigation will follow in the wake of regulatory enforcement activity.

 

As companies confront these developments, among the issues that are likely to arise are questions concerning coverage for these proceedings under their D&O insurance policies, as discussed in a prior guest post on this blog.  The Act’s fines and penalties are not likely to be covered under typical policies. Whether investigative costs and defense fees will be covered will depend on a large variety of circumstances, including who is the target of the investigation. How serious these problems will turn out to be will depend a lot on the Act’s implementation, a development that will be worth watching.

 

9. What Impact Will the Changing Corporate Governance Requirements Have?: Largely due to the 2010 enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, we have entered a watershed period of corporate governance reform. Processes now afoot have wrought a transformation in the relations between corporate boards and corporate shareholders. These changes have not only created additional burdens on affected companies but they have also resulted in some cases in a change in the corporate litigation environment as well.

 

Among the changes the Dodd-Frank Act implemented is the requirement for an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation. As a result of Section 951 of the Dodd Frank Act and the requirements of SEC rules that went into effect January 25, 2011, all but the smallest public companies had to put their executive compensation practices to an advisory shareholder vote this past proxy season. As it turns out, about 40 companies experienced a negative shareholder vote. In some cases the negative “say on pay” vote have been followed by shareholder litigation, by activist investors seeking to reform executive compensation practices, as discussed here.

 

The requirement for a shareholder “say on pay” is only one of many current corporate governance reform under discussion. Other areas include the question of proxy access – that is, the question whether shareholders can have their board candidates listed on the annual proxy form. The D.C. Circuit recently struck down the SEC’s rules requiring proxy access, but the issue is not likely to go away.

 

As discussed at length here, other current corporate governance issues include reforms such as board declassification and majority voting. Other issues that loom ahead as other provisions of Dodd-Frank go into effect include requirements that companies disclose the ratio between total annual compensation of their CEO and the median annual compensation of their employees (rules implanting these provisions are required to be adopted before the end of 2011).

 

Another provision of the Dodd Frank Act requires to SEC to direct the national exchanges to impose new listing standards directing public companies to implement compensation clawback provisions. Under Section 954 of the Dodd Frank Act, companies making accounting restatements of prior financials must recover from any current or former officer all incentive-based compensation paid during the preceding three-year period above what would have been paid without the misstated financials. These provisions are to be implemented by this year-end.

 

These various provisions will affect different companies in different ways. But it is clear that these changes are here to stay and that as a result companies and their management are operating in a challenging environment. Companies that resist these governance developments may face heightened levels of scrutiny, both from shareholders and from the media. Moreover, as corporate governance standards change, boards will be held to standards of conduct reflecting the changed governance norms and expectations. And in an era of growing shareholder empowerment, that reality may translate into increased judicial expectation for boards to address shareholder initiatives.

 

Taken together, these changes in the corporate governance environment mean heightened scrutiny, changing shareholder expectations, and even an increased litigation risk. How extensive these changes ultimately will prove to be remains to be seen as the additional provisions of Dodd Frank are put into effect in the months ahead.

 

10. What Does All of This Mean for the D&O Insurance Marketplace?: Given all of these trends and developments, an outside observer might reasonably expect that the marketplace for D&O insurance would be becoming more restrictive. And certainly with respect to certain categories, such as U.S.-listed Chinese companies and commercial banks, the marketplace for D&O insurance is challenging. However, outside of those very particularized categories, the marketplace for D&O insurance remains generally competitive. Most financially stable companies continue to be able to obtain broad terms and conditions at relatively attractive prices.

 

There is nothing specific to suggest that the generally competitive environment is about to change, at least immediately. But there are a number of considerations that could lead to change. The first is the cumulative impact of the year’s catastrophic losses. The various natural disasters this year, from the earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan to Hurricane (and tropical storm) Irene, have had an impact on the insurance industry’s collective balance sheet. If there were to be another significant event in the four remaining months of the year, the accumulated losses could be enough to force a pricing increase or to cause carriers (or at least some of them) to pull back.

 

Given the catastrophe events that have already occurred this year, carriers are likely to be scrutinizing their books. Many of the developments discussed above will undoubtedly lead the various carriers to take a close look at their D&O portfolios. The mounting losses from the subprime meltdown and the credit crisis; the looming impact of the wave of failed banks; and the difficulties and uncertainties associated with a changing litigation and legal environment are all likely to raise concerns. These concerns inevitably lead to questions about pricing adequacy, risk selection, and scope of coverage.

 

In light of all of these considerations, it would be very rational for the D&O insurance marketplace to enter a more restrictive phase. In some sectors that may already be happening. For example, even relatively healthy commercial banks are seeing increased pricing and reduced limits. Several carriers are pulling back in that space.

 

At the same time, though, the overall marketplace remains competitive. As long as capacity remains ample and competition active, most companies outside of the most troubled sectors apparently will continue to enjoy the benefits of a competitive marketplace for D&O insurance. The question is how long these conditions will continue. Time will tell of course, but if the wind blows or the earth shakes again, among the consequences could be a harder market for insurance generally and for D&O insurance in particular.  

 

The Back-to-School Issue

Labor Day has come and gone. The kids are back in school. The air is cooler and the nights are longer. There’s a definite autumnal feel in the air. It is time to get back to work. Fortunately, The D&O Diary kept its eye on things over the summer. So if you are feeling the need to get caught up on what happened while you were at the beach, don’t worry, we’ve got you covered. Here is a quick summary of what you missed on The D&O Diary while you were away.

 

Key Insurance Coverage Decisions: There have been several important D&O insurance coverage decisions in the last few months, two of them in the federal circuit courts. Probably the most significant decision of the summer is the Second Circuit’s July 1, 2011 ruling in the MBIA case, in which the Court held that the company’s D&O insurance policies cover the investigative and special litigation committee expense the company incurred during a regulatory investigation of its accounting practices.

 

The Fifth Circuit issued another important coverage ruling on August 5, 2011 when it held that where a policyholder has accepted a compromise payment from a primary carrier of less than the limit of liability of the primary policy, the excess carrier’s payment obligations were not triggered and the excess carriers has  no obligation to pay the policyholders‘ loss.

 

In another interesting coverage decision, the Judge William Q. Hayes of the Southern District of California held in an August 15, 2011 decision (refer here) that the D&O insurance policy at issue covered the attorneys’ fees of non-party employee witnesses.

 

Significant Developments in the Subprime and Credit Crisis-Related Litigation Wave: The subprime litigation wave began over four years ago but only a small number of the cases have been settled. As reflected in my running tally of subprime cases, even now only 29 of the cases have settled. But a number of these settlements were announced just in the past few weeks, and there is a definite sense that the movement of these cases toward settlement is gaining momentum.

 

The recent settlements in subprime and credit crisis-related cases included the largest subprime securities lawsuit settlement so far, the $627 million Wachovia bondholders settlement, about which refer here. Other subprime securities lawsuit settlements this summer included the following: Washington Mutual, $208.5 million (refer here); Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities, $125 million (refer here); National City, $168 Million (refer here); Colonial Bank, $10.5 million (refer here); and Lehman Brothers executives, $90 million (refer here).

 

In other developments in the subprime and credit crisis cases, two appellate courts affirmed the lower courts’ dismissals of a couple of subprime cases. On May 24, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the HomeBanc case (refer here), and on August 23, 2011, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action that had been brought on behalf of the Regions Financial trust preferred securities holders (refer here).

 

There were also dismissal motion denials in two of the higher profile cases. First, on July 27, 2011, Southern District of New York Judge Lewis Kaplan denied the motion to dismiss in the Lehman Brothers case (about which refer here; as noted above, the Lehman Brothers executives settled the case against them shortly thereafter). And as discussed here, on July 29, 2011, Southern District of New York Judge Kevin Castel granted in part and denied in part the renewed motions to dismiss in the BofA/Merrill Lynch merger case.

 

FDIC Failed Bank Litigation Mounts: The current wave of bank failures is now several years old. Over 390 banks have failed since January 1, 2008. Yet the FDIC has filed lawsuits involving former directors and officers of failed banks in only a very small number of instances. In the past several weeks, however, the FDIC has launched several new lawsuits and there is a definite sense that the lull in FDIC lawsuit filings may be over.

 

Just in the last few weeks, the FDIC has filed lawsuits involving the former CEO of IndyMac bank (about which refer here); former directors and officers of Haven Trust bank (refer here); former directors and officers of Silverton bank (refer here); and First National Bank of Arizona (refer here). The Silverton bank case is particularly interesting because, as I discuss in my blog post about the lawsuit, the defendants that the FDIC named in the lawsuit include the bank’s D&O insurers.

 

With these latest filings, the FDIC has now filed a total of eleven cases involving former directors and officers of failed banks. But the likelihood is that there are more cases to come, perhaps many more. The FDIC’s own website states that the agency has authorized suits in connection with 30 failed institutions against 266 individuals for D&O liability with damage claims of at least $6.8 billion. The lawsuits the FDIC has filed so far involve only eleven failed institutions and 77 individuals. Even just taking account of the lawsuits that have already been authorized, there are many more suits to come, and undoubtedly even more lawsuits will be authorized.

 

Mid-Year Securities Litigation Studies Released: All of the leading statistical services issued their respective studies of securities class action lawsuit filings for the first six months of 2011. My post about the Cornerstone Research study can be found here; the NERA Economic Consulting study, here; and the Advisen study, here. My own analysis of the first half filings can be found here.

 

Supreme Court Issues Key Rulings: It already seems like a long time ago, but at the end of the Supreme Court’s term in June, the Court issued its opinions in several key cases. First, in a June 6, 2011 opinion (about which refer here), the Supreme Court held in the Halliburton case that proof of loss causation is not required at the class action certification stage. On June 13, 2011, the Court held in the Janus Capital case (refer here) that a mutual fund management company cannot be held liable for the alleged misstatements in the prospectuses of the mutual funds that the management company administered.

 

And finally, on June 20, 2011 the Court held in the Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes case (refer here) that the gender discrimination claimants did not allege a companywide pattern of discriminatory practices and therefore their case could not proceed as a class action. (Earlier in the year, the Supreme Court also issued its opinion in the Matrixx Initiatives case, refer here, in which the Court rejected the “statistical significance” test for securities suit materiality.)

 

Consistent with the inexplicable interest the Court has shown in recent years in taking up securities cases, the Court has already granted a writ of certiorari for yet another securities case to be heard in the upcoming term. As discussed here, the Court has agreed to hear the Credit Suisse Securities case, which involves statute of limitations issues in Section 16(b) short-swing profits cases.

 

Litigation Against U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies Continues to Surge: As I have noted in several posts, most recently here, one of the most distinct securities litigation trends over the last twelve months or so has been the surge in litigation involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies. Signs are that this litigation surge is continuing, as the filings involving these companies have continued to accumulate so far in  the second half of the year, about which refer here. While some have questioned the merits or value of these cases, at least one of these cases recently survived a motion to dismiss, as discussed here.

 

These cases raise a number of important D&O insurance issues for these companies. A July 14, 2011 Client Advisory that I co-authored (about which refer here) examines the critical D&O insurance issues that these companies face and reviews the questions these companies should be asking about their D&O insurance.

 

Keynote Speeches at the Stanford Directors’ College: In June, I attended the Stanford Law School Directors’ college as a member of the event faculty. While there I was able to monitor the keynote speeches, about which I reported in a series of blog posts. The key note speakers included SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes, about whose presentation I wrote here; Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron Steele, whose speech I wrote about here; and SEC Enforcement Division head Robert Khuzami, about whose presentation I wrote here.

 

Debating Director Liabilities: As part of this blog’s continuing mission to explore the issues surrounding the liabilities of corporate directors and officers, I posted a couple of commentaries this summer discussing  whether and to what extent directors should be held responsible when problems occur at their companies.

 

First, on June 13, 2011, I published a post here examining the question of whether or not directors should be held liable more often. And on August 5, 2011 (here), I reviewed the question of whether or not directors at companies that have failed should be stigmatized for their association with the failed companies. Finally, on a related topic, in an August 15, 2011 post, I took a look here at issues surrounding the potential liabilities of former directors of failed banks.

 

Guest Posts: One of the great privileges of maintaining this site is that from time to time I am honored to be able to publish guest posts from leading commentators and observers. Over the course of this summer, I was fortunate to be able to publish several guest posts, including posts from the following authors and on the following topics: Anjali Das on the U.K. Bribery Act (here); Angelo Savino on the applicability of the Morrison decision to SEC enforcement actions (here); Rick Bortnick and Micha J.M. Knapp on the significance and implications of the Second Circuit’s decision in the MBIA case (here); Anjali Das again, on the issues surrounding the lawsuits against Chinese reverse merger companies (here); and Paul Ferrillo on the question of insurance coverage for investigative costs in light of the revisions of the Dodd-Frank Act (here).

 

Finally, just this past week, I published a post (here) by Mary Gill, Robert Long and Todd Chatham about the issues and concerns surrounding the defense of former directors and officers of failed banks in FDIC litigation.

 

I am very grateful to all of these authors for their willingness to publish their articles on this site. I am interesting in receiving guest post submissions from responsible commentators on topics of interest to readers of this blog. If you are interested in submitting a guest post, please contact me.

 

Coming Attractions: Tomorrow I hope to post my annual fall survey, “What to Watch Now in the World of D&O.” Obviously due to their significance, many of the items referenced above will also appear in tomorrow’s post, albeit discussed in greater depth, and there will be many additional topics as well.

 

ABA TIPS Commemorates 9/11: In recognition of the tenth anniversary of 9/11, the Tort, Trial and Insurance Practice Section (TIPS) of the American Bar Association is sponsoring a series of educational events. Among these events will be a teleconference sponsored by the TIPS Professionals, Officers and Directors Committee scheduled for September 16, 2011 from 12:00 to 1:30 Eastern Time, entitled “9/11 Attacks on the World Trade Center: Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers in the Preparation and Executive of Disaster Avoidance and Recovery,” which will be moderated by my friend Perry Granof. Complete information about this series can be found here. Registration for the September 16 teleconference can be found here

 

It’s a Long, Long While from May to December, But the Days Grow Short When You Reach September: Summer, it was great having you around. We are sorry to see you go. Please come back again next year. We will be thinking about you while you are gone. One thing, though. Next year we can do without the heat wave, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and tropical storms, O.K.?

 

It is hard to believe that it is already September. There is something about heading into September and moving past Labor Day that always makes me feel blue. The feeling is captured in the classic soulful “September Song,” sung here by the incomparable Sarah Vaughn, with Teddy Wilson Quartet. Oh, the days dwindle down to a precious few. 

 

D&O Insurance Coverage in the Wake of the IndyMac Bank Failure

In an opinion that provides an interesting glimpse of a complex D&O insurance program, on August 24, 2011, Central District of California Judge R. Gary Klausner granted the motions to dismiss of the insurance company defendants in an action that had been brought by a subsidiary of IndyMac bank, which was trying to establish its rights to coverage under the failed bank’s D&O insurance policies. A copy of the August 24 opinion can be found here.

 

IndyMac failed on July 11, 2008. The bank’s closure represented the second largest bank failure during the current banking crisis, behind only the massive WaMu failure. (IndyMac has assets of about $32 billion at the time of its closure).

 

As I detailed in a prior post (here), the bank’s collapse triggered a wave of litigation.  The lawsuits include a securities class action lawsuit against certain former directors and officers of the bank; lawsuits brought by the  FDIC and by the SEC against the bank’s former President; and a separate FDIC lawsuit against four former officers of Indy Mac’s homebuilders division.  According to Judge Klausner’s August 24 opinion, there are a total of twelve separate lawsuits pending (referred to in the opinion as the “underlying actions”). Judge Klausner describes the litigation generally as alleging “various improprieties, mostly centering around mortgage backed securities.”

 

IndyMac MBS was a subsidiary of IndyMac Bank, and is now wholly owned by the IndyMac federal receivership. IndyMac MBS is a defendant in a number of the lawsuits that have been filed in the wake of the bank’s collapse. Earlier this year, IndyMac MBS filed an action seeking a judicial declaration of coverage on its behalf under the bank’s D&O insurance policies.

 

The insurance policies at issue represent a total of $160 million of insurance coverage spread across two policy years. (Judge Klausner’s opinion does not explain why two policy year’s policies are potentially implicated, rather than only one.) The coverage in the 2007-2008 policy year, providing coverage during the year from March 1, 2007 to March 1, 2008, consists of eight layers of insurance. Each layer has a $10 million limit of liability. The eight layers consist of a primary policy providing traditional ABC coverage, with three layers of excess insurance providing follow form ABC coverage, followed by four layers of Excess Side A insurance.

 

The coverage for the policy year March 1, 2008 to March 1, 2009 is arranged similarly, except that the lineup of insurer involved changed slightly in the 2008-2009 program. Judge Klausner’s opinion names all of the carriers involved and their respective roles in the two programs.

 

In its declaratory judgment action, IndyMac MBS sought to have the court determine that each of the underlying actions is covered under one or the other of the two insurance coverage towers. Moreover, because the two programs are each subject to a “priority of payments” provision giving the individual defendants in the underlying actions priority to coverage under the policies, IndyMac MBS sought to have the court make a determination of coverage for the individual defendants in the underlying actions, so as to allow the court to ascertain whether IndyMac MBS  may be eligible to receive coverage under the policies. The defendant insurance companies moved to dismiss.

 

In his August 24 order, Judge Klausner granted the insurance companies’ motions to dismiss, holding that IndyMac MBS’s request for declaratory relief is “too remote to constitute a case or controversy” because any insurance coverage that may ultimately be owed “can only be determined after the underlying actions involving the Individual Defendants have been concluded.” Accordingly, IndyMac MBS “does not yet have an adequate injury that would make this case justiciable.”

 

In addition, Judge Klausner found with respect to the excess layers of insurance had not even been triggered because the underlying insurance has not yet been exhausted, and whether the excess layers “will ever be triggered in the underlying action is too speculative to give rise to a valid request for standing in the current case.” Indeed, even under the primary policy, IndyMac’s alleged injury is “too speculative” as IndyMac MBS has not yet met the $2.5 million deductible.

 

Finally, Judge Klausner separately granted the Excess Side A insurers’ motion to dismiss. Because the insurance coverage under the Excess Side A policies is only available, if at all, for the benefit of the individual defendants, IndyMac “lacks standing to request declaratory relief” because it “cannot adequately allege that it has a legal interest” in the Excess Side A policies, given that the Excess Side A policies “provide coverage only for the Individual Insured Defendants.”

 

Discussion

There is nothing surprising about the outcome of this ruling. It clearly is too early for the court or anyone else to try to sort out who is going to be entitled to what under the various policies. Nevertheless, it certainly is understandable that IndyMac MBS would want to know how much insurance it is going to have as it faces the various lawsuits in which it is involved.

 

This is a classic situation of too many claims, too many defendants and possibly not enough insurance. Even though IndyMac carried annual limits of liability of $80 million (and I note as an aside, there is nothing that says that both of the two $80 million towers of insurance will actually be available; it is entirely possible that all claims will relate back to the date of the initial filing of the first claim, in which case only a single $80 million tower would actually be available to pay the various insured persons’ losses), that may prove to be an insufficient amount to pay the defense fees and to pay settlements and judgments in order to resolve all of the various underlying actions.

 

The larger concern for IndyMac MBS is that owing to the priority of payments provision in the traditional ABC policies, and owing to the limitation of coverage in the Excess Side A policies to the individuals only, it is entirely possible that payment of the individual insureds’ defense expenses and settlement amounts will entirely exhaust all insurance. The Excess Side A insurance of course is not available at all for IndyMac MBS. IndyMac’s declaratory judgment action seems like an attempt to try to do something before all of the insurance is gone.

 

Of course, I am assuming for the sake of argument that there actually is coverage available under these policies for the benefit of the individual insured persons. Whether or to what extent there are policy terms and conditions that preclude coverage in whole or in part for the individual insureds is another question. That is of course one of the questions that IndyMac MBS wanted answered in the declaratory judgment action, because knowing the answer to the question of how much insurance is available to the individuals is a necessary predicate to knowing the answer to how much insurance might be available to IndyMac MBS.

 

The structure of IndyMac’s insurance was somewhat unusual, as it is not common for companies to carry equal amounts of traditional ABC insurance and of Excess Side A insurance, or to carry $40 million of Excess Side A, as IndyMac did here. However, from the perspective of the individuals, the unusually large amount of Excess Side A insurance that the bank carried is turning out to be a good thing from there perspective, as it is looking like they are going to need it, and it is only going to be available to them and for their benefit, without having to share with other entities.

 

Anyway, while I don’t think the outcome of this decision is particularly surprising, it is still an interesting situation. The circumstances provide insight into the ways that the various parts of a D&O insurance program operate, particularly the priority of payments provision and the Excess Side A insurance structure.

 

One final observation has to do with the fact that a lot of insureds, like IndyMac MBS, become frustrated when they are unable to find out with clarity at the outset of a claim how much insurance is going to be available. The problem is, as this case demonstrates, until the underlying litigation has played itself out, it is not possible to know how all of the various rights and interests under the policy are going to be addressed. When this type of frustration arises in the course of a claim, the insured persons often translate their frustration into anger at the carriers involved. But as this case also shows, even taking as active a step as suing the carriers to try to force a determination of coverage cannot eliminate the unavoidable constraint that requires the underlying claim to be resolved (or at least sufficiently advanced) before coverage can finally be determined.

 

I do wonder sometimes whether it is a sad commentary that I find all of this interesting.

 

Special thanks to a dedicated reader for sending me a copy of the IndyMac order.

 

Las Vegas Sands Credit Crisis-Related Securities Suit Survives Dismissal Motion: Like a lot of companies during the economic turmoil in late 2008, the Las Vegas Sands Corp. experienced serious liquidity problems that put it in breach of various covenants it has with its lenders. These disruptions affected the company’s ability to proceed with expansion plans in Las Vegas and Macao. As these events unfolded the company’s share price lost much of its value.

 

As I discussed in an earlier post, somewhat belatedly, in May 2010, a plaintiff shareholder filed a securities class action lawsuit in the District of Nevada, alleging that the company and certain of its directors and officers had made misleading statements about the company, its development plans, its liquidity and its financial condition. The defendants moved to dismiss.

 

In an August 24, 2011 order (here), District of Nevada Judge Kent Dawson denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. He concluded that the plaintiffs “have adequately pled facts asserting that investors were misled by statements that liquidity was not an issue and that development was steadily progressing.” He also concluded that the plaintiffs have “adequately pled that Defendants knew that the statements they were making were false.”  He also found that the allegations in the complaint “show a series of public statements on material issues that were inconsistent with what was known internally.” He did conclude that certain forward-looking statements were not actionable, because they came within the safe harbor for forward looking statements.

 

I have added the Las Vegas Sands case to my running tally of credit crisis-related dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

 

Here’s A Real Shocker: Merger Objection Lawsuits Are Worthless: If the hurricane blew away your Saturday newspapers, you may not have seen the August 27, 2011 article in the Wall Street Journal entitled “Why Merger Lawsuits Don’t Pay” (here). According to the article, “legal experts” warn prospective claimants with respect to merger objection lawsuits that “the chances that you will succeed in stopping a deal or receiving a payday are minimal.”


 

The article reports data from Advisen that in 2010, there were 353 merger objection lawsuits, which represents a 58% increase from 2009. There have already been 352 merger objection lawsuits so far this year. The number of these lawsuits keeps increasing even though these suits “rarely result in a tangible award,” and the best outcomes are usually limited to “a delay in the merger or slightly improved disclosures about the deal’s terms.”

 

The answer to the question about why these cases are filed if they produce so little is that they make money for the lawyers. As the article puts it, “in many cases the biggest beneficiaries are the law firms,” which collect fees “from roughly $400,000 for typical cases to several million for bigger cases.” The article quotes a statement from Delaware Chancellor J. Travis Laster that the specific merger objection case before him was “a bunch of movement for nothing.”

 

Yes, it’s a great country, isn’t it?

 

Video Tribute: As a parting salute to Irene as she heads north and back out to sea, here's a video tribute -- The Scorpions "Rock You Like A Hurricane." (sorry about the commercial at the beginning, it is short).

 

Guest Post: Dodd Frank, Corporate Investigations and D&O Insurance

One of the hottest current topics in the field of D&O insurance is the question of coverage for costs incurred in connection with regulatory investigations. As discussed in the following guest post from Paul Ferrillo, who is Of Counsel and a senior litigator in the Securities Litigation/Corporate Governance Group of Weil Gotshal & Manges, LLP, these issues are likelier to become even more important as the Dodd-Frank whistleblower rules go into effect.

 

I would like to thank Paul for his willingness to publish his article on this site. (Paul's article previsously appeared in Propery & Casualty 360.) I am interested in publishing guest posts from responsible commentators on topics of interest to readers of this blog. Please contact me directly if you are interested in submitting a guest post for consideration.

 

 

Here is Paul’s guest post:

 

 

            Though most in-house risk professionals and in –house corporate lawyers do not exactly relish the opportunity to review their company’s directors and officers (“D&O”) liability insurance policy, the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), coupled with an increasingly active regulatory environment, should cause all companies (especially smaller ones) to consider the scope and breath of their D&O policies. Particularly important under Dodd-Frank is whether and how their policies will cover internal corporate investigations caused by whistleblowers out to recover a bounty (10 to 30 percent) on potential penalties collected by the SEC in excess of $1 million. Should these sorts of complex internal investigations be covered under the Company’s pre-existing directors and officers liability insurance coverage? Here are the considerations, and here are some potential answers.

 

 

            Scope of D&O Coverage for Corporate Investigations – Then and Now

 

 

            Before we begin, its probably important to re-emphasize why this question is important. Simply put, corporate investigations set in motion by a whistleblower or regulatory authorities (SEC, DOJ, and/or the states attorney generals), can lead to a whole host of problems for a company and its directors and officers, including: (1) potential fines and penalties, (2) potential criminal repercussions for individuals who are accused of potential wrongdoing, and (3) follow-on civil litigation commenced by the plaintiff’s bar seeking to take advantage of potentially damaging facts that came to light as a result of the investigation.  It also goes without saying that internal corporate investigations are expensive to conduct, including not only the associated legal expenses, but also IT expenses as well, which are occasioned by the need to review email and other soft-copy documents that might be relevant to the investigation. A competently handled investigation where no wrongdoing is found may cause regulators to walk away satisfied that the company “did the right thing.” and will many times will add no fodder to the follow on civil litigation A poorly handled investigation can lead to disastrous consequences for all involved, especially the company who has to ultimately “foot the bill.”

 

 

            Prior to 2011, D&O coverage for certain categories of internal corporate investigations was relatively standard in most primary D&O policies. Individual directors and officers were generally covered (depending, of course, upon the primary carrier and policy form in question) for both informal inquiries and requests for information, and civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory investigations commenced by either the issuance of a Target Letter or Wells Notice, or after the service of a subpoena. The company was almost never covered, except when it was named (along with an individual directors and officer) in a “formal”[1] SEC investigation (and then only when the D&O policy at issue specifically allowed for such coverage). No coverage, at all, existed for the Company for responding to “informal” inquiries and requests for information from the SEC.

 

 

            The New Threat – More Investigations – More Risk – More Expense

 

 

            On May 25, 2011, the SEC adopted final rules implementing the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank. Though these rules are somewhat complex, for the corporate risk professional they can be broken down as follows. Dodd-Frank provides that (1) an eligible individual (e.g. an employee of a company), (2) who “voluntarily” provides the SEC (3) with “original information” about a potential violation about a violation of the federal securities laws, (4) that ultimately leads to a “successful” enforcement action, (5) may be entitled to receive a cash award ranging from 10% to 30% of the total monetary sanctions, in excess of $1 million, recovered by the SEC in a civil or judicial action.[2]

 

 

            Importantly, despite the fact that the potential whistleblower might just have easily reported the potential wrongdoing through the company’s own internal reporting and compliance program, the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank do not require him or her to first do so. Instead, the whistleblower may go directly to the SEC in order to be “first in line” to receive the potential bounty. The new rules enacted by the SEC do give the whistleblower an “incentive” to first report internally by (1) allowing him up to 120 days to report such information to the Commission after he or she first reports internally (and still retain her or her place in line to receive the bounty), and (2) allowing for the attribution to the whistleblower who first reports internally all subsequently reported information reported by the Company following its own internal investigation.

 

 

            These reporting provisions, along with the monetary incentives of Dodd-Frank present the company at issue with a number of potential challenges: (1) more internal investigations as a result of the clear financial incentives of employees and others to “blow the whistle” (in fact, there are reports already that the SEC has received an increased number of tips (often made with supporting documentation) since the passage of Dodd-Frank[3], (2) the potential need to quickly perform an internal investigation should the whistleblower report to the Company first (knowing that he or she has 120 days to report to the SEC). Indeed it may be in a company’s interest to self-report to the SEC before the SEC contacts it first, and/or (3) in any event, be ready to perform the investigation upon first contact with the SEC should the whistleblower choose to bypass internally reporting procedures.

 

 

            Corporate Investigations D&O Coverage Today

 

 

            Prior to 2011, companies generally had no insurance mechanism to cover a costly internal investigation triggered by a regulatory inquiry. Today that is not the case. One large insurer has created a stand-alone product that potentially covers a company for a wide variety of potential corporate investigations., whether triggered by internal reporting through a company’s internal compliance program (with subsequent self reporting of a potential securities law violation), or triggered by a direct formal or informal written or telephonic communication with the SEC requesting information, documents or interviews.[4] There are rumors that other companies will soon follow suit and provide similar, if not alternative products or solutions, to cover the costs of internal corporate investigations triggered by regulatory inquiries.

 

 

            A stand-alone corporate investigations D&O policy has a clear advantage for many companies seeking to insure for corporate investigations, and a compelling advantage from the stand-point of a director or officer of a public company. Since it is “stand-alone,” monies spent under an “investigations”  policy will not reduce the limits of the company’s pre-existing directors and officers insurance coverage. Simply put, separate dedicated limits for a corporate investigation is the best solution.

 

 

            If for cost reasons, a stand-alone product is not affordable, but a carrier agrees to attach or “blend” corporate investigations coverage directly into the primary directors and officers policy, the directors and officers should insist either (1) that company only purchase such coverage with a significant “sublimit,” (meaning that only a portion of the primary policy can be used for a corporate investigation), or (2) purchase much higher D&O limits from a “tower of insurance” perspective, knowing that “on any given Sunday” a complex investigation could eat up millions of dollars of the tower. For many companies, it may be a good idea to consult with an insurance broker or advisor that has a high degree of experience in insuring public companies, as they can often help inform and effectuate some of the corporate investigations D&O insurance strategies laid out above.

 



[1] A “formal” SEC investigation is one commenced by the issuance of a Formal Order of Investigation by the SEC. Formal orders of investigation can now be issued by the Director of Enforcement of the SEC, or by certain senior officials of the SEC to whom he has delegated such authority. The SEC can also make “informal” inquiries of company’s, seeking both documents and information on specific issues which they are interested in investigating.

[2] For a thorough review of the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank, see June 3, 2011 Weil Alert: “SEC Disclosure and Corporate Governance: Dodd Frank Update: SEC Adopts Whistleblower Rules.

[3] In fact, SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro noted publicly on May 25, 2011 in an SEC Open Meeting that “Already, the whistleblower provision of the Dodd-Frank Act is having an impact. While the SEC has a history of receiving a high volume of tips and complaints, the quality of tips we have received has been better since [Dodd-Frank] became law. And we expect this trend to continue.” Refer here.

[4] This product is called the Chartis Investigation Edge, refer here.

 

D&O Insurance: Non-Party Employee Witnesses' Attorneys' Fees Held Covered

When corporate officials face an SEC enforcement action, the testimony of non-party corporate employees is sometimes required. The insurance question that may arise when this happens is whether the attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with these witnesses’ testimony is covered under the company’s D&O policy. According to an interesting August 15, 2011 decision from the Southern District of California and applying California law (here), the employee witnesses’ attorneys’ fees are covered under the specific language of the D&O policies  involved.

 

Background

Three individual officers of Gateway, Inc. were the subject of an SEC enforcement action. During the course of the SEC action, certain of Gateway’s current and former employees who were not parties to the SEC lawsuit were compelled by subpoena to give deposition testimony in the SEC lawsuits as fact witnesses. Ultimately, the SEC lawsuit was resolved by way of a settlement.

 

At the time of the SEC action, Gateway carried a total of $35 million in D&O insurance, arranged in three layers: a primary layer of $10 million; an excess layer of $10 million; and a second excess layer of $15 million. The primary and first excess layers were exhausted through payment of loss. The second excess layer advanced a total of about $12.18 million in payment of defense expenses, leaving about $2.82 million.

 

In connection with the testimony of the witness employees, attorneys’ fees of about $553, 875 were incurred. The second excess carrier denied coverage for this amount (referred to as the amount in dispute). Gateway sued the second level excess carrier to recover the amount in dispute. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on a stipulated record.

 

Relevant Policy Language and the Parties’ Respective Positions

The second excess policy incorporated the terms of the primary policy. Insuring Clause B of the primary policy provided that the insures shall pay loss “which the Company is required or permitted to pay as indemnification to any of the Directors and Officers resulting from any Claim firm made against the Directors and Officers during the Policy Period.”

 

Policy Section II.H.2 defined the term “Directors and Officers” to mean “to the extent any Claim is for …a Securities Law Violation, all persons who were, now are, or shall be employees of the Company.” Policy Endorsement No. 7 amended the definition of “Directors and Officers,” inter alia, by adding Policy Section II.H.5, to include within the definition “employees of the Company. However coverage for employees who are not directors or officers shall only apply when an employee is named as a co-defendant with a director or officer of the Company.”

 

Gateway argued Policy Sections II.H.2 and II.H.5 were independent clauses and that the attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the employee witnesses were covered under Section II.H.2, because the SEC lawsuit was a Claim for “Securities Law Violation” against” Directors and Officers” (the three officer defendants in the SEC action), and the company incurred loss in connection with indemnifying the employees, who are “Directors and Offices” within policy section II.H.2. 

 

The second excess carrier argued first that as mere witnesses, the testifying employees were not parties to the civil action, and therefore no claim had been made against them. The second level excess carrier argued further that Endorsement No. 7 had modified the policy language to provide that “However, coverage for employees who are not directors shall only apply when an employee is named as a co-defendant with a director or officer of the Company.” The second level excess carrier argued that because none of the employee witnesses had been named as co-defendants, they were not “Directors and Officers” for whom reimbursement coverage was available under the policy.

 

The Court’s Decision

The fundamental question for the Court to decide was whether or not the “However” clause in Policy Section II.H.5 applied only to the preceding sentence in Policy Section II.H.5 or also applied to Policy Section II.H.2. (“However coverage for employees who are not directors or officers shall only apply when an employee is named as a co-defendant with a director or officer of the Company.”)

 

In his August 15, 2011 opinion in the case ruling in favor of Gateway, Southern District of California Judge William Q. Hayes found that the “clear and explicit reading” of the policy showed that Policy Sections II.H.2 and II.H.5 “are independent provisions” and the Gateway employees on whose behalf the disputed fees were incurred “constitute ‘Directors and Officers’ pursuant to sub-paragraph II.H.2.” The court said that “alternatively” the two “competing interpretations” of the definitional sections “highlight an ambiguity” in the policy language, which the Court construes in favor of Gateway.

 

Judge Hayes also rejected the second level excess carrier’s position that the employee witnesses attorneys’ fees did not come within Insuring Clause B of the policy because as mere witnesses no claim had been made against them. Gateway argued that Insuring Clause B required only that a claim have been made against Directors and Officers, which was the case in connection with the SEC action against the three Gateway officers, and in any event, the subpoenas directed to the employee witnesses constituted a claim against them as well. Judge Hayes said that the two parties “have advanced a reasonable interpretation of the Insuring Clause,” and accordingly the policy is ambiguous on this issue, and therefore the policy is interpreted in Gateway’s favor.

 

Judge Hayes granted summary judgment in favor of Gateway and against the second level excess carrier.

 

Discussion

At one level, this decision is just a reflection of the interaction between the specific policy language and the circumstances presented. In the end, rather than choose between two alternative views, Judge Hayes found that the alternatives reflected an ambiguity and therefore ruled in favor of the insured on a more or less “tie goes to the runner” basis.

 

I am sure that at least some carrier-side observers may find it a surprising outcome that there was found to be coverage in connection with fees incurred for  non-party employee witnesses who were not defendants in the SEC action. In that regard, it is possible to look at the policy language as amended and to conclude that the Endorsement No7 had not been intended simply to add an alternative and independent provision bringing employees within the definition of covered “Directors and Officers,” but instead to fundamentally alter the policy’s coverage for employees.

 

Thus, in the base form, Policy Section II.H.2 afforded coverage for employees by bringing them within the definition of Directors and Officers, but only in connection with Claims for Securities Law Violations. The Endorsement amended the policy to remove the limitation restricting the coverage for employees only to Claims for Securities Law Violations, extending the policy’s coverage afforded to employees even for claims that did not involve Securities Law Violations, but specifying further that this broader employee coverage is only available when the employees are co-defendants with officers and directors of the company.

 

I think there is a good case to be made that that was what was intended at the time the changes were made. Unfortunately for the second level excess carrier, the amendments were accomplished through additional provisions rather than through delete and replace alterations. Because the Endorsement No. 7 amended by adding, the policy provisions necessarily had to be read together, thus creating the possibility that two different provisions could potentially apply to the same circumstance.

 

There is a practical lesson here for everyone who is involved in the process of modifying policy language through endorsement. That is, it is not enough that the language in the endorsement accomplishes what is intended to be accomplished. In addition, the endorsement language must also interact as intended with the language in the base policy form. Because I know how hard these issues are to manage, I am reluctant to postulate how these changes should have been done, as I may establish nothing but to show that in hindsight this language could have been structured differently. (My reluctance here is underscored by the fact that the second excess carrier that was forced to argue these issues here was forced to make these arguments based on language negotiated by the primary carrier, not by the excess carrier itself.) But all of that said, the disputes here could have been avoided if rather than simply adding an additional policy provision about coverage for employees, the endorsement had deleted and replaced the base form’s provision for employee coverage.

 

Because of his findings of ambiguity, Judge Hayes managed to sidestep a number of interesting issues, including, for example, whether or not the deposition subpoenas served on the employee witnesses constituted “Claims” within the meaning of the policy. As I have discussed in prior posts (most recently here), the question of whether or not a subpoena is a claim is one of the perennial D&O insurance coverage issues. It would have been particularly interesting for the Court to have explored in particular whether or not a deposition subpoena is or is not a claim under the applicable policy language. But Judge Hayes managed to make a decision without issuing rulings on many of the parties’ disputed issues, and so we will have to await another case and another day on many of these issues.

 

An Alternate List of Top Colleges: If for no other reason than its sheer perversity, the recently released Forbes Magazine list of theTop 100 U.S. colleges makes for some fascinating reading. What can you say about a list where West Point outranks Stanford, Harvard, MIT and Yale? (For that matter, Yale is not even in the top 10, coming in at number 14). Or where Haverford outranks Swarthmore, Claremont-McKenna outranks Pomona (that one was particularly unpopular in our house), Washington & Lee outranks Dartmouth, Colby and Bates are ranked ahead of Bowdoin, and Penn is ranked 52nd? And Michigan is ranked 93rd, just above Transyvania University? (The methodology used in compiling the Forbes list can be found here.)

 

One thing you can say is that the Forbes listmaker has a bias against public universities. The highest ranked public college on the list is UVa, coming in at 46th (another ranking particularly unpopular in our house).

 

If nothing else, the Forbes list is reminder not to get too hung up on the U.S. News and World Reports college list -- it does not represent scripture, and there are many ways of looking at the many fine colleges in the U.S. As the excellent guidance counselor at my daughters' school says, "College admission is a match to be made, not a prize to be won." 

 

Fifth Circuit: Excess Insurance Not Triggered When Underlying Insurance Limit Not Exhausted by Payment

A recurring insurance coverage issue is the question of excess insurers’ obligations when the underlying insurers have paid less than their full policy limits as a result of a compromise between the underlying insurers and the policyholder.

 

In the latest of a growing list of recent cases examining these issues, on August 5, 2011, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law held, based on the language of the excess policies at issue, that where a policyholder has accepted a compromise payment from a primary carrier of less than the limit of liability of the primary policy, the excess carrier’s payment obligations were not triggered and they have no obligation to pay the policyholders ‘ loss. The Fifth Circuit’s August 5 opinion can be found here.

 

Background

In July 1999, Associates First Capital Corporation purchased $200 million of integrated risk insurance coverage, arranged in three layers. The primary $50 million was provided by Lloyd’s. In addition, there was a layer of $50 excess of the primary $50 million in the “Secondary Layer,” and a third layer, called the “Quota Share Layer,” provided $100 million excess of the primary and Secondary layers.

 

In November 2000, Citigroup purchased Associates and later sought insurance coverage from the insurers in connection with its settlement of two matters that had been pending against Associates. The settlement in the actions totaled $240 million plus $23 million in class counsels’ fees and costs. The Fifth Circuit opinion states that Citigroup entered the settlement “without the consent of the carriers.”

 

Each of the insurers initially denied coverage, but Citigroup ultimately entered a settlement with Lloyd’s by which Lloyd’s paid $15 million of its $50 million layer. The excess carriers continued to refuse coverage, and Citigroup filed suit. Citigroup later settled with the insurers in the Secondary layer, but the coverage litigation continued as to the insurers in the Quota Share Layer. The remaining parties moved for summary judgment.

 

The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the excess insurers, holding that under each of the excess insurers’ respective policies, their liability did not attach until the primary insurer had paid its full $50 million limit of liability. Citigroup appealed.

 

The August 5 Opinion

On appeal, Citigroup attempted to rely on the holding of Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 23 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1928), arguing that where an excess insurance policy ambiguously defines “exhaustion,” settlement with an underlying insurer constitutes exhaustion of the underlying policy, for purposes of determining when the excess coverage attaches.

 

The Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, declined to follow the “Zeig rule,” stating that “we conclude that the plain language of the policies dictate that primary insurer pays the full amount of its limits of liability before the excess coverage is triggered.”

 

The Fifth Circuit examined the exhaustion trigger language of each of the excess policies and concluded that the “plain language” of each of them “requires that Lloyd’s pay Citigroup the total limits of Lloyd’s liability before excess coverage attaches,” adding that “Citigroup’s settlement with Lloyd’s for $15 million of its $50 million limits of liability in exchange for a release from coverage for [the underlying claims], did not satisfy the requirements necessary to trigger the excess insurers’ coverage.” 

 

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the excess insurers.

 

Discussion

The Fifth Circuit’s decision in the Citigroup case joins a growing list of recent judicial decisions rejecting the Zeig rule and requiring as a trigger of coverage for excess insurance coverage that the limit of liability of the underlying insurance be exhausted by payment of loss. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit cited with approval the March 2008 California Intermediate appellate court opinion in the  Qualcomm case (about which refer here) and also cited the July 2007 Eastern District of Michigan opinion in the Comerica case (about which refer here), noting that “while not binding,” the Comerica case is “persuasive.” Another recent case reaching the same conclusion was the Bally case (about which refer here), although the Fifth Circuit did not refer to the Bally decision.  As first federal circuit court decision, the Citigroup case could prove to be the most significant in this line of cases.

 

While this list of case authority is growing longer, it is important to keep in mind that the outcome of each of these cases was a direct reflection of the specific language of the exhaustion trigger in the excess policies at issue. In each case, the courts concluded that the excess policies required complete exhaustion of the underlying limit of liability by payment of loss.

 

These cases underscore the critical importance of the language describing the payment trigger in the excess policy. In recent months, and in large part as a reaction to these cases, excess carriers increasingly have been willing to provide language that allows the excess carriers’ payment obligations to be triggered regardless whether the underlying amounts were paid by the underlying insurer or by the insured. This language was not generally available in 1999 when Associates First purchased its integrated risk insurance.

 

Increasingly larger settlement amounts and increasingly higher defense expenses are increasingly driving claims losses into the excess layers, and as a result these issues pertaining to the excess policies’ coverage triggers are also increasingly important. These cases underscore the critical importance of the specific wording used in the excess policies, which in turn highlights the need to have an experienced, knowledgeable insurance professional involved in the insurance placement process.

 

One interesting final note about the Fifth Circuit’s opinion is that it represents the unusual resolution of a case “by quorum.” Due to the July 14, 2011 death of Judge William Garwood, the opinion was issued by the remaining two judges of the three judge panel that heard the case.

 

What Makes a Marine Biologist Scream?: This is seriously cool. Warch very closely...

 

As Banks Fail, Will Insurance Coverage Lawsuits Follow?

One of the many distinctive traits of the litigation that surrounded the S&L crisis in the late 80s and early 90s was the plethora of lawsuits  between the FDIC (and other federal banking regulators), on the one hand,  and the failed banks’ insurers, on the other hand,  over the interpretation of the banks’ management liability insurance policies. Among the questions surrounding the current bank failure wave has been whether or not we will see a similar round of insurance coverage litigation. If a lawsuit filed last week in the Middle District of Alabama is any indication, the anticipated insurance coverage litigation may be on its way.

 

The coverage lawsuit arises out of the massive failure of Colonial Bancorp, which closed its doors on August 14, 2009. The bank’s holding company filed for bankruptcy on August 25, 2009. Among the factors contributing to Colonial’s failure was the criminal conspiracy relating to the failed mortgage lender, Taylor Bean & Whitaker. In April 2011, Lee Farkas, Taylor Bean’s ex-Chairman, was convicted of wire fraud and securities fraud.

 

Prior to Farkas’s conviction, two Colonial Bank employees pled guilty in connection with the Taylor Bean scheme. As reflected here, on March 2, 2011, Catherine Kissick, a former senior vice president of Colonial Bank and head of its Mortgage Warehouse Lending Division, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank, wire and securities fraud for participating in the Taylor Bean scheme. As reflected here, on March 16, 2011, Teresa Kelly, the bank’s Operations Supervisor and Collateral Analyst, pled guilty on similar charges.

 

The two bank employees allegedly caused the bank to purchase from Taylor Bean and hold $400 million in mortgage assets that had no value. The employees also allegedly engaged in fraudulent actions to cover up overdrafts of Taylor Bean at the bank. The employees are also alleged to have had the bank engage in the fictitious trades with Taylor Bean that had no value.

 

At the time of the bank’s failure, the bank carried three financial institution bonds. At or about the time that Colonial failed, the bank submitted notices of claim under the financial institutions bonds in connection with the activities and actions that ultimately were the topic of the criminal guilty pleas of the bank employees.

 

In a complaint filed on July 29 in the Southern District of Alabama (a copy of which can be found here), the FDIC as receiver for Colonial Bank, as well as the bankrupt bank holding company on its own behalf, filed an action against the bank’s bond insurer. Among other things, the complaint alleges that the losses caused by the misconduct “constitute recoverable losses under the Bonds up to the full aggregate limits of liability of the Bonds.” 

 

The complaint states that the bond insurer “has neither accepted nor denied the Plaintiffs’ claims under the Bonds.” The complaint alleges  that the insurer “has failed to investigate the claims and losses in a reasonable and appropriate manner.” After cataloging the back and forth between the FDIC and the insurer on their respective efforts to enter a confidentiality agreement, the complaint alleges that the insurer “has declined to enter into any of the proposed confidentiality agreements or offer appropriate confidentiality agreements of its own,” and “hence” the FDIC is unable to produce the confidential information that the insurer has requested. The complaint asserts a single claim for breach of contract.

 

Interestingly, the complaint does not specify whether or not the FDIC or the bankrupt holding company is entitled to recover under the bonds, but rather says that the amount of any recovery under the bonds is to be deposited in a bankruptcy court escrow account, where the issue of entitlement to the proceeds will be determined.

 

There are a number of arguably unusual features of this dispute. First, it is filed in connection with the failed bank’s financial institutions bonds, rather than in connection with the failed bank’s D&O insurance policy. To be sure, given the circumstances surrounding the bank employees’ guilty pleas, the implication of the bonds is hardly surprising. But the typical bank closure during the current round of bank failures will not implicate the failed bank’s financial institution bonds. The relevant insurance issues will more likely arise, if at all, under the failed bank’s D&O policy.

 

Another interesting thing about this dispute is that the parties are in coverage litigation even though the carrier has not even denied coverage. It looks as if the parties’ so-far unsuccessful attempts to hammer out a confidentiality agreement have gotten a little bit out of hand. It is mercifully uncommon for parties in similar circumstances to be unable to come up with a mutually acceptable confidentiality agreement. It may be that once the parties in this circumstance can finally manage to come up with a confidentiality agreement that this whole dispute will resolve itself without the need for further litigation (whether or not there was ever really any need for litigation in the first place.)

 

But the fact that the FDIC has not hesitated to file this suit in the first place certainly does evince a willingness to use the court to pursue its claims, as receiver, in connection with failed banks’ insurance policies. And while this case may not on its face present any significant coverage issues of more general significance, the likelihood is that as the FDIC presses claims for insurance recovery, that some of these claims will find their way into court with significant implications for questions of coverage under the applicable policies.

 

As I have said before, so many aspects of the current bank failure wave provide a feeling of déjà vu for those of us who lived through the S&L crisis. If the feeling is not necessarily one of nostalgia, it at least has a certain familiarity. Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not there will be any where near the amount of coverage litigation this time around. It just looks to me from this recent lawsuit that just like last time, the FDIC is not messing around, and it is not going to hesitate to use the courts to pursue claims against failed banks’ insurers.

 

Guest Post: 2nd Circ. Holds D&O Policies Cover Voluntary Compliance Expenses and Special Litigation Committee Costs

In its sweeping July 1, 2011 opinion in the MBIA case, the Second Circuit addressed many of the D&O insurance coverage issues that are currently the most contentious. The opinion has occasioned much discussion and commentary in the D&O insurance industry. My blog post about the case can be found here.

 

In view of the ongoing discussion about the case, I am very pleased to be able to publish here as a guest post an article analyzing and commenting on the Second Circuit’s decision written by Richard Bortnick and Micah J. M. Knapp of the Cozen O’Connor law firm. Rick is also the co-author of the Cyberinquirer blog. Many thanks to Rick and Micah for their willingness to publish their article here.  I welcome guest posts from responsible commentators on topics relevant to this blog. Any readers who are interested in publishing a guest post on this site are encouraged to contact me directly.

 

 

Here is Rick and Micah’s guest post:

 

 

In its July 1, 2011 opinion MBIA, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. and ACE American Ins. Co., 10-0355-cv (2d Cir. July 1, 2011), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected Insurers Federal Insurance Company’s (Federal) and ACE American Insurance Company’s (ACE) (collectively, the Insurers) appeals seeking to reverse a Finding of coverage for (1) expenses associated with federal and state government investigations into the insured’s accounting practices, and (2) a special litigation committee formed to investigate the shareholder derivative suits that followed the agency scrutiny. In an analysis heavily influenced by the facts, the Second Circuit swept aside the Insurers’ arguments that their D&O policies did not cover expenses associated with what they argued were informal agency inquiries and investigations only loosely associated with written agency orders and subpoenas. The court also concluded that expenses incurred by the special litigation committee formed by the insured, MBIA, Inc. (MBIA), to investigate two derivative suits were “Defense Costs” covered under the Insurers’ D&O policies. On close scrutiny, however, the impact of the decision may be limited based on the particular policy language at issue and the facts of the case.

 

 

 

The Policies

 

 

MBIA provides financial guarantee insurance for government bonds or structured finance obligations – essentially guaranteeing that bond holders would be paid with respect to MBIA’s clients’ bonds. MBIA purchased $15 million in primary D&O insurance from Federal covering the period of February 15, 2004 through August 15, 2004. ACE issued $15 million in excess coverage that followed form to the Federal policy in all respects relevant to the lawsuit (collectively, the Policies). The Policies’ entity coverage section provided: “The Company shall pay on behalf of any Organization all Securities Loss for which it becomes legally obligated to pay on account of any Securities Claim first made against it during the Policy Period ….” The Policies further covered “Defense Costs” for “Securities Claims.” “Securities Claim” was defined as “a formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document” that “in whole or in part, is based upon, arises from or is in consequence of the purchase or sale of, or over to purchase or sell any securities issued by [MBIA].”

 

 

 

The Agency Investigations and MBIA’s Claim

 

 

In 2001, the SEC issued an Order Directing Private Investigation and initiated an investigation into potentially unlawful accounting practices in the insurance industry. The SEC targeted MBIA in November 2004 as part of that larger investigation, issuing subpoenas compelling the company to produce documents concerning transactions involving “non-traditional products” – products that could be used to “affect the timing or amount of revenue or expense recognized.” The New York attorney general (NYAG) followed suit, serving MBIA with similar subpoenas requesting similar documents in November and December 2004.

 

 

 

The federal and state investigations eventually focused on three separate MBIA transactions. In the first transaction, MBIA purchased reinsurance for its guarantee of bonds issued by a group of hospitals owned by the Allegheny Health, Education and Research Foundation (AHERF) after AHERF declared bankruptcy. The investigations sought to determine whether MBIA endeavored to disguise the impact of a $170 million loss from the transaction with AHERF.

 

 

 

In the summer of 2005, the SEC and NYAG began investigating two additional transactions. In the second such transaction, MBIA purchased an interest in Capital Asset Holdings GP, Inc. (Capital Asset), but soon found it necessary to provide additional, unanticipated funds to Capital Asset. MBIA made the payment through a subsidiary, thereby transferring the risk of the investment loss to the subsidiary and allegedly disguising a potential loss to the parent company. The third transaction involved MBIA’s guarantee of securities used to purchase airplanes for US Airways. MBIA foreclosed on the airplanes after US Airways declared bankruptcy and treated the transaction as an investment in airplanes rather than a loss. 

 

 

 

MBIA forwarded the agency subpoenas to the Insurers in May 2005, informing them that it was the target of state and federal investigations. MBIA asked for the Insurers’ consent to retain counsel. The Insurers denied that the subpoenas triggered coverage, but accepted the subpoenas as notice of a potential claim. MBIA hired counsel and responded to the agency inquiries.

 

 

 

The SEC and NYAG considered issuing additional subpoenas concerning the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions in the summer of 2005. Concerned about additional adverse publicity, MBIA requested that the agencies hold on issuing more subpoenas, and instead accept MBIA’s voluntary compliance with the agencies’ demands. The SEC and NYAG agreed and, thereafter, MBIA complied with the agencies’ informal, often oral, requests.

 

 

 

In October 2005, MBIA forwarded the agencies an over of settlement concerning the AHERF transaction investigation. That over included a payment of penalties and MBIA’s proposal to retain an independent consultant to analyze the Capital Asset and US Airways matters. MBIA notified the Insurers of the settlement discussions in September 2005 and met with Federal in October 2005. At the time, however, MBIA did not advise the Insurers of its proposal to hire an independent consultant. The SEC and NYAG finalized settlements with MBIA in January 2007 in accords substantially similar to MBIA’s October 2005 over. The independent consultant later exonerated MBIA of any wrongdoing in the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions.

 

 

 

MBIA’s shareholders followed the state and federal agency investigations with two derivative lawsuits. Upon receiving the shareholder plaintiffs’ presuit demand letters, MBIA formed a Demand Investigative Committee (DIC) – a committee of independent directors tasked with investigating the shareholders’ demand letter. The DIC retained an outside law firm, Dickstein Shapiro (Dickstein), to assist in the investigation. When the DIC failed to act on the shareholders’ derivative demand within the time allotted by Connecticut law, the shareholders filed suit. MBIA reconstituted the DIC as a Special Litigation Committee (SLC), which again employed Dickstein to aid in the investigation of the derivative suit allegations. The SLC concluded that the suits were not in the best interests of the company and, consistent with Connecticut law, moved to dismiss the complaints.

 

 

 

MBIA submitted a claim with the Insurers seeking costs associated with the agencies’ investigations of the three transactions, the cost of the independent consultant retained to investigate the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions, and expenses associated with the DIC and the SLC. Federal paid MBIA approximately $6.4 million out of its $15 million limit to cover losses from the SEC investigation of the AHERF transaction and related lawsuits. The payment included $200,000 for the DIC’s investigation of the shareholder plaintiffs’ presuit demand pursuant to the Federal policy’s derivative investigation coverage sublimit. Federal denied MBIA’s claim for losses associated with the NYAG investigation of the AHERF transaction, the SEC and NYAG investigations of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions, the independent consultant, and the SLC. ACE denied that it had any obligation to pay for any of the losses based upon MBIA’s non-exhaustion of the primary policy.

 

 

 

The Motions for Summary Judgment and Appeal

 

 

MBIA filed suit against the Insurers on May 7, 2008, asserting three claims for breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment. MBIA and the Insurers cross-moved for summary judgment on MBIA’s claim for losses associated with the NYAG investigation of the AHERF transaction, the SEC and NYAG investigations of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions, the independent consultant, and the SLC.

 

 

 

Judge Berman of the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. On balance, however, the Southern District found in MBIA’s favor, holding that the Insurers owed coverage for the SEC and NYAG investigations of all three transactions, as well as for the expenses incurred by the SLC. The District Court determined that MBIA was not entitled to coverage for the costs associated with the independent consultant’s review of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions because MBIA had not provided the Insurers with adequate notice of its intent to retain the consultant. The Insurers appealed and MBIA cross-appealed. 

 

 

 

The Insurers’ appeal challenged the District Court’s holdings that the Policies obligated the Insurers to cover losses associated with (1) the NYAG investigation of the AHERF transaction, (2) the SEC and NYAG investigations of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions, and (3) the SLC. 

 

 

 

On the first issue, the Insurers argued that the NYAG subpoena was a “mere discovery device” that did not meet the Policies’ definition of “Securities Claim.” The Second Circuit disagreed, pointing out that a subpoena is the “primary investigative implement in the NYAG’s tool shed,” and that, at a minimum, it constituted a document similar to a “formal or informal investigative order,” which was within the definition of “Securities Claim.”

 

 

 

On the second issue, the Second Circuit rejected the Insurers’ argument that the SEC and NYAG investigations into the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions were not within the scope of the SEC’s formal order and the NYAG’s similar AHERF investigation. The court found that the language of the SEC order and NYAG subpoenas evidenced a “broad but definitive investigatory scope” that included all three of the questionable transactions. It further observed that the SEC and NYAG investigations of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions were connected to the SEC’s formal order and the NYAG’s AHERF investigation, and rejected the Insurers’ argument that they were not obligated to cover MBIA’s expenses associated with its voluntary compliance with informal requests made in the course of those related investigations.

 

 

 

The Insurers’ main argument in support of its third issue on appeal was that the SLC costs were incurred solely by the SLC, and that the SLC was not an “insured person” under the Policies. The District Court found coverage for the SLC expenses primarily because the expenses at issue were owed to Dickstein, and Dickstein had entered its appearance on behalf of MBIA, a nominal defendant in the derivative suits. The District Court reasoned that because Dickstein represented MBIA in the derivative suits, Dickstein’s fees were covered “Defense Costs.” The District Court then suggested that the SLC expenses would have been covered even if the outside firm had not represented MBIA, because the SLC was not an entity independent of MBIA.

 

 

 

The Second Circuit broadened the District Court’s reasoning and concluded that the SLC expenses were covered “Defense Costs” because the SLC was part of MBIA. After a brief analysis of Connecticut law on how and through whom corporations operate, the Second Circuit proclaimed that MBIA directed or acted through the SLC when the latter moved to dismiss the derivative suits and, as a result, the SLC was an “insured person” under the Policies. Unlike the District Court, the Second Circuit did not mention, much less rely upon the fact that Dickstein represented both the SLC and MBIA in the derivative suit. The Second Circuit further rejected the Insurers’ arguments that coverage for the SLC would render superfluous the Policies’ sublimit for investigation costs, and that the SLC expenses were excluded from coverage by operation of exclusions within the Policies’ definition of “Loss.” The court found that the investigation sublimit only applied to presuit investigations, not costs related to derivative suits, and that the Insurers had failed to establish that any exclusions applied to MBIA’s claim for SLC expenses. 

 

 

 

Turning to MBIA’s cross-appeal, the court reversed the District Court’s ruling in the Insurers’ favor on the issue of coverage for costs associated with the independent consultant’s investigation of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions. In a lengthy analysis reciting what and when MBIA reported to the Insurers, the court concluded that MBIA did not breach the Policies’ “right to associate” clause, because MBIA provided the insurers with sufficient notice of the settlement discussions with the SEC and NYAG “early enough in the process to allow the insurers to exercise their option to associate effectively.”

 

 

 

MBIA’s Affect on Future Claim Disputes

 

 

The Second Circuit’s opinion touches on two types of expenses commonly disputed in D&O claims, expenses incurred in responding to state or federal subpoenas and special litigation committee expenses associated with the investigation of allegations in derivative suits. The court accepted the policyholder’s arguments in support of coverage for both types of expenses. 

 

 

 

With respect to the first category of expenses, MBIA interprets “Securities Claims” broadly, supporting the assertion that coverage extends to expenses associated with an insured’s voluntary compliance with certain types of informal or quasi-formal agency investigations. Insureds undoubtedly will cite MBIA for the proposition that a company does not forfeit its D&O coverage when it volunteers to cooperate with investigative agency requests rather than await formal, legal proceedings and risk suffering potentially damaging publicity and harsher penalties. 

 

 

 

The court’s ruling on coverage for MBIA’s voluntary cooperation with investigators, however, cannot be universally applied without regard to the court’s view of the breadth of the investigations and the expansive language of the primary policy’s insuring agreement. Both factors may provide bases for distinguishing MBIA from other cases. In MBIA, the policy at issue broadly defined “Securities Claim” to include any “formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document.” A formal order of investigation and regulatory subpoenas already had been issued by both agencies before any voluntary compliance was offered or undertaken. Given the Federal policy’s expansive definition of “Securities Claim,” the Second Circuit had little difficulty concluding that coverage existed. This should be distinguished from situations involving voluntary disclosure in the absence of formal agency process or where a policy contains more limited language. 

 

 

 

The most significant aspect of the Second Circuit’s MBIA opinion is the seemingly blanket pronouncement that special litigation committee investigative costs incurred in response to a derivative suit are covered “Defense Costs.” That holding, however, relies on two questionable propositions: (1) that the SLC was an agent of, and acted at the behest of, MBIA, and (2) that the SLC’s actions were related to the defense of MBIA or insured directors.

 

 

 

On summary judgment, the District Court strained to find coverage for SLC expenses by noting that outside counsel retained by the SLC to investigate the shareholders’ claims also represented MBIA as a nominal defendant in the derivative lawsuits. After linking the SLC’s expenses to Dickstein’s representation of MBIA in the derivative suits, the District Court decreed that the SLC costs were, in fact, “Defense Costs.” 

 

 

 

The Second Circuit abandoned the District Court’s reliance on Dickstein’s representation of both the SLC and MBIA, determining instead that the SLC was not a separate entity from MBIA and was, therefore, an “insured person” under the Policy. The court’s analysis notwithstanding, there is no support for the proposition that MBIA directed the SLC. Rather, the SLC was comprised of independent directors uninvolved in wrongdoing alleged by the shareholder plaintiffs. Indeed, under Connecticut law, the SLC was required to operate independent of MBIA and its board in the SLC’s investigation of the derivative suits. The decision to dismiss the derivative suits was the SLC’s alone. MBIA did not, and legally could not, instruct the SLC to conclude that the derivative suit was not in the company’s best interest.

 

 

 

More importantly, the SLC did not act in the defense of MBIA or the insured directors and its expenses should not have been categorized as “Defense Costs.” The Second Circuit’s opinion provides no analysis on this point, concluding simply that “the costs incurred by the SLC in terminating the derivative litigation were covered ‘Defense Costs.’” But the very purpose of special litigation committees – to investigate allegations in shareholder derivative suits and determine whether the company should prosecute those claims against the defendant directors – is a corporate governance function. The board, through the SLC, has a fiduciary duty to investigate whether wrongdoing has occurred and whether to seek relief on behalf of the corporation. Thus, the SLC’s investigative costs should be covered here only to the extent of the Federal policy’s investigations sublimit. 

 

 

 

Moreover, costs for appearing in a lawsuit are not necessarily defense expenses. The SLC, after all, was not defending itself or the corporation. It was, in this case, seeking the termination of claims against other directors on grounds that it was not in the company’s interest to pursue those claims. This is the company’s right as the true owner of the claims being prosecuted. Simply because targeted directors avoided adverse claims as a result of the SLC’s investigation does not transform the SLC into a tool to defend target directors or defeat shareholder derivative claims. Had the SLC decided to take over the prosecution of the claims, also its right, no colorable argument for coverage could have been made. The Second Circuit overlooked this crucial analytical distinction.

 

 

 

MBIA is likely to be cited by policyholders both within and outside the Second Circuit in support of arguments for broad coverage with respect to agency investigations and Special Litigation Committee costs. Insurers need to be aware of the limitations of the Second Circuit’s reasoning and the factual idiosyncrasies of the case.

 

D&O Insurance: What Happens When the Former CEO Sues the Company?

When an ex- Chairman, CEO and Director sues his former company, are the company’s defense expenses covered under its D&O insurance policy? According to the June 24, 2011 report and recommendation of Middle District of Tennessee Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant, applying Tennessee law, they are not. A copy of Magistrate Bryant’s report and recommendation can be found here.

 

In October 2009, David Resha, a current shareholder and former Chairman, CEO and director of American Security Bank & Trust Company, sued the company in Tennessee state court for alleged violations of law and fiduciary duty. Resha alleged that the company had violated its bylaws and asserted the right to inspect the company’s books and records. American Security is the sole named defendant in the action.

 

The company submitted the action as a claim to its D&O insurer, seeking reimbursement for its defense expenses. The carrier denied coverage for the claim and American Security filed an action against the carrier alleging breach of contract and bad faith and seeking a judicial declaration that all past and future expenses incurred in defending against Resha’s claim are covered.

 

The policy contained the standard D&O insurance agreements for nonindemnifiable loss (Side A coverage) protecting the individual directors and officers in the event indemnification is not available to them due to insolvency or legal prohibition, and for corporate reimbursement (Side B coverage), reimbursing  the company to the extent it does indemnify the individual directors and officers. At least as presented in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, the policy did not contain a separate insuring agreement providing coverage for the entity’s own losses (Side C coverage).

 

The policy defined the term “Claim” to mean a “civil proceeding commenced by the service of the complaint … instituted against an Insured Person or against the Company, coverage is granted to the Company.” 

 

Resha’s lawsuit named only American Security as defendant in the lawsuit. Due to the absence of an entity coverage insuring provision, there is no separate coverage for the company under American Security’s D&O insurance policy. The company nevertheless argued that the insurer should reimburse the company’s defense costs because the complaint asserts bad faith actions and breaches of fiduciary duty by American Security directors, and therefore “impliedly” asserts claims against the directors.

 

The Magistrate Judge rejected American Security’s arguments, holding that because Resha’s complaint did not name the directors as defendants, the action has not been “instituted against” them. He said that to find under these circumstances that Resha’s action was “instituted against” the directors, the court “would be required to find the words ‘instituted against’ to be ambiguous.” He said that ‘after considering the usual, natural, and ordinary meaning of these words, there is no ambiguity to be found and any premise to the contrary must be rejected.” He added that “to find otherwise would violate the intent of this D&O policy and effectively change it into a comprehensive corporate liability policy.”

 

The Magistrate Judge went on to hold that “to the extent that a claim has been made against the directors and officers of American Security in substance, though not in form,” the claim would be barred by the policy’s Insured vs. Insured exclusion, since Resha, as the company’s former CEO is an insured person under the policy.

 

American Security had tried to argue that because Resha was also a shareholder, his claim was in the nature of a derivative claim, and therefore his action fell within the exception to the Insured vs. Insured exclusion for derivative claims. Without deciding whether or not Resha’s action was a derivative claim, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the derivative claim exception to the Insured vs. Insured exclusion did not apply, because Resha’s action was not maintained “independently of, and totally without the participation of any Insured” as would be required in order for the derivative claim exception to the Insured vs. Insured exclusion to apply.

 

The Magistrate Judge recommended that the insurer’s motion to dismiss be granted and the complaint against it dismissed.

 

Discussion

Assuming that the description of American Security’s D&O insurance policy in Magistrate Judge Bryant’s report and recommendation is complete, its policy is somewhat unusual as most current D&O insurance policies include a so-called entity coverage insuring provision (Side C coverage) providing insurance for the entity’s own separate liability exposures. Subject to all of the typical policy’s terms and conditions, entity coverage does provide a form of corporate liability protection.

 

However, even if American Security’s D&O insurance policy had carried the typical entity coverage insuring provision, Resha’s claim would still have run afoul of the policy’s Insured vs. Insured exclusion, and indeed if anything the exclusion’s applicability would have been even more clear.

 

The inclusion of the Insured vs. Insured exclusion in the D&O insurance policy is usually explained as a way to avoid the provision of insurance coverage for “collusive” claims. But that is not the only reason the exclusion is there. It is also a means to avoid insurance for corporate “infighting” where company officials attempt to pursue their disputes and rivalries in Court. The requirement that a derivative claim must be independent and without the participation of an insured person in order for the exclusion’s coverage carve back for derivative claims to apply is just an illustration as the ways the typical exclusions seeks to avoid coverage for infighting type claims.

 

Although Magistrate Judge Bryant’s report and recommendation does not say, it seems possible that Resha’s action represents just such an example of corporate infighting. The report and recommendation does not explain why Resha no longer is Chairman, CEO and a director of the company, but his action alleging by law violations and seeking access to the company’s books and records sounds like part of an ongoing dispute after his departure from office. In any event, Resha’s claim is the kind for which most D&O insurance policy’s typically would not provide coverage.

 

For a more detailed discussion of the Insured v. Insured exclusion generally, refer here.

 

Morrison: Domestic Transaction in Other Securities?: In its June 2010 decision in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case, the U.S. Supreme Court said that the Exchange Act applies only to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.” Among other issues with which the lower courts have struggled in the wake of Morrison has been the reach of Morrison’s second-prong; that is, what are “domestic transactions in other securities?”

 

A July 8, 2011 decision by the Eleventh Circuit may shed at least a little bit of light on this question. The case, styled as Quail Cruise Ship Management Ltd. V. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, which can be found here, involved the sale of M/V Pacific, a boat once featured in The Love Boat television series. The sale was effected by a transfer of shares.  The buyer alleged that it had been induced to purchase the shares through a series of misrepresentations, in violation of the U.S. securities laws.

 

The district court had concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because the shares were not listed on a U.S. exchange (the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted that the issue was not jurisdictional at all, but was rather under Morrison a question as to whether or not the U.S. securities laws applied).

 

The Eleventh Circuit held that because the complaint alleged that "the acquisition of the Templeton stock closed in Miami, Florida, on June 10, 2008, by means of the parties submitting the stock transfer documents by express courier into this District," the Complaint at least alleged that the final act to effect the share transfer took place in the U.S. Of course, whether or not the share transfer actually took place in the United States and whether the transfer actually effected the sale of the ship are questions of fact for later determination. 

 

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that it “cannot say at this stage in the proceedings that the alleged transfer of title to the shares in the United States lies beyond § 10(b)’s territorial reach.” the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. 

 

A further discussion of this case can be found in a July 15, 2011 post on the Corporate and Financial Weekly Digest blog, here.

 

The Message is Getting Through in China, Too -- At Least to a Certain Extent: In numerous posts on this blog, most recently here, I have noted the increasingly challenging D&O insurance market for U.S.-listed Chinese companies. The word about the challenging insurance market for these firms apparently is getting heard in China, too, at least based on one recent article. On June 24, 2011, the People’s Daily Online (English edition) carried an article entitled “D&O Premiums Skyrocket After U.S. Lawsuits” (here).

 

Although it is good that this message is getting communicated in China, the article soft-pedals the problem. D&O insurance premiums for U.S.-listed Chinese companies have gone up much more than the 20% increase cited in the article – that is, if you can find coverage at all. The article does at least go on to note, with greater (but not yet complete) accuracy, that in some cases the premiums have doubled. The premium increases have in fact been even more dramatic than that.

 

“Starring Your Love Boat Crew”: Those of you interested in having a look at the M/V Pacific or who just want a short trip down memory lane will want to view this video clip of the opening credits from The Love Boat, which according to Wikipedia, aired on television from 1977 to 1986.

 

Client Advisory: Critical D&O Insurance Issues for U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies

During the twelve months ending June 30, 2011, at least 32 Chinese companies were hit with U.S. securities suits. In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has initiated a number of enforcement actions and other proceedings against U.S.-listed Chinese companies, issued a formal bulletin warning investors about the risks of investing in Chinese companies that have gone public through reverse merger transactions, and launched a task force to investigate U.S.-listed Chinese companies that have sold stock to investors in the U.S.

 

These developments have significant D&O insurance implications for the directors and officers of these firms. In a July 14, 2011 Client Advisory from the Pillsbury Winthrop law firm, Pillsbury partner Peter M. Gillon and I review the current litigation exposure facing U.S.-listed Chinese companies and examine the questions that officials at these firms should be asking about their D&O insurance.

 

The Client Advisory can be found here.

 

D&O Insurance: Second Circuit Holds Investigative and Special Litigation Committee Expenses Covered

In a sweeping July 1, 2011 opinion in MBIA’s favor, the Second Circuit held that the company’s D&O insurance policies cover the investigative and special litigation expense the company incurred during a regulatory investigation of its accounting practices. This case had been closely watched in the D&O insurance community because of widespread carrier concerns over the district court’s coverage findings. The insurers had hoped for relief on appeal. But the Second Circuit’s decision, if anything, is even more expansive in favor of coverage than was the district court.  

 

Background

For the policy period February 15, 2004 to August 15, 2005, MBIA carried $30 million of D&O insurance, arranged in a primary layer of $15 million and an additional $15 million layer of excess insurance.

 

In 2001, prior to the policy period, the SEC had issued an Order Directing Private Investigation in connection with certain of insurance industry accounting practices. In November and December 2004, the SEC issued subpoenas to MBIA concerning "nontraditional products." The New York Attorney General also issued subpoenas in November and December 2004 regarding nontraditional products. Both the SEC and the NYAG issues additional subpoenas in March 2005. In spring 2005, MBIA, because of concerns about the cumulative impact in the marketplace, asked regulators to forbear from issuing additional subpoenas and agreed to comply voluntarily with informal document requests.

 

The investigation ultimately narrowed to three MBIA transactions. The first involved MBIA’s retroactive purchase of reinsurance on it guarantee of bonds issued by an Allegheny Health hospital group (knows as “AHERF”). The regulators latter contended that MBIA’s retroactive reinsurance purchase allowed MBIA to avoid recognizing a large ($170 mm) one-time loss. In the second transaction involving General Asset Holdings GP, the allegation was that MBIA transferred its risk of an investment loss to an MBIA subsidiary, allowing the parent company to avoid reporting the loss. The third transaction involved MBIA’s guarantee of securities US Airways issued to purchase aircraft. When US Airways went bankrupt, MBIA foreclosed on the aircraft, and treated the transaction as an “investment” rather than a “loss.”

 

In October 2005, MBIA submitted an offer of settlement to SEC. In the offer of settlement, MBIA undertook to retain an independent consultant to review MBIA’s accounting for the transactions. In January 2007, the SEC entered a Cease and Desist Order and the NYAG entered an Assurance of Discontinuance, both of which documents largely incorporated the company’s prior offer of settlement. Thereafter the company hired a consultant to undertake the proposed review. The independent consultant found no wrongdoing in connection with the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions.

 

In addition to the regulatory investigations, the company, as nominal defendant, was also sued in two derivative lawsuits. Prior to filing the suits, the shareholder plaintiffs had sent demand letters to MBIA asking the board to file suit against the directors and officers for the alleged wrongdoing. The company organized a demand investigative committee (“DIC”) to investigate the demands, but the DIC failed to act within the statutory time limit. The shareholders then filed suit, as a result of which the company organized a Special Litigation Committee (“the SLC”). The SLC hired an outside law firm, which investigated the derivative lawsuit allegations. Following its investigation, the SLC determined that maintaining the lawsuits was not in the company’s interest and recommended that the derivative lawsuits be dismissed. The derivative suits ultimately were dismissed.

 

MBIA claimed that it has spent $29.5 million in defending or responding to the regulatory investigations and the follow-on litigation. The primary insurer had agreed it was obligated to pay the costs associated with the SEC’s AHERF investigation and also its $200,000 sublimit for the DIC investigation. The primary insurer disputed that it was obliged to reimburse other amounts incurred. Specifically the primary insurer disputed that it was obligated to reimburse the costs associated with NYAG’s AHERF subpoena; the Capital Asset and US Airways transaction investigations; the SLC expenses; and the independent consultant’s expenses. The primary carrier reimbursed MBIA $6.4 million.

 

MBIA filed an action against the two insurers alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration that the insurers were obligated to reimburse the company for legal fees and other costs associated with the regulatory investigations and the derivative actions. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

 

In December 30, 2009 opinion (discussed here), District Judge Richard M. Berman held that the policies covered all of the investigative costs and the special litigation committee counsel’s expenses, but that they did not cover the independent consultant’s post-settlement investigation. The parties cross appealed.

 

The July 1 Second Circuit Opinion

In a 43-page July 1, 2011 opinion for a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit, Southern District of New York Chief Judge Loretta Preska (sitting by designation) affirmed the district court’s holdings finding coverage for the investigative expenses and for the special litigation committed expenses. However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court with respect to the independent consultant’s expenses, holding that the policies covered this category of expense as well. In short, the Second Circuit found for MBIA with respect to all items in dispute.

 

The insurers argued that NYAG’s AHERF subpoena did not represent a covered “Securities Claim” within the meaning of the primary policy. The primary policy defined a “Securities Claim,” inter alia, as “a formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document.”

 

The Second Circuit agreed with the district court’s “sensible intuition that a businessperson would view a subpoena as a ‘formal or informal investigative order’ based on the common understanding of these words,” adding that in any event a “subpoena is a ‘similar document’ to those listed the definition of a ‘Securities Claim’ because it is similar to other forms of investigative demands made by the regulators.” The Court rejected the insurer’s “crabbed view” that a subpoena is a “mere discovery device” that is “not even ‘similar’ to an investigative order.”  Rather, it is the “primary investigative implement in the NYAG’s toolshed.”

 

The coverage debate with respect to the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions was whether or not the transactions fell within scope of the SEC’s formal order and the NYAG’s AHERF subpoena. The insurers had argued that descriptive limitations in the formal order’s caption put these matters outside the scope of the SEC’s order and NYAG subpoena. The Second Circuit rejected this argument holding that the order “announced a broad but definite investigative scope that includes these transactions.” It reached a similar conclusion with respect to the NYAG subpoena.

 

In addition, the Second Circuit rejected the insurers’ arguments that because the investigative documents connected with these matters were produced voluntarily by oral request rather than by subpoena or other formal process, there was no coverage in connection with the related investigation. The Second Circuit found this argument “meritless” since the investigations were connected with the formal order. The Second Circuit added that “insurers cannot require that as an investigation proceeds, a company must suffer extra public relations damage to avail itself of overage.”

 

The Second Circuit also rejected the insurers’ argument that the SLC expenses were not covered. The insurers had argued that the SLC was “independent” of MBIA and therefore was not an insured person under the policy. The Second Circuit observed that “MBIA formed the SLC to determine MBIA’s response to this litigation, and the SLC decided to terminate the litigation. The SLC entered appearances for MBIA and filed motions to dismiss on it behalf in both the state and federal cases.” Because “the dismissal of the suits was MBIA’s decision, undertaken pursuant to the powers granted to MBIA under Connecticut law,” the Second Circuit rejected the insurers’ argument that the SLC was not an “Insured Person” under the policy.

 

The Second Circuit further  rejected the insurers’ argument that because the SLC was required by law to operate “independently” of MBIA, it took on a separate identity and operated separately from MBIA. The Second Circuit characterized this as “sleight of hand,” because “independent” in this context means “independence of judgment,” a “lack of conflict of interest.” The Court noted that “independence of judgment does not generate a new source of authority to terminate derivative litigation; that authority is still exercised by the corporation, which can only act through its agents.”

 

Similarly, the Second Circuit rejected the insurers’ attempt to rely on the $200,000 sublimited coverage for investigative costs. The Court found that this sublimit related solely to pre-litigation demands. However the SLC’s activities were, consistent with Connecticut law, post-litigation, as a result of which the operative policy provisions were the general policy provisions relating to litigated matters, rather than the narrow sublimit relating to pre-litigation demands.

 

Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the insurers’ argument that against coverage for the post-settlement consultant’s investigation expenses. In a highly fact-based analysis, the Court determined that the insurers had been given adequate notice of these expenses and that MBIA’s provision of information relating to these expenses had not violated any of its notice or settlement consent obligations under the policy.

 

Discussion

The Second Circuit’s MBIA opinion is an important decision addressing many recurring D&O insurance coverage issues, Because of the Second Circuit’s reasoning and the breadth of its language, policyholders will undoubtedly seek to rely heavily on this opinion in connection with the perennial issues such as coverage for costs associated with responding to a subpoena and special litigation committee expenses.

 

The Second Circuit’s opinion largely mirrored the district court with respect to the issue of the policy’s coverage for costs associated with responding to the NYAG’s subpoena – although even there, policyholders may find the Second Circuit’s language useful.

 

But the Second Circuit’s reasoning on the question of coverage for the SLC expenses goes further than the district court did. Judge Berman had found coverage for the SLC’s outside counsel’s expenses largely because of his specific factual determination that the SLC’s counsel had appeared on behalf of MBIA to have the derivative suits dismissed. The Second Circuit’s logic was more basic, having to do with the fundamental character of the SLC and its relation to the company under Connecticut law. The Court’s rejection of the insurers’ argument that the SLC was “independent” of the company seems particularly critical.

 

Another aspect of the opinion that many policyholders may find helpful is the section where the Second Circuit found coverage for the company’s expenses incurred in voluntarily providing investigative material to the regulators. Companies are often fighting with carriers over whether there is coverage for voluntary or cooperative efforts, which are often undertaken in an effort to fend off more formal regulatory action. Insurers can expect to have quoted back to them frequently the Second Circuit’s words that “the insurers cannot require that as an investigation proceeds, a company must suffer public relations damage to avail itself of coverage a reasonable person would think was triggered by the initial investigation.”

 

From the carrier’s perspective, this is a very fact-specific opinion that in many ways is largely a reflection of the unusual circumstance that all of the investigation followed the SEC’s issuance of its very broad formal investigative order. Much of the coverage analysis, including for example the court’s discussion of coverage for the voluntarily produced information, is merely  a reflection of the fact that the disputed expenses arose  after the formal order of investigation.

 

The much more frequent dispute involves costs incurred before the issuance of a formal order of investigation, a circumstance that was not involved here.  In that respect, it is critical to note that as broad as the Second Circuit’s opinion is, the decision has nothing to say concerning the recurring question of policy coverage for expenses incurred in connection with an informal investigation.

 

In addition to being fact-specific, the Second Circuit’s analysis, particularly in connection with the SLC expenses, is very law-specific too, depending narrowly on the details of Connecticut corporate law. Carriers can be expected to argue when the laws of other jurisdictions are applicable, the Second Circuit’s determination in the MBIA case is inapplicable.

 

While there are ways that the carriers can try to narrow the application of the Second Circuit’s MBIA decision, the fact is that this decision is a strong one for policyholders. This may be one of those instances where the carriers, if they really didn’t intend to cover these things and really don’t want to cover these things, may have to go back and look at their policy language. But since the general marketplace trend recently has been toward increased investigative cost coverage, the carriers may find that they lack sufficient marketplace room to maneuver on these issues from a policy language standpoint.

 

UPDATE: Joe Monteleone has an interesting July 6, 2011 post about the SLC portion of the Second Circuit's MBIA opinion on his The D&O E&O Monitor blog, here.

 

Same Name, Different Reference: I may be the only one that cares, but there is a Camaroonian soccer player named Stephane Mbia, who plays in the French top flight soccer league, League 1, for the Olympique de Marseille club.

 

Guest Post: D&O Insurers Be Wary: U.K. Bribery Act Takes Effect July 1, 2011

As discussed in a prior post (here), the U.K Bribery Act of 2010 is now set to take effect on July 1, 2011. In a guest post below, Anjali Das, a partner in the Chicago office of the Wilson Elser law firm, takes a look at the Act’s key provisions and requirements and then reviews the Act’s D&O insurance implications. 

 

My thanks to Anjali for her willingness to publish her article as a guest post here.  I welcome guest posts from responsible commentators on topics relevant to this blog. Any readers who are interested in publishing a guest post on this site are encouraged to contact me directly,

 

 

Anajli’s guest post follows:

 

 

            As if companies and their directors and officers did not have enough to contend with in the wake of the global financial crisis and the U.S. government's increasingly zealous prosecution of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), they will soon have to comply with the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 ("Bribery Act") effective July 1, 2011, which far surpasses the FCPA in terms of potential liability exposure for bribery in the broadest sense of the word. In light of the potential long-arm reach of the Bribery Act, Directors and Officers ("D&O") liability carriers should familiarize themselves with the potential increased exposure to their insureds under the Bribery Act.

 

 

            This article discusses the following the issues related to the Bribery Act:

 

 

  • Four key bribery offenses under the Act: 
  • Imputation of bribery offenses by associated persons to the company;
  • Six guiding principles for implementing effective anti-bribery policies and procedures;
  • Potential coverage issues under D&O policies for investigations and proceedings under the Act

 

PART I: Overview of the Bribery Act

 

 

            On March 30, 2011, the U.K. Ministry of Justice ("MOJ") issued long-anticipated Guidance on the Bribery Act which provides an overview of the four key offenses under the statute and six guiding principles to prevent bribery in violation of the Act.

 

 

 Four Key Offenses Under the Act

 

 

            As discussed below, the key offenses under the Bribery Act include: (i) active bribery or offering bribes (Section 1), (ii) passive bribery or accepting bribes (Section 2), (iii) bribery of a foreign public official (Section 6), and (iv) a company's failure to prevent bribery (Section 7).  

 

 

            Sections 1, 2 and 6 apply with respect to acts of bribery that take place in the U.K. or if the person committing the offense has a "close connection" to the U.K such as a British citizen, resident of the U.K., or entity incorporated under the laws of any part of the U.K. A company may also be liable under Sections 1, 2 or 6 if the offense was committed by or with the consent of a company's senior officer. Section 7 applies to companies that are incorporated or formed in the U.K. or "carry on business" in the U.K., regardless of whether the bribery occurred in the U.K. or elsewhere. 

 

 

            Active and Passive Bribery: Section 1 of the Bribery Act prohibits "active bribery" and makes it an offense for a person to offer, promise, or give "financial or other advantage" to another person with the intent to induce "improper performance" of a relevant function or activity. Section 2 of the Bribery Act is the flip side of Section 1 and prohibits "passive bribery".   Section 2 makes it an offense for a person to accept or receive a financial or other advantage intended to induce or reward improper performance by the recipient or some other person. According to the MOJ's Guidance, improper performance means "performance which amounts to a breach of an expectation that a person will act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust." 

 

 

            In the introduction to the MOJ's Guidance, Kenneth Clarke, U.K. Secretary State for Justice, seeks to assuage businesses that the parameters of the Act are not intended to prohibit reasonable client development activities: "Rest assured, -- no one wants to stop firms getting to know their clients by taking them to events like Wimbledon or the Grand Prix." Moreover, the Guidance itself suggests that "an invitation to attend a Six Nations match at Twickenham as part of a public relations exercise designed to cement good relations or enhance knowledge in the organisation's field is extremely unlikely to engage section 1. . . ." However, more lavish hospitality intended as a quid pro quo to induce favorable treatment in a pending business deal (i.e., to get new business, keep business, or get some other business advantage) could be subject to greater scrutiny under the Act. The test is what a "reasonable person" in the U.K. would expect under the circumstances, and whether the prosecution can demonstrate evidence of intent to induce improper performance as defined by the Act.

 

 

            Bribery of Foreign Officials: Section 6 of the Bribery Act, which resembles the anti-bribery provisions in the FCPA, prohibits the bribery of a foreign public official. As explained in the MOJ's Guidance, an offense is committed when a person offers, promises or gives a foreign public official a financial or other advantage with the intent of: (i) influencing the official in the performance of his or her official duties, and (ii) obtaining or retaining business or other advantage in the conduct of business by offering the bribe. A foreign official includes any person who performs public functions in any branch of national, local, or municipal government in any country or territory outside the U.K.   An example in the MOJ's Guidance of a permissible transaction with foreign officials is a U.K. mining company's offer to pay for reasonable travel and accommodation to enable the foreign officials to inspect the standard and safety of the company's distant mining operations. In contrast, an offer to pay the foreign officials' "five-star holiday" in an unrelated destination is questionable. 

 

 

            Failure to Prevent Bribery :Section 7 of the Bribery Act creates a new offense for corporate liability for failing to prevent bribery in the first instance. Under this section of the Act, a company will be liable if a person associated with it bribes another person with the intention of obtaining or retaining business or other advantage. Liability under this section applies to "relevant commercial organizations" which include: (1) entities incorporated or formed in the U.K., regardless of whether the entity conducts business in the U.K., and (2) entities that "carry on business" in the U.K., regardless of the place of incorporation or formation. The Act itself does not define the term "carry on business," and the MOJ's Guidance merely states that this interpretation is subject to a "common sense approach". While the MOJ notes that the courts are the final arbiter of this determination, the Government itself does not expect that companies merely listed on the London Stock Exchange without a "demonstrable business presence" in the U.K. are subject to liability under Section 7 of the Act. 

 

 

 Imputation of Acts by Associated Persons

 

 

            Corporate liability under Section 7 of the Act may be established through bribery conducted by "associated persons" which broadly encompasses any person or entity that "performs services" for the company. An associated person may include the company's employees, agents, subsidiaries, or any other party that performs services for or on behalf of the company regardless of the "capacity" in which such services are performed. Significantly, this may include the company's suppliers (that do more than merely sell goods) and direct contractors (as opposed to sub-contractors). As a result, there is an increased burden on companies to examine their supply chain and external business relationships with third parties for potential risk of bribery and imputation of corporate liability under the Act.

 

 

 Ministry of Justice's Six Guiding Principles

 

 

            The MOJ has identified six "guiding principles" to assist companies in adopting effective policies, and procedures to prevent bribery. If a company can demonstrate that it has adequate anti-bribery procedures in place, this could be a complete defense to violation of Section 7 of the Bribery Act. These guiding principles include:

 

(1) Proportionality: The company's anti-bribery policies and procedures should be "proportionate" to the size of the company and the perceived risks it faces. The procedures should be designed to mitigate identified risks and prevent deliberate unethical conduct on the part of associated persons.

 

 

(2) Top Level Commitment: The message of zero tolerance for bribery should be adopted, implemented, and/or communicated by individuals at the highest levels of the organization such as the board of directors.

 

 

(3) Risk Assessment: The company should periodically assess and document its perceived exposure to internal and external risks of bribery, including an analysis of bribery risk in the markets in which it conducts business (for country risk, sector risk, transaction risk, and business opportunity risk) and risk presented by various business partners/associates.

 

 

(4) Due Diligence: The company should conduct appropriate due diligence either internally or by external consultants prior to hiring and engaging other persons, third party intermediaries, agents, or business partners/associates to represent the company in its business dealings.

 

 

(5) Commmunication: The company's anti-bribery policies and procedures should be communicated internally to staff and employees and externally to all business partners/associates that perform services for the company. Such communications may be made orally, in writing, and/or through training sessions.

 

 

(6)    Monitoring and Review: The company should periodically evaluate its anti-bribery policies and procedures for effectiveness in light of changing business or political environments that may increase the company's bribery risk in certain markets. These periodic reviews may be conducted through special internal systems such as internal financial control mechanisms, staff surveys, formal reviews by top-level management, and/or external verification of the effectiveness of the company's anti-bribery procedures. 

 

 

            It is important to recognize that the MOJ's guidelines for anti-bribery policies and procedures are not "prescriptive," and there is no "one- size-fits-all" approach that applies to all companies. 

 

 

PART II:     Potential Coverage Issues Under D&O Policies 

 

 

            These days, D&O policies routinely afford "worldwide" coverage, including coverage for foreign (non U.S.) proceedings against a company's foreign subsidiaries and directors and officers of these subsidiaries.   Therefore, U.S. companies that do business in the U.K., have subsidiaries, directors and officers, employees or agents in the U.K. may be subject to violations of the Bribery Act. As such, D&O insurers would be well-advised to consider the potential coverage implications under their policies for claims and investigations under the Bribery Act.

 

 

            Potential coverage issues that might arise under D&O policies for Bribery Act violations, investigations and proceedings include, but are not necessarily limited to:

 

 

·        Coverage for investigations

 

 

·        Covered claims against a D&O versus uncovered claims against the company

 

 

·        Allocation of defense costs

 

 

·        Insured subsidiaries and their directors and officers

 

 

·        Coverage for collateral litigation arising from Bribery Act violations

 

 

·        Dishonesty and Personal Profit Exclusions

 

 

·        Coverage for fines and penalties

 

 

 Coverage for Investigations

 

 

            Initially, it is important to consider whether a government investigation for potential violations of the Bribery Act gives rise to an insurer's obligation to pay or advance the insured's legal fees and expenses under a D&O policy. Like FCPA investigations, investigation costs for Bribery Act violations could be substantial – potentially exceeding millions of dollars. Consider for example the ongoing FCPA investigation of Avon Products, Inc. where the company reportedly spent $96 million in 2010 and $35 million in 2009 for legal fees related to its FCPA investigation. 

 

 

            Coverage for investigations under D&O policies has evolved dramatically in recent years. In some instances, the D&O policy definition of a Claim has expanded to encompass investigations of directors and officers by various government or regulatory authorities. Some D&O policies only afford coverage for formal investigations if a director or officer is served with a "subpoena" or identified as a "target" of an investigation by a governmental investigative authority. More recently, some insurers have expanded coverage to include informal investigations of directors and officers which do not require the issuance of a subpoena.  Such informal investigations may include a voluntary request for production of documents, interviews, or testimony.  This year, for the first time, a new generation of D&O coverage affords entity coverage for investigations "of the company" itself.  However, entity coverage for investigations under these newest policies may be limited to claims for violations of securities laws and/or expressly exclude FCPA and Bribery Act claims. Thus, it is critical to analyze the specific policy wording to determine the scope of coverage for investigations. 

 

 

            Undoubtedly, there are numerous cases finding both in favor of and against coverage for investigations under D&O policies. This is a fact-sensitive analysis dictated in part by the precise policy wording and the circumstances surrounding the investigation.  

 

 

            For instance, a number of courts have held that subpoenas and/or Civil Investigative Orders issued by the SEC, DOJ, or other government authorities are covered claims under a D&O policy – particularly where the definition of a claim expressly includes an "investigative order". In MBIA, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124335 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), the court held that subpoenas issued by the SEC and New York Attorney General ("NYAG") in connection with their investigations of MBIA constituted a Securities Claim which was defined as "a formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document". The court rejected the insurer's argument that a subpoena was not an investigative "order". At a minimum, the subpoenas were "similar documents" that triggered coverage under the policies. 

 

 

            In Ace American Ins. Co. v. Ascend One Corp., 570 F.Supp.2d 789 (D. Maryland 2008), the court held that an administrative subpoena issued by the Maryland Attorney General and a Civil Investigative Demand issued by the Texas Attorney General constituted a Claim which was defined by the policy as "a civil, administrative or regulatory investigation against any Insured commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, investigative order, or similar document". The court also rejected the Insured's argument that the subpoena and Investigative Demand failed to allege a Wrongful Act. The court observed that the Maryland and Texas Attorney General's Office were investigating violations of their respective state Consumer Protection Acts in connection with the company's business activities. 

 

 

            In National Stock Exchange v. Federal Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23876 (N.D. Ill. 2007), the court held that an SEC investigation commenced by a formal order of investigation was a Claim under the policy. In that case, the definition of a Claim included "a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal investigative order or similar document". It was undisputed that the SEC issued an order directing a private investigation and designating officers to take testimony. The court rejected the insurer's argument that the SEC investigation was not a Claim "against an Insured Person for a Wrongful Act". The court observed that the scope of the SEC's investigation included the company and its directors and officers for possible violations of securities laws. 

 

 

            In contrast, other cases have held that government investigations are not a claim under a D&O policy. In Office Depot, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2010), the court held that the D&O insurer was not liable to pay legal fees and costs incurred by the company in connection with: (1) the SEC's investigation, or (2) the company's internal investigation by its Audit Committee. First, the court opined that the SEC investigation was not a covered Securities Claim against the Company since the definition expressly excluded "an administrative or regulatory proceeding against, or investigation" of the company. Second, the court concluded that the SEC investigation was not a Claim against an Insured Person (D&O). The definition of a Claim included "a civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory, proceeding" or "investigation . . . commenced by service of a subpoena" or identifying an Insured Person in writing as the target of an investigation. Here, however, the SEC investigation was directed to the company – not to an Insured Person. The SEC's formal order of investigation did not identify any specific D&Os or any specific wrongdoing by any of the D&Os. Third, the court found that the insurer was not liable for the company's internal investigation because they were not a covered "loss" "arising from" a Claim or Securities Claim. Instead, the internal investigation, which preceded subsequent shareholder suits, was triggered by a whistleblower complaint regarding various accounting irregularities. Fourth, the court observed that the internal investigation costs did not "result solely from investigation or defense" of a covered Claim as contemplated by the policy definition of Defense Costs. The court held that the insurer was not liable for the legal fees and costs incurred by the company in response to: (i) the SEC informal inquiry, (ii) SEC formal investigation prior to the issuance of a subpoena or Wells notice on an Insured Person, or (iii) internal investigation by the Audit Committee. 

 

 

            In Diamond Glass Companies, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86752 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) , the court held that expenses incurred by the insured in responding to a federal grand jury investigation were not covered under the insured's D&O policy. In that case, the court opined that the investigation was not a "criminal proceeding . . . commenced by the return of an indictment, filing of a notice of charges, or similar document" as defined by the policy. The court observed that there was no claim against an individual insured, because the policy expressly stated that the individual must receive "written notice from an investigating authority specifically identifying such Insured Person as a target against whom formal charges may be commenced". 

 

 

            Of course, if prosecutors ultimately sue any directors or officers for violations of the Bribery Act, such a legal proceeding might be covered if the D&O policy broadly defines a Claim to include any civil, criminal, administrative or regulatory proceeding. On the other hand, if the company alone is the subject of a legal proceeding for violation of Section 7 of the Bribery Act, this may not constitute a covered Claim. Under many D&O policies entity coverage is limited to a Securities Claim against the company such as a lawsuit by shareholders in connection with the purchase or sale of the company's securities. Such a narrow definition of Securities Claim may not apply to a company sued for violations of the Bribery Act to the extent the bribery does not involve a violation of securities laws, does not arise out of the purchase or sale of a company's securities, or is not brought by a company's shareholders. 

 

 

Identifying the Insured

 

 

            It is also critical to determine whether an "insured" is the subject of an investigation. As noted herein, many D&O policies offer worldwide coverage for a company, its subsidiaries, and their directors and officers. However, a subsidiary is a defined term that may be limited to entities in which the company owns a specified percentage of the subsidiary's stock. Consider, for example, a company that has an overseas U.K. affiliate in which it owns 40% of the voting stock. That affiliate and its directors and officers are the subject of an investigation or proceeding for violations of the Bribery Act. However, if the D&O policy only affords coverage to subsidiaries in which the company owns 50% or more of the voting stock, then the affiliate and its directors and officers are not insureds. 

 

 

            However, if both a covered subsidiary and one of its officers are sued for violations of the Bribery Act, this could give rise to a covered claim against the subsidiary's officer and an uncovered claim against the company (assuming the policy does not afford entity coverage for investigations). In that event, the insurer may need to seek an allocation of covered defense costs (for the officer) versus uncovered defense costs (for the company). Some D&O policies contain express allocation language which state that the parties will make a reasonable effort to arrive at a fair allocation for covered versus uncovered defense costs and, in the event of a dispute, the insurer will advance those amounts which it determines are covered until the coverage dispute is ultimately resolved by negotiation, arbitration, litigation, mediation, or otherwise. 

 

 

Collateral Litigation

           

            It is possible that Bribery Act violations may spur collateral litigation against a company and/or its directors and officers by shareholders, employees, customers, competitors, or other third parties. By comparison, FCPA violations have prompted a number of shareholder suits in the U.S. which may give rise to a covered Securities Claim.  In addition, in the case of multinational corporations, Bribery Act investigations by U.K. authorities might provoke similar investigations or legal proceedings by foreign governments or U.S. authorities under the FCPA or other anti-bribery laws. Many D&O policies are claims made and reported policies. In other words, a claim is covered if it first made during the policy period and timely reported to the insurer. When there is a chain of bribery-related investigations or legal proceedings, potential coverage issues include the date the initial bribery claim was first made (and reported), and whether subsequent bribery claims are deemed to be related to the initial claim such that they are all covered under a single policy period.  

 

           

D&O Policy Exclusions 

 

 

            Common exclusions in D&O policies include the fraud, dishonesty, and personal profit exclusions. These exclusions might be implicated if an insured is found to have engaged in intentional misconduct or unlawfully profited from his wrongdoing.   Oftentimes, however, such exclusions are subject to a final adverse adjudication establishing that the insured engaged in such wrongdoing. In addition, such exclusions may be "severable" such that the wrongful acts of one insured cannot be imputed to another for purposes of triggering an exclusion.

 

 

            Companies and individuals may be subject to imprisonment and/or fines for violations of the Bribery Act. As a general rule, most D&O policies do not afford coverage for fines or penalties. However, some D&O policies now afford very limited coverage for fines imposed under the FCPA. Thus, it is possible that similar coverage for limited fines or penalties might be offered for Bribery Act violations in the future.

 

 

Conclusion 

 

 

            Without a doubt, governments are demonstrating increasing intolerance of bribery in the corporate world by individuals and companies alike. To date, the Bribery Act far surpasses other anti-bribery laws, including the FCPA, in identifying the breadth of unacceptable business practices in both the private and public sectors that are subject to prosecution. U.K. enforcement authorities have emphasized the strong public policy rationale for adopting the Act's stringent measures which are designed to encourage "free and fair competition," and have outright rejected the notion of greasing the wheels of commerce by so-called facilitation payments which are considered commonplace in some parts of the world. If the rigorous enforcement and prosecution of FCPA violations in the U.S. has caused companies pause for concern, the Bribery Act might possibly signal just cause for companies to scrutinize and re-think their transnational business activities to avoid future claims, prosecution, and legal expenses for potential violations of the Act.

             

D&O Insurance: Does "Fraudulent" Mean "Fraudulent"?

If a verdict form contains the jury’s specific finding that the insured engaged in “fraudulent, malicious, oppressive, wanton, willful, or reckless conduct,” you might think that would trigger the exclusion for fraudulent misconduct in the applicable D&O insurance policy. But apparently not, at least according to a May 12, 2011 Southern District of West Virginia ruling (here) in a case involving the Charleston Area Medical Center (CAMC). The case makes for some interesting reading and interesting analysis.

 

Background       

In September 2004, CAMC determined that Dr. R.E. Hamrick’s plan to self-fund his medical professional liability was inadequate and not actuarially sound. Based on this determination and the fact that Dr. Hamrick’s insurance coverage had lapsed, CMAC revoked his clinical privileges. Dr. Hamrick went to court seeking injunctive relief and three days later succeed in having his clinical privileges restored. He then pursued a damages claim against CAMC. Dr. Hamrick’s amended complaint contained a claim for defamation and a claim for invasion of privacy/false light. Dr. Hamrick also sought punitive damages.

 

In February 2008, Dr. Hamrick’s damages claim went to the jury. In Section 1 of the jury Verdict form, entitled “Liability,” the jury indicated that they found in favor of Dr. Hamrick. In Section 2 of the Verdict form, entitled “Damages,” the jury awarded Dr. Hamrick $5 million in compensatory damages. In Section 3, labeled “Punitive Damages,” the jury found that CAMC had engaged in “fraudulent, malicious, oppressive, wanton, willful, or reckless conduct with respect to Dr. Hamrick,” and awarded $20 million in punitive damages. In Section 4 of the form, labeled “Other,” the jury found that CAMC had acted in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons with respect to Dr. Hamrick.”

 

In July 2008, the court granted CAMC’s motion for remittitur, and reduced the damages award to $2 million in compensatory and $8 million in punitive damages. The case ultimately settled for $11.5 million, representing the remittitur award of $10 million, post-judgment interest of $476,917 and attorneys’ fees of $1.023,083.

 

The Insurance Coverage Dispute

CAMC was insured, inter alia, by a  D&O insurance policy with a primary limit of liability of $10 million., including a punitive damages limit of $5 million (the punitive damages limits is part of not in addition to the primary $10 million limit.) The policy contains an exclusion stating that the insurer will “not pay Loss for Claims brought about or contributed to in fact (1) by any dishonest or fraudulent act or omission or any willful violation of any statute, rule or law by any Insured.”

 

The D&O insurer filed a coverage action seeking a judicial declaration that at least some portion of the settlement falls under the dishonest/fraudulent acts exclusion and therefore is not covered, maintaining further that the jury’s findings necessitate an allocation between covered and non-covered conduct. CAMC filed a counterclaim, and the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

 

The May 12 Opinion

In his May 12, 2011 opinion (here), Southern District of West Virginia Chief Judge Joseph R. Goodwin held that the insurer had not carried its burden under West Virginia law to prove the facts necessary to support an exclusion to coverage.

 

In attempting to carry its burden, the insurer had sought to rely on the jury’s determinations in Sections 3 and 4 of the verdict form. Judge Goodwin found that these portions of the verdict form “quite clearly related to damages and attorney’s fees, as the jury assessed liability only in Section 1 of the jury form,” adding that the insurer’s arguments that “the jury’s findings in Section 3 and 4 related to something other than damages and attorney’s fees is somewhat hard to fathom.”

 

Judge Goodwin noted that the standards in Sections 3 and 4 “are not elements of any of the causes of action on which the jury’s liability finding in Section 1 could have been predicated, nor are those standards relevant to compensatory damages.” As a result “the only reason for the jury to have made such findings would have been in relation to punitive damages and attorney’s fees.”

 

Judge Goodwin went on to state that the insurer

 

has lost sight of the simple fact that the claims presented to the Hamrick jury were for defamation and invasion of privacy, not fraud. Because Dr. Hamrick never pressed a cause of action that was predicated on fraudulent or dishonest conduct, the jury could not possibly have found for him on such a claim. Moreover, [the insurer] cannot identify any particular dishonest or fraudulent act or omission on the part of CAMC.

 

Instead, [the insurer’s] entire position boils down to the argument that the last two sections of the jury verdict form somehow transformed the claim into one involving dishonest or fraudulent conduct. …CAMC was alleged to have wronged Dr. Hamrick by communicating to others his lack of insurance coverage, the actuarial deficiencies of his self-insurance program, and his revoked clinical privileges. There is no fraudulent or dishonest conduct in those acts or omissions, however, and the mere fact that the jury made predicate findings with regard to punitive damages and attorney’s fees does not alter the nature of the conduct giving rise to the claim.

 

Judge Goodwin further stated that “there were only two claims in this case – for defamation and invasion of privacy – and no colorable argument that the conduct giving rise to them fit within the Dishonest/Fraudulent Act Exclusion,” adding that the insurer’s “argument for denying coverage stems not from the nature of the claims or the conduct giving rise to them, but from specific findings made by the jury as part of the damages award.”

 

Judge Goodwin entered summary judgment against the insurer and in favor of CAMC.

 

Discussion

This coverage dispute is different than the usual clash over the fraudulent misconduct exclusion. Disputes about the fraudulent misconduct exclusion are usually over the fact that there are all kinds of allegations but unless there has been a finding that the precluded conduct actually occurred, then the exclusion doesn’t apply. Here the usual debate has been completely turned on its head. The assertion is that regardless of the jury’s specific finding of precluded misconduct, the exclusion doesn’t apply because the precluded misconduct was never alleged.

 

Judge Goodwin emphasizes that the specific legal theories on which Hamrick proceeded did not allege or depend upon precluded acts or omissions. Perhaps Judge Goodwin reads the phrase precluding coverage for “Loss for Claims brought about or contributed to in fact” by the excluded conduct to mean (1) that it is not sufficient if the Loss is brought about or contributed to by the precluded act or omission; (2)  the exclusion applies only if the Loss arises from Claims brought about or contributed to precluded act or omission. Because the Claims on which Hamrick relied and which he asserted did not depend on or even allege precluded conduct, then the exclusion would not apply, regardless of whether or not Loss was brought about or contributed to by precluded conduct.

 

The arguable problem with this analysis is that it  exalts mere pleading over proof – regardless of what Hamrick’s pleadings might have alleged , the fact is that the  jury specifically found that CAMC had engaged in “fraudulent, malicious, oppressive, wanton, willful or reckless conduct” with respect to Dr. Hamrick. (Moreover, Judge Goodwin doesn’t seem to have considered the jury finding’s use of the disjunctive “or” to be inconsistent with a finding of “fraudulent “conduct. He seems to accept that the jury finding represents a finding of “fraudulent” conduct.)

 

Judge Goodwin emphasizes that the jury made its fraudulent misconduct determination in the portion of the verdict form that relates to damages rather than the portion of the form relating to liability. It may well be that this distinction is as determinative as he believes it to be. But he never explains why that is so, particularly with reference to the operative policy language. In the absence of this explanation, we are left to wonder why he finds that distinction determinative of the issue.

 

All of this analysis disregards what seems to be the real problem here –there doesn’t seem to have been any fraudulent misconduct pleaded or proven.  As Judge Goodwin states, the insurer “cannot identify any particular dishonest or fraudulent omission on the part of CAMC.” In other words, Judge Goodwin seems to to be saying, the fraudulent misconduct exclusion doesn’t apply because there wasn’t any fraudulent misconduct – notwithstanding the jury’s specific finding in the jury verdict form that there was fraudulent misconduct. Judge Goodwin eludes this problem with this statement: “The mere fact that the jury made predicate findings with regard to punitive damages and attorney’s fees does not alter the nature of the conduct giving rise to the claim.” Well,  what could “predicate findings” be based upon other than conduct?

 

Judge Goodwin doesn’t say anything about it expressly , but there really does seem to be something wrong with a result in which punitive damages have been awarded based on a jury finding for which there appears to be  no basis in the record. And that’s not all. For a few days loss of clinical privileges, Hamrick was awarded millions of dollars of damages for reputational harm. Even without the punitive damages, Hamrick seem immensely better off than he would have been if his privileges had not been briefly interrupted.  

 

I will leave it to others to assess what the result in the underlying case might imply about the process involved.  But given the apparent proclivity of West Virginia juries, Dr. Hamrick’s plan to self-insure really does not look like a great idea.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending along the opinion.

 

D&O Insurance: "Where's My Price Reduction?"

One of the most challenging assignments for those of us in the D&O insurance business is to try to explain to those outside the industry how D&O insurance pricing works. The explanation is difficult enough as a general matter, but it is often even more difficult to explain in connection with a specific transaction. The difficulty of the explanation is itself a reflection of a number of features of the current marketplace for D&O insurance.

 

Among the reason for the difficulty of the explanation are the expectations of many insurance buyers. Because of superabundant capacity and rampant competition, D&O insurers have managed to create an environment where many buyers simply expect a price reduction every year.

 

But for all the downward pricing pressures in a  competitive insurance environment, some insurance underwriters at least some of the time still try to segment applicants by risk and price accordingly. There are corporate attributes that even in today’s hyper competitive insurance marketplace will militate against aggressive pricing competition. These factors include, for example, financial instability, past litigation or regulatory activity, adverse business developments, management changes, and maturing debt. By the same token, relatively young companies or development stage companies will always be viewed differently than more mature companies, and companies in certain industries will always be considered more risky than other companies.

 

Looking at it objectively, it makes perfect sense that D&O underwriters might want to try to segment applicants by their relative risk exposures and price accordingly. D&O insurance remains a high severity product. Insured companies and their management are often blindsided by the bad news that leads to claims. The claims can be enormously expensive to defend and settle – in fact, they have been becoming more expensive to defend and settle for years, and at a rate much greater than the rate of general economic inflation.

 

The astonishing thing about the D&O insurance marketplace is that despite the pervasiveness and unpredictability of the risk exposure, the marketplace continues to attract new competitors. In a field where there has been abundant insurance capacity and downward pressure on prices for years, new players still continue to appear and existing players continue to try to expand their portfolios.

 

Growing capacity chasing a finite number of opportunities means that there inevitably will be further downward pressure on prices, despite an adverse claims environment. In addition to downward pricing pressure, there is also outward pressure on the expansiveness of available terms and conditions. As a result, many D&O insurance buyers continue to enjoy the ability to purchase relatively favorable insurance protection at relatively attractive prices.

 

However, even in today’s competitive marketplace, not every company will see only  reduced costs. The D&O insurance marketplace can sometimes seem completely crazy, but it is not always completely illogical. From time to time, the marketplace even manifests that most remote and elusive of all insurance industry phenomena – “underwriting discipline.”

 

The point is that even in a highly competitive insurance marketplace, some insurance buyers are going to pay more for their D&O insurance than other buyers. And even in a competitive insurance marketplace, companies whose risk profiles changed during the policy year may well find themselves paying more for their renewal policy than they did for their current policy. Companies perceived as riskier may not see their insurance cost decline, even if the companies operating history during the policy year generally has been positive.

 

The chronic lack of discipline that so often characterizes the D&O insurance marketplace makes the occasional outbreak of underwriting discipline that much harder to explain when it makes one of its sporadic appearances. For that reason, it can be critically important for companies’ insurance advisors to set expectations at the outset of the insurance placement process.

 

Insurance advisors also have a role to play in helping buyers to understand the pricing alternatives available in the marketplace, particularly if the pricing available reflects something other than a pricing decrease.

 

But the advisors’ efforts to explain marketplace pricing can be completely undercut by a couple of kinds of marketplace unpredictability. The first involves carriers whose pricing decisions are inconsistent and therefore challenging to anticipate. The second involves carriers whose different individual underwriters produce differing pricing determinations. Both of these types of inconsistencies can be difficult to explain, but the problems arising when the same carriers’ underwriters are inconsistent among themselves can be a particularly vexing.

 

No one likes surprises, and that is particularly so when it comes to big ticket expenses like D&O insurance. It is unlikely that pricing surprises can ever be completely eliminated, particularly because the surprise can be the result of expectations and assumptions that might not have been realistic to start with. The possibility for unwelcome pricing surprises be reduces by focused efforts to match expectations the marketplace realities. And finally, carriers can do their part too though the consistency with which they conduct themselves in the marketplace.

 

The Name Game: I am sure I am not alone among Americans who find place names in England particularly interesting. For example, one of the pleasures of the London underground is the memorable names of many of the stops. I am not only thinking here of the splendor of some of the more  triumphant names, like “Elephant and Castle,” “Knightsbridge,” or “Vauxhall.”  I am thinking more of the  names that have that particularly British distinctiveness, such as the termination point of the Piccadilly line service, which is announced by a business-like female voice this way:  “This is the Piccadilly line service to Cockfosters.  (Pause.)  Please mind the gap (pause) between the train (pause) and the platform.” Or on another line: “This is the District line service to Barking. (Pause.) Please mind the gap (pause) between the train (pause) and the platform.”

 

My fascination with interesting names is among the reasons why I feel compelled to follow English football. The pervasive presence of international players in the English premier league contributes a certain musicality to many of the team rosters.

 

Among the names I often wind up repeating to myself is that of the Ivorian defenseman playing for Manchester City, Yaya Touré. Another name with the same kind of pleasing musicality is that of the Cameroonian now playing for Tottenham Hotspur, Benôit Assou-Ekotto. Other names that I find oddly compelling are those of Peter Odomwinge, a Nigerian now playing for West Bromwich Albion, and José Bosingwa, the Portuguese player for Chelsea. There are also the players whose names convey a definite staccato rhythm, like the Bulgarian player for Manchester United, Dimitar Berbatov, or drumbeat finality, like the Dutch wingman for Liverpool, Dirk Kuyt (“kowt”).

 

(Just as an aside, it is worth noting that Silicon Valley venture capitalist Michael Moritz wrote an April 4, 2011 editorial in the Wall Street Journal about the immigration lessons of English Premier League football.)

 

The aural magic of so many of these names is enhanced by the way the TV announcers will track the progress of the ball during the game by simply stating the last names of the players involved. An example involving, say, an offensive set by Chelsea, might go something like this “Cech …Essien … Anelka … Kalou …Malouda …Drogba. Malouda. Drogba!!!!” (The enjoyment of this litany is significantly enhanced when accompanied by ritually appropriate quantities of beer.)

 

And then there are the players’ nicknames. For example, the back of the jersey of Manchester United forward Javier Hernández bears his nickname, “Chicharito” (“little pea”). The second best all time nickname is that of Fitz Hall, who plays for the Queens Park Rangers in the npower Championship League. His nickname is “One Size.”

 

Which brings me to the all time, indoor/outdoor world champion nickname. The nickname does not in fact have anything to do with English football, but it is simply too good to omit from this discussion. The nickname is that of my college classmate, Tom Glasscock, who was known as “STP” (for “See-Through P---s.’ )

 

Blog Update: Some readers may have seen my recent post (here) in which I raised the question of whether or not the Berkshire board could really be held liable for David Sokol's trades in Lubrizol shares. UCLA Law Professor Stepen Bainbridge has added a post to his blog (here), in which he answers my qustion. The answer according to Bainbridge is "no" for reasons he explains furhter on his site, with reference to the attempts a few years ago to hold the board of Martha Stewart's  company liable for Stewart's own insider trading.

 

Wage and Hour Claims Exposure and EPL Insurance

Cases alleging violations of wage and hour laws have been a growing source of litigation activity in recent years. These cases present a variety of allegations, such as unpaid overtime, employee misclassification, and failure to pay minimum wage. A March 21, 2011 NERA Economic Consulting publication entitled “Recent Trends in Wage and Hour Settlements” takes a look at evolving settlement patterns in these cases. The report, which can be found here, contains a number of interesting observations and underscores the litigation risk that these cases present. The report’s findings have a number of important Employment Practices Liability implications, as discussed below.

 

The report examines 187 wage and hour case settlements reported between 2007 and 2010. The report notes in a footnote that the settlement data, derived from a number of sources, while inclusive of a large number of settlements, “is not likely to be comprehensive.” In addition, some potentially significant settlements were excluded due to incomplete information. Moreover, the settlement information regarding 48 of the 187 cases studied is confidential. For that reason, many of the observations in the study may be more a reflection of the data available that of the overall trends. Notwithstanding the possible data constraints, the report reflects a number of interesting observations.

 

Over the entire four year period of the study, the average settlement per case was $12.8 million and the median settlement was $4.3 million. However, these summary statistics “mask a large range of settlement values.” About 25% of all settlements were under $1 million, while about 20% settled for $20 million or more.

 

In addition, the report reflects a “sharp decrease “in both the average and median settlements in 2009 and 2010 relative to 2007 and 2008. This apparent difference may be a reflection of the data available. For example, in the first two years of the period there were very few reported settlements under $1 million, while in the last two years there was an increased proportion of these smaller settlements. The low number of these smaller settlements in the first two years “may be a result of data limitations.” The pattern in the data could be explained “if lower-value settlements were systematically less publicized in earlier years’”

 

Of course, the relative absence of lower settlements in the two earlier years may also reflect “differences in the underlying characteristics” of the cases during that period. The study does reflect that the nature of the cases shifted in the second two years of the study period. There were more overtime and off-the-clock allegations in the second two years and relatively fewer misclassification cases in those years than in 2007 and 2008. The report notes that “cases with overtime allegations tend to settle for lower amounts,” when controlling for other factors.

 

Two specific factors seem most determinative of settlement size, the number of class members participating and the duration of the class period. The number of plaintiffs involved in the cases varied widely, with about 80 cases involving fewer that 1,000 plaintiffs while six cases had more than 100,000 plaintiffs. The average per-plaintiff settlement amount was $5,700 and the median amount was $3,500. The average settlement amount per year of the class period was $1.2 million. The average settlement amount per plaintiff-year was about $1,000. Consistent with the overall settlement trends, the average per plaintiff settlement and the average per year settlement amount declined in the second two years of the four year study period.  

 

Discussion

The NERA study provides a detailed if not entirely comprehensive overview of the severity risks associated with these kinds of cases. It is apparent that the settlements examined in the NERA study were largely class or at least mass actions involving large numbers of plaintiffs acting collectively. Nevertheless the per plaintiff settlement data may be useful in assessing wage and hour cases that are not presented as collective actions.

 

The study certainly does underscore the seriousness that wage and hour collective actions may represent to employers. The settlement amounts obviously do not include the costs that the various defendant companies incurred in defending these actions. But taking the additional if not precisely known costs of defense in account, it is clear that these kinds of cases represent a serious exposure for the defendant companies.

 

The typical Employment Practices Liability (EPL) insurance policy contains exclusions for wage and hour cases. The usual carrier explanation for these exclusions is something along the lines that insurance for this liability would create a moral hazard, as it might otherwise encourage employers to withhold pay owed to employees with the idea of shifting the compensation expense to the insurer. A June 2010 National Underwriter article discussing EPL coverage issues involving these types of claims can be found here.

 

But while the liability for these cases is typically excluded, EPL policies increasingly include some defense cost protection for these kinds of claims, often on a sublimited basis. The NERA report underscores the seriousness of these kinds of claims, which in turn highlights the importance for the defendant companies of mounting an effective defense. For that reason, the inclusion of the defense cost coverage for wage and hour claims, even if sublimited and even if subject to a self insured retention, could represent a valuable coverage extension for insured companies.

 

It is important to note that not all EPL policies contain this coverage extension, and that some carriers will provide this extension only upon request. This issue represents one more reason why it is critically important for insurance buyers to retain knowledgeable and experienced brokers in their insurance purchases.  

 

Guest Post: Judge Rakoff Again Criticizes SEC Settlements, How Will D&O Insurers Respond?

I am pleased to reproduce below a guest post from my friend Maurice Pesso, who is a parner in the White & Williams law firm, and his colleagues Sarah Katz Downey. I welcome guest contributions from responsible commentators. This article first appeared as a White & Williams law firm memo. Please note that in an earlier post (here), I summarized a speech Judge Jed Rakoff gave last summer about the Bank of America case (mentioned below). Here is the guest post:

 

 

In a March 21, 2011 opinion by U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff  in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., et al., Case No. 10cv9239 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2011) (the "Opinion"), Judge Rakoff, in approving the proposed consent judgments against Vitesse and two of its officers, questioned whether the SEC’s practice of allowing defendants to neither admit nor deny liability might render a proposed consent judgment “so unreasonable or contrary to the public interest as to warrant its disapproval.” Here are Judge Rakoff’s own words: “[h]ere an agency of the United States is saying, in effect, ‘although we claim that these defendants have done terrible things, they refuse to admit it and we do not propose to prove it, but will simply resort to gagging their right to deny it.’”

 

 

This is at least the second time that Judge Rakoff has publicly called into question the SEC’s settlement practices. In September 2009, Judge Rakoff initially refused to approve a $33 million settlement between the SEC and Bank of America relating to shareholder communications by Bank of America prior to its takeover of Merrill Lynch. Although Judge Rakoff subsequently approved the settlement on revised terms, he chastised the SEC for the initial settlement terms, stating that the settlement "does not comport with the most elementary notions of justice and morality, in that it proposes that the shareholders who were the victims of the Bank's alleged misconduct now pay the penalty for that misconduct."

 

 

If Judge Rakoff’s reasoning gains traction in judicial or political quarters, the SEC may be placed in a position where it must refuse to enter into settlements with defendants unless the defendants admit liability. This would create a strong disincentive for defendants, and especially individual defendants, to settle with the SEC for at least two reasons: (1) if they admit liability, they will have limited future prospects as directors or officers of any registered company; and (2) the admission of liability will significantly raise the cost of resolving any related civil litigation, such as a securities class action.

 

In the wake of the Vitesse decision, D&O underwriters should be thinking about how the inability to settle SEC enforcement proceedings will affect the costs of defense for SEC enforcement proceedings and impact defense and settlement costs for related shareholder class actions and derivative litigation. On the one hand, if defendants cannot settle with the SEC without admitting liability, there likely will be fewer settlements and some defendants may decide to litigate until a final judgment — all resulting in increased costs of defense. On the otherhand, if a defendant chooses to litigate until a final judgment and a verdict is rendered against the defendant, the D&O insurer may be able to deny coverage in its entirety based on conduct exclusions in the D&O policy.

 

SEC v. Vitesse, et al.

 

On December 10, 2010, the SEC filed an enforcement proceeding against Vitesse Semiconductor Corporation and four Vitesse officers and directors. In its complaint, the SEC generally alleged that the defendants made numerous material misrepresentations in Vitesse’s SEC filings in an effort to conceal their fraudulent revenue recognition practices and stock options backdatings. Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint, the SEC filed proposed consent judgments against Vitesse and two of its officers, apparently anticipating that the court would simply approve the settlement as negotiated.

 

The consent judgments were presented to Judge Rakoff for court approval. According to the Opinion, the consent judgments lacked information explaining why they should be approved and how they met the requisite legal standards for court approval. In response to Judge Rakoff’s request for additional information, the SEC provided a December 21, 2010 letter brief. In addition, on December 22, 2010, a hearing was held before Judge Rakoff at which time the parties provided further information.

 

In the Opinion, Judge Rakoff acknowledged that, at first glance, the terms of the proposed consent judgments appeared inadequate based on the allegations of material misconduct by the defendants. However, despite the fact that the three defendants neither admitted nor denied liability, Judge Rakoff concluded that the terms of the settlement were “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.” In finding that the terms of the proposed settlement were adequate, Judge Rakoff considered factors outside the terms of the settlement with the SEC, such as the fact that the two officers pled guilty to parallel criminal charges and that Vitesse had little money to pay based on its current troubled financial condition.

 

Despite having approved the settlement, Judge Rakoff raised concerns with the SEC’s longstanding practice of seeking court approval for settlements in which serious allegations of fraud are asserted against the defendants without requiring the defendants to expressly admit or deny the allegations.

 

As a practical matter, the SEC’s practice of settling with defendants who neither admit nor deny liability benefits both the SEC and the defendants. By entering into the consent judgments without admitting liability, the defendants are not collaterally estopped from asserting their innocence in parallel civil actions. Because the defendants do not have to admit liability, the SEC benefits because the defendants are more likely to enter into SEC settlements at an earlier time, and without requiring the SEC to devote substantial resources to taking enforcement actions to trial.

 

According to the Opinion, the SEC’s practice of entering into settlements where the defendants neither admit nor deny liability began decades ago and has developed through the years. Prior to 1972, after a court approved a settlement, the defendant would publicly deny his or her liability in connection with the SEC’s allegations. In response, in 1972, the SEC began to require all defendants who settled with the SEC without an admission of liability to refrain from publicly proclaiming their innocence. Nevertheless, SEC defendants still found ways in which to make it known that they never admitted liability — while being careful to refrain from denying liability at the same time.

 

In the Opinion, Judge Rakoff questioned whether the SEC’s practice of allowing defendants to neither admit nor deny liability might render a proposed consent judgment “so unreasonable or contrary to the public interest as to warrant its disapproval.” According to Judge Rakoff, the public suffers from the SEC’s practice of allowing the defendants to settle serious allegations without admitting liability, leaving the public with no way of knowing whether there was any truth behind the allegations.

 

D&O Coverage Implications

SEC settlements themselves are generally uninsurable under D&O policies because they are composed of either: (1) fines/penalties; (2) disgorgement; and/or (3) equitable relief. However, the costs associated with defending against SEC enforcement proceedings are generally covered under D&O policies.

 

As discussed, if Judge Rakoff’s reasoning is followed, the SEC may find itself pressured — or obligated — to enter into settlements only with defendants who will admit liability. If defendants cannot settle with SEC without admitting liability, there will be fewer settlements, and some defendants may decide to litigate until a final judgment — all resulting in increased costs of defense. In recent years, defense costs for even a single SEC defendant have run into the millions of dollars, and sometimes even more than $10 million. Because defense fees associated with SEC enforcement proceedings are generally covered under D&O policies, D&O insurers would feel the impact of increased defense costs in SEC actions.

 

At the same time, if a defendant chooses to litigate until a final judgment and a verdict is rendered against the defendant, the D&O insurer may be able to deny coverage for the defendant based on the conduct exclusions. In addition, the D&O insurer may be able to rely on the judgment to deny coverage for one or more D&O defendants in any related civil litigations. Depending upon the policy terms at issue, the D&O insurer may also be able to seek reimbursement of all of the defense costs that it previously advanced following an adverse verdict in an SEC trial.

 

The SEC’s reaction to Judge Rakoff’s criticism remains to be seen. Although intended to be an independent regulator, the SEC can be subjected to political pressure — especially from the U.S. Congress, which sets the SEC’s annual funding budget. It will be interesting to see if there is a slowdown in SEC settlements over the next few months and if other judges refuse to “rubber stamp” SEC settlements where the defendants neither admit nor deny liability. We will follow this issue and report any findings.

 

Guest Post: Professionalism in the D&O Claims Process -- Civil Behavior is Just Good Business

I am pleased to be able to print below a guest post from my friend and industry colleagueDonna Ferrara. Donna is Senior Vice President and Managing Director, Management Liability Practice Group, at Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. As Donna indicates, this guest post is the result of an email exchange between Donna and myself following one of my recent blog posts about to a recent coverage decision. Because I recognized the depth of Donna’s feelings about the need for professionalism in the insurance claims process, I invited her to submit a guest post on the topic, which she has done and which I have set out below.

 

I want to emphasize that I welcome proposed guest posts from responsible commentators throughout the industry. I also encourage readers who have reactions to Donna’s guest post to please add their thoughts using the blog’s comment function. Here is Donna’s guest post:

 

After I posted a comment on Kevin’s blog, he asked if I would write about the need for professionalism in our business. The following is my opinion and does not reflect that of my employer or colleagues. In the interest of full disclosure, I currently work for a major insurance broker. In the past, I have represented both insurers and insureds, which provides, I believe, an unusual point of view.

 

First, this is not a sniveling request for a return to the days of elaborately false good manners and courtly lawyering, if there ever were such a time.

 

Rather, this is an unscientific discussion of how civil – or Rational - behavior is good business.

 

Navigating the arcane world of D&O insurance requires a fairly high level of expertise. One would hope that this would be matched by a high level of professionalism and respect, but that is not always the case.

 

Rationally, D&O disputes should not create feelings of betrayal and personal peril. Unlike criminal or civil rights cases, the ultimate issue is money. Yet often disputes are ratcheted to an emotional level more appropriate for armed combat.

 

Recently, I looked at cases in which D&O coverage disputes had been litigated to appeals courts, an expensive and unusual event. Most litigation settles long before there is anything to appeal. At Kevin’s request, I am not including the names or identifying information of the litigants. I have no knowledge of the cases reviewed, beyond what is publically available.

 

In each case, someone was pressing an argument which was, at best, difficult. For example, in one case, a carrier asserted that even if a court ordered a litigant to pay plaintiffs’ costs, that litigant was not "legally obligated to pay" those costs. In another, the insured argued that the policy provided coverage for investigations of the corporation, although the policy limited such coverage to individuals. In a third, the parties claimed that a provision which provided only defense coverage actually provided no coverage (in the carrier’s view) or full defense and indemnity (in the insured’s view).

 

Unsurprisingly, these arguments did not succeed. After the parties had expended substantial legal fees, appeals courts found, in effect, that the policies said what they said.

 

Why did the parties fight so hard to reach what should have been an obvious conclusion?

 

The reason may be found in the pleadings and motion practice.

 

In each case, there was a substantial amount of money at stake, but probably not a "bet the company" sum for either party. Still, the dockets reveal extensive and vitriolic communications between the parties and their respective counsel. Carriers complained that their advice had been ignored. Insureds claimed deception and bad faith. Both sides bickered over discovery. Sanctions were demanded. The exhibits to the pleadings included emails and letters demonstrating that animosity had been the tone of the parties’ relationship from the beginning.

 

In short, the litigants subscribed to the Tough theory of business and litigation.

 

Probably the parties felt that the sums involved justified their mutually Tough stance. Possibly, they felt that "It was the Principle" – although, again, the issue was really only money. In any case, being Tough virtually assured that they would end up in court, yet in none of these cases did one side succeed completely.

 

Rationally, the parties might have realized that courts are poor places to make difficult arguments. Courts are not equipped to make decisions based on business considerations. With few exceptions, judges were litigators in their past lives. They come from an adversarial background and are limited to deciding specific issues. They cannot make compromises or force settlements (at least not overtly). Every issue has to be reviewed. At the end of the process, there has to be a "winner" and a "loser" on every point, even if no one actually "wins" the entire case.

 

Moreover, most judges have more cases than they can handle. Aggressive tactics slow the docket, annoying judges and magistrates. True, Tough tactics mean more money for lawyers who bill on an hourly basis. Clients, however, resent high legal fees that are not accompanied by clear success (and even those that are).

 

I suspect that, at the end of the cases reviewed, no one felt victorious or vindicated.

 

In a Rational world, the parties in this litigation would have met before a claim had even been made. The contract would have been openly discussed. There would be a Rational presumption that good coverage costs more than poor coverage, that no insurer wants to accept unlimited risk and that the insured would want the policy to respond as its words – and advertising - indicated it would.

 

It is unlikely this discussion ever took place.

 

D&O insurance is sold in a market where price is often the primary, if not the sole, consideration and that price is set by competition, not by risk.

 

Underwriters, pressured to write business, tweak their forms, but price according to what other carriers charge. Because D&O claims are historically infrequent, but relatively severe, claims handlers do not have the chance to manage and pay many claims. Insureds demand the broadest possible coverage, for the lowest cost - a Bentley for the price of a bicycle. Brokers are in the middle, often an untenable situation. They must be seen as Tough, or risk losing the business.

 

Lawyers may exacerbate the situation: Often both client and lawyer perceive attorneys as the "hired gun". As a brash young attorney once said, "If my clients wanted to make nice, they would have called a florist." D&O is especially fertile ground for disputes: policy language varies and insurance is governed by the state law. Whatever position a party takes can find support somewhere.

 

The present economic climate increases the pressure on everyone: "bad" results can have bad personal consequences. Carriers’ personnel may be fired, lawyers dismissed and brokers replaced. Rationality may be perceived as weakness or lack of commitment.

 

Rather than suggest that the other side may have merit, parties feel compelled to press every point against equally committed adversaries.

 

In my own experience, there can and should be a Rational approach to D&O issues. While difficult and even counterintuitive, it is possible for insurers and insureds to listen to each other, discuss differences and come to appropriate business decisions. Everyone should know that their position had been heard. Lawyers can recognize that their clients might benefit more from compromise than scorched earth. Although we are bound to be advocates for our clients, we can and should be counselors as well.

 

This is just good business.

 

In the cases discussed, it is easy to imagine that the relationships among the litigants were damaged irreparably. The insureds were unlikely to ever purchase insurance from the carriers again, but the brokers and lawyers may have lost their clients as well.

 

I am not so naïve as to envision a world in which carriers and their insureds are "partners", in the sense that they will both benefit from the same outcome. While I passionately serve my clients, I know that insurance is a business of trading services for money. As with any business, rational, civil behavior can be mutually beneficial. 

 

Does D&O Insurance Cover Fee Awards to Derivative Plaintiffs?

A frequent component of derivative litigation resolution is an award to the plaintiffs of the fees and expenses the plaintiffs incurred in pursuing the suit. A contentious, recurring question is whether D&O insurance covers fee awards to derivative litigation plaintiffs. This issue received a through going over in a February 17, 2011 opinion from a five judge panel of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.

 

In the opinion (here), a three-judge majority held, over the dissent of two judges, that a $8.8 million derivative plaintiffs’ fee award was covered under Loral Space & Communications D&O insurance policy, but all five judges held unanimously that the D&O policy did not cover the separate $10.7 million awarded for plaintiffs’ fees in a related action seeking damages for breach of fiduciary duty.

 

Background

The coverage suit arises out of litigation filed after Loral agreed to enter a financing transaction with MHR Fund Management. In the transaction, MHR agreed to provide Loral $300 million in exchange for convertible preferred stock Loral was to issue to MHR.

 

Two lawsuits ensure. First, a BlackRock fund filed a shareholders’ derivative action seeking to rescind the deal. Second, Highland Crusader Offshore Partners filed a damages action. Both actions alleged Loral had breached its fiduciary duty because the value to MHR of the proposed deal allegedly far exceeded $300 million.

 

The cases were consolidated. Following a trial, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded that the transaction was unfair to Loral, and reformed the deal terms so that MHR would receive nonvoting common stock rather than convertible preferred stock. The court awarded no damages and made no findings of fault.

 

Concluding that the plaintiffs’ actions had produced a substantial benefit for Loral, and applying the corporate benefit doctrine, the Court entered a fee award to BlackRock of $8.8 million and entered a fee award to Highland of $10.7 million. Loral paid these amounts and then sought coverage under its D&O insurance policy for the payments.

 

Loral’s D&O insurer denied coverage and commenced an action seeking a judicial declaration that their policy did not cover the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee awards. The trial court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in Loral’s favor. The insurers appealed.

 

The February 18 Order

On appeal, the insurers argued that the Highland fee award was not covered because the Highland action for damages was not a "securities claim" and therefore there was no coverage under the policy for any amount related to that action. The insurers argued that the BlackRock fee award was not covered because the BlackRock litigation produced a benefit for Loral and therefore the fee award did not represent covered "Loss since it was a cost the company incurred as part of procuring the benefit.

 

The five-judge panel unanimously agreed that there was no coverage for the $10.7 million Highland fee award, because the Highland damages action was neither a derivative suit nor did it allege violation of any securities law, and therefore it did not represent a securities claim as was required to bring the claim within the Policy’s coverage.

 

The panel split badly on the question whether or not the fee award in the BlackRock derivative action was covered under the D&O policy. The three-judge majority concluded that it was. Its reasoning turned it part on the policy’s definition of "Loss," which provides that "Loss" includes "damages, judgments, settlements or other amounts (including punitive or exemplary damages where insurable by law) and Defense Expenses in excess of the Retention that the Insured is legally obligated to pay."

 

The majority rejected the insurers’ argument that because the derivative suit produced a benefit for Loral, Loral had not suffered a "Loss." The majority perceived this argument as essentially a suggestion that the fee award should be offset against the nonmonetary benefit Loral received as a result of the restructured transaction. The majority found that while Loral received a benefit in that it no longer suffered the detriment that would have followed from the transaction as originally structured "it does not follow that Loral actually made a tangible profit."

 

The attorneys’ fee award, the majority found, "constitutes damages" and representing "other amounts" that Loral has become "legally obligated to pay" and therefore comes within the Policy’s definition of "Loss." The majority also noted that the Policy expressly covers derivative lawsuits and that "to declare that Loral has no coverage for derivative plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees would deprive Loral of the coverage for derivative lawsuits that it paid for and expected to receive."

 

The dissent objected to the majority’s conclusion about the derivative fee award. First, the dissent argued that the "legally obligated to pay" language in the definition of Loss followed and referred to "the Retention," not to "other amounts."

 

The dissent also argued that in order for the derivative fee award to be covered, it would have to represent "an actual loss, not an expense or the cost of doing business." The dissent reasoned that in this case, Loral "did not sustain a loss but rather benefitted from the judgment."

 

A fee award a derivative suit, the dissent observed, represents "the equitable entitlement of the successful derivative plaintiff to recover the expenses of his/her attorneys’ fees from all the shareholders of the corporation on whose behalf the suit was brought." The dissent observed that "if not spreading the cost of attorneys’ fees sounds in unjust enrichment, the obvious corollary is that shifting the cost to shareholders as a group cannot be characterized as a loss."

 

Discussion

The insurers in this case did not come away empty, as the appellate court unanimously agreed that because there was no coverage under the policy for the Highland damages claim, the $10.7 million Highland fee award was not covered under the Policy.

 

This holding was not preordained as at least one court has recently held that a fee award can represents damage for which there can be coverage under a D&O policy even if there is no coverage under the policy for the underlying litigation. In a February 9, 2010 ruling (here), the District of Minnesota held that a derivative lawsuit fee award represented "damages" and could be covered under a D&O insurance policy even where the underlying claim itself was not covered under the policy.

 

With respect to the question of coverage for the BlackRock derivative fee award, the insurers did manage to persuade two of three judges that because of the nature of the outcome of the underlying case and the nature of the derivative fee award, the award did not represent a loss to Loral and therefore is not covered under the policy.

 

The narrowness of split between the majority and the dissent on this issue suggests that this dispute is far from resolved. Even just in this case, there seems a substantial likelihood for further appellate proceedings in the New York Court of Appeals. And in general, given the close split, the underlying issue is likely to continue to be debated in other cases.

 

The carriers assert their position on these issues with conviction. Policyholders find the insurers’ rationale on this issue obscure and unpersuasive (those are among the milder adjectives, actually) – although obviously the insurers were able to persuade two judges of the appellate court of their position, so clearly there is something to their position on this issue.

 

The danger for all involved is that this issue will continue to come up over and over again. A colleague in the industry suggested to me in a note about the Loral case that eventually this issue may have to be addressed in the policy, along the lines of the way the industry developed a policy solution to the contentious issue that Section 11 settlements were not covered under the Policy. The way the industry addressed that issue is that it became standard to include in public company D&O policies language stating that the insurer would not take the position that a settlement of a ’33 Act case was not covered under the Policy. Perhaps, the colleague suggested, the industry will adopt a similar approach on this derivative lawsuit fee award issue.

 

I am interested in readers’ thoughts on these issues. I hope readers will add their observations to this post, using the blog’s comment feature.

 

Many thanks to the several readers who sent me a copy of the Loral decision.

 

I am Word Power: In a column in the February 28, 2011 issue of The New Yorker entitled "Who Am I" (here), Demetri Martin wrote "I am bravery. I am courage. I am valor. I am daring. I am holding a thesaurus."

 

Towers Watson Releases 2010 D&O Liability Survey Report

Great news – the survey is back. After year’s interruption, Towers Watson has resumed its annual D&O Liability Survey. The report for the 2010 survey (a copy of which can be found here) is full of valuable information about D&O insurance policyholders’ limits selection, program structure, and claims experiences, among many other things. The entire industry should celebrate the return of this venerable and highly valued survey report. Towers Watson's February 22, 2011 press release about the survey report can be found here. Full disclosure: I was consulted in connection with the survey questionaire and results.

 

Preliminary Notes

The survey report contains numerous valuable insights, as discussed in detail below. However, a number of preliminary observations are in order, as these observations may aid in understanding the results.

 

First, the characteristics of the survey respondents provide important context for some of the report’s findings. In particular, the pool of 496 respondents to the 2010 survey was weighted toward large institutions and entities. Excluding nonprofit respondents, the survey respondents’ average revenues were $3.7 billion, and nearly two- thirds of all respondents had revenues over $1 billion.

 

The respondents’ average asset size is $4.6 billion, with about 70% of all respondents reported assets of over $1 billion. Even just the private company respondents include a significant number of very larger organizations. Thus, about 44% of the private company respondents reported assets of $1 billion or more.

 

The pool of public company respondents was also weighted toward large publicly traded companies. The average market capitalization of the public company respondents is $4.6 billion, with about 71% of public company respondents reporting market caps of $1 billion or over. Nearly a third of all public company respondents have market caps over $5 billion. 23% of all public company respondents have market capitalizations over $10 billion.

 

Second, the pool of respondents to this year’s survey is relatively smaller than prior years’. As the report itself notes, because "the sample size is smaller this year," the data are "less statistically reliable." (As I note below, everyone in the industry has a stake in trying to increase the size of the sample in future surveys, in order to try to address this concern.)

 

Third, the difference in the number of organizations represented in the survey response pools may be only one way that the two sets of survey respondents differ. The pool of respondents may well differ in other ways too, such as by industry or by size. Given the differences between the respondent pools, there is a possibility that apparent differences between the reported survey results may reflect only the change in the composition of the pool, rather than changes in the underlying behaviors. In other words, comparisons between different years’ survey results should be viewed cautiously.

 

The Survey Findings

1. The survey found that, excluding nonprofits, 53% of all respondents have international operations. Of the companies with international operations, 47% reported that they purchased local policies in foreign jurisdictions. (The 2008 survey found that only 2% of respondents purchased local policies in foreign jurisdictions.)

 

2. The average limits purchased among all private company respondents was $34 million. However, the average limit purchased by private companies with assets of less than $250 million was $7 million.

 

3. The average limit purchased among all public companies was $118.3 million. However, the average limits for public companies with market caps of less than $250 million were $26.1 million. The average limits for companies with market caps between $250 million and $499 million is $42.4 million, and the average limits for companies with market caps between $500 million and $999 million is $57.2 million.

 

4. 21% of survey respondents said they had increased their D&O limits at the last renewal. The survey report speculates that this could reflect a reaction "to the fact that D&O liability exposures are arguably at an all time high," but also acknowledges that at a time of generally declining prices, it "may also be likely that purchasers are reallocating a portion of their savings to buy additional limits."

 

5. The survey notes that 35% of nonprofit respondents and 22% of private company respondents were unsure of how their D&O insurance program is structures, about which the report notes that "brokers and other management liability consultants need to spend more time educating their nonprofit and private company clients about their insurance coverage."

 

6. 9% of all survey respondents reported that they purchase D&O insurance that covers only outside or independent directors. (The 2008 survey found that only 0.3% of all respondents purchased D&O insurance that covers only outside or independent directors.)

 

7. 75% of public company survey respondents reported that their company purchases Excess Side A insurance or Side A/DIC insurance, which the survey report notes is a "significantly higher" percentage than noted in the 2008 survey. 83% of companies with market caps over $10 billion purchased Excess Side A or Side A/DIC insurance, but only 50% of companies with market caps under $250 million purchased Excess Side A or Side A/DIC insurance.

 

8. The average amount of Excess Side A insurance purchased by public companies is $47.5 million, but only $14.5 million for companies with market caps of under $250 million, and $20 million for companies with market caps between $500 million and $999 million.

 

9. 35% of private organizations reported buying Excess Side A insurance, but only 20% of private companies with assets of under $250 million. The average amount of Excess Side A insurance purchased by private company respondents is $18.8 million, but only $6.2 million among private companies with assets under $250 million.

 

10. 31% of all respondents reported having a D&O claim in the last 10 years (up from only 17% in the prior survey report). Asset size had a direct bearing on the likelihood of a claim.

 

11. The most frequent type of claims for nonprofit respondents and private company respondents was employment related claims. Among public company respondents, the most frequent type of claim is the shareholder or investor suit.

 

Discussion

This year’s report is full of interesting and useful information that will be valuable to insurance buyers and their advisors. Though I have summarized the report above, the report is replete with additional interesting detail, and the report merits reading at length and in full.

 

Many of the observations noted in the report may reflect in part the weighting of the respondent pool toward larger organizations. Thus, for example, the report’s observations about the following phenomena may reflect the number of larger entities in the survey pool: the relatively higher prevalence of entities purchasing local policies in foreign jurisdictions; the larger number of entities purchasing insurance solely for the protection of outside or independent directors; the increased prevalence of Excess Side A insurance or Side A/DIC insurance; and the reported increase in the number of claims experienced.

 

Indeed, the survey report itself notes with respect to each of these categories that prevalence of these phenomena increased as the size of the responding entity increased. Accordingly, the use made of the report’s observations of each of these items should take into account the survey respondent pool’s relative weighting toward larger institutions. Some of the observations may or may not retain their validity when compared to the universe of all firms or entities, or perhaps even when compared to a range of smaller firms and entities.

 

All of that said, with respect to many of the items measured in the survey, the survey report may be the only publicly available source of information. Particularly with respect to the many items measured in the report for which there is no publicly available alternative source, the survey reports provides indispensible insight

 

It is this aspect of the survey which ultimately makes it invaluable – that is, there is no other place where D&O industry professionals and their clients and customers can go to get the kind of information in this report. For that reason, the report’s return after a one year interruption is, as I noted at the outset, a cause for celebration.

 

Because just about everyone in the industry refers to this survey and because the entire industry benefits from the availability of the information in the survey, everyone in the industry has an equal stake in making the survey as broad and valid as possible. All of us have a stake in trying to make sure that future surveys reflect a broad cross-section of all firms and entities, and that as many respondents as possible complete the survey.

 

Now that the survey is back again, we can all look forward to the survey’s continuation in future years. We should all plan on trying to encourage maximum participation in future surveys as well.

 

Many thanks to Larry Racioppo of Towers Watson for providing me with a copy of the survey report..

 

Auction Rate Securities Litigation Grinds On: The mess left behind when the market for auction rate securities froze in February 2008 still has not been cleaned up. But the mess did beget at least one tangible byproduct – a mountain of litigation that continues to grind its way through the system. And though many of these cases, like the MRU Holdings case described below, have failed to survive initial dismissal motions, there have been a a very few, like the Akamai case described below, that have managed to overcome the initial pleading hurdles.

 

As discussed at length here, the MRU Holdings case arguably was somewhat distinct amount the auction rate securities cases. Unlike most cases, it did not involve purchasers of the auction rate securities themselves alleging to have been misled by their broker dealers (or by their mutual fund). The case did not even involve shareholders’ claims that they had been misled about the extent of a company’s exposure to its own auction rate securities investments. Rather, the plaintiffs in the MRU Holdings case were investors in a company that originated student loans and securitized the loans by putting them into pools for securitization. The investors claim to have been misled about the company’s dependence on the artificially favorable auction rate securities marketplace as a way to generate capital and free up income.

 

Though the MRU Holdings case represented a variant on the usual auction rate securities litigation, the case itself did not fare better than many of the other auction rate securities litigation cases.

 

In a February 17, 2011 order (here), Southern District of New York Judge Richard Berman granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss in the MRU Holdings case. Among other things, Judge Berman concluded that the company’s disclosure documents fully disclosed the company’s vulnerability due to its resort to the ARS marketplace. The disclosures, he found, "appear to have been based upon an appraisal of MRU’s financial position during an economically difficult timeframe and when read in their entirety not only bespeak caution but shout it from the rooftops." (citations omitted) Judge Berman also concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to plead scienter adequately as well.

 

By interesting contrast, in a February 15, 2011 order (here), District of Massachusetts Judge Joseph Tauro denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss in the individual action that Akamai Technologies filed against Deutsche Bank. Akamai claimed that it had been misled in connection with the company’s purchase of $217 million of ARS. Judge Tauro had little trouble concluding that Akamai’s allegations satisfied the pleading requirements. Significantly, Judge Tauro concluded that Akamai did not need to plead scienter since the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard for scienter is inapplicable to a claim to Akamai’s control person liability claim.

 

I have added these cases to my running tally of credit crisis-related litigation dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

 

In Memoriam: It is with sadness that I note here the passing of Judge Richard L. Williams of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. It was my privilege and honor to have clerked for Judge Williams many years ago, when I was just out of law school and he had only recently gone on the federal bench. My year clerking for him was one of the best years of my life. Following my clerkship, Judge Williams remained a mentor and a friend, for me as he was for so many others. He was an avid outdoorsman, an unequalled story-teller, a good judge and a good man. He taught me so much about how life should be lived. Judge, we will miss you.

 

The February 21, 2011 obituary for Judge Williams from the Richmond Times-Dispatch can be found here.

  

Record Number of EEOC Discrimination Filings in FY 2010

According to EEOC information released on January 11, 2011, there were a record number of discrimination filings in the fiscal year that ended September 30, 2010. The number of filings approached 100,000, as economic challenges and high levels of unemployment boosted the number of filings.

 

The EEOC’s January 11 press release can be found here. The EEOC’s Enforcement and Litigation Statistics can be found here.

 

During the 2010 fiscal year, there were a total 99,922 charges filed, which represents an increase of about 7% over the number of filings in the 2009 fiscal year, and an increase of about 4.7% over the 2008 fiscal which previously had had the highest annual number of EEOC filings. The FY 2010 filings represent a 21% increase over FY 2007.

 

In the 2010 fiscal year filings, all major categories of charges increased (race, sex, national origin, religion, retaliation [all statutes], age, disability and equal pay act). During 2010, retaliation under all statutes was the most frequently alleged charge, for the first time exceeding race as the most frequent charge. Since the EEOC become operational in 1965 race consistently had been the most frequently alleged charge.

 

In addition to retaliation charges, another category of charges that has grown rapidly in recent years are charges of discrimination based on disability. There were 25,165 disability discrimination charges in fiscal 2010, which represents an increase of over 17% from fiscal year 2009 and an increase of nearly 42% over fiscal year 2007.

 

During the FY 2010, the EEOC filed 250 lawsuits, resolved 285 lawsuits and resolved over 104,000 private sector charges. According to its press release, the EEOC "secured more than $404 million in monetary benefits from employers" – the highest level of monetary relief ever obtained by the Commission through the administrative process.

 

A January 12, 2011 Wall Street Journal article describing the statistics can be found here. An Economix blog post discussion the question of whether these figures are the result of an increase in discrimination can be found here.

 

Today’s Cool Weblink of the Day: The Stanford Graduate School of Business has added a page to its website with a full list of its faculty’s various publications on corporate governance topics. What makes the page cool is that it includes links to powerpoint presentations that faculty members have prepared on a wide variety of governance topics (e.g., The Duties and Liabilties of Boards of Directors). The page can be found here.

 

The Top Ten D&O Stories of 2010

2010 was an eventful year in the world of D&O liability. Congress passed massive financial reform legislation, the Supreme Court issued landmark decisions in important cases and numerous claims emerged as the litigation landscape continued to evolve. With so much going on, it is a challenge to narrow the year’s events down to just the ten most significant developments.

 

With appropriate humility about the limitations of all year-end inventories, here is my list of the top ten D&O developments of 2010.

 

1. Securities Suits Pick Up in Year’s Second Half: As I detailed in my 2010 securities litigation overview (here), after a filing downturn in the year’s first half, the number of securities lawsuit filing picked up in the last six months of the year. Among other things, as the year progressed, filing activity shifted away from credit crisis-related cases and toward a broader range of other types of cases.

 

Although at least some of the litigation activity in the year’s second half was driven by limited or short term events (as was the case, for example, in the rash of cases filed against for-profit education companies and against Chinese domiciled companies), the shift away from credit crisis cases could suggest that the heightened pace of securities suit filings may continue as we head into 2010.

 

2. The Changing Mix of Corporate and Securities Lawsuits: As insurance information firm Advisen has well documented, the mix of corporate and securities lawsuits has been evolving over the past several years. The most important feature of this changing mix of cases has been the decreasing prevalence of class action securities lawsuits as a percentage of all corporate and securities cases.

 

As the percentage of class action securities lawsuits has declined, other types of lawsuits, particularly breach of fiduciary duty cases, have grown in relative frequency. Many of these breach of fiduciary duty cases are related to mergers and acquisitions activity. Indeed, as I noted in my year-end review of 2010 securities lawsuit filings, even many of the cases that are categorized as securities class action lawsuits involve merger objection cases.

 

 

It is important to keep this changing mix of cases in mind when considering the various year end reports on securities litigation activity. These reports will show that overall 2010 securities class action lawsuit filings are down compared to post-PSLRA averages. However, it would be mistake to conclude that the relatively reduced number of securities class action lawsuits means that claims activity in general is down. To the contrary, overall claims activity is actually up. The mere fact that securities class action lawsuits are down does not mean that fewer companies are being sued or that overall claims exposure has diminished, either for companies or insurers. Rather, what is happening is that the claims exposure is changing, away from securities class action lawsuits and toward other types of claims.

 

This shift away from traditional securities class action lawsuits as a percentage of all claims activity has important implications for the insurance marketplace. The shift toward higher frequency, lower severity type of claims could have a significant impact both on primary and excess carriers. Primary carriers may experience an increase in overall claims frequency, with consequences for their loss experience. Excess carriers, particularly higher excess carriers, may experience relatively fewer claims piercing their layers, possibly producing a positive impact on the excess carriers’ results.

 

 

3. Banks Fail, Lawsuits Loom: 157 banks failed during 2010, the largest annual number of bank failures since 1992. The total number of bank closures since January 1, 2008 is 322. In addition, in the FDIC’s most recent Quarterly Banking Profile (refer here), the FDIC identified 860 banks, or about one out of nine of all banks, as "problem institutions."

 

Given the magnitude of these problems in the banking industry, it is hardly surprising that litigation involving failed and troubled banks is increasingly significant. Indeed, 13 of the 177 securities class action lawsuits filed in 2010 involved failed or troubled banks. In addition, aggrieved investors in failed or troubled privately held banks also filed a variety of other lawsuits, primarily in state courts.

 

It may be anticipated that the FDIC will also actively pursue claims against failed banks’ former directors and officers. However, to date, the FDIC has instituted only two D&O claims as part of the current round of failed banks (refer here and here).

 

It appears that it will only be a matter of time before the FDIC launches further suits against former officials of failed banks. Widely circulated news reports have quoted FDIC officials as saying that the FDIC has authorized civil actions against more than 80 directors and officers of failed banks. In addition, the Wall Street Journal reported in November that the FDIC is conducting fifty criminal investigations against directors, officers and employees of failed banks.

 

While we may hope that the current round of bank failures may begin to wane as we head into 2011, it appears that the failed bank litigation may only just be getting started.

 

4. Credit Crisis Lawsuit Settlements: The Dog that Didn’t Bark This Year: The subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave will be heading into its fifth year early in 2011. Since 2007, there have been over 230 subprime and credit crisis related securities lawsuits filed. Many of these cases continue to work their way through the system.

 

As some of these cases have survived the preliminary motions, they have moved toward settlement. There were several noteworthy credit crisis related securities class action lawsuit settlements during 2010, including Countrywide ($624 million, refer here), Schwab Yield Plus ($235 million , refer here), and New Century Financial ($124 million, refer here).

 

But while there have been a few noteworthy settlements of these cases this year, the more striking observation is how few of these cases have settled so far, particularly given how far along we are in the subprime and credit crisis litigation wave.

 

By my count, only 17 of the over 230 subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuit have settled, and only eight of these 17 settlements were announced in 2010. (My list of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit resolutions can be accessed here.)

 

NERA Economic Consulting stated in its year-end report on securities litigation that of the approximately 230 credit crisis securities suits, only 8% have settled, 29% have been dismissed, and 63% remain unresolved.

 

Of the 63% of unresolved cases, some of course will wind up being dismissed. But many more will settle, eventually. Given the now long duration of the credit crisis litigation wave, it can be anticipated that there may be many more settlements of these cases in 2011. The likelihood is that D&O insurers’ aggregate claims losses for these claims will mount, perhaps rapidly.

 

The question is whether the materialization of these losses will come as a surprise or has already been fully anticipated in the carriers’ prior years’ loss reserves. This answer to this question could have important implications for the D&O insurers’ 2011 calendar year results.

 

5. Megasettlements of Shareholders’ Derivative Lawsuits Surge: There was a time when the settlement of a shareholder derivative lawsuit involved the payment of little or no money, other than in connection with the payment of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. However, one of the more striking developments in recent years has been the emergence of jumbo settlements of shareholders derivative lawsuits, in which millions of dollars are paid to or on behalf of the company involved.

 

This emerging trend continued to develop in 2010, with at least two huge shareholder derivative lawsuit settlements: the $90 million AIG/Greenberg settlement (about which refer here) and the $75 million Pfizer settlement (refer here).

 

These 2010 settlements join a growing list of other jumbo derivative settlements in recent years, including the UnitedHealth Group settlement ($900 million, refer here); Oracle ($122 million, refer here); Broadcom ($118 million, refer here); and the first AIG derivative settlement (refer here).

 

The striking thing about these settlements is not only their size, but also the fact that in each case the company involved is solvent. The significance of this fact is that these settlements represent instances in which the companies’ D&O insurance potentially could have been called upon to fund an A Side loss outside of the insolvency context. These kinds of settlements provide concrete evidence of the value to policyholders of Side A insurance protection even outside of the insolvency context, and underscore the importance of added Side A protection in a well-designed D&O insurance program.

 

From the carriers’ perspective, these settlements suggest that Side A losses can mount outside of insolvency. Only the carriers themselves can answer the question whether or not they are actually pricing their Side A products for this loss exposure.

 

One final note about the Pfizer derivative lawsuit settlement concerns the unusual funding mechanism the settlement implemented. In many derivative lawsuit settlements the companies involved agree to institute corporate governance reforms. What was unusual about the Pfizer settlement is that the settlement agreement created a dedicated fund intended to finance the company’s agreed upon governance reforms. If the advance funding of corporate governance reforms were to become a standard feature of derivative lawsuit settlements, the cash cost of derivative settlements could increase substantially. This is a potential development worth watching closely.

 

6. Rare Securities Lawsuit Trials Result in Plaintiffs’ Verdicts: Very few securities class action lawsuits actually go trial. Most are settled or dismissed. But in 2010, two cases made it all the way through to jury verdicts. In January, the jurors in the Vivendi case entered a verdict on behalf of the plaintiffs against the company (about which refer here), and in November, the jurors entered a verdict for the plaintiffs in the BankAtlantic subprime-related securities suit (refer here).

 

In addition to these jury verdicts, in June 2010, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion overturning the trial court’s post trial ruling in the Apollo Group case, a ruling that had set aside the jury’s $277.5 million jury verdict in that case. Refer here regarding the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Apollo Group case.

 

All three of these cases remain subject to further proceedings. The Vivendi case in particular is the subject of significant post-trial motions having to do with the composition of the plaintiffs’ class in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case (about which refer to these prior guest blog posts, here and here. See also item 10, below).

 

The defendants in the Apollo Group case have filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari (about which refer here). And the BankAtlantic case has now moved on to post-trial motions, and depending on the motions’ outcome, possible appeal.

 

But while the ultimate outcome of these cases remains to be determined, it is striking that all three of these cases not only involve rare trials, but all three resulted in jury verdicts for the plaintiffs. To be sure, there have also been recent securities lawsuit trials that have resulted in defense verdicts, as was the case for example in the JDS Uniphase trial (about which refer here).

 

According to information compiled by Adam Savett, the Director of Securities Class Actions at the Claims Compensation Bureau, there have now been ten securities class action lawsuit trial post-PSLRA and involving post-PSLRA facts. The scoreboard currently reads: Plaintiffs 6, Defendants 4. The scoreboard is of course subject to revision pending further proceedings. Nevertheless, the juries themselves seem to have been favoring the plaintiffs, a phenomenon that may make plaintiffs’ threats to push a case to trial represent a particularly threatening tactic.

 

7. Assessing Coverage for "Bump Up" Claims: As noted above, a significant and growing number of corporate and securities lawsuits arise out of merger and acquisition activity. Often, the goal of this litigation is to try to increase the transaction consideration. One recurring question is the availability of D&O insurance coverage for amounts paid in settlement of so-called "bump up" claims.

 

In October 2010, the First Circuit entered an opinion in coverage litigation involving Genzyme Corporation, discussing the question of the preclusive effect of a D&O policy’s "bump up" exclusion. The First Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision that had held that the company’s D&O insurance policy did not provide coverage for additional amounts paid to claimants who asserted they did not received adequate consideration in a share exchange.

 

Though the First Circuit reversed the lower court’s holding of noncoverage, the First Circuit did not invalidate the bump up exclusion and agreed that the exclusion precluded entity coverage for bump up amounts.

 

The First Circuit remanded the case to the lower court for further allocation proceedings (that is, because the First Circuit held that the bump up exclusion precluded coverage only under the policy’s entity coverage provision, further proceedings are required to determine whet portion if any of the underlying settlement is allocable to settlement of liabilities of persons insured under other insuring provisions of the policy).

 

Of critical importance is that the First Circuit found that exclusion is enforceable and is effective to preclude coverage according to its terms. The holding clearly will be relevant to questions of coverage in future cases involving settlements of "bump up" claims, at least where the implicated D&O insurance policies include bump up exclusions.

 

8. D&O Insurance Coverage for Informal SEC and Internal Investigations: Among the perennial D&O insurance issues are the questions of coverage for informal SEC investigations and for internal investigations. In either case, the question is whether or not there is a "claim" as required to trigger coverage under the policy.

 

In one of the year’s most noteworthy D&O insurance coverage decisions, Southern District of Florida Judge Kenneth Marra, applying Florida law in a summary judgment ruling in coverage litigation involving Office Depot, held there is no coverage under the company’s D&O insurance policies for either of these categories of expenses.

 

Though the holding in the Office Depot case is direct reflection both of the specific policy language involved and the facts presented, the decision nevertheless could be influential in future claims involving questions of coverage for informal SEC investigations and internal investigations. The Office Depot decision suggests that policy definitions of the terms "Securities Claim" and "Claim" are critical, particularly with respect to the definitional references to "investigations" and "proceedings." Refer here for a more detailed discussion of the case and the decision.

 

The Office Depot ruling is hardly the final word on these issues, but it clearly will loom large in future consideration of questions of coverage for these kinds of expenses. Insurers undoubtedly will seek to rely on the decision to try to preclude coverage for costs incurred in connection with informal SEC investigations and internal investigations.

 

On a related note, a separate court held in the MBIA coverage case that there is coverage under the D&O insurance policy at issue for special litigation committee expenses, as discussed here. 

 

9. Is a Whistle the Sound of the Future?: The massive Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 enacted in July will affect virtually every aspect of our financial system, in ways that may only become clear over time. But among the Act’s innovations that seem likeliest to have a significant litigation impact are the Act’s new whistleblower provisions.

 

The whistleblower provisions include the creation of a new whistleblower bounty pursuant to which persons who first bring securities law violations to the attention of the SEC will receive between 10 percent and 20 percent of any recovery in excess of $1 million.

 

Give the magnitude of the fines paid in many recent SEC enforcement actions, particularly those involving Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations (about which refer here), the prospective size of potential bounties is enormous. These bounty provisions seem likely to encourage a flood of whistleblower reports to the SEC. This could create an administrative nightmare for the SEC, and the agency is already struggling with funding limitations that may constrain its ability to implement the whistleblower requirements. On the other hand, the SEC, under pressure to rehabilitate its regulatory credentials after its failure to detect the Madoff scheme, will face significant pressure to pursue whistleblower claims.

 

Another 2010 development that seems likely to encourage an entirely different sort of whistleblower activity is the series of WikiLeaks disclosures. The extensive media attention give to the disclosures, as well as the suggestions of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange that future disclosures will expose corporate misconduct, raise the possibility of that other self-appointed corporate scourges will launch similar guerilla campaigns involving the disclosure of internal corporate communications.

 

These two types of prospective whistleblower risks arguably represent an entirely new level of corporate exposure that could leave companies and their senior officials susceptible to claims of wrongdoing based on public or regulatory disclosures by persons inside the company with access to sensitive information. Indeed, companies and their senior officials could even be susceptible to claims for the alleged failure to implement and maintain sufficient controls to prevent embarrassing or harmful disclosures. Regardless, companies could face the prospect of significant risks involving person inside (or with access to) their own operations.

 

10. Foreign Companies, U.S. Courts: In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case, holding that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies only to transactions taking place on the U.S. securities exchanges, or domestic transactions in other securities.

 

Among other things, the Morrison decision seems to represent the end of so-called "f-cubed" claims, involving foreign claimants who bought their shares in foreign companies on foreign exchanges.

 

Lower courts are now wrestling with Morrison’s implications, including, for example, the question of whether or not Morrison precludes claims under the U.S. securities laws against companies whose American Depositary Receipts trade on U.S. exchanges. (Surprisingly, at least one court has held that case has that effect, as discussed here.) Other courts have struggled to determine what falls within Morrison’s second prong relating to "domestic transactions in other securities." Clearly, there will be much further lower court activity as these kinds of issues are sorted out.

 

In the meantime, one consequence that seemed likely in the wake of Morrison is that there might be fewer (or at least only narrower) cases filed in U.S. courts involving non-U.S. companies. Contrary to expectations, however, there were quite a number of securities cases filed in U.S. courts involving foreign-domiciled companies in 2010, including many filed after the Supreme Court issued its Morrison opinion.

 

As reflected in my recent year-end analysis of 2010 securities lawsuit filings, there were 19 new securities class action lawsuits filed in 2010 involving foreign domiciled companies, representing 10.7% of all 2010 securities lawsuit filings. Of these 19 cases, 12 were filed after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morrison.

 

One possibly temporary factor driving many of these filings is the rash of new cases filed against Chinese- domiciled companies. There were ten new lawsuits against Chinese companies in 2010, eight of which were filed post-Morrison. It should be noted that the shares of many of these Chinese companies trade on U.S. exchanges and in fact many of the cases directly relate to the companies’ securities offerings in the U.S., facts which made these companies susceptible to securities lawsuits in this country even under Morrison.

 

The lower courts will continue to interpret and apply Morrison in the months ahead. In the meantime, it seems that lawsuits involving non-U.S. companies will continue to arise, at least where the companies’ shares trade on U.S. exchanges.

 

A Final Note: Readers of this blog post may also be interested in my September 2010 post entitled "What to Watch Now in the World of D&O," which can be found here.

 

Ten Top Ten Lists: Top ten surveys proliferated at year end, and so it seems like a list of ten top ten lists would be the appropriate accompaniment to The D&O Diary’s own top ten list:

The Year’s Top Ten Insurance Coverage Decisions

Top Ten YouTube Videos of 2010

Top Ten Annoying Things British Men Do While Abroad

Top Ten New Species (International Institute for Species Exploration)

Top Ten Goals from the 2010 World Cup

Top Ten TV Commercials of 2010

Top Ten Encyclopedia Britannica Queries 2010

Top Ten Must-Reads in the Law, 2010

Princeton Review Top College Ranking 2010-2011

Time Magazine’s Top Ten of Everything List

 

 

Guest Post: Dan Bailey on the "No Broader than Underlying" Excess Provision

As reflected in detail below, noted D&O maven Dan Bailey of the Bailey & Cavalieri law firm has submitted the following guest blog post in response to an earlier guest post on this site. I would like to thank Dan for his willingness to have his comments published here. Dan’s guest blog post is as follows:

 

Kevin,I am responding to thearticle in your November 15, 2010 blog by John Iole at Jones Day regarding the "no broader than underlying" provision in virtually all excess D&O policy forms. I normally do not comment on articles which I think are misguided since conducting a public debate often elevates the visibility of the article and usually accomplishes little. However, in this instance it appears that John’s article has resulted in a number of brokers requesting the deletion of the "no broader than underlying" provision from excess D&O policies without fully appreciating the issues involved and the importance of that provision.

 

As summarized below, I think John’s article overstates the alleged concerns with such a provision and ignores the purpose and value of such a provision. Here is a brief summary of many of my concerns about the article.

 

     

  1. Purpose of Provision

    The primary purpose of this provision in excess policies is to avoid an excess insurer covering loss which is not covered under an underlying policy and thus to avoid the risk the excess policy would drop down in that situation. Excess policies typically state that liability attaches to the excess policy only if and when the underlying insurers and/or the Insureds pay loss which is covered under the underlying policies in an amount equal to the Underlying Limit.

     

    If the excess policy covers a loss not covered by the underlying policies, the Underlying Limit presumably would never be depleted by such loss since such loss is not covered by the underlying policies. In that event, a literal reading of the excess policy’s attachment provision would result in liability never attaching to the excess policy for such loss even though such loss is otherwise covered under the excess policy.

     

    That nonsensical result could cause a Court to conclude the excess insurer must pay the loss notwithstanding the fact that the Underlying Limit has not be exhausted as required by the attachment provision in the excess policy. In other words, there would be a risk that the excess policy would be forced to drop down and pay that loss at a much lower level within the insurance program than the excess insurer intended. Such a result would violate the intent of the parties and force the excess insurer to incur far greater loss exposure than was reflected by the excess insurer’s pricing and underwriting analysis.

     

    Other purposes of this provision include (i) allowing the excess insurer (which is receiving substantially less premium that the underlying insurers) to rely on the underwriting analysis of underlying insurers (i.e. if an underlying insurer identifies and excludes an unacceptable risk, the excess insurer gets the benefit of that analysis), and (ii) providing assurance to the excess insurer  that all of the underlying insurers will be actively involved in monitoring and adjusting any claim covered under the excess policy. Those purposes would obviously be lost if the provision is deleted from the excess policy.

     

    Therefore, this provision is important in order to preserve the integrity of the excess program structure and in order to avoid an excess insurer paying more losses than the excess insurer intended or contractually agreed to pay.

     

     

  2. Concerns with Provision

John’s article identifies several purported problems or concerns with this very standard provision, each of which are addressed below. It is important to note, though, that the article fails to even identify – much less address - the very important purposes and value of the provision from the excess insurers’ perspective. Plus, one should note that although this provision has been in virtually all excess D&O policy forms for decades, virtually no caselaw exists with respect to the meaning and applicability of this provision, thus indicating that in practice the provision does not create the controversies touted in the article.

 

     

  1. The article states that the provision allows the excess insurer to "pick and choose"  among various underlying policy terms in defining the coverage afforded by the excess policy. That is simply incorrect. The provision is clear and absolute – if a loss is not covered under an underlying policy, that loss is not covered under the excess policy. There is no discretion involved, and the excess insurer cannot and need not "pick and choose" which provisions in the underlying policies the excess insurer does or does not want to adopt. The article cites to several examples of situations where this discretion could purportedly exist. However, those examples (e.g. different arbitration provisions in different underlying policies) are not valid examples since they deal with different procedural provisions in the underlying policies. The "no broader" provision only applies to the scope of coverage (i.e. is a loss covered or not) and does not apply to other procedural provisions, such as the notice, claims participation, cooperation, ADR, etc. provisions.

     

  2. The article states that this provision creates a "bewildering patchwork of coverage arguments". That is simply incorrect. Actually, the provision creates greater consistency within an insurance program by better aligning the scope of coverage among different policies within the program. By including this provision in all the excess policies, all of the excess polices will provide more consistent coverage throughout the program. It is only if the provision is deleted will the "bewildering patchwork of coverage arguments" be increased since there would be a higher likelihood that each policy within the program will have a different scope of coverage.

     

  3. The article states that the provision can create the risk that different insurers could apply inconsistent interpretations to the same term in an underlying policy. But that risk exists with or without this "no broader" provision. Even if the provision is deleted, the excess policies follow the terms of the Primary Policy and thus there is a risk the primary insurer may interpret a term of the Primary Policy differently than an excess insurer may interpret that provision.

     

  4. The article questions what does "broader coverage" mean for purposes of this provision. That is answered simply: is loss otherwise covered under the excess policy but not covered under the underlying policy?

     

  5. The article states that one cannot determine if coverage is broader until the loss is incurred. That is correct in many instances, but that dynamic is not due to the "no broader" provision. Under any policy, coverage typically cannot be determined until the loss is incurred, and deleting the "no broader" provision will not change that result.

 

In summary, the stated concerns regarding this provision are either not valid or not material, particularly when compared with the compelling purpose and value of this provision.The provision has survived the test of time over several decades without creating undue problems for Insureds while accomplishing some important benefits to excess insurers. Therefore, on balance I think the provision should be retained in excess policies.

 

*******

Once Again, I would like to thank Dan for his willingness to have his comments published here. The D&O Diary welcomes guest blog post submissions from responsible commentators. Please contact me if you think you might be interested in submitting a guest blog post.

 

D&O Insurance: Disgorgement of Contingent Commissions Not Covered "Loss"

An insurance broker’s settlement of claims for disgorgement of undisclosed contingent commissions does not represent covered loss under a combined lines professional liability insurance policy, according to a December 3, 2010 decision of the Illinois (Cook County) Circuit Court. A copy of the December 3 opinion can be found here.

 

Background

Aon Corporation was first sued in 1999 in a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of its customers who alleged the firm had acted improperly with respect to its receipt of certain contingent commissions from insurance carriers. This class action lawsuit came to be known as the Daniel action. Aon was also the subject of certain regulatory investigations from several states’ Attorneys General based on the same allegations.

 

As originally pled, the Daniel action sought damages as well as other relief. However, the Daniels action was amended multiple times. As ultimately pled, the Daniel action sought only a disgorgement into a constructive trust of the amounts allegedly improperly received.

 

On March 4, 2005, AON entered into a settlement with the Attorneys’ General in which it agreed to deposit $190 million into a fund to be paid to former clients of the firm. The agreement specified that the firm would not seek indemnification from its insurers for the funds paid in the settlement.

 

On March 9, 2005, AON entered a separate settlement in the Daniel action, in which the firm agreed to pay an additional $38 million. The Danies action was approved by the Court.

 

Aon sought indemnification from its insurers for the amounts paid in settlement of the Daniels case as well as defense expenses incurred in the Daniel case and the Attorneys General action.

 

Aon’s insurance program included a Combined Lines Policy which combined certain lines of professional liability insurance, including directors and officers liability insurance, errors and omissions insurance and other lines as well. The Combined Lines Policy insurance program consisted of a layer of primary insurance and multiple layers of excess insurance.

 

In August 2006, AON initiated an action in Illinois (Cook County) Circuit Court seeking a judicial declaration of coverage under the Combined Lines Policy for loss incurred in connection with the Daniels action and related matters. The parties filed cross motions seeking to establish whether or not the Danies settlement and the defense costs incurred in the Daniel and the Attorneys General actions represented covered loss under the Combined Lines Policy.

 

The December 3 Order

In arguing that there was no coverage under the Combined Lines Policy for the settlement and defense expenses, the carriers argued that "Loss" covered under the Policy does not include "disgorgement of an ‘ill-gotten’ gain, that is, money of property an insured allegedly had no right to receive in the first place." The insurers argued that the Daniel plaintiffs sought only a constructive trust, not individualized damages, making it clear "that they were seeking disgorgement as their only remedy." The carriers also argued that it would be against Illinois public policy to allow the firm to pay restitution or fund a constructive trust with insurance proceeds.

 

AON in turn argued that there were genuine issues of material fact whether or not the remedies the Daniel plaintiffs sought were restricted solely to restitution. AON argued further that even if the pleadings as amended sought only restitutionary relief, the original pleadings had sought damages, and therefore the firm was entitled to its costs of defending the original pleadings. AON also argued that there was a genuine issue of fact whether the Attorneys General actions sought only restitutionary relief.

 

In her December 3 opinion, Judge Kirie Kinnaird rejected AON’s arguments and held that the relief sought in the Daniel action was "restitutionary and not an insurable loss." Judge Kinnaird rejected the firm’s contention that it was entitled to the defense expenses incurred before the pleadings were amended to remove the damages allegations, since the ultimately operative complaint, and the one to which AON filed its motion to dismiss, sought only restitutionary relief.

 

Judge Kinnaird also rejected AON’s argument that because there had been no determination in the Daniel action that the contingent commissions were "ill-gotten," the commissions represented amounts the firm was entitled to receive, and therefore the Daniels settlement represented covered "Loss." Judge Kinnaird said:

 

Insurability does not depend on whether a claim has merit, but rather what the settled claim sought….This Court will not make a finding or determination of whether AON’s alleged actions in the Daniel litigation were "ill-gotten gains" or unlawful. The lawfulness of collecting contingent commissions was not at issue in the Daniel litigation and is not relevant here. It was the Daniel plaintiffs’ allegation that AON failed to disclose its eligibility to receive the contingent commissions and the retention thereof that gave rise to AON’s potential liability.

 

Finally, Judge Kinnaird held that the firm was not entitled to recover its expenses incurred in defending the Attorneys General actions because the matters were in the nature of disgorgement and restitution. Judge Kinnaird rejected AON’s argument that the way that the claims were characterized in the settlement documents altered this conclusion. Because the underlying claims were not covered, the expenses incurred in the defending the matters likewise were not covered.

 

Discussion

There is an extensive body of case law holding that D&O insurance does not cover disgorgement or amounts incurred that are restitutionary in nature. What makes this holding interesting is Judge Kinnaird’s express observation that the question of coverage for the amounts AON sought does not depend on whether or not the amounts themselves were "ill-gotten."

 

Rather, the Judge held, the question of coverage for the amounts sought depending solely on the fundamental nature of the relief sought. Because the relief sought in both the Daniel action and the Attorneys General action was fundamentally restitutionary in nature, there was no coverage under the policy at issue.

 

The part of Judge Kinnaird’s holding worth thinking about is the ruling with respect to defense expenses. I think most would accept that liability insurance can’t be used as a way for insured’s to finance their repayment of amounts that were not the insured’s in the first place. However, the determination of noncoverage for the amounts incurred in defending against wrongful acts may or may not be as obviously reasonable to many observers.

 

I would be interested in knowing readers’ thoughts on the defense expense question. I think there may be some difficult issues there to consider, especially with respect to individual defendants (particularly in the bankruptcy context).

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of the AON decision.

 

SafeNet’s Excess Carrier’s Rescission Action to Go Forward: On December 7, 2010, Southern District of New York Judge Naomi Buchwald denied the motion to dismiss an action to determine whether or not there is coverage under SafeNet’s excess D&O insurance policy for the settlement of the company’s options backdating related securities class action lawsuit. A copy of the opinion can be found here.

 

The excess carrier’s action seeks to rescission. In her December 7 opinion, Judge Buchwald held that neither the underlying carrier nor individual directors and officers who had not been named as defendants in the rescission action were indispensible parties to the rescission action.

 

Judge Buchwald also rejected the argument that the rescission action was not yet ripe, because the primary policy had not yet been exhausted by payment. She held that the rescission action represented a ripe controversy notwithstanding the fact that the underlying limit had not been exhausted because the securities class action lawsuit settlement presented the "practical likelihood" that the excess limits would be called upon.

 

Semtech Options Backdating Securities Class Action Lawsuit Settles: On December 8, 2010, Semtech announced that it had settled what is one of the last remaining options backdating-related securities class action lawsuits. As reflected in Semtech’s December 8 press release, which can be found here, the case has settled for $20 million.

 

I have added the Semtech settlement to my running tally of options backdating related class action lawsuits, which can be accessed here.

 

According to data compiled by Adam Savett of the Claims Compensation Bureau, of the 39 options backdating related securities class action lawsuits, seven (or 18% were dismissed) and 31 have been settled or partially settled. The total value of all options backdating related securities class action lawsuit is $2.38 billion. The average settlement is $68.7 million, and the median settlement is $14 million. Savett’s data also reflects average and median insurer settlement contributions.

 

R-T Specialty, LLC Acquires Oakbridge Insurance Services, LLC

R-T Specialty, LLC Acquires Oakbridge Insurance Services, LLC

 

 

Acquisition Broadens RT’s Presence in the Executive and Professional Liability Segment   

 

Oakbridge is one of the nation’s leading specialty insurance intermediaries with extensive experience and exclusive focus on executive and professional liability exposures and insurance solutions. The company was organized in 2005 as the successor to Carpenter Moore Insurance Services’ Eastern U.S. operations. Oakbridge’s main office in Bloomfield, Connecticut is strategically located within a 15 mile radius of many of the underwriting facilities with whom the company transacts business. In addition, the company maintains offices in California, Minnesota, New Jersey and Ohio.

 

Tim Turner, President and CEO of RT Specialty, says of the acquisition, "At RT Specialty, our mission is to assemble the best and the brightest wholesale brokers in the country; brokers committed to providing our clients with the best resources available. The RT Specialty team, retail agents and brokers, and specialty insurance markets have long recognized Oakbridge’s reputation as an outstanding organization whose brokers are widely regarded as among the very best nationwide in the executive and professional liability arena. By combining our teams in these segments, we will solidify our position as the preeminent executive and professional liability wholesaler in the minds of retail brokerage firms, their clients, and the specialty markets that underwrite this insurance."

 

Jose Medina and Alex Jezerski, the Managing Members of OakBridge offer the following commentary. Jose Medina states: "For over 15 years, we have been steadily executing on a business model which depends on constant innovation, attracting and retaining the best people in the industry and staying true to our core mission of being the leading executive and professional liability wholesale intermediary in the country." Alex Jezerski adds: "RT Specialty has presented us with a once in career opportunity that will allow us to combine the expansive RT resources and existing talent pool with our unique business model, intellectual property and claims advocacy skills. The synergies between the two firms will be extraordinarily beneficial to our existing retailers and prospects, as we develop and expand the relationships that will continue to bring innovative products and solutions for our partners’ clients." 

 

About R-T Specialty, LLC

 

R-T Specialty, LLC is a subsidiary of Ryan Specialty Group, LLC specializing in wholesale brokerage, MGU/MGA underwriting facilities and other services to agents, brokers and carriers. In California: R-T Specialty Insurance Services, LLC License #OG97516 

 

About Oakbridge Insurance Services, LLC

OakBridge Insurance Services is one of the nation’s leading Executive and Professional Liability insurance intermediaries. The firm provides its services through co-brokerage alliances with strong, regional insurance brokers across the country.

#####

Can a D&O Insurer Seek to Recoup Prior Settlement Payments from Its Own Insured?

Settlement is the critical goal in every claim that cannot be resolved otherwise. It terminates the open dispute, it provides the parties with finality, and, perhaps, most importantly, it provides the parties with repose. After a settlement is final, everyone is free to get on with their lives.

 

Notwithstanding these fundamental settlement values, are there times when a D&O insurer may nevertheless seek to recoup from its own insured the amount the insurer previously paid in settlement of a third-party claim? A November 22, 2010 Eastern District of Virginia decision, applying Kansas law, in a case involving Sprint Nextel Corporation, addressed this issue. The court held that an excess D&O insurer could not, two years after a settlement was final and based upon post-settlement case law developments, recoup from its insured the amount the insurer paid toward settlement.

 

Background

In February 2004, Sprint Nextel’s board voted to recombine the company’s two separate tracking stocks, leaving a single surviving equity interest. The holders of shares to be retired received, in exchange for their shares, additionally issued shares of the surviving share class.

 

In March 2004, investors who had held shares of the retired class of stock filed class action lawsuits alleging that the company’s board breached its fiduciary duty by implementing a conversion ratio that undervalued the retired shares.

 

Sprint Nextel provided notice of claim to its D&O insurers. At the time of the shareholder claims, Sprint Nextel carried a total of $100 million in D&O insurance, which was written over a $25 million self-insured retention. The first three layers of the D&O insurance program consisted of three layers of $15 million each, arranged between a primary layer of $15 million, and two excess layers of $15 million.

 

In 2007, as a result of mediation, the parties to the shareholder litigation agreed to a $57.5 million settlement. The settlement was to be funded by Sprint Nextel’s payment of the $10 million remaining under the deductible, as well as full $15 million contributions from the primary, first excess and second excess carriers. The fourth level excess carrier contributed the remaining balance.

 

The second level excess carrier agreed to pay its limit but sought in its letter of consent to "reserve its rights to deny coverage and seek repayment."

 

The carriers ultimately funded their respective contributions toward the settlement. On December 12, 2007, the court entered final judgment in the shareholder litigation. The second level excess carrier closed its claim file.

 

However, in December 2009, after the District of Massachusetts issued its opinion, in the Genzyme case, the second level excess carrier filed a complaint against Sprint Nextel in the Eastern District of Virginia against its insured, seeking to recover the $15 million it had paid in the 2007 settlement.

 

As I discussed in a prior post, here, the district court held in the Genzyme case that under Massachusetts law Genzyme’s D&O insurance did not cover amounts Genzyme paid to settle the claims of individuals who asserted they had received inadequate consideration in an exchange for their tracking shares of an internal Genzyme division.

 

The second level excess carrier and Sprint Nextel filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

 

The November 22, 2010 Decision

In seeking to recover its settlement payment, the second level excess carrier argued that the settlement did not represent covered loss under the policy because it represented a delayed payment of a preexisting obligation (in that the company had preserved the Board’s right to decide to recombine the two separate classes of tracking stock into a single class). The second level excess carrier also argued that the settlement represented a mere redistribution of assets among different classes of Sprint shareholders.

 

In making these arguments, the second level excess carrier relied on the Massachusetts District Court’s September 28, 2009 opinion in the Genzyme case. As I as discussed at length here, the district court’s opinion in Genzyme was overturned by the First Circuit on October 13, 2010.

 

In rejecting the second level excess carrier’s argument that the settlement merely represented a preexisting obligation, Judge Claude Hilton wrote that "it is no understatement to say that one of the principal reasons for D&O insurance is to cover D&Os when they are alleged to have breached such preexisting obligations. The mere existence of generalized obligations to follow the law and honor one’s fiduciary duty does not render uninsurable a lawsuit alleging that corporate directors failed to do so."

 

Judge Hilton also rejected the second level excess carrier’s further argument that there is a general public policy against insuring this type of settlement. Judge Hilton also noted that the second level excess carrier only decided to file its recoupment action after the Massachusetts District Court entered its opinion in Genzyme, which the second level excess insurer characterized as "a case of first impression" – which contention, even if true, is inconsistent with the notion that there is a clear and pervasive public policy against payment of these types of settlements.

 

To the contrary, Judge Hilton found, Kansas public policy "favors enforcement of D&O insurance policies" and the second level excess carrier had not identified any grounds that would justify restitution or recoupment of the settlement payment.

 

Judge Hilton specifically noted that though the D&O policy allows the reinsurer to seek repayment of defense costs if the costs were not covered, "there is no basis under the policies for an insurer to make a settlement advance and later to seek its return."

 

Judge Hilton said that he would not allow the second level excess carrier "to retroactively amend its policy by trying to infer a recoupment right or attempt to circumvent the policy’s terms by invoking restitution." Although the carrier may have made its payment "grudgingly," there "can be no question that the payment was made voluntarily." Judge Hilton also found there was no excuse for the second level excess carrier’s delay in brining its action.

 

Discussion

I can certainly see the argument that amount paid in the underlying settlement represents nothing more that a payment by or on behalf of the company to make up for the inadequate consideration the company allegedly paid to the holders of the retired shares in the share recombination.

 

But in the end, I don’t think that Judge Hilton’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sprint Nextel necessarily depended on the merits of the second level excess carrier’s arguments about the nature of the settlement amount or even on the fortuity that the Genzyme decision was reversed after the second level excess carrier filed this action.

 

I think the summary judgment ruling is best understood as a reflection of the second level excess carrier’s timing. It might have been one thing if the second level excess carrier had asserted its position and resisted its settlement obligation while the underlying claim was still pending. The simple fact is that the second level excess carrier did not bring its recoupment action until two years after the settlement of the underlying claim was final.

 

Moreover, as Judge Hilton noted, the grounds on which the second level excess carrier sought to recover the amounts it had paid in settlement was not "fraud, duress or mistake of fact," which might justify setting a prior settlement aside and requiring a restoration of funds. Rather, the second level excess carrier’s bid to recoup funds was based solely on a district court opinion entered two years after the underlying claim was finally settled.

 

If carriers were able to seek the return of settlement payments years after the fact based on nothing more than post-settlement case decisions, the case resolution process could be seriously compromised. Settlements could become nothing more than a contingent arrangement, a state of affairs which frankly is in no one’s interest.

 

Whatever else might be said about second level excess carrier’s decision to pursue this belated action, one can only hope that the outcome of this case and the impression it makes might deter other carriers from seeking to recoup settlement payments long after the fact, at least in the absence of fraud or other similar factor.

 

D&O Insurance: Actions and Allegations in an "Insured Capacity"

Directors and officers can expect their company’s D&O insurance policy to provide them with a claim defense, but only for claims against them for actions made while they are acting in an "insured capacity." The question is whether the determination of the capacity in which the individual was acting depends on the claimant’s allegations, or does it depend on the individual’s actions, regardless of what may be alleged?

 

An October 20, 2010 unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion (here) held that "an insured would reasonably expect coverage for actions taken in the capacity of director or officer of an insured company, whether or not that capacity was alleged by the third-party plaintiff."

 

Frederick Goerner was CEO of TransDimension, and was insured under the company’s D&O insurance policy, which provided coverage for claims against insured persons for "any actual or alleged error" committed by an insured individual "in [his] capacity as such".

 

In litigation to determine whether the company’s D&O insurer had an obligation to provide a defense to Goerner for claims that had been asserted against him, the district court had held that the because the underlying complaint did not specifically allege that Goerner had been acting in his capacity as TransDimension CEO, but rather asserted that he action on behalf of two other industries in the same industry, coverage under the policy was not triggered. Goerner appealed.

 

On appeal, the carrier argued that because the underlying complaint did not specifically allege that the claimant’s losses resulted from action Goerner took in his capacity as TransDimension’s CEO, there was no coverage.

 

A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that, because the carrier’s position, if valid, would preclude coverage even for actions in his insured capacity if the claimant failed to allege in the complaint that the actions were in an insured capacity, the carrier’s position "defeats the purpose of the insurance coverage."

 

The Ninth Circuit said that the guiding consideration is whether "the insured would reasonably expect a defense by the insurer," and that the specific question here is whether the actions at issue in the complaint "could have been taken by Goerner in his capacity as CEO of TransDimension."

 

Finding that Goerner had shown that TransDimension had business dealings "with all of the individuals and companies at issue in the underlying complaint" and that TransDimension’s board "authorized and paid for Goerner’s travels to meet with those two companies in Asia," the Ninth Circuit concluded that Goerner had presented facts that "give rise to the possibility of coverage" and that the carrier therefore was obligated to provide Goerner with a defense.

 

Discussion

Questions of insured capacity are not infrequent in litigation involved senior corporate officials, particularly where the individuals involved wear multiple hats. A not uncommon question, for example, is whether an individual, who is affiliated with a private equity firm and who is serving on the board of the PE firm’s portfolio company, was acting in a capacity for which the individual is insured under the portfolio company’s policy.

 

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case clarifies that the allegations in the complaint alone are not conclusive of the issue. Rather, courts should look at what is reasonable to expect under the circumstances given the nature of the misconduct alleged against an individual defendant.

 

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling ensures that an insured person’s rights under a D&O policy are not subject to the vagaries involved with a third-party plaintiffs’ pleading peculiarities. Basically, insured persons ought to be able to count on their insurance to respond in the kinds of situations for which the insurance was intended to respond. The problem of course is that at the outset of a claim, often all there is to go on is the complaint. Answering the capacity question at the outset may require parties to be flexible and keep an open mind, in order to avoid protracted disputes of the kind involved here.

 

It is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case was designation "not for publication." Nevertheless the opinion may still be cited. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32.1, circuit courts may no longer prohibit the citation to opinions designated, inter alia, "not for publication."

 

A November 17, 2010 memo from the McGuire Woods law firm discussing this case can be found here.

 

The recurring issue of insured capacity is one of the basic coverage issues that can complicate claims handling. Readers interested in getting a handle on the basics of D&O insurance coverage may want to refer to my multipart-series on the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance, which can be accessed here.

 

D&O Liability Insurance Conference: On November 30 and December 1, 2010, I will be co-chairing with my friend Michael Early of the Chicago Underwriting Group the American Conference Institute’s 16th Annual Summit on D&O Liability in New York. The D&O Diary is a media partner for this event. The conference brochure can be found here. I hope readers who will be attending the event will make a point of greeting me at the conference, particularly if we have not previously met.

 

Guest Post: The Unpredictable Consequences of "No Broader than Underlying"

I am pleased to reproduce below the latest guest post submission. This post has been submitted by John Iole, a partner in the Pittsburgh office of the Jones Day law firm. In submitted this post, John emphasized that "comments expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Jones Day or its clients." In addition, John has expressly retained the copyright to the content. John previous guest post submission to this blog can be found here.

 

I would like to thank John for his willingness to post his submission on this site. The D&O Diary welcomes guest submissions from responsible persons on differnent points of view. Readers who may be interested in submitting a guest post should please feel free to contact me. John's guest post follows below:

 

 

            Large insureds often purchase substantial D&O coverage limits in layers that comprise a tower, with each D&O insurer occupying one or more layers and attachment points.[1] The excess policies commonly contain provisions that dictate how the overall program will respond to claims that implicate multiple layers. Ideally, the policy responses will be harmonious, because all participants are interested in efficiency of administration as well as a satisfactory level of coverage predictability. This guest post addresses the “narrowing clause” found in many such excess D&O policies, and how this feature can raise extremely difficult issues of policy interpretation and coverage that are not always obvious -- or even knowable -- at the time of policy placement.

 

 

            Assume that each excess policy in a layered program contains a “follow form” endorsement providing that the excess policy will follow the terms, conditions and exclusions of a designated underlying policy. A standard explanation of a follow form policy is that it provides coverage that is neither more broad nor more narrow than the followed policy.[2]

 

 

            If all of the policies in a tower are written on a “pure” follow form basis, then it is likely (but not inevitable) that coverage issues will be determined in essentially the same way at each layer of coverage. However, many D&O excess policies are not pure follow form, but instead contain terms and conditions specific to particular insurers. This is where the “no broader than underlying” provision (called a “narrowing clause” for the purposes of this post) comes in.

 

 

            A sample narrowing clause from an “Underlying Insurance” section in a Bermuda D&O excess form provides:

 

 

In no event shall this policy grant broader coverage than would be provided by any of the Underlying Policies.[3]

 

This provision clarifies that the excess policy does not to provide coverage if the underlying policies do not provide coverage.[4]  The excess policy might impose additional restrictions on coverage, but it is a one-way ratchet. Coverage can only get more narrow as a claim rides up the coverage tower.[5]  The following sections discuss the potential coverage impact presented by narrowing clauses.

 

 

 

            What Are The Mechanics Of Applying A Narrowing Clause?

 

 

            In the most basic situation, a narrowing clause can be interpreted to allow an excess insurer to incorporate a selected, “more narrow” provision from an underlying policy. In many cases, the effect of incorporation will be to erase a contrary term that otherwise would be applicable through the followed policy, or to erase such a term in the (incorporating) excess policy itself. As a consequence, the upper-level policy might, in operation, provide drastically different coverage than is implied by the direct terms of the upper-level policy (but for the narrowing clause).

 

 

            Narrowing clauses do not actually provide that they permit “incorporation” of provisions in underlying policies, nor do they provide any guidance on how incorporation is to be achieved. Nevertheless, it is likely that courts will permit incorporation as the method for executing such a clause. A good example of this in the D&O context is Fed. Ins. Co. v. Raytheon Co., 426 F.3d 491 (1st Cir. 2005). In Raytheon, the court held that a prior and pending litigation exclusion in the primary policy negated coverage under the excess policy, even though the excess policy had its own, differently-worded PPL exclusion that might not have excluded the claim.[6] The narrowing clause therefore deleted the excess policy’s stated PPL provision.

 

 

            Assuming that the narrowing clause permits incorporation by reference, a more difficult question is how much leeway it gives the excess insurer to pick and choose amongst underlying provisions. For example, assume that two excess policies each have an arbitration clause. Further assume that each clause has two provisions, one that deals with selection of arbitrators, and another that deals with the conduct of the arbitration itself. Further assume that the lower-layer policy is more limited in respect of arbitrator selection, and the upper-layer policy is more limited in respect of the arbitration proceedings. Can the upper-layer excess insurer invoke the narrowing clause to incorporate the selection provision from the lower-layer policy, but retain the proceedings provision from the upper-layer policy, thereby stitching together the most narrow, combined arbitration clause applicable to the upper-layer policy? If this is possible in practice, then a high-level excess insurer would be able to pick and choose from amongst numerous underlying provisions. One can easily envision a situation in which this exercise could lead to a bewildering patchwork of coverage arguments in a multi-issue case.[7]

 

 

            One can say with almost certain confidence that an “unlimited incorporation” approach, resulting in a hodgepodge policy, is likely to be rejected as unfair. Accordingly, it is likely that an insurer will have to incorporate underlying provisions in full (“jot for jot”), or not at all. Even this rule of thumb could be difficult to apply in practice. If the upper- and lower-layer policies are structured in ways that do not allow provisions to be easily matched up (or are endorsed so as to make a match-up confusing), then an incorporation exercise can lead to difficult questions about the scope of coverage.

 

 

            Can A Narrowing Clause Be Applied To All Underlying Provisions?

 

 

            Again assuming that a narrowing clause permits incorporation of underlying policy provisions, one must ask whether all underlying provisions are candidates for incorporation.  A policyholder would contend that the excess policy is not restricted in all instances to what is provided by the underlying insurance. A trivial example is the limit of liability provision of the excess policy, which is unaffected by “narrower” underlying provisions.

 

 

            Another seemingly obvious example is the notice provision. That is, if an underlying policy requires notice “immediately” and the excess policy requires notice “as soon as practicable”, it would seem to be absurd to import the more rigid standard into the excess policy, even if doing so would potentially affect the timeliness of a claim under the excess policy. Nevertheless, it is perhaps not completely free from doubt as to whether incorporation in this setting would be refused by a court.

 

 

            There are additional provisions that, one could argue, are not candidates for incorporation because they do not directly pertain to coverage, such as forum selection, choice of law, and claims participation clauses. However, these provisions can have an important impact on the effective coverage available, and therefore an insurer might well contend that they are subject to incorporation as “more narrow” provisions. An insurer would likely contend that the purpose of the narrowing clause is to limit the net effective coverage under the excess policy to what is available from the underlying coverage. Therefore, it would contend, any term in the underlying coverage that has the practical effect of limiting coverage also should apply to the excess policy. These arguments are left to the courts or other tribunals to determine without guidance from the narrowing clause itself.[8]

 

 

            If Incorporated, Should Policy Provisions Be Interpreted Uniformly?

 

 

            Once the incorporation of underlying text is settled, there is another problem awaiting the parties – interpretation of the text. Is the text to be incorporated “bag and baggage”, such that a 2nd-layer excess insurer is bound by a reading of the text that satisfies the 1st-layer excess insurer? The answer to this is perhaps “No”, at least in those jurisdictions that follow reasoning similar to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the Allmerica case.[9] If the policyholder and the 1st-layer excess insurer obtain a court or arbitral declaration on the meaning of the text, does this bind the 2nd-layer excess insurer in its own use of the text? The answer here is “Yes, perhaps,” but I am not aware of any authority for this outcome.[10]

 

 

            A related question can arise in the case of policy mistakes. It is not unknown for a mistake to be made in an insurance policy, perhaps through misunderstanding or inattention on the part of the underwriter, broker or policyholder. Assume that an underlying policy is reformed on the basis of mistake, where does that leave the excess policy? An excess insurer can probably make a strong case for leaving the underlying policy intact (as to the excess insurer) insofar as the unreformed policy provides narrower coverage than the as-reformed policy. The excess insurer probably would contend that its excess policy was placed in actual or presumed reliance on the terms of underlying coverage, and therefore no change via reformation is effective as to the excess policy.[11] Moreover, if reformation of the underlying policy has the opposite effect – i.e., reformation results in a narrowing of coverage, that change might well trickle up to the excess policies, narrowing them as well. These dynamics greatly magnify the potential consequences of any mistake that occurs at the time of placement.

 

 

            What Does it Mean to be “Broader Than” Underlying Coverage?

 

 

            The previous three issues are somewhat mechanical. A more fundamental question provoked by narrowing clauses is what it means to be “broader than” the underlying coverage. In some respects, such a characterization is not far different from asking whether one restaurant is “better than” another – the distinction works perfectly well for extreme (or at least reasonably clear) examples, but breaks down when a more precise differentiation is required.

 

 

            An example helps to illustrate the problem. Let’s assume that a 1st-layer excess policy in a coverage tower selects New York substantive law for all matters of policy interpretation, including insurability of punitive damages, and that such damages are uninsurable as a matter of New York law. Then assume that the 2nd-layer excess policy specifically selects Wisconsin law, under which punitive damages are insurable. Is coverage afforded by the 1st-layer policy “less broad” than that afforded by the 2nd-layer policy? If the answer to that question is “Yes”, is the New York choice of law swept into the 2nd-layer excess policy so as to supplant Wisconsin law? The 2nd-layer (and above) excess insurers might well contend that this is what should happen.

 

 

            Well, if the 2nd-layer excess insurer is correct (New York law supplants Wisconsin for purposes of punitive damages), then what happens if the dispute involves multiple issues? Let’s assume in our same example that the parties also dispute how a prior and pending litigation exclusion in the excess policy should be interpreted. In our hypothetical, let’s say that Wisconsin has a much more expansive (favoring insurers) application of PPL exclusions, which has the ultimate affect of narrowing coverage. Does Wisconsin law retain its place in the dispute for this purpose, via some type of party-dictated depecage (New York law applies so as to preclude coverage for punitive damages and Wisconsin law applies so as to favor application of the PPL exclusion)?[12] The excess insurer(s) might again say that this is an available outcome.

 

 

            When Is The True Scope Of Excess Coverage “Knowable”?

 

 

            There is a major consequence of the “no broader than underlying” exercise that should be apparent from the foregoing discussion. If one stops to think about it, the implications of a narrowing clause are potentially ominous. The content, meaning and coverage of the excess policies – as determined only after the incorporated provisions have been selected – cannot be known until the point of a claim, or even a good bit thereafter. It is impossible to say, on an a priori or categorical basis, whether a lower-level policy is more or less broad than an upper-level policy. First, one needs to know: (a) exactly the claim for which coverage is being requested and, potentially, (b) how the claim has been resolved in each of the underlying layers. Although a party and its counsel can hypothesize examples and anticipate how the coverage would respond, it is not possible to know exactly what issues the next claim will bring.  This raises the prospect of inefficient and contentious claims resolution.

 

 

            One might counter that all insurance policies are somewhat indeterminate until a claim has crystallized to the point at which coverage can be analyzed, rendering trivial this observation. In a standard insurance situation, however, the wording is static, and all that is left to do is apply the policy wording to the claim as presented. The major difference with “no broader than underlying” provisions is that the actual wording of the policy is not fixed until a claim is asserted. The excess policy is “inchoate” until the point of a claim and the wording floats and metamorphoses until determinations are made under each of the underlying layers. The text of the excess policy cannot truly be determined until each of the underlying policies has responded.

 

 

            Potential Solutions to Ponder

 

 

            Perhaps the most simple and comprehensive solution to the “problem” of narrowing clauses is to negotiate “pure” follow-form coverage if possible. This solves the problem through identity of wording and avoids the prospect of vertical discontinuity. Obviously, this alternative will not always be available. Another potential solution is to implement quota-share insurance.[13] In that event, the problem of layered coverage is eliminated through a change in program structure. Again, however, knowledgeable observers have identified problems with this approach, including the difficulty in arranging for claims control, and the potential for losing horizontal continuity on a long-standing program. Notwithstanding these potential solutions, it appears likely that layered, non-uniform programs are going to continue into the foreseeable future. Therefore, a solution that directly meets the terms of narrowing clauses could be useful.

 

 

            When seeking to determine the field over which a narrowing clause operates, and the clause states that the excess policy provides coverage no broader than underlying, it is reasonable to interpret the provision as applying to the coverage grant, and terms that specifically pertain to the scope of coverage. Under this interpretation, the narrowing clause would not incorporate “non-coverage” elements of the underlying policies, perhaps those dealing with notice, choice of law, forum selection or cooperation and settlement.[14]  In the context of reservation of rights letters, and for the purpose of crafting rules dealing with waiver of defenses and avoiding “coverage by estoppel”, some courts already distinguish between “coverage defenses” and “policy defenses” available under the policies at issue.

 

 

            Under these cases, a “coverage defense” is one asserting that a claim simply does not fall within the scope of insurance for which a premium was charged. For example, a claim seeking coverage under a D&O policy when no “wrongful act” has been alleged, or seeking Side-C coverage for something other than a securities claim, would be deemed to fall outside the scope of coverage, and therefore would be subject to a coverage defense.

 

 

            A “policy defense” is one in which the insurer acknowledges that the claim comes within the scope of coverage, but contests the claim based on the policyholder’s failure to comply with some other provision in the policy, such as a requirement of cooperation. See, e.g., Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Myers, 789 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1986) (Texas law); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980).

 

 

            This distinction obviously cannot be applied woodenly, and it is beyond the scope of this post to engage in a full-blown discussion of the merits, deficiencies and complexities it poses in a particular situation. Nevertheless, there is no simple way to craft a rule that can be applied in all instances, and this approach can form a basis for striking a fair balance between the interests of insurers and policyholders.



[1]The use of pure follow-form and/or quota share insurance to ameliorate the problems addressed herein is mentioned briefly below, but this post assumes a continuation of the practice of placing layered coverage with less than full vertical continuity.

 

[2] E.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Constitution Reinsurance Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21829 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2004) ("A typical 'follow the form' provision 'expressly limits the reinsurance to the terms and conditions of the underlying policy and provides that the reinsurance certificate will cover only the kinds of liability covered in the original policy issued to the insured.' . . . [A] 'follow the form' emphasizes ab initio that the scope of the reinsurer's undertaking is not broader (or narrower) than that of the ceding insurer.") (quoting 14 Appleman on Insurance Law & Practice § 106.2 (2d ed. 2004)).

 

[3] Some other formulations of this concept are as follows:

“Provided always that this policy shall, in no event and notwithstanding any other provision, provide coverage broader than that provided by the Followed Policy unless such broader coverage is specifically agreed to by the Insurer in a written endorsement attached hereto.”

"In no event shall this Policy grant broader coverage than would be provided by the most restrictive policy constituting part of the applicable Underlying Insurance."

“The Insurer shall pay the Insured . . . in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Followed Form . . . as amended by any more restrictive terms, conditions and limitations of any other Underlying Policies excess of the Followed Form . . . .”

 

[4]Simply because an insurer occupies an excess position above more narrowly-drawn underlying policies does not preordain that its coverage is limited to the scope of underlying coverage. E.g., Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 783 F. Supp. 1222 (D. Ariz. 1991) (in a CGL context, court held that follow form excess policy covered pollution loss whereas underlying policy did not, based on difference in relevant endorsements, and the presence of phrase “except as otherwise provided herein”).

 

[5]This post does not address the separate question of whether an excess policy should pay if the claim is “covered” but one or more of the underlying policies has not fully paid its limits. In those cases, an “exhaustion of underlying insurance” provision might provide that the excess policy will pay if – and only if – the underlying insurance pays in full. This is a different method for achieving essentially the same result as the narrowing clause. Although outcomes differ depending on jurisdiction and policy wording, recent cases have resulted in particularly strict applications of such exhaustion requirements. E.g., Great American Ins. Co. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61553 (N.D. Ill., June 22, 2010)(less than limits settlement with primary and first- and second-layer excess carriers means that third- and fourth-layer excess policies are not liable);Citigroup, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 2010 WL 2179710 (S.D. Tex., May 28, 2010)(settlement with primary insurer for less than full limits means that excess policies are not liable). A reasonable (although perhaps not always feasible) solution to this problem is to settle on a global or top-down basis as opposed to a bottom-up basis. Because of their potentially chilling effect on settlements, one might conclude that these provisions are even less favorable to policyholders than narrowing clauses. Practically speaking, both provisions are apt to appear in the excess policies.

 

[6] See also HLTH Corp. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 2009 Del. Super. LEXIS 437 (Del. Super. Ct., July 15, 2009), in which a D&O excess insurer at the $10mm xs of $90mm layer effectively incorporated a run-off endorsement from the $10mm xs of $80mm policy instead of a provision in the “followed” primary policy.

 

[7] As another (more substantive) example, can an upper-level policy incorporate a “more narrow” PPL date from below, but retain its own “more narrow” PPL trigger wording?

 

[8] When policy language does not provide clear guidance for incorporation, courts sometimes can reach results that are quite different from what the parties appear to have intended. For an example of incorporation by reference of a defense obligation into an excess follow form policy in the CGL context, see Johnson Controls Inc. v. London Market, 325 Wis.2d 176, 784 N.W.2d 579 (2010).

 

[9] Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, 449 Mass. 621, 871 N.E.2d 418 (Mass. 2007)(excess insurer who issued follow-form policy was not bound by settlement entered into by primary insurer). It is important not to overstate the holding of Allmerica. That was a case in which the primary carrier paid its full limits, but did so by way of a “no admission of coverage” settlement on a claim as to which it had already raised coverage questions. The primary insurer also expressly provided that the settlement had no effect on excess coverage.

 

[10]Assuming that at least one of the policies involved has a private arbitration provision, there is no functional way in which all of the parties can be haled into a court or arbitral forum for the purpose of forcing a declaration that is binding on them all. The most logical solution, however, is to bind any higher-layer excess insurer to an interpretation of lower-level policies so long as it was reached in an arms-length proceeding otherwise worthy of recognition. Some insurers may be more likely agree to be informally bound by underlying determinations than others, and the assistance of a knowledgeable broker can be extremely important.

 

[11] The excess follow-form insurer made this argument, unsuccessfully, in L.E. Myers Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 77 Ill. 2d 4, 394 N.E.2d 1200, 31 Ill. Dec. 823 (1979). In that case, however, the evidence showed that the excess insurer did not bother to review the underlying policy before issuing its excess policy.

 

[12] The concept of depecage (French for “dismemberment”) allows a court to apply different states’ laws to different parts of a single contract. Schwartz v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp. 2d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying law of two states to D&O policy interpretation and to handling of claim under policy), aff’d, 539 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2008). Although not really an issue of depecage so much as party choice, a policy can specify the application of more than one state’s law. The Bermuda form choice of law clauses are a familiar example of this in D&O policies, in that they apply a modified version of New York law in some circumstances, and potentially call for the application of other law (such as the law of England and Wales) in other circumstances, which easily can result in the application of both.

 

[13]Some participants in the Bermuda market have been particularly active in advocating a simplification of coverage terms and basic vertical continuity, although others remain uncertain. E.g., P&C National Underwriter, Top Bermuda Players Split Over Wisdom Of Adopting Single Excess Policy Form (June 16, 2008); see also Insurance Journal, Aon: Bermuda Markets Introduce Single Excess Follow Form (October 13, 2008). Other commentators have advocated the quota-share solution. For example, in 2008 and again this past August, Joseph Monteleone pointed out the inefficiencies of multiple wordings in the same tower, suggesting that quota share insurance might be the best response. E.g., J. Monteleone, D&O E&O Monitor, Quota Share Insurance - An Idea Whose Time Has Come Again (Aug. 18, 2010).

 

[14]However, as can be seen by the third example in note 4, supra, not all narrowing clauses will specifically reference “coverage”, but might limit themselves to the “most restrictive” terms in the underlying policies. Moreover, some provisions that might be identified as “non-coverage” are nevertheless classified as conditions precedent to coverage in some wordings.

 

Does D&O Insurance Undermine the Deterrence Effect of Securities Litigation?

All too often, the securities class action litigation process seems like a complicated and costly mechanism for transferring large amounts of money to the lawyers involved but only small amounts to the aggrieved investors, all at the expense of the D&O insurers. It is hard not to wonder sometimes what the whole process accomplishes, other than making D&O insurance indispensible and expensive.

 

Even worse, the deterrent effect that securities litigation is supposed to have is undermined because the presence of insurance insulates companies and their managers from any consequences for their alleged misconduct, at least according to a new book by Penn law professor Tom Baker (pictured, left) and Fordham law professor Sean Griffith (pictured, right).

 

The irony is that D&O insurers are in a position from which, at least in theory, they could positively influence corporate conduct and advance the regulatory goals of the securities laws. In their book, "Ensuring Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation," Baker and Griffith explore the ways D&O insurers might provide a "constraining influence" on their policyholders. The authors conclude that as a result of actual practices and processes insurers do not in fact perform that role.

 

Rather, the authors conclude, D&O insurance "significantly erodes the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation, thereby undermining its effectiveness as a form of regulation." In order to try to "rehabilitate the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation, notwithstanding the presence of liability insurance," the authors propose three regulatory reforms, as discussed in detail below.

 

To understand how D&O insurance works and how it affect securities litigation, the authors interviewed over 100 professionals from across the D&O insurance industry, as well securities litigators from both the plaintiffs and defense side. (Full disclosure: I was one of the people interviewed.) The authors previously published interim assessments of their research in three separate law review articles, about which I previously commented here, here and here. This new book pulls their prior publications together in a single volume comprehensively presenting their research and the bases for their reform proposals.

 

D&O Insurers’ Three Opportunities to Advance Securities Litigation Deterrence Goals

The authors postulate that there are three ways D&O insurers might, in theory, preserve the deterrence function of shareholder litigation.

 

First, insurers might use insurance pricing as a way to motivate corporate behavior, by forcing companies engaging in riskier behavior to pay more for insurance.

 

Second, the insurers might monitor their policyholders and force them to avoid risky conduct or adopt governance reforms.

 

Third, the insurers could control claim defense and settlement to insure that settlements reflect the merits of the claim and force defendants to pay more toward the defense and settlement when there is evidence of actual wrongdoing.

 

 

The D&O Insurers Failure to Pursue Opportunities to Advance the Deterrence Goals

The authors found from the interviews, however, that D&O insurers do not take advantage of these opportunities, despite the seeming financial incentives to do so.

 

What they found is that the pricing mechanism does not affect policyholder conduct, in part because the insurance cost is a very small part of most companies’ overall cost structure, and in part because the difference between the premiums riskier companies pay and the premiums less risky companies pay is relatively slight.

 

The authors also found that D&O insurers do almost nothing to monitor their policyholders or to try to influence their conduct. The authors puzzled over this issue at length, because insurers not only have an incentive to try to improve conduct but also because insurers effectively and positively influence their policyholders’ behavior with respect to other hazards and other lines of insurance.

 

Ultimately the authors concluded that monitoring and loss prevention services related to D&O insurance are not valued by corporate managers, and that in a competitive insurance environment it is hard to charge a price that supports the costs associated with delivering these services. (When the authors previously published their research pertaining to this particular topic, I wrote a lengthy blog post, here, discussing my views on why D&O insurers do not offer monitoring and loss prevention services.)

 

Finally, the authors found that, as a result of the way that D&O policies are structured, D&O insurers have little control over defense costs, and that insurers’ authority over settlements is constrained by the dynamics of the claims process – in particular, by the fact that the plaintiffs’ theoretical damages usually so far exceed the policy limits. The authors also found that insurers have some ability to use coverage defenses to insist on greater contributions to defense and settlements from defendants when there is greater evidence of actual wrongdoing, but that insurers' ability to deploy these influences is limited.

 

The Authors’ Three Proposed Reforms

The authors concluded that each of these problems "increases the likelihood that insurance substantially mutes the deterrence effect of shareholder litigation." But rather than jumping to the extreme position of suggesting the abolition of D&O insurance, the authors suggest three reforms they contend would reinvigorate the deterrence function.

 

First, the authors suggest that the SEC require reporting companies to disclose their D&O insurance information (premium, limits, retentions, and the identity and attachment point of various insurers). The authors contend that these details "will convey an important signal concerning the quality of the firm’s governance," and that changes in premiums will alert investors to changes in the risk. The limit selected, the authors contend, would signal the managers’ belief about their companies’ relative risk of serious securities litigation, and the identity of carriers (and in particular whether the carrier is "a market leader" or a "cut-rate insurer") could "signal governance quality."

 

Second, in order to ensure that corporate defendants have "skin in the game" and therefore become more deeply invested in avoiding litigation and more deeply involved in managing defense costs and settlement amounts, the authors propose the mandatory requirement of coinsurance. By ensuring that the settlement of a securities lawsuit would produce a loss for the company, coinsurance would reduce the "moral hazard" of D&O insurance.

 

Third, in order to "provide capital market participants a window onto the merits of claims," the authors propose that the SEC require the disclosure of information about settlements, including the extent to which insurance funded the settlement and defense costs.

 

Discussion

Baker and Griffith have written a readable, interesting and important book. Their discussion of the actual role of D&O insurance in the securities litigation process is enhanced by their research methodology. All too often, theoreticians postulating about D&O insurance lack any understanding of the way things actually work. Because the authors took the time to interview the marketplace participants, their analysis is grounded in the practical realities of the real world.

 

As a result, the authors bring an informed outsider perspective to their discussion of the D&O insurance industry. The authors are painfully successful in highlighting the peculiar pathologies of the D&O insurance industry and the ways that D&O insurers and other marketplace participants systematically undermine both the insurers’ financial interests and the regulatory goals of the securities litigation system.

 

I am grateful to the authors for not just coming right out and advocating the abolition of D&O insurance – the career change I would face would be rather unwelcome at this point in my work life.

 

The authors do propose some regulatory alternatives. Some of the authors’ proposed reforms have substantial merit. In particular, I agree with the authors’ suggestion that the entire process would be improved if corporate defendants were required to have "skin in the game" in some form. The threat that companies would have to contribute to defense and settlement would encourage companies to try to avoid risky behavior. It would also provide a healthy influence both on the defense and settlement of securities lawsuits.

 

I know that many companies and their advocates will object to the idea of requiring  companies to participate financially in the lawsuit. Companies clearly would prefer to avoid that cost. But the benefits that would follow from greater company participation will ultimately inure to the benefit of everyone, and ultimately lead to a more disciplined, more rational and less costly system.

 

There might be ways other than coinsurance to bring about this reform. One possibility has already been implemented in Germany, where D&O insurance is now required to include a self-insured retention for individual liability. This is a more extreme version of the solution Baker and Griffith have proposed, but it undeniably has the potential to motivate corporate officials to avoid misconduct and risky behavior. My lengthy discussion of the new German requirement can be found here. (I am not advocating the German alternative, merely pointing out there there are alternatives to coinsurance.)

 

The authors’ proposal to require the disclosure of settlement and defense cost information also has some merit. At a minimum, investors are entitled to know the actual financial impact the litigation has had on the company. Investors would be astonished to learn how much these cases cost to defend, and the extent of insurance contribution to the defense and settlement is also highly relevant in order to understand the financial impact of the litigation on the company.

 

The availability of defense cost and settlement information would also be enormously helpful to companies themselves when deciding how much insurance to buy. As it stands, the settlement information that companies rely on to decide how much insurance to buy lacks any connection to insurance contribution toward settlements, and also lacks the vital detail regarding the costs of defending these cases. This kind of information would be valuable for everyone.

 

I am less persuaded by the authors’ proposal that reporting companies should have to disclose their D&O insurance information. I do not believe the publication of insurance information would provide the marketplace "signal" the authors think it would. I also think that requiring this disclosure could also could distort corporate behavior in ways that would be harmful to shareholders.

 

The analytic flaw with the authors’ proposal is that it treats D&O insurance as if it were a fungible commodity, like wheat. The fact is that these days, every single public company D&O policy is heavily negotiated. In the process of negotiation, it frequently happens that buyers will have to make a choice of whether or not to incur the cost required in order to obtain a particular term -- say, for example, adding increased limits with or without full past acts coverage. The insurance the company winds up with is the product of a host of these kinds of decisions.

 

As a result, every policy is different and those differences have important pricing implications. If you were to go down your street and find out how much each one of your neighbors paid for their car, you still wouldn’t know everything you need to know. I drive a small compact, my neighbor across the street has a squadron of kids and so he drives a Yukon. If you didn’t know about the differences between the vehicles, and also the reason for these differences, you wouldn’t understand the meaning of the differences in what we paid for our vehicles. The same goes for D&O insurance.

 

The authors give a nod to the notion that D&O policies are not standardized by suggesting that public companies should be required to publish their policies on their website. (As a person who makes his living off of policy wording expertise, I find this suggestion absolutely loathsome.) But even this extreme step would not supply the necessary information to explain the tradeoffs and choices the company went through in order to make its insurance purchase. The bare policy alone would not, for example, reveal what selections the company did not make or how those choices affected the final policy and the policy’s ultimate price.

 

The bottom line is that companies that make prudent, conservative choices sometimes pay more for D&O insurance that provides better protection. Moreover, there are other important considerations that would distort the author’s postulated signal. For example, many buyers attach value to stability in their insurance relationship. These buyers bypass opportunities to reduce their insurance costs in exchange for stability and continuity. Other buyers who have had positive claims experiences feel loyalty to their carrier (yes, that really does happen) and even recognize the carrier’s need to try to recoup claims costs in higher premiums.

 

In other words, premium levels reflect a host of considerations that have nothing to do with the governance signaling assumptions underlying the authors’ proposal. But on the other hand, if companies nevertheless had to confront the possibility that investors and analysts might downgrade them because of the amount they pay for D&O insurance, the companies inevitably would cut corners to bring costs down, for example by buying less or narrower coverage. This could leave both executives and the company’s balance sheet exposed to losses that could financially harm the company and thereby harm investors’ interests.

 

In the end, whatever else might be said, Baker and Griffith have certainly raised a host of issues meriting further discussion. Indeed, Professor Baker will be participating in a panel to discuss the impact of D&O insurance on securities litigation this upcoming Thursday, November 11, 2010, at the PLUS International Conference in San Antonio. I suspect this will be the first of many industry discussions about the authors’ book.

 

Professor Griffith’s prior guest post on this blog in which he defended the authors’ suggestion of requiring companies to disclose their insurance information can be found here. My apologies to Professor Griffith for my not being able to figure out how to make his picture the same width as that of Professor Baker.

 

 

See You in San Antonio: I will also be in San Antonio for the PLUS Conference, and I look forward to seeing and greeting readers of The D&O Diary while I am there. I hope readers who see me will say hello, particularly if we have never met before.

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance - Limits Selection and Program Structure

In a series of posts, I have been exploring the "nuts and bolts" of D&O insurance. In this post, the seventh in the series, I examine the perennial questions of limits selection and program structure – that is, how much insurance is enough, and how should the insurance be structured? As explained below, these two questions are inextricably linked

 

Limits Selection

One of the most challenging questions for anyone that advises D&O insurance buyers is the question of what is the right amount of insurance The question inevitably involves a mixture of art and science, particularly because the analysis is affected by basic considerations of cost and risk tolerance. While there are certain objective benchmarks that can help to inform the process, the benchmarks must be considered in conjunction with relevant considerations that should also influence the analysis.

 

The question of D&O insurance limits selection is, of course, different depending on whether the buyer is a publicly traded company or is privately held. The difference in analysis between the two is not just in the total quantity of insurance purchased but also in how the limits selection question is analyzed. I discuss the question of limits selection for public and privately held companies separately below.

 

For publicly traded companies, there are some basic benchmark reference points and some additional considerations that every insurance buyer should asses.

 

Publicly traded companies will first want to approach questions surrounding limits selection from the perspective of basic limits adequacy, taking into account the company’s likely securities class action litigation settlement exposure. The securities suit settlement exposure is the appropriate starting place because for most companies in most circumstances, a securities suit represents the company’s largest management liability exposure. The company should be provided with information sufficient to allow it to assess the range and distribution of settlements for companies of its size and other characteristics.

 

A second benchmark publicly traded companies may want to consider are peer purchasing patterns – that is, how much D&O insurance do other companies like ours buy? Some buyers find this information reassuring, although care should always be taken to make sure that peculiar purchasing patterns, which sometimes can be industry-wide, do not inappropriately drive an important decision like limits adequacy.

 

In addition to these basic, relatively objective guidelines like settlement trends and peer purchasing patterns, there are additional considerations that should also be taken into account.

 

The first is that information about securities class action settlements, discussed above, does not take into account defense expense. Defense costs must be considered, because under most D&O insurance policies, defense costs erode the limits of liability. Every dollar of defense cost means one less dollar available for settlements or judgments. For a company to be sure that it has adequate limits of liability both to defend and to settle serious claims, appropriate consideration must be given to likely defense expenses as well as to settlement amounts. Along those lines, it is critical to note that both settlements and defense expenses have been escalating in recent years, much faster than the rate of economic inflation.

 

The other consideration that should be taken into account is that the most important value of D&O insurance is the protection it affords individual insureds in the event of a catastrophic claim. When things go seriously wrong, the D&O insurance may be the individuals’ last line of defense.

 

When these catastrophic type events occur, the company and the individual directors and officers may find themselves battling multiple legal proceedings simultaneously. In addition, the interests of the various defendants in the various proceedings may conflict dramatically, particularly when ousted former management is faulted for the company’s woes. Often when this occurs, each defendant will retain separate counsel. Under these circumstances, defense expenses can mount astonishingly quickly, causing the rapid depletion or even the complete exhaustion of the available insurance (for more about which, refer here).

 

The possibility of a catastrophic claim that could consume available limits underscores the importance of careful consideration of limits selection issues. Simply put, what other cases might have settled for in the past or how much insurance other companies buy may provide little guidance for the question of how much insurance a particular company might need in the future, particularly since the settlement and purchasing pattern data tend to be backward looking and incorporate historical patterns that may not be relevant to future requirements.

 

On the other hand, the difficulty of using a catastrophic claim scenario is that it may quickly lead to the rather unhelpful conclusion that no amount of insurance is enough to address the top end exposures. At some point, the analysis must shift from the quantity of insurance to the structure of the insurance, a question I address further below.

 

With respect to private companies, the issues are different, primarily because privately held companies do not typically face class action securities litigation risks. However, merely because private companies have no class action securities litigation exposure does not mean that private companies and their directors and officers do not face serious liability risks. I have in fact seen numerous private company D&O claims that have settled for millions of dollars. For that reason, an appropriate awareness of the possibilities should also inform private company D&O limits selection issues.

 

For private companies, the objective reference standards are peer purchasing patterns by company asset size. These peer data have the same benefits and limitations as they do for public companies, but many buyers find this data useful and reassuring in the insurance acquisition process.

 

The limits of liability for private company D&O insurance is, like public company D&O insurance, in most instances subject to erosion by defense expenses. so many of the same considerations concerning defense expenses should also be taken into account for questions of private company D&O limits selection.

 

One added consideration particular to private company D&O insurance is that the entity coverage available under a private company policy is quite a bit broader in the private company policy than is the entity coverage in a public company policy. (The public company policy is limited to securities claims; the private company policy is not so limited.)

 

The broader entity coverage available in the private company policy creates the possibility that the limits of liability could be eroded by the defense expenses and settlements of the entity, potentially leaving the individuals with less (or no) insurance remaining to defend themselves or settle claims. The broader entity coverage in the entity policy could influence some buyers to increase the D&O insurance limits of liability, as one way to protect against erosion or exhaustion of the limits by entity claims.

 

Program Structure

In light of the escalating average claims severity and of the catastrophic potential for defense expense to deplete policy limits, it may be necessary to reconsider commonplace concepts of limits adequacy. Increased limits alone, however, may not solve all of the problems.

 

Part of the solution has to be program structure. Clearly, one of the factors that can contribute to limits depletion or exhaustion is that so many different people are accessing the insurance, particularly when there are multiple simultaneous claims. One way that well-advised corporate officials can ensure they are not left without insurance to protect them as individuals is through supplemental D&O insurance structures dedicated solely to their own protection.

 

These supplemental structures might take any one of a number of different forms, including for example, excess Side A coverage for a specified group of individuals, or even through an individual D&O insurance policy (so-called IDL coverage). While there are a variety of ways this supplemental insurance might be structured, the possibility of catastrophic claims underscores the importance of addressing these issues as part of the insurance acquisition process.

 

The point of these supplemental insurance structures is to ensure that no matter what happens, the individuals (or some subset of them, for example, the non-officer directors) will have a pot of money with their name on it, as reassurance that the individuals will not be left with unresolved claims but no insurance remaining with which to defend themselves. For more about structuring D&O insurance to protect non-officer directors, refer here.

 

Moreover these alternative structures often have broader coverage than the "traditional" D&O insurance; for example, they often contain fewer exclusions. They also provide so-called "drop down" protection when they provide first dollar coverage, in the event, for example, that the underlying traditional D&O insurers have become insolvent or seek to rescind coverage. In addition, because these alternative insurance structures protect only specified individuals, the insurance cannot be siphoned off for the payment of entity claims or the claims of other individuals who are not insured under the structure.

 

The complexity of these limits selection and program structure issues underscore how indispensible it is that insurance buyers enlist knowledgeable and experienced advisors in their D&O insurance acquisition process. In particular, it is important that buyers ensure not only that their advisors have access to the data described above that is relevant to the limits selection process but also have the ability to explain the limitations of the data as we well as the additional considerations that should be taken into account. In addition the insurance advisor should be able to guide the company through the process of selecting the right insurance structure to ensure that the company and its directors and officers are adequately protected even in the event of a catastrophic claim.

 

Readers who would like to read the prior posts in this series about the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance should refer here: 

Executive Protection: Indemnification and D&O Insurance – The Basics  

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance – The Insuring Agreement

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance—The Policyholder’s Obligations

D&O Insurance: Executive Protection – The Policy Application

Executive Protection: Private Company D&O Insurance 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance Policy Exclusions

Insights: "What to Watch Now in the World of D&O"

The astonishing pace of legislative and judicial changes - just over the last few months alone - underscores how rapidly the liability exposures in the directors and officers arena can be transformed. In the latest issue of InSights (here), I take a look at the current hot topics in the world of directors’ and officers’ liability. There is much to discuss in the world of D&O, with further changes just over the horizon. The year ahead could be very interesting and eventful. The latest InSights article reviews what to watch now in the world of D&O.

 

The Latest Bulletin From Our San Francisco Bureau:  Our SF correspondent filed this report before last night's game (names removed to protect privacy, swear words modified to conform with the family-oriented approach of this blog):

 

So living with a wacko Giants fan is actually really fun right now. Yesterday {name removed} and her mom and godmother went kayaking outside the stadium and it sounds like SO MUCH FUN. I have added it to my to-do list of things while I live in the Bay.

 

Anyway, aside from kayaking (and drinking, and eating, and singing while kayaking) Giants fans wear these ugly fake beards to mimic the "rally beards" that the pitchers have (well, all the pitchers except Lincecum). And they have t-shirts that say "Fear the Beard." I have seem some television footage of very small children and very blonde women in beards. Very strange.

 

Also, just to prove that Tim Lincecum really could never play on any team except the Giants or the A's, everyone knows he smokes pot like it's his job, and the fans wear shirts that say "Let Timmy Smoke." I very much doubt that would be the public reaction ANNNYwhere else. Also he doesn't cover his mouth when he swears, so "F*ck Yeah" t-shirts are also very popular.

 

Unfortunately, I'm still not overly interested in the BASEBALL...just the funny things that San Franciscans do while they WATCH baseball.

 

D&O Insurance: Defense Costs Incurred in Informal SEC and Internal Investigations

Among the most frequently recurring and arguably most vexatious D&O insurance coverage issues are the questions of the carrier’s obligation under the policy for defense expenses incurred either in connection with an informal SEC investigation or an internal investigation.

 

In an October 15, 2010 summary judgment ruling in insurance coverage litigation involving Office Depot, Southern District of Florida Judge Kenneth Marra, applying Florida law, denied coverage for both of these categories of defense expense. Though the decision is a direct reflection of the specific facts involved and the particular policy language at issue, the ruling provides an interesting insight into these recurring issues.

 

Background

In June 2007, Office Depot was the subject of news report suggesting the company had improperly disclosed material information to securities analysts in violation of Sec. Regulation FD. In a July 17, 2007 letter, the SEC advised Office Depot it was "conducting an inquiry" to determine whether the securities laws had been violated, and requested certain information from Office Depot "on a voluntary basis." Office Depot opted to voluntarily cooperate by providing documents and making its employees and officers available for sworn testimony. On July 31, 2007, the SEC requested that Office Depot preserve the records of numerous employees and offices, which it identified by job title.

 

Office Depot forwarded the letter to its insurers. Office Depot’s primary insurer accepted the letter as a "Notice of Circumstances" that may give rise to a claim.

 

In addition, in July 2007, before it received the SEC’s informal inquiry, Office Depot received an internal whistleblower letter raising concerns relating to the timing of recognition of Office Depot’s vendor rebate funds. Office Depot self-reported the whistleblower allegations to the SEC, which expanded its inquiry to include the whistleblower allegations. The company’s audit committee conducted its own investigation of the allegations, retaining lawyers, accountants and consultants for those purposes. The internal investigation resulted in Office Depot’s restatement of its 2006 financial statements.

 

In November 2007, two shareholder derivative lawsuits and two securities class action lawsuits were filed against the company. The shareholder suits alleged misrepresentations in connection with the company’s financial reporting of vendor rebates. In January 2010, the defendants’ motions to dismiss the securities class action lawsuit were granted. The dismissal is now on appeal. The plaintiffs in the derivative lawsuits voluntarily dismissed those cases.

 

In January 2008, the SEC issued a formal "order directing private investigation" and during the course of 2008 subpoened the company and at least eight current and former Office Depot officers and directors, including several who previously voluntarily testified. The notice did not name any individuals as wrongdoers. In November and December 2009, the SEC issued Wells notices to three Office Depot officers. In December 2009, the company reached an undisclosed settlement with the SEC staff.

 

Office Depot requested reimbursement from its D&O insurers of the over $23 million the company had incurred in responding to the SEC, indemnifying individuals against defense expenses, and conducting an internal investigation of the whistleblower allegations.

 

The primary carrier acknowledged its obligation to reimburse Office Depot for defense costs incurred by officers and directors after having been served with SEC subpoenas and Wells notices, and for the costs incurred in the four securities lawsuits. However, the approximately $1.1 million of acknowledged expenses did not exceed the policy’s $2.5 million retention. The primary insurer denied coverage for the other expenses, and Office Depot filed an action alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration of coverage. Office Depot’s excess D&O insurer intervened the action.

 

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

 

The October 15 Ruling

The insurers argued that there is no coverage for Office Depot’s costs incurred in voluntarily responding to the SEC’s investigation and for the costs of Office Depot’s internal investigation of the whistleblower allegations because the costs did not arise either because of a "Securities Claim" against Office Depot or a "Claim" against an insured director or officer. All policy references below refer to the language of the primary policy.

 

The policy’s definition of Securities Claim contains threshold language that excludes from the term "an administrative or regulatory proceeding against, or investigation of, an Organization." However, the definition contains a "carve back" which specifies that the term Securities Claim "shall include an administrative or regulatory proceeding against an Organization, but only if and only during the time that such proceeding is also commenced and continuously maintained against an Insured Person."

 

Judge Marra found it significant that the threshold language excluded coverage for "an administrative or regulatory proceeding against, or investigation of" an Organization, but the carve back preserving coverage refers only to "an administrative or regulatory proceeding" – and thus the carve back does not refer to "an investigation" as does the threshold language. Judge Marra concluded that "the carve-back clause does not restore coverage for ‘an investigation of’ the Organization"

 

Judge Marra also found the policy’s definition of "Claim" distinguishes between "a proceeding for relief" and an "investigation of an insured person," specifying that an investigation constitutes a "Claim" only once the insured person has been notified in writing that he or she may be a target or after service of a subpoena.

 

In addition, Judge Marra rejected Office Depot’s argument that the term "proceeding" was broad enough to encompass the SEC’s informal and formal investigation of Office Depot. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Marra referenced the policy’s distinction between "proceedings against" and "investigations of" insured persons and organizations. Judge Marra said this distinction can only be given "any meaning" by giving the term "proceeding" its "plan meaning," which he defined as "a formal legal action or hearing conducted in a court of law or some official tribunal."

 

Judge Marra concluded therefore that the company’s costs of voluntarily responding to the SEC do not represent "loss of the Organization arising from a Securities Claim."

 

Judge Marra also concluded that the voluntary, pre-subpoena costs incurred on behalf of the individual directors and officers were not incurred in connection with a "Claim." In reaching this conclusion he specifically referenced the trigger required to bring an "investigation" within the definition of "Claim."

 

Office Depot had argued further that the policy’s "relation back" language brought all of the pre-claim costs within coverage when the claims finally did emerge. Office Depot made this argument in reference to the language in the policy’s notice provisions which provide that when a policyholder provides a notice of circumstances that could give rise to a claim, and a claim subsequently arises, the claim relates back to the time of the original notice.

 

Judge Marra ruled that the "relation back" language pertained solely to the question of when a "Claim" is first made for purposes of determining the appropriate claims made policy period. The relation back language, Judge Marra said, "simply serves to identify the policy period in which the ‘subsequent Claim’ was made; it does not operate to expand the Policy definition of ‘Claim’ to absorb any allegations of wrongdoing which happen to be related or similar to the wrongdoing described in the insured’s original Notice of Circumstances."

 

Judge Marra also rejected Office Depot’s related argument that the November 2007 securities lawsuit "relate back" to provide coverage for the company’s internal investigation. The company had argued that because the subsequent lawsuits were "subsequent claim," the Policy’s "relation back" language brought under the Policy’s coverage all defenses expenses incurred from the date of the Notice of Circumstances.

 

Judge Marra said that even if the securities suits were "subsequent claims" that relate back for notice purposes to the date of the original notice of circumstances, "it does not follow that any pre-suit investigation costs which may have related to and benefitted the defense of those suits…are transformed into a covered ‘loss’ which ‘arises from’ that securities litigation."

 

Finally, Judge Marra held that the Policy’s definition of covered Loss does not include the costs of investigating potential or anticipated claims, rejecting Office Depot’s argument that those costs are "arising from" the defense of a claim. He found that the "arising from" phrase "connotes a sequential relationship" between the Claim and the Loss that "arises from it" – that is, Loss that "follow sequentially in time." He said that covered loss "does not include related pre-suit or pre-claim investigation costs, regardless of how ‘related’ or ‘beneficial’ those costs may have ultimately proved to be in defending against the claim which ultimately materialized." He added that "while these costs may well have reasonably been incurred in contemplation of anticipated or potential litigation, that is not enough to meet the Policy’s requirement that the ‘resulted solely from’ the investigation or defense of a Claim."

 

UPDATE: In a subsequent October 27, 2010 order (here), Judge Marra rejected Office Depot's further assertion, based on the prior order, that the company was entitled to insurnace payment for all costs the company incurred in responding to the SEC after November 5, 2007, the date on which the first of the shareholder lawsuits was filed.

In his October 27 order, Judge Marra said that volunarary SEC response costs the company incrred after the shareholder suit was filed "may have followed the securities lawsuit sequentially in time, they did not 'grow out of' or 'flow from' the subject lawsuits, and therefore did not 'arise from'" those suits. Judge Marra added that even though the comany incurred SEC response costs after the shareholder suit was filed, that "does not transform the post-suit SEC response costs into covered 'Loss" ... even though some of those response costs may have been related to or had utility in Office Depot's defense of the securities lawsuit."

 

Discussion

Judge Marra’s analysis and conclusions are a direct reflection of the specific language at issue in the Office Depot case, and his analysis might or might not produce the same or similar outcome under different policy language. He seemed particularly persuaded that Office Depot’s primary D&O policy draws a clear distinction in how the policy responds to "investigations" on the one hand and "proceedings" in the other.

 

That said, Judge Marra’s analysis is quite detailed and represents a very thorough examination of what policyholders are entitled to under the policy before an investigation ripens into a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding. The opinion also represents a detailed examination of what insurers are responsible for before a claim has been made under the Policy.

 

Insurers will undoubtedly welcome this decision and will attempt to rely on it in other cases. As a district court opinion, the decision has limited precedential value, but the insurers will seek to rely on the decision for its persuasive value. The extent to which other courts will follow Judge Marra necessarily will depend on the policy language at issue in the other cases. Indeed, Judge Marra himself rejected Office Depot’s attempt to rely on prior decisions in which courts had held that an "investigation" is a "proceeding," stating that the policies involved in those other cases involve different language.

 

Notwithstanding Judge Marra’s decision, policyholders will continue seek coverage for defense costs incurred in informal investigations and for internal investigation, particularly where distinctions in policy language would seem to justify a different outcome. The sheer dollar costs involved alone (see, e.g., Office Depot’s $23 million in expenditures) ensure that policyholders will continue to agitate on these issues.

 

Given the perennial nature of these issues, the question arises of what are the practical lessons of Judge Marra’s opinion. The most important lesson seems to be that the policy’s wordings of "Securities Claim" and "Claim" are very important and the specific wording used with relation both to "investigations" and "proceedings" can be critically important. A particularly important issue for insurance buyers and their advisors to keep in mind is that a court may differentiate "regulatory and administrative proceedings" on the one hand and "investigations" on the other hand, and it is critically important to analyze coverage with respect to these two sets of considerations separately.

 

One final note relates to Judge Marra’s analysis of whether pre-claim defense expenses may be said to be "arising from" a subsequent claim. Judge Marra reduced this analysis to a question of temporal relation, in effect concluding that any particular item of defense expense can only "arise from" a claim if it comes later in time. I am not sure this analysis takes into account all of the possibilities, In particular, there are occasions when defense expenses are incurred earlier that would inevitably have been incurred later, the argument being the expenses "would have been incurred in any event" and the fact that they were incurred prior is an accident of timing. Arguably, Judge Marra’s analysis is not (or perhaps fairly ought not to be) preclusive of this argument. (Please refer to the Update above for further on this point).

 

It is probably worth noting that there have been recent innovations introduced into the D&O insurance marketplace designed to try to provide coverage for certain preclaim expenses incurred by or on behalf of individual directors and officers. The most recent formulations would not address the pre-claim expenses or internal investigative expenses of the insured entity itself, but it would at least provide direct or reimbursement coverage for costs incurred by or on behalf of individuals before a "Claim" has emerged.

 

 

These issues surrounding informal inquiries and internal investigations raise many points of contention, and policyholders and their insurers will continue to struggle with these issues. It seems probable that insurers facing these disputes will attempt to rely on Judge Marra’s opinion.

 

Special thanks to Steve Brodie of the Carlton Fields law firm for providing me with a copy of Judge Marr’s opinion. The Carlton Fields firm represented the primary insurer in the coverage litigation.

 

For discussion of a recent decision in which a court held that there was coverage under a D&O insurance policy for investigative expenses of a special litigation committee, refer here.

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance Policy Exclusions

In a series of posts, I have been exploring the "nuts and bolts" of D&O insurance. In this post, the sixth in the series, I examine the range of D&O insurance policy exclusions. Though some exclusions are found in most D&O insurance policies, others appear only occasionally , while yet other particular exclusions may only appear in specific policies or specific kinds of policies. For purposes of analysis, I have tried to group the various kinds of exclusions in separate categories below.

 

As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that while generalizations are possible about the kinds of exclusions that may appear in "most" or "many" policies, there are always exceptions. For example, one type of D&O policy, the so-called Excess Side A/DIC policy, often has fewer exclusions than the traditional D&O policies. In addition, more recently introduced D&O insurance policies may have different or narrower exclusions that are found in the typical policy. D&O insurance policies for financial institutions often have exclusions relating specifically to the type of financial activity in which the institution is engaged.

 

Any attempt to try to identify all of these exclusions and exceptions would be far beyond the scope of this post. For purposes of this introductory overview, I have limited my observations to what generally is the case, and in most cases, my observations relate to traditional D&O insurance policies.

 

Exclusions to Define the Policy’s Relation to Other Policies: In order to avoid overlapping policies or duplicate coverages, most D&O policies contain exclusions providing that coverage is precluded for matters that have been reported or the subject of notice under other policies. Consistent with the claims made nature of D&O policies, many policies also include exclusions precluding coverage for litigation that was pending prior to the policies inception.

 

Exclusions to Fit the Policy with Coverage Afforded by Other Types of Insurance: D&O insurance policies are built with the presumption that it is just a part of the policyholder’s overall program of insurance. With that in mind, most D&O policies contain exclusions to preclude coverage for claims that are typically covered by other types of insurance. Thus, most policies contain exclusions for loss arising from claims arising from bodily injury or property damage, as those hazards are typically insured under Commercial General Liability Insurance (CGL) policies. Similarly, most D&O policies exclude coverage for claims under ERISA and similar laws, as those claims typically would be covered under Fiduciary Liability Insurance policies.

 

Catastrophic Hazards: Many policies include separate exclusions for loss arising from catastrophic hazards, such as nuclear events, environmental damage and war. Some of these exclusions, particularly the environmental damage exclusion, will often have coverage coverage carve backs for shareholder claims or for loss for which the company is unable to indemnify individual directors and officers. In addition, in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, and in compliance with the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), many policies will also contain specific provisions relating to acts of terrorism.

 

Refer here for an example of a coverage dispute arising in connection with the question whether or not a D&O policy’s pollution exclusion precluded coverage for a shareholder claim alleging pollution related misrepresentations and omissions.

 

Conduct Exclusions: Most D&O policies contain one or more exclusions precluding coverage for certain types of conduct. The conduct exclusions typically preclude coverage for two categories of conduct: first, for loss relating to fraudulent or criminal misconduct; and second, for loss relating to illegal profits or remuneration to which the insured was not legally entitled.

 

These exclusions can often have subtle wording differences that can significantly affect the availability of coverage. The most important wording variant is with respect what is required in order for the exclusion to be triggered. In recent times, these provisions usually require a prior "adjudication" that the precluded conduct has actually occurred in order for the exclusion to be triggered. Different variations of the adjudication requirement may require the adjudication to take place in the underlying claim, while other exclusions may allow the determination to be made in a separate proceeding (such as a declaratory judgment proceeding).

 

Another important aspect of these exclusions are the accompanying provisions defining when one insured person’s conduct may be attributed to another person or to the insured entity. In more recent times, many policies restrict the imputation of conduct among insurerds – policies with these provisions are said to have "full severability of conduct."

 

An example of a recent case illustrating the importance of the precise wording of the adjudication trigger in the fraud exclusion can be found here.

 

Insured vs. Insured Exclusion: Most D&O policies have exclusions precluding claims brought by one insured against another insured, in order to preclude coverage for collusive claims and for infighting among senior corporate officials. The Insured vs. Insured exclusion typically includes numerous exceptions (or "carve backs" as they are usually called). The exceptions preserve coverage for derivative claims, cross claims, certain employment practices claims, and claims brought by bankruptcy trustees.

 

The Insured vs. Insured exclusion (often referred to as the I v. I exclusion) has evolved over time, and so there are many variants both to the exclusion and to the carve backs. As others have noted (refer here), the Insured vs. Insured exclusion continues to be heavily litigated and is often at the heart of many coverage disputes. Insured vs. Insured disputes can often arise in the context of corporate bankruptcy, as noted here. More recently, whistleblower provisions in the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act have also potentially raise Insured vs. Insured concerns, if the whistleblower is also an insured person. Many insurers will agree to Insured vs. Insured exclusion carve backs designed to preserve coverage for whistleblower claims.

 

Particular Circumstances: In the course of insurance acquisition process, it sometimes happens that the insurance underwriter will identify a specific circumstance or event that represents a risk the underwriter is unwilling to accept. In that event, the underwriter will sometimes insist on an exclusion precluding coverage for the event or circumstance. While these kinds of specific event (or "laser" exclusions as they are sometimes called) are not uncommon, the typical insurance buyer that has an alternative will try to acquire a policy without the event exclusion.

 

Private Company D&O Insurance Policy Exclusions: As discussed in the preceding post in this series, the entity coverage available in a private company D&O insurance policy is quite a bit broader than the entity coverage in a public company D&O policy. In a public company policy, the entity coverage extends only to securities claims. The entity coverage available under a private company policy is not so restrictive, and in fact is quite comprehensive.

 

In order to protect themselves from the breadth of claims that otherwise might come within the entity coverage, many private company D&O insurers will include a number of exclusions applicable solely to the entity coverage. Some examples of entity coverage exclusions of this type include the contract exclusion (about which refer here), an exclusion precluding coverage for intellectual property claims, and an exclusion for antitrust and other competition related claims.

 

The antitrust or competition exclusion is not found in all private company D&O policies, and many insurers will remove or at least modify the exclusion upon request. There are a very limited number of insurers who insist on retaining this exclusion or at most allowing only defense cost coverage. In the current competitive insurance environment there are usually private company D&O insurance alternatives available that do not include the antitrust exclusion.

 

Since private company D&O insurers do not want to include the risks associated with public securities trading, most private company policies contain exclusions relating to public securities offerings and trading. It is important for these exclusions to be worded appropriately so that they do not preclude coverage for activities that might take place in advance of a planned public offering. If the planned offering does not go forward, the private company policy will have to respond to any claims, so it is important that the wording of the exclusion contemplates that possibility.

 

Miscellaneous and Anachronistic Exclusions: As the exclusion involved in the Stanford Financial coverage dispute demonstrates, there a many other kinds of exclusions out there in the insurance marketplace, some of them quite unusual. Among other exclusions that sometimes appears is the so-called "bump up" exclusion, precluding coverage for additional amounts paid to investors claiming inadequate consideration in a corporate buy out situation (about which refer here).

 

There are a host of other exclusions that have been around for a long time but that you just don’t see that much any more. An example of this kind of exclusion is the "failure to maintain insurance" exclusion (or FTMI exclusion, as it sometimes is called), precluding coverage for claims against corporate officials based on their negligent failure to obtain or maintain insurance.

 

Another example of this type of exclusion is the old "Commissions" exclusion The commissions exclusion, as typically worded, precludes coverage for loss incurred in connection with any claim "alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to payments, commissions, gratuities, benefits or any other factors to or for the benefit of" an agent or employee of any foreign government.

 

This exclusion was instituted after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in the late 70s. The exclusoin has largely fallen into disuse since that time, although you still see it on some policies from time to time. As discussed at greater length here, in an era of heighted FCPA enforcement activity, the Commissions exclusion is highly undesirable from the policyholder’s perspective.

 

As I noted at the outset, D&O insurance policies for companies in the financial sector sometimes contain exclusions particularly relevant to claims and exposures associated with the companies’ specific activities. An example of this kind of exclusion is the so-called regulatory exclusion sometimes found on policies issued to commercial banks. This exclusion became relative rare in the mid-90s and until recently, but as the number of failed banks began to rise a couple of years ago, the exclusion began to reappear in at least some commercial banks’ D&O insurance policies. Refer here for a brief overview of the regulatory exclusion.

 

A Final Note about Policy Wording: One final note is that language accompanying the exclusions can often be critically important. As discussed here, some exclusions are preceded by all-encompassing omnibus language, precluding all loss "based upon, arising out of, or any way relating to" the excluded conduct or matter. In other instances, the exclusion is preceded only by the more limited "for" preamble. The broader preamble can substantially expand an exclusion’s preclusive effect, and accordingly it is critically important to consider not only what exclusions a policy contains, but also how the exclusions are worded and what terms and conditions accompany the exclusions.

 

Towers Watson Survey 2010: The 2010 version of the Towers Watson survey is underway, but the window is closing soon. This survey, which so many of us in the industry depend upon, queries companies about liabitliy issues and D&O insurance questions. Because we all depend on the survey results, and because the more survey responses the more complete the survey results will be, we all have an interest in as many respondents as possible completing the survey.

 

The survey, the questionnaire which can be accessed here, will close Friday October 22, 2010, so please have your clients and companies complete the survey form.

 

Prior Installments in the D&O Nuts and Bolts Series: Readers who would like to read the prior posts in this series about the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance should refer here: 

 

 

 

 

Executive Protection: Indemnification and D&O Insurance – The Basics  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance – The Insuring Agreement

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance—The Policyholder’s Obligations

 

D&O Insurance: Executive Protection – The Policy Application

 

Executive Protection: Private Company D&O Insurance

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

D&O Insurance: First Circuit Takes a Whack at "Bump Up" Claims Coverage

The First Circuit has overturned a lower court’s decision holding that Genzyme’s D&O insurance policy did not provide coverage for additional amounts paid to claimants who asserted they had not received enough in a share exchange. Though the First Circuit reversed and remanded the case, the First Circuit did not invalidate the so-called bump up exclusion and indeed agreed that the exclusion precluded entity coverage for bump up amounts.

 

The First Circuit’s October 13, 2010 opinion can be found here.

 

Background

From 1993 to 2003, Genzyme’s capital structure included "tracking stock" to track the performance of three separate business units within the company. In May 2003, Genzyme’s board decided to eliminate the tracking stocks, and the company announced that it would exchange the business units’ tracking stock for a certain number of the company’s General Division’s shares. 

 

The ensuing exchange was unpopular among many Biosurgery Division shareholders, who subsequently initiated a securities class action lawsuit against Genzyme and certain of its directors and officers. The Biosurgery Division shareholders alleged that the defendants had schemed to depress the Division’s tracking stock so that Genzyme could fold the Biosurgery Division into the General Division at an exchange rate favorable to General Division shareholders. In August 2007, Genzyme agreed to settle the Biosurgery Division shareholders’ claim for $64 million. More detailed background regarding the lawsuit can be found here.

 

Genzyme sought to recover part of this settlement amount from its D&O insurer. The insurer denied coverage on two grounds: (1) that the settlement did not represent insurable "loss" under the policy; and (2) that coverage was precluded by the policy’s "bump up" exclusion. Genzyme initiated coverage litigation. The D&O insurer moved to dismiss.

 

As detailed here, in a colorfully written September 2009 opinion, District of Massachusetts Judge Nancy Gertner granted the insurer’s motion to dismiss. Judge Gertner based her decision on two separate grounds.

 

She concluded first that the settlement amount did not represent insurable loss as a matter of Massachusetts public policy because the settlement benefitted one group of shareholders at the expense of another. She also concluded that coverage for the settlement amount was precluded by the policy’s "bump up" exclusion, which provides that the carrier is not liable for "the actual or proposed payment by any Insured Organization of allegedly inadequate consideration in connection with its purchase of securities issued by any Insured Organization."

 

 

In her opinion, Judge Gertner expressly considered and rejected Genzyme’s argument that the "bump up" exclusion was limited by its own terms to the policy’s entity coverage and therefore did not apply to claims against individual directors and officers.

 

The First Circuit’s opinion

In an October 13, 2010 opinion written by Judge Timothy Dyk, a three judge panel of the First Circuit reversed in part Judge Gertner’s ruling, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings.

 

As an initial matter, the First Circuit rejected Judge Gertner’s conclusion that coverage for the settlement would violate Massachusetts public policy, noting both that "the public policy rationale articulated by the district court finds no support in Massachusetts statutory or case law." Massachusetts recognizes "only a limited public policy exception" and applicable principles weigh against "creating amorphous public policy limitations on insurance policies."

 

The First Circuit concluded that not only does it "see no basis in Massachusetts legislation or precedent for concluding that the settlement payment is uninsurable as a matter of public policy," but also that "there are significant reasons why such an exception should not be created as a matter of public policy," noting that such an exception "have the effect of making it impossible to secure coverage for damages awards in routine securities litigation that charges the corporation with unfair or unlawful treatment of a class of securities holders."

 

The First Circuit then went on to agree with Judge Gertner’s conclusion that the bump up exclusion precluded coverage for the settlement. However, the Court noted that the exclusion by its own terms expressly limited its preclusive effect only to policy’s entity coverage clause. The court held that there was no basis in the policy language or under Massachusetts public policy for applying the bump-up exclusion to the policy’s other insuring clauses.

 

The First Circuit also referenced the policy’s allocation provisions, which the court found expressly recognized that there might be occasions on which the bump up exclusion operated to bar coverage under the policy’s entity insuring provision but in which the other insuring provisions would still provide coverage.

 

The court concluded that "we must remand the district court to consider the allocation question," adding that "if part of the Genzyme payment represented indemnification provided to officers and directors," then the payment would fall under the policy’s corporate reimbursement coverage provisions (as opposed to the entity insuring provisions) "and allocation of the total settlement is required under the policy."

 

 

With a final wink and a nod, the First Circuit acknowledged that because "the problems involved in allocation may be difficult," this might be a case "where settlement, rather than lengthy and costly litigation, might be worth consideration by the parties."

 

Discussion

On the one hand, we might assume that because the First Circuit reversed and remanded this case that insurers would score this as a loss. No doubt, the ruling arguably represents something of a setback for the specific carrier involved in this case. But the news for insurance carriers generally is not all bad here, and looked at from a certain angle, the overall news for the insurers may be relatively good, or at least acceptable.

 

First of all, the First Circuit affirmed that the bump up exclusion applied to the Genzyme settlement. Sure, the court also concluded that the exclusion only applied to preclude coverage under the Policy’s entity insuring provision, but that limitation is expressly stated in the exclusion itself. It was pretty slick for the insurer to have convinced Judge Gernter that the exclusion applied to other insuring provisions notwithstanding the express limitations in the exclusion, but insurers in general can hardly grumble that exclusions are to be applied according to their express terms.

 

And though the First Circuit may have taken away Judge Gertner’s public policy determination, I think the circuit court’s conclusion here may not be all bad from the insurer’s perspective.

 

In thinking about this public policy issue, it is worth drawing a contrast between the colorful prose of Judge Gertner’s district court opinion, which was full of humorous analogies and heavily freighted language, and the straightforward, workmanlike approach of the First Circuit’s opinion.

 

I noted at the time that not everyone was going to be equally impressed with Judge Gernter’s elaborate hypotheticals and her willingness to dispense with conventional case law formulas. I also noted the problems that that her judicial approach might prsent in the event other less intellectually agile judges were to try reasoning by analogy or from first principles rather than established case law formulas.

 

Back in the day when I was regularly representing D&O carriers in coverage disputes, I know which way I would have come down on the question whether I would have prefered a judicial decision maker that writes flamboyantly and dispenses with case law formulas, or a judicial decision maker that is unwilling to infer case decisive principles. Over the long haul, this latter approach to the decision making process is likelier to be preferable – in fact, preferable for all litigants, not just insurers.

 

All of that said, the parties must now go back to this district court to try to sort out the allocation issues, which the First Circuit correctly stated are likely to be difficult. The insurer probably did not appreciate the First Circuit’s friendly suggestion that perhaps settlement is the best approach. As someone who once represented carriers, I know that when a court suggests settlement, what they are really saying is – insurance company, get out your checkbook. I never considered that particularly helpful, actually.

 

But as I said, though Genzyme’s D&O insurer may not be happy with the way the First Circuit’s opinion impacts this specific case, I don’t think this is necessarily a bad decision overall for the insurers. As was said to me back when I was representing carriers, some days the bear eats you, some days you eat the bear.

 

I fully recognize that some readers may take strong exception to my interpretation of this decision, and those readers are strongly encourage to post their views to this blog using the site's comment feature. (I really do wish people would post their thoughts and reactions more often.)

 

Special thanks to the several loyal readers who send me copies of the First Circuit’s opinion, including Peter Welsh of the Ropes & Grey law firm. The Ropes & Grey law firm represented Genzyme before the First Circuit.

 

D&O Insurers Relieved of Advancing Allen Stanford's Criminal Defense Fees

Stanford Financial’s D&O insurers do not have to continue to advance the criminal defense attorneys’ fees of R. Allen Stanford and two other former Stanford related individuals, according to an October 13, 2010 ruling by Southern District of Texas Nancy Atlas.

 

The ruling, which can be found here, follows a four day evidentiary hearing in August 2010, the purpose of which was to determine whether or not to continue a preliminary injunction compelling the insurers to advance the defense fees. In her October 13 opinion, Judge Atlas granted the insurers’ motion to vacate the preliminary injunction.

 

The insurers had denied coverage in reliance on the D&O policy’s money laundering exclusion. The exclusion applies if insured persons took any of a number of specified actions with respect to "criminal property," which is a benefit the Plaintiff knew of suspected , or reasonably know or should have suspected was obtained through "criminal conduct."

 

The money laundering exclusion does not apply "until such time as it is determined that the alleged act or acts did in fact occur."

 

In a January 26, 2010 opinion, Southern District of Texas Judge David Hittner entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the insurers from "withholding payment" of defense expenses, as discussed here. Judge Hitner required the insurers to continue paying the fees "until a trial on the merits in this case or such other time as this Court orders."

 

In a March 15, 2010 opinion (about which refer here), the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court, concluding that the money laundering exclusion’s "in fact" wording required a judicial determination to establish whether or not the exclusion had been triggered, but also concluding that this determination can be made in a separate proceeding such as a coverage action.

 

As discussed at here, the purpose of the August 2010 evidentiary hearing was to determine whether or not the insurers had shown a substantial likelihood that one or more of the three individuals has engaged in money laundering as defined in the applicable insurance policies.

 

In her October 13, 2010 opinion, Judge Atlas concluded that the insurers met their burden of showing a substantial likelihood that "the preponderance of the evidence would demonstrate that the Money Laundering Exclusion applies to each Plaintiff and that coverage of defense costs in the Criminal or SEC Action or related litigation, for Plaintiffs is not required under the Policy," and accordingly she granted the insurers’ motion to vacate the preliminary injunction.

 

The October 13 opinion reflects a detailed review of the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing; however, Judge Atlas also stressed that her "findings and conclusions are neither final findings of fact nor conclusions of law for use in the criminal or SEC cases pending against each Plaintiff."

 

Judge Atlas considered the facts as applicable to Allen Stanford separately from the other two individuals, Gilbert Lopez and Mark Kurht, who were, respectively, Stanford Financial’s chief accounting officer and global controller.

 

In concluding that the underwriters had carried their burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence a substantial likelihood that Lopez and Kuhrt had violated the money laundering exclusion, she concluded that the two knew or reasonably should have known that the investment information they were provided, and that were included in annual reports and marketing materials, "were fictitious, or at the very least, were not accurate reflections" of Stanford Financial’s investment performance. The two individuals were also aware of but did not report personal loans to Allen Stanford of at least $1.7 billion.

 

In reaching a similar conclusion with respect to Allen Stanford, she concluded that he was aware that Stanford Financial’s affiliates were marketing certificates of deposit based on "important misrepresentations" about Stanford Financial’s assets, investment allocations and the performance of those investments. Stanford was also aware that the financial statements did not reflect the massive personal loans that had been made to him.

 

After having reached these conclusions, Judge Atlas reiterating that her ruling was "narrow," adding that

 

The Court does not reach the issue of whether the evidence supports a finding that Stanford personally engaged in criminal conduct. The ruling is limited to analysis of conduct found by a preponderance of the evidence on a necessarily restricted record.

 

Judge Atlas declined to enter a stay of her ruling pending appeal.

 

Discussion

Judge Atlas’s ruling is indeed narrow, since it was in the context only of the preliminary injunction. Because of this procedural context, her determinations represent only a conclusion that evidence presented established "a substantial likelihood" that the exclusion has been triggered, and therefore the continuation of a preliminary injunction until an ultimate determination on the merits is not appropriate.

 

There are other significant attributes of her ruling that would limit any potential general applicability. First and foremost is the money laundering exclusion itself which is an uncommon exclusion (you don’t see this exclusion in very many D&O policies).

 

In addition, many other D&O policy exclusions (including even other exclusions in Stanford Financial’s D&O insurance policy) specify that they only apply "after adjudication" that the prohibited conduct has occurred. The money laundering exclusion, by contrast, specified that it was triggered if "in fact" the prohibited conduct occurred. This distinction was critical in the Fifth Circuit’s consideration of these issues.

 

So, to recap, what we have is a procedurally narrow context, an unusual set of coverage issues, and some very case specific factual determinations. Moreover the factual determinations were made only pursuant for purposes of determining whether or not the preliminary injunction should remain in force – as Judge Atlas specifically stated, these determinations were not "final findings of fact."

 

Judge Atlas was accurate in stating that her conclusions were "narrow." But nevertheless, the determination, unless overturned on appeal prior to the criminal trial, will leave Allen Stanford and the other two individuals without insurance for their defense expenses as they prepare for their January 2011 criminal trial.

 

An October 13, 2010 Bloomberg article discussing Judge Atlas’s opinion can be found here. (Full disclosure, I was interviewed in connection with the article).

 

Executive Protection: Private Company D&O Insurance

In a series of posts, I have been exploring the "nuts and bolts" of D&O insurance. In this post, the fifth in the series, I examine D&O insurance issues of particular concern to private companies. Both the potential liability exposures and the available insurance solutions for private companies and their directors and officers are quite a bit different than for public companies.

 

Why Should Private Companies Buy D&O Insurance?

Most public companies don’t need to be persuaded that their company needs D&O insurance. Public company executives generally understand that D&O insurance is an indispensible prerequisite for a company whose securities are publicly traded.

 

However, the view among at least some private company managers is different. These officials, particularly those at very closely held companies, feel they are unlikely to need the insurance because, they believe, they are unlikely to ever have a D&O lawsuit. In my experience, just about every company that has ever had a claim was quite sure, before the claim arrived, that they would never have a claim. Executives who have survived a claim know better; too many company officials find out the hard way that when they recognize they need the insurance after all, it is too late. The fact is, the right time to buy the insurance is when you think you don’t need it.

 

Many of those who resist the need for D&O insurance are affiliated with companies that have only a very small number of shareholders. These company executives look at the ownership structure and conclude their company could never have a D&O claim. This perspective overlooks the fact that the plaintiffs in D&O claim include a much broader array of claimants than just shareholders. D&O claims plaintiffs also include customers, vendors, competitors, suppliers, regulators, creditors and a host of others. In our litigious age, just about anybody is a prospective claimant.

 

And when a company has claim, expenses mount quickly. Even frivolous suits can be expensive to defend and resolve. At the same time, the cost of insurance to protect private companies against D&O claims is relatively low. Indeed, the incremental costs of private company D&O insurance, on top of the company’s employment practices liability insurance (and no entity should do business in this country without EPL insurance) is relatively slight.

 

For the relatively low cost, private company D&O insurance buyers obtain coverage that is quite broad. Private company D&O insurance policies are materially broader than D&O insurance for public companies. In particular, the entity coverage under a private company D&O policy is significantly broader than the entity coverage under public company D&O insurance policies. The entity coverage in public company D&O insurance policies is generally limited just to securities claims. However, private company D&O policies contain no such limitation, so the private company D&O insurance policy provides significant balance sheet protection for the insured entities.

 

Because the private company D&O insurance policies provide broad coverage at relatively low cost it should be a part of every private company’s risk management portfolio – not just private companies with a broad ownership base.

 

Combined or Separate Limits?

A recent D&O insurance innovation is the development of modular management liability policies. These permit various management liability coverages to be combined in a single policy. The typical modular policy consists of a declarations page (identifying the limits of liability and the policy period, and so on), a general terms and conditions section applicable to all of the separate coverage parts, and then separate coverage parts for each of the various management liability coverages (such as D&O, EPL, Fiduciary, Crime, etc).

 

These modular policies have become quite popular. They do have certain advantages. The first is that the policies simplify the management liability insurance acquisition process by reducing what would otherwise be a series of discrete transactions into a single insurance transaction. The modular structure also ensures that the various coverages are coordinated, which could be important in the event of a claim the straddles several coverages.

 

The modular structure does present questions with respect to the limits of liability. Many buyers, attracted by the convenience of multiple coverages combined in a single policy are also attracted by the possibility of combining the limits of liability for the various coverages into a single, combines aggregate limit, under which a claim payment under any of the various coverages would reduce the amount of insurance remaining for a separate claim under any of the coverages.

 

There is no doubt that combining the limits of liability into a single aggregate limit affords costs savings for the buyer. For some insurance buyers, particularly very small enterprises, the cost saving consideration justifies the decision to structure the insurance into a single aggregate limit.

 

For most other enterprises, however, the combination of all of the coverages into a single limit may be a poor choice. A combined limit presents the possibility that a prior claim might reduce the amount of insurance available for a later, more serious claim. The fact is that when things go wrong, multiple problems can arise at once.

 

My greatest concern is that a prior unrelated claim against the company might leave company executives with insufficient remaining insurance to protect them if a separate claim later arises against them as individuals. This concern is particularly applicable in the bankruptcy context, in which company indemnification is unavailable. The executives could be left without insurance or with insufficient insurance at the time when they need it most.

 

I am Old School on this issue. I have a bias in favor of separate limits for the separate coverages, because I believe that there should be a fund of insurance available to protect the individual executives, without a concern that entity claims might drain the insurance away. Of course, as noted above, cost considerations may nevertheless dictate that some small enterprises will purchase combined limits. But most insurance buyers should not allow relatively small premium differences to drive important insurance decisions, potentially leaving the company with insurance that might not afford sufficient protection with the hour of need arises.

 

Duty to Defend or Duty to Indemnify?

Public company D&O insurance is written on reimbursement basis, based on the insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured company for its defense expenses and claim resolution costs. Under this duty to indemnify type of coverage, the insureds select their defense counsel, subject to the insurer’s consent, and the insureds control the claim. The insurer reimburses the insureds for these costs.

 

Private Company D&O insurance is also often written on a duty to indemnify basis. In addition, however, private company D&O insurance is also sometimes written on a duty to defend basis, under which the insurer selects the defense counsel and controls the defense. Many private company D&O insurance carriers offer their prospective insureds the choice of whether or not the coverage will be written on a duty to indemnify or a duty to defend basis.

 

There are certain advantages to the duty to defend structure. The first is ease of administration. Under the duty to defend coverage, the carrier appoints defense counsel and takes care of managing the claim. The policyholder doesn’t have to deal with legal bills and so on. This can be particularly helpful for smaller and more routine claims. In addition, the counsel the carrier selects often are experienced with these kinds of claims, which can also contribute to smoother claims resolution.

 

Another advantage of duty to defend coverage is that, in general, if any part of the claim is covered, the insurer must defend the entire claim, even those parts of the claim that are not covered. This unified defense avoids what can be a recurring problem under a duty to indemnify policy when a claim encompasses both covered and uncovered matters; in that circumstance under a duty to indemnify policy, the defense costs must be allocated between the covered and uncovered matters and the insurer reimburses only the defense expenses associated with the covered matters (often only a percentage of total defense expenses). The process of determining the allocation can be contentious and disruptive at a time when the insured and the insurer ought to be trying to work together to resolve the claim.

 

But despite these advantages of the duty to defend coverage, there may be times when duty to defend coverage is not the best choice. In particular, many policyholders are not comfortable having the insurer’s counsel defending a claim. This may be particularly true with more serious and more sophisticated litigation, which some insureds feel are outside the capabilities of some insurer-selected defense counsel. Also, although the topic involves issues far beyond the scope of this blog post, a host of issues arise when the insurer is defending a claim subject to a reservation of rights to deny coverage for any settlements or judgments.

 

There are no absolute answers to the question whether the D&O coverage should be written on a duty to defend or a duty to indemnify basis. It is a question each insurance buyer must decide in consultation with their insurance adviser.

 

One innovation the D&O insurance industry has introduced in recent years is an optional duty to defend policy, which gives the policyholder the option of tendering the claim defense to the carrier at the outset of the claim. The advantage of this arrangement is that it allows the policyholder to let the carrier handle the smaller or more routine matters, while allowing the company to select its own counsel and manage its defense on more significant matters or matters of greater concern to the company.

 

Public Offering Exclusion

The critical distinction between private and public companies is that public companies have publicly traded securities and private companies do not. Private company D&O insurers do not intend to cover exposures arising from the issuance or subsequent trading of publicly traded securities, and so private company policies typically have a public offering exclusion.

 

One particular concern with this exclusion is that it should not be written so broadly that it would preclude coverage for claims arising from pre-IPO activities. If a company is preparing to go public, the company and its senior executives undertake a variety of activities that may create potential liability exposures. If the company ultimately goes public, the public company D&O insurance policy, put in place on the offering date, should pick up coverage for all claims arising from the offering related activities. However, if the company does not complete the offering and claims result, or if offering activity claims arise prior to the offering date, then private company policy is the one that will respond to the claims.

 

Because of the heightened claims exposure associated with pre-offering activities, it is critically important that the public offering exclusion is worded in a way to afford coverage for these kinds of claims. Unfortunately, this is an area where there is a significant and serious lack of uniformity in available wordings, and many of the wordings available are not well-designed to provide the full extent of coverage needed. For example, many carriers, in an attempt to address this concern, will include a so-called "roadshow carve back" from the securities offering exclusion. These wordings, while helpful, are not sufficient to address all of the potential pre-IPO exposures, because pre-offering problems might arise that have nothing to do with the roadshow.

 

The concerns arising in connection with coverage for pre-IPO activities is a good illustration of the unavoidable fact that even with respect just to private company D&O, it is critically important for insurance buyers to associate knowledgeable and experienced insurance advisors in the insurance acquisition process. Otherwise the insured could wind up with D&O insurance coverage that is not well suited to the company’s needs and exposures, and that does not reflect the best coverage available in the marketplace.

 

Readers who would like to read the prior posts in this series about the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance should refer here: 

 

 

Executive Protection: Indemnification and D&O Insurance – The Basics 

 

 

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance – The Insuring Agreement

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance—The Policyholder’s Obligations

 

D&O Insurance: Executive Protection – The Policy Application

 

 

 

D&O Insurance: Executive Protection - The Policy Application

In a series of posts, I have been exploring the "nuts and bolts" of D&O insurance. In this post, the fourth in the series, I examine issues surrounding the application for D&O insurance and the surrounding application process. Although this might seem like a pretty straightforward topic, there are actually quite a few issues involving the D&O insurance application.

 

The Policy Definition of "Application"

As with most insurance, D&O insurers usually require insurance applicants to complete an insurance application as part of the insurance acquisition process. The D&O insurance application is of course a physical document – but it is not just a physical document. The term "application" is usually defined to comprise several categories of materials beyond just the physical document.

 

The term "application" is often defined broadly to include all prior applications the applicant previously submitted; all materials submitted with the application; and, in the case of public companies, all documents filed with the SEC or equivalent regulatory bodies. These policy definitions of the term "application" are sometimes unnecessarily overbroad and need to be narrowed to avoid sweeping in an entire universe of information that has no reasonable relationship to the actual application process. For example, many carriers will agree to revise the category of publicly filed documents to be included within the "application" to be narrowed to documents filed within the preceding twelve months.

 

The Application Form Itself

With respect to the physical application document itself, there is a further question of which application form an insured appropriately may be asked to complete and submit. Specifically, there is an important difference between the questions that appropriately may be asked when new coverage is being placed (or increased limits are being procured), compared to what appropriately may be asked when existing coverage is being renewed.

 

When new coverage or increased limits are being put in place, the insurer appropriately can ask the so-called "warranty question" – that is, whether the applicant is aware of any fact, situation or circumstances that might reasonably be expected to give rise to a claim. (The actual wording of the representation required varies among insurers and applications.) Any matters disclosed pursuant to the warranty statement will be excluded from coverage.

 

Because the policyholder is entitled to expect complete continuity of coverage in successive policy years, the warranty question emphatically is not appropriate in connection with the renewal of existing coverage.

 

Unfortunately, process participants sometimes use applications including the warranty question even in connection with renewals of existing coverage. The problem with providing an answer to the warranty question on renewal is that it potentially can provide the carrier with a basis on which to try to disclaim coverage, when the question should not even have been asked or answered in the first place. (In a previous post, here, I discussed a case in which a carrier successfully relied on this defense to disclaim coverage, in a situation where it fairly may be asked whether the policyholder should have answered the warranty question in the first place.)

 

Application Misrepresentations and the Consequences

This whole question of the carrier seeking to rely on application responses to disclaim coverage leads to the larger question of policy rescission – that is, the question of when the carrier may, on the basis of alleged material misrepresentations in the policy application, seek to have the policy declared void ab initio – that is, as if it had never been put in place. There are several components of this question, each one raising important considerations in connection with the wording of key policy terms and conditions.

 

The first issue of course is what the application consists of, as noted above. The second question is whose alleged misrepresentations may be relied on by the carrier and against whom may they be used.

 

The Representations Clause

Many policies will specify in a representations clause whose knowledge of the mispreresented facts will result in a vitiation of coverage. For example, the policy might specify that if certain top company executives are aware that application statements were untrue, then coverage will not apply to those executives or to the company. Because the operation of the representaitons clause could void coverage for the company, it is critical that the group of persons who knowledge will void coverage for the company be restricted and as narrow as possible, preferably just the CEO, CFO and General Counsel.

 

Nonimputation and Severability

Two related issues pertain to questions of imputation and severability. The question is basically whether one individual’s knowledge will be imputed to the company or to other individuals. As noted in the preceding paragraph, certain officials’ knowledge will be imputed to the company. But ideally, the policy terms will be structured so that no individual’s knowledge is imputed to another individual – or to put it another way, that each individual’s knowledge is severable from that of other individuals. (Please see the note below discussing the difference between this type of severability – that is, application severability – from a different type of severability that may arise under the D&O policy—that is, exclusion severability).

 

The inclusion within the policy of a provision of so-called "full severability" (that is, the specification that no individual’s knowledge will be imputed to another individual for purposes of determining the effect of an application misrepresentation) is critical in order to ensure that coverage for innocent insureds remains unimpaired.

 

Policy Rescission and Claim Exclusions

The final question that should be asked about policy provisions pertaining to application misrepresentations is the issue of what the consequences of an application misrepresentation will be. As noted above, absent policy provisions providing otherwise, the carrier may seek to rely on application misrepresentations as a basis on which to rescind the policy. From the policyholder’s perspective, policy rescission is highly undesirable on many levels, not least of which is that the voiding of the policy means not only that coverage will be unavailable for the specific matter at hand, but also for any and all future matters that might arise.

 

In light of this latter consideration, many carriers will agree to amend their policies so that in the event of an alleged application misrepresentation, policy coverage is unavailable only for persons aware of the misrepresentation and only with respect to claims pertaining to the allegedly misrepresented matter. This formulation allows for the possibility that coverage might be available for future matters that might arise, even if it is not available for certain persons in connection with the immediate matter at hand.

 

Non-rescindable Policies

In addition, in many instances, carriers are willing to incorporate provisions specifying that the policy is nonrescindable. In some cases, the policy may provide that it is nonrescindable only as to Side A coverage (that is, the coverage protecting the individuals in the event that corporate indemnification is unavailable due to insolvency or legal prohibition). In other cases, the policy may be fully nonrescindable.

 

Completing the Application and Polling the Board

As noted above, there are times when it is undeniably appropriate for the carrier to ask the warranty question. The issue for the applicant company is how to answer the question in a way that will need lead to problems down the road. The applicant obviously wants to make sure that all known circumstances are disclosed, so that coverage is not later impaired if it later turns out that there were known circumstances that were not disclosed.

 

In order to address this issue, the applicant company should poll its senior executives and board members, in a process that communicates the importance of the inquiry. The polling process and responses to the survey should also later serve to substantiate the fact that the applicant company took reasonable steps to determine whether or not any person was aware of any fact, circumstance or situation.

 

Two Different Kinds of Severability

As noted above, in an appropriately structured policy, no person’s knowledge will be imputed to any other person for purposes of determining the scope and effect of any alleged misrepresentations. This non-imputation is sometimes referred to as "full severability." This type of application severability is separate and distinct from another type of severability that operates in many D&O policies.

 

That is, many D&O policies contain provision, typically at the end of the exclusions section, in which it is provided that for purposes of determining the operation of the policy exclusions, no individual’s conduct will be imputed to any other individual. This "exclusion severability" is analytically separate and distinct from "application severability" but the similarity of the names can sometimes be confusing. Both types of severability are critically important but they are dealt with in separate parts of the policy and they must be addressed separately.

 

Readers who would like to read the prior posts in this series about the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance should refer here:

 

 

 

 

 

Executive Protection: Indemnification and D&O Insurance – The Basics

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance – The Insuring Agreement

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance—The Policyholder’s Obligations

 

 

 

 

 

 

What to Watch Now in the World of D&O

Every fall since I first started writing this blog, I have assembled a list of the current hot topics in the world of directors’ and officers’ liability. This year’s list is set out below. As should be obvious, there is a lot going on right now in the world of D&O, with further changes just over the horizon. The year ahead could be very interesting and eventful. Here is what to watch now in the world of D&O:

 

1. What Impact Will Dodd-Frank Have on D&O Liability?: The massive Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which Congress enacted this past July, represents the most significant reform of financial regulation in decades. It will affect virtually every aspect of our financial system. However, exactly what the impact will be and how that might affect the liability of directors and officers remains to be seen.

 

Among the few things that are clear at this point is that some of the proposed reforms were not incorporated into the final version of the Act. Thus, for example, the law did not, as was proposed, legislatively overturn the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Stoneridge and enact a private right of action for aiding and abetting. The Act also did not incorporate a proposed legislative provision that would have extended the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. securities laws in cases brought by private litigants. (The Act did include a provision regarding the SECs extraterritorial jurisdiction, however).

 

One reason that the Act’s ultimate implications remain unclear is that much of the work still remains to be done. The Act calls for more than 240 rulemaking efforts and nearly 70 studies by 11 different regulatory authorities. Most of the details of the key provisions, and the ways those provisions will be implemented, remain to be spelled out by the various regulators in the months ahead.

 

But though much of the picture has yet to be fleshed out, there are certain provisions that clearly will impact directors and officers, even if the ultimate effect is uncertain. First, the Act provides rules regarding executive compensation and corporate governance generally applicable to U.S. public companies, including requirements on shareholder "say on pay;" broker discretionary voting; compensation committee independence; executive compensation disclosures; executive compensation "clawbacks;" disclosure regarding employee and director hedging; disclosures regarding Chairman and CEO structures; and shareholder proxy access.

 

These provisions do not expressly create new causes of action against directors and officers, but they do create a host of new obligations that undoubtedly will drive shareholder expectations. The probability of claims arising from these new requirements seems high, particularly with respect to the new disclosure requirements.

 

Among the specific parts of the Act that also seem particularly likely to lead to future claims are the new whistleblower provisions. The whistleblower provisions include the creation of a new whistleblower bounty pursuant to which individuals who bring violations of securities and commodities laws to the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission will receive between 10 percent and 30 percent of any recovery in excess of $1 million.

 

Many commentators have predicted that these incentives could lead to a dramatic increase in complaints of accounting misconduct, corrupt practices, and other violations. (The specific possibilities for increased reporting related to the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act are discussed below.) The likely increased enforcement activity also seems likely to generate a related upsurge in follow-on civil litigation, as the underlying violations are disclosed.

 

There are many ways that the impact of Dodd-Frank Act can be anticipated or at least conjectured, but the Act’s overall impact and significance wil only become apparent over the long haul. At 2,319 pages, the Act’s scope is so sweeping that many of its specific implications inevitably will reveal themselves only with the passage of time. Be prepared for years of commentaries about the Act that begin "Though the provision was little-noticed at the time that the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, …" In the meantime, the laws of unintended consequences will be hard at work.

 

2. What Happens Next with the Subprime and Credit Crisis-Related Litigation Wave?: For several years beginning in 2007, corporate and securities litigation was largely driven by lawsuits arising out of the subprime meltdown and the global credit crisis. Beginning in the second half of 2009, the litigation wave began to lose steam, and the related lawsuits dwindled as we headed into 2010.

 

But while the pace of new lawsuit filings has dwindled, new filings have not entirely gone away. Even now, well into 2010, the credit crisis-related lawsuits continue to arrive (although as time goes by, it become harder and harder to maintain absolute definitional certainty around what makes a particular case "credit crisis-related."). By my count, there have been as many as 19 new subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits filed during 2010, out of approximately 104 new securities class action suits so far this year (as of September 3, 2010).

 

In the meantime, the vast amount of litigation that accumulated over the last four years continues to work its way through the system. There have been over 220 subprime and credit-crisis related securities class action lawsuits filed overall since the first was filed back in 2007. About two-thirds of the cases remain pending and many have yet to reach the motion to dismiss stage, though the dismissal motion rulings are starting to accumulate.

 

And while a number of courts have seemed skeptical about the fraud allegations in light of the magnitude of the global financial crisis, there have also been a number of decisions were the court have found the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient. My running tally of the various subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit dismissal motion rulings can be found here.

 

With the increasing number of dismissal motion rulings, the cases that survive are likely to head towards settlement. Just in the last few months, there have been several very high profile subprime-related lawsuit settlements, including the $624 million settlement in the Countrywide case, the roughly $124 million settlement in the New Century Financial case, and the $235 million total settlement in the Schwab Yield Plus case. (All settlement figures reflect aggregate settlement amounts) By my calculation, though there have been only 15 subprime and credit crisis related lawsuit settlements so far, those few settlements alone total over $1.8 billion.

 

The one thing that seems clear is that when all is said and done on the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave, the total costs will be staggering. The defense costs alone associated with this litigation will be enormous. (By way of illustration, the defense expenses associated just with the Lehman bankruptcy are running at about $ 5 million a month, and those costs are likely to accelerate in the event the SEC files an enforcement action or the DoJ files criminal charges.) Though not all of these costs will be insured, many of them will be.

 

In the aggregate the subprime meltdown and credit crisis represents an enormous event for the D&O insurance industry. Just how big of an event it is will continue to unfold in the weeks, months and years ahead.

 

3. Will the Wave of Bank Failures Lead to a New Wave of Failed Bank Litigation?: Since January 1, 2008 and through September 3, 2010, 283 banks have failed in the United States, and the total number of failed banks continues to grow. Indeed, in its most recent Quarterly Banking Profile, the FDIC reported that one out of ten banks in the United States is a "problem institution" (meaning rated a "4" or "5" on a scale of one-to-five on lineup of financial and operational criteria).

 

During the S&L crisis, the banking regulators pursued claims against the directors and officers of the failed institutions in connection with about a quarter of the bank failures. These efforts proved worthwhile for the FDIC, since its S&L crisis D&O claims led to recoveries of about $1.3 billion, out of total professional liability claims recoveries of about $3.25 billion. Given that history, it seems probable that the FDIC will pursue D&O litigation as part of the current bank wave.

 

Though the FDIC, as part of the current bank failure wave, has to date filed only one lawsuit against former directors and officers of a failed banks, there is every reason to expect that there will be more claims to come, perhaps many more. The FDIC has sent claims notice letters to the directors and officers of many failed banks, and otherwise taken steps to preserve its right to pursue claims and also to assert its priorities over other claimants.

 

During the S&L crisis, the lag between the peak of the failed banks and the timing of the FDIC’s peak recoveries was about three years. Since the current wave of bank failures did not really start to take off until late 2008 and did not really gain serious momentum until 2009, and in light of the lag in the FDIC’s recovery during the S&L crisis, it would seem that the FDIC’s failed bank lawsuit will begin to accumulate in earnest some time during 2011.

 

In the meantime, other claimants are also asserting claims against the failed banks’ former directors and officers . Unlike during the S&L crisis, when most of the failed institutions were privately held, many of the banks that have failed during the current wave were publicly traded. According to a recent NERA report, about 45 of the subprime and credit crisis related securities class action lawsuits have involved depositary institutions. Of the 20 failed banks that produced the largest losses prior to 2010, 13 involved publicly traded securities, of which eight had been named in securities class actions as of the end of 2009.

 

Even in privately held banks’ investors are pursuing claims, although they are crafting their claims very carefully to avoid running afoul of the FDIC’s priority rights to the claims of the failed institutions.

 

In some respects these investor lawsuit could be competing with the FDIC for the proceeds of the D&O insurance policies insuring the directors and officers of the failed institutions. However, while the FDIC generally has priority, the investors may be able to access the policies proceeds when the FDIC may not, if, for example, the relevant policies have exclusions precluding coverage for claims by regulatory bodies.

 

For now, the extent to which the FDIC will pursue litigation against former directors and officers of the failed institutions is uncertain, although the likelihood is that there will be extensive litigation ahead. In the meantime, numerous investors are pressing ahead with their own claims. In all likelihood, an extensive amount of litigation related to failed and troubled banks seems likely to accumulate as we head into next year.

 

4. Will the Mix of Litigation Involving Directors and Officers Continue to Shift Away from Securities Class Action Lawsuits?: One of the more interesting litigation phenomena of the last several years, at least as relates to the exposure of directors and officers, as been the material shift of litigation away from securities class action lawsuits and towards other types of lawsuits.

 

This shift was first discernable in the litigation that arose from the options backdating scandal, beginning in 2006. Though there were over 30 options backdating related securities class action lawsuit file, there were more than 160 options backdating related shareholders derivative lawsuits filed.

 

According to the mid-year 2010 corporate and securities litigation study by the insurance information firm Advisen, this shifting mix of litigation away from securities class action lawsuits has continued and securities class action lawsuits have represented a progressively smaller proportion of overall corporate and securities litigation for several years now. Thus, whereas prior to 2006, securities class action litigation represented over half of all corporate and securities litigation, through the middle of 2010 securities class action litigation represented less than 20% of all corporate and securities lawsuits.

 

What is making up the remainder of the corporate and securities lawsuits are a broad mix of kinds of claims including individual securities lawsuits, shareholder derivative lawsuits, and breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits.

 

This shifting mix has a number of important considerations. The first is that the dialog about litigation levels tends to focus on securities class action lawsuit filing patterns. Though class action lawsuit filings levels have always ebbed and flowed over time, it seems that every time the filing levels decline or climb (as they inevitably do), some commentator will make some sweeping generalizations about permanent changes in the filing levels.

 

The fact is, the dialog about shifting class action filing levels may be beside the point. The real story may be that the kinds of cases that are getting filed have changed.

 

In any event, the growing importance of lawsuits other than securities class action lawsuits does alter the issues that should be considered in the context of directors’ and officers’ liability exposures. The changing mix of litigation could have important implications for D&O insurance terms and conditions and limits of liability.

 

At a minimum, the changing litigation mix provides an important context within which to consider information relating to securities class action filing levels. Even if fewer class action lawsuits are being filed (at least lately, anyway), that does not mean the overall threat of litigation has declined. To the contrary, the Advisen report shows that the threat of corporate and securities litigation generally continues to increase. That is, the litigation threat is not declining, it is simply changing.

 

5. What Will Be the Impact of the Supreme Court’s Most Recent Securities Law Decisions?: Every year it seems, at least recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued important decisions affecting securities litigation. The Court’s most recent term, which was completed in June, proved to be no exception. The Court issued two cases of particular significance that potentially could have significant impact on future securities lawsuit cases and filings.

 

First, on June 24, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its long awaited ruling in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case. The case was much anticipated because it was expected to provide much-needed guidance on the questions of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. securities laws.

 

The Court threw everybody a bit of a curve ball, when it discarded many decades of jurisprudence analyzing when there was sufficient "conduct" in the U.S to support the application of the U.S. securities laws to a foreign company. The Court said that rather than a "conduct" based test, the securities laws required a "transaction" test, and effectively held that the U.S. securities laws do not apply to transactions that take place outside the U.S.

 

The Morrison case clearly rules out so-called "f-cubed" cases, which involve claims asserted against foreign-domiciled companies by foreign domiciled claimants who bought their shares on foreign exchanges.

 

Since the Morrison case came down, plaintiffs in other cases have tried to argue that Morrison does not preclude so-called "f-squared cases" – that is, cases in which U.S. investors bought a foreign company’s shares on a foreign exchange. So far, courts have not proven receptive to that argument but the issue is far from resolved.

 

In the meantime, the Morrison case seems likely to affect the many U.S. securities cases that have been filed in recent years against foreign domiciled companies. At a minimum, the cases in which the complaints have sought to assert claims on behalf of "f-cubed" claimants seem likely to be narrowed to exclude those claims. (I know many plaintiffs’ lawyers may contest the extent of this statement, and in recognition of their arguments I duly acknowledge their objections here.)

 

The larger impact of Morrison may be there will be fewer, or at least narrower, U.S. securities lawsuits filed against foreign domiciled companies. The many claimants who may now be unable to pursue claims in the U.S. may seek to resort to the courts and laws of their home countries, and perhaps, to the extent the home country laws fail to provide adequate relief, seek legislative change to allow greater investor protections.

 

The other significant decision this past term was the Court’s April 2010 ruling in the Merck case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of what is sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations for securities claimants. The Supreme Court held that the running of the statute of limitations is not triggered until the plaintiffs have, or with reasonable diligence could have had, knowledge of facts constituting the violation, including facts constituting scienter.

 

The practical effect of the Court’s decision in Merck is that it could postpone the running of the statute of limitations, potentially lengthening the time within which plaintiffs might file their claim. This effect seems particularly significant in light of the relatively recent phenomenon that has developed in which plaintiffs have been filing securities lawsuits well after the proposed class period cutoff date.

 

Although so far there have been relatively few new filings that have reflected potential longer limitations periods, the possibility for an increase in belated filings remains. The challenge this presents for D&O insurance underwriters and companies alike is that it is harder to be sure when a company that has had adverse developments in the past may be "out of the woods" as far as possible securities lawsuits.

 

6. What Will Be the Impact of Securities Cases the Supreme Court Will be Considering in the Upcoming Term?: For whatever reason, the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has seemed  particularly interested in taking up securities cases, and the Court’s docket for the upcoming October 2010 term is no exception. With Justice Kagan newly added to the Court’s lineup, the Court will be considering at least two potentially significant securities cases.

 

First, the Court has granted a writ of certiorari in the Matrixx Initiatives case. The question presented is whether plaintiffs must allege that adverse event information is "statistically significant" in order to establish that the defendants’ alleged failure to disclose the information was material. Though the issues involved appear narrow, the case potentially could address broader issues of securities claim pleading sufficiency.

 

Even if the Court confines itself just to the narrow question of statistical significance, the Court’s consideration of this issue has the potential to be important, since companies are regularly receiving customer complaints and must decide when the level of complaints are significant.

 

The larger possibility for this case is that the Court might take the occasion as an opportunity for a more comprehensive consideration of the issue of materiality. Were the Supreme Court to take up this larger question, the Court’s ruling potentially could have significant ramifications for many future securities class action lawsuits.

 

Second, the Court also granted certiorari in the Janus Capital Group case, which involved the question of who may be a "primary violator" under the securities laws. The defendants in the case are the holding company and the management company for a family of mutual funds. Investors claim they were misled by statements that the funds did not engage in market timing; the funds later entered a settlement for market timing.

 

As the Supreme Court recently affirmed in its Stoneridge case (about which refer here), there is no private action for aiding and abetting liability under the federal securities laws. Accordingly, the Janus entities can be liable if at all if they are "primary violators," that is, if they are directly responsible for the allegedly wrongful conduct. The Janus entities contend that as mere service entities for the actual funds, they cannot be held primarily liable. 

 

The Fourth Circuit ruled that "a service provider can be held primarily liable in a private securities fraud action for ‘helping’ or ‘participating’ in another company’s misstatements." The Fourth Circuit’s ruling is at odds with the decisions of other Circuit courts. Some courts hold that only someone that "makes" a statement and has it attributed to him can be held liable as a primary violator. Other courts, similarly to the Fourth Circuit, have held that someone that "substantially participates" in the activities that led to the creation of the allegedly misleading statement can be held liable as a primary violator, even if the statement is not attributed to him or her.

 

At some level, this "substantial participation" test starts to sound a lot like the "aiding and abetting liability" that the Supreme Court had rejected in connection with private lawsuits in the Stoneridge case. That may, in fact, be why the Supreme Court took up the case – not just to reconcile an apparent split in the Circuits, but to align the principles of primary violator liability with those of the secondary violator jurisprudence. In any event, and at a minimum, the case will draw greater clarity around what constitutes a primary violation of the securities laws.

 

7. What Will Happen to the Level of Business Bankruptcy Filings?: According to the latest report from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, business bankruptcy filings rose 8.34% for the 12-month period ending June 30, 2010. Not only did the filing levels rise relative to the prior period, but they remain well above levels in recent years – for example, the filing rate during the twelve month period ending June 30, 2010 is 76% greater than the comparable period ending June 30, 2008, and 150% greater than the comparable period ending June 30, 2007.

 

The level of business bankruptcy filings directly affects the overall level of D&O claims activity, because so many bankruptcies involve claims against the former directors and officers of the failed entity. These claims are asserted by investors, creditors, the bankruptcy trustee and others. As long as the business bankruptcy filing rate remains at relatively elevated levels, D&O claims activity levels will also remain at higher levels.

 

The one positive note from the recent bankruptcy filing statistics is that the rate of business related filings may be slowing, albeit while remaining at relatively elevated levels. Thus, during the period ending June 30, the number of business-related filings declined during each of the three months periods during the twelve month stretch. During the first three months of the twelve month period, there were 15,303 business related filings; in the second three months, there were 15,156 business-related filings; in the third three-month period there were 14,697; and in the final three months, there were 14,452.

 

We can all hope that the continuing economic recovery will lead to fewer business-related bankruptcy filings in the months ahead. However, as long as the filing levels remain elevated compared to historical norms, D&O claims activity will also be elevated.

 

These issues are important because the interaction between the D&O insurance policy and the processes of the bankruptcy court are intricate and fraught with complexities. The ongoing heightened risk of business bankruptcy has important implications for D&O claims exposure as well as for issues surrounding the D&O insurance placement process.

 

8. What Will be the Next Sector to Get "Hot"?: One of the well-established patterns of securities class action lawsuit filings is that periodically some industrial sector will get "hot" and suddenly numerous companies in that sector will find themselves the targets of securities class action lawsuits.

 

Companies in the for-profit education sector saw that during August this year, when, following a government report suggesting the possibility of education loan fraud, nearly a half dozen companies in the sector were hit with securities suits within the space of just a few days. In just about the same way, late last year, a host of exchange traded funds were hit with securities class action lawsuits over a very short time period.

 

The recent industry-specific litigation outbreak in the for-profit education sector is a reminder of the many odd and circumstance-specific events that can drive securities class action lawsuit filings. Many things determine filing levels, many of which cannot be captured or predicted in historical filing data. As a result, it can be misleading to try to generalize from short term trends about future filing levels. Simply put, the numbers vary over time, because, for example, contagion events and industry epidemics happen.

 

 

9. Will Heightened FCPA Enforcement Activity Lead to Increased Follow-On Civil Litigation?: One of the relatively well-established trends in recent years has been that increasing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement activity has led to increasing levels of follow on civil litigation, in which the claimants assert that mismanagement and poor internal controls allowed the corrupt activity to occur. In addition shareholders also claim to have been misled about controls, as was alleged, for example, most recently in the securities class action lawsuit filed in August against SciClone Pharmaceuticals and certain of its directors and officers.

 

For at least a couple of reasons, the heightened level of anticorruption enforcement activity seems likely to accelerate in the months ahead.

 

First, as noted above, the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act contains a whistleblower bounty provision that seems likely to produce heightened whistleblower activity in connection with FCPA violations. Under these whistleblower provisions, whistleblowers can receive rewards of up to 30 percent of recoveries over $1 million. These kinds of rewards could produce some enormous bounties in the FCPA enforcement context, where recent enforcement penalties have been in the range of tens and hundreds of millions of dollars.

 

Indeed, the top ten FCPA settlements collectively total $2.8 billion, but the top six, all of which took place just in the last 20 months, represent 95% of the total. Four of the top six settlements were reached just in 2010. Because of the massive scale of the settlements that the SEC has been achieving in this area, the potential rewards for whistleblowers are enormous.

 

Second, the UK Bribery Act received Royal Assent on April 8, 2010. On July 20, 2010, the U.K. Ministry of Justice released its timetable for the implementation of the Bribery Act, setting April 2011 as the effective date. The Act is widely viewed as in several important respects more "far-reaching" than the FCPA, and is likely to have significant impacts on business that either are based in the U.K. or have significant parts of their operations in the U.K.

 

Though the U.K. provisions may be somewhat delayed and though the impact of the new Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower provisions may be as yet undeveloped, there is no question that this is an area where many things are happening. Anti-corruption enforcement represents a significant and growing area of liability exposure for corporate officials, especially in light of the government’s apparent willingness to resort to sting tactics and other prosecutorial techniques as part of the heightened enforcement.

 

These developments also have significance for purposes of the structure and implementation of insurance calculated to protect corporate officials. The fines and penalties associated with these kinds of enforcement actions typically would not be covered under a D&O policy, but the defense fees, at least for the individuals might well be. However, the Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower provisions, for example, may raise concerns under the typical D&O policy’s insured vs. insured exclusion.

 

Finally, the increased levels of anticorruption enforcement may also represent a growing area of civil litigation exposure, as these kinds of enforcement actions frequently lead to follow-on civil lawsuits. Altogether, exposures arising from anticorruption laws represent an important and growing area of potential liability of corporate officials.

 

10. What Does All of This Mean for the D&O Insurance Marketplace?: The astonishing pace of legislative and judicial changes just over the last few months alone underscores how rapidly the liability exposures in the directors and officers arena can be transformed. Given the absolute whirlwind of recent changes, D&O insurers might be excused for taking a conservative approach to risk. Indeed, those outside the industry often assume that is what the carriers would be doing now.

 

But despite everything, the D&O insurance industry remains competitive, and all signs are that it will remain that way for the foreseeable future. Most insurance buyers, particularly those outside the financial sector and those with reasonably solid financials, can expect to obtain insurance with broad terms and conditions at relatively attractive prices. Though pricing is not declining at the pace we saw in recent years, pricing remains stable at relatively lower levels.

 

The iron laws of supply and demand are impervious to more trivial forces like legislative or judicial change. On the supply side, the insurance industry is operating with ample capacity, largely due to the absence of large-scale catastrophes. As a result, the D&O insurance marketplace is characterized by a large number of competitors all of whom are continuing to seek to write business. On the demand side, the number of businesses has been cut down by bankruptcies. Shrinking labor forces and diminished budgets have also reduced insurance demand.

 

In the absence of some large external event that substantially erodes insurance capacity, the likelihood is that insurance buyers (or at least those buyers outside the financial sector with relatively stable financials) will continue to enjoy a relatively favorable marketplace.

 

Nevertheless, the liability landscape for directors and officers is changing rapidly, and well-advised insurance buyers will want to make sure that their D&O insurance program is properly positioned to respond to these changing exposures.

 

Discount for Readers of The D&O Diary: On November 30 and December 1, 2010, I will be co-chairing the American Conference Institute’s 16th Annual Summit on D&O Liability. This conference is a great event every year, and once again the conference will feature an impressive array of the D&O insurance industry’s thought leaders. Background information about the conference, including the event brochure and registration information, can be found here.

 

The D&O Diary is a conference media partner for this event, and as a result the conference organizers are offering a $200 discount to readers of The D&O Diary. In order to obtain this discount, just use the code "D&O Diary" on the registration form. Hope to see everyone at the conference.

The "Back-to- School" Issue

If the number of out of office messages sent back when I sent out new blog post email notifications during August are any indication, many readers have been away for some or all of the past few weeks. I hope you saved the little paper umbrella from the fruity drink that you and your spouse shared on the terrace of the outdoor café and that you are still finding sand in your tennis shoes.

 

Sadly, the summer eventually ends and everyone eventually has to go back to school.

 

 

Now that you are back at your desk, you will want to get caught up, especially because while you were away, the blogosphere continued to gyrate, and The D&O Diary continued to publish new posts. Here’s just some of what you missed:

 

 

The Nuts and Bolts of D&O: I have now published three installments in my ongoing series about the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance, the latest of which relates to the policyholder’s obligations under the D&O policy. The prior posts in the series related to the relationship of indemnification and insurance, and to the insuring agreement in the Policy. Additional installments will be forthcoming in the weeks ahead.

 

 

Guest Posts: I have been delighted to be able to publish a number of interesting guest posts over the past several weeks.

 

 

First, I published, in the form of two separate posts (here and here), an interesting exchange between Milberg partner Michael Spencer and Minnesota Law Professor Richard Painter, on the question of the impact of the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case.

 

 

Second, I published a post from Jones Day partner John Iole on the topic of conflicts in the insurance transaction.

 

 

And finally, I published a post (here) written by former plaintiffs’ securities attorney Bill Lerach, who had some spirited comments about my prior post discussing an article by three academics about whether corporate defendants that settle securities suits suffering continuing financial detriments. I published the academics’ response to Mr. Lerach over this past weekend.

 

 

Failed Banks: The number of banks that have been closed as a result of the current failed bank wave continues to grow.  Indeed, according to the FDIC’s most recently quarterly report, one out of ten banks in the U.S. is a “problem institution.” The FDIC has filed its first lawsuit, as part of the current failed bank wave, against former directors and officers of a failed bank. Meanwhile, investor litigation involving failed banks continues to move forward. For example, in the PFF Bancorp and Banco Popular cases the dismissal motions were denied, although in the Raymond James loan loss reserve case the dismissal motion was granted. In the meantime, at least one investor lawsuit involving a troubled bank appears headed to trial. NERA has published a comprehensive report on failed bank litigation.

 

 

Subprime Cases: There have been a number of significant dismissal motion rulings in subprime-related securities cases, including the partial dismissal in the BofA/Merrill merger case and the dismissal in the SunTrust case. In addition, the New Century Financial case settled for about $125 million. My updated list of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit dismissal motion ruling can be found here.

 

 

Coming Attractions: Now that everyone is caught up, tomorrow morning I will be publishing my annual survey of the D&O marketplace, “What to Watch Now in the World of D&O.” Watch this site.

 

 

Speakers’ Corner: On September 29, 2010, I will be speaking at C5’s 5th European Forum on D&O Liability Insurance in Cologne, Germany. I will be participating on a panel with Maurice Pesso of the White & Williams law firm on the topic “Why European Directors of U.S. Companies Should Worry About Their Exposure to U.S. Class Action Claims” – a topic that has changed pretty dramatically in the last few months. Information about the conference can be found here. I will look forward to seeing and greeting my European readers at this upcoming conference.

 

Trial on D&O Insurance Coverage for Allen Stanford's Attorneys' Fees Begins

The question of insurance coverage for the attorneys’ fees of Allen Stanford and his co-defendants is at issue in a three-day bench trial before Southern District of Texas Judge Nancy Atlas that began on Tuesday, August 23, 2010 in Houston.

 

Stanford and several other individuals have been criminally charged with financial fraud in connection with the collapse of the Stanford Financial Group. The criminal trial is set to commence in January 2011. Stanford and several of the other individuals are also defendants in an SEC enforcement action as well as numerous other civil proceedings.

 

Stanford Financial had $100 million in D&O insurance. The primary policy contains a money laundering exclusion that the insurers contend precludes coverage under the policies. The money laundering exclusion specifies that it does not apply "until such time as it is determined that the alleged act or acts did in fact occur."

 

In a January 26, 2010 opinion, Southern District of Texas Judge David Hittner entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the insurers from "withholding payment" of defense expenses from four individuals (including Allan Stanford), as discussed here. 

 

In a March 15, 2010 opinion (about which refer here), the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court, concluding that the money laundering exclusion’s "in fact" wording required a judicial determination to establish whether or not the exclusion had been triggered, but also concluding that this determination can be made in a separate proceeding such as a coverage action.

 

Based upon the trial that began on Tuesday in Houston, the court will determine whether or not the money laundering exclusion has been triggered, and therefore whether the insurers have any obligations to pay the defendants’ attorneys fees or other amounts on the defendants’ behalf under the policies.

 

According to news reports, there were a number of interesting developments in the first day of trial.

 

First, the lawyer for Laura Pendergest-Holt, Stanford Financial’s former Chief Investment Officer, told the court that Pendergest-Holt had entered a settlement with the insurers. The details of the settlement were not disclosured.

 

Second, in response to a question from Judge Atlas as to where the policy’s unusual definition of "money laundering" had originated, the lawyer for the insurers told the court that the language had been in prior policies through several renewals, but the language originally "been brought to the contract negotiation …by Stanford’s insurance broker." The insurers’ lawyer said that the insurer did not plan to offer a witness on the origins of the language.

 

Judge Atlas commented: "All I can say, it’s turning out not to be such a bargain."

 

Third, the witnesses are unlikely to testify during the coverage trial, given the risks that would entail for the criminal case. Judge Atlas said she will not determine yet whether she will draw an adverse inference about the individuals’ guilt from the individuals’ decision not to testify during the coverage case.

 

Finally, the insurers revealed that to date the insurers had advanced over $15 million dollars to pay for attorneys’ fees on behalf of the individuals and other insured persons under the policy.

 

Think Your Commute is Bad?: According to an August 24, 2010 Wall Street Journal article, a 60-mile traffic jam near Beijing "could last until mid-September." Traffic has been backing up since earlier this month due to construction on the Beijing-Tibet highway. Traffic is now backed up "almost all the way to Inner Mongolia."

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance - The Policyholder's Obligations

In prior posts published as part of a continuing series, I have been exploring the basics of D&O insurance. In this third post in the series, I continue the discussion of the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance with a discussion of the policyholder’s policy obligations and requirements.

 

When most people think of insurance, they are usually thinking about the insurer’s obligation to pay claims. And rightly so, as the insurer’s claims payment obligation is the very essence of the insurance agreement. Unfortunately, from time to time the insurer does not pay claims, or does not pay them completely or in a timely fashion. On some occasions, the insurer’s failure to fulfill or complete its payment obligation is the result of good faith coverage disputes. But it also sometimes happens that the insurer’s delay or failure to pay is the result of the insurer’s contention that the policyholder has not taken or completed some action required under the policy.

 

The purpose of this post is to discuss the policyholder’s obligations under the D&O insurance policy. This topic is critical for many policyholders, because the insurer’s contention that the policyholders have not taken or completed required steps is at the center of many insurance disputes.

 

As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that not all of the policyholder’s policy obligations and requirements are claim related. First and foremost, the policyholder must pay the required policy premium. And there are also other D&O insurance policy obligations that impose requirements on the policyholder outside the claims context.

 

By way of illustration, the typical D&O insurance policy has "organizational change" provisions specifying how the policy will respond, for example, if the company is sold. These provisions also specify how the policy will respond if the insured company acquires another company with assets greater than a specified threshold amount. These after-acquired subsidiary provisions often require the policyholder to notify the insurer in writing of the "full particulars of the new Subsidiary," in order for the policy’s coverage to extend to the new subsidiary. Private company policies often have similar notice requirements if the company conducts a public securities offering. In both instances, the insurer may also require the payment of additional premium.

 

But while there are some policyholder requirements that are not claim related, many of the typical D&O policy’s other policyholder requirements are claim-related.

 

Notice of Claim: First, the policy requires the insured, as a condition of coverage, to provide notice of claim within a specified time or time frame (that is, either within a set number of days or "as soon as practicable"). In the absence of notice or if notice is tardy, the carrier may take the position that it is relieved of its obligation to pay – although some courts require the carrier to establish that the notice failure prejudiced the insurer’s rights in order to disclaim coverage.

 

Consent to Counsel: Second, most D&O policies require the policyholder to get the carrier’s consent for the lawyers that will be defending the claim. Some policies to have so-called "panel counsel," which is a list of authorized law firms, but most other policies allow the insured to select the lawyers, subject only to the carrier’s consent.

 

Though the carrier’s consent should be (and often is) a very straightforward matter, issues can and often do arise. The typical carrier objections are to the selected lawyer’s or selected law firms hourly rates. The carrier sometimes objects to the number of lawyers involved. Less frequently, the carrier raises concerns about the lawyer’s qualifications to handle the claim.

 

It may be impossible to completely eliminate these kinds of disputes, but there are certain steps policyholders can take to reduce the likelihood of disputes. The most important step is to notify the carrier as soon as practical of the names and hourly rates of the attorneys involved. (Often this can even be addressed before any claims have arise, which is a good practice that can avoid problems if claims do later arise.) It should be kept in mind that because defense expenses erode the policy limits, both the carrier and the policyholder have an interest in ensuring that the defense goes forward in the most cost effective way possible, in order to preserve limits for the payment of settlements and judgments.

 

Cooperation: Third, once the claim is underway, policyholders have another obligation, and that is the requirement to cooperate. The specifics of this cooperation duty usually are not provided, but it basically refers to the insured’s obligation to take steps to support, and to refrain from taking steps that interfere with, the defense of the claim.

 

Though the policy does not specify, many carriers will also contend that the cooperation clause requires the policyholder to keep the carrier informed about the claim, to provide copies of pleadings and other key documents, and to provide the carrier with information related to the defense (in particular, with defense expense information and fee statements).

 

Whether or not these kinds of steps truly are required by the cooperation clause, taking these steps is simply good practice and is more likely to result in smoother claim resolution. By the same token, failure to take these steps is the often the source of claims handling frictions and frequently contribute to issues with the carrier’s fulfillment of its payment obligations.

 

Consent to Settlement: Fourth, the typical D&O insurance policy requires the insurers consent to settlement. The failure to keep the insurer informed about settlement discussion is a frequent source of tension. The important thing for the policyholder to remember is that the insurer’s consent really is required. Where problems sometimes arise is in connection with excess insurers, when settlement amounts unexpectedly pierce upper layers of insurance. These kinds of recurring disputes underscore the fact that the consent of all of the affected insurers is required, and that keeping the insurer informed about the claim really means keeping all of the carriers involved and potentially involved informed about the claim.

 

I know many readers will be surprised that I have chosen to write about policyholders’ policy obligations, as it is the carrier’s claims payment obligation that is the heart of the insurance contract. Some readers may also be bothered by the fact that the insurance policy has so many policyholder requirements. But whether or not as a philosophical matter it is or is not appropriate for the insurance policy to incorporate so many policyholder requirements, the fact is that these requirements are found in most D&O policies, and so the best approach is to recognize and address these requirements.

 

Far too many claim disputes arise when carriers take the position that policyholders have failed to fulfill one or more of these requirements. My hope is that by highlighting these requirements, more of these process related disputes might be avoided.

 

Readers who would like to read the prior posts in this series about the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance should refer here:

 

 

Executive Protection: Indemnification and D&O Insurance – The Basics

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance – The Insuring Agreement

 

 

Lehman Bankruptcy, Defense Expenses, and D&O Insurance

The September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers resulted in the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history, as well as an explosion of litigation and regulatory actions and investigations. In the pending bankruptcy proceedings a recent motion by the debtor’s counsel details the massive legal costs accumulating in the various legal proceedings and also raises some interesting D&O insurance implications.

 

Special thanks to Wayne State University Law Professor Peter Henning, who provided me with copies of the bankruptcy-related documents and who previously these issues on the Dealbook blog, here.

 

On July 27, 2010, counsel for the debtor filed a motion in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy proceeding under Bankruptcy Code Section 362 for relief from the automatic stay in order to allow certain of Lehman’s excess D&O insurers to advance defense expenses.

 

According to the motion papers, for the policy period May 16, 2007 to May 16, 2008, Lehman carried an aggregate of $250 million in D&O insurance, consisting of a $20 million primary policy and sixteen layers of excess insurance. A copy of the Lehman primary policy, which is included in the bankruptcy pleadings, can be found here.

 

In March and November 2009, respectively, the bankruptcy court previously entered orders granting relief from the stay to allow defense fees to be paid first from the $20 million primary policy and then from the $15 million first excess policy.

 

However, the motion papers note, submitted defense fee statements already exceed the limits of liability of the first excess policy (i.e., the aggregate fees already exceed $35 million). The motion seeks relief from the stay to allow the second excess insurer, whose policy provides limits of $10 million in excess of $35 million, to advance defense expenses.

 

The motion goes on to state that the second excess policy’s $10 million excess of $35 million limits are likely to be exhausted "by August of this year." (That is, fees apparently already have or are about to top $45 million.) Accordingly the motion asks for relief from the stay for third excess policy, which provides limits of liability of $10 million excess of $45 million.

 

The third excess policy may also soon be exhausted. The motion suggests that the third excess policy may be exhausted by October. So the motion also asks for relief from the stay for the fourth excess policy, which provides limits of $15 million in excess of $55 million.

 

In answer to the obvious question of how so much defense expense could be accumulating so rapidly, the motion provides a brief recitation of the various proceedings in which the company’s former directors and officers are involved. First, there are the various securities class action lawsuit which have been brought by Lehman security holders. Then there are the various securities lawsuits which have been brought against former directors and officers in connection with the plaintiffs’ purchases of mortgage-backed securities. There are also additional actions or arbitrations which have been brought against certain individuals in connection with Lehman-issued securities, auction rate-securities and other alleged conduct.

 

In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice as well as the SEC and the New Jersey Bureau of Securities have "commenced formal grand jury and regulator investigations concerning the circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Lehman enterprise and have issued various requests and subpoenas," according to the motion papers.

 

All of these various proceedings undoubtedly took on a heightened sense of urgency after the March 11, 2010 release of the report of the bankruptcy examiner, Anthon Valukas, in which he referred, among many other things, to what he regarded as "actionable balance sheet manipulation."

 

In light of all of these various proceedings and given the fact that each of the individuals undoubtedly has their own counsel, it may be unsurprising that defense fees are accumulating so rapidly. Indeed, as Professor Henning notes in his Dealbook post, the fees seem to have been accumulating more rapidly in recent months, to the point that the fees now seem to be running at about $5 million a month. At that rate, even the fourth excess policy is likely to be exhausted before year’s end.

 

Given the size of Lehman’s insurance tower, there may be no immediate reason for the individual defendants to be alarmed. Even were the fourth excess policy to be soon exhausted, that would still leave $180 million in insurance available to cover the defense expenses.

 

But even if there may be no immediate cause for alarm for the individuals, the events so far and that likely lie ahead do present some noteworthy issues.

 

First, the sheer volume of defense expense so far dramatically underscores the enormous potential for a catastrophic claim to produce astonishing levels of defense expenses. To be sure, the Lehman collapse, as the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, may represent an extreme case. But it is not as if the Lehman situation is the only case where enormous defense expenses have rapidly accumulated. To cite just two examples, in prior posts I have detailed the huge defense expenses that accumulated in the Broadcom options backdating lawsuit (refer here) and in connection with the Collins & Aikman bankruptcy (refer here).

 

In that regard, it should noted that not only has the pace of defense fee accumulation in the Lehman case accelerated in recent months, but the fees seem likely to accumulate even more quickly if the SEC were to file an enforcement action or the DoJ were to file criminal charges. As astonishing as are the fees that have accumulated already, it seems possible (arguably, probable) that even more astonishing fees could lie ahead. Professor Henning’s blog post, linked above, discusses these possibilities in greater detail.

 

While it is still only the catastrophic claims circumstances that produce these kinds of enormous fees, these cases do raise some very serious questions about traditional notions of limits adequacy. The fact is that the most important purpose of D&O insurance is to ensure that the individual directors and officers are protected in the event that the corporate entity is unable to indemnify them. These catastrophic claims scenarios demonstrate how challenging it may be to ensure that the D&O insurance can provide sufficient protection at the point where it is most needed.

 

One answer to this challenge may be the one that Lehman itself apparently followed, which is to buy very significant amounts of D&O insurance. Of course, not every company can afford to purchase anywhere near the amount of insurance that Lehman did. (To put the Lehman insurance program into perspective, the primary policy alone – which was written over a $10 million corporate reimbursement retention – cost Lehman more than $2 million. Clearly Lehman was willing to invest very substantial sums for its executives’ protection.)

 

For that matter, it remains to be seen if even the huge amount of insurance that Lehman put in place will be sufficient to protect the individuals from all of the defense expenses that may lie ahead. If the SEC were to file an enforcement action and the DoJ were to pursue criminal charges, it is not impossible that the accumulating defense expenses could test even the remaining limits

 

(And that is without even allowing for the possibility, raised by Professor Henning in his blog post, that one or more of the excess insurers might seek to disclaim coverage – "You know how insurance companies can be," he comments.)

 

There are no easy solutions to these kinds of concerns, although one consideration that should be taken into account is D&O insurance program structure. That is, in addition to considering the question of how much insurance is enough, the question of what structure of insurance should be put into place should also be considered. Among other things, one particular question is whether specific parts of the program should be designated solely for the protection of specific individuals (for example, outside directors) as one way to ensure that no matter what happens there is always a specific pot of money available for the protection of those individuals.

 

In any event, the consequences following the Lehman collapse are continuing to unfold and undoubtedly have much further to run. The astonishing accumulation of defense expense seems likely to continue if not accelerate. Whether or to what extent any of the D&O insurance might be available to pay settlements or judgments remains to be seen.

 

This last point, about possible funds for settlements or judgments, does underscore an issue that could well become critically important later on. That is, the D&O insurance tower that is responding to these various proceedings is the one that was in place for the period May 2007 to May 2008. However, Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008. There is in fact, according to footnote 6 of the debtor’s memorandum in support of the motion for relief from the stay, a separate $250 million insurance tower that was in place for the period May 16, 2008 to May 16, 2009.

 

The 2007-2008 tower presumably is the one that is responding to these various proceedings because the first of the shareholder lawsuits apparently was filed in February 2008, during the policy period of the earlier tower, and later filed proceedings apparently have been treated as interrelated with the first filed claim, and therefore relate back to the date the first claim was made.

 

Given the huge amount of money at stake and in light of the fact that the 2007-2008 tower is being substantially eroded, it seems probable that someone will find it worthwhile to try to establish that one or more of the various claims triggered the 2008-2009 tower. (Indeed, it may well be that this type of effort is already well underway in one or more disputes or proceedings.) Before all is said and done in connection with the fallout from the Lehman collapse, there could be many twists and turns.

 

With as many as 17 different D&O insurers involved in this claim, there undoubtedly are quite a number of professionals in the D&O insurance industry involved in this matter. With a situation like this, there could be some pretty good scuttlebutt. I encourage anyone involved in this matter who is willing to share to post a comment using this blog’s comment function (anonymously if necessary). I am certain there is a lot more going on in this claim than can be discerned from the bare face of the pleadings.

 

Finally, for those practitioners who would appreciate insight into how the D&O insurance policy operates in the bankruptcy context, the debtor’s motion makes some pretty interesting reading. The motion not only shows how the the policy proceeds are administered and monitored in light of bankruptcy procedures, but it also illustrates how various key policy provisions (for example, the priority of payments clause) are intended to operate.

 

Guest Post: Actual and Potential Conflicts in D&O Coverage Placement and Claims

I am pleased to present below an article submitted by John Iole, a partner in the Insurance Recovery Practice of the Jones Day law firm. John notes with respect to his guest post that “the views expressed in this post are those of the author and not necessarily those of the firm or any of its clients.”

 

I welcome proposed guest post submissions from responsible persons on topics relevant to this blog or its readership. Please contact me if you think you might be interested in submitting a guest post.

 

 

I note that John’s post addresses conflicts of interest that may arise in connection with the D&O insurance policy. In addition to the conflicts John discusses in his post, an additional conflict that can arise under the D&O policy is a conflict between the interests of the non-officer directors and other persons insured under the policy. I discussed these conflicts involving non-officer directors in a prior post, here.

 

 

Here is John’s post.

 

 

D&O insurance rightfully attracts the scrutiny of highly-placed personnel at purchasing companies. Likewise, the placing brokers are specialists with broad and deep experience in this line of cover. Nevertheless, a recurring issue that is infrequently addressed is the balance of interests that must be struck each year at the time of D&O renewal. This issue can arise again at the point of a claim.[1]

 

 

            Several characteristics combine to create divergent interests among the parties involved in D&O coverage. First, standard D&O insurance is sold on an aggregate limits basis, meaning that the program limits in any given policy period are available for any and all claims made against the policy. With exceptions that are essentially immaterial, any claim made against a D&O policy will, to the extent it is paid, result in an erosion of the limits available to pay all other claims that are made during (or allocated to) that same policy period. This means that a claim that is paid today necessarily reduces the insurance limits available to pay another claim tomorrow.[2]

 

 

            The second -- and for present purposes the most significant -- characteristic of D&O insurance is the fact that there are multiple insured persons who stand to receive the benefit of the insurance limits available. Each insured person has a separate interest in maximizing the limits available to pay a claim that might be asserted against that individual (or entity). Because insurance is protection purchased today against the financial consequences of events that might take place tomorrow, each insured person has an interest in guarding against erosion of limits – this holds true even when no claim has been asserted or is expected. Of course, if claims are known to be likely (known risks, not known losses, which would be excluded), then each insured person has an even greater interest in making sure that expenditures are kept to a minimum in order to protect the availability of funds. In addition, some individuals might have a particularly acute sensitivity to the potential for claims. For example, a member of the audit or compensation committee might expect a higher incidence of claims than non-member insureds. Although many insurance contexts represent the situation in which payment of claims results in a consumption of limits, the multiple insured persons that exist in the D&O context creates a potential for conflict.

 

 

            A third complicating consideration is the interest of the entity in the case of a company that has cover under Side-B (reimbursement of the entity for claims paid on behalf of directors and officers) or Side-C (which provides coverage to the entity itself, generally for securities claims). Take the case of a claim asserted against a director or officer that falls within the Side-B cover, and the entity not only is permitted to indemnify the individual, but also is required as a matter of corporate by-laws and/or indemnification agreement to do so. In such a case, the entity will pay the individual’s legal expenses as they become due, and these can be significant. In addition, the entity will stand ready to pay any judgment (or settlement) that results on the merits of the claim. In turn, the entity can expect to be reimbursed by the D&O insurance proceeds for the amount outlaid on behalf of the individual.[3] The individual’s interests are protected by the entity’s funds, and the individual has no direct concern as to whether the entity is reimbursed. Thus, a Side-B claim presents a conflict situation that is similar to the straightforward competition for limits (or preservation of limits) that exists between any two directors or officers. In a Side-B context, however, the competition is between the individuals (as a whole) and the entity.

 

 

            The conflict is essentially the same when a Side-C claim is asserted, in that the entity’s consumption of limits in the defense or resolution of a covered claim likewise reduces the limits available for other purposes (such as payment of Side-A claims). One significant difference in Side-C claims is that, unlike Side-B claims, a Side-C claim does not present any retirement of individual liability, but only pays for the elimination of corporate liability. In the case of a Side-B claim, the entity is reimbursed only after the individual claims already have been paid, whereas Side C claims potentially put the entity at the front of the claims line.

 

 

            Additional conflicts arise when a D&O program is laden with coverage “enhancements” that branch out from the core purpose of D&O cover. These enhancements sometimes are offered as a way to add value to an expensive line of insurance. In this respect, it can be an alluring prospect to equip the D&O program with optional coverages with the idea that the entity is saving premium dollars that otherwise would be spent on separate policies. For example, some D&O programs include special coverages (or combined limits) for employment-related claims or fiduciary claims. This type of cover might take the place of separate Employment Practices Liability or Fiduciary coverage.[4] Similarly, some D&O programs provide Employed Lawyers coverage for in-house counsel when acting as a lawyer (as opposed to coverage for counsel acting as an officer of the company).[5] As with securities claims against Side-C cover, these coverage grants can result in claims that compete for limits with “standard” D&O claims. Moreover, these coverages can extend the scope of insured persons to a broad swath of employees.

 

 

            These conflicts are not necessarily insurmountable problems, but should be adequately recognized and harmonized within the overall D&O program. There are many ways to deal with these issues, both at the point of policy placement, and also at the point of a claim. For example, a potential solution to invoke at the time of placement is to purchase substantial limits so that the risk of complete exhaustion is minimized, but of course this will bring extra cost. Another time-of-placement solution is to purchase Side-A only coverage (either excess, or excess difference in conditions) that sits above the Side A/B/C cover and comes into play if the A/B/C cover is exhausted (but of course this does not eliminate the potential for conflicts among insured persons). Another option is to purchase stand-alone individual Side-A-only cover for particular directors and officers.

 

 

            So long as the policy language provides sufficient flexibility, different solutions can be used at the point of a claim in order to reduce competition for limits. If it appears that the program limits could be compromised by pending and expected claims, the potentially competing demands can be harmonized by an automatic or discretionary deferral of payments to the entity through an order of payments clause.[6] A problem with an automatic order of payments clause (e.g., a clause stating that side A claims shall be paid before side-B or side-C claims), however, is that it can only operate with respect to known and ripe claims.  If the policy also combines a discretionary feature that allows the designated person to direct when and how payments will be made, then a deferral can be invoked to preserve limits for pending claims that are not yet ripe for payment, or for potential unasserted claims.[7] Because of the delicate interests that must be balanced in such a situation, the designated decision-maker will play a critical role.

 

 

            Given the inherent conflicts facing the directors and officers (both inter se and as between the entity), an additional consideration confronts each lawyer or other professional involved in policy placement and negotiation -- namely, the interests that he or she is protecting, and the extent to which he or she is charged with representing conflicting interests. It is basic black-letter legal ethics law that a lawyer representing a corporation represents “the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”[8]

 

 

            In the context of D&O insurance, however, the representation analysis is complicated by the fact that the entity is providing coverage for the benefit of the individuals, and potentially also for its own benefit. In that setting, there are multiple potential clients – or at least acutely interested parties – who do not share identical interests. Furthermore, because the actual or potential conflicts of interest might not be fully appreciated by each of the affected persons, and the role of counsel might not be clearly understood, some statement of role clarification ordinarily will be prudent.[9] Nevertheless, a potential adversity of interests does not necessarily require separate legal representation. In the case of divergent interests among clients, the basic ethics rules still permit a multiple representation, so long as the lawyer reasonably believes that each client can be competently represented and each provides informed consent.[10] Although conflicts of interest at the time of placement have not generated reported disputes or case decisions, similar conflicts that arise at the point of a claim can produce major difficulties if the rules are not carefully observed.[11] 

 

 

            Therefore, when embarking on a representation involving D&O insurance that might affect multiple constituencies, the most prudent course to follow is to clearly define and limit (if necessary) the scope of the representation, and to obtain informed consent of each affected client if representation of more than one party is undertaken.[12] Another option is to make clear that some constituencies are being represented as clients and others are not being represented. In cases of particular risks or sensitivities, there is always the option to retain separate counsel to represent one or more constituents who are adverse to the others. Depending on the interests and jurisdiction involved, this potentially could be accomplished through separate lawyers from the same organization, or might require separate outside counsel.[13] In the end, there is no certain decision that is foolproof, but a consideration of these items, along with thoughtful guidance when appropriate, hopefully will yield the most prudent decisions that properly accommodate the different interests involved.

 

 



[1]This post does not address the obvious conflicts that occur when it becomes apparent that competing claims to limited insurance proceeds will eclipse the available limits, as discussed in Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2006). In that situation, jurisdictions develop rules to determine whether claimants will be treated on a "first in time, first in right" basis or an equitable apportionment basis.

 

[2] There are some ancillary coverages that do not significantly affect the analysis, in that they either are subject to defined sub-limits or allowances, or are likely to be so small as to be an inconsequential impairment of limits. For example, a D&O policy might provide coverage for “crisis management” or “crisis communications,” or for responding to a subpoena for documents or testimony. Except in extraordinary situations, these claims will not seriously erode the limits, and these claims might be subject to a stated maximum amount. For example, the Chartis Executive Edge form provides: “This policy shall pay the Crisis Loss of an Organization, up to the $100,000 CrisisFund®. . . . .” A crisis under this form includes delisting events and events that cause or are reasonably likely to cause a material effect on stock price.

 

 

[3]Functionally, the insurance could pay instead of the entity in order to discharge the entity’s indemnity obligation, or alternatively could reimburse the entity after it has made payments on behalf of the individual. For example, the Chubb Asset Management Protector form pays on behalf of the entity: “The Company shall pay, on behalf of an Organization, Loss for which such Organization grants indemnification to an Insured Person, and which the Insured Person becomes legally obligated to pay on account of any Claim first made against the Insured Person, during the Policy Period . . . for a Wrongful Act by such Insured Person before or during the Policy Period.” The Chartis Executive Edge form provides reimbursement to the entity:  “This policy shall pay the Loss of an Organization that arises from any: . . . . Claim . . . made against any Insured Person . . . for any Wrongful Act of such Insured Person . . . but only to the extent that such Organization has indemnified such Loss of, or paid such Loss on behalf of, the Insured Person.”

 

 

[4]Towers Perrin reports that, for 2008 (the most recent year for which data is available), 57% of the surveyed companies purchased EPL coverage with their D&O insurance policy, whereas 33% purchased a stand-alone EPL policy (10% purchased no EPL coverage). Towers Perrin, Directors and Officers Liability: 2008 Survey of Insurance Purchasing Trends (Sept. 2009), at 7. Of those surveyed companies that purchased any fiduciary coverage, Towers Perrin reports that roughly half bought combined limits for D&O and fiduciary cover. Id.

 

 

[5]Additional coverages might include cover for shareholder derivative demand investigations or cover for participation as a member of the board of other organizations.

 

 

[6] The Chubb Asset Manager Protector form directs that Side-A claims, and covered loss to be paid on behalf of a benefits plan (if such coverage is purchased), be paid first before all other claims. The form specifically permits the insurance to pay claims without regard to whether there is a “potential for other future payment obligations” (i.e., future claims). The Chartis Executive Edge form provides:

 

In the event of Loss arising from a covered Claim(s) and/or Pre-Claim Inquiry(ies) for which payment is due under the provisions of this policy, the Insurer shall in all events:

 

(1) First, pay all Loss covered under Insuring Agreement A. Insured Person Coverage;

 

(2) Second, only after payment of Loss has been made pursuant to subparagraph (1) above and to the extent that any amount of the Limit of Liability shall remain available, at the written request of the chief executive officer of the Named Entity, either pay or withhold payment of Loss covered under Insuring Agreement B. Indemnification Of Insured Person Coverage; and

 

(3) Lastly, only after payment of Loss has been made pursuant to subparagraphs (1) and (2) above and to the extent that any amount of the Limit of Liability shall remain available, at the written request of the chief executive officer of the Named Entity, either pay or withhold payment of Loss covered under Insuring Agreement C. Organization Coverage and Insuring Agreement D. Crisisfund® Coverage.

 

In the event the Insurer withholds payment pursuant to subparagraphs (2) and/or (3) above, then the Insurer shall, at such time and in such manner as shall be set forth in instructions of the chief executive officer of the Named Entity, remit such payment to an Organization or directly to or on behalf of an Insured Person.

 

 

[7]Even though D&O insurance is sold on a claims-made basis (i.e., it pays covered claims made against the insureds during the policy period), it is not true that all payable claims will be made before the end of the policy period. For example, if a later claim (made after the policy period) is sufficiently related to a claim made during the policy period, then the limits of the first policy will respond to the claim and it will be excluded from later policies.

 

 

[8]See, e.g., ABA Model Rule 1.13, Organization as Client. This rule is emphasized by the Corporate Governance Recommendations adopted by ABA House of Delegates in 2003, which include the following statement: “A lawyer representing a public corporation shall serve the interests of the entity, independent of the personal interests of any particular director, officer, employee or shareholder.” Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, at p.32 (March 31, 2003).

 

9] For example, ABA Model Rule 1.13(f) provides: “In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.”

 

 

[10] ABA Model Rule 1.7(b) provides: “Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; . . .and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing." Each state has a different formulation of the rule, and some are dramatically different, so the relevant rule must be verified. For example, some states require consent to be confirmed in writing, whereas others do not. It is also clear that in-house counsel are treated essentially the same as outside counsel, and thus company counsel must be mindful of the conflicts presented by intra-corporate representations. See, e.g., ABA Model Rule 1.0(c) ("Firm" or "law firm" denotes . . . the legal department of a corporation or other organization.”); see also Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee On Professional And Judicial Ethics, Formal Opinion 2008-2, “Corporate Legal Departments And Conflicts Of Interest Between Represented Corporate Affiliates” (Sept. 2008) (discussing responsibilities of in-house counsel in the conflicts context).

 

[11] See, e.g., U.S. v. Ruehle, 606 F. Supp.2d 1109 (C.D. Cal.) (law firm referred for discipline for failure to properly advise and/or document warning to officer that firm represented corporate entity and not individual officer), rev’d on other grounds, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir., Sept. 30, 2009) (indictment dismissed on remand).

 

 

[12] See, e.g., ABA Model Rule 1.13(g) (“A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7.  If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.”).

 

 

[13] The lawyer ethics rules have not completely caught up with the realities of corporate law departments. The Model Rules define a “firm” to include a corporate legal department. The trouble arises when the imputation rule applicable to law firms is applied indiscriminately to corporate law departments. In that setting, no two lawyers in the law department are permitted to represent adverse interests unless two lawyers within a private firm would be permitted to do so. See, e.g., The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Opinion 2008-2, “Corporate Legal Departments And Conflicts Of Interest Between Represented Corporate Affiliates” (Sept. 2008). Some accommodation of corporate realities to permit ethical screens in this context to take the place of separate "firms" would appear to be appropriate in most cases.

 

Executive Protection: D&O Insurance - The Insuring Agreement

In a prior post, I published the first in what I intend to be an occasional series of articles on the nuts and bolts of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance. I continue the series here with the second post in the series. In this post, I take a look at the most basic component of the D&O insurance policy – the insuring agreement. This basic policy clause contains the most critical terms, the definitions of which often determine whether or not a claim will be covered under the policy.

 

The Insuring Clause

Though the precise formulations may (and often do) vary from policy to policy, all D&O insurance policies more or less provide coverage for Loss arising from Claims first made during the policy period alleging Wrongful Acts against Insured Persons.

 

Each one of these nouns or noun clauses in the insuring agreement – Loss, Claims, Wrongful Acts, Insured Persons – are defined terms in the policy, and the specifics of the definitions of each of these terms may be among the most coverage-determinative provisions in a D&O insurance policy.

 

I briefly discuss below each of these terms and the claims issues that can arise in connection with each of the terms. I should emphasize at the outset that the precise contours of these terms have been the subject of extensive litigation over the years. Within the constraints of this blog format, I could not hope to summarize this litigation or all of the issues that have arisen. Moreover, it is important to note that the specific terms and definitions in any particular policy will determine the claims outcome in specific claims circumstances.

 

Here are the key insuring clause terms, addressed in a slightly different order than they typically appear in the D&O policy.

 

"Claims Made"

Many liability insurance policies are what are known as "occurrence" policies – that is, the policies provide coverage for accidents or mishaps that occur during the policy period, regardless of when the lawsuit is actually filed. However, D&O insurance policies are not "occurrence" policies, they are "claims made" policies. That is, D&O insurance policies provide coverage for claims made during the policy period, regardless of when the underlying conduct may have occurred.

 

(Actually, that last statement is not always literally true, as many D&O policies have "past acts" dates which specify the date after which the allegedly wrongful conduct must have occurred. In connection with policies that have past acts dates, claims based on conduct that occurred prior to the date would not be covered, even if the claim is made during the policy period.)

 

"Claim"

Obviously, in order to determine whether a claim was made during the policy period, one critical question is going to be, what is a "Claim"? Answering that question may be relatively straightforward in the context of civil litigation, as the service of the complaint is relatively easily recognizable as a claim.

 

The typical D&O policy’s definition of the term "Claim" extends much more broadly beyond civil litigation. Most policies’ definitions of the term encompass any type of demand for monetary or non-monetary relief, whether or not in the form of a complaint. A letter demand for redress of grievances, for example, though less formal than a civil complaint, typically constitutes a claim under a D&O policy.

 

In addition, the term "Claim" typically extends well beyond civil litigation to many other types of proceedings. For example, many policies extend the definition to include criminal proceedings, usually with a narrowing provision requiring the service of an indictment or an equivalent document. Many policies also extend to regulatory or administrative proceedings, although these clauses often include a requirement that these proceedings be "formal."

 

The term "Claim" also increasingly is defined to extend to arbitration and mediation and other types of alternative dispute resolution proceedings.

 

One of the perennial claims battlefields is the question whether investigative proceedings constitute a "Claim" within the meaning of a D&O policy. The question usually depends critically on the precise wording of the policy definition and the specifics of the investigation involved. Among other frequently recurring questions is whether grand jury subpoenas, informal document requests or other informal inquiries represent claims.

 

"Loss"

The term "Loss" specifies the things for which the policy will pay. The term usually encompasses specified indemnity amounts (settlements and judgments) as well as attorneys’ fees and other defense costs. (And, it should be noted, the policy’s payment of defense fees reduces the amount of insurance remaining under the policy, as payment of defense expenses erodes the limit of liability under the policy). The policy definition also typically excludes payment of certain items, including fines, penalties and matters deemed uninsurable under applicable law.

 

Among the recurring issues in relation to the definition of "Loss" are questions of coverage under the policy for amounts paid as disgorgement or restitution. These amounts generally are not regarded as "Loss," since they typically represent a defendant’s restoration of funds that were never his or hers in the first place. The battleground on these questions, though, is usually over whether or not a specific payment or kind of payment actually represents restitution or disgorgement.

 

Another recurring D&O insurance question arises in connection with lawsuits filed in the M&A context, particularly where the claim is that the transaction price is unfair to shareholders. These claims often are settled with an adjustment of the sales price. The question is whether the additional consideration paid is covered under the policy. These kinds of claims, often referred to as "bump up" claims, frequently recur and often depend on the specific circumstances presented and the policy wording involved. (Many policies today actually have specific "bump up" exclusions.)

 

"Wrongful Act"

The term "Wrongful Act" is usually defined as an actual or alleged act, error or omission, misleading statement or breach of duty. D&O policies are liability policies, so in order for coverage to attach, the insured person must have done something (or be alleged to have done something) for which they are liable to third parties. Although that might seem pretty straightforward, it can often become tricky in a variety of contexts.

 

One frequently recurring set of circumstances where the question whether or not a wrongful act has been alleged is in connection with the investigative proceedings. As noted above, the question whether or not subpoenas or informal document requests are claims often comes up. However, even if the specific investigative proceedings are claims under the definition of a specific policy, there may still be questions of coverage (again, depending on the specific circumstances and policy language involved) because the subpoena or informal document request does not allege a wrongful act. Or, if they allege a wrongful act, whether or not it is alleged against an insured person.

 

"Insured Person"

Many D&O policies provide coverage for both natural persons and for corporate entities. Whether or not a person or entity is or is not an insured person under the policy will often depend both on the person’s status and on the capacity in which they were acting.

 

For individuals, the status entitling them as insured persons under the policy is usually their service as a duly elected or appointed officer or director of the company. Whether or not a person is duly elected or appointed will often depend on the insured company’s own organizing documents or corporate charter. Questions can sometimes arise about whether or not middle or lower level personnel are insured; these questions are usually best addressed at the time the policy is formed, by endorsing the policy to specify that persons holding specific offices – or even specify particular named persons—are insured persons under the policy.

 

A frequent concern is whether individuals have coverage after they have completed their board service or officer duties. Most D&O policies include current, past and future director and officers within the definition of insured persons, so a former director or officer should continue to have protection for acts undertaken during their service, at least as long as the company continues to have D&O insurance in place.

 

Beyond the questions whether an individual’s status entitles him or her to be an insured person under the policy are questions concerning the capacity in which an individual was acting at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct. The individuals are insured only for actions in an insured capacity – that is, in connection with their service as a director or officer of the company.

 

These questions can be difficult when the individual has multiple connections with the insured company – as an investor, for example, or as a representative of a private equity or venture capital firm, or where the individual’s actions were in connection with a joint venture or other related but separate entity. The capacity in which the person was acting at the time may be a critical issue.

 

As for entities insured under the D&O policy, the typical policy provides coverage both for the insured entity (usually the first named insured) and its subsidiaries. Questions can arise whether or not an entity is a subsidiary (depending on the corporate parent’s ownership percentage). Questions can also arise about organizations formed or acquired after the policy’s inception. Most policies have very specific policy provisions addressing these subsequent formations or acquisitions.

 

More complex organizational structures can pose particular challenges. Organizational vehicles such as joint ventures or limited partnerships can pose particularly troublesome concerns if not addressed in the policy. Full exploration of these entity organizational issues are well beyond the scope of this blog post, but the critical issue is that these organizational questions should be addressed during the insurance acquisition process.

 

Future Posts in This Series: Based on the response I received to my initial post in the series, I intend to continue to write and publish posts on the nuts and bolts of D&O insurance in the weeks ahead. I am interested to hear from readers on topics they are particularly interested in seeing this series address. I can’t promise that I will address every issue – that are so many issues that I might possibly address, some of which are well beyond the "nuts and bolts" scope of this project.

 

However, with a better understanding of the issues in which readers are interested I can at least try to shape future posts to the issues that appear to be of greatest interest or concern. As always, I welcome readers’ thoughts and comments on the posts I publish as part of this series, as well as any other issues relating to this blog or its content.

 

Executive Protection: Indemnification and D&O Insurance - The Basics

My primary objective on this blog is to address important developments in with world of directors’ and officers’ liability as they occur. From time to time, however, readers contact me with more fundamental questions about executive liability and protection, particularly regarding the basics of indemnification and D&O insurance. In response to these recurring questions, I intend to prepare a series of posts, to be published intermittently in the weeks ahead, discussing these more basic issues.

 

This post is the first of the series and will address the basics about indemnification and insurance and how they interact.

 

Introduction

It is a basic fact of life in this day and age that individuals serving as corporate directors and officers face a significant litigation exposure. Claims are regularly brought against corporate officials on a wide variety of legal theories, including, for example, allegations of breach of fiduciary duty or of securities law violations. These lawsuits are expensive to defend and they also potentially expose the individual to significant personal liability.

 

Companies typically protect their executives from these legal expenses and liability exposures are through indemnification and insurance.

 

Indemnification

Corporate officials’ front line of liability protection is indemnification. This statutorily authorized protection is usually embodied in corporate documents such as articles of incorporation or by-laws, and generally encompasses the rights to both advancement of defense expenses and indemnification.

 

Corporate indemnification represents important protection for company officials, even for those at companies that purchase and maintain significant levels of D&O insurance. D&O insurance is subject limits of liability, whereas indemnification is theoretically unlimited (although, of course, practically limited by the indemnifying company’s financial resources). Indemnification is often very broad, often extending "to the maximum extent permitted by law", whereas D&O insurance polices contain numerous exclusions and conditions. In addition, D&O insurance must be renewed each year, with possible changes in terms and conditions. Indemnification rights are much less likely to be changed, particularly for corporate officials who negotiate their own indemnification contracts.

 

The company’s indemnification provisions specify the procedures individuals must follow in order to obtain indemnification. It is worth considering that indemnification questions often arise when at a time of corporate turbulence, which may complicate an individual’s efforts to obtain indemnification or advancement. A separate written indemnification provision can not only provide much greater procedural specificity but it can also provide certain protections against wrongful withholding of indemnification, by providing presumptions in favor of indemnification and providing for "fees on fees" (that is, fees incurred in order to enforce rights to advancement or indemnification).

 

Although corporate indemnification is broad, it is not unlimited. There are times when a corporation may not indemnify an individual – for example, there generally are limitations on a corporation’s ability to indemnify individuals found liable in shareholders’ derivative suits. In addition, insolvency may prevent a company from honoring its indemnification obligations.

 

D&O Insurance 

D&O insurance provides protection for company officials when corporate indemnification is not available, whether due to insolvency or legal prohibition. D&O insurance also provides a mechanism for corporations to be reimbursed when they do indemnify their executives.

 

The coverage provision in which the D&O policy provides individuals with insurance protection when indemnification is not available is commonly referred to as Side A coverage. The D&O insurance policy’s provision for reimbursement of a company’s indemnification obligations is referred to as Side B coverage.

 

In more recent years, many D&O insurance policies have also incorporated a Side C coverage as well, which provides insurance protection for the corporate entity’s own liability exposures. In D&O insurance policies for public companies, this Side C protection is usually limited just to the company’s liabilities under the securities laws.

 

Coverage B and C essentially operate as balance sheet protection for the company. Coverage B also provides a way for companies to contractually transfer their indemnification obligations to the insurer (subject of course to all of the policy’s terms and conditions).

 

Coverage A is essentially catastrophe protection for the individual executives. It provides a way to ensure that litigation protection is still available to them even if the company is financially unable to indemnify them or legally prohibited from doing so.

 

D&O insurance policies are generally built to complement other types of insurance that most companies carry. For example, D&O policies will typically exclude coverage for loss arising from bodily injury or property damage, because those exposures are addressed in the company’s general liability and property insurance policies. The D&O policy, by contrast to these other types of coverage, protects the insured persons from economic loss arising from claims made against the insured persons for wrongful acts in their insured capacities.

 

Many companies find that the amount of insurance available in a single policy of D&O insurance insufficient to provide adequate protection and so they purchase additional limits of liability through excess D&O insurance policies as part of a tower of insurance arranged in various layers.

 

One of the most important functions of D&O insurance is to protect the individuals when the company has become insolvent and unable to honor its indemnification obligations. This protection is afforded under Side A, as discussed above. Because of the critical importance of this insurance protection, some companies choose to buy additional amounts of insurance providing additional limits of liability just for this Side A coverage, in the form of Excess Side A insurance.

 

In the current marketplace, this Excess Side A insurance often provides certain additional insurance protection in the form of coverages whereby the Excess Side A insurance will "drop down" and provide first dollar protections. These additional coverages are in the form of "Difference in Condition" (or "DIC") protection, and would apply, for example, in the event an underlying D&O insurance carrier is insolvent or if the underlying policy is rescinded.

 

Many D&O insurance buyers are very sensitive about the cost of the insurance -- and appropriately, as D&O insurance is often perceived as expensive (although currently relatively less expensive than it has been at times in the past). However, the scope of insurance protection afforded is much more important than the cost. Small incremental cost savings sometimes available pale by comparison to the potential financial significance of the scope of coverage afforded.

 

There is no standard D&O insurance policy. Each D&O insurance carrier has forms that differ from their competitors’ and most policies are generally the subject of extensive negotiations. In order for D&O insurance buyers to be assured that they have the broadest available terms and conditions and the appropriate insurance structure put in place, it is critically important that they associate a knowledgeable and experience broker in their acquisition of the insurance. The best brokers also have skilled and experience claims advocates available to protect their clients’ interests in the event of a claim.

 

 

Second Circuit Holds D&O Policy "Ambiguous"

In a June 30, 2010 opinion (here), a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling that coverage under a directors and officers liability insurance policy for an underlying claim was precluded by the policy’s "insured vs. insured" exclusion, holding that the D&O policy at issue was "ambiguous" under Virginia law.

 

Background

Prior to May 2004, Community Research Associates, an Illinois corporation, was controlled by three shareholders, referred to in the coverage action as the Legacy Shareholders. In May 2004, CRA was reorganized as a Delaware corporation as part of a stock purchase agreement by which Sterling Investment Partners became the majority shareholder, and the Legacy Shareholders became minority shareholders. The pre-transaction entity was referred to in the coverage litigation as CRA-Illinois and post-transaction entity was referred to as CRA-Delaware.

 

The May 2004 transaction contemplated several events occurring simultaneously at the time of the transaction closing. Among other things, the Legacy Shareholders were to assume positions as officers or directors of CRA-Delaware in order to sign the paperwork to complete the reorganization plan. In addition, as a condition of closing, the Legacy Shareholders were required to resign their positions as directors of CRA-Delaware in order to close the merger.

 

In October 2004, CRA-Delaware purchased D&O Insurance policy. In its application for insurance, CRA-Delaware stated, among other things:

 

On May 3, 2004, the company had a merger with an investment entity. A new Chairman and Chief Executive Officer was installed. The prior ownership remained in a minority capacity but were no longer participants on the Board or officers of the corporation. On August 2, 2004 a new Chief Financial Officer was hired.

 

In August 2005, CRA-Delaware approved a merger whereby all of CRA-Delaware’s stock was sold to a third-party, CRA Acquisitions Corp. The Legacy Shareholders filed a lawsuit against certain directors and officers of CRA-Delaware, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the August 2005 merger. The breach of fiduciary duty action ultimately settled for $3 million.

 

The CRA-Delaware directors who were sued in the breach of fiduciary duty action filed a claim under the company’s D&O insurance policy for the losses incurred in connection with the claim. The D&O insurer denied coverage for the claim in reliance on the policy’s "insured vs. insured" exclusion, and coverage litigation ensued.

 

The district court in the coverage action granted the carrier’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the "insured vs. insured" exclusion was unambiguous and that because the Legacy Shareholders were all former directors and officers of CRA-Delaware, having assumed those roles briefly in order to effectuate the merger, the losses from their claim fell within the Policy’s exclusion.

 

The Second Circuit’s Opinion

The Second Circuit first found that when the district court had concluded that the Legacy Shareholders "briefly assumed" the role of directors of CRA-Delaware in order to effectuate the merger, the district court "assumed[ed] the answer without addressing the parties’ argument."

 

The coverage claimants argued that CRA-Delaware "did not exist as an entity until after the closing of the merger." The Second Circuit said that "at the very least, the question should have gone to a jury to determine whether CRA-Delaware existed prior to the merger or, if it did, whether it was the same entity that existed after the merger for purposes of policy coverage."

 

In reaching this conclusion the Second Circuit, referenced CRA-Delaware’s policy application, which was attached to and, by the Policy’s terms, incorporated into the policy. The Second Circuit found that the application, which the Court emphasized was part of the policy, described the May 2004 transaction in a way that raised these questions about when CRA-Delaware came into existence, and in particular about whether the Legacy Shareholders were ever officers or directors of CRA-Delaware as such.

 

Citing Virginia law, the Second Circuit held that "the Policy, when read in its entirety, can reasonably be ‘understood in more than one way’ and is thus ambiguous." Both of the parties’ interpretations of when CRA-Delaware came into existence "rely only on language of the Policy and are reasonable in light of the various provisions of the Policy."

 

Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court "to undertake any additional fact finding to interpret the Policy provisions in light of the facts to be found."

 

Discussion

At first impression, this case is a bit of head-scratcher, since the record does seem to suggest that the Legacy Shareholders were briefly directors of CRA-Delaware in order to effectuate the merger, which is exactly what the district court found.

 

On further reflection, however, the question may not be quite as straightforward as the first impression might suggest. There is a question about exactly when CRA-Delaware first came into existence, and whether the Legacy Shareholders were ever directors of CRA-Delaware when it came into existence. The application itself, which was incorporated in to the policy, seemingly suggests that the Legacy Shareholders were not officers or directors of CRA-Delaware as such.

 

Significantly, the Second Circuit did not affirmatively say that there was coverage here under the D&O policy, only that further findings of fact were required before it could be determined whether or not the insured vs. insured exclusion applied.

 

At some level, this coverage dispute may simply be a reflection of a very specific and arguably unique set of facts. However, the parties’ dispute is a reminder of the complexities that can sometimes arise in connection with the application of the "insured vs. insured" exclusion, which is frequently the source of contentious coverage issues.

 

That said, I don’t think the Second Circuit was saying the insured vs. insured clause in and of itself was ambiguous. Rather, the finding of ambiguity turned on the fact that the policy application was incorporated into the Policy – that is, by the Policy’s terms, the application was a part of the policy. The finding of ambiguity related to the interaction between the application as part of the policy and the insured vs. insured exclusion. In essence, the Second Circuit said that because of the ambiguous relation between these two parts of the policy, further fact finding is required.

 

My prior posts on the Insured vs. Insured exclusion can be found here and here.

.

More About Excess D&O Insurance and the Exhaustion Trigger

One of the recurring D&O insurance coverage issues is the question of excess D&O insurers’ obligations when the underlying insurers have paid less than their full policy limits as a result of a compromise between the underlying insurers and the policyholder.

 

In the latest of a growing line of recent cases examining these issues, Judge Wayne Anderson of the Northern District of Illinois, in a June 22, 2010 opinion applying Illinois law, held that the "plain language" of the excess D&O insurance policies at issue required the actual payments of full policy limits in covered claims before the insureds could access the excess insurance.

 

Background

During the relevant period, Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation carried a total of $50 million in D&O insurance arranged in five layers of $10 million each, between a primary insurer and four excess insurers. Bally and certain of its directors and officers were named as defendants in a securities class action lawsuit (about which refer here) in connection with which Bally incurred $33 million in defense expenses, for which Bally sought coverage under from its D&O insurers.

 

The primary insurer initiated an action in the Northern District of Illinois seeking a judicial declaration of noncoverage. Bally joined the excess insurers to the action as third-party defendants. Ultimately the primary insurer and the first and second level excess insurers reached a compromise by which they agreed to contribute a total of $19.5 million toward Bally’s defense expenses. The first level excess insurer settled for $8 million, $2 million less than its full policy limit. The second level excess insurer settled for $1.5 million.

 

The third and fourth level excess insurers refused to settle or otherwise contribute toward Bally’s defense expense. These two excess insures argued that the conditions precedent to coverage in their excess insurance policies had not been triggered. In making this argument, the third level excess insurer relied on its policy’s language that its payment obligations are triggered "only after the insurers of the Underlying Policies shall have paid, in the applicable legal currency, the full amount of the Underlying Limit." The fourth level excess insurer relied on language in its policy specifying that its payment obligations apply "only after all Underlying Insurance has been exhausted by payment of the total underlying limit of insurance."

 

The Court’s June 22 Opinion

In his June 22 opinion, Judge Anderson granted the third and fourth level excess insurers’ motions for summary judgment, finding that the plain language of their policies requires that the underlying insurers each "make actual payments of $10 million each in covered claims before Insureds can access coverage provided by the Third and Fourth Layer Excess Policies."

 

The insureds had argued that the third and fourth level excess policies were "ambiguous" as to whether the underlying policies had to make actual payment of a full $10 million each to trigger the top level excess carriers’ coverage. The insureds argued that the third and fourth level excess carriers had contracted to pay claims in excess of specified levels "regardless of who makes payment for covered claims" below those levels.

 

Judge Anderson considered the case law on which the insureds relied, particularly the 1928 Second Circuit decision in Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.. In examining this line of cases, Judge Anderson concluded that "if an excess insurance policy ambiguously defines exhaustion, as in Zeig, courts generally find that settlement with an underlying insurer exhausts the underlying policies." However, Judge Anderson went on, "in cases where the policy language clearly defines exhaustion, the courts tend to enforce the policy as written."

 

Judge Anderson went on to find that the third and fourth level excess policies clearly defined how the underlying insurance must be exhausted prior to the insureds accessing coverage. Accordingly, and because the underlying insurance had not been exhausted by the underlying insurers’ payment of covered loss, Judge Anderson granted summary judgment in the third and fourth excess insurers’ favor.

 

Discussion

As a result of rising settlement levels and escalating defense costs, excess D&O insurance has become increasingly important in D&O claims resolutions. As more and more claims get pushed into the excess layers, more and more questions are arising, including this recurring question of whether the excess carriers’ payment obligations are triggered when the policyholder has compromised with the underlying carriers.

 

Judge Anderson’s holding in the Bally Total Fitness case joins a line of several recent cases in which courts have similarly held that, given the excess policy language at issue, the excess carriers’ payment obligation were not triggered when the underlying carriers paid less than their full policy limits as a result of a compromise with the policyholder. These recent cases include the July 2007 Eastern District of Michigan decision in the Comerica case (about which refer here) and the March 2008 California intermediate appellate court decision in the Qualcomm case (about which refer here).

 

The outcome of these various coverage disputes is a direct reflection of the excess policy language involved, and in particular the language specifying what is required in order for excess insurers’ payment obligations to be triggered. These cases underscore the critical importance of the language describing the payment trigger in the excess policy.

 

In recent months, and in large part as a reaction to these cases, excess carriers increasingly have been willing to provide language that allows the excess carriers’ payment obligations to be triggered regardless whether the underlying amounts were paid by the underlying insurer or by the insured. (I note as an aside that this language was not generally available at the time that Bally Total Fitness purchased the D&O insurance at issue in this case.)

 

The potential importance of the excess insurance payment trigger language, and the availability of language alternatives in the current insurance marketplace, in turn underscores the importance for policyholders of involving a knowledgeable and experienced D&O insurance broker in their acquisition of D&O insurance. The presence of the most favorable excess trigger language, among many other critically important policy language issues, could make a significant difference in the availability of coverage in the event of a claim.

 

Speedy Justice: According to Judge Wayne Anderson’s official biography (here), the Judge is the co-holder of the record for the 100-yard dash at Harvard University, from which he graduated in 1967.

 

 

Sarbanes-Oxley Act Clawbacks and D&O Insurance

The SEC has made it clear that it intends to use Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to "clawback" compensation from CEOs and CFOs of companies that restate their financial statements, even if the individuals are not alleged to have engaged in any wrongdoing. A recent district court opinion confirms that the statute gives the SEC the authority to proceed on that basis. These actions raise complex D&O insurance coverage concerns that arguably suggest certain necessary policy adjustments.

 

Section 304 provides that if a company restates its financials, the company’s CEO and CFO, who certified the financial statements under Sox Section 302, "shall reimburse" the company for any bonus compensation received during the 12 months following the restated period, as well as any stock sale profits earned during those twelve months.

 

There is no requirement in Section 304 that the CEO or CFO from whom reimbursement is sought have any involvement in the events that necessitated the restatement; indeed, the statute doesn’t require any showing of wrongdoing or fault.

 

The SEC’s first use of this statutory provision to clawback compensation from a corporate official against whom no wrongdoing is alleged was the enforcement action filed in July 2009 against Maynard Jenkins, the former CEO of CSK Auto. I first wrote about this enforcement action in a prior post, here.

 

CSK Auto had restated its financial statements for the fiscal years 2002 to 2004. The SEC filed separate enforcement actions against the company and four company officials for securities law violations in connection with the restatements. However, Jenkins is not among the company officials alleged to have violated the securities laws.

 

The SEC’s action, filed in reliance on Section 304, seeks to compel Jenkins to reimburse CSK Auto for more than $4 million he received in bonuses and stock sale profits "while CSK was committing accounting fraud." Jackson not only is not alleged to have had any role in or awareness of the alleged scheme, but the SEC has actually alleged in its separate enforcement action against the other CSK officials that the others concealed their scheme from Jenkins.

 

Jenkins moved to dismiss the SEC’s clawback action on numerous grounds, arguing that he cannot properly be forced to disgorge compensation in the absence of any personal wrongdoing.

 

In a June 9, 2009 order (here), District of Arizona Judge G. Murray Snow held that the SEC’s complaint against Jenkins alleges facts sufficient to state a claim under Section 304, stating further that "the text and structure of Section 304 require only the misconduct of the issuer, but do not necessarily require the specific misconduct of the issuer’s CEO or CFO."

 

Judge Snow elaborated by saying that "the misconduct of the issuer is the misconduct that triggers the reimbursement obligation of the CEO and the CFO." Before reimbursement can be required "the issuer’s misconduct must be sufficiently serious to result on material noncompliance with a financial reporting requirement."

 

The SEC has already made it clear that it intends to use Section 304 to try to clawback compensation from other CEOs and CFOs who are not alleged to have done anything wrong. For example, just a few days ago, the SEC settled a Section 304 filed against Walden O’Dell, the former CEO of Diebold, even though, as noted in the SEC’s June 2, 2010 litigation release, the SEC’s complaint does not allege that O’Dell engaged in the alleged fraud at Diebold.

 

Judge Snow’s opinion in the Jenkins case confirms that the SEC may properly pursue Section 304 clawbacks even against corporate officials who are not alleged to have engaged in personal wrongdoing (although he did leave open the question whether the statute could be used in ways that would be unconstitutionally punitive).

 

Though statutorily authorized, the statute’s use to effect a forfeiture without culpability or fault raises troubling questions, including even basic questions of fairness. On the other hand, it might also fairly be asked whether the CEO or CFO ought to be able to retain benefits accumulated at a time when the investing public was being misled, by financial statements that the CEO and CFO certified, about the company’s financial condition.

 

Beyond these issues, these kinds of actions may also raise complex D&O insurance coverage questions.

 

A Section 304 claim potentially would raise at least two possible coverage concerns – first, whether the claim involves an allegation of a "wrongful act" as required to trigger coverage; and second, whether coverage for the claim is precluded by the "profit or advantage" exclusion.

 

D&O insurance typically is only triggered by a claim made against an insured person for an actual or alleged wrongful act. Under a Section 304 claim in which no personal wrongdoing is alleged, the question would arise whether a wrongful act has been sufficiently alleged to trigger coverage under the policy.

 

I think it could fairly be argues that a Section 304 claim does involve a wrongful act even if no personal wrongdoing is alleged against the individual defendant. As Judge Snow’s opinion in the Jackson case emphasized, a prerequisite to a Section 304 claim is misconduct by the issuer (which is an "insured" under the typical public company D&O insurance policy’s "entity coverage" provision).

 

Given the statutory prerequisite of issuer wrongdoing, a Section 304 claim necessarily involves a claim for a wrongful act, even if the wrongful act alleged is not that of the targeted individual. The typical D&O policy emphatically does not say that the claim must be made against an insured person for that insured person’s own wrongful act – to the contrary, the typical policy requires only that the claim be made for "an actual or alleged wrongful act," without specifying whose act it must be.

 

Nevertheless, I can still imagine a carrier bent upon denying coverage urging that this policy provision requires a wrongful act by the insured person against whom the claim has been made, which may indicate the need for certain policy revisions, as detailed below.

 

Even if the wrongful act concern can be overcome, there is still the policy exclusion to be dealt with. The typical D&O policy excludes coverage for any loss based on a claim for any "profit or advantage" to which the insured is not legally entitled. A carrier might attempt to rely on this provision not only to deny coverage for the amount of any reimbursed compensation, but also to try to deny coverage for the costs of defending the claim.

 

One way to try to circumvent this concern about Section 304 defense costs is to amend the exclusionary provision to required a judicial determination in the underlying claim that the insured was not legally entitled to the "profit or advantage," which would at least allow defense costs to be advanced up until there has been such a judicial determination. The limitation of this approach is that once there has been a judicial determination, the carrier might seek to be reimbursed for the advanced defense costs.

 

The point here is that the question of D&O insurance coverage for the costs of defending a Section 304 clawback claim could be problematic. One approach to try to address these concerns would be to amend the policy to provide that the "profit or advantage" exclusion will not be applied to the costs of defending a Section 304 act, and to further amend the policy to provide that the carrier will not take the position that a Section 304 action does not allege a wrongful act.

 

At least one insurer has taken an alternative approach to address the Section 304 defense cost issue in its revised policy form. Under this approach, the costs of defending a Section 304 claim are expressly included in the policy’s definition of Loss.

 

It is not my intention here to debate the merits of these alternative approaches (which indeed may not be mutually exclusive) or of any other alternative approaches that might exist. My purpose here is simply to point out that this issue has reached the point where the question of Section 304 defense expenses ought to be addressed in the D&O policy form.

 

Just as a few years ago, the D&O insurance industry quickly adapted express policy language designed to address concerns arising from SOX whistleblower claims, it may now be time for the industry to adapt express policy provisions addressing Section 304 defense costs. Policyholders should not have to wait until the claim has been filed to find out what the carrier’s position will be on Section 304 defense expenses.

  

2010 World Cup: Some Early Notes:

1. Vuvuzela: Did the site selection committee know about those damned vuvuzela horns when they chose South Africa as the 2010 World Cup venue? What an awful, idiotic noise. (There are reports that the event organizing committee is considering a ban.)

 

2. Remember, The Beautiful Game is Fast, Too: England was up on the U.S. by a goal before I even had a chance to turn the T.V. on.

 

3. U.S. Goal Inspires Headline Writers Everywhere: Here’s my entry – "English Green’s Gift Gaffe Gives Yanks a Goal."

 

4. Most Underappreciated: Tim Howard ought to be one of the most celebrated athletes in the U.S. He certainly is one of the most talented.

 

5. Go Figure: The official nickname of the Australian team is the "Socceroos." Discuss.

 

6. Self-Destruction (and Team Takeout, Too): Substitute Algerian striker Abdelkader Ghezzal entered his team's game against Slovenia in the 58th minute (which was a scoreless tie at the time). Approximately five seconds later he was given a yellow card for an aggressive tackle. Then in 74th minute, he earned his second yellow (and an automatic red card, requiring his ejection from the game) for a flagrant hand ball . Within minutes, his shorthanded team conceded Slovenia's winning goal.

 

7. Divided By a Common Language: The "pitch" is the playing field. A "side" is a team. A "strike" is a shot. To "win a cap" is to be selected to play for your country’s team. "Nil" means zero. "Draw" means tie. And "nil-nil draw" (usually preceded by the word "dreaded") means a scoreless tie. The phrase "argy bargy" is not susceptible to translation. 

 

Allen Stanford, D&O Insurers Spar Over Defense Issues

The strange sequence of legal events surrounding R. Allen Stanford has taken yet another bizarre turn. The latest developments began earlier last week when Stanford yet again sought to fire his criminal defense lawyers. Then on May 21, 2010, Stanford, representing himself pro se in coverage litigation arising out of his and fellow criminal defendants’ efforts to secure insurance coverage for their defense expenses, wrote a letter to the court in the coverage action asserting that the insurers "have thwarted my every attempt to obtain counsel of my choosing." He also protests the insurers are controlling his defense and denying payments through a "reasonable and necessary" shield.

 

In his letter, Stanford requested that the court order the lead insurer to "approve and compensate my criminal attorneys and coverage attorneys of my choice."

 

In their May 24, 2010 response (here), the lead insurers contend, contrary to Stanford’s assertion  that they have "thwarted" his defense,  "nothing could be further from the truth," noting that he has "cycled through more than 10 different law firms (all of his own choosing and all at Underwriters’ expense) in the course of the SEC and Criminal Actions" adding that they have paid these attorneys "more than $ 6 million dollars."

 

The lead insurer further argues that it has withheld consent to Stanford's latest defense counsel "only due to extraordinary and alarming circumstances" – including disagreements among Stanford’s own counsel, leading to Stanford’s latest criminal defense attorney to withdraw "only a month after entering an unconditional appearance" and while publicly asserting that the lawyer with which Stanford seeks to replace him is "often times" acting "against Stanford’s best interests." The lead insurer asserts that has "no obligation" and "in fact cannot in good faith approve counsel that has been fired by an insured or counsel that is alleged to have acted against an insured’s best interest."

 

The lead insurer bemoaned the "chaos" and "turmoil" surrounding Stanford’s choice of counsel, which threatens "serious harm" to the insurers’ interests as well as those of all other claimants to the policy. The insurer also pointed out that Stanford has no right under the policy to coverage counsel.

 

As discussed in greater detail here, the insurers have sought to deny coverage under the policy on the grounds that the criminal defendants’ conduct violated the policy’s Money Laundering exclusion. In a March 15, 2010 decision (here), the Fifth Circuit ordered that the question of whether or not the exclusion has "in fact" been triggered must be determined in a separate judicial proceeding, to take place on an expedited basis, so that the fundamental question of coverage for the criminal defendants’ attorneys’ fees can be determine.

 

In the meanwhile, Stanford remains jailed pursuant to a ruling by Judge David Hittner, denying Stanford bail.

 

In a May 25, 2010 Am Law Litigation Daily article (here), David Bario describes the May 25 hearing before Judge Nancy Atlas on these issues, at which Stanford apparently appeared shackled and unshaven. Stanford apparently argued that either his choice of criminal defense attorney should be approved or he should be released in order that he can prepare his defense.

 

According to a May 25, 2010 Bloomberg article (here), Judge Atlas said that she would urge Judge Hittner to "reconsider" his bail ruling. She proposed an arrangement subjecting Stanford to "very, very, very tight house arrest" so he can prepare his defense in the insurance case. "I would not be opposed to that," she said.

 

Judge Atlas reportedly told the insurers’ attorneys, as a warning that they will have to sustain their coverage defense in court, "You’ve got to prove there was some criminal act that gave rise to criminal property. And then you’ve got to prove what role each of these executives had to do with that."

 

According to the Am Law Litigation Daily article, Judge Atlas set a hearing date for early June to "sort through the crowded field of former, current and future Stanford lawyers to determine how they managed to rack up the $6 million tab." The Houston Chronicle reports that the hearing will take place on June 3, at which Atlas says, "We are going to get to the bottom of why so much money is being spent in Mr. Stanford's defense."

 

Judge Atlas set an August 24, 2010 date for the hearing on the coverage issues, and said that Bob Bennett, Stanford’s current defense counsel, might represent him at that hearing. The criminal trial against Stanford and his co-defendants is set for January 2011.

 

Bankruptcy and D&O Insurance

According to statistics compiled by the American Bankruptcy Institute, over 60,000 businesses filed for bankruptcy in 2009, the highest annual number of business-related bankruptcies since 1993. By way of comparison, the 2009 business bankruptcy filing levels were nearly 200% greater than in 2006. All signs are that these bankruptcy filing levels have continued unabated this year.

 

One of the frequent accompaniments of a corporate bankruptcy filing is the initiation of litigation against the directors and officers of the failed company. This litigation often leads to complex questions of D&O insurance coverage. As discussed in the April 2010 paper from ACE Insurance entitled "Financial Crisis: Bankruptcy Implications for D&O Insurance" (here), "bankruptcy poses the greatest threat of personal financial risk and the most complicated [D&O Insurance] coverage issues."

 

Yet there may be no time when D&O insurance is more important than in bankruptcy. As Paul Ferrillo of the Weil Gotshal firm notes in his April 30, 2010 memorandum "Directors and Officers Liability Insurance in Bankruptcy Settings – What Directors and Officers Really Need to Know" (here), "when a Corporation files for bankruptcy, the D&O policy becomes one of the few protections a director or officer has against lawsuits and claims targeting his or her personal assets."

 

Because, as the ACE report notes, "bankruptcy has the potential to dramatically complicate D&O coverage issues," it is important at the time the D&O insurance is put in place that these potential issues are taken into account and that the insurance is structured to try to reduce the likelihood of these complications arising in the event of a later bankruptcy.

 

The Weil Gotshal memo outlines a number of critical steps the company can take in structuring its insurance to address these bankruptcy-related concerns, including the following.

 

First, in order to avoid the possibility that the insurance is unavailable to defend individuals in bankruptcy related claims due to a policy rescission based on application misrepresentations, the company should incorporate into its insurance program a provision that the Side A coverage (protecting individuals for nonindemnifiable claims) is not rescindable. This provision specifies that the Side A coverage cannot be rescinded and will require the D&O carrier to begin advancing defense costs immediately.

 

Second, the company’s program should incorporate a Priority of Payments provision that, as described in the Weil Gotshal memo, "created a clear path that allows for the contemporaneous payment of defense costs for directors and officers." The provision specifies that payment of individuals’ defense expense or other loss costs takes priority over those of any insured entity. As the memo notes, this provision "limits the uncertainty of whether a D&O Policy will be immediately available to fund the defense costs of directors and officers who are embroiled in litigation when a company files for bankruptcy."

 

Third, the policy exclusion precluding coverage for claims against insureds brought by other insureds (known as the "insured vs. insured exclusion) should be amended to carve back coverage to ensure that the policy exclusion is not applied to preclude coverage for claims brought by "a debtor in possession, chapter 11 trustee, creditors, bondholders, all committees and other bankruptcy constituencies."

 

The Weil Gotshal memo includes a number of other policy prescriptions which, while described within the context of bankruptcy-related concerns, actually are critically important regardless whether or not a company might eventually wind up in bankruptcy, including the following.

 

First the company should ensure that there is "full severability" in connection with the policy application, so that any insured person’s knowledge of application misrepresentations "should not affect coverage for directors and officers who were unaware" of the misrepresentations.

 

Second, with respect to the D&O policy’s conduct exclusions (excluding, for example, coverage for criminal or fraudulent misconduct) should be drafted so that they are "triggered only upon a final adjudication of the prohibited …conduct."

 

Third, it is critically important for companies to attend to questions of limits adequacy and policy structure. Complex claims, of the type that often arise in bankruptcy but that can also arise without regard to bankruptcy, have the dramatic potential to substantially erode or even exhaust available insurance. The amount and structure of insurance acquired should take this dramatic possibility into account.

 

In particular, with respect to policy structure, board members will want to determine whether the company’s insurance program includes so called Excess Side A insurance or even Excess Independent Directors Liability Insurance (IDL). As the Weil Gotshal memo notes, when D&O claims are filed, the CEOs and CFOs "generally use up most of the coverage" in the Company’s D&O insurance program, "potentially leaving the independent directors with insufficient coverage to resolve the claims against them." Even though IDL policies "are the most underutilized insurance policies," it may be in the board’s interest to purchase IDL insurance as added protection in the event of significant claims against company inside management.

 

All of these concerns underscore the importance of taking all of these issues into account at the time the insurance is put in place, which in turn highlights the importance of having a knowledgeable and skill insurance professional involved in the insurance acquisition process. As the Weil Gotshal memorandum notes, "a good insurance broker may be able to assist in finding alternative primary carriers or alternative coverage solutions that will better satisfy a Corporation’s needs."

 

The complex D&O insurance coverage issues that can arise in the event of bankruptcy related claims are a recurring concern that I have previously explored in related posts, most recently here.

 

Putting Options Backdating Into Perspective: In light of the vivid events in the global financial marketplace in the last couple of years, the options backdating scandal seems both distant and even trifling, at least relatively speaking. However, as Professor Peter Henning points out in an April 30 post on the Dealbook blog (here), the government’s record in prosecuting options backdating may provide important clues to the way the government may proceed in connection with the current financial crisis.

 

As Henning notes, the options backdating results on the criminal side "were decidedly mixed," with a few trial victories but also with "notable acquittals." In particular, Henning notes, "the cases turned out to be much more difficult to win because the conduct had neither the visceral appeal nor the impact" that prior corporate scandals had. No company’s survival was threatened and the options practices involved accounting and tax issues were murky, allowing defendants to argue successfully in some cases that they did not believe they engaged in wrongdoing.

 

Henning suggests that "the experience with options backdating prosecutions may be leading prosecutors to adopt a much more cautious approach to cases involving complex financial transactions in which the accounting rules are less than clear." He concludes that "the options backdating cases show how difficult it is to win convictions against senor executives, even when they are directly involved in the transactions," as a result of which "we will see few, if any, prosecutions from the recent financial turmoil when executives can point to the markets as the reason for any harm suffered by their companies."

 

There is Absolutely No Cause for Alarm: Tom Kirkendall on the Houston’s Clear Thinkers blog recently linked to the classic Monty Python Skit, "How to Irritate People: Airplane" which reminded me in certain air travel woes to which I have been subjected. Please remain comfortably seated while you watch this video, and be certain to reassure yourselves that no one would deliberately set out to irritate anyone like this, now would they?

 

Second Circuit Affirms Excess D&O Insurers' Coverage Denial Based on Prior Knowledge Exclusion

In a March 23, 2010 Summary Order (here), the Second Circuit affirmed the March 2, 2009 ruling of Southern District of New York Judge Gerald Lynch, in which he held that the excess insurers’ prior knowledge exclusion precluded coverage under their policies for claims brought against former Refco directors and officers.

 

Background

As detailed in a prior post about Judge Lynch’s district court order (here), at the time that the Refco scandal emerged, Refco had $70 million of D&O insurance arranged in multiple layers. The primary and first level excess insurers advanced their entire combined $17.5 million limits of liability in payment of defense expenses. In a separate ruling not involved in this appeal, Judge Lynch ruled that the second level excess insurer also must advance its defense expense.

 

In his March 2, 2009 ruling (here), Judge Lynch granted summary judgment for the third and fourth level excess insurers, based on exclusions in those policies (not found in the underlying policies) precluding coverage for claims arising from any facts or circumstances of which "any insured" had knowledge at policy inception and that might reasonably be expected to give rise to the claim. (In a portion of his opinion not relevant to this appeal, Judge Lynch denied summary judgment as to the fifth level excess insurer.)

 

The critical question before Judge Lynch was whether the knowledge of the fraudulent scheme of Refco’s CEO Phillip Bennett could be imputed to the other directors and officers. These individual had sought to rely on so-called severability provisions in the primary policy, to which the excess policies were "follow form," and from which they sought to argue that the prior knowledge exclusion was not applicable to them. Their argument was that Bennett’s knowledge could not be imputed to them due to the non-imputation language in the primary policy’s severability provision.

 

Judge Lynch rejected their argument that the severability provision in the primary policy precluded the operation of the prior knowledge exclusion in the excess policy.

 

The Second Circuit’s March 23 Summary Order

In its March 23 Summary Order, the Second Circuit expressly adopted Judge Lynch’s "comprehensive and well-reasoned analysis." The Court quoted Judge Lynch’s language that "in the context of the [prior knowledge exclusion] the words ‘any insured’ unambiguously precludes coverage for innocent coinsureds."

 

The Second Circuit also expressly affirmed that because the exclusionary language in the excess policy "cannot be reconciled with the severability language provision of the underlying policy, the language in the excess policy controls." The Second Circuit also affirmed that the claims against the individuals come within the "arising out of" preamble of the exclusion.

 

Discussion

As I detailed in my prior discussion of Judge Lynch’s opinion, this case illustrates the complicated ways that the various components of a single D&O insurance program can operate in unanticipated ways to produce unexpected results. The case also demonstrates the extent to which supposed "follow form" excess coverage is not always truly "follow form."

 

The outcome also underscores the importance of application and exclusion severability issues not just at the primary levels but all the way up the insurance tower.

 

My other ruminations about this outcome are set forth at length in my prior post about Judge Lynch’s opinion.

 

The Second Circuit’s Summary Order states on its face that it has no precedential effect. However, the practical effect of the Summary Order is the validation of Judge Lynch’s analysis, to which future litigants undoubtedly will refer.

 

It is probably worth noting that while Judge Lynch was a district court judge in March 2009 when he wrote his coverage opinion in the Refco case, by the time the Second Circuit got around to reviewing the case, Judge Lynch had become a member of the Second Circuit bench, where his new Circuit Court colleagues found his prior work as a district court judge to be "comprehensive and well reasoned." Perhaps the preservation of domestic tranquility around the courthouse water-cooler requires no less.

 

Special thanks to Neil McCarthy of Lawyer Links for providing me with a copy of the Second Circuit’s Summary Order.

 

Two Appellate Courts Consider D&O Insurers' Obligation to Advance Defense Expenses

Within the space of just a few days, two federal appellate courts – the Fifth and Sixth Circuits – issued separate opinions consider D&O insurers’ obligations to advance defense expenses. The Fifth Circuit entered its March 15, 2010 decision in the high-profile Stanford Financial insurance coverage dispute. The Sixth Circuit’s March 11, 2010 opinion was entered in an insurance coverage dispute involving Abercrombie & Fitch and a rather unusual set of circumstances surrounding the company’s D&O insurance policies. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion was also accompanied by a rather spirited dissent. Both decisions are interesting and provide illuminating perspective on D&O policy interpretation.

The Fifth Circuit’s Stanford Financial Decision

The March 15 Opinion

The Fifth Circuit’s March 15, 2010 opinion (here) arises out of the expedited appeal of Stanford Financial’s D&O insurers to the January 26, 2010 opinion of Southern District of Texas Judge David Hittner entering a preliminary injunction prohibiting the insurers from "withholding payment" of defense expenses from four individuals (including Allan Stanford) who face SEC and criminal actions in connection with the Stanford Financial scandal. My prior discussion of Judge Hittner’s ruling can be found here

Stanford Financial had $100 million D&O insurance. The primary policy contained a fraud exclusion which does not apply absent a "final adjudication" that the prohibited conduct had occurred. The policy also contains a "money laundering" exclusion, which the insurers contend precludes coverage. The money laundering exclusion specifies that it does not apply "until such time as it is determined that the alleged act or acts did in fact occur."

In its March 15 opinion, the Fifth Circuit considered whose determination of the facts this exclusionary provision requires. The court emphasized that the provision does not specify that the insurer was to make this determination. The court commented that "while there is nothing remarkable about an insurer reserving the right to make a unilateral coverage decision, it is equally unremarkable to require an insurer to be explicit when doing so, rather than leaving the reader to ponder the word ‘it’."

The Fifth Circuit also considered the wording contrast between the fraud exclusion, which requires a "final adjudication," and the money laundering exclusions "in fact" wording, and observed that the difference between the two exclusions’ wordings boils down to the judicial proceeding in which the determination is to be made. The "final adjudication" provision, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, requires the determination to be made in the underlying proceeding, but the money laundering exclusion’s "in fact" determination wording requires a judicial determination but allows that determination to be made in a separate proceeding such as a coverage action.

The Fifth Circuit also held, in contrast to Judge Hittner’s ruling at the district court level, that the evidence relevant to this determination is not limited to the "eight corners" of the insurance policy and the underlying complaint; rather, the policy’s terms expressly contemplate the consideration of "extrinsic evidence" in the determination of policy coverage.

The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, with the added proviso that a judge not involved in the underlying criminal proceedings should consider the insurance coverage issues. The remanded case will be the "collateral vehicle" in which coverage is to be determined.

In the interim, until the determination, the insurers are obligated to advance defense costs until the merits are resolved. To that extent, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction enjoining the insurers from withholding payment of defense expenses until the judicial determination.

 

However, the determination cannot be "final" until the underlying proceeding is resolved, because "a determination of the facts on remand unfavorable to the executives would have to be reconsidered should the executives be cleared of all charges."

Discussion

The money laundering exclusion in the Stanford Financial D&O insurance policy is an unusual provision not found in many D&O insurance policies, and the wording arguably also reflects an unusual and awkward formulation. As the Fifth Circuit said of its own work and of the policy, its construction "is a sensible construction of an awkwardly drafted instrument."

But the Fifth Circuit’s analysis represents more than just a detailed exposition of an awkwardly worded and atypical clause. Most D&O policies have conduct exclusions requiring "determinations" as a prerequisite to the exclusions’ application to a particular set of circumstances. The Fifth Circuit’s orderly analysis of the determination processes implied by various policy formulations will undoubtedly inform future judicial consideration of the "determination" language found in the more typical D&O policy exclusions.

In particular, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis implying a requirement of a judicial determination in the first instance, and precluding unilateral insurer determinations unless expressly provided for, will illuminate coverage analysis whenever these types of conduct exclusions are at issue.

And in the underlying cases, the individual defendants will have their defense expenses advanced, for now, on an interim basis, until there is a determination in the collateral coverage case, and subject to the outcome of the underlying proceedings. Depending on how all of these circumstances unfold, the coverage dispute could go on for a considerable time. For now at least the individuals will be able to fund their defenses.

The Sixth Circuit’s Abercrombie Opinion

The March 11 Decision

In its March 11, 2010 opinion in the Abercrombie & Fitch coverage action, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Abercrombie’s D&O insurer must advance defense expense incurred in connection with the underlying claim. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion can be found here.

The coverage dispute arose out of an unusual sequence of events. Abercrombie had been insured by a $10 million D&O insurance policy that expired on September 1, 2005 (hereafter, the predecessor policy). On September 2, 2005, Abercrombie and certain of its directors and officers were sued in a securities class action lawsuit. Subsequently derivative suits were also filed and an SEC investigation ensued. On September 30, 2005, Abercrombie exercised its right under the predecessor policy to purchase one-year extended reporting period coverage.

Abercrombie also purchased a successor D&O insurance policy with a different insurer with a policy period incepting on September 1, 2005. The successor policy was amended to specify that the successor policy is expressly excess to the predecessor policy for any claims made regarding acts occurring prior to September 1, 2005. The parties to the coverage dispute agree that if the successor policy lacked this excess provision, the predecessor and successor policies would both be primary and would pay loss for the claim (including defense expense) on a pro rata basis.

The predecessor insurer contended that in this deal shifting the burden to provide primary coverage exclusively to the predecessor insurer, Abercrombie violated the policy’s cooperation clause, which specifies that "in the event of a claim," the policyholder "will do nothing that will prejudice [the insurer’s] position or its potential or actual rights of recovery."

The Sixth Circuit rejected the predecessor insurer’s argument, holding that the "purpose" of the cooperation clause, including its "no prejudice" provision, was to "enumerate the parties’ respective rights and obligations when a claim was made against an insured," but it "does not address the parties’ rights and obligations when a policy has elapsed, a claim has been made against a (formerly) insured, and the insured is deciding whether to elect – and how to structure – extended insurance coverage."

The Sixth Circuit added that "there is nothing about" the cooperation clause that "prevents Abercrombie from making fiscally driven business decisions, even if such a decision is unanticipated by an existing or past insurer." The Sixth Circuit also adopted the district court’s statement that it is an "unreasonable interpretation" of the cooperation clause "to find that it requires Abercrombie to structure its insurance needs based not on its own needs and its own best interests, but rather to minimize the insurers’ potential exposure."

Judge Kethledge’s Dissent

Circuit Judge Raymond Kethledge dissented. He emphaszied that the successor policy incepted on September 1 and as originally written was primary, and in fact, Abercrombie first reported the September 2 claim to the successor insurer. Then on September 29, Abercrombie elected discovery coverage, which Judge Kethledge noted "seemed a strange thing to do," since the $820,000 extended reporting period coverage was seemingly duplicative of the coverage in place under the successor policy.

Abercrombie was, Judge Kethledge wrote, "behind the scenes" negotiating with the successor insurer, for the successor insurance to be excess to the predecessor insurer’s coverage. It was not until November 22, 2005 that the successor policy was endorsed to make the successor policy expressly excess.

The effect of these changes, Judge Kethledge noted, was "retroactively to foist" on the predecessor insurer "the entire burden of coverage for the claim up to the $10 million policy limit." The reason Abercrombie did that, and was willing to pay the $820,000 premium for the extended reporting period coverage, was that in exchange the successor insurer waived its $2 million retention for the securities claims and promised not to increase Abercrombie’s premium for the following renewal.

Judge Kethledge viewed these events as having "prejudiced" the predecessor insurer in violation of the "no prejudice" provision in the cooperation clause, because it extinguished the predecessor insurer’s right to collect half of the claims costs from the successor insurer. Judge Rutledge noted that the "very purpose" of Abercrombie’s post claim action was to "increase [the predecessor’s] liability by $5 million and to extinguish its contribution claim for that amount." Judge Rutledge found the no prejudice clause’s requirement that the policyholder "do nothing" to prejudice that predecessor to be unambiguous and to clearly govern these circumstances.

Discussion

What makes this situation so awkward is that Abercrombie’s negotiations with the successor insurer took place after the claim arrived. The opinion is not sufficiently clear on this point, but it seems as if at the time of the September 1, 2005 renewal the successor insurer competed to move onto the account and then got smacked by a claim airmailed in the second day it was on the policy.

It isn’t clear who initiated the negotiations, but the successor insurer was bargaining to reduce its exposure to the walk in claim. Reading between the lines, the predecessor insurer’s gripe is not with Abercrombie but with the successor insurer, for (as Judge Kethledge put it) "foisting" the claim on the predecessor insurer.

The deal Abercrombie and the successor insurer struck clearly benefited both of them – the successor insurer reduced its claim expense (for a claim that was clearly made during its policy period), and Abercrombie was able to obtain valuable concessions.

I can certainly see why the predecessor insurer objected under these circumstances. The question is whether as a matter of contractual rights and duties (as opposed to more basic notions of fair play) the detrimental impact of the successor insurer’s deal with Abercrombie represents the kind of "prejudice" that violates the provisions of the cooperation clause.

On the one hand, as a result of the deal, the predecessor insurer was obligated to do nothing more than it was otherwise obligated to do under the extended reporting period coverage, which all agree that Abercrombie was entitled to purchase, even if it did so after the claim came in.

On the other hand, the predecessor insurer’s rights and obligations under its policy also include the right to proceed against alternative sources of recovery. Abercrombie’s entry into the deal with the successor insurer compromised the predecessor insurer’s rights and it did so after the claim had come in. You can certainly see the predecessor insurer’s argument that this violated the requirement that the policy "do nothing" after a claim to prejudice the predecessor insurer’s right of recovery.

The majority found that there is nothing in the policy to prevent Abercrombie from structuring its insurance according to its own interests. There is certainly nothing here to suggest that Abercrombie did anything to prejudice the underlying claim. Moreover, there is nothing about the "no prejudice" provision that requires a policyholder to subordinate its interests to those of the insurer, and that consideration seems particularly relevant after a policy’s expiration.

In the end we may all nod sympathetically in response to the plight of the predecessor insurer here. Our sympathetic nods, however, reflect the sentiment expressed in the words of Judge Keithridge’s dissent: "What is legal is sometimes different than what is right."

And Finally: "Cigarettes are very like weasels – perfectly harmless unless you put one in your mouth and try to set fire to it." Boothby Graffoe.

Data Privacy and Security: The "Stealth Issue" of 2010?

Data security and privacy could be the "stealth issue of 2010," according to a recent report. Despite the intense focus on financial and related issues during the current economic crisis, a variety of legislative and regulatory initiatives suggest that data privacy and security issues necessarily will become a top corporate priority. These developments have important risk management consequences, among which are the increasing importance of privacy breach and network security liability insurance within a company’s overall insurance program.

 

Recent Regulatory and Legislative Action

A March 12, 2010 Law Technology News article entitled "The Evolving Landscape of Data Privacy" (here), takes a comprehensive look at the various recent regulatory and legislative developments raising the importance of data security and privacy issues.

 

As the article emphasizes, several new federal and state privacy regimes go into effect this year. In particular, the FTC’s long-delayed Red Flag rules will become effective on June 1, 2010. These rules will require "financial institutions" and "creditors" (as those terms are defined in the rules) to implement a written identity theft protection program designed to detect the warning signs of identify theft, to prevent the crime, and to anticipated the damage it inflicts. The FTC’s guide to the new rules can be found here.

 

In addition, the Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation has promulgated its "Standards for the Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth" (here), which applies to persons who "own, license, store or maintain personal information about a resident of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

 

The regulation requires all affected persons to "develop, implement, maintain and monitor a comprehensive, written information security program applicable to any records containing such personal information." The regulations include the requirement that the affected persons must "adopt comprehensive security programs that include technical administrative and physical safeguards for both electronic and paper records."

 

The state level action in Massachusetts suggests the possibility of similar actions in other states, which raises the specter of a confusing patchwork of different regulatory requirements, a situation that cries out for uniform regulation at the federal level. In that context it is hardly surprising that there are Congressional initiatives in this area as well.

 

On December 8, 2009, the House passed the Data Accountability and Trust Act (H.R. 2221), about which refer here. The legislation would, among other things, require all businesses to implement safeguards to protect reasonably foreseeable data vulnerabilities and to notify customers if their personal information is breached. Similar initiatives are receiving Senate consideration. Though the Senate has a great deal of other things on its plate right now, it is possible this legislation could still get through, perhaps as part of another larger bill (for example, a financial reform bill).

 

Practical Steps, Including Insurance Solutions

It seems probable that these kinds of regulatory and legislative initiatives will continue to emerge in the months and years ahead. In light of these concerns, the article cited above suggests that companies adopt compliance strategies, including: reviewing how their firms safeguard non-public customer and employee data; adopting risk-based safeguards and controls that encompass industry best practices and make use of available technology; and reviewing their firms’ data privacy policies and notices.

 

In addition to these practical steps, every company’s data privacy and security risk management should also include the acquisition of a privacy breach and network security liability insurance policy. These policies have been available for some time, but in recent years, both their availability and their scope of coverage have improved significantly. There are now a variety of commercially attractive insurance products available in this area.

 

Because this insurance product is relatively new, there still is some skepticism over the need for this type of insurance protection. Some of this resistance is simply due to the lack of familiarity with the numerous and growing sources of exposure in this area. As time goes by and the extent of corporate vulnerabilities becomes increasingly apparent, this reluctance will eventually fade, a process that will undoubtedly be accelerated by the increasing amount and extent of the growing regulatory requirements.

 

Another source of skepticism about his product arises from the view that the consumer actions that have been filed so far have not fared particularly well. Some of the consumer cases have indeed been unsuccessful (refer for example here), in part because consumers have a difficult time showing proximately caused damages. In light of consumer concerns when data breaches occur, however, it seems likely that consumers affected by data breaches will continue to bring these kinds of actions, which at a minimum means a continuing defense costs exposure.

 

Companies that suffer data breaches will continue to have both notification and remediation requirements, which even in relatively modest breaches can entail an enormous expense. A recent study relating to data security breaches in the United States (link unavailable) shows that the average 2009 per-incident costs were $6.75 million. The costs included an average cost of $204 per customer with a potentially compromised data record.

 

In addition, companies sustaining data breaches are subject to the costs of regulatory investigations, as well as penalties and fines. While not all of these costs will be insured in every instance, remediation costs and legal expense will be covered in many instances. Many policies offer fines and penalties coverage on a sub-limited basis under certain circumstances.

 

Finally, because of the likelihood that plaintiffs’ lawyers will continue to press these issues when data breaches occur, there is a continuing danger that plaintiffs lawyers will succeed in imposing liability on persons they contend are responsible for the data breach. The policies cover negligence or failure to protect or safeguard confidential data, even for acts of rogue employees or vendor employees. Some policies will apply in instances of employee negligence such as lost or stolen laptops.

 

Some of the insurance products also provide protection in the event of cyber extortion, for example in connection with the threat of a disclosure of a security breach or a denial of service attack. Some policies also provide first party coverage in the event of electronic business interruption or reimbursement coverage for the cost to replace or reconstruct digital assets.

 

Insurance for privacy liability and network security is still a developing product area, but with the passage of time, more and more companies are recognizing that their insurance programs are incomplete without this kind of protection. The evolution of this product very similar to where we were several years ago when Employment Practices Liability insurance came along. At first, takeup of the product was slow. But over time the product improved and the need for the insurance became more self-evident, and now pretty much every company has EPL insurance. Within a very short time, the same will also be true of privacy liability and network security insurance.

 

The fact is that, particularly in the current regulatory and legislative environment, every company is susceptible to these kinds of problems and so every kind of company should consider this insurance as an important part of a complete corporate insurance program.

 

Guest Post: More About D&O Insurance Coverage for Special Litigation Committee Expenses

In recent posts (here and here), I have discussed the issues surrounding coverage under D&O insurance policies for investigative costs and special litigation committee expenses. In response to these posts, readers Jeff Kiburtz and Cindy Forman of the Santa Monica law firm of Shapiro Rodarte & Forman have submitted the following guest blog post. This guest post of course reflects the views of the post’s authors, and not necessarily those of the author of The D&O Diary. Cindy and Jeff's guest post is as follows:  

 

Having recently ended an unusual week straight of rain in normally sunny Los Angeles, the saying "when it rains it pours" comes to mind. This phrase aptly describes the situation in which many companies find themselves when revelations of accounting irregularities or other alleged misconduct surface – first there is a story in the press, then a letter indicating the SEC opened an informal investigation, next a DOJ subpoena, and, sometime during this period, the company’s stock drops and a shareholder makes a demand for an investigation or forgoes the demand and files a derivative suit.

 

The response to this downpour is immediate and expensive. Typically, at least three sets of law firms are retained – one to handle the government investigations and private litigation, a second to conduct an internal investigation and report to a special committee established by the company, and a third, which usually consists of several different firms, to defend the implicated directors and officers.

 

Recognizing the potential to spend large amounts of money very quickly, in-house counsel and the company’s outside lawyers move to create a division of labor between the various firms to coordinate the overall effort. Central projects such as the review, coding and scanning for privilege of all of the documents potentially relevant to the underlying issue are assigned to a specific firm, frequently the internal investigation counsel. Work specific or unique to the various groups is, however, done by the respective group’s own counsel.

 

Although each firm represents the unique interests of their clients, and potential or actual conflicts are therefore implicit, in many circumstances the various interests are largely aligned and the attorneys can and do work together for the mutual benefit of all. If, for example, the company needs to respond to a DOJ document subpoena, there is no reason their theoretically diverging interests should prevent the company’s defense counsel from tapping into the document review work done by the internal investigation counsel to locate responsive documents.

 

The single greatest beneficiary of this collaboration is the company, which in many circumstances is required to pay the bill for all of the various lawyers. We would think that, by extension, the company’s D&O insurers would also see and appreciate the extent to which collaboration between the various groups reduces the overall legal spend. It seems, however, that many D&O insurers are quite restrained in their enthusiasm, often declining coverage for various categories of fees incurred by the company under numerous theories. One fee category that is almost uniformly declined is fees incurred by internal investigation counsel, which, perhaps coincidentally, also happens to be the largest single line-item in many situations.

 

When declining coverage for internal investigation fees, insurers often argue that because the definition of "Claim" does not specifically reference internal investigations, fees incurred by internal investigation counsel were not incurred "in connection with a Claim." Insurers also argue that the internal investigation counsel represents only the special committee, which typically is not one of the enumerated categories of "Insureds" under most D&O policies. A related argument is that internal investigation counsel is supposed to be neutral and objective, such that their work cannot be described as defensive in nature and, therefore, cannot be considered "defense costs."

 

Most policyholders regard these arguments as formalistic and compartmentalized, divorced from the business realities of these "when it rains it pours" situations. For one, the carriers do not give adequate consideration to the fact that much of the internal investigation work (e.g., construction of an electronic document database and obtaining witness statements) is relevant and necessary to defending any securities claim or government investigation, and would need to be performed even in the absence of any internal investigation. In this sense, the insurer’s objection is one of form not substance, as the nature of the substantive work is less relevant to the insurer than the designation of the firm who handled that work (e.g., document review conducted by defense counsel is admittedly covered, but that same work is allegedly not covered merely because it was performed by internal investigation counsel).

 

Further, the insurers’ arguments tend to disregard the direct and obvious connection between the allegations of and investigation into potential wrongdoing and the coordinated effort taken and paid for by the company to investigate and respond in an appropriate manner. When the allegations surface, all of the attorneys involved, whether they represent the company, the special committee or the individual insureds. need to review documents and interview witnesses to determine the relevant underlying facts that impact their respective clients’ interests. It often is not until much later, if at all, that facts surface which demonstrate that the various parties’ interests are in fact adverse. That the information gained during the earlier investigation phases might be used by the special committee in a manner inconsistent with coverage (e.g., advising the board to pursue litigation against directors and officers) does not justify a wholesale declination of all fees incurred by the special committee.

 

A few of these issues came up in the recent MBIA v. Federal Ins. Co. coverage action Kevin has addressed (here and here), where the court seemed not to have been overly warm to the legal principles underlying the insurer’s arguments.

 

 

Federal argued that the firm which handled the internal investigation, Dickstein Shapiro, represented only the special committee, not the company or any of the other insureds. Although the court dismissed this argument on a factual basis (finding that Dickstein made an appearance on behalf of the company in the securities litigation), it also noted that, independent of this fact, the special committee was comprised of members of the board of directors who were expressly charged with acting in the best interest of the company and who "could readily reach independent decisions without being independent of [the company]." While this portion of the opinion could have been more clear, the court’s decision cuts against both the notion that special committees are necessarily separate "entities" from the company and that their required independence precludes characterizing as "defense costs" the work done on their behalf.

 

Another aspect of the court’s decision in MBIA is also worth noting. Insurers frequently argue that internal investigation counsel’s work was not performed "in connection with a Claim," but rather was performed "in connection with" something other than a "Claim," e.g., an internal investigation. This argument makes relevant the causal nexus implied by the "in connection with" language. Policyholders often argue that the implied nexus in this non-exclusionary term is very broad, something akin to an incidental or minimal causal connection; for example, the fees are covered if they bear some reasonable relationship to a covered claim. In our experience, insurers appear reluctant to characterize the allegedly required nexus, but by implication seem to suggest something like predominant causation; for example, the fees are covered only if the predominant reason for doing the work was to defend against the covered claim. While it does not appear that the parties in the MBIA case briefed this issue, by finding coverage for the internal investigation fees related to the derivative suits the court arguably recognized that "in connection with" implies only a minimal causal connection in this context.

 

The insurance bar is likely concerned by the MBIA decision, as it could have widespread implications. It will be interesting to see whether Federal seeks appellate review or whether insurers in the future will simply seek to downplay the significance of a district court decision and attempt to confine it to the facts before the court. 

 

The D&O Diary would like to thank Cindy and Jeff again for their submission of this guest post. The D&O Diary accepts appropriate guest posts from responsible commentators on topics relevant to this blog. My goal in hosting guest posts is to encourage discussion of important topics and to facilitate the exchange of contrasting points of view. Readers who are interested in submitting guest posts should feel free to let me know using the "Contact" function on this blog. 

 

 

Can Insurers Really Just Cancel Bank D&O Insurance?

The problems facing many banks in the current economic environment are well-documented. For troubled banks’ directors and officers, the banks’ D&O insurance may represent a last line of protection. But what if the insurers could just cancel the policies? Surprisingly, many bank D&O insurers have that right under their policies, and while cancellation is rare, it is not unprecedented, and some insurers are now invoking that right to shed the risks associated with failing or problem institutions.

 

As reflected in a January 24, 2010 FinCri Advisor article entitled "Your D&O Insurer Might Be Scouring Your Call Report Looking to Cancel Coverage" (here), the policy forms of many bank D&O insurers have cancellation clauses that permit the insurer to cancel the policies mid-term, either because there is a "material change in the risk" or for any reason at all.

 

Many of these clauses are found only in policies that were issued on a multiyear basis, but even some single-year bank D&O insurance policies contain cancellation clauses. While many policies also specify that the insurer must give the policyholder 60 days (or more) notice so that the policyholder can try to replace coverage, the fact is that if something serious enough to cause the insurer to cancel coverage has occurred, it likely will be a very difficult time for the policyholder to try to find replacement coverage.

 

For D&O insurance practitioners who don’t venture into the Financial Institutions arena (or FI as it is known), the very existence of these clauses in bank D&O policies may come as a surprise, since these clauses do not appear in most mainstream commercial D&O insurance policies.

 

The obvious question is how did a cancellation clause get into bank D&O policies when it is rarely if ever seen in other kinds of D&O insurance policies? Part of the answer is that, particularly with respect to community banks, the D&O insurance marketplace has over the years become both very specialized and intensely competitive.

 

Before the current troubled bank era began, D&O insurance for community banks became increasingly less expensive. But as buyers became increasingly (or even exclusively) focused on price, some carriers looked for ways to trim coverage. And so a term such as the cancellation clause that isn’t seen in other D&O insurance policies found its way into the basic forms of several community bank D&O insurance carriers.

 

A neutral observer might question the value of a contract that one party can simply cancel unilaterally. The promise to provide insurance seems tenuous indeed if the insurer can walk away because problems have emerged – which is of course the very circumstance for which buyers purchase insurance in the first place.

 

All of this does raise the question of why any buyer would agree in the first place to accept a policy that has a cancellation clause. The answer is either that the buyer is unaware the clause is there or the buyer has no other choice.

 

Given the number of bank D&O insurers that have cancellation clauses in the policy forms, there undoubtedly are many banks whose policies have these clauses. I am guessing only a very small number of these banks (many of whom may have purchased their insurance on a direct basis) have any idea the clauses are there.

 

The problem is that the market for D&O insurance for banking institutions is in turmoil now due to the number of failed and troubled banks. For banks that are struggling, it may be challenging in the current environment to obtain a policy without a cancellation clause. Or, if they can a policy without a cancellation clause, the coverage afforded may otherwise be restricted (as for example, by the inclusion of a regulatory exclusion or the absence of past acts coverage).

 

Healthy financial institutions in many instances can still get coverage on a relatively attractive basis. Healthier banks should not have to accept a policy with a cancellation clause. However, even the healthy banks can only avoid the cancellation clause and other undesirable policy features if their advisor is well-informed and knows what to look and ask for.

 

One added note is that even some bank D&O policies that do not have cancellation clauses have other undesirable features that are almost as bad. For example, the policy form of at least one D&O insurer that is active with community banks does not allow the policyholder the option of purchasing extended reporting period coverage, even in the event of nonrenewal, which could have a similarly negative impact on a bank whose D&O insurance is not renewed. Again the presence or absence of an extended reporting period option is a term that the bank’s D&O insurance advisor will, if well-informed and knowledgeable, be looking for.

 

For the banks whose D&O insurers hit them with a notice of cancellation, the only recourse may be for the banks to provide their insurers with a "laundry list" notice of circumstances that may give rise to a claim – always a challenging proposition because of the uncertainty of knowing what claims may arise later. But the laundry list may be the only chance the bank has to lock in coverage before it is unilaterally taken away.

 

All of this underscores the critical importance for banks and for all insurance buyers of involving a knowledgeable and experience advisor in the acquisition of D&O insurance. Without informed advice, policyholders can be left with inadequate insurance protection when problems arise.

 

Court Orders Stanford Financial D&O Insurers to Advance Defense Expenses

The individual defendants in the various Stanford Financial-related SEC enforcement and criminal proceedings have been engaged in a long-running and procedurally complicated battle over whether the firm’s D&O insurers must advance the individuals defense expenses. In a sweeping January 26, 2010 opinion (here), Southern District of Texas Judge David Hittner rejected the grounds on which the insurers sought to avoid coverage and ruled that the insurers must advance the individuals’ defense costs.

 

Background and the January 26 Opinion

The defense fee dispute has a complex procedural history but for purposes of the January 26 opinion the critical fact is that on November 16, 2009, the insurers sent the individuals letters "retroactively declining to extend coverage for costs." The insurers contended that coverage was precluded by the Policy’s "money laundering" exclusion. The exclusion precludes coverage for loss "arising directly or indirectly as a result of or in connection with any act or acts (or alleged act or acts) of Money Laundering," as that term is defined in the policy.

 

In his opinion, Judge Hittner noted that the carrier’s were not seeking to avoid coverage based on the exclusion precluding coverage for fraud or criminal misconduct, because that exclusion has a requirement of an "adjudication" that the precluded conduct had occurred. The money laundering exclusion has no "adjudication" requirement, leaving, the insurers’ argued, the determination that money laundering has in fact occurred, to the insurers.

 

Judge Hittner also noted parenthetically that the insurers urged this position even though only one of the twenty-one counts in the criminal action alleges money laundering or conspiracy to commit money laundering. (The insurers argued that the policy’s definition of money laundering was broad enough to encompass all of the allegations.)

 

The plaintiffs first opposed the insurers’ position based on the "eight corners" rule, arguing under Texas law that in determining an insurer’s defense obligations, a court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the policy and the four corners of the complaint. Judge Hittner found that despite the insurers’ arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court of Texas "never has recognized an exception to the eight corners rule."

 

Judge Hittner was in any event strongly against a broader view of what a court properly might consider in determining the insurers’ obligations.

 

If a contemporaneous duty to advance or reimburse defense costs were judge on an "actual facts" basis, an insurer’s contractual obligation to pay defense costs could change on a daily basis as additional "facts" are developed. Essentially, coverage that directors and officers relied upon and expected when the Policies were purchased on their behalf could be withdrawn at the insurer’s whim. If, as Underwriters suggest, the Policies afford Underwriters absolute discretion to withhold payments whenever charges of intentional dishonesty are leveled against directors and officers, then insurers will be able to withhold payment in virtually every case at their discretion. That would leave directors and officers in an extremely vulnerable postion , as any allegation of dishonesty, not matter how groundless, could bring financial ruin on a director or officer. Essentially an insurer could act as judge and jury and convict its own insureds, thus avoiding any further financial responsibility for the insureds’ defense. This simply cannot be the case. (Citations omitted.)

 

The court found in applying the eight corners rule that the allegations were insufficient to establish that the precluded conduct had occurred. The insurers nevertheless sought to argue that the individuals refusal to testify in support of the application for a preliminary injunction is proof enough that the allegations against the individuals are true. The insurers sought to argue that the refusal to testify supported an inference that money laundering did in fact occur.

 

Judge Hittner held that the "given the magnitude, complexity and nature of the charges," he declined to draw the inference, and that in any event, because of the eight corners rule, the insurers’ reliance on the supposed inference from the individuals refusal to testify is "misplaced."

 

Judge Hittner, applying the standard required for a preliminary injunction motions ruled that though the money laundering exclusion does not require a judicial determination to apply, the exclusion’s requirements "also may mean much more than an insurer’s own determination." He said that he need not decide what level of factual determination must be made, and instead ruled only that plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits at trial, satisfying the standard for awarding preliminary injunctive relief.

 

The court, in further consideration of the preliminary injunction standard, noted that the plaintiffs would suffer "irreparable harm" if the relief they sought was withheld. He noted that it is "unmistakable and cannot be seriously disputed" that the harm the individuals will suffer is "real, immediate and irreparable." He rejected the insurers contrary position that, he said, would "essentially require [the individuals] to prove their innocence." Judge Hittner commented that
 

 

Underwriters’ position is absurd because these circumstances are precisely why corporations procure D&O insurance on behalf of their directors and officers. Indeed, it would contravene the very purpose of the Policies – as well as the policy language itself – to require Plaintiffs to prove their innocence before being entitled to funds for their defense.

 

Judge Hittner found the harm to the insurers from granting the preliminary injunction was relatively slight and that public interest also weighed in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. He finally held that the individuals did not have to post a bond.

 

Discussion

Given the nature of the allegations against the individuals and the notoriety of the circumstances, as well as the number of people who lost money as a result of the collapse of Stanford Financial, the tone and temperature of Judge Hittner’s words are a little surprising. If nothing else is clear, Judge Hittner was certain that individuals needed to be able to defend themselves, and the insurers were obliged to provide the defense. The depth of Judge Hittner’s discussion of these defense cost issues are such that his words may prove useful for other individuals who are seeking to have their defense expenses paid under their policies.

 

You do get the sense that Judge Hittner ducked the hard issue – that is, if the money laundering exclusion, unlike the fraud exclusion, doesn’t have an "adjudication" requirement, then an adjudication can’t be required, so what is sufficient? Given Judge Hittner’s certainty that the eight corner rule is absolute under Texas law, there might be no way to meet the requirement. It does make you wonder whether it matters from a practical perspective whether or not there is an "adjudication" requirement.

 

Even though the usefulness of Judge Hittner’s determinations for others seeking insurance coverage arguably might be limited to those jurisdictions that also absolutely enforce the eight corners rule, the breadth of his pronouncements about the limitations on insurers’ ability to make preclusive coverage determinations virtually guarantees that his phrases will appear in the legal briefs of other individuals who are seeking defense cost coverage. His unwillingness to allow the individuals’ refusal to testify on their own behalf in the preliminary injunction proceeding may also prove helpful to other policyholders.

 

Because of the tone of Judge Hittner’s rhetoric and the high profile nature of the case, I suspect there may be some strong views about this decision. I invite readers who have thoughts about this decision to add their views to this post using the blog’s comments feature.

 

A January 26, 2010 Bloomberg article about Judge Hittner’s ruling can be found here.

 

Special thanks to Bill Schreiner of the Zuckerman Spaeder law firm for providing me with a copy of the decision.

 

Vivendi Watch: The Vivendi securities class action case went to the jury on January 11, 2010, but still no verdict. The parties are anxiously awaiting the verdict and in the meantime debating what the length of the jury deliberations may mean, according to a January 26, 2010 article by Andrew Longstreth on AmLaw Litigation Daily (here). The article also reports that almost regardless of the verdict, there will likely be an appeal, if for no reason that because of the potential jurisdictional implications of the National Australia Bank case now pending before the Supreme Court. Stay tuned (to the second power, apparently).

 

EPL Insurance: A "Surprise" Coverage Decision

Every now and then, I read a court opinion on a coverage issue, and though I can understand how the court reached its decision, I still find the outcome surprising and troubling. A January 19, 2010 per curiam opinion from the Connecticut Supreme Court (here) involving a coverage dispute under an Employment Practices Liability (EPL) policy presents a recent example of this kind of decision. The court’s analysis is internally logical, but I suspect the outcome would surprise most EPL policyholders and even many insurance practitioners. The decision may have important implications for the placement and administration of EPL insurance.

 

Background and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s Decision

National Waste Associates was purchased an EPL policy for the period February 15, 2007 to February 15, 2009. On May 12, 2007, a former employee brought a wrongful discharge action against National Waste. National Waste submitted the claim to its EPL carrier. The carrier refused to provide a defense or to indemnify the firm. National Waste filed a lawsuit seeking a judicial declaration of coverage.

 

The carrier took the position that coverage was precluded by the EPL policy’s prior or pending action exclusion. The exclusion provides that the policy does not provide coverage for any claim "based upon, arising out of, [etc.] … any fact, circumstance, situation, transaction, event or wrongful act underlying or alleged in any prior or pending civil, criminal or administrative or regulatory proceeding."

 

The carrier contended that the prior or pending action exclusion had been triggered by the proceedings the employee had brought in 2005 to obtain unemployment benefits. As later recited by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its review of the case, the former employee had claimed, both in pursuing unemployment benefits and in the later wrongful discharge action, that she had been wrongfully discharged after resisting National Waste’s alleged invasion of her privacy.

 

The trial court agreed with the carrier that the unemployment benefit proceedings clearly constituted prior "administrative proceedings" within the meaning of the policy and granted the carrier’s motion for summary judgment. National Waste appealed.

 

In its January 19 per curiam opinion, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, adopting the trial court’s reasoning.

 

Discussion

The court’s reasoning is straightforward and internally logical, particularly if the unemployment benefits proceeding is, as seems to be the case, fairly characterized as an "administrative proceeding" within the meaning of the policy.

 

But as noted in a January 21, 2010 memorandum about the ruling from the Murtha Cullina law firm entitled "Employment Practices Liability Insurance: Surprise Coverage Interpretation" (here), the outcome "no doubt shocked" the employer. The law firm memo identifies the sharp distinction between, for example the circumstances that might be involved had the former employee raised an EEOC charge of discrimination in a prior period, and the circumstances actually presented, with the former employee’s prior filing of proceedings for unemployment benefits.

 

As the law firm memo observes:

 

Unemployment compensation claims are not only very common, but they are typically handled very differently by employers. (For example, employers rarely if ever engage legal counsel to attend unemployment compensation hearings.) The standard for denying unemployment benefits is so high that employers often do not even contest the claims. Even if they do contest, most former employees who lose their jobs for any reason collect benefits. If fact, a claim for unemployment benefits is not even really a claim "against" the employer – it is a claim for state benefits that are funded by a tax on all employers. Moreover no EPLI policy provides coverage for unemployment claims.

 

In light of all of these practical circumstances, it would come as an unexpected and inexplicable revelation to most employers to learn that an unemployment benefits claims in one policy period could preclude coverage for an employment practices claim in another period. The implication is that the employer has to notify their EPL carrier of the unemployment benefits claim in order to preserve EPL coverage if the former employed later files an employment practices claim.

 

Most employers would be completely astonished to learn that their EPL carrier expects to be provided with notice of unemployment benefits proceedings. Indeed the revelation of this expectation is so unanticipated that it has the feel of a trap for the unwary.

 

The message for policyholders and their advisors hoping to avoid the trap seems to be that companies should provide carriers with notice of every single instance where an employee or former employee seeks unemployment benefits. However, given the frequency of these types of proceedings, I suspect strongly that if policyholders gave notice of every instance where an employee or former employee is seeking unemployment benefits, the carriers would quickly find themselves drowning in paper. I doubt the carriers would really want what would ensue.

 

And regardless of what the carriers may want or even expect, it is a serious question whether, as a practical matter, it is fair to penalize companies for failing to take actions that the most companies would have no idea are required of them.

 

This may be one of those instances where the professional liability industry needs to come together to craft a solution to prevent an outcome that no one could possibly really want. (I have in mind the recent sequence of events where the D&O industry, in order to avert the consequences of an unexpected coverage decision, quickly took steps to try to eliminate the possibility of a carrier arguing that a Section 11 settlement did not represent covered "Loss.)

 

Maybe I am being optimistic, but perhaps policyholder representative and the carriers can find a solution that will ensure that EPL insurers will not take the position that an action for employment benefits is not a "claim" or an "administrative action" within the meaning of the policy.

 

I recognize that some readers may take exception, perhaps strong exception, to my analysis. I invite readers to submit their views using the comment feature on this blog.

 

Insurance Coverage for Special Litigation Committee Expenses and Other Web Notes

In an earlier post (here), I wrote about a December 30, 2009 ruling in the MBIA coverage litigation that  special litigation committee investigation expense are covered under a D&O liability insurance policy. As I anticipated, the decision has proven to be controversial.

 

Two law firms that traditionally act as coverage counsel for D&O carriers recently released memoranda discussing the opinion. The Wiley Rein issued a brief memo (here) discussing the case and its holding. The Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge law firm released a longer memorandum (here) also discussing the opinion.

 

 

The Edwards Angell memo, written by my friend John McCarrick and his colleagues, Maurice Pesso and Peter de Boisblanc, is particularly interesting because opens by reviewing the justification for the insurers’ standard position that special litigation committee expenses are not covered under the typical D&O insurance policy.

 

 

 

 The Edwards Angell memo also includes a review of implications of and the likely consequences that flow from the decision. Among other things, the memo stresses that the decision did not hold that special litigation committee expenses will always be covered, but only under the facts presented. The memo also recites the difficulties and logical problems involved with characterizing the special litigation committee expenses as “defense costs” (including the likelihood that plaintiffs might use the characterization as a way of challenging the independence of the special litigation committee.).

 

 

 

The Edwards Angell memo concludes with the observation that

 

 

 

Unless and until the D&O insurers in MBIA press a successful appeal of this ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, D&O insurers should brace themselves for the likelihood that the MBIA ruling will be cited by policyholder counsel and brokers in an effort to significantly expand the scope of coverage for these kinds of legal expenses and costs, as well as to cover other fees and expenses that an insured can argue were incurred “in connection with” a covered D&O claim.

 

 

 

The memo provides an interesting presentation of the carrier perspective on the decision. Reading the memo, I wondered whether any policyholder-side coverage attorneys had written their own analyses of the decision from the perspective of insured companies. I hope that any readers aware of these alternative perspectives will please send them along to me. I will update this post with any additional materials that are sent to me about the case.

 

 

 

NAB Update: The closely watched National Bank of Australia case pending before the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari from the Second Circuit has now been scheduled for oral argument. According to a post on The 10b5-Daily (here), oral argument in the case, which will address the question of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign domiciled companies under the U.S. securities laws, is now set for March 29, 2010.

 

 

 

The 10b-5 Daily post also has a link to the Petitioners’ Brief., which argues that under the federal securities laws there are no extraterritorial limitations on the U.S. courts’ jurisdiction. Finally, the blog post also links to a National Law Journal article (here) written by Columbia Law School Professor John Coffee suggesting that, in light of various pending legislative proposals, Congress and the Supreme Court are on a “collision course” on the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. securities laws. Coffee concludes by suggesting that “a legal train wreck might result from opposing approaches to global class actions.”

 

 

 

Detailed background regarding the NAB case can be found here.

 

 

 

Another Belated Securities Lawsuit Filing: In prior posts (for example, here), I have noted the phenomenon that developed in the second-half of 2009 where plaintiffs’ lawyers were filing securities class action lawsuit complaints well after the proposed class period cutoff date. In a more recent post (here), I noted that at least one lawsuit first filed in January suggested that this trend has continued in the New Year.

 

 

 

Yet another case filed this week suggests that this trend is continuing. In a January 21, 2010 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers announced that they had filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois against Motorola and certain of its directors and officers. The lawsuit relates to alleged misrepresentations about the company’s sales of its RAZR2 telephone handset. The complaint in the case can be found here.

 

 

 

Though the complaint was only just filed, the proposed class period cutoff date is January 22, 2008, a full one year and 364 days prior to the filing date, and just before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations applicable to ’34 Act claims.

 

 

 

In his comments in connection with the recent release of Cornerstone’s year-end analysis of the securities class action lawsuits, Stanford Law School Professor Joseph Grundfest had a number of choice comments about these belated securities class action lawsuit filings, essentially suggesting that the plaintiffs are scraping the bottom of the barrel (my words, not his) to file these belated lawsuits because they had run out of more meritorious cases to file. Public statements by leading plaintiffs’ attorneys (refer, for example, here) suggest more neutrally that they are just getting around to filing cases that were “backburnered” while the lawyers were concentrating on getting the subprime and credit crisis cases on file.

 

 

 

But whatever the explanation may be for the belated case filings, it is a very distinct phenomenon that has appears to be continuing as move well into 2010.

 

 

 

New SEC Climate Change Disclosure Guidance Ahead?: In prior posts (here), I discussed the possibility that the SEC could issue guidelines for public companies’ disclosures about climate change related issues and exposures. As discussed on the FEI Financial Reporting Blog (here), the SEC has announced (here) that in a meeting on January 27, 2010, it will be considering “a recommendation to publish an interpretive release to provide guidance to public companies regarding the Commission's current disclosure requirements concerning matters relating to climate change.”

 

 

 

As the FEI Financial Reporting Blog explains, an interpretive release of this type is designed to provide final guidance on existing disclosure requirements. The blog post speculates that the guidance could be effective immediately upon release.

 

 

 

Cheers: I have joined the Facebook group "A Glass of Wine Solves Everything" (here). Although I can't account for every glass, I can testify that I have developed an appreciation for two very different reds, Oregon Pinot Noir and Argentine Malbec. Although I must admit that these preferences manifest one of my biggest problems, which is the mismatch between my tastes and my pocketbook. Somehow, I don't  think I will be able to work my way a glass of wine at a time to the point where I can afford the Burgundys, Bordeauxs and Super Tuscans that I would really prefer to apply to solving my problems.

 

Insurance Coverage for Special Litigation Committee Expenses and Other Web Notes and Updates

In an earlier post (here), I wrote about a December 30, 2009 ruling in the MBIA coverage litigation that special litigation committee investigation expenses were covered under a D&O liability insurance policy. As I anticipated, the decision has proven to be controversial.

 

Two law firms that traditionally act as coverage counsel for D&O carriers recently released memoranda discussing the opinion. The Wiley Rein issued a brief memo (here) discussing the case and its holding. The Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge law firm released a longer memorandum (here) also discussing the opinion.

 

The Edwards Angell memo, written by my friend John McCarrick and his colleagues, Maurice Pesso and Peter de Boisblanc, is particularly interesting because opens by reviewing the justification for the insurers’ standard position that special litigation committee expenses are not covered under the typical D&O insurance policy.

 

The Edwards Angell memo also includes a review of implications of and the likely consequences that flow from the decision. Among other things, the memo stresses that the decision did not hold that special litigation committee expenses will always be covered, but only under the facts presented. The memo also recites the difficulties and logical problems involved with characterizing the special litigation committee expenses as "defense costs" (including the likelihood that plaintiffs might use the characterization as a way of challenging the independence of the special litigation committee.).

 

The Edwards Angell memo concludes with this observation:

 

Unless and until the D&O insurers in MBIA press a successful appeal of this ruling to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, D&O insurers should brace themselves for the likelihood that the MBIA ruling will be cited by policyholder counsel and brokers in an effort to significantly expand the scope of coverage for these kinds of legal expenses and costs, as well as to cover other fees and expenses that an insured can argue were incurred "in connection with" a covered D&O claim.

 

The memo provides an interesting presentation of the carrier perspective on the decision. Reading the memo, I wondered whether any policyholder-side coverage attorneys had written their own analyses of the decision from the perspective of insured companies. I hope that any readers aware of these alternative perspectives will please send them along to me. I will update this post with any additional materials that are sent to me about the case.

 

One final note on a related subject -- the Wilmer Hale law firm has an interesting memo about recent developments in shareholder derivative litigation (here), which, among other things, discusses court's' increased scrutiny of special litigation committees, particularly with respect to the  question whether or not the committees are in fact independent.

 

NAB Update: The closely watched National Bank of Australia case pending before the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari from the Second Circuit has now been scheduled for oral argument. According to a post on The 10b5-Daily (here), oral argument in the case, which will address the question of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign domiciled companies under the U.S. securities laws, is now set for March 29, 2010.

 

The 10b-5 Daily post also has a link to the Petitioners’ Brief., which argues that under the federal securities laws there are no extraterritorial limitations on the U.S. courts’ jurisdiction. Finally, the blog post also links to a National Law Journal article (here) written by Columbia Law School Professor John Coffee suggesting that, in light of various pending legislative proposals, Congress and the Supreme Court are on a "collision course" on the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the U.S. securities laws. Coffee concludes by suggesting that "a legal train wreck might result from opposing approaches to global class actions."

 

Detailed background regarding the NAB case can be found here.

 

Another Belated Securities Lawsuit Filing: In prior posts (for example, here), I have noted the phenomenon that developed in the second-half of 2009 where plaintiffs’ lawyers were filing securities class action lawsuit complaints well after the proposed class period cutoff date. In a more recent post (here), I noted that at least one lawsuit first filed in January suggested that this trend has continued in the New Year.

 

Yet another case filed this week suggests that this trend is continuing. In a January 21, 2010 press release (here), plaintiffs’ lawyers announced that they had filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois against Motorola and certain of its directors and officers. The lawsuit relates to alleged misrepresentations about the company’s sales of its RAZR2 telephone handset. The complaint in the case can be found here.

 

Though the complaint was only just filed, the proposed class period cutoff date is January 22, 2008, a full one year and 364 days prior to the filing date, and just before the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations applicable to ’34 Act claims.

 

In his comments in connection with the recent release of Cornerstone’s year-end analysis of the securities class action lawsuits, Stanford Law School Professor Joseph Grundfest had a number of choice comments about these belated securities class action lawsuit filings, essentially suggesting that the plaintiffs are scraping the bottom of the barrel (my words, not his) to file these belated lawsuits because they had run out of more meritorious cases to file. Public statements by leading plaintiffs’ attorneys (refer, for example, here) suggest more neutrally that they are just getting around to filing cases that were "backburnered" while the lawyers were concentrating on getting the subprime and credit crisis cases on file.

 

But whatever the explanation may be for the belated case filings, it is a very distinct phenomenon that has appears to be continuing as move well into 2010.

 

New SEC Climate Change Disclosure Guidance Ahead?: In prior posts (here), I discussed the possibility that the SEC could issue guidelines for public companies’ disclosures about climate change related issues and exposures. As discussed on the FEI Financial Reporting Blog (here), the SEC has announced (here) that in a meeting on January 27, 2010, it will be considering "a recommendation to publish an interpretive release to provide guidance to public companies regarding the Commission's current disclosure requirements concerning matters relating to climate change."

 

As the FEI Financial Reporting Blog explains, an interpretive release of this type is designed to provide final guidance on existing disclosure requirements. The blog post speculates that the guidance could be effective immediately upon release.

 

Cheers: I have joined the Facebook group "A Glass of Wine Solves Everything." (here). In vino veritas, dude. I recently have developed an affinity for two very different kinds of red, Oregon Pinot Noir and Argentine Malbec -- in part because one of the problems I have to solve is that I can't afford the Burgundys, Bordeauxs and Super Tuscans I would prefer. In my next life, my blog will be about wine.

 

EEOC Discrimination Complaints Near Record Highs in 2009

According to its January 6, 2010 press release (here), the U.S. Equal Employment Commission announced that near record numbers of workplace discrimination charges were filed with the agency in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009. As reflected in the agency’s statistical presentation, there were 93,277 charges filed in FY 2009, which is the second-highest number the agency has recorded.

 

The highest annual number filings occurred in FY 2008, when 95,402 charges were filed. The FY 2009 filing levels were about 2.2% below the FY 2008 levels, but still well above any prior year. After 2008, the next closest year in terms of filing activity was FY 2002 (during the prior economic downturn), when there were 84,442 filings.

 

Consistent with recent historical trends, the most frequently alleged types of discrimination are race (36%), retaliation (36%) and sex-based discrimination. (A single charge filing may allege multiple types of discrimination.) Allegations based on age-based disability (up about 10%), religion (up 3%) and/or national origin (up 5%) hit record highs. Allegations of age-based discrimination reached the second-highest level ever.

 

The EEOC also reported that through its enforcement, mediation and litigation programs, the agency "recovered more than $376 million in monetary relief for thousands of discrimination victims."

 

The EEOC’s press release states that the "near-historic level of total discrimination charge filings [in FY 2009] may be due to multiple factors," including "greater accessibility of the EEOC to the public, economic conditions, increased diversity and demographic shifts in the labor force, [and] employees’ greater awareness of their rights under law."

 

The sustained record level of EEOC charge filings during the fiscal years 2008 and 2009 should be a matter of concern for every employer. These figures not only underscore the need for every employer to adopt and implement best employment practices, they also highlight the need for every employer to procure employment practices insurance as a critical and indispensible part of their insurance program.

 

The EEOC’s suggestion that the heightened level of filings of individual charges is due in part to the economic conditions and to employees’ greater awareness of their rights also suggests that, as the current economic downturn drags on, the elevated filing levels could continue for some time to come.

 

A January 6, 2010 National Law Journal article about the EEOC’s statistical release can be found here (registration required).

 

Another Securities Class Action Trial: We are all awaiting the outcome of the long running Vivendi trial, which is just wrapping up this week in the Southern District of New York. But while all eyes were on the Vivendi trial, few of us noted that another securities class action trial was going on in the Central District of California, in the American Mutual Funds Fee Litigation.

 

Kudos to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog, who first brought this development to my attention in his blog post here.

 

The case apparently went forward as a bench trial this past summer before Judge Gary Feess, whose December 28, 2009 post-trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law can be found here. Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated the federal securities laws by charging excessive advisory and distribution fees. Judge Feess concluded that the plaintiffs had not sustained their burden of proving that the fees were so "disproportionately large" that they bore "no reasonable relationship" to the services, as the plaintiffs were required to show in order to prevail.

 

As the Securities Litigation Watch details here, there have now been 22 post-1996 securities class action lawsuit cases that have gone to trial (not counting Vivendi), eight of which involved post-PSLRA conduct and that have actually gone to verdict. Taking into account post-verdict motions and appeals, the current scoreboard on these post-PSLRA lawsuit verdicts (according to the SLW’s data) now reads: Defendants 5, Plaintiffs 3. (Soon to be updated, I suppose, after the Vivendi jury reaches a verdict.)

 

Andrew Longstreth’s January 6, 2009 American Lawyer article about the American Mutual Funds Fee Litigation verdict can be found here.

 

Insurer Must Defend Broker Sued in Connection with Stanford Group Fraud

In a January 4, 2010 order (here), Southern District of Texas Judge Nancy Atlas held that an insurance broker’s Professional Liability Insurance insurer must defend the broker and one of its employees in connection with claims arising out of the Stanford Group fraud.

 

Background

The Bowen Miclette & Britt insurance brokerage and one of its employees (Winter) have been named as defendants in several civil actions filed following the revelations of the Stanford Group fraud. The plaintiffs in the cases had deposited money in or invested in Certificates of Deposit issued by the Stanford International Bank (SIB).

 

The plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuits alleged that the brokerage provided the Stanford Group with "safety and soundness letters" that Stanford used in marketing. Among other things, the letters allegedly asserted that SIB was "insured by various Lloyd’s insurance policies" and that SIB had "qualified" for the Lloyd’s policies.

 

The defendants sought to have their insurer under the brokerage’s Professional Liability Insurance policy defend them in the underlying actions. The insurer denied coverage, and in July 2009, the insurer initiated an action against the brokerage and Winter in the Southern District of Texas, seeking a judicial declaration that there was no coverage under the policy for the claims. The defendants counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration of coverage. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

 

The January 4 Order

In her January 4 order, Judge Atlas denied the insurer’s summary judgment motion and granted the defendants’ motions, ruling that the allegations in the complaint gave rise to a duty for the insurer to defend. Judge Atlas’s ruling was without prejudice as to the duty to indemnify, the issues with respect to which she held were not yet justiciable because the underlying actions remain pending.

 

Judge Atlas first concluded that the allegations in the underlying cases about the defendants’ provisions of the "safety and soundness letters" were claims for "Professional Services" within the meaning of the policy.

 

The insurer argued that coverage under the policy nevertheless was precluded by the policy’s securities exclusion, which excluded coverage for any claim "based upon or arising out of any violation or alleged violation" of federal or securities laws. The insurer argued that the underlying complaints alleged securities violations and therefore the exclusion precluded coverage.

 

Judge Atlas agreed that the underlying complaints alleged violations of the securities laws, but noted that the complaints also "alternatively asserted negligence-based claims" that were not within the securities exclusion, and therefore the insurer owed the defendants a duty to defend all claims in the underlying lawsuit.

 

Winter had also sought to have the insurer defend him. Winter was an employee of the brokerage who allegedly had provided and signed the "safety and soundness" letters. The plaintiffs in the underlying case alleged that Winter had not disclosed that he was also a director of SIB.

 

Judge Atlas found that "in none of the three underlying lawsuits are there allegations against Winter in his capacity as a member of SIB’s Board or in any capacity other than an employee of BMB." She found that the allegations against him are based on professional services Winter provided in his capacity as a BMB employee and that the insurer owed him a duty to defend.

 

Discussion

High-profile cases, particularly those charged with headline grabbing fraud allegations, can sometimes be difficult from an insurance perspective. Insurers may well feel that the kinds of things alleged are not the kinds of things for which they undertook to provide insurance. On the other hand, at the outset of a case, the allegations are as yet unproven. And the defendants dragged into a high profile cases need to be able to defend themselves.

 

There may or may not ultimately be indemnity coverage under the policy for the claims against BMB and Winter. But in the meantime, the defendants – who are insureds under the policy – face very serious allegations for which they would likely have trouble defending themselves if there were no insurance available. Unfortunately, in addition to having to defend themselves against very serious allegations in the underlying cases, they also had to deal with a lawsuit brought against them by the insurer from whom they were hoping to obtain a defense.

 

As Judge Atlas found, the complaint contained allegations that potentially come within the policy’s coverage, and so the insurer was obliged to provide a defense. If the defendants (and their insurer) are fortunate, their defense will succeed and the need to address the indemnity issues will never arise.

 

D&O Insurance: Investigative and Special Litigation Committee Defense Expense Held Covered

Among perennial D&O insurance issues are questions whether policy coverage is available for defense expenses incurred in connection with investigative costs, subpoenas and the costs associated with special litigation committees. A December 30, 2009 decision in the coverage lawsuit brought by MBIA against its D&O insurers considered all of these recurring issues, and reached some interesting decisions.

 

Background

For the policy period February 15, 2004 to August 15, 2005, MBIA carried $30 million of D&O insurance, arranged in a primary layer of $15 million and an additional $15 million layer of excess insurance.

 

In 2001, prior to the policy period, the SEC had issued an Order Directing Private Investigation in connection with certain of MBIA’s loss mitigation insurance products. In November and December 2004, the SEC issues subpoenas to MBIA concerning "nontraditional products." The New York Attorney General also issued subpoenas in November and December 2003 regarding nontraditional products. Both the SEC and the NYAG issues additional subpoenas in March 2005. In spring 2005, MBIA, because of concerns about the cumulative impact in the marketplace, asked regulators to forbear from issuing additional subpoenas and agreed to comply voluntarily with informal document requests.

 

In October 2005, MBIA submitted an offer of settlement to the SEC in connection with certain specific transactions. In the offer of settlement, MBIA undertook to retain an independent consultant to review MBIA’s accounting for the transactions. In January 2007, the SEC entered a Cease and Desist Order and the NYAG entered an Assurance of Discontinuance, both of which documents largely incorporated the company’s prior offer of settlement. Thereafter the company hired a consultant to undertake the proposed review.

 

In additional to these regulatory investigations, the company, as nominal defendant, was also sued in two derivative lawsuits, as a result of which the company organized a Special Litigation Committee. An outside law firm "represented the SLC," and according to MBIA, also "represented MBIA through its representation of the SLC." The derivative lawsuits were later dismissed.

 

MBIA claimed that it has spent $29.5 million in defending or responding to the regulatory investigations and the follow-on litigation. The primary insurer had reimbursed $6.4 million but disputed that it was obliged to reimburse other amount incurred. MBIA filed an action against the two insurers alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration that the insurers were obligated to reimburse the company for legal fees and other costs associated with the regulatory investigations and the derivative actions. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

 

The December 30 Ruling

The defendant insurance companies had disputed coverage for the investigative items, in part of the grounds that the matters in connection with which the defense costs were incurred were not "securities claims" within the meaning of the primary policy.

 

The primary policy defined a "securities claim as "a formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document" that "in whole or in part, is based upon, arises from or is in consequence of the purchase or sale of, or offer to purchase or sell, any securities issued by" the company.

 

In his December 30 Order, Southern District of New York Judge Richard M. Berman reviewed each category of defense expense separately.

 

Judge Berman first considered the defendants’ arguments that there was no coverage for fees incurred in responding to the NYAG’s subpoenas because the subpoenas were not a proceeding commenced by the filing of an "order or similar document." Judge Berman first found that the subpoena, which literally "commanded" compliance, was an "order" within the "common understanding" of "an ordinary businessman." He found further than even if it were not an "order" it was "sufficiently a ‘similar document’ that triggers coverage under the policy."

 

Judge Berman then considered the certain aspects of the SEC’s investigation, which the defendant insurers contended pertained to "traditional reinsurance" rather loss mitigation products. The defendants argued that the SEC’s 2001 Order Directing Private Investigation pertained only to the investigation of loss mitigation products, and so the SEC’s investigation of traditional reinsurance transactions was not pursuant to an "order."

 

Judge Berman rejected this argument among other reasons on the grounds that "Defendants have offered no persuasive evidence to support their argument that the SEC ran a series of concurrent investigations."

 

The defendant insurers also argued that the NYAG’s oral requests for documents pertaining to traditional reinsurance transactions were not pursuant to an "order." Judge Berman found that "defendants point to no persuasive evidence to suggest that the NYAG’s request for documents" relating to the reinsurance transactions "were part of separate investigations."

 

MBIA had also sought reimbursement for its costs incurred in connection with the independent consultant. Judge Berman found that there was no coverage under the policy for the costs associated with the independent consultant because MBIA "did not permit Defendants to effectively associate with it" because it did not inform the insurers about the independent consultant (and arguably did not get the insurers consent to agree to the independent consultant) "until at least ten months after it had committed to retaining" the independent consultant.

 

Finally, Judge Berman found that there was coverage under the policy for the fees incurred by counsel for the special litigation committee. MBIA had argued that the law firm had represented MBIA through its representation of the SLC. The carriers argued that the SLC was, by definition, independent, and therefore its counsel could not have represented the company.

 

In rejecting the insurers’ arguments, Judge Berman found that the SLC’s counsel had appeared as counsel for MBIA in the derivative actions and had filed pleading in the actions on behalf of MBIA. But even assuming that the law firm represented only the SLC, Judge Berman found there would still be coverage, because the SLC was composed of individual members of MBIA’s board who were acting pursuant to delegated authority from the board. Judge Berman noted that "the SLC could readily reach independent decisions without being independent of [MBIA]."

 

Discussion

The questions whether the kinds of defense fees in dispute in this case will be covered is often going to be a factor both of the policy language at issue and the specific facts involved. To a certain extent, Judge Berman’s decision may simply be a reflection with a very distinctive set of facts. In particular, it is a rather unusual feature of this set of circumstances that all of the disputed legal fees were incurred after the SEC had entered a formal order of investigation. Given that, it seems as if the only remaining dispute was whether or not the other investigative actions of the regulators were or were not related to the Order.

 

Judge Berman’s finding of coverage for the SLC legal counsel’s expense may also be a reflection of the fact that the law firm also entered an appearance on the company’s behalf in the derivative suit. These circumstances are not always present in connection with disputes over SLC’s counsel’s fees (although that fact certainly does not answer the question of the SLC’s counsel’s fees incurred prior to making an appearance in the derivative suit.)

 

But even though the decision may be a reflection of the particular facts involved, Judge Berman’s ruling nevertheless is significant as an example where a court found coverage for fees incurred with regulatory subpoenas, oral document requests, and special litigation counsel fees.

 

In particular, Judge Berman’s finding that, at least under these circumstances, the policy covered oral document requests and that the policy would have covered the SLC counsel’s defense even if it had not been counsel of record for the company in the derivative suit are particularly noteworthy.

 

Judge Berman’s finding the policy covered the SLC counsel’s expense because the SLC, though independent, was a committee of the Board operating pursuant to the Board’s delegated authority, is particularly noteworthy, and may represent a basis on which other insureds may seek to argue for coverage for SLC counsel fees.

 

This interesting case combines a number of frequently disputed issues. I expect that many readers may have reactions to this ruling and I would be very interested in hearing readers’ thoughts.

 

Top Ten D&O Stories of 2009

2009 was an eventful year, with significant developments across a wide variety of economic, financial, judicial and legislative fronts. With the arrival of the New Year, it seems appropriate to take a look back at the past year’s most significant D&O developments.

 

So, in the finest tradition of year-end punditry, here is The D&O Diary’s list of The Top Ten D&O Stories of 2009.

 

1. Credit Crisis Litigation Wave Wanes: The subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave that began in February 2007 continued to surge as 2009 began, but as the year progressed, the long-running wave finally seemed to lose momentum. During the wave’s nearly three-year duration, there were by my count 205 subprime and credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuits filed, 62 of which were filed in 2009, primarily during the first half of the year.

 

NERA’s annual securities litigation survey noted that during 2008, over 40% of all filings had involved credit crisis cases, but that this proportion decreased to "around 30%" in 2009, and "by the second half of the year, credit crisis filings began to slow down." Nevertheless, the NERA report also noted that "total levels of filings have remained relatively high," as "standard cases appear to have made up much of the decrease in filings related to a slowdown in credit crisis litigation" during the second half of 2009.

 

2. Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Turn to "Backburnered" Cases: One of the main drivers in the return to the filing of "standard cases" in the second half of 2009 was belated filing of cases to which the plaintiffs’ lawyers returned after the credit crisis cases died down. Many of the cases during the second half of 2009 were filed long after the purported class period cut off date, a phenomenon I noted most recently here. According to public statements of one leading plaintiffs’ attorney, the plaintiffs’ lawyers are going back to cases that they have "backburnered for two years."

 

By my count, 22 of the 94 securities class action lawsuits in the second half of the year were filed more than a year after the proposed class period cut-off date. Indeed, NERA noted with respect to the cases that were filed in the second half of 2009 that the average time to filing from the end of the class period to the filing date had grown to 279 days, compared to historical averages of 161 days, and only 69% of the cases in the second half of the year were filed within one year of the end of the class period, compared to historical averages of 84%.

 

The plaintiffs’ lawyers efforts to work off the backlog that developed while they were concentrating on the credit crisis cases poses a challenge for D&O underwriters, because it means that companies with long distant stock price drops could still find themselves getting dragged into securities litigation long after the event. As a result, it is hard for underwriters to be sure when a company is "out of the woods."

 

Moreover, the arrival of the belated filings still seems to be going strong, as a number of the new securities suits filed in December 2009 presenting these same backlog characteristics. It seems probable that this trend will continue, at least for the short run, as we head into 2010.

 

3. The Stockpile of Subprime and Credit Crisis Cases Slowly Makes Its Way through the System: The number of subprime and credit crisis-related filings may finally have slowed, but due to this nearly three-year onslaught of new cases, there is a stockpile of accumulated lawsuits that still are just beginning to be resolved.

 

As NERA noted in its annual securities litigation survey, over 80% of the subprime and credit crisis cases remain pending. About 15% of the cases have been dismissed, and only about 4% have been settled. This proportion of settlements to dismissals is consistent with historical experience, in which cases are more likely to be dismissed than to settle in the first few years after filing.

 

As reflected in my own running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit dismissal motion rulings (here), there have been 28 dismissal motion rulings granted (eleven with prejudice) -- although in three cases in which dismissal motions were initially granted, the subsequently filed amended complaint survived renewed dismissal motions. The three cases in which the renewed motions were denied include the Washington Mutual and PMI Group cases (about which refer here and here). One dismissal (in the NovaStar Financial case) has already withstood appeal.

 

On the other hand, dismissal motions have been denied in whole or in part in 14 subprime and credit crisis-related cases, including several high profile cases, such as the cases involving New Century (here), Countrywide (here) and Accredited Home Lenders (here).

 

Though only a small number of subprime and credit crisis cases have settled, the settlements to date are impressive. The settlements include not only the outsized Merrill Lynch settlements (about which refer here), but also include significant settlements in other cases as well, including the Beazer Homes and Accredited Home Lenders cases.

 

With only a small percentage of these cases yet resolved, it is clear that the resolution of the subprime and credit-crisis related cases will remain an important part of the litigation landscape for years to come.

 

4. Bank Failures Mount: In a troublesome development with many worrisome implications, 140 lending institutions failed in 2009, by far the largest number of annual bank closures since the end of the S&L crisis. (By way of comparison, in 2008, there were 25 bank closures.) The number of bank failures increased as the year progressed, as 95 of the 140 bank failures (or roughly 68%) took place in the second half of 2009.

 

Though the bank closures were spread across 32 states, more than half of 2009 failed banks were concentrated in just four states: Georgia (25), Illinois (21), California (17) and Florida (14).

 

Despite the mounting numbers of bank failures, there has not yet been significant amounts of D&O litigation involving former directors and officers of the failed institutions. The are significant signs, however, that significant amounts of failed bank litigation ahead. Not only have investors and even employees of some failed banks filed lawsuits (about which refer here), but the FDIC has also shown a commitment to preserving its prerogative to assert claims against the directors and officers of failed banks. The FDIC has also begun to file notices of claims, in an attempt to preserve insurance against which to recover for claims against the directors and officers.

 

The FDIC’s latest quarterly banking report shows that it reckons there were 552 "problem" institutions as of September 30, 2009, up from just 416 at the end of 2Q09. With the numbers of both failed and troubled banks growing, and with the signs already pointing toward increased litigation involving these institutions, it seems likely that failed bank litigation will be a significant part of D&O litigation activity in 2010.

 

5. Business Bankruptcies Swell: According to the latest quarterly report of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (about which refer here), business bankruptcy filings were up 52 percent in the 12 months ended September 30, 2009. The number of business-related bankruptcy filings has increased in the 12-month period preceding the quarter end of each quarter since the end of the third quarter 2006. The highest monthly total was in April 2009, when there were 5,621 business-related bankruptcies, compared to 4,853 in September 2009.

 

The possibility of a bankruptcy filing remains a significant threat for financially troubled businesses. As a general rule, D&O claims follow the filing of a bankruptcy petition.

 

Bankruptcy-related claims present a host of complications, not least of which is the intricate way that D&O insurance policies respond in the bankruptcy context. One recent development illustrating the difficulties that can arise in the bankruptcy context was the July 2009 decision in the Visitalk case (about which refer here), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the carriers’ denial of coverage for a lawsuit brought be a company as debtor in possession against former directors and officers of the company, as a result of the policies insured vs. insured exclusion.

 

The likelihood of further business bankruptcies, with the prospect of related D&O claims, suggests that these kinds of coverage complications will appear frequently during 2010.

 

6. Rising Derivative Lawsuit Settlements: Threaten Increased Excess Side A Losses: The $118 million settlement in August 2009 of the Broadcom options backdating-related derivative lawsuit is the latest in a series of massive derivative lawsuit settlements. But perhaps even more significantly from the D&O insurance industry’s perspective, the Broadcom settlement appears to be the first instance where Excess Side A insurers were called upon outside of the insolvency context to contribute significantly toward settlement.

 

As detailed in greater length here, Broadcom’s Excess Side A insurers contributed $40 million toward the $118 million settlement. If nothing else, the settlement certainly underscores the value to companies (and their directors and officers) of the Excess Side A product, even outside the insolvency context.

 

The Broadcom settlement also represents a significant development for D&O insurers, who up until now have enjoyed the opportunity to offer Excess Side A insurance in a relatively low cost environment, particularly outside of the insolvency context. The Broadcom settlement highlights the potential for Excess Side A insurers to sustain significant losses on this product. The increasing incidence mega settlements, along with the growing numbers of business insolvencies, underscore the growing possibility for these kinds of losses.

 

7. Ponzi Schemes Emerge, Lawsuits Follow: The dramatic December 2008 revelation of Bernard Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme proved to be only the first in a series of Ponzi scheme disclosures. According to a December 29, 2009 AP story (here), more than 150 Ponzi schemes collapsed in 2009, compared to "only" 40 in 2008. Among others, the schemes revealed in 2009 included the alleged Stanford Financial Group fraud and the alleged fraud of disbarred Florida attorney Scott Rothstein.

 

The one inevitable product of these disclosures has been the subsequent emergence of related litigation. The Madoff scandal along is its own litigation phenomenon. Indeed, the list of just the Madoff-related lawsuits – most of which were filed during 2009 – runs to over 25 pages. The Stanford Financial scandal also generated its own mass of litigation, beginning shortly after the fraud was revealed in February 2009. Many of the other Ponzi schemes have also generated their own burst of related litigation activity.

 

All of this litigation has produced a flood of claims activity for insurers. To be sure, many of these claims are more likely to trigger losses under E&O or even Fiduciary liability policies, rather than D&O policies. However, D&O insurance is implicated in a number of these suits, and the sheer claims volume as well as the accumulating costs of defense undoubtedly will adversely affect the results of D&O (and E&O) insurers for some time to come.

 

8. Supreme Court Grants Cert in Two Securities Cases: There was a time not too long ago when the U.S. Supreme Court only rarely took up securities lawsuit appeals. But in recent years, securities cases have become increasingly common on the Supreme Court’s docket. Just within the last couple of terms, the Court has handed down the Tellabs and Stoneridge cases (about which refer here and here).

 

Even with these recent developments, it remains noteworthy when the Supreme Court agrees to hear securities related cases, and for that reason it is significant that during 2009 the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeals of two different securities suits. These two cases potentially could have a material impact on securities litigation procedure and jurisdiction.

 

First, in May 2009, the Supreme Court granted Merck’s petition for a writ of certiorari in the securities class action relating to the company’s disclosures about Vioxx. The Supreme Court will in this case address the question of what is required to establish "inquiry notice" sufficient to trigger the running of the two-year statute of limitations for private securities suits under the ’34 Act. Background on the Merck case can be found here.

 

Second, in November 2009, the Supreme Court granted cert in the National Australia Bank case. As a result of taking the case, the Supreme Court is likely to confront generally the question of extraterritorial application of the U.S. securities laws and will address specifically the question of when U.S. court properly can exercise jurisdiction over the claims of so-called "f-cubed" claimants (that is, foreign investors who bought their shares in foreign-domiciled companies on foreign exchanges). Background on the NAB case can be found here.

 

Both of these cases are likely to be decided during 2010. The Supreme Court heard argument in the Merck case in late November and it will likely hear argument in the NAB case during 2010. These cases potentially could have a significant impact on many securities lawsuits. The Merck case could affect frequently recurring statute of limitations issues and the NAB case could affect jurisdictional issues, and perhaps other concerns, in cases involving foreign companies (though pending Congressional initiatives could wind up superseding the Court on the jurisdiction question, about which see below).

 

While the outcome of these cases remains to be seen, the very fact of the Supreme Court’s involvement makes these cases significant. The anticipated rulings likely will represent among the more significant developments in 2010.

 

9. Congress Tackles Financial Reform: As a result of the political and financial events of the past two years, Congress is now poised to address a host of issues affecting both the financial markets and the securities laws, and some of the Congressional initiatives commenced in 2009 likely will have a significant impact on securities litigation.

 

The House of Representatives has already approved "The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009" H.R. 4173 (here), a sprawling 1279-page Bill that would institute a number of reforms that could have dramatic impact on the financial services industry.

 

As I detailed in a prior post (here), the Act also incorporates a number of provisions that could significantly affect securities litigation. Among other things, the Act provides a statutory standard for extraterritorial jurisdiction of the securities laws in certain circumstances. The Act also clarifies the pleading standard applicable to private securities lawsuits against the credit rating agencies. The Act would also significantly increase the SEC’s funding.

 

The House Bill must now be reconciled with several financial reform proposals pending in the Senate. Among other competing Senate initiatives are two bills introduced by Senator Arlen Specter.

 

The first of these, "The Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009," S. 1551 (here), would legislatively overturn Stoneridge and allow private securities suits for aiding and abetting claims. (Refer here for a discussion of this Bill.)

 

The second of the bills, "The Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009," S. 1504 (here, would legislatively overturn the Iqbal case and set aside the "facial plausibility" pleading requirement. (Refer here for a discussion of this Bill.)
 

 

While the legislative proposals are likely to go through many changes before financial reform legislation finally is enacted, these initiatives suggest that whatever finally becomes law will likely include provisions that could significantly impact securities litigation in the years ahead. It seems probably that Congress will enact financial reform legislation in some form during 2010, and so these Congressional initiatives could prove to be among next year’s top stories as well.

 

10. Significant D&O Exposures Emerge Outside the United States: For many years, the increasing threat of significant D&O exposures outside the United States has been a recurring theme amongst D&O insurance professionals. But in 2009, there were several significant developments demonstrating that D&O exposures outside the U.S. are no longer merely theoretical possibilities.

 

Perhaps the most significant developments in that regard are the two December 2009 rulings by Ontario Superior Court Justice Katherine van Rensberg allowing the securities lawsuit pending against IMAX and certain of its directors and officers to go forward, and certifying a global class of investors on whose behalf the case will now proceed. Legislation permitting this type of lawsuit in Ontario had been enacted several years before, but the IMAX case represented the first instance in which a lawsuit filed under the relatively new statutory provisions was allowed to proceed, as discussed at greater length here.

 

Though the IMAX case is still only in its earliest stages, a separate development in the liability case filed in Germany against certain directors and officers of Siemens underscores the fact that lawsuits outside the U.S. are potentially capable of producing massive D&O insurance losses.

 

As discussed at greater length here, in December 2009, Siemens reached a 100 million euro settlement with its D&O insurers in connection with claims arising from the company’s bribery scandal.

 

These developments are interesting and significant in and of themselves. But they are perhaps even more significant to the extent they underscore the fact that D&O exposures outside the U.S. are both growing and substantial. Clearly, the U.S. no longer has serious liability exposures for directors and officers.

 

Conclusion

One of the most noteworthy aspects of the 2009’s top D&O stories is that extent to which many of them indicate the trends we can expect to emerge or to continue in the year ahead. Certainly, the number of banks that failed during 2009 suggests the probability during 2010 of extensive litigation against the directors and officers of failed banks. The anticipated decisions of the Supreme Court and the probable Congressional action on financial reform legislation are also likely to be among the significant developments in 2010.

 

For that matter, the continued resolution of credit crisis-related litigation and the Ponzi scheme lawsuits are also likely to be a significant part of the litigation activity in 2010 (and for years to come).

 

What lies ahead in the coming year remains to be seen. But based solely on the events during the year we just concluded, 2010 promises to be both interesting and action packed. All I can say is that it is a great time to be a blogger.

 

More Year End Lists: As we head into 2010, a number of my fellow bloggers have also produced retrospective posts about the year we just concluded.

 

Francis Pileggi of the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog has published a list of the "Top 5 Corporate and Commercial Cases from Delaware for 2009" (here).

 

In an interesting complement to Pileggi’s post, University of Denver Law Professor Jay Brown has begun a series on his Race to the Bottom blog of "Delaware’s Top Five Worst Shareholder Decisions for 2009" (here). This list apparently will be published in a series of posts, the first of which may be found here, and the rest to be published in the days ahead.

 

The FCPA Blog has published its annual "FCPA Enforcement Index" (here), which among other things, tallies up the SEC and DOJ enforcement actions under the FCPA, as well as FCPA-related civil litigation.

 

The Drug and Device Law Blog has a list of the "Top Ten Prescription Medicine/Medical Device Decisions of 2009" (here).

 

Legally related but more on the entertainment end of the continuum, Above the Law published its list of its "Top Ten Most Popular Stories of 2009" here.

 

Randy Maniloff and Sarah Damiani’s "Ninth Annual Review of the Year’s Ten Most Significant Insurance Coverage Decisions" (including the "Second Annual Insurance Coverage for Dummies) can be found here.

 

And finally, with a look ahead, my friend Evan Rosenberg of Chubb has written "A D&O Liability Wish List for 2010" which appeared in the January 2010 issue of Directors & Boards magazine, here.

 

Early January Observation: It is a truth universally acknowledged that early January is a rotten time to use a health club. I have belonged to many different clubs in many different cities, and the invariable pattern regardless of the facility or the location is that after New Year’s the clubs fill up with earnest, first-time users. This year has proven no exception.

 

Usually, by the 15th of the month or so, all of the hubbub dies down and the only ones in the club are the regulars. My advice to anyone who has made a New Year’s resolution this year to start going to the gym is – don’t get discouraged, working out will be much more enjoyable after the middle of the month or so. Hang in there.

 

D&O Insurance: Recent Rulings Relevant to Subprime Claims

In a series of recent rulings in coverage litigation arising out of the 2007 collapse of Brookstreet Securities Corporation, a California-based securities broker-dealer, Central District of California Judge Cormac Carney addressed the claims of several claimants to the proceeds of a professional liability insurance policy that had insured the defunct company. Though the rulings are narrow and tied to the specific facts presented, the issues in dispute are likely to recur in claims arising from the subprime meltdown and accordingly the rulings may be of more general interest on that basis.

 

Background

Brookstreet provided broker dealer services nationwide until mid-2008 when the company experienced a financial collapse. The company ceased operations in June 2007 and is now insolvent.

 

Brookstreet was insured under a Securities Broker Dealer Professional Liability Insurance Policy for the period November 8, 2006 to November 8, 2007. The policy provides coverage for claims made against Insured Persons for actual or alleged Wrongful Acts in the rendering of "Professional Services." The policy had limits of $3 million.

 

The policy is an express "claims made and reported" policy, requiring in order for coverage to apply both that the claim be made within the policy period and that notice of claim be given within thirty days and during the policy period.

 

The insurer brought an action for interpleader and posted a $3 million bond. The insurer then filed three separate motions for summary judgment as to certain separate groups of interpleader defendants, all of whom are in turn claimants against Brookstreet or certain of its former directors, officers or employees.

 

Judge Carney’s Rulings

In a three separate rulings, Judge Carney addressed each of the insurer’s summary judgment motions.

 

Claims Made/Late Notice Issues: First, in a November 20, 2009 opinion (here), Judge Carney addressed the insurer’s motion for summary judgment as to the defendant claimants who had not made their claim against Brookstreet prior to the policy’s expiration or with respect to whose claims Brookstreet had not provided notice of claim to the insurer prior to the policy’s expiration.

 

Judge Carney quickly granted the insurer’s motion as to the claimants whose claims were made after the policy’s expiration, or with respect to whose claims Brookstreet had not provided notice of claim to the insurer during the policy period.

 

The more interesting questions about notice sufficiency arose with respect to the claimants who had made their claims during the policy period and with respect to whose claims Brookstreet had provded notice of claim during the policy period, but with respect to whose claims Brookstreet had not provided notice within the 30-day period required under the policy.

 

Judge Carney, enforcing the policy’s notice requirements strictly, found that the insurer was entitled to summary judgment even as to this latter group of claimants. Judge Carney found that the 30-day notice requirement was a "condition precedent" to coverage and that "to force" the insurer to have to demonstrate prejudice in order for the notice provision to be enforced "would be to rewrite the insurance contract, and the Court is unwilling to take this step."

 

Derivative Claim Exclusion: The insurer had also moved for summary judgment as to those claimants whose claims arose out of or were based on transactions involving Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO). The insurer relied upon a policy exclusion precluding coverage for claims "based upon, arising out of or attributable to the sale, attempted sale, or servicing of … any type of …derivative." Relying on this exclusion, the insurer argued that the CMOs are derivatives, and therefore the policy precluded coverage for claims relating to the CMOs.

 

In a November 20, 2009 ruling (here), Judge Carney concluded, based on extensive material provided by the insurer, that CMOs are "derivatives" within the meaning of the policy. Accordingly, he granted summary judgment as to those claimants whose claims were based on CMOs.

 

Interrelated Acts: The insurer had also moved for summary judgment as to a claimant who asserted that a Brookstreet employee had mismanaged her investments, through a pattern of "churning, making unauthorized trades, buying and selling high risk stocks, and failed to advise [her] of investment losses" during the period 1996 though June 2006.

 

The insurer argued that her claim arose out of an Interrelated Wrongful Act that first occurred prior to the policy’s September 10, 2002 retroactive date. The insurer further argued that the pre- and post-September 10, 2002 conduct constituted a single, non-covered Interrelated Wrongful Act. The claimant asserted that each of the improper acts was a separate Wrongful Act, and that each time Brookstreet failed to supervise its employee, it also committed a new and discrete Wrongful Act.

 

In a November 18, 2009 ruling (here), Judge Carney held that while he "does not discount the possibility that [the employee’s] actions may have constituted an Interrelated Wrongful Act …there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the acts after September 10, 2002 were interrelated with those occurring before that date." Because a "reasonable jury could conclude" that each time the employee "made an unauthorized trade, churned [the claimant’s account] or bought and sold high risk stocks" each was a separate Wrongful Act.

 

Discussion

Judge Carney’s rulings are interesting in and of themselves, but they are also interesting for what they suggest more generally.

 

First, his holding that the claims based on CMOs were precluded from coverage under the Brookstreet policy’s exclusion for derivatives claims is a reminder that the way insurance policies respond to many of the current claims based on complex financial instruments could involve a host of complicated insurance issues.

 

Although the exclusion that the CMO claims triggered in the Brookstreet case is peculiar to the specific type of insurance policy involved in that case, similar questions could arise under other policies in connection with other claims relating to complex investment securities and other financial instruments.

 

Many of the types of recurring claims asserted in the current litigation wave (e.g., the auction rate securities suits and the Madoff feeder fund lawsuits) present allegations of the type for which professional liability policies like that involved in the Brookstreet case were designed to respond. However, as the Brookstreet case shows, there potentially could be a host of complex coverage issues associated with many of these claims, depending on the facts alleged and the specific policy language involved.

 

Second, Judge Carey’s ruling on the interrelatedness issue is a reminder of how difficult interrelatedness questions can be. The term "interrelated" is neither defined in the typical policy nor is it self-defining. At a certain level of generalization, everything in the universe is interrelated, and at the same time, at another level, nothing is interrelated. What makes something interrelated for insurance coverage purposes can become quite situational and subjective, which leads many judges, like Judge Carney here, to want to leave interrelatedness questions to the jury.

 

Many of the cases in the subprime and credit crisis litigation wave present interrelatedness questions. Different complaints against the same or similar defendants in different policy periods raise the question whether one or several policies have been triggered. Judge Carney’s ruling in this case shows how difficult it may be for carriers seeking to rely on interrelatedness arguments. My own experience, consistent with Judge Carney’s ruling, is that courts tend to resolve interrelatedness questions in a way that maximizes the amount of insurance available.

 

Finally, Judge Carney’s rulings on the claims made and late notice issues are largely unremarkable, except as pertains to the question of the timeliness of notice for notices provided within the policy period but beyond the 30-day notice period. Judge Carney strictly enforced the policy’s 30-day notice requirement, and declined to even consider arguments based on the absence of prejudice.

 

Judge Carney’s literal enforcement of the notice requirement is is particularly noteworthy in that his ruling operated to preclude coverage for the claims of claimants where were in no way themselves involved with or responsible for the late provision of notice. ‘

 

In any event, Judge Carney’s rulings present an interesting case study. Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with copies of Judge Carney’s rulings.

 

D&O Insurance: Is "Choice of Law" the Next Hot Topic?

Pop quiz: the law of which jurisdiction should govern a coverage dispute arising under D&O insurance policies issued by U.S-domiciled insurers to an NYSE company incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters in Oregon? If you find the answer "British Columbia" as surprising as I do, read on. The court decision discussed below could have important implications for the typical U.S. D&O policy, with its extension of "worldwide coverage," particularly as both commerce and litigation become increasingly global.

 

Background

Now-bankrupt forest products company Pope and Talbot, Inc. was incorporated in Delaware and had its corporate headquarters in Portland, Oregon. Until its bankruptcy, its shares traded on the NYSE. Pope and Talbot conducted business through several operating subsidiaries, the largest of which was P&T Ltd., a Canadian federally chartered company with its principal operations in British Columbia. The bulk of Pope and Talbot’s operations ran through P&T Ltd. and the bulk of Pope and Talbot’s employees were employed by P&T Ltd.

 

P&T Ltd. is now in receivership. PricewaterhouseCoopers is the receiver for P&T Ltd. PWC, in its role as receiver, has instituted an action in British Columbia seeking a judicial declaration of coverage under the parent company’s D&O insurance policies for claims against P&T Ltd.’s directors and officers brought by former P&T Ltd employees under the Canadian Business Corporations Act for unpaid wages.

 

Pope and Talbot’s D&O insurance program was structured in several layers, involving three U.S. domiciled insurers. The negotiation and placement of the policies took place in the United States.

 

In a prior ruling, British Columbia Supreme Court Justice Paul Walker determined that the British Columbia court had jurisdiction over PWC’s declaratory judgment action. The insurers then sought a declaration that Oregon law would govern the dispute.

 

The November 12 Opinion

In his November 12, 2009 decision (here), Justice Walker determined that British Columbia law is the proper law to be applied to the interpretation of the policy.

 

He began with the determination that the parties intended different laws to apply to different parts of the policy (a choice of law principle known as dépeçage). In reaching this conclusion, Justice Walker referenced several different parts of the policies at issue, including in particular the primary policy’s definition of "Loss," which contained a provision specifying that the policy’s coverage for punitive and exemplary damages would be determined under the law most favorable to the insured. Justice Walker also referenced the policy’s Oregon state amendatory endorsements, which specified that Oregon law would govern any disputes regarding alleged misrepresentations in the insurance application.

 

Justice Walker determined that given these clause-specific choice of law provisions, and given the absence from the policies of any general choice of law provisions, the "proper law" governing the disputes arising under other policy provisions "is left to be determined by the court hearing the dispute to find based on the application of its own laws, taking into account the directing language in the policies."

 

Reviewing these circumstances in this light, and discounting the policies’ various connection to jurisdictions in the United States, and applying British Columbia choice of law principles, Justice Walker concluded that "the policies have the closest and most substantial connection with BC," and therefore BC law governs the coverage dispute presented by the receiver.

 

In substantiating this decision, Justice Walker stated that given the importance of the Canadian subsidiary, "most of the claims could be expected to arise from Canadian operations," and he stressed that the P&T Ltd. employees’ wage claims are "unique to Canadian operations" and have "no equivalent in Oregon," as a result of which Justice Walker concluded that "the proper law of the policies to determine the carriers’ coverage obligations for these claims is BC law."

 

He added that the parties "would reasonably have expected BC law to apply to determine the insurers’ coverage obligations."

 

Discussion

Suffice it to say that I have concerns with Judge Walker’s analysis. He managed to blow right past the fact that all of the acts involved with the formation of the insurance contracts took place in the U.S. and that insurance contracts were formed between a U.S.-domiciled company and U.S.-domiciled insurers, and that the key risks insured against and for which the policy was purchased were U.S.-based.

 

Justice Walker simply jumps to the conclusion that given the size of the P&T Ltd’s operations, the insurance contracts were primarily designed to protect against Canadian exposures. However, the company that purchased the policy was the parent company, a U.S.-domiciled company whose shares traded on a U.S. securities exchange. Is there any possible doubt that the most important reason the company bought the policy – and the reason the policies cost so much in U.S. currency – is because the company and its directors and officers wanted protection against corporate litigation in U.S. courts under U.S. law?

 

Of course the policies do provide "worldwide coverage" and, yes, of course substantive local law governs the local claims wherever the claims might arise. But Justice Walker seems to have telescoped the primacy of local law regarding the underlying dispute into a determination that local law should govern questions of policy interpretation, which analytically are two completely different issues.

 

All of that said, there are a couple of points in Justice Walker’s analysis that do give me pause. In particular, the considerations on which he relied in concluding that principles of dépeçage control the choice of law issue are by no means far-fetched. His consideration of the "law of the most favorable venue" wording in the provisions relating to coverage for punitive and exemplary damages is interesting and raises issues I had not previously considered. He may have a point that this language could be interpreted to suggest that the parties intended the laws of different jurisdictions to apply to different parts of the policy.

 

Where his analysis goes off track, in my view, is having found that different jurisdictions’ laws may apply to different policy provisions, he concluded both that BC choice of law principles should determine which law should apply, and he applied these BC choice of law principles in a blunderbuss way to conclude that BC law governed interpretation of the policy (see, e.g., his assertion that the likeliest claims to arise under the policies were Canadian claims.)

 

But the most significant aspect of Justice Walker’s decision is the unmistakable message that if a policy provides "worldwide coverage," the policy not only applies to claims wherever they may arise, but courts in those far flung jurisdictions may push ahead and apply their own local laws to questions of coverage relating to the local claim.

 

In the increasingly global economy, many businesses have significant operating subsidiaries in many countries. And as the rest of the world become increasingly litigious, too, the possibility of claims arising in these multifarious jurisdictions is increasingly likely. But while the U.S. D&O insurance industry has long noted the increasing possibility of claims arising outside of the U.S., I suspect it may come as a big surprise to many U.S. D&O insurers that local will law will not only govern the local claim itself, but the local court could also determine that local law governs questions of policy coverage for the local claim.

 

I have no idea what the insurance coverage laws are in vast smorgasbord of countries outside the U.S. Who knows what a court in, say, Vietnam or Slovakia or Gabon might conclude about a U.S-issued D&O insurance policy’s coverage for a local claim? I doubt that many domestic U.S. D&O insurers do either, and I suspect they have little interest in finding out.

 

On that score, it should be noted that Justice Walker repeatedly recognized the right of the parties to choose the law that would govern the interpretation of the policies, and it was only the absence of any such a provision that allowed him to conclude that BC law should govern.

 

All of which suggests to me that we may have reached the point where, at least from the carriers’ perspective, it may be time to for U.S.-based D&O insurers to consider the inclusion of a general choice of law clause in their policy. The inclusion of a choice of law clause would have the advantage of predictability and certainty, and it would spare the parties from a post-claim surprise discovery that, for example, the parties reasonably expected that BC law would govern the interpretation of these policies. (I am sure it was news to these carriers to learn that they had "expected" the interpretation of these polices to be governed by the law of British Columbia.)

 

Given the increasingly global nature both of commerce and of litigation, the inclusion of a choice of law clause arguably could be the reasonable next step in the evolution of the U.S. D&O insurance policy. Many international contracts in many contexts (including the insurance and reinsurance context) as a matter of course specify which jurisdiction’s law should govern the interpretation of the contract. Indeed, the typical D&O policy, with its "worldwide coverage" provision, really is itself an international contract, and to that extent it may be anomalous that U.S. D&O policies often do not have choice of law provisions.

 

Of course, were general choice of law clauses to be included in D&O insurance policies, the clauses would have to be carefully coordinated with other policy provisions, including in particular the most favorable venue wording relating to coverage for punitive and exemplary damages.

 

I recognize that both my analysis of Justice Walker’s opinion and my suggestions about the inclusion of choice of law language in U.S. D&O insurance policies could be controversial. I can well imagine D&O professionals who advocate for policyholders arguing that the local law ought to govern policy coverage issues. I can also imagine some insurance professionals objecting that whatever benefit a choice of law clause might produce in the international context, it might produce some unexpected and even unwanted results in the domestic context.

 

I am very interested in readers’ views, particularly those who may have a perspective different than mine regarding Justice Walker’s opinion and also with respect to my suggestions about choice of law provisions.

 

Very special thanks to loyal D&O Diary reader Raymond Sieh, whom I just met for the first time at last week’s PLUS International Conference, for providing me with a copy of the opinion.

 

D&O Insurance: The Latest Hot Topics

There are certain constant issues in the D&O insurance marketplace, but at the same there is always a steady stream of critical issues that emerge and dominate the dialog. In the latest issue of InSights (here) entitled "What to Watch Now in the World of D&O," I take a closer look at the current hot topics affecting the marketplace for D&O insurance.

 

Bribery Probes and D&O Insurance: Regular readers know that I have written frequently on this blog (most recently here) about the increasing concerns about  the rising number of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions, including possible threats arising from follow on civil actions. The problems that issues may present for D&O insurers is discussed further in an article by Zack Phillips in the November 9, 2009 issue of Business Insurance entitled " Rise in Bribery Probes May Hit D&O Insurers" (here). Special thanks to a loyal readers for sending along a link to this article.

 

On a related note, Frederick Bourke, Jr., the individual mentioned in the Business Insurance article as having been convicted on criminal FCPA charges, was sentenced yesterday to one year in prison. Refer here for Andrew Longstreth's November 10, 2009 AmLaw Litigation Daily article.

D&O Insurance: Increased Limits Warranty Exclusion Precludes Coverage

D&O insurance policyholders typically do not have to provide "fresh warranties" when they renew their policy of the kind they provided when they originally purchased the coverage – that is, they do not have to represent to the insurer that at the time of the renewal they are not aware of any facts or circumstances that could give rise to a claim. However, when policyholders increase their limits of liability at the time of renewal, they often are required to provide "fresh warranties" as to the increased limits, whether in the form of an increased limits application or in a separate warranty letter.

 

An October 26, 2009 Tenth Circuit opinion (here) illustrates the potential pitfalls for policyholders required to provide fresh warranties for increased limits. In its recent opinion, the Tenth Circuit held that an increased limits warranty exclusion precluded coverage for the defense fees of insured persons that fell within the amount of the increased limits. The Tenth Circuit held that the allegations in a later SEC complaint showed that at the time the policyholders’ representatives signed the letter, individual insured persons had knowledge of accounting improprieties that might (and subsequently did) give rise to claims.

 

Background

Fisher Imaging carried $5 million of primary D&O insurance, as well as an excess D&O policy providing an additional $2.5 million of insurance. At the time of the company’s April 2002 D&O insurance renewal, the company sought to increase the excess policy’s limits of liability from $2.5 million to $5 million.

 

In order to obtain this additional $2.5 million of excess coverage, Fisher supplied the excess insurer with a warranty letter signed by the then-CFO and the CEO representing that "no person or entity for whom this insurance is intended has any knowledge of information of any act, error, omission, fact or circumstance which may give rise to a claim which may fall within the scope of the insurance." The warranty letter stated further that it was an "express warranty for all insureds." (This last sentence is capitalized in the original.)

 

In April 2003, Fisher was sued by its shareholders in two securities class action lawsuits, both of which were later dismissed. In addition, in June 2005, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action against five officers and directors of Fischer. The SEC amended its complaint in May 2008. The amended complaint alleges that from January 2000 through September 2002, the officials had engaged in a scheme to fraudulently inflate the company’s share price by improperly recognizing revenue, misstating financial reports and misleading the company’s outside auditors.

 

Defense expenses incurred in connection with these actions exhausted the primary $5 million as well as the first $2.5 million of the excess layer. (The primary insurer and the excess insurer advanced these amounts subject to a reservation of rights to challenge these payouts later) However, the excess insurer took the position that the allegations in the SEC’s complaint triggered the exclusionary language in the warranty letter and therefore that it had no obligation to advance defense fees that fell within the "top" $2.5 million layer.

 

The individual directors and officers who are defendants in the SEC enforcement action filed a separate action against the excess insurer seeking a judicial declaration of coverage for their fees within the top $2.5 million, or in the alternative for a declaration that the excess insurer had a duty to advance defense fees within the layer.

 

The parties cross moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the allegations in the SEC’s amended complaint triggered the warranty letter exclusion, because "when read together," the SEC complaint and the exclusion show that certain of the individual SEC enforcement action defendants "knew of the wrongful activities at Fischer that could give rise to a claim."

 

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer and the plaintiffs appealed.

 

The Tenth Circuit’s Opinion

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that in reaching its conclusion that the warranty letter exclusion had been triggered, the district court improperly considered matters developed in discovery in the underlying SEC action, and that therefore represented matter "extrinsic" to the question whether the SEC’s amended complaint triggered the exclusion. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that "we … confident that the court confined its legal analysis to the allegations in the SEC’s amended complaint."

 

The plaintiffs next argued that the district court had improperly used an "objective" standard in determining that the exclusion had been triggered – that is, the plaintiffs argued, the district court based its decision on what the plaintiffs (or some of them) must have known, rather than what they subjectively knew. The Tenth Circuit found that the district court properly used the required subjective standard, rather than an improper objective standard. The Tenth Circuit noted:

 

While the district court did not use the term "subjective knowledge" when it recounted the allegations, its reliance on those allegations about each director’s or officer’s knowledge about and participation in Fischer’s irregular accounting practices establishes that the court properly applied a subjective knowledge standard.

 

The plaintiffs raised several additional arguments, each of which the Tenth Circuit rejected with a variation on its conclusion that "the district court correctly concluded that the SEC’s claims, when read together, compelled the conclusion that the SEC’s allegations were within the exclusion in the Warranty Letter."

 

Discussion

Upon initial review, I found a number of things about the Tenth Circuit’s opinion puzzling. The first is that the opinion refers throughout to a warranty "exclusion" – yet there is nothing in the warranty letter language quoted in the Tenth Circuit opinion that would or even could affirmatively precludes coverage. Without any expressly exclusionary language, the excess carrier would lack any contractual basis to disclaim coverage within the top $2.5 million layer, even if there were warranty letter misrepresentation.

 

In order to try to answer to this puzzle, I tracked down the parties’ appellate briefs on PACER. Upon review of the briefs, it turns out that there was additional, critically important language in the warranty letter that the Tenth Circuit opinion neglects to even quote (a rather astonishing oversight, given that but for this exclusionary language in the warranty letter, there would have and could have been no coverage dispute).

 

That is, as described in the excess insurers’ appellate brief (here, see page 5), the warranty letter contains additional language, following the warranty statement in which the applicants disclaim the existence of knowledge of any facts or circumstances that may give rise to a claim, providing that "it is agreed that if such knowledge or information exists, any claim arising therefrom…is excluded from the proposed coverage." (The original is in all capital letters.)

 

So, you wouldn’t know it from the text of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, but there was critically important exclusionary language in the warranty letter, and that language was in fact the language that the Tenth Circuit was deciding whether or not to apply.

 

The other thing that puzzled me about the Tenth Circuit’s opinion (and for that matter, the district court’s opinion) is that it seems to make an awful lot out of what are unproven allegations. Merely because the SEC has alleged some things doesn’t mean they are true. Yet the Tenth Circuit repeatedly says the district court properly relied on what the courts themselves both acknowledge were just pleading allegations. Both courts concluded that the mere allegations were enough for the excess insurer to withhold payment of defense fees that fell within the top $2.5 million.

 

A review of the plaintiffs’ appellate brief (here) did little to help clarify this puzzle. The plaintiffs never quite seem to get around to arguing that just because the SEC has thrown up a bunch of allegations that doesn’t mean that any of individual actually had knowledge of the facts or circumstances that might give rise to a claim at the time the warranty letter was signed.

 

Indeed, in its brief the excess insurer notes how far away from this argument the plaintiffs stayed, observing that the plaintiffs "understandably have nothing to say about the detailed litany of wrongdoing alleged in the SEC’s Amended Complaint" adding later that the plaintiff "never address this litany of facts." Instead, the plaintiffs seem (to me at least) to get hung up on arcane arguments about whether the objective or subjective standard should apply. It seems to me that only facts are sufficient to satisfy either an objective or a subjective standard, but that mere unproven allegations cannot suffice to satisfy either standard, regardless of which one applies.

 

This puzzling aspect of the opinion is all the more bewildering (to me at least) given the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that the "subjective" test is the proper standard to apply. That is, the exclusion could be triggered only if the insured persons had subjective knowledge of the triggering facts. How can a test of subjective knowledge be satisfied by mere allegations rather than upon the proof of actual knowledge? Particularly if, as the Tenth Circuit further held, extrinsic matter is irrelevant -- nothing outside the complaint can be relied upon to show that the allegations are true.

 

Claimants assert all sorts of bizarre things, but mere allegations alone should not be enough to trigger policy exclusions, particularly an exclusion that is triggered only by what insured persons subjectively knew. Readers who may be able to explain to why I should not be troubled by this aspect of the Tenth Circuit’s decision are strongly encouraged to clarify this for me and other readers using this blog’s comment function. I am particularly interested to know how mere allegations could possibly provide a sufficient basis to trigger an exclusion requiring subjective knowledge of the triggering facts.

 

One possible explanation does occur to me. It may well be that the plaintiffs did not make the argument that the SEC amended complaint represents mere allegations because they felt they simply couldn’t make an argument premised on the suggestion that they did not have knowledge of some or all of the facts described in the complaint.

 

Indeed, it probably should be noted in that regard that the company itself had in 2004 voluntarily entered a cease and desist order with the SEC (refer here).Among other things, the agreed order recited that the company, "acting through certain of its officers and personnel," had improperly recognized revenue, overstated inventory, improperly classified expenses, among other things. The plaintiffs may felt under these circumstances that there were limitations on how much they could argue that the SEC’s complaint against them represented "mere allegations."

 

However, the existence of the cease and desist order might (or then again, might not) explain why the plaintiffs’ may not have raised the argument that the SEC complaint represents mere alletgations; they don’t really explain why the Tenth Circuit concluded that mere pleading allegations were sufficient to trigger the exclusion.

 

It is worth noting that the circumstances involved in this coverage dispute may be a vestige of the time period in which these events took place. The excess insurer’s warranty letter used provisions that would be unlikely to be used today. Specifically, the excess insurer’s warranty letter was set up so that if any one insured had knowledge of the preclusive facts or circumstances, the top $2.5 million would be unavailable to any insured person, even those without knowledge.

 

A well-crafted increased limits application or increased limits warranty letter today would likely provide (or the policy to which it referred would provide) that no knowledge of any person would be imputed to any other person. This nonimputation language would operate to preserve coverage for those without knowledge of the preclusive facts, which is clearly a preferable arrangement from the standpoint of insured persons.

 

Will the Hard Insurance Market Arrive Late?

One of the questions insurance professionals have been asking with interest and anxiety since the financial crisis began is whether the economic recession will lead to a "hard market" for insurance (characterized by rising prices and tightening terms and conditions).

 

Earlier this year, Advisen, the insurance information firm, created a stir by predicting that a hard market for insurance would "begin to set in" as early as mid-2009, and in any event no later than 2010. The earlier Advisen report did, however, note that the current recession could reduce the demand for insurance, which in turn could complicate the insurance cycle’s transition. My post about the prior Advisen report can be found here.

 

In an updated October20, 2009 study entitled "Planning for 2010: The Recession Will Keep Insurance Premiums Under Pressure" (here), Advisen now reports that "while rates are firming in a few isolated segments of the market," overall, due to falling demand resulting from the recession, insurance buyers "will continue to enjoy favorable pricing in 2010," and "materially higher rate levels most likely will have to wait until 2011."

 

The insurance cycle is basically a result of the shifting relationship between the demand for and supply of insurance. Prices fall when supply increases faster than demand. In order to track these shifting relationships, the Advisen report uses Gross Domestic Product (GDP) "as a proxy for demand," on the assumption that demand for insurance moves in relation to overall economic activity.

 

The study notes that historically, when the ratio of the supply of insurance (the insurers’ policyholder surplus) to GDP crosses the 3.2 percent mark, either up or down, "the market changes directions within the next 12 months or so." Part of the reason Advisen had earlier this year made its prediction of an approaching hard market is that the ratio fell to about 3.2 percent at the end of 2008 and continued to fall in the first quarter of 2009. However, the ratio crept back up to 3.27 percent at the end of the first half of 2009. Now, "the market remains unsettled with conflicting forces pushing and pulling on both sides of the tipping point."

 

The reason for this uneasy equipoise is that the recession is affecting both the supply and the demand sides of the equation. On the supply side, declining investment portfolio values has significantly reduced the insurers’ policyholder surplus. On the other hand, reduced economic activity has resulted in lower demand due to reduced numbers of "exposure units" (such as payroll levels, sales, vehicle units, etc.)

 

Other factors that have complicated the insurance cycle transition are: lower levels of catastrophe losses during 2009 compared to prior years; heightened competition from wounded market participants; the entry of new insurance capacity; and the insurers’ release of redundant loss reserves from prior years. Some of these factors could disappear (for example, catastrophe claims could emerge with little advance warning), or are less likely to be a factor going forward – in particular, loss reserve redundancies "now have been almost fully harvested," which eliminates insurers’ "cushion against adverse developments" and "could contribute to upward pressure on rates in 2010 and beyond."

 

Even if the recession may have ended as a matter of technical economic analysis, its effects are still being widely felt and the impacts from recovery "will be uneven, leading to further complexity and uncertainty" with respect to capacity and pricing. While these factors will continue to complicate the insurance cycle transition and "delayed the hard market," the shifting elements of the supply and demand equation "favor a modest increase in insurance demand by the end of 2010" – though "materially higher rate levels most likely will have to wait until 2011."

 

In the meantime, other than in certain areas, commercial insurance rates "on average continue to drift downward, though at a much reduced rate compared to a year ago." With respect to D&O insurance, financial sector premiums have "increased sharply" and financially stressed or highly leveraged companies "are likely to see higher premiums and some may have trouble finding adequate coverage." However other companies can expect to see premiums continue to fall into 2010, though "at a much slower pace."

 

Even at the time of Advisen’s earlier report, I had commented that "if there is going to be a hard market, its arrival could be more delayed than the report suggests." The more recent report seems consistent with my prior view that a hard insurance market could prove to be a long time coming. At this point, I don’t think I have any better sense of when it might arrive. I do agree that the uneven and gradual nature of the economic recovery could further delay the cycle transition. Unanticipated events (such as significant natural catastrophes) could intervene to accelerate the change, but absent those kinds of developments, the prospects for a market change anytime soon seem remote.

 

In any event, at 11 am EDT on October 22, 2009, Advisen will be hosting a free one-hour webinar on the State of the Insurance Market and the 2010. Registration for the webinar can be found here.

 

Stanford Financial's D&O Insurer Can Advance Individuals' Defense Costs

Stanford Financial Group’s D&O insurer may advance the individual directors’ and officers’ defense expenses without violating the court’s receivership order, according to an October 9, 2009 ruling by Northern District of Texas Judge David Godbey. A copy of Judge Godbey’s ruling can be found here.

 

As detailed in a prior post (here), the insurer had been prepared to begin advancing defense expenses of Stanford Group’s former CFO, Laura Pendergest-Holt, subject to a reservation of its rights to later deny coverage under the policy if circumstances should warrant. However, before the insurer began advancing these amounts, the Stanford group receiver had notified the receiver that if the insurer advanced Pendergest-Holt’s defense expenses, the receiver would seek to have the insurer held in contempt of court for violating the court’s receivership and asset freeze orders.

 

The receiver asserted that the proceeds of the D&O insurance policies are "receivership assets" within the meaning of Judge Godbey’s prior receivership and asset freeze orders. The receiver also argued that his right to the proceeds "supersedes" the rights of insureds under the policy.

 

Pendergest-Holt filed a motion in the SEC enforcement proceeding (here) seeking a judicial clarification that the receivership order does not apply to the D&O policy proceeds, and alternatively seeking authorization for the disbursement of the proceeds for payment of her defense expense.

 

The insurer itself had also inquired of the court whether it could advance the defense expenses without "running afoul" of the receivership order. However, the insurer, which has separately filed an action seeking a judicial declaration that the Stanford receivership is not entitled to payment of claims as a result of the operation of policy exclusions, did not request the court in the SEC enforcement proceeding to decide whether or to what extent any insured is entitled to coverage—it sought only to determine whether the receivership order barred it from advancing the individuals’ defense fees.

 

In his October 9 ruling, Judge Godbey concluded that he did not need to determine whether or not the proceeds were receivership assets, because he concluded that he would exercise "equitable discretion" to permit the payment of defense costs "even if the proceeds were part of the receivership estate."

 

In deciding to exercise his discretion to allow the proceeds to be advanced for defense expenses, he noted that "there is no argument that the insurance proceeds are potentially tainted by fraud" and therefore "the Court has not duty to preserve them as such." As for the possibility that the insurance premiums might have been paid with "stolen money," he noted that while this might be "unjust and regrettable," that fact "would not entitle victims to proceeds of policies intended to pay defense costs."

 

With respect to the receiver’s argument that allowing policy proceeds to fund the individuals’ defense expense would "decrease the coverage dollars eventually available for distribution," Judge Godbey found that "the possibility that the D&O proceeds might one day be paid into the receivership does not justify denying the directors’ and officers’ claims." The judge noted that the receiver "has not yet tendered any claims against the Stanford entities to [the insurer] for a defense," noting further that even if it had, "it is not at all clear" that the insurer would ever pay a claim into the receivership, owing to the insurer’s policy defenses.

 

Finally, Judge Godbey found that the "interests of fairness" justify allowing the individuals to access the insurance proceeds. The receivership’s potential claims are "speculative" while the individuals "expected that D&O proceeds would afford a defense" and the "potential harm to them if denied is not speculative but real and immediate: they might be unable to defense themselves."

 

Judge Godbey emphasized that in his ruling that his prior orders the insurer from disbursing policy proceeds to fund the individuals’ defense, he was not holding that any defendant "is entitled to have its defense costs paid by D&O proceeds." Moreover, Judge Godbey emphasized that his October 9 ruling does not authorize the insurer "to pay any claims other than defense costs."

 

Though Judge Godbey ruled only on Pendergest-Holt’s motion, his ruling expressly "extends to any covered officer or director whose claim is approved" by the insurer. Judge Godbey’s ruling seemingly applies to R. Allen Stanford himself, at least to the extent that the ruling represents a determination that the court’s prior receivership orders are no bar to the insurer advancing defense costs.

 

Whether the insurer will in fact advance Allen Stanford’s defense expenses may be yet to be determined, notwithstanding the October 9 ruling that the receivership order is no bar. An October 9, 2009 Bloomberg article (here) presumes that as a result of Judge Godbey’s ruling, Stanford is now entitled to have his attorneys’ fees advanced. Indeed, absent a judicial "determination" that Stanford in fact engaged in excluded misconduct, the basis on which the insurer might withhold advancement of Stanford’s defense expenses is not immediately apparent, notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations against him.

 

The problem for everyone involved is the sheer number of persons who will seek to have their defense fees paid by the insurance and the extent of the collective defense expense. According to the Bloomberg article, as many as 60 Stanford officials are seeking to use the D&O insurance proceeds to pay their legal bills. Moreover, many of these individuals are involved in numerous civil and criminal proceedings.

 

The total amount of D&O insurance available is not entirely clear from the published reports. The Bloomberg article variously reports that the total insurance limits are "as much as $50 million" and "as much as $90 million" – kind of a big swing on a rather important detail. But the potential for defense expenses in catastrophic claims to substantial erode or even exhaust insurance programs of a similar magnitude has already been demonstrated in other claims (refer for example here).

 

Given the seriousness of the allegations and the multiplicity of proceeding involved, the various individuals’ collective defense expenses could quickly erode the available limits, particularly if, as seems possible, Stanford himself accesses the policy proceeds for his defense expenses.

 

It is worth noting that Judge Godbey exercised his discretion to allow the proceeds to be advanced toward the defense expenses, notwithstanding the Stanford entities’ potential claims, even though this policy reportedly lacked a "priority of payments" provision, which would have given the individual defendants priority to the policy proceeds over the entity, as a matter of policy language. As discussed in an October 4, 2009 Business Insurance article (here), this type of provision is now standard in most D&O insurance policies, and might have helped sort out this dispute, although in the end the outcome apparently would have been no different.

 

Special thanks to William Schreiner of the Zuckerman Spaeder law firm for providing me with a copy of Judge Godbey’s October 9 ruling.

 

No D&O Policy Coverage Where Claim Made Only Against the Company: In an October 8, 2009 opinion (here), the First Circuit held that a D&O insurance policy does not cover the settlement of a disability discrimination claim that did not name any individual directors and officers as defendants.

 

The Medical Mutual Insurance Company of Maine had been sued in an administrative proceeding by a former company executive who claimed that the company had discriminated against him due to his stroke-related disability. The administrative proceeding resulted in a "right to sue" letter, pursuant to which the former executive initiated a federal court discrimination lawsuit. Both the administrative complaint and the federal complaint named only the company itself as a defendant.

 

The company settled the lawsuit and sought coverage under the D&O insurance policy for $325,000 of the settlement amount. The D&O insurer denied coverage under its policy, arguing that because there had been no claim made against an individual director or officer, there was no coverage for the settlement under the policy’s "corporate reimbursement" coverage. (The opinion explains in footnote 3 that while the policy also separately provided "entity coverage" for "securities claims," the discrimination complaint was not a securities claim and accordingly the policy’s separate entity coverage provisions were not implicated.)

 

In an October 8 opinion written by Judge Bruce Selya, the First Circuit held that the company’s argument that the policy’s coverage extended to claims in which directors and officers were not named as defendants "would if accepted transmogrify D&O policies into comprehensive corporate liability policies," and that "such a transmogrification is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the D&O policy at issue."

 

The company had argued that the Policy’s claims made requirement had been satisfied because the underlying discrimination complaint consisted "largely of allegations of misconduct on the part of the directors and officers." The First Circuit held that "no matter what conduct the complaint describes, it is not a claim ‘made against’ any of the directors and officers."

 

The court went on to note that the policy’s separate requirements of both allegations of wrongful acts and for claims against insured persons "are complementary requirements and allegations of wrongful acts, without more, do not satisfy both."

 

The First Circuit’s opinion is arguably unremarkable, as D&O policies clearly and separately require both allegations of wrongful acts and claims to be made against insured persons.

 

The only puzzling thing to me about this case is why there was a D&O insurance dispute at all. The more natural place for the company to have looked for coverage for a claim like this is an Employment Practices Liability (EPL) insurance policy. EPL policies are designed to provide coverage for employment-related discrimination claims and generally provide coverage for claims against the insured organization.

 

Because I was curious, I ran down the parties’ appellate briefs on PACER. As it turns out, and as might have been predicted, the insured company did indeed also submit this claim to its EPL insurer.

 

As reflected in the D&O insurer’s appellate brief (here, at pages 4-6), not only did the EPL insurer provide the company with a defense for the underlying claim but it also paid $225,000 toward a total settlement amount of $500,000. The remaining $325,000 portion of the settlement amount for which the company sought coverage under the D&O policy represented the amount the company paid in resolution of the former executive’s unpaid contractual severance and benefits, for which the EPL carrier denied coverage under its policy.

 

So – that explains why this company was trying to stick what is rather obviously an EPL claim into the D&O policy, because there was a portion of the underlying EPL claim settlement for which the EPL policy did not provide coverage.

 

In any event, congratulations to my friend and former colleague Leslie Ahari, who represented the insurer in this action.

 

An October 12, 2009 Law.com article discussing the opinion can be found here. Special thanks to alert reader Marty Fox for providing me with a link to the Law.com article.

 

The Transmogrifier: For reasons unrelated to the merits or even the issues involved, the First Circuit’s opinion is one of my new favorites -- it is the first judicial opinion of which I am aware using the words "transmogrify" and "transmogrification." (Judge Selya, the opinion’s author, has a well-established reputation for using flamboyant and occasionally obscure language in his opinions.)

 

The word "transmogrify" in its various formulations was forever immortalized in the Calvin and Hobbes comic strip, in which Calvin turned an empty cardboard box into a "transmogrifier," capable of changing a person into "whatever you’d like to be."

 

There is a truly wonderful website here dedicated exclusively to the Calvin and Hobbes transmogrifier comic strips. And the excuse to be able to link here to the Transmogrifier site is more than enough justification for discussing the First Circuit opinion above.

 

Please click through to the site and enjoy the comic strips. They will make you smile. You too could consider turning yourself into a "500-story gastropod, a slug the size of the Chrysler Building." However, do keep in mind, as Calvin reminded Hobbes, that "transmogrification is a new technology."

 

Court Bars Insurers' Bid to Rescind Milberg's Insurance

On September 30, 2009, in a decision that will be widely discussed both because of the high profile figures involved as well as because of the outcome, Southern District of New York Judge Loretta A. Preska ruled (here) that the statute of limitations bars the action brought by the Milberg law firm’s professional liability insurers to rescind the policies they had issued to the firm.

 

Background

During the period January 31, 2001 through January 31, 2004, the Milberg firm was insured under two professional liability insurance policies issued through the London insurance markets (the "Lead Policies") as well as under an Excess Policy.

 

In January 2002, Milberg and certain of its partners learned that they were the subject of a criminal investigation. The firm was served with investigative subpoenas. The law firm advised the insurers of the subpoenas and the investigation. The Lead Insurers provided defense expense funding in connection with the criminal investigation pursuant to an interim funding agreement.

 

The firm and several of its partners were indicted in May 2006. The firm provided a copy of the indictment to the insurers. During 2007 and 2008, four individual partners – Melvyn Weiss, David Bershad, William Lerach, and Steven Schulman – pleaded guilty to criminal charges for paying kickbacks to name plaintiffs in securities class action litigation. (Refer below for links regarding the guilty pleas.) On June 16, 2008, the prosecutor dropped the charges against the law firm itself under a non-prosecution agreement that required the firm to pay $75 million.

 

On August 26, 2009, the Lead Insurers filed an action seeking to rescind their policies, based on their allegation that they had been induced to provide the insurance by material misrepresentations in the policy application. The Excess Insurer intervened. The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

 

The September 30, 2009 Decision

In granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Preska rejected all of the Lead Insurers’ arguments that their action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

 

The Lead Insurers first argument was that the defendants should be "equitably estopped" from asserting the statute as a defense, because of the firm’s "emphatic denials" while the investigation was pending that the allegations had any basis. Judge Preska rejected this theory because the defendants failed to show or allege that they had reasonably relied on these denials of criminal guilt. Among other things, Judge Preska commented that:

 

This case … involves a contractual relationship between an insurer and an insured, both of who are sophisticated parties dealing at arm’s length. The London Insurers were not lulled into believing Milberg’s claims of innocence the same way a patient may be lulled into believing a doctor’s prognosis. And Plaintiffs do not contend that their contractual relationship with Milberg involved a fiduciary relationship such as that in a partnership, in which reliance on a party’s representations might be more justifiable. Therefore, the London insurers have failed to demonstrate that Defendants should be estopped from invoking the statute of limitations.

 

The court also rejected the Lead Insurers’ suggestion that the statute did not apply because the policy was void at its inception, holding that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ arguments, New York’s six year statute of limitations for fraud applied.

 

In that same vein, she rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the running of the statute had been tolled because the insurers were providing a defense under a reservation of rights. Judge Preska noted that the plaintiffs "offer no authority holding that an insurer’s defense of its insured is inconsistent with investigating the validity of its contractual duty to defend." She went on to note that none of the cases on which the plaintiffs attempt to rely in support of their tolling argument "remotely suggest that an insurer’s duty to defend give it a special exception for the statute of limitations governing its own rescission claim."

 

Judge Preska further observed that "rather than awaiting the results of the government prosecution of Milberg, the London Insurers should have conducted their own inquiry into whether Milberg might have committed fraud in obtaining the London policies." The Court found that there was no record that the Lead Plaintiffs took any steps to determine whether the policies "were still valid."

 

Finally, Judge Preska rejected the Lead Insurers argument that their rescission claim was saved by the two-year discovery rule (that is, they argued that their action was brought within two years of the discovery of the fraud.) She found that because under New York law knowledge of a government investigation "clearly triggers a duty to inquire as to potential fraud," and because the Lead Insurers were aware of the government subpoenas soon after they were issued in 2002, they were put on notice of the alleged much longer than two years before they filed their action.

 

Judge Preska went commented further that "the most striking example of Plaintiffs’ willful ignorance of their potential rescission claim is their failure to have made any inquiry after Milberg was indicted." A "prudent insurer," she commented, "should have known in July 2006 that it may have a claim against Defendants for rescission." Yet, she noted, even then they undertook no inquiry, so that even if the two-year discover period runs from the time of the indictment, the rescission action "would still be time barred because Plaintiffs did not commence this action until August 2008."

 

Discussion

If nothing else, Judge Preska’s opinion serves as a vivid illustration of a point I have made many times, which is that courts are hostile to rescission claims. Let it be said, courts don’t like them, even apparently when asserted against convicted criminals.

 

Because the decision is particularly dependent on New York case law with which I am insufficiently familiar, I am in no position to assess this decision on its legal merits. I will stipulate that this decision could well be completely unremarkable given the governing principles.

 

But even allowing for these legal principles, I have to say I find this outcome somewhat, well, uncomfortable. I know statutes of limitations exist to encourage diligence and to eliminate stale claims, and therefore must be enforced. There is no doubt that a great deal of time elapsed while these events transpired. And I am well aware the insurers must act promptly in order to assert rescission.

 

What I am unsure about is exactly what it is that the court thinks the insurers should have done. I can only imagine what might have happened if the insurers had tried to launch their own investigation while the criminal investigation and prosecutions were pending. The criminal defendants undoubtedly would have raised holy hell if the insurers had, say, tried to interview witness or obtain copies of documents. The defendants and their lawyers almost certainly would have accused the insurers of quadruple bad faith for even trying to take those actions. I imagine that the defense attorneys would have argued that the insurers were interfering with or even prejudicing the criminal defense.

 

I can envision compelling arguments that under these circumstances it was entirely appropriate that the carriers showed forbearance until after the guilty pleas had been entered before taking action – had they acted earlier, they might well have been accused of acting precipitously or worse.

 

Finally, I am not sure I am entirely comfortable with what this decision implies about what a carrier should do in similar circumstances in the future – perhaps New York law may require insurers who wish to protect their interests to do so, but would it really be a good thing for insurers to interject their own investigation at a time when one of their insureds is accused of criminal misconduct? That strikes me highly undesirable for all concerned.

 

This is a very high profile case and it obviously will attract a lot of attention and perhaps significant debate as well—indeed, I can well imagine some readers taking vociferous objection to observations here. I am very curious to know readers’ reactions, either to Judge Preska’s opinion or to my observations. I strongly encourage readers to post their thoughts using this blog’s "comments" function.

 

An October 1, 2009 Business Insurance article discussing the opinion can be found here.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for supplying me with a copy of the court’s September 30 opinion.

 

Memory Lane: For those interested readers, my original post about the Milberg indictment and its possible effect on securities class action lawsuit filings can be found here. My post about Bill Lerach’s guilty plea can be found here. My post about Mel Weiss’s indictment and Steve Schulman’s guilty plea can be found here. My post about David Bershad’s guilty plea agreement can be found here.

 

D&O Insurance: Additional Consideration, "Loss," and the "Bump Up" Exclusion

One of the recurring D&O insurance issues is the question of policy coverage for additional acquisition consideration paid to an acquired companies’ shareholders – so-called "bump up" claims. In an interesting and colorfully written September 28, 2009 opinion (here) that insurers undoubtedly will cite profusely in future disputes of this kind, District of Massachusetts Judge Nancy Gertner held that Genzyme Corporation’s D&O insurance policy did not cover amounts Genzyme paid to settle the claims of individuals who asserted they had received inadequate consideration in an exchange for their tracking shares of an internal Genzyme division.

 

Background

From 1993 to 2003, Genzyme’s capital structure included "tracking stock" to track the performance of separate business units within the company. In May 2003, Genzyme’s board decided to eliminate the tracking stocks, and the company announced that it would exchange the business units’ tracking stock for a certain number of the company’s General Division’s shares.

 

The ensuing exchange "proved to be unpopular among many Biosurgery Division shareholders," who subsequently initiated a securities class action lawsuit against Genzyme and certain of its directors and officers. The Biosurgery Division shareholders alleged that the defendants had schemed to depress the Division’s tracking stock so that Genzyme could fold the Biosurgery Division into the General Division at an exchange rate favorable to General Division shareholders. In August 2007, Genzyme agreed to settle the Biosurgery Division shareholders’ claim for $64 million. More detailed background regarding the lawsuit can be found here.

 

Genzyme sought to recover part of this settlement amount from its D&O insurer. The insurer denied coverage on two grounds: (1) that the settlement did not represent insurable "loss" under the policy; and (2) that coverage was precluded by the policy’s "bump up" exclusion. Genzyme initiated coverage litigation. The D&O insurer moved to dismiss.

 

The September 28, 2009 Opinion

Judge Gertner opened her opinion with an assessment of the "plethora of cases" on which the D&O insurer sought to rely to argue that "an insured does not incur insurable loss when she is merely forced to disgorge money or other property to which she is not entitled." Judge Gertner noted that "this legal principle is undeniably correct and would almost certainly be adapted by a Massachusetts court."

 

Judge Gertner then made the first of the several vivid commentaries that characterize her opinion, when she noted that

 

A thief should not be able to claim the return of stolen property as an insurable loss. Similarly, an individual who breaches her contract and then is forced to pay damages should not be able to seek indemnification under an insurance policy. If I pay only $100for an item for which I promised to pay $200, and I am later ordered by a court to pay the additional $100, I should not be able to claim the additional $100 as an insurable loss. Had I paid the full $200 due up front, then clearly no part of the $200 would constitute loss covered by insurance. The dilatory nature of my obligatory payment should not transform it into an insurable event.

 

Genzyme sought to distinguish the referenced case law by arguing that it had received no benefit to which it was not entitled or that could be disgorged. Judge Gertner agreed, noting that the company had merely reorganized its capital and issued additional shares. But while Genzyme itself did not benefit, its shareholders "surely did" benefit from the reduced exchange ratio, and the class action was "meant to redress the imbalance."

 

As a result of these circumstances, Judge Gertner found, this case "does not fit comfortably within the existing case law holding that the mere return of an ill-gotten gain was uninsurable." She expressly rejected the insurer’s "attempt to force this case into the existing case law."

 

Having determined that the existing case law was inapposite, she proceeded to address defendants’ motion based her own analysis of the question presented, which she stated to be as follow: "When a corporate pays a settlement to resolve a claim that it benefitted one group of shareholders at the expense of another group of shareholders, is this settlement payment an insurable loss?" The answer to this question, she found, "must undoubtedly be ‘no.’"

 

To explain this conclusion, Judge Gertner resorted to a "somewhat strained – but one hopes enlightening – hypothetical." In her hypothetical, a father and his two sons, Daniel and Eli, are in a restaurant and have ordered a singled milkshake divided into two cups. The father redistributes the milkshake between the cups in a way that leaves Daniel with two-thirds of the milkshake and Eli with one third. The father, she noted, would be expected equalize the distribution, not "to turn to the restaurant owner and demand that he provide more milkshake to make up the difference."

 

Drawing upon this hypothetical, she found that the lawsuit settlement had merely "recalibrated the division" in the share exchange by giving the Biosurgery Division shareholders additional cash in place of the additional shares to which they claimed they were entitled. Genzyme should not, she said, be able to demand indemnification from the insurer for what is in effect a share redistribution.

 

If Genzyme’s interpretation of the policy were correct, she found, "a corporation merely need issue several classes of shares, cancel one class in an arguably unfair way, and then demand that the insurer pick up the tab." She rejected this possibility noting that the policy "should not be read in a way that produces absurd results."

 

Judge Gertner then turned to the insurer’s alternative argument that there was no coverage under the policy for the settlement because of the policy’s "inadequate consideration" or "bump up" exclusion, which provides that the carrier is not liable for "the actual or proposed payment by any Insured Organization of allegedly inadequate consideration in connection with its purchase of securities issued by any Insured Organization." Genzyme argued that the exclusion did not apply because the share exchange did not involve a "purchase" of securities, but rather the mere exchange of one class of securities for another.

 

After reviewing dictionary definitions, Judge Gertner concluded that the share exchange was "unambiguously a ‘purchase’ within the natural and ordinary meaning of the word." She also found that Genzyme sought coverage under a policy provision applicable only to a "securities claim," defined inter alia as the "purchase or sale of securities." Genzyme, she noted, was contending that the share exchange was a "purchase" for purposes of relying upon the policy’s definition of securities claim, yet did not explain why the same word should have a different meaning in a different policy provision.

 

Judge Gertner rejected Genzyme’s further argument that even if Genzyme itself no claim in its own right under the policy, there would still be coverage for the settlement under the policy’s separate insuring clause providing reimbursement for Genzyme’s indemnification of its directors and officers.

 

Judge Gertner found that "it makes little sense to allow a corporation to sidestep coverage limitations in its insurance policy through the simple expedient of claiming that a settlement payment was made to indemnify its directors and officers." She noted that a contrary holding could "encourage fraud" and "chicanery," as otherwise a corporation could use calculated indemnification resolutions to try to create coverage for otherwise noncovered claims.

 

Discussion

Judge Gertner’s opinion is not only highly readable and even entertaining, it is also potentially significant, for a number of reasons.

 

First, Judge Gertner made it clear that she was not relying on prior case law in reaching her decision. As a result, her opinion potentially represents a new line of analysis in connection with the perennial questions about coverage under the D&O policy for "additional consideration" claims. In particular, her analysis does not depend on whether or not the payment for which coverage was sought was "restitutionary." Rather her analysis turned on whether the insurer could fairly be asked to pay for what was effectively a redistribution or "recalibration."

 

At a minimum, this line of analysis could give insurers disputing coverage for "bump up" settlements an additional ground on which to base their position, arguably without even having to get into the question whether the payment in dispute was "restitutionary." Insurers instead (or perhaps alternatively) will strain to rely on Judge Gertner’s milkshake hypothetical.

 

Second, and perhaps more significantly, Judge Gertner did not base her decision on the bump up exclusion alone, although she did grant the motion in the alternative based on the exclusion. The significance of the fact that she separately and independently granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the settlement is not an insurable "loss" is that even today many policies do not contain a bump up exclusion. Indeed, over the years, many of the "additional consideration" coverage disputes that have arisen have involved policies lacking such exclusions. Judge Gertner’s reasoning could be particularly influential in future "additional consideration" disputes involving policies without bump up exclusions.

 

Third, even though her opinion did not rely on the prior case law holding that restitutionary payments are uninsurable, her detailed elaboration of the intellectual basis for the principles behind the case law will undoubtedly add weight (and color) to legal arguments relying on these cases.

 

Fourth, the decision is also significant for its interpretation and application of the bump up exclusion. As I noted in a prior post (here), these exclusions are still relatively new, vary widely, and generally have not been subject to extensive judicial scrutiny. There is still relatively little case law interpreting bump up exclusions. Judge Gertner’s enforcement of the exclusion here, particularly her conclusion that the share exchange was a "purchase" within the exclusion’s meaning, helps illuminate how these exclusions operate and how they will apply.

 

Finally, Judge Gertner’s opinion may be particularly noteworthy because of her willingness to dispense with prior case law formulas and to base her decision instead on a careful consideration of the underlying transaction and facts. However, I expect that not everyone is going to be equally impressed with her milkshake hypothetical. Even those inclined to cheer Judge Gertner’s opinion here should reflect on the possibility that other judges, perhaps lacking Judge Gertner’s intellectual rigor, might unburden themselves of their own hypotheticals that may or may not have anything to do with the parties’ reasonable expectations of how the policy should operate.

 

In any event, insurers undoubtedly will find much to like in Judge Gertner’s opinion, which is not only highly literate but highly quotable. Her colorful phrases will undoubtedly be featured heavily in insurers’ future legal briefs both on bump up claims and with respect to questions regarding restitutionary payments. The only things that may undercut insurers’ attempts to rely on the Genzyme decision are the somewhat unusual facts involved in the case. Those seeking coverage will certainly try to argue that Judge Gertner’s "redistribution" or "recalibration" analysis is restricted to the specific and unusal circumstances of the Genzyme case.

 

A September 29, 2009 memo by the Wiley Rein law firm summarizing the opinion can be found here. Wiley Rein represented the D&O insurer in the Genzyme coverage dispute.

 

Special thanks to the several loyal readers who sent me copies of the Genzyme opinion.

 

All That, and She’s A Fellow Blogger, Too: Readers curious about Judge Gertner’s willingness to express herself so freely in a judicial opinion may be interested to know that in addition to being a federal judge, she is also a blogger. According to a Boston Globe profile (here), she began blogging because she determined with respect to blogs (correctly in my view), that "if this is where people are getting information, this is where to be." She also noted, in an observation to which every blogger and would-be blogger will relate, that the hardest part about blogging may be finding time to blog.

 

She apparently has had found little blogging time lately, because there have been relatively few recent entries by any of the contributing authors on the site for which she has been blogging, the Convictions blog on the Slate website (here). (Believe me, Judge Gernter, I know all about the way a pesky day job can interfere with important blogging activities.)

 

Towers Perrin Releases 2008 D&O Survey Report: Some Comments

On September 9, 2009, Towers Perrin released its report of the firm’s 2008 Survey of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Purchasing Trends, which can be accessed here. Towers Perrin’s anticipated annual report again this year will undoubtedly be widely read throughout the D&O insurance industry. The report is a good resource and it is full of useful and interesting information.

 

Because the Report is so widely read, I think it is very important to highlight some specific issues about  the report. As I noted in connection with the 2007 report (here), the survey report is subject to some very important limitations that may not always be fully appreciated or understood.

 

In my view, the most significant limitation is one that is duly noted in the final two sentences of the Report section headed "Statistical Terms Used in This Report." As the Report states, the Report is the product of a survey, which means that the data in the Report are drawn from a "non-probability sample." That is, participants "choose – or are selected" to participate, and therefore the sample "is not random." Most importantly, because "not all potential respondents are likely to participate, survey biases must be considered when interpreting results."

 

It is the danger that this last point – the possibility that the reported results reflect "survey biases" – that most concerns me. In particular, the reference to the possibility that the survey respondents were "selected" is particularly relevant.

 

Specifically, the broker rankings section of the Report reveals that fully 95.2% of all survey responses came from the clients of just four brokerage firms. The same four firms also dominated the 2007 survey results, but the 2008 results reflect an even greater concentration, as the four firm’s clients represented "only " 88% of the survey respondents in the 2007 survey. In the 2008 survey, only 4.8% of all respondents are clients of firms other than the four brokerages. Indeed, clients of the three global insurance carriers represented just 1.8% of the respondents.

 

These observations should not be taken as a criticism of these four survey-predominating brokerages. I will stipulate that they are in fact strong and significant industry participants. But no informed person actually thinks they are the four largest D&O brokers in the country. They are undeniably the leading firms in getting their clients to complete the Towers Perrin survey. Again, no criticism here; I salute their enterprising spirit in achieving this result. However, no one should confuse the survey "ranking" with an actual market share ranking, nor could anyone fairly attempt to use the survey results to try to create that impression.

 

I emphasize this aspect of the Report because the survey bias in the broker participation population has pervasive effects throughout the entire report. Indeed, given that the pool of actual survey respondents for all practical purposes represents the clientele of those four brokerage firms, the Report fairly might be characterized as a description of the purchasing patterns of the clients of those four firms, rather than of the marketplace as a whole.

 

However, the Report itself does not address whether or not this rather categorical "skew" in the survey response population affects the other reported results, although it pretty obviously could significantly affect many of the other observations in the report. For example, the Report’s attempt to rank carriers by policy count and premium could simply be a reflection of the predilections of the four firms. The same is true with respect to such issues as respondents’ decision whether to purchase Side A insurance or IDL insurance.

 

There are other limitations arising from the characteristics of the respondents. Many of the respondents are very small.—nearly 40% reported assets under $6 million. Nearly 70% of the respondents had under 100 employees.

 

Another perhaps more significant concern with the 2008 Report is that the survey participants completed the survey during the third quarter of 2008. Not only does that mean the data are a year old, but also the survey results may fail to reflect the enormous changes in both the global economy and in the insurance marketplace during the last twelve months. Thus, there is some risk that the survey results, to whatever extent they fully and accurately reflect marketplace conditions of a year ago, may not reflect current conditions, given the enormous changes since the survey was conducted.

 

In addition, the Report also makes numerous year over year comparisons, noting changes between the results of the 2007 survey and the results of the 2008 survey. The difficulty with these comparisons is that there is no way of knowing whether or not the differences in the survey results are simply the result of a different mix in survey respondents, rather than a change in the underlying circumstances. To be sure, the Report does several times work hard to provide comparisons showing the results reported by repeat survey respondents. But there are numerous comparisons throughout the Report that are not so limited.

 

With respect to the concern noted above about the concentration of survey respondents in the portfolios of just four brokerage firms, it is a fair observation that the survey is open to all. If survey participation were more widespread, many of the concerns noted above might be alleviated. However, the opposite appears be happening, as participation by other brokerage firms is clearly declining, for reasons that might well be surmised.

 

None of this is meant as a criticism of Towers Perrin, which should be saluted for performing the survey and distributing the survey report without charge. Moreover, Towers Perrin itself acknowledges that there may be biases arising from the survey population distribution. So I don’t mean to criticize Towers Perrin, or anyone else for that matter. Rather, my analysis here is presented as a petition to all industry participants that in using the survey data, they should explicitly recognize and acknowledge the sample bias limitations inherent in the report. In particular, no one should try to make the survey results represent anything more than they actually do, particularly with respect to the concentrations noted above.

 

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What to Watch Now in the World of D&O

Each fall for the last three years I have taken a look at the current trends and hot topics in the world of D&O. There are of course the perennial topics that always remain important. However, this overview is intended to address the most significant concerns of current interest for D&O insurance professionals and their clients. My list of the current issues to watch is set out below.

 

Will Rising Corporate Bankruptcies Produce Increased D&O Claims?

According to the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts (refer here), the number of business-related bankruptcies increased 63% (to 55,021 from 33,822) during the year ended June 30, 2009. Although there are some encouraging signs that the overall economy may be beginning to recover, significant numbers of individual companies could continue to face the risk of bankruptcy for some time to come.

 

Among other problems associated with bankruptcy filings is the risk of increased claims against officials at the bankrupt firms. For example, in its 2008 year end report on securities litigation activity, Advisen noted that since 1995, roughly 35 percent of the large public companies (defined as having assets of over $250 million in 2008 dollars) that filed for bankruptcy also sustained securities class action lawsuits against their directors and officers. During 2007 and 2008, the percentage increased to 77 percent. The directors and officers of private companies also face a heightened claims exposure when their companies file for bankruptcy.

 

Bankruptcy associated-claims present a host of complications, not least of which is the intricate (and sometimes problematic) way that D&O insurance policies respond in the bankruptcy context. One recent development illustrating the difficulties that can arise in the bankruptcy context was the July 2009 decision in the Visitalk case (about which refer here), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the carriers’ denial of coverage for a lawsuit brought by a company as debtor in possession against former directors and officers of the company, as a result of the policies’ insured vs. insured exclusion.

 

These kinds of complications underscore the need for D&O insurance policies to be closely scrutinized for their ability both to withstand and to respond to claims arising in the context of bankruptcy.

 

One final concern is that the rising tide of corporate bankruptcies could trigger increased losses under Excess Side A insurance that many companies now carry. This possibility is one of several factors, many of which that are discussed below, that could represent a changing environment for carriers offering Excess Side A insurance. The increased number of bankruptcies in any event further reinforces the proposition that Excess Side A insurance is an indispensible part of a complete D&O insurance program for any corporate insured, whether public or private.

 

Will the Growing Number of Bank Failures Produce a Wave of Failed Bank Litigation?

The number of 2009 year to date failed banks is now up to 89 (as of September 4, 2009, about which refer here), and the total number of bank failures since January 1, 2008, is up to 114. Alarmist commentators have made predictions that as many as 1,000 banks could fail by the end of 2010, as discussed here. Whether or not the number of bank closures will come anywhere near that level, it is clear that we are in the midst of the most significant wave of bank failures since the S&L crisis.

 

The question remains whether this time around we will see the same level of litigation activity as we saw during the last failed bank wave. Somewhat surprisingly, so far the FDIC has initiated relatively little litigation to try to recoup its losses from the directors and officers of the failed financial institutions. However, for now the FDIC is preoccupied dealing with further bank closures. And even during the S&L crisis, the FDIC and the other regulatory agencies usually did not act until statutes of limitations were just about to expire. There could yet be another round of failed bank litigation, in a 21st Century edition.

 

Private litigants might also be expected to get in the act -- for example, investors who lost their entire investment when a bank closes might well be expected to pursue claims. There has been a certain amount of that (refer here). There has also been some securities class action litigation activity involving failed banks whose shares were publicly traded. Of the 25 banks that failed in 2008, six of them are involved in securities class action litigation, even though only 11 of them were publicly traded.

 

However, the securities class action litigation involving the failed banks has not fared particularly well so far. For example, in the Downey Financial securities class action lawsuit (about which refer here), the district court recently granted the renewed motion to dismiss following the plaintiffs’ attempt to amend their complaint to try to remedy the pleading defects noted in the initial dismissal without prejudice. In addition, in the Fremont General securities lawsuit (refer here), the court also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, albeit with leave to amend.

 

These early returns potentially could be discouraging some potential litigants. Nevertheless, if for no other reason than the fact that there was so much failed bank litigation last time around, it seems likely that when all is said and done, the growing number of bank failures will at some point lead to an extended round of failed bank litigation.

 

Whether or the failed bank litigation ultimately emerges, the D&O insurers have responded defensively to the wave of bank failures. Many financial institutions, including even smaller community banks, are facing significantly more challenging circumstances when trying to renew their D&O insurance. Many banks find that they can obtain coverage, if at all, at significantly greater cost for significantly restricted terms and conditions, and in many instances with significant new limitations such as reduced limits of liability or the addition of additional exclusions, such as a regulatory exclusion. The wave of failed banks has already had a significant impact in the D&O insurance marketplace.

 

Will the Rising Number of Derivative Lawsuit Mega Settlements Mean Significant Excess Side A Losses?

Within the last several years, there have been a rising number of unprecedented mega settlements in shareholders’ derivative lawsuits, particularly during the last 12 to 24 months. These massive derivative lawsuit settlements include the $900 million UnitedHealth Group options backdating settlement (refer here); the $118 Broadcom options backdating settlement (refer here); and the $115 AIG settlement (refer here).

 

One consequence of this outbreak of massive derivative lawsuit settlements is that now for the first time Excess Side A carriers are being called upon to contribute significantly toward settlement outside of the insolvency context. The recent Broadcom settlement, in which the Excess Side A insurers collectively contributed $40 million to settlement, appears to represent a milestone development in that regard. While there may well have been prior occasions on which Excess Side A insurance contributed toward settlement outside of insolvency, the Broadcom settlement is by far the most public example. Based on the reactions I have heard, the Broadcom settlement has been a wake up call of sorts for many players throughout the D&O industry.

 

Among other things, the Broadcom settlement underscores the value for companies and their directors and officers of the Excess Side A product, which, along with the insolvency related considerations noted above, should further encourage policyholder take up of this product. As also noted above, Excess Side A protection increasingly will become a standard part of any well designed D&O insurance program.

 

The Broadcom settlement also represents a significant development for D&O insurers as well, who until now have enjoyed the opportunity to offer Excess Side A insurance in a relatively low loss cost environment, particularly outside the insolvency context. The Broadcom settlement highlights the potential for Excess Side A insurers to sustain significant claims losses on this product, even outside of the insolvency context. The increasing incidence of mega derivative lawsuit settlements underscores the growing possibility of these kinds of losses.

 

Another significant side effect of the Broadcom settlement is that the plaintiffs’ lawyers clearly will now have developed an appreciation of the value of presenting claims that trigger the Excess Side A coverage. The question arises whether they might now attempt to craft claims for the express purposes of accessing the Excess Side A limits. The attempt to pursue this strategy would face considerable challenges – derivative lawsuits, for example, are subject to formidable defenses, including the demand requirement and the business judgment rule defense. Nevertheless, the possibility of claims targeted expressly at the Excess Side A limits is a consideration that should not simply be disregarded.

 

Will Securities Lawsuit Filings Return to Historical Levels?

As discussed in a prior post (here), securities class action lawsuit filings dropped during the second quarter of 2009. This decline was largely due to the low filing activity during May (when there were only 11 new securities class action lawsuits) and during June (when there were only six new securities lawsuits), compared to historical monthly filing levels in the range of 15 to 20 new lawsuits a month.

 

At least to this point in the third quarter, it seems as if the second quarter filing decline was just a temporary dip that has already ended. There were at least 20 new securities class action lawsuits in July, and at least 17 in August, both of which monthly filing levels are well within historical norms.

 

Another interesting attribute of the most recent lawsuit filings is that so far the third quarter filings are not nearly as concentrated in the financial sector. During the first half of the year, about two-thirds of the securities class action lawsuit filings involved financial companies. However, of the 37 securities lawsuits filed in July and August, only about 13 (or roughly a third) involved financial institutions. In other words the proportion of lawsuits filed against financial companies to lawsuits filed against nonfinancial companies seems to be completely reversed from the first half of the year.

 

The other interesting thing about the third quarter filings is the extent to which the cases involve proposed class period cutoff dates that are well in the past, sometimes by as much as a year or more prior to the actual filing date. As I have previously noted on this blog (most recently here), these belated filings suggest that while the plaintiffs lawyers were scrambling to file subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit against financial companies in the first part of the year, they were also developing a backlog of other cases that they are now working off.

 

All signs indicate that by the end of this year, securities class action filing levels will likely have returned to historical levels after the brief and apparently temporary decline in the second quarter. The concentration of filings in the financial sector also seems to be abating, with distribution of filings by industry starting to look more like historical norms.

 

How are Plaintiffs Faring in the Subprime and Credit Crisis-Related Securities Lawsuit?

We are now more than two and a half years into the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave, yet in many respects the cases are still only in their earliest stages. But there have been a number of recent significant developments suggesting that the evolving subprime litigation wave recently may have passed a significant milestone, and that it could be an appropriate time to take a closer look at the status of the subprime and credit crisis cases. For that reason, I will be publishing a post within the next few days providing a detailed status report on the litigation wave. I will update this post with a link when the status report is available. UPDATE: My September 8, 2009 status report on the subprime and credit crisis related litgation can be found here.

 

In the meantime, though the wave is still in its early stages, it is possible to make a number of generalizations. First, it seems like the defendants again have the upper hand at the motion to dismiss stage. Among other things, the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision affirming the district court’s dismissal in the NovaStar Financial case (about which refer here) represents a significant victory for defendants. The Downey Financial dismissal, discussed above in connection with the failed banks is another example. The recent dismissals in the Citigroup subprime-related derivative lawsuit (refer here) and Citigroup ERISA lawsuit (refer here, scroll down) also suggest that plaintiffs may be faring poorly in those cases as well.

 

On the other hand, there have also been some significant recent settlements suggesting that if the plaintiffs can survive motions to dismiss in these cases, the cost of settlement can be significant. Along those lines, the recent $32 million settlement in the RAIT Financial case (refer here) and the $22 million settlement in the Accredited Home Builders case (refer here) illustrate how costly it can be to try to settle cases that survive motions to dismiss.

 

Two equally significant settlements in cases in which the dismissal motions had not yet even been heard – the $37.25 million settlement in the American Home case (refer here) and the $30.5 million settlement in the Beazer Homes case (refer here) – suggests that in cases that are sufficiently serious the plaintiffs may be able to avoid the initial pleading hurdle altogether.

 

The American Home settlement may be particularly noteworthy because in that case both the offering underwriter defendants and the company’s auditor contributed substantially toward the cost of settlement. That, together with the Judge Scheindler’s September 2, 20009 partial denial of the motion to dismiss the claims against the rating agencies in the Cheyne Finance lawsuit (about which refer here), could suggest that in at least some of these cases the possibility of gatekeeper liability could be an important part of the overall claims resolution.

 

The final point is that these cases are proving to be extremely costly to litigate. The most dramatic illustration of this point is State Street’s August 10, 2009 announcement (here) that the approximately $625 million subprime-related litigation expense reserve the company had established in January 2008 was as of June 30, 2009 already down to $193 million, and further that there could be no assurances that the remaining amount would be adequate for the company’s continuing litigation.

 

So while the defendants may have won some important victories in the courtroom, the overall costs of defending and settling these cases taken in the aggregate nevertheless continues to look as if it will be enormous. By any measure, the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave continues to represent a tremendous loss exposure for D&O insurers.

 

Will the SEC’s Renewed Aggressiveness Expand Individual Liability Exposures for Corporate Officials?

The SEC is under considerable pressure to reestablish its regulatory credentials and to try to restore its tarnished reputation. As a result, the SEC recently has shown a renewed aggressiveness and even an apparent willingness to try to expand the weapons in its arsenal, in ways that may pose increased threats to corporate officials.

 

Two recent enforcement actions underscore this pronounced new aggressiveness. First, in July 2009, the SEC launched an enforcement action against the CEO of CSK Auto. As discussed here, the SEC is seeking to clawback the compensation the CEO earned during the period for which the company later restated its financial statements. Significantly, the SEC is pursuing this claim even though the CEO is not alleged to have engaged in any wrongful misconduct or even to have had any role in or knowledge of the issues that triggered the company’s restatement.

 

The second example of the SEC’s recent aggressiveness is the July 2009 enforcement action filed against two corporate officials at Nature’s Sunshine Products. As discussed here, the SEC sought to impose control person liability on the two officials for the company’s activities that violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, even though the two individuals were not themselves alleged to have been involved in or even aware of the corrupt activities.

 

Though the SEC’s apparently needs no further encouragement to pursue liability claims against individuals, the agency nevertheless is facing significant additional pressure to target individuals as part of its enforcement activities. Indeed, among other reasons that Judge Jed Rakoff has questioned the proposed settlement of the enforcement action involving the Merrill Lynch bonuses is that the settlement does not involve any specific allegations against or claims against the individuals who caused the alleged wrongdoing to take place. (Refer here for additional details regarding Judge Rakoff’s objections). Regardless of the outcome of the Merrill Lynch settlement, going forward the SEC likely will have to anticipate this objection and incorporate targeted allegations against individuals in an effort to forestall further objections of this kind.

 

The bottom line is that as a result of these developments, corporate officials could find themselves increasingly on the firing line. Of particular concern is that the CSK Auto and Nature’s Sunshine Products enforcement actions evidence an arguably disturbing willingness on the SEC’s part to try to impose liability on corporate officials even in the absence of culpable involvement in or even awareness of the alleged wrongdoing.

 

Will Claimants Increasingly Target Outside Directors?

The $61.55 million settlement earlier this year of the claims against the outside director defendants in the Peregrine Systems securities lawsuit is merely the latest example where outside directors have found themselves required to contribute toward a separate settlement of significant liability claims against them. As discussed at greater length here, at least some of the outside director defendants appear to have been required to contribute toward the Peregrine Systems settlement out of their own assets.

 

As was also shown in the now infamous Just for Feet settlement (about which refer here), the threat that outside directors will be targeted and could be called upon to contribute toward settlement out of their own assets is a growing concern, and one that is significantly increased in the bankruptcy context. Given the growing number of corporate bankruptcies, outside directors could find increasingly find themselves on the front lines of D&O claims.

 

These developments underscore yet again the need for alternative insurance structures such as Excess Side A insurance to be included as an important part of the corporate D&O insurance program. Indeed, among the defendants whose potential liabilities were settled by the Excess Side A insurers’ contribution in the Broadcom options backdating derivative lawsuit settlement were several of that company’s outside directors.

 

These cases also highlight the extent to which the outside directors’ liability exposures and interests should be separately considered as part of the construction of a company’s D&O insurance program. Simply put, the outside directors’ interests and the interests of the company’s officers may or may not be completely aligned. These developments and considerations suggest that the non-officer directors could be well advised to have their insurance interests independently reviewed, in order to ensure that their interests are appropriately addressed in the way the company’s insurance program is constructed, as I discuss at greater length here.

 

What Will be the Next Industry Event for the D&O Insurance Industry?

It is commonly understood that the D&O insurance industry’s historical experience is characterized by a sequence of industry events – for example, we went from the bursting of the Internet bubble to the era of corporate scandals, and we went from options backdating to the subprime litigation wave.

 

So what will be the next industry event? It might be one or more of the issues discussed above, like the failed bank litigation wave, or the rising number of derivative lawsuits. Or it could be a further extension of existing trends, like the rising numbers of FCPA follow-on civil lawsuits. Or it could be something entirely new, like lawsuits arising from climate change related disclosures.

 

Only time will tell for sure what the next industry event will be. The one thing that is for certain is that there will another event that will emerge and define the industry’s experience in the months and years that follow.

 

Is the D&O Insurance Marketplace Headed for a "Hard Market"?

Earlier this year, Advisen took the bold and provocative step of predicting that the D&O insurance marketplace is headed toward a "hard market" as early as late 2009 or early 2010, as discussed at greater length here. Whether or not we are actually headed to an overall harder insurance market remains to be seen, though as 2009 progresses, the possibility to that we will see a hard market earlier rather than later seems less and less likely.

 

To be sure, the D&O insurance marketplace for companies in the financial sector is definitely harder than for the rest of the marketplace, and some financial institutions are now "hard to place." The speed with which the D&O marketplace for community banks firmed up shows how quickly conditions can change.

 

Nevertheless, for most companies, particularly those that are financially stable, the D&O marketplace remains competitive, with ample capacity and coverage available on favorable terms and conditions. The pricing declines that have characterized the marketplace over the last several years have largely ended, but outside the financial sector significant pricing increases (at least for financial stable companies) remain the exception.

 

That is not to say that the possibility of a generalized harder market is completely out of the question. The losses and defense expense associated with the subprime and credit crisis related litigation wave, in combination with several years’ of pricing declines and coverage expansions, could start to affect carriers’ overall results and trigger pricing increases and marketplace restrictions. Whether and when these circumstances might arise remains to be seen.

 

D&O Insurer "Cut Out" of Settlement Process May Reasonably Withhold Consent

In prior posts (refer here), I have observed that the D&O insurer’s consent to settlement really is required. An August 10, 2009 decision by the Delaware Supreme Court (here) confirms that not only is the insurer’s consent required, but the D&O insurer may under certain circumstances reasonably withhold its consent to settlement. The Court, applying Missouri law and observing that the excess carrier in the case had been "cut out" of the settlement process, affirmed the jury’s verdict that the excess carrier had not unreasonably withheld its consent.

 

Special thanks to Francis Pileggi of the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog (here) for providing me with a link to the opinion. Pileggi's blog post on the opinion can be found here.

 

Background

Payless Cashways was insured under three different layers of insurance from three different carriers, a primary carrier and two excess carriers. The first level excess insurer is referred to in this post as the excess insurer.

 

In 2003, Hilco Capital and another entity sued Payless’s directors and officers alleging that in connection with certain loans Hilco made to Payless the defendants had misrepresented the value of Payless’s inventory.

 

Prior to trial, the parties scheduled a mediation session. The primary carrier’s representative attended the mediation, but because the defense counsel (Shay) and the primary carrier valued the case within the primary insurer’s $10 million limit, and because Shay told the excess carrier’s representative that he would rather try the case than settle for more than the the primary limit, all parties agreed that the excess carrier’s representative should not attend the mediation, but rather  be available by telephone.

 

After the mediation’s first day, the mediator proposed mediation of a single issue – whether the defendants were aware that a Payless employee had falsified the company’s inventory numbers. He further proposed a "high-low" outcome, whereby the primary insurer would pay Hilco $5 million immediately, and then if Hilco lost the single issue mediation, it would keep the $5 million, but if it won the mediation, it was also get the remaining limits of the primary policy (about $3.7 million) -- and in addition approximately $7 million under the excess insurer’s policy.

 

Unfortunately, it was 10:00 P.M. by the time the mediation parties agreed to this proposal, and they couldn’t get the excess insurer’s representative on the phone. As the Delaware Supreme Court later put it, "rather than wait until the next morning," the parties finished the deal that night by agreeing that the individual defendants would not be liable for the settlement and would assign their rights under the excess policy to Hilco.

 

Upon reviewing the memorandum of understanding (MOU), the excess insurer’s representative rejected the proposed settlement, among other grounds on that a "straight" settlement would be lower than the high-end number in the high-low settlement.

 

The excess carrier asked the mediation parties to withhold finalizing the MOU until after a January 5, 2005 settlement conference, but they did not. The mediation parties later mediated the single issue, and Hilco prevailed. The primary insurer paid its remaining limit. The excess insurer denied coverage for the settlement, asserting a breach of the policy’s consent to settlement requirement.

 

Coverage litigation ensued. The trial court granted summary judgment for the excess insurer on certain legal issues, and the coverage action then went to trial. The jury found for the excess insurer on three issues: that the individual insureds had breached the policy before the excess insurer withheld consent; that the excess insurer did not unreasonably withhold its consent; and that the excess insurer was not permitted to reasonably associate in the negotiation. Hilco appealed.

 

The Delware Supreme Court’s Opinion

One of the issues on which the trial court had granted summary judgment was whether or not the excess insurer had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Missouri law. The Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling but on alternative grounds, holding that even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Hilco, the excess insurer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that "all agreed" that the excess carrier’s representative should not attend the mediation because it would "send the wrong message," so, the Court concluded, there was no breach in the excess carriers’ failure to attend the mediation. And, the Court noted, it was the mediation participants "who refused to wait until the next day to discuss the proposal" but instead "effectively cut [the excess carrier] out of the process by agreeing that the Insureds would assign their rights to Hilco."

 

Hilco argued that while the MOU was being negotiated, the excess insurer "was willing to negotiate" but that the "straight settlement" it sought required the primary insurer to tender its limits. The Supreme Court noted that the primary insurer refused to tender its limits "because the MOU gave it a better deal," under which, at worst it would pay its limits, but "at best "it would save approximately $3.5 million.

 

The excess insurer’s "only recourse" under the circumstances was to object to the settlement at the January 5 settlement hearing, but the "mediation participants mooted that effort by executing a definitive settlement agreement the day before the conference." Thus, the Court said based on these circumstances, "in sum, there is no record of a breach of good faith claim against [the excess insurer]."

 

The Court also ruled in the excess carrier’s favor on other legal grounds and held as well that even if the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence at trial, it "did not deny Hilco a fair trial."

 

Among Hilco’s evidentiary objections was that the trial court had allowed Shay to testify that the excess carrier "had a reasonable basis to withhold settlement." The Court noted that Shay testified that "he believed it was more likely than not that the Insured would win if the case went to trial and that Hilco had grossly overstated its damages." Shay also testified that he "believed a ‘straight’ settlement could have been negotiated for less than the ‘high’ end …of the high-low agreement."

 

The Court found that given his testimony "it was obvious" that Shay thought the excess insurer "had a reasonable basis to withhold its consent," so his testimony on that question "did not deny Hilco a fair trial."

 

The Court reached similar conclusions regarding Hilco’s other evidentiary objections and concluded that because the jury found the excess carrier had "a reasonable basis to withhold its consent," it did not need to reach the jury’s other rulings, and affirmed the jury’s verdict.

 

Discussion

There are two sides to every story, and there may well be a side to this story that does not appear from the face of the Court’s opinion. Perhaps the information in the excluded evidence paints a different picture.

 

All of that said, though, the only surprising thing to me about this case is that it went all the way to the Delaware Supreme Court. Pretty clearly, the settlement looked like a set up deal to the jury, and that seems to be the way the Supreme Court saw it too.

 

Whatever else might be said in defense of the settlement process, it is undeniable that the mediation participants’ actions managed to eliminate any possibility that the process would later appear to have been fair to the excess insurer. Their repeated actions to, as the Supreme Court put it, to "cut out" the excess insurer, make it appear as if their goal was to keep the excess insurer from upsetting a settlement that they clearly found advantageous for themselves, even if objectionable – for obvious reasons – to the excess insurer.

 

The details of the settlement that the Supreme Court chose to emphasize in its opinion are telling. The Supreme Court twice noted that at the mediation (a mediation "all agreed" the excess carrier’s representative should not attend to avoid "sending the wrong message"), the mediation participants decided not to wait until the following morning to discuss the proposed settlement. Instead, the Court observed, they cut the excess insurer out of the deal, with the assignment of rights and the agreement that the inidividuals would not be liable.

 

The Court also noted that the mediation participants, having refused even to wait until the next morning to discuss the deal with the excess insurer,  refused to forebear from finalizing the settlement until after the January 5 hearing, depriving the excess insurer of its only means of objecting to the settlement.

 

In addition to the obvious question of fairness of a process that appears to have been calculated to cut out the excess insurer but that nonetheless exposed its interests, there are the further questions of the fairness of the amount of the settlement and the burden it imposed on the excess insurer, given Shay’s trial testimony about the trial prospects of the underlying case and the appropriate settlement valuations at the high end.

 

The interesting thing about the outcome of this case is its suggestion that absent a reasonable opportunity to consider a settlement, a D&O insurer may reasonably withhold its settlement consent. The further implication is that a set up deal that deprives a D&O insurer of a reasonable opportunity to consider a proposed settlement may represent a sufficient basis for the insurer to withhold its consent. Perhaps with an awareness of this possibility, other settlement participants might think twice about taking steps that later could be portrayed as cutting an insurer out of the process.

 

About Those Late Night Settlement Demands: 10 P.M. seems to be a popular time to send D&O insurers unexpected settlement demands. As I noted in a prior post (here), former Globalstar CEO Bernard Schwarz sought his company’s D&O carriers’ consent to a $20 million at 10 P.M. on a Sunday night before his Monday morning trial testimony.

 

In that case, by contrast to the one discussed above, the Second Circuit held that the insurers’ did not reasonably withhold consent to Schwarz’s settlement. However, the critical difference between that case and the case discussed above is that in connection with his settlement, Schwarz accepted personal liability and in fact funded the settlement out of his own assets while seeking coverage from the carriers. This willingness to assume responsibility for the settlement deprived the carriers of the ability to argue that the amount of the settlement was unreasonable and by extension that their action in withholding consent reasonable.

 

In other words, the difference between the two cases is that in the case discussed above the deal looked like a set up. That seems to be how the jury saw it and how the Delaware Supreme Court saw it. That is why I say I am surprised the case went all the way to the Supreme Court. It is hard to argue that someone else wasn’t reasonable when your own conduct can be portrayed as unreasonable.

 

Stanford Financial Receiver Seeks D&O Insurance Proceeds

In a move that recapitulates a classic dispute that has been brewing in bankruptcy court for years, the Stanford Financial Group receiver has asserted that the proceeds of Stanford’s D&O insurance policies are "receivership assets" and that his right to the proceeds "supersedes" the rights of insureds under the policy. Moreover, he has specifically threatened the insurer with "contempt" if it were to advance the individual insureds’ defense expenses. This sequence raises some fundamental issues about the D&O insurance structure and coverage and could highlight the importance of certain policy provisions that have recently become prevalent. It also raises some questions about some coverage structures.

 

Let me just say at the outset that I am not involved in this case and I do not intend in this post to express my opinions on the merits of the parties’ respective positions. Rather, the purpose of this post is simply to note the parties’ dispute and to make some observations.

 

According to a June 30, 2009 motion filed in the Stanford Financial SEC proceeding pending by former Stanford CEO Laura Pendergest-Holt (here), Stanford’s D&O insurance carrier had advised her that it would begin advancing her defense expense, subject to a reservation of its rights to deny coverage under the policy, on July 1, 2009. However, on June 25, 2009, the receiver sent the carrier a letter claiming that the D&O policy proceeds are "Receivership Assets" and that the receiver’s right to the proceeds "supersedes" the right of the other insureds under the policy. The carrier has withheld payment.

 

Pendergest-Holt’s motion seeks clarification that the receivership order does not apply to the D&O policy proceeds, and alternatively seeks authorization for disbursement of the D&O policy proceeds for payment of her defense expense. A host of other individuals claiming also to be insureds under Stanford’s D&O policy have sought to join in Pendergest-Holt’s motion, as reflected, for example, in the August 6, 2009 motion (here) filed by two former Stanford brokers. UPDATE: The receiver's response to Pendergest-Holt's motion can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the response.

 

The question of ownership and entitlement to D&O policy insurance proceeds is a long-standing question in the bankruptcy context. This recurring question became even more troublesome after so-called "entity coverage" was added to most D&O policies in the mid-90s. This coverage extension provides liability protection for the company itself. In public company policy’s, the coverage is limited just to securities claims. However, for private companies, like Stanford, the entity coverage is usually more extensive.

 

As reflected in a memo (here) by my friend Kim Melvin of the Wiley Rein firm, courts have continued to struggle with these issues in bankruptcy, with some courts finding that the policy proceeds are not a part of the bankruptcy estate and therefore not subject to the stay in bankruptcy, and others reaching a contrary conclusion.

 

But these questions may take on a different light in the context of the question of the advancement of defense expenses subject to a carrier’s reservation of rights. In these circumstances, policy funds are advanced without a final determination of coverage (one that might, in fact, never come, if the claims are compromised). When it comes to the entitlement to advancement of defense expense, it could be argued that, all else equal, the various insureds’ rights -- including the bankrupt company’s rights – under the policy could be regarded equivalent.

 

These issues could be even further complicated where, as here, the bankrupt company faces a likelihood of its own third-party liability claims, in which the company will likely incur its own defense expense.

 

One critical element of this dispute may be the question whether Stanford’s policy has a priority of payments provision, which predetermines the order of payment under the policy. This type of provision has become fairly standard in recent years. These provisions generally specify that payment of loss will first be made under the policy’s A Side coverage (which provides individual protection in the event the corporate entity is unable to indemnify them due to insolvency or legal prohibition). These provisions confirm the parties’ intent that the D&O policy serves primarily to protect the individual directors and officers.

 

Whether Stanford’s policy has this type of provision, and if so how the court will interpret and apply it here remains to be seen. The court’s interpretation of this provision (assuming it is in the policy) could be determinative of the parties’ dispute.

 

While the outcome of this dispute remains to be seen, the receiver’s position caused me to reflect on an auxiliary D&O insurance policy that many insureds have acquired in recent years, the so-called Excess Side A/DIC policy. The "difference in condition" coverage extension under this type of policy provides that the policy will "drop down" and provide first dollar coverage under certain circumstances.

 

Although these policies vary significantly, one of the relatively standard features of the DIC coverage is a provision specifying that the policy will "drop down" and provide first dollar coverage if the insured company is in bankruptcy and the proceeds of any traditional underlying insurance cannot be paid because the proceeds are subject to the automatic stay.

 

The circumstances of the dispute involving the Stanford D&O insurance policy present a situation where the individual insureds might well find themselves unable to access the protection of a traditional D&O insurance policy, at least if the receiver’s current efforts are successful. However, even if Stanford Financial D&O insurance program included a Side A/DIC policy, the typical Side A/DIC policy would not appear to provide drop down protection to the individual insureds in this circumstance, because their inability to access the policy proceeds is not as the result of the initiation of an action under the U.S Bankruptcy Code and not as a result of the automatic stay in bankruptcy.

 

The apparent nonapplicability of the drop down coverage to these circumstances under the typical Excess Side A/DIC policy made me reflect that there could be a need for an extension of the DIC coverage’s drop down protection to circumstances like this one where the proceeds of the traditional D&O insurance policy may be unavailable for the individual insureds’ protection for reasons other than the operation of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. There may well be some DIC policies out there that might respond in this situation, but the typical Excess Side A/DIC policy likely would not.

 

The Stanford Financial insurance dispute will be interesting to watch, although it is an extremely unwelcome situation from the perspective of the individuals involved. In any event, the specifics of the situation suggest a possible (and arguably necessary) extension of the DIC coverage in the typical Excess Side A/DIC policy.

 

I know that many readers may have much more experience with the coverage issues involved in the receiver’s actions in the Stanford Financial case, and many readers may also have views about the extent and limitations of the typical Excess Side A/DIC policy. I encourage readers to share their views with others using the blog’s "Comment" feature.

 

Quelle Surprise: The Lawyers Want to Be Sure They Will Be Paid: Among other things, the receiver’s asset freeze together with the dispute of over the D&O policy proceeds may have left the various individuals’ lawyers wondering when and how they will be paid. R. Allen Stanford’s new criminal defense lawyers want assurance they will be paid before they will take any actions.

 

As reflected in an August 10, 2009 Texas Lawyer article entitled "Stanford’s Lawyers Want Assurance on Pay" (here), Stanford’s erstwhile new legal defense team has entered an appearance in the criminal proceeding against Stanford – solely for the limited purpose of determining "whether Mr. Stanford will be granted access to monies to pay for his legal fees and expenses."

 

"Private Companies Need D&O Insurance, Too": The Stanford Group case may represent an extreme example, but it does illustrate that private companies can become involved in serious claims for which D&O insurance is required. But many private company officials remain unconvinced of the need for D&O insurance, particularly when it comes to closely held companies.

 

A recent memo by Shannon Graving and Thomas H. Bentz, Jr. of the Holland & Knight law firm entitled "Private Companies Need D&O Insurance, Too" (here) takes a look at this recurring question about private companies and D&O insurance. As the article shows, private companies and their directors and officers may be susceptible to a wide variety of claims, as a result of which, the companies – even family owned businesses – would be well advised to secure D&O insurance protection.

 

More Madoff-Related Coverage Litigation: As I noted in a prior post (here), Madoff-related coverage litigation has started to arrive, and there undoubtedly will be more to come. Along those lines, Bloomberg reported today (here) that Madoff feeder fund Tremont Group Holdings and its related organizations have filed an action in Delaware Chancery Court against its insurers for denying coverage for Madoff-related claims.

 

According to the article, Tremont is owned by OppenheimerFunds, a unit of Mass Mutual Financial Group. The article reports that the complaint alleges that Mass Mutual’s D&O insurers and its bond insurers "have ignored repeated requests to pay defense costs." The complaint apparently contends that MassMutual’s D&O insurer has taken the position that the company’s bond insurer should pay a portion of the defense expense, but that "the primary bond underwriters have refused to pay any portion of the joint defense expense." The complaint seeks a judicial declaration of coverage under the applicable policies.

 

I don’t yet have a copy of this complaint, but I will post a link as soon as I get a copy. I would be grateful if any reader that has a copy of the complaint would forward a copy to me (anonymously, of course, if necessary), so that I can post the link. UPDATE: A copy of the complaint can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of this complaint.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending me a copy of the Bloomberg article.

 

D&O Insurance: Bankruptcy and the Insured vs. Insured Exclusion

Claims arising out of corporate bankruptcy represent a significant stress test for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance coverage. Among other frequently recurring issues are questions whether post-bankruptcy claims against the bankrupt company’s directors and officers run afoul of the Insured vs. Insured (I v. I) exclusion found in most D&O insurance policies.

 

In a July 10, 2009 opinion (here) that highlights many of these perennial bankruptcy-related D&O insurance coverage issues, the Ninth Circuit held that a D&O policy’s Insured vs. Insured exclusion bars coverage for claims that were brought against former directors and officers of a bankrupt company by the post-bankruptcy debtor in possession and later assigned to a creditors’ trust. The decision may have important implications for the prospective wording of coverage “carve backs” from the  I v. I exclusion.

 

  

Background

 

Visitalk, which had filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, and while acting as “debtor and debtor in possession,” sued four of its recently discharged directors and officers for breaches of their fiduciary duties. Visitalk’s D&O insurers refused coverage for the claim, in reliance on the I v. I exclusion.

 

 

Visitalk’s primary D&O insurance policy’s I v. I exclusion provided as follows:

 

 

V. EXCLUSIONS

 

The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection with any Claim made against the Directors and Officers . . .:

 

(D) brought or maintained by or on behalf of an Insured in any capacity or by any

security holder of the company except:

 

(1) a Claim, including, but not limited to, a security holder class or derivative action that is instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of an Insured;

 

(2) an Employment Practice Claim3 by a former Director or a present or former Officer;

 

(3) a claim for contribution or indemnity if the Claim directly results from another Claim that is otherwise covered under this Policy; or

 

(4) a claim by any employee(s) of the Company described in IV.(D)(2) of the Policy.

 

 

Visitalk filed a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that assigned its claims against the directors and officers to a trust created by the creditors. The trustee for the creditors trust (Biltmore) and the four director and officer defendants agreed to settle Visitalk’s claims for about $175 million. The four directors and officers assigned to the creditors’ trust their rights against the D&O insurers. (The record does not disclose whether or not the settlement with Biltmore also included a provision typical of these kinds of arrangements, which is a covenant by the settling claimant not to execute any judgment entered pursuant to the settlement on the assets of the settling defendants.)

 

 

Biltmore, as trustee for the creditors’ trust, then sued the D&O insurers in reliance on the individuals’ assignment to Biltmore of their rights under the D&O policies. The District Court dismissed Biltmore’s complaint on narrow grounds relating to the relation between Visitalk’s primary D&O insurer and the primary insurer’s successor in interest. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the successor in interest issue but nevertheless affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the case on the grounds that the I v. I exclusion applies.

 

 

The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion

 

The Ninth Circuit’s July 10, 2009 opinion (here) written by Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld opens with a review of the reasons for the inclusion of an insured vs. insured exclusion in D&O insurance policies, noting that “because risks such as collusion and moral hazard are much greater for claims by one insured against another insured … than for claims by strangers, liability policies typically exclude them from coverage.”

 

 

The Court then noted that because none of the exceptions to the policy’s I v. I exclusion apply, the only question was whether the underlying suit was “brought or maintained on behalf of an Insured in any capacity.”

 

 

The Court found that the underlying claim had been “instigated and continued” by Visitalk as Chapter 11 “debtor and debtor in possession.” Though coverage was now being sought by the trustee of the creditor’s trust, it was doing so merely as an assignee. The court noted that “an assignee of a claim against an insurance company can have no stronger claim than the assignor who assigned the claim.”

 

 

The question then is whether Visitalk’s status as debtor in possession at the time it initiated the claim triggered the I v I exclusion.

 

 

Biltmore argued that Visitalk, the chapter 11 debtor in possession that brought the underlying suit, is not the same entity as Visitalk, the insured corporation. However, the Ninth Circuit concluded after a review of authorities that “for purposes of the insured versus insured exclusion, the prefiling company and the company as debtor in possession in chapter 11 are the same entity.”

 

 

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “it is certainly true that interests differ once a debtor goes into bankruptcy.” Among other things, due to the bankruptcy “ownership of the cause of action fell into the bankruptcy estate” and Visitalk as debtor in possession of the bankrupt estate was “empowered to act as fiduciary for its creditors and shareholders.”

 

 

Biltmore argued that because Visitalk as debtor in possession was acting as representative for the estate’s creditors in bringing the suit, the I v. I exclusion does not apply. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that while suit might be brought for the benefit of creditors, it was not brought “on behalf of” the creditors. The Ninth Circuit said that the suit is “for the benefit of the creditors, but on behalf of the pre-bankruptcy corporation.”

 

 

The Court said that the question was not whether the creditors might benefit from any recovery. The court said that the insurance “cannot be turned into an available pot for the corporation’s creditors by enforcing the insurance obligations while disregarding the parties’ agreement to limit those obligations to exclude insured versus insured claims.”

 

 

The Ninth Circuit concluded its analysis of the I v. I exclusion issues by noting that a contrary holding would

 

 

create a perverse incentive for the principals of a failing business to bet the dwindling treasury on a lawsuit against themselves and a coverage action against their insurers, bailing the company out with the money from the D & O policy if they win and giving themselves covenants not to execute if they lose. That is among the kinds of moral hazard that the insured versus insured exclusion is intended to avoid.

 

 

Discussion

 

As I have previously noted (here), the insured vs. insured exclusion is heavily litigated and continues to be at the heart of many D&O coverage disputes, particularly in the bankruptcy context, as this case demonstrates. In response to these many continuing disputes, the exclusion itself has continued to evolve, and the I v. I exclusion in the typical D&O policy in today’s marketplace is quite a bit different than the exclusion at issue in the Visitalk case.

 

 

Among other things, the I v. I exclusion in most D&O policies today contain additional exceptions to the exclusion, or coverage “carve banks” as they are usually called. Among other provisions now more or less standard is a carve back to the I v. I exclusion specifically relating to the bankruptcy context. A typical carve back of this type would specify that the I v. I exclusion would not apply “in any bankruptcy proceeding by or against an Organization” to “any claim brought by an examiner, trustee, receiver, liquidator or rehabilitator (or any assignee thereof) of such Organization.”

 

 

It would have been interesting to see how the Ninth Circuit would have addressed the issues in the Visitalk case if the policy as issue had contained these now fairly standard provisions. However, even if Visitalk’s policy had contained a carve back of this kind, it likely would not have altered the outcome, because the underlying action in the Visitalk claim had not been brought by any of the creditors’ representatives referenced in the carve back, but rather had been brought by Visitalk as debtor in possession.

 

 

The solution to this coverage problem would seem to be simply to include the debtor-in-possession in the list of bankruptcy-related claimants for whose claims coverage is carved back as an exception to the exclusion. Indeed, parts of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Visitalk case suggest that this would be appropriate, particularly the Court’s comments about how a debtor’s status changes upon becoming a debtor in possession, and how an action by a debtor in possession as representative of the estate is for the benefit of creditors.

 

 

However, throughout the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is a pervasive concern with the possibility of collusive litigation. The Court clearly was concerned that if there were coverage, a debtor in possession action might represent a collusive attempt by a debtor company to use the cover of a bankruptcy filing and the ruse of a supposed claim as a way to access insurance proceeds to pay off the company’s debts.

 

 

Without minimizing the collusive possibilities to which the Ninth Circuit refers, I believe there is also a legitimate concern that without policy recognition in some way for debtor in possession claims, individuals could be left without insurance for claims of a kind for which D&O policies are intended to provide coverage.A debtor in possession claim is not inevitably collusive, and in that regard I note that the individuals named as defendants in the underlying suit in the Visitalk claim were former directors and officers, targeted post-bankruptcy on behalf of the bankrupt estate.

 

 

There are, in fact, D&O insurance policies available in the current marketplace that attempt to address the problem of debtor in possession claims. For example, one policy’s list of the bankruptcy-related claimants for whose claims coverage is carved back include “a Claim by the Entity as Debtor-in-Possession after such Examiner, Trustee, Receiver has been appointed.” The prerequisite for the availability of coverage under this carve back for the appointment of an examiner or trustee does represent some check against the collusive possibilities about which the Ninth Circuit was concerned.

 

 

Whether or not this particular formulation is sufficient to preclude the possibility of collusive claims, it strikes me as a step in the right direction toward protecting against the possibility that individuals could otherwise be left without coverage for claims of a kind for which these policies were intended to provide protection.

 

 

To be sure, the individual defendants in the Visitalk claim were not left to defend themselves without coverage; they entered into the settlement and assignment of rights with the trustee to the creditors’ trust. The parties’ entry into this settlement arrangement clearly troubled the Ninth Circuit, and the Court’s concerns about these kinds of settlement and assignment of rights deals clearly affected the court’s analysis. However, it should be noted that there is nothing about the debtor in possession claim context that uniquely encourages this kind of settlement, and litigants in many other contexts enter similar arrangements. Indeed, if the individuals were clearly covered and thus able to defend themselves, they would have far less incentive to enter these kinds of arrangements.

 

 

While I don’t mean to trivialize concerns about the possibility of collusive claims, for me the most important message from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the Visitalk case is not necessarily the threat of collusive claims but rather then need to address in the policy the possibility of debtor in possession claims against individual directors and officers. The clear implication seems to be that the now fairly typical bankruptcy-related coverage carve back to the I v I exclusion should be modified to preserve coverage for debtor in possession claims.

 

 

One final observation about this particular coverage problem is that whether or not the primary D&O insurer will agree to provide a coverage carve back in the I v I exclusion for debtor in possession claims, an insured company may be able to purchase an excess Side A policy providing “difference in condition” protection and that either does not contain an I v. I exclusion or has one that is very narrowly circumscribed.

 

 

Because of the issues raised in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, particularly the court’s concerns about the possibility of collusive claims, I would like to hear readers’ views about these issues, and I encourage everyone to post their thoughts for others using this blog’s “Comment” feature.

 

 

Very special thanks to Mike Early of the Chicago Underwriting Group for providing me with a copy of the Visitalk opinion. I hasten to add that the views expressed in the blog post are exclusively my own.

 

 

2009 Failed Banks – The Slideshow: This past Friday night, the Bank of Wyoming of Thermopolis, Wyoming, became the fifty-third bank to fail this year (refer here for more details). Regular readers know that the FDIC maintains a detailed list of failed banks (here). But who needs a list when you can see a slideshow, including pictures of all of the banks that failed this year? Check out Clusterstock’s failed bank slideshow, which is complete prior to the closure of the Bank of Wyoming, and can be accessed here.

 

 

Mid-Year Review: Securities Litigation and Enforcement: On July 9, 2009, I participated in a Securities Docket webinar entitled “Mid-Year Review: Securities Litigation and Enforcement” that included as panelists Lyle Roberts of the 10b5-Daily blog, Francine McKenna of the Re: The Auditors blog, Tom Gorman of the SEC Actions blog, as well as Bruce Carton of Securities Docket. Carton has posted a brief summary of the topics discussed in the webinar in a July 10, 2009 Compliance Week column entitled “Bloggers Offer 2009 Mid-Year Review” (here).

 

 

The webinar itself is available to be viewed online and can be accessed below:

 

New German Statutory D&O Insurance Requirements

A recent German legislative action creates some interesting requirements for and limitations upon insurance for German corporate director liability. These legislative changes are designed to try to ensure greater director exposure to personal liability, as a deterrent to corporate misconduct. However, the legislative changes are susceptible to circumventions that may limit their intended effects.

 

As reflected in a July 1, 2009 memo by Anthony Menzires and Dr. Gunbritt Kammerer-Galahn of the Taylor Wessing law firm entitled “D&O Insurance in Germany – The New Legislation Arrives” (here), on June 18, 2009, the Bundestag enacted the new Act on the Adequacy of Managerial Salaries.

 

 

Among other things, this new Act will impose a new requirement that German Stock Corporations (Aktiengesetz) purchasing D&O insurance for their executives must impose a personal deductible to be borne by the directors in an amount equivalent to at least 10% of the relevant loss, up to an annual cap. Comments accompanying the Act specify that the annual cap must be set at not less than one and one half the annual fixed remuneration of the director.

 

 

These requirements are applicable to all stock corporations, whether listed or publicly owned.

The requirements will to into effect immediately following the Act’s ratification by the Bundesrat on July 10, 2009, with immediate effect on all D&O insurance policies formed after that date and with a further requirement that all existing policies must be amended to bring them into compliance by July 1, 2010.

 

 

According to the law firm’s memo, these new statutory requirements codify long-standing German governance guidelines that had encouraged companies to structure their D&O insurance with a deductible to be borne personally by the directors as a way to “motivate them to avoid claims arising.” The memo observes that many German corporations “circumvented” these voluntary requirements.

 

 

The elevation of these provisions into statutory mandates represents an apparent legislative attempt to try to use the threat of personal liability to deter corporate misconduct. The German legislature’s action raises a couple of questions: Will the statutory requirement be effective? And will other countries follow?

 

 

As for whether the requirement will be effective in deterring corporate misconduct, there are certain aspects of the statutory requirement that are worth considering. The first is that that under the German two-tier system of board governance, the requirements apply only to D&O insurance for the management board (Vorstand) and not to the non-executive supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). At a minimum, then, the deterrent effect, if any, is limited solely to the management board and would not reach the supervisory board.

 

 

The other aspect of the statute that may affect its effectiveness is the fact that the Act does not prohibit the acquisition of separate insurance for the individual director’s deductible exposure, which presents a rather obvious new product opportunity for German D&O insurers. And while the premium cost would have to be borne personally by the director, there is, as the memo notes, nothing to prevent each director from “seeking a commensurate uplift in their remuneration to cover the outlay.” Furthermore, there apparently is no existing requirement that would compel the corporation to disclose this type of compensation arrangement.

 

 

Whether other countries might follow the German legislation and enact similar statutory requirements may depend on whether the German requirement proves to be effective in deterring corporate misconduct. While the results from the statutory requirement remain to be seen, the apparent ease with which the personal exposure could be insured may well limit the deterrent effects.

 

 

The obvious logical step, then, might be to suggest that other countries considering the German requirement add further specifications that the director cannot acquire separate personal insurance to protect against the required liability exposure. My own view is that there are several critical considerations that should be taken into account before these kinds of prohibitions are imposed.



 

The first is that directors ought to be able to defend themselves, and so there should be no prohibition for the insurance providing defense expense protection. The second is that fundamental fairness requires that the barriers should apply only if an adjudication has determined that the director actually violated liability standards, and accordingly the statutory prohibition should only apply to judgments.

 

D&O Insurance and Non-Officer Directors

One of the most striking things I have found when talking to corporate officials about D&O insurance is how different the conversation can be when talking to non-officer directors compared to talking to corporate officers. Without meaning to over-generalize, the two groups sometimes have different questions and concerns. And indeed there are very good reasons why the insurance needs and interests of non-officer directors should be analyzed differently from those of the corporation and its officers.

 

By way of background, these issues arise in the context of the traditional D&O insurance policy, which may have potential conflicts of interest built right into its frame. By way of illustration, after I recently made a recent presentation about D&O insurance to a group of noninsurance professionals, one of the audience members (an economist) came up to me to express his astonishment that both a company’s inside officers and its non-officer directors would be insured under the same policy of insurance. When you think about it, it may not make much sense, but that is the way the insurance typically is structured.

 

 

Not only are there two potentially conflicting sets of individuals yoked together in the traditional D&O insurance policy, but since the mid-90s, the traditional D&O insurance policy has also incorporated so-called “entity coverage” for securities claims, providing the company with balance sheet protection and representing yet another potential conflict within the policy with respect to the interests of the non-officer defendants.

 

 

In recent years, the insurance marketplace has developed and materially improved a variety of alternative insurance vehicles designed to ensure a dedicated source of insurance protection for the individuals insured under the D&O insurance program. These alternative approaches include excess Side A insurance, which effectively provides catastrophe insurance for the protection of individual directors and officers, and individual director liability insurance (IDL), which protects a single individual. These products can be further customized to protect a specific group of individuals – for example, the non-officer directors.

 

 

Not every company wants, needs or can afford to acquire these alternative products in addition to their traditional D&O insurance. But every company should consider them. And these days, an increasing number of companies do purchase some form of these alternative products, typically Side A excess insurance. But both with respect to the companies declining to purchase these products and with respect to many of the companies that do, the assessment of these alternative or supplemental structures often is not taken from the perspective of the needs and interests of the non-officer directors.

 

 

It is this conversation topic – the one about the non-officer board members’ interests in the structure of the D&O insurance program – that represents the heart of the difference that arises between speaking about D&O insurance to outside board members compared to talking about these issues to corporate officers.

 

 

In my experience, outside board members are keenly interested in learning more about the protection afforded by these alternative products and the ways the D&O insurance program can be structured to maximize their protection. In particular, non-officer directors want to know about the ways the insurance program can be structured so that there is dedicated insurance set aside that cannot be eroded or exhausted by the defense expenses and indemnity obligations of the company or the company’s officers. They want as much reassurance as they can get that no matter what happens, they will not have to go out of pocket in any way.

 

 

Corporate officers, even those who recognize the theoretical value of these products, often are most concerned with considerations pertaining to cost. Even officials persuaded of the need for the company to acquire excess Side A insurance to protect the individual directors and officers may not be susceptible to persuasion of the need for separate limits set aside just for the outside board members, and frequently the stumbling block to further consideration of these issues is an unwillingness to incur additional D&O insurance expense.

 

 

These issues recur with sufficient frequency that it is my universal recommendation to non-officer board members that they request a separate presentation directly to the board about the company’s D&O insurance, to afford all of the board members a separate opportunity to inquire about their interest and the level of insurance protection available to them.

 

 

Another step I have found an increasing number of concerned board members requesting is a separate review of their company’s D&O insurance program by an outside and independent insurance professional, on behalf of the board. An independent review not only facilitates a separate determination whether or not the non-officer board members’ needs and interests are appropriately addressed, but it also facilitates a separate inquiry whether the terms, conditions, and structure of the program adequately addresses all of the interests insured.

 

 

This latter point bears emphasizing – that is, there is considerable value in having the D&O insurance program separately and independently reviewed. D&O insurance is of course only one part of the company’s overall insurance program, but from the outside board members’ perspective, the D&O insurance is the only insurance the company has that insures them directly, so they are highly motivated that the insurance program is the best available.

 

 

Though both the company’s officers and its board members are equally interested in ensuring the adequacy of the D&O insurance program, my own experience is that a separate insurance audit on behalf of the non-officer board members frequently discloses a variety of ways the overall D&O insurance program might be improved, sometimes materially.

 

 

Another constituency that may have an interest in having an independent insurance review is the board of a corporate subsidiary, particularly where the subsidiary’s board is separately constituted from the parent company’s board. Though the corporate parent’s D&O insurance typically will provide protection for the subsidiary’s directors and officers, there are occasions when the subsidiary board’s interests are sufficiently distinct that the subsidiary’s board would be well advised to at least consider whether or not to acquire a separate policy dedicated to their own protection. These interests are particularly noteworthy for subsidiaries of large financial services companies, when the subsidiary board may have its own distinct liability exposures as well as a separate interest in the availability of insurance limits dedicated to their protection.

 

 

As I noted above, the interests of a wide variety of insureds are yoked together in a single D&O insurance program. But that does not mean that the various constituencies’ interests cannot be considered separately. A separate consideration of competing and sometimes conflicting interests can sometimes result in the selection of different insurance structures. In addition, as noted above, an independent insurance audit can provide an opportunity for the separate review of the adequacy and appropriateness of the terms and conditions in the applicable policies.

 

D&O Insurance: Cost vs. Value

Most reasonably sophisticated consumers understand that the cheapest running shoes may be no bargain, that the least expensive cellular plan may have big gaps, and that selecting legal counsel based on which attorney charges the least is fraught with peril. Yet when it comes to D&O insurance, these same buyers are often only concerned with which is the lowest cost alternative, without complete consideration whether the cheapest coverage fully addresses their insurance needs.

 

The assumption behind many insurance purchasing decisions is that the various alternatives are basically equivalent, and the only relevant variable is price. Whether or not this assumption would be valid for personal insurance like home or auto, for which the insurance is generally issued on standard forms, it definitely is not true with respect to D&O insurance.

 

 

There is no standard D&O insurance policy form; to the contrary, the various carriers’ base forms vary significantly, and many of the key terms are negotiable, particularly with respect to public company D&O insurance.

 

 

So the assessment of D&O insurance alternatives often involves – or rather should involve – careful comparison between a host of relative advantages and disadvantages, among which price is one of many important factors to be considered.

 

 

Despite the many subtle but nonetheless critically important differences between D&O insurance alternatives, many insurance buyers, even those who otherwise qualify as very sophisticated, ultimately make their selection based solely upon price, even though they would never depend solely on price alone when selecting, say, a pair of running shoes, a cellular plan, or an attorney to represent them.

 

 

When it comes to running shoes, cellular plans or attorneys, consumers both understand what these goods and services are for and they also fully expect to use these goods and services. When it comes to D&O insurance, however, the same buyers are unconsciously assuming that they will never actually need to use the product, and that the insurance acquisition is nothing more than a box-checking exercise. D&O insurance? Yep, got that.

 

 

The one subset of insurance buyers who do not need to be reminded when selecting among D&O insurance alternatives of how important it is to consider all issues, and not just price, are company officials who have previously been involved in a D&O claim. These individuals fully understand what D& O insurance is for, and they often have a deep appreciation of the way that seemingly small difference in policy language can have a significant impact on the extent of coverage in the event of a claim.

 

 

After over a quarter of a century of involvement with directors’ and officers’ liability issues, I have seen hundreds of claims involving thousands of individual director and officer defendants. I have seen highly regarded individuals, who have amassed a lifetime’s worth of wealth and prestige, have everything they worked for their entire careers come crashing down around them. I have seen formerly powerful executives taken away in handcuffs. I have seen grown men cry. None of these individuals ever thought they would ever find themselves in these circumstances – but they did. I guarantee you that not one of them, finding themselves caught up in these circumstances, thought to themselves “Boy, I sure am glad we got the cheapest D&O insurance we could find.” .

 

 

The D&O insurance acquisition process cannot be built on the assumption that those things might happen, but not to my company and certainly not to me.  The entire acquisition process has to be built on the assumption that these things will happen to this company.

 

 

Of course, not all D&O claims are catastrophic, but the one thing I know for sure about D&O claims is that, whether or not they are catastrophic, the quality of the D&O insurance available at the time of the claim is critically important. The time to analyze whether or not the D&O insurance program is built to respond to the range of possible claims circumstances is not when the claim comes in, but when the insurance is purchased.

 

 

Cost is of course an indispensible consideration and price considerations should always be taken into account. In fact, I have many times recommended to clients that they select an alternative that is the lowest cost option. But when I make that recommendation, price alone is neither the sole nor the most important criterion.

 

 

D&O insurance buyers whose advisors recommend the lowest priced alternative need to consider whether (a) the advisor is recommending the lowest priced alternative because it really is the best option for the company based on full consideration of all relevant factors; (b) the advisor is recommending the lowest price alternative because he or she thinks that is what the buyer wants to hear and that’s what it will take for the advisor to get or keep the business, and he or she doesn’t have the guts to provide an independent and fully considered recommendation; or (c) the advisor doesn’t have a clue what the important differences are between the available alternatives and the only distinction the advisor can explain is the cost difference.

 

 

I am often asked to review public companies’ D&O insurance programs. In many cases, the companies have insurance programs that are more or less matched to their requirements and circumstances. But in a surprising number of cases, the programs I review lack critically important features that could dramatically affect the availability of coverage in various claims circumstances. Sometimes these underserved policyholders are also over-paying for their insurance, which has its own set of implications. But more often, the company itself has selected into an inadequate insurance program because they chose their insurance based solely on price.

 

 

Price considerations alone are not enough to allow a buyer to select the best running shoes, cellular plan or legal counsel. Price considerations are important of course, because no one should overpay for something. Often the way to make the optimal purchase is to get assistance from someone who knows more about the products and services.

 

 

Insurance buyers may never have to use their D&O insurance, but policyholders don’t want to find out when a claim arises that the cheap insurance they bought was no bargain. That is why it is indispensible to have a skilled and experienced insurance advisor involved in the D&O insurance transaction, one that understands and can explain the differences between the insurance alternatives and that can recommend the alterative that will best meets the company’s needs and finances.

 

 

Where are You Going, Al? Can’t You Read?: Any alpaca having the temerity to disregard this sign will find itself in very serious trouble.

 

Interpleader: AIG, Greenberg and D&O Policy Proceeds

One byproducts of the turmoil that has swept over insurance giant AIG has been a cascade of litigation. But even before the company’s latest woes, it was locked in a series of hotly contested legal battles with its former Chairman and CEO, Maurice Greenberg. The latest front in this ongoing war apparently is a fight over the proceeds of the company’s primary D&O insurance policy, as a result of which the D&O insurer has now initiated an interpleader action to sort out whose claims to the policy proceeds should prevail.

 

As reflected in the complaint (here) that the insurer filed on May 8, 2009 in the Southern District of New York, the insurer issued a $15 million primary D&O insurance policy over a $10 million self-insured retention for the policy period May 24, 2004 through May 25, 2005. As the D&O insurer’s complaint notes, "AIG is at the center of a firestorm," as a result of which the company and its present and former directors and officers are the targets of numerous lawsuits. (The lawsuits themselves are not specified in the D&O insurer’s complaint.)

 

But as the insurer’s complaint observes, "even before the current issues at AIG became front page news, a very public split" occurred between AIG and Greenberg, as a result of which the company and Greenberg have "taken strongly adversarial positions" in the various lawsuits that have accumulated against AIG. Both AIG and Greenberg and his related entities have expended significant sums in their defense of the underlying litigation, and both AIG, on the one hand, and Greenberg and his related entities, on the other hand, have demanded that the D&O insurer advance to them the proceeds of the D&O policy, presenting the insurer with "competing adverse demands to the proceeds of the Policy."

 

According to the complaint, AIG was advancing Greenberg’s defense expenses until mid-2007, after which Greenberg’s defense expenses were advance by his various related entities. The D&O insurer’s complaint alleges that the defense expenses that AIG has incurred on Greenberg’s behalf and on behalf of other individual defendants in the underlying litigation exceed both the D&O policy’s $10 million self-insured retention and its $15 million limit of liability.

 

The D&O insurer’s complaint is filed in the form of an interpleader action under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Using this procedure, the insurer is basically disclaiming any right or interest in the policy proceeds, and tendering them to the court, for the court to sort out the competing interests to the policy proceeds.

 

The precipitating event that triggered the initiation of the interpleader action was the attempt by Greenberg to pursue arbitration, in reliance on the arbitration clause in the D&O insurance policy. While the policy does provide for arbitration, Greenberg did not join AIG as a party to the arbitration, while at the same time purporting on his own to select an arbitrator. The D&O insurer is concerned both that AIG must be a party to the arbitration, and that the Policy reserves to AIG rather than to individual insureds the right to select the arbitrator.

 

In light of this separate arbitration proceeding, the D&O insurer’s recently filed complaint seeks, in addition to interpleader, a judicial declaration whether or not Greenberg is entitled to use the arbitration procedure under the policy, and if so whether AIG is a necessary party to the arbitration, as well as whether or not AIG has the right under the policy to select the arbitrator. The D&O insurer also seeks a judicial declaration of the appropriate disposition of the policy proceeds pending the outcome of the arbitration.

 

Obviously one of the things that makes this new action interesting is the high profile of the litigants involved. But the case is also interesting as an illustration of the kinds of problems that can arise between current and former directors and officers – clearly, the disputes can even include vehement disagreement over the proper allocation and distribution of D&O insurance proceeds.

 

The arbitration dispute also demonstrates some the shortcomings that can arise in the application of arbitration provisions in a D&O insurance policy. The sequence of events here not only raises questions about who can initiate arbitration, but also who has what rights in the event of an arbitration. Individual insureds might well be concerned to learn that their company could reserve the exclusive right to select arbitrators in any dispute in which the individuals might become involved with the D&O insurer. (These issues illustrate one reason why I have always thought that the preferred approach to alternative dispute resolution clauses in an insurance policy is for the specified procedures to be at the option of the aggrieved insured, rather than mandatory.)

 

Another interesting note in this dispute is that it relates to a D&O insurance policy that incepted in 2004. Obviously, the hottest parts of the "firestorm" in which AIG is now engulfed arose well after the policy period for the policy that is in dispute in this case, raising the question of how many (if any) other policy years’ of coverage have been triggered by the various lawsuits in which AIG is involved. How many of the various lawsuits "relate back" to this policy year, and how many triggered policies that were in force in subsequent policy periods? The total amount of insurance potentially in play depends on the outcome of this question.

 

It is also worth noting that the interpleader complaint described above involves only the primary policy in AIG’s D&O insurance program for the policy period 2004-05. AIG undoubtedly carried significant additional amounts of insurance (i.e., excess insurance) during that same policy period. While the excess insurers in the program may be indifferent whether the primary policy is exhausted in payment of AIG’s or Greenberg’s defense expenses, once the primary policy is exhausted, the dispute between AIG and Greenberg will just move up to the first level excess carrier, and so on up the ladder.

 

So it is obviously important to the excess insurers to know how the present dispute is resolved, because the outcome potentially could dictate the excess carriers’ rights, obligations and interests.

 

One final point that the many claimants in the various lawsuits pending against AIG and its present and former directors and officers may well want to note is that the deluge of litigation in which AIG is involved is rapidly depleting whatever amounts of insurance may remain. At some point, the insurance could well be exhausted even just by defense expense alone, leaving only the assets of the now nationalized entity as the primary source of funds out of which to try to extract a settlement or judgment – putting the claimants’ interests in direct conflict with those of U.S. taxpayers.

 

The theoretical possibility that these claimants might be able to recover from the individual defendants out of the individuals’ own assets must be tempered by the awareness that these individuals, although once wealthy, had most of their net worth tied up in AIG stock. My point here is that well-advised claimants might want to focus on trying to figure out how to maneuver cases toward settlement as soon as possible with the least possible additional defense expense. Not that I have a dog in this particular fight, I’m just saying …

 

Bloomberg reporter Thom Weidlich has a May 11, 2009 article about the interpleader action, here.

 

Mayday, Mayday!: Readers may be interested to know that Hank Greenberg just celebrated his 85th birthday on May 4. Everyone here at The D&O Diary wishes Hank a belated Happy Birthday.

 

And speaking of May anniversaries, with a May 24 inception and expiration date for the insurance policy at issue in this dispute, is it possible that the AIG D&O insurance program is up for renewal once again in just a few days?

 

Pertinent to the possibility of an impending AIG D&O insurance renewal during the month of May, I note that, according to Wikipedia (here), the universal distress signal "mayday" is a derivation of the French expression "m’aider," short for "venez m’aider," meaning "(you) come help me."

 

D&O Insurance: Knowledge, Renewal and Rescission

In an interesting decision that raises a host of important issues, a federal district court applying Arkansas law held that due to renewal application misrepresentations, a hospital’s D&O insurance policy is void ab initio, and therefore that the hospital must refund amounts the insurer previously paid as defense costs. The April 17, 2009 opinion, written by Eastern District of Arkansas Judge Susan Webber Wright can be found here.

 

Background

The insurance dispute involves three key events: the May 22, 2003 adoption by Baptist Health, a nonprofit corporation that operates hospitals in Arkansas, of an Economic Conflict of Interest policy (ECOI policy), commonly known as "economic credentialing"; Baptist Health’s December 16, 2003 renewal of its D&O insurance; and the February 2004 filing of the first of three lawsuits filed against Baptist Health relating to its adoption of and enforcement of the ECOI policy.

 

The ECOI policy provided that no physician that directly or indirectly owns or acquires an interest in a competing hospital will be eligible to apply for an initial or renewed appointment or clinical privileges for the professional staff at any Baptist Health hospital. The physicians were required to disclose their financial interests, and physicians failing to meet the eligibility requirements were not entitled to any hearing or appellate review.

 

Judge Wright’s opinion has a detailed review of the events and deliberates that led up to Baptist Health’s adoption of the ECOI policy, because the events and deliberations preceding the adoption were relevant to the subsequent insurance dispute.

 

As summarized on pages 31 and 32 of the opinion, Judge Webber found, among other things that Baptist Health knew at the time it adopted the ECOI policy that legal challenges had been raised in connection with at least four other hospitals’ attempts to adopt similar policies ; that questions had been raised whether the ECOI policy violated federal kickback laws; that at an FTC hearing prior to Baptist Health’s adoption of the ECOI policy, and in the presence of Baptist Health’s CEO, the head of one of Baptist Hospital’s competitors had raised questions about the legality of ECOI policies.

 

In addition, by the time Baptist Hospital adopted the ECOI policy, hospital administrators had compiled a list of physicians whom they anticipated would be affected by the policy (all of whom subsequently were plaintiffs in lawsuits against Baptist Health). When asked at a deposition in the subsequent underlying litigation if Baptist Health had adopted the policy "knowing that it could result in a lawsuit," the CEO answered "Yes, sir." (However in the separate coverage litigation with the D&O insurer, the same CEO submitted an affidavit in which he swore that at no time prior to the filing of the first of the underlying lawsuits did he believe that it was likely that the adoption of the ECOI would result in litigation.)

 

In December 2003 – that is, after the ECOI policy was adopted but before the first of the three underlying lawsuits had been filed – Baptist Health renewed its D&O policy. Its expiring coverage, in force during the period December 12, 2002 to December 12, 2003, had been with one of the larger, more well-established insurance carriers. However, during the policy period of Baptist Health’s D&O policy, the individual that had underwritten the Baptist Health account for the incumbent carrier left that job to join a new, start-up insurance company. For reasons Judge Wright discusses at greater length in her April 17 opinion, Baptist Health moved its coverage from the incumbent carrier to the new, start-up carrier at the time of its December 12, 2003 renewal.

 

In connection with the renewal process, Baptist Health completed two  applications, first completing one on the incumbent carrier’s renewal application form, and then later on the start-up carrier’s application form. Each of these two application forms asked "prior knowledge" questions (discussed below). Although there were slight differences in the questions each form asked, the difference proved to be unimportant for the outcome of the subsequent coverage dispute.

 

The prior knowledge question in both forms asked whether any entity or individual proposed for coverage is aware of any fact, circumstance, situation or event that could result in a claim. Both renewal application forms also stated that if any such fact, circumstance, situation or event exists, any claim arising thereform is excluded from coverage. In response to this question in each of the application forms, the hospital responded "None," indicating that it was not aware of any such fact or circumstance.

 

In February 2004, a group of physicians filed the first of three lawsuits against Baptist Health alleging that the ECOI policy violated anti-kickback and Medicaid statutes. Baptist Health submitted this claim and the two subsequent lawsuits to its new D&O insurer as claims under its D&O policy. After the third lawsuit was filed, the D&O carrier became aware of some of the circumstances that had preceded the hospital’s adoption of the ECOI policy.

 

The D&O insurer subsequently filed an action seeking a judicial declaration that the hospital was required but failed to disclose in the application forms the information that its adoption of the ECOI policy may lead to claims, and as a result there is no coverage under the policy for the three subsequent lawsuits about the ECOI policy. Baptist Health counterclaimed, seeking a judicial declaration of coverage. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

 

The April 17 Opinion

In her April 17 opinion, Judge Wright granted the insurance carrier’s motion for summary judgment and denied the hospital’s summary judgment motion.

 

The essence of her ruling, on pages 30-32 of the opinion, is her conclusion that Baptist Health was "specifically aware" of a wide variety of circumstances that suggested the possibility of a claim when it answered the prior knowledge questions on the application. She found that, given Baptist Health’s awareness of the likelihood of litigation, the conclusion that Baptist Health’s answers to the prior knowledge questions in the renewal applications "were misrepresentations" seems "inescapable."

 

Among other things, Judge Wright noted that Baptist Hospital was aware of that other hospitals’ adoption of similar policies had led to litigation. She specifically found that "a reasonable person would foresee that adoption" of the policy "in these circumstances may give rise to or result in a claim." She also noted that Baptist Health’s CEO acknowledged in a deposition in the underlying action that the ECOI policy "was adopted knowing that a claim would result."

 

Judge Wright reviewed Baptist Health’s responses to other questions in the applications that called for relevant information but that Baptist Health had failed to supply. She found Baptist Health’s attempts to explain its answers to these questions to be "reflective of an apparent tendency on the part of Baptist Health to contort language to its own purposes" and "disingenuous." She said of Baptist Health’s defense of its responses to one application question "reflects a parsing of language that might properly be characterized as a misrepresentation."

 

Judge Wright held under Arkansas law that because the application misrepresentations were material to the underwriting of D&O insurance policy, the policy "is void ab initio and rescinded as if it were never in effect." She also found that even if some of the hospital’s answers were not misrepresentations, the prior knowledge exclusion in the renewal applications "operates to bar coverage."

 

Finally, Judge Wright held that Baptist Health’s retention of the defense expenses the insurer had paid would represent "unjust enrichment," and therefore the insurer is entitled to recover those amounts from the hospital. She did hold that the insurer had to return to Baptist Health the amount of the premium the hospital had paid.

 

Discussion

I have four different reactions to this decision, each one based on different perspectives I have acquired over the years as a participant in different parts of the insurance underwriting and claims handling process.

 

The first reaction I have is based on my many years of representing insurance companies in coverage litigation similar in many ways to this case, as well as my years as an insurance company manager. From this insurer-oriented perspective, this decision represents a complete sweep for the carrier of a kind that rarely occurs. Judge Wright’s ruling that Baptist Health had to return the amount of previously paid defense fees put an extra olive in a sweet martini that insurance company lawyers rarely get to enjoy. As one who knows how these things go, I tip my hat to the counsel that successfully represented the insurance carrier in this case.

 

But these considerations lead to the second of my reactions to this decision, which is more from the perspective of a neutral observer. That it, it seems pretty obvious that by the time Judge Wright ruled on the summary judgment motions, she had developed a less than flattering view of Baptist Health.

 

For instance, I think the opinion suggests pretty strongly that she didn’t think much of the ECOI policy itself, which her opinion describes in negative tones. I also think Judge Wright was genuinely offended that Baptist Health’s CEO submitted an affidavit in support of the summary judgment motion, claiming that Baptist Health was not aware that its adoption of the ECOI policy would result in litigation, even though the same individual had testified in a deposition in the underlying litigation that Baptist Health had adopted the ECOI policy knowing that litigation would result.

 

When a federal judge refers to a litigant as "disingenuous" and accuses it of "contorting" and "misrepresenting" insurance policy language, that litigant is going down.

 

My third reaction to this case is based on the perspective from my current role counseling and advocating for policyholders. Here, I am not as concerned with Baptist Health itself and the merits of its particular case, but rather what these facts suggest. Looked at from this perspective, there are a couple of things that trouble me.

 

First, the insurance dispute arises out of a policy renewal, not the initial placement of a policy. Why then was Baptist Health being asked to answer the "prior knowledge" question in the first place? Yes, both the incumbent and the new carrier asked the question. But to me, the insertion of a "knowledge" question in a application at the time of renewal is inconsistent with the theoretical justifications insurers routinely provide for claims made coverage.

 

That is, in exchange for the improved loss exposure determinations offered with respect to claims made policies, insurers undertake to provide coverage for any claims made during the policy period, regardless of when the underlying circumstances may have occurred.

 

Insurance carriers rightfully should not be expected to cover claims that are known or anticipated when coverage initially incepts. But implicit in the "claims made bargain" is that policyholders should be entitled to expect continuity of coverage as the claims made policy renews, so that the policyholder is not susceptible to losing coverage due to the mere caprice of the date on which a claimant chooses to file a claim. The inclusion of the knowledge question into the application at the time of renewal of a claims made policy represents the insertion of a jagged edge that could – and here, did – result in stripping the policyholder of coverage that would have been available under an expiring policy if the claim had been filed before the prior policy expired.

 

I do not mean to find fault with anyone who was involved in this policy renewal. The insurance marketplace in late 2003 was different than it is today, and I do not mean to judge former circumstances by today’s standards. But even allowing for all of that, I find the inclusion of the knowledge question in a claims made policy application at the time of renewal surprising, troubling, and arguably inconsistent with the very nature of claims made coverage.

 

The other thing I find troublesome from the policyholder’s perspective about this decision is that Baptist Health’s answer to the knowledge question (which comes with and supposedly is enforced by its own prior knowledge exclusion) resulted not just in an exclusion of coverage, but in a policy rescission rendering the policy void ab initio. For most of the last decade the D&O insurance industry collectively has struggled to develop insurance policy provisions to narrow the coverage forfeiture consequences of application misrepresentations. As part of this dialog, insurers try to characterize the prior knowledge exclusion in a policy application as a stepped-down threat from the possibility of policy rescission, since the remedy it triggers results only in the exclusion of coverage and not in the entire policy being voided.

 

Yet here, Baptist Health’s answer to the knowledge question (as well as its answers to other questions, to be sure) resulted not just in noncoverage of a claim, but the rescission of the entire policy (which clearly is yet another reason why the inclusion of the knowledge question in a renewal application is highly objectionable).

 

The fourth and final set of reaction I have to this decision really represents a combination of all points of view. That is, I can’t help but observe that this case involves a couple of very significant missed opportunities.

 

The first of the missed opportunities was the chance Baptist Health had to lock in coverage for the subsequently filed claims, under the incumbent carrier’s policy that expired on December 12, 2003. That is, if you accept Judge Wright’s findings of fact as true, Baptist Health knew prior to the time this policy expired that it was probably going to get sued; it knew who was probably going to file the lawsuit(s); and it even knew what legal theories were likely going to be asserted.

 

In short, Baptist Health had at its disposal, prior to the expiration of the incumbent carrier’s policy, all of the constituent elements required to have provided notice of circumstance that might give rise to a claim. Had this notice been provided to the incumbent carrier, then any subsequently filed claim would have related back to the incumbent carrier’s policy.

 

Again, I am not trying to find fault with anyone that was involved in insurance issues for Baptist Health, particularly since I know I now have the benefit of hindsight and the convenience of the factual recitations in a carefully groomed judicial record. This perspective and these facts may not have been available to the persons directly involved in the insurance transaction. However, if Baptist Health had provided notice of potential claim under the incumbent carrier’s expiring policy, then it could have avoided the problems that later arose with the new carrier under the subsequent policy. (As an aside, I note that this notice of potential claim opportunity may represent the best response to the concerns I noted above about claims made issues).

 

The final missed opportunity that may have been involved here is the chance the parties had to negotiate a compromise of the insurance coverage dispute. Footnote 1 to the opinion reports that a settlement conference in the case took place before a Magistrate Judge, but that the conference "proved unsuccessful." There are innumerable reasons why any case might not settle. But parties that are motivated to settle can usually find a way to get it done.

 

Here, Baptist Health had ample reasons to try to seek a compromise, whether it realized it or not. The hospital CEO’s deposition testimony in the underlying case that when Baptist Health adopted the ECOI policy it anticipated getting sued arguably should have motivated the hospital to seek a compromise of this claim (and that is without even considering the deeply troubling conflict between the CEO’s deposition testimony on this point and the contrary affidavit he supplied in connection with Baptist Health’s summary judgment motion in the coverage case.)

 

There are even reasons why an insurer in this situation might arguably want to consider a compromise. I know many readers would find this observation surprising, especially given how sweeping the insurer’s litigation victory subsequently proved to be. Long experience has taught me that even very strong cases can turn out far differently than expected, and this uncertainty alone ought to counsel any litigant to remain open to possible compromise, regardless of how strong their case may seem.

 

In addition, as I have previously discussed at length (here), the thing about rescission as a policy defense is that it is such a powerful weapon, its effects can not always be predicted in advance. I have direct, relevant personal experience from which to say that even a complete victory in a highly meritorious rescission case can produce unanticipated collateral damage for an insurer. Based on what I have seen and know, any carrier involved in a rescission case, no matter how meritorious, would be well advised to consider opportunities to resolve the case without taking it all the way to the end.

 

One final note about this decision is that it is worth reading for the interesting glimpse it affords into the operations of a fledgling insurance company in its earliest stages. I will not characterize here what the opinion reflects, except to say that most industry participants will find the "inside baseball" description of  the start-up operation interesting.

 

Special thanks to Karen Ventrell of the Troutman Sanders law firm, who together with her colleague Whitney Lindahl represented the insurer in this case, and who provided me with a copy of the decision. I hasten to add that the views expressed in this post are exclusively my own, and nothing I said here about the insurance transaction should in any way reflect on the outstanding job the insurer's lawyers did in this case.

 

Defaults, Bankruptcies and D&O Claims

Deteriorating economic conditions threaten a massive wave of corporate defaults.  Corporate borrowers’ inability to fulfill debt obligations could not only prompt a bankruptcy filing surge, but could also result in a flood of lawsuits and claims as creditors and shareholders seek to recoup their losses.  These claims could present a host of challenging D&O coverage issues. 

 

In the latest issue of InSights (here), I take a look at the conditions that could contribute to an increase in corporate bankruptcies, the likelihood that more bankruptcies could translate to increased litigation, and the D&O insurance issues that bankruptcy litigation could present.

Will the Recession Cause a Hard Insurance Market?

The global financial crisis has produced challenges across the entire economy, but the financial sector, where all the problems arguably began, has been particularly hard hit. While the most investment firms and other banking institutions may have experienced the most dramatic consequences, insurance companies have also been swept up in the whirlwind.

 

The extent of the recession’s impact on insurance companies and the resulting consequences for the insurance marketplace are the subjects of an April 2009 paper from insurance industry data firm Advisen entitled "The Impact of the Economic Crisis on the P&C Insurance Industry" (here, $ required). Advisen’s April 2, 2009 press release describing the report can be found here.

 

According to the paper, the various economic forces at play will likely shrink insurers’ policyholder surplus, thus diminishing the supply of insurance. These circumstances ordinarily would produce a so-called "hard" market, characterized by rising prices for insurance. However, the reduction in economic activity as a result of the current recession could also reduce the demand for insurance, which in turn could complicate the insurance cycle’s transition and "make for a very turbulent 2009" for the insurance industry.

 

The major cause for the reduction in the demand for insurance, which according to the paper could delay the transition to a hard market, is "shrinking exposure units." An exposure unit is the basis for calculating premium – for example, the size of an employer’s workforce will determine the employer’s workers comp and EPL insurance premiums.

 

Many of the exposure units that are critical for determining pricing for a variety of insurance lines – such as sales, real estate square footage, number and mileage of vehicles, payroll, and property values – are all likely to shrink in the months ahead, as a result of the recession. The shrinking exposure base will produce a fall-off in insurers’ top-line revenue.

 

In addition, insurance demand will also likely be further eroded as businesses close or fail. Even companies that survive may seek to increase self-insured retentions or limits, as a way to cut costs.

 

The reduction in demand will also likely be accompanied by a reduction in supply, in the form of policyholder surplus, both as a result of increased claims losses and as a result of diminished investment income and investment losses.

 

The likely increased claims losses could arise from a variety of sources. The paper states that job losses frequently are accompanies by an increase in the frequency and severity of workers’ comp claims. Reductions in force also could trigger EPL claims. And as has been well documented on this blog (refer here), the current economic crisis has also produced a wave of shareholder claims. As the Advisen report notes, these claims are particularly complex which will make them costly to defend and could also make them costly to resolve. D&O claims arising from bankruptcies and E&O claims arising from the various Ponzi scheme scandals could exacerbate the claims losses that insurers experience.

 

On the investment side, insurers’ investment results have taken a massive hit. Many insurers have had to take huge write-downs, both in their fixed income assets and with respect to more exotic investments. A few insurers have been particularly hard hit with valuation issues concerning "toxic" assets.

 

In more typical cycle transitions, insurance pricing swings result from changes on the supply side (i.e., policyholder surplus). But the depth of the current economic crisis could also uncharacteristically affect the demand for insurance. One proxy for insurance demand is GDP. When policyholder surplus declines relative to GDP, a hard market usually follows. In the current circumstances, GDP is under pressure, but the decline in policyholder surplus is relatively greater.

 

These circumstances, together with the likely difficulty insurers will face trying to raise fresh capital, suggest that the insurance marketplace will eventually harden, and higher premiums eventually will result. The Advisen paper projects that the hard market could "begin to set in" as early as mid-2009, and in any event no later than 2010.

 

However, the hard market will "likely take off slowly" due to lack of consumer and business confidence. When it comes, though, the hard market "could extend longer than previous hard markets owing to the lack of new capital entering the market."

 

The Advisen report is accompanied by extensive supporting data and analysis, and I think the author makes an excellent point about the pressure that the recession will put on the demand side of the insurance equation

 

As for the report’s predictions of the arrival and timing of a forthcoming hard market, I guess time will tell. In my view, a hard market is characterized by more than just rising prices; among other things, it also means a shortage of capacity as well as a constriction of terms and conditions. If there really were going to be a hard market as early as mid-2009 (which at this point is only a couple of months away), you would expect some sign of these things in the marketplace, but so far there is very little evidence of any of these things. Which at a minimum suggests to me that if there is going to be a hard market, its arrival could be more delayed than the report suggests.

 

That said, the report does make a compelling case for the likelihood that there actually will be a hard market this time. It may not be a question of whether, but only of when. Overall, the report is interesting and provides useful analysis of the current insurance marketplace and its likely future direction. The report is well worth reading at length and in full and I commend it to everyone.

 

Rescission Denied: Policy rescission is a controversial topic. But because the debate often involves high profile cases where the insurer has successfully rescinded a policy, it is sometimes overlooked how difficult it is for insurers to rescind coverage. A recent decision illustrates the difficulties carriers face when they seek to rescind a policy.

 

In a March 25, 2009 opinion (here), New York (New York Country) Supreme Court Justice Charles Ramos granted summary judgment for JP Morgan Chase in an insurance dispute involving several high profile claims. An excess insurer in J.P. Morgan’s bankers professional liability insurance program had sought to rescind its policy based on alleged misrepresentations in the company’s 2001-02 insurance renewal.

 

The excess insurer claimed that the company had made misrepresentations about its exposure to Enron, both in a Notice of Potential Claim submitted under the prior insurance program and in a Press Release.

 

As reflected in the April 2009 memo from the Proskauer Rose law firm entitled "Court Grants Summary Judgment Dismissing Insurer’s Rescission Claim" (here), Judge Ramos found that the Notice and the Press Release were not part of the renewal materials, and the insurer had not asked the company to warrant either document in connection with the renewal.

 

Judge Ramos also found that there was no issue of triable fact either that the insurer’s underwriters relied on the documents or that the company officials who prepared the documents were aware of any misrepresentations in the documents.

 

Judge Ramos also found that the insurer had waived rescission because it did not raise the defense until 2006, several years later, and had retained the premium.

 

While much more might be said about this decision, if nothing else, Judge Ramos’s opinion demonstrates the many hurdles carriers face in attempting to rescind a policy. Any carrier considering policy rescission might well want to review the opinion.

 

A prior post in which I discuss the difficulties carriers face in attempting to rescind coverage can be found here. Among other things, I note that "policy rescission wreaks havoc on all concerned."

 

Special thanks to John Gross and Michelle Migdon of the Proskauer Rose firm for providing a copy of the opinion.

 

More About the Bailout: Much has been written and said about the gargantuan federal bailout. A March 19, 2009 Rolling Stone article entitled "The Big Takeover" (here) presents a particularly irreverent and occasionally profane perspective on the subject.

 

Although the overall tone of the article borders on feverish, and the article definitely tends toward the conspiracy view of the world, it also contains some funny lines as well as some interesting observations. I particularly liked the author’s take on AIG: "AIG is what happens when short, bald managers of otherwise boring financial bureaucracies start seeing Brad Pitt in the mirror."

 

The article’s overall take on the bailout is summarized in this paragraph:

 

In essence, Paulson and his cronies turned the federal government into one gigantic, half-opaque holding company, one whose balance sheet includes the world's most appallingly large and risky hedge fund, a controlling stake in a dying insurance giant, huge investments in a group of teetering megabanks, and shares here and there in various auto-finance companies, student loans, and other failing businesses. Like AIG, this new federal holding company is a firm that has no mechanism for auditing itself and is run by leaders who have very little grasp of the daily operations of its disparate subsidiary operations.

The report concludes with the observation about the bailout that "it’s AIG’s rip-roaringly shitty business model writ almost inconceivably massive." (I should probably emphasize that the view in the article quoted above are those of the article’s author, and do not necessarily represent the view or sentiments of this blog’s author.)

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the Rolling Stone article.

 

D&O Insurance: Late Notice?

Among the recurring sources of D&O insurance coverage disputes are issues relating to timely notice of claim. A 6-3 decision by the Texas Supreme Court on March 27, 2009 (here), written over a vigorous dissent (here), recapitulates many of the perennial notice issues and reaches a result that while unquestionably policyholder friendly also poses certain concerns.

 

Background

At the time of FlashNet Communications May 2000 merger with Prodigy Communications, FlashNet purchased a 3-year discovery period under its existing D&O insurance program, which extended coverage for claims first made during the period May 31, 2000 to May 31, 2003.

 

The notice provision in the policy had been amended. The original provision required as a "condition precedent to coverage" that the insured provide notice of claim "as soon as practicable…but in no event later than ninety (90) days after such claim is made." The amended provision required "as a condition precedent" to coverage that the insured provide "notice, in writing, as soon as practicable of any claim first made against [the insureds] during the Policy Period, or Discovery Period (if applicable) but in no event later than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the Policy Period, or Discovery Period."

 

On November 28, 2001, FlashNet was named as a defendant in a securities class action lawsuit that was one of the many IPO laddering cases. Prodigy was served with a copy of the complaint on June 20, 2002.

 

Prodigy first communicated with the insurer by letter dated June 6, 2003, in which Prodigy sought the insurer’s consent under the policy to settlement of the securities case. The insurer responded that the June 6 letter failed to comply with the policy’s notice requirements. In reply, Prodigy sent a formal notice of claim on June26, 2003, which Prodigy claimed was timely because it was sent within ninety days of the May 31, 2003 expiration of the 3-year discovery period. The carrier denied coverage and Prodigy initiated an action seeking a judicial declaration of coverage.

 

Proceedings Below

The trial court ruled that Prodigy had failed to comply with the condition precedent to coverage and that this failure "avoids coverage, with or without prejudice to [the insurer]." The court of appeals affirmed, holding among other things that notice given almost one year after the lawsuit was filed was not "as soon as practicable," and that the insurer was not required to proved that it was prejudiced.

 

The Majority’s Opinion

Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson’s opinion for the majority framed the question before the court as "whether, under a claims made policy, an insurer can deny coverage based on its insured’s alleged failure to comply with a policy provision requiring that notice of claim be given ‘as soon as practicable’ when (1) notice of claim was provided before the reporting deadline specified in the policy; and (2) the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay."

 

The majority did not consider it determinative that notice as "as soon as practicable" was identified in the policy as a "condition precedent" to coverage. Rather, the Chief Justice wrote, in order to determine whether or not a showing of prejudice is or is not also required in order for the insurer to assert late notice as a defense to coverage, the question is whether the "notice as soon as practicable" language was "an essential part of the bargained-for exchange in the claims made policy at issue."

 

After reviewing the role of the notice provisions within claims made policies generally, the Chief Justice concluded that the insured’s obligation to provide notice "as soon as practicable" was "not a material part of the bargained-for exchange," and further concluded that "in a claims-made policy, when an insured gives notice of a claim within the policy period or other specified reporting period, the insurer must show that the insured’s noncompliance with the policy’s ‘as soon as practicable’ notice provision prejudiced the insurer before it may deny coverage."

 

Therefore, because the insurer had admitted that it was not prejudiced by the delay in receiving notice, the majority held that the insurer could not deny coverage based on Prodigy’s failure to provide notice as soon as practicable.

 

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Phil Johnson and joined in by two other justices, asserted that "today the Court rewrites an unambiguous insurance contract and changes the agreement of the parties." Justice Johnson wrote that "the record does not show as a matter of law that the notice language was not essential to the parties’ agreement," adding that "the Court’s conclusion otherwise is in derogation of the parties’ intent as expressed by the policy language."

 

Justice Johnson added that "there is no basis in the record for concluding that Prodigy’s one-year delay in reporting the claim was any more or less important to [the insurer’s] insurance business than if Prodigy had delayed for a year reporting a claim made on the last day of the Discovery Period."

 

Discussion

If nothing else, the majority opinion in this case confirms the frequent observation that courts disfavor insurance coverage denials based on late notice defenses. The general reluctance of courts to recognize notice defenses is based on an apparent perception that a policy notice requirement can operate like a "gotcha" to cut insureds off from the policy coverage for which they paid and to which they would have been entitled if notice were timely – and if the carrier is not prejudiced by the late notice, well then, no harm, no foul, right?

 

But even allowing for these assumed biases, the majority’s opinion’s disregard of the policy’s explicit "condition precedent" language and its own determination that the "as soon as practicable" language was "not a material part of the bargained for exchange" are both discomfiting.

 

Some perspective seems in order here. Not only was Prodigy’s notice to the insurer delayed by nearly a year, but Prodigy’s first contact with the insurer was a request for settlement consent. At some level, these facts exemplify the very kinds of circumstances to which insurers will sometimes refer in attempting to explain why notice provisions are necessary.

 

It may well be objected that if the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay here, what difference did the one-year delay really make? The typical insurer answer to this question is that they don’t want to get caught up in sometimes complicated and potentially fraught debates about whether or not a delay prejudiced their interests. After all, what really constitutes prejudice? What has to shown to establish prejudice? Rather than having to debate these kinds of fact intensive and divisive issues, the insurers prefer certain bright line tests that specify the minimal requirements under certain circumstances.

 

On the other hand, the policy language itself may have preordained a policyholder friendly outcome here. The notice provision the court was interpreting had in fact been amended to make it more policyholder friendly, by substituting the more flexible "as soon as practicable language" for the policy’s base form requirement of notice within a specified number of days.

 

The question is whether the majority opinion’s ruling represents more of a policyholder friendly outcome than the insurers may have thought they were offering with the more flexible language – an outcome that may in the future constrain the insurers’ willingness to offer the flexible language and encourage them to insist on more rigid alternatives as reaction to this kind of outcome. A more rigid approach could in turn lead to more questions about the timeliness of notice and potentially to more coverage disputes.

 

All of that said, and knowing full well how devastating any coverage denial can be to policyholders, and how some clerical or administrative error potentially could produce notice problems that otherwise might leave policyholders in the lurch, there arguably is some fundamental fairness to the judicial system’s chronic suspicion of notice defenses. Viewed in that light, the outcome in the Prodigy case is at least understandable, even if the majority opinion itself could be unsettling in certain respects.

 

Special thanks to the several readers who provided me with copies of the Prodigy opinion.

 

Private Eq. Reps. on Portfolio Co. Board: Indemnity and Insurance

Private equity firms and the funds they organize frequently place individuals on their portfolio companies’ boards. However, all too frequently, it is not until a claim has arisen that the various entities consider how the potentially implicated indemnities and insurance will interact. Unanticipated interactions sometimes can produce unintended consequences, particularly from the perspective of the private equity firm.

 

A March 19, 2009 article by the Latham & Watkins firm on the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Forum blog entitled "Indemnification of Director-representatives by PE Firms" (here) takes a closer look at these issues.

 

Among other things, the authors note that "the allocation of responsibility for indemnification and advancement obligations … are not considered until after litigation has been filed" and the same "holds true with respect to the amount of available insurance, especially at the portfolio company level."

 

The authors offer a number of excellent practical suggestions.

 

First, they suggest that the contractual arrangements between the private equity firm and the individuals serving on the portfolio company boards "provide clearly that the private equity firm’s indemnification and advancement obligations to its director-representatives are secondary to the indemnification and advancement obligations of the portfolio company." Otherwise, courts may consider the private equity firm and the portfolio company to be "co-equally liable," which could prove very costly for the private equity firm if it advances costs in the first instance and later seeks reimbursement from the portfolio company.

 

Second, the authors suggest that if the indemnification documents with the director-representative cannot be modified, the private equity firm "should seek an assignment of the director-representative’s rights to indemnification and advancement from the portfolio company prior to the fund paying out defense or settlement costs on their director-designees’ behalf."

 

Third, the authors point out that advancement rights are distinct from indemnification rights, and they suggest that the portfolio company’s advancement commitments "should be examined to be certain that advancement is contractually required and that any advancement obligations owed by the private equity firm or its fund are secondary to the obligations of the portfolio firm."

 

The authors’ final observations relate to insurance. They comment that typically "neither the director nor the private equity firm will look at the portfolio company’s D&O insurance policies until after the director needs to defend/or settle such claims."

 

The authors correctly note that the private equity firm should review the portfolio company’s policies to ensure that the policies are "adequate to protect their director-representatives." The authors also suggest a review of the provisions that will determine how the portfolio company’s policies and the private equity firm’s policies will interact in order to "prevent a battle of the insurance companies."

 

The authors cite the interaction between the portfolio company’s D&O insurance policy and the private equity firm’s policy as a potential concern. These insurance issues become particularly critical if the portfolio company goes bankrupt, in which case portfolio company indemnity issues drop out of the picture and the portfolio company's insurance can becomes critical.

 

Bankruptcy often has a way of demonstrating the insufficiency of the limits of insurance that the portfolio company purchased. Moreover, bankruptcy also has a way of demonstrating –after the fact – the need for auxiliary insurance structures (such as Side A/DIC insurance or independent director insurance) to protect individuals in the event of complex claims while the portfolio company is bankrupt.

 

The authors are correct that the the various potentially implicated insurance policies terms and prospective insurance interactions all too often go unexamined. However, looking at the terms alone is not enough. Limits selection and program structure should also be carefully considered. Private equity firms should take steps to ensure that the portfolio company’s insurance program will sufficiently protect the director-representatives in all contingencies, even bankruptcy—or, rather, especially in bankruptcy.

 

I disagree with the article’s authors on one point. The authors state that "private equity firms should also strongly consider having the same carrier write the primary policies at both the firm and at each of its portfolio companies." The authors suggest this approach avoids the "other guy’s" policy coverage dodge.

 

The authors are correct that this would avoid the "not my problem" dodge. But it could be a terrible insurance solution in every other respect, both for the private equity firm and for the portfolio companies. First, from the private equity firm's perspective, there are relatively few carriers willing to write those kinds of risks in the first place, and within that small group, the available terms and conditions vary dramatically. The private equity firm should focus first on placing the optimal insurance solution for its own risks and needs, without being forced to accept a suboptimal solution out of an artificial effort to try to match carriers with its portfolio companies.

 

By the same token, the portfolio companies are unlikely to have uniform exposures and interests. Given the incredible diversity of potential insurance alternatives available in the marketplace, it is very unlikely that the same carrier would provide the best insurance solution for each of the various portfolio companies. And by the same token, the portfolio companies should not have their range of potential D&O insurers restricted only to the relatively few carriers that also will write private equity firm D&O insurance.

 

In short, trying to cram all of the various insured entities under a single carrier’s umbrella could address one single issue but create a host of potentially more significant problems as a result. The preferred approach is exactly the one the authors otherwise recommend, which is to consider policy interaction issues in connection with the insurance placement process – a process that should in the first instance be addressed to providing the best solutions for each respective entity.

 

The authors’ interesting article highlights the need for private equity firms to enlist knowledgeable and experienced insurance professionals in connection with their insurance placement and in connection with their consideration of the issues discussed above. Insurance can sometime appear like a peripheral or relatively unimportant matter-- unless things go seriously wrong, in which case insurance can turn out to be the most important thing. At the point that things have gone seriously wrong it a very poor time to discover that critical insurance issues were insufficiently considered.

 

Break in the Action: The D&O Diary is taking its act overseas, and so the publication schedule will be disrupted for the next few days. Regular publication will resume the week of March 30.

 

New York Ins. Dept. Considers Revised Reg. on D&O Ins. Duty to Defend Issue

Last fall, the New York Department of Insurance ignited a firestorm when it issued an opinion that a D&O insurance policy may not place the duty to defend on the insured. As I discussed in an earlier post (here), the opinion is contrary to both the uniform practice of the D&O insurance industry and the unambiguous preference of public company D&O insurance buyers.

 

On February 26, 2009, following his keynote address at the the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) D&O Symposium, New York Insurance Superintendent Eric Dinallo acknowledged the industry’s reaction to his department’s opinion, and indicated that the department would reconsider the issue and address it through the issuance of a new regulation. He also invited the industry to help his department to shape the new regulation.

 

Based on the Superintendent’s invitation, PLUS is now working with the American Insurance Association (AIA). The AIA has drafted proposed revised regulatory language that is now being circulated among its members. PLUS has also invited its member companies to comment on the draft regulatory proposal. PLUS will compile the comments and share them with the AIA and the New York Department of Insurance.

 

One representative from each PLUS member company can obtain a copy of the draft proposed regulatory language by contacting PLUS’s Executive Director, Derek Hazletine, dhazeltine@plusweb.org.  

 

I am setting all of this information out in a separate blog post because the deadline for comment to be received is next Monday, March 23, 2009, so companies that want to participate will have to move quickly.

 

In his Feb. 26 presentation, Dinallo indicated that he intends to act quickly on the proposed regulations and that he hopes to have the regulations in place by late spring.

 

Insurers Must Disclose Climate Change Exposures: On March 17, 2009, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners adoped a "mandatory requirement that insurance companies disclose to regulators the financial risks they face from climate change, as well as the actions the companies are taking to respond to those risks." According to the NAIC's press release (here), all insurance companies with annual premiums of $500 million or more will be required to complete an annual Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey with an initial deadline of May 1, 2010. 

 

In the Survey, insurers will be required to report on "how they are altering their risk-management and catastrophe risk moedline in light of the challenges posed by climate change" and they will also be required to report  on "steps they are taking to engage and education policymakers and policyholders on the risks of climate change" as well as "whether and how they are changing their investment strategies." 

 

These reporting requirements could have a singificant impact, not just on insurers disclosures, but on their conduct as well. The requirement to disclose what the carriers are doing to "engage and educate" policymakers seems to suggest that the NAIC expects carriers to become proactive on the legislative and regulatory front regarding climate change. The disclosure regarding investment strategies potentially could influence insurers'' investment decisions. The clear implication of the NAIC's rule is that the regulators expect the disclosure requirements will motivate the carriers to become proactive in these areas.

 

 

The web page for the NAIC's Climate Change and Global Warming Task Force, including a link to the draft language of the new disclosure requirements, can be found here.

 

The Hits Just Keep on Coming: Bernard Madoff may now be in jail following his recent guilty plea, but that does not seem to have slowed the flow of new Madoff-related lawsuits. As the new suits have come in, I have added the new suits to my running tally of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

 

The litigation register has now grown to be quite lengthy. Madoff’s fraudulent scheme may have cost investors billions, but he has stimulated a heaping stack of litigation.Special thanks to the many readers who have been sending me the new complaints as they have come in, especially Jon Jacobson of the Greenberg Traurig law firm. Readers may be interested to know that Jon is also reporting on the new cases on Twitter (here) as they come in.

 

Speaker’s Corner: Next week I will be in London speaking at the C5 D&O Liability Insurance Conference. The specific panel on which I will be speaking is entitled "Current Litigation Trends in Europe and the U.S.: Are Class Actions on the Horizon?" The conference, which will take place March 24 and 25, 2009 at the Grange City Hotel., will feature a diverse array of speakers on a wide variety of D&O insurance related topics. The entire program agenda can be found here.

 

D&O Insurance: The Contract Exclusion

A liability insurance policy is not intended to provide policyholders a means to shift to the insurer their separate, voluntarily undertaken contractual obligations. Private company D&O insurance policies generally embody this principle in a separate exclusionary provision. However, the wording of the exclusionary clause can substantially affect the scope of coverage otherwise available under the policy. In particular, the expansive reading given certain exclusionary language in recent cases suggests that a more narrowly constructed exclusion would more appropriately address the concern that the provision was originally intended to address.

 

Background

Long standing case law establishes that liability insurance policies do not cover breach of contract claims, because a contractual duty is not a liability imposed by law but is rather a voluntarily undertaken obligation. By way of illustration, a debtor ought not to be able to borrow funds, neglect to repay the debt, and then shift the repayment obligation to an insurer.

 

While these case law principles are well-established, some years ago private company D&O insurers nevertheless began to insert express contract exclusions in their policies. In part the insertion of the contract exclusion was intended to address the recurring policyholder objection that the policy does not say that it will not cover contractual liability. The insurers also wanted policy language to try to address recurring problems presented by claims against insured companies that sound both in contract and in tort (e.g., a complaint that asserts both a breach of contract claim and a claim for tortious breach of contract).

 

In addressing these issues, some carriers have adopted broadly worded exclusionary language. For example, one leading carrier’s private company D&O insurance policy contract exclusion precludes coverage for claims "based upon, arising from, or in consequence of any actual or alleged liability of an Insured Organization under any written or oral contract or agreement provided that this exclusion… shall not apply to the extent that an Insured Organization would have been liable in the absence of the contract or agreement."

 

As an important aside, most public company D&O insurance policies typically have no contract exclusion, for the simple reason that the company (or "entity") coverage provided in most public company D&O insurance policies is limited exclusively to Securities Claims. Because contract claims are not within the scope of entity coverage provided in the typical public company policy, there is no need to exclude contract claims. The contract exclusion (in some form) is, however, a relatively standard part of most private company D&O insurance policies because the entity coverage afforded under the private company policy is more expansive and is not restricted merely to a single category of claims.

 

While most private company D&O insurance policies have some form of contract exclusion, not all policies have adopted the more expansive exclusionary language of the type illustrated in the example quoted above. The scope of language in the exclusion can substantially affect the extent of coverage available under the policy; in particular, courts have applied a broadly preclusive interpretation to the expansive exclusionary language of the type quoted above.

 

Recent Case Examples

Spirtas: In an April 2008 opinion (here), the Eighth Circuit affirmed an Eastern District of Missouri opinion granting summary judgment on behalf of a D&O insurer on the basis of the applicable policy’s contract exclusion.

 

The insured, Spirtas Company, had entered a contract to perform construction contract demolition work. The project manager later sued Spirtas claiming that it had not performed the demolition work properly and had failed to use funds the project manager had supplied Spirtas to pay subcontractors and suppliers. The complaint alleged breach of contract, breach of express or implied trust, conversion and unjust enrichment. Spirtas sought coverage for the claims under its D&O insurance policy.

 

The D&O insurer denied coverage in reliance on a policy exclusion that, in pertinent part, precluded coverage "based upon, arising from or in consequence of any actual or alleged liability of an Insured Organization under any written or oral contract or agreement." In the ensuing coverage litigation, the district court granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment holding that the underlying cause of action, including the tort claims, arose from Spirtas’s obligations under the demolition contract.

 

The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the contract exclusion "applies to claims sounding in tort as long as they flowed from or had their origins in the breach of contract." The Eighth Circuit made it clear that its conclusion was reinforced by the broad scope of the exclusion’s "arising from" language.

 

GE HFS: The difficulty with the breadth of scope given the "arising from" language in this context is that it potentially lacks a logical stopping point. A 2007 opinion in the GE HFS case in the District of Massachusetts illustrates the how broadly this expansive reading just might extend. (The magistrate’s report and recommendation, which was subsequently adopted by the district court, can be found here; this post refers to the magistrate’s report and recommendation.)

 

In the GE HFS case, a home health care company had a line of credit in which the company was obliged to provide the lender certain status reports, upon which the lender relied in advancing additional credit. After receiving reports and advancing funds, the lender claimed the company had overstated its assets, as a result of which it had overextended the credit. The company went bankrupt. The lender sued certain of the company’s directors and officers.

 

The lender’s complaint, by its own terms, sought damages from the individual defendants for "negligent misrepresentations…with respect to collateral available to satisfy loans." The complaint also sued certain of the individual defendants for breach of contract on a personal guaranty. (There was no contention that the claims based on the personal guarantees were covered under the policy.) According to the magistrate in the coverage action, the "crux" of the lender’s complaint is its allegation that the individual defendants in the underlying action "failed to exercise reasonable care and competence in the preparation and communication" to the lender, as a result of which the receivables collateral were overstated and the lender advanced more money than it would have if the reports had been accurate.

 

The coverage case involved one of the individual defendants, Ingoldsby, who asserted among other things that the underlying complaint did not allege that he had prepared or compiled the disputed reports, and therefore that the claim against him was in effect a claim for negligent supervision or mismanagement, rather than misrepresentation. Indeed, the magistrate assumed for purposes of its opinion that the claim against him was for "negligent supervision."

 

The D&O insurer nevertheless denied coverage for Ingoldsby’s defense expenses on the basis of the applicable policy’s contract exclusion. The exclusion precluded coverage for claims "alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to any actual or alleged contractual liability of the Company or any other Insured under any express contract or agreement."

 

The magistrate found that the "arising out of" language "must be read expansively," holding that because the "allegedly wrongful conduct" was "dependent upon and in furtherance of" the loan, the loan "provided more than context: the entire claim was based upon the performance under the contract." Because the "allegedly wrongful conduct was part and parcel of performance under the contract," the contract exclusion applied.

 

The court also rejected the Ingoldsby’s argument that "the exclusion is void as it excludes virtually all types of coverage." The magistrate found that "misrepresentations may occur in a business setting yet not be related to a contractual duty."

 

Discussion

The outcome in the GE HFS case may be entirely appropriate give the facts and the contractual language involved, but the practical consequences of the case should not be overlooked. The court denied coverage for an individual director and officer for a negligent supervision claim, because of the relation of the claim to the underlying contract and because of the breadth of the contract exclusion.

 

The troublesome thing about the breadth of the preclusionary effect applied in these cases is that some type of transaction is at the heart of many claims under a private company D&O insurance policy. The danger is that insured individuals could find themselves facing claims of a kind that might well have assumed would be covered (say, for example, a negligent supervision claim), because of the involvement in the claim of an underlying transaction and because of the expansiveness of the D&O insurance policy’s contract exclusion.

 

Which brings me to the ultimate point– that is, the real problem here may be the expansiveness of the preamble to the exclusion. Clearly, the use of the broad "based upon" and "arising out of" language was instrumental in the two cases discussed above.

 

The court in the GE HFS case more or less recognized this when it acknowledged that "the coverage provided by the policy at issue… may be more limited than other available D&O policies." The inverse of this statement is, of course, that coverage provided by other policies is less limited. While that does not necessarily mean that a differently worded policy would have covered the claims at issue in the GE HFS case, the differently worded policy would not be as "limited."

 

My own observation is that carriers whose policies have the broad preamble language in the contract exclusion of the type discussed above perceive that coverage under their policies is indeed limited, demonstrating that as a practical matter there may be no logical stopping point in interpreting the coverage restrictions created by an expansive exclusionary provision.

 

By significant contrast, certain carriers’ private company D&O insurance policies have contract exclusions that do not use the broad omnibus "based upon" or "arising out of" preamble language. Rather, these carriers’ policies use the more restricted "for" wording.

 

Given the extent of the preclusive effect that courts have found in interpreting policies with the broad omnibus wording, policy forms using the narrower "for" wording are, in this respect at least, clearly superior from the policyholder’s perspective, particularly if carriers whose policies have the broader wording choose (as some are now doing) to try to apply the exclusion to preclude a wide swath of otherwise covered claims, including not just contract claims against entities but tort claims against individuals.

 

Indeed, I would argue that the "for" wording is much closer to the original purposes for the inclusion of the contract exclusion in private company D&O insurance policies – that is, an exclusion with the "for" wording makes it clear that insurers do not intend to pick up the insured company’s contractual liability, without extending the potential preclusive effect, for example, to tort claims against individuals.

 

Many prospective insurance buyers would be surprised indeed to learn that their prospective insurer intended to take the position that their policy would not cover even defense expense for, say, a negligent supervision claim if the claim also involves an underlying business transaction. Indeed, I suspect that many D&O underwriters would be surprised to learn that the claims handling counterparts would take such a position.

 

The use of the "for" wording in the contract exclusion provides at least some assurance that these reasonable expectations will not later be defeated by a reading of the contract exclusion that is so broad that is arguable defeats coverage for claims that might reasonably be presumed to be covered.

 

One final note. I want to acknowledge that my thoughts on this topic were triggered by the excellent November 2008 PLUS Journal article by Joseph A. Bailey III of the Drinker Biddle law firm entitled "Trio of Recent Cases Affirms Broad Scope of Contract Exclusion" (here). I hasten to add that the views expressed in this post are exclusively my own.

 

D&O Insurance: Knowledge, Structure and Coverage

On March 2, 2009, in an opinion with important implications for the availability of coverage when a company official has inculpatory knowledge at the time of policy formation, Judge Gerald Lynch of the Southern District of New York granted the motions for summary judgment of two of Refco’s excess D&O insurers, but denied the summary judgment motion of a third excess insurer. The reasons both for the grants and the denial are instructive, particularly with respect to the interplay between varying excess forms and the language of the primary policy. A copy of the March 2 opinion can be found here.

 

Background

As reflected in prior posts regarding this case (here and here), this coverage dispute relates to the D&O insurance Refco procured in connection with its ill-fated August 2005 IPO. Refco’s $70 million insurance program was arranged in multiple layers, with a primary carrier and several excess carriers.

 

The $70 million program was arranged as follows: A primary $10 million layer; a first level excess layer of $7.5 million excess of the primary $10 million; a second excess layer of $10 million excess of the underlying $17.5 million; a third excess layer of $12.5 million excess of the underlying $27.5 million; a fourth excess layer of $10 million excess of the underlying $40 million; and a fifth excess layer of $20 million excess of $50 million. UPDATE: According to the remarks posted by an anonymous commentator, the fifth level excess policy is a Side A/DIC policy.

 

In October 2005, two months after Refco’s IPO, it was revealed that at the time of the IPO, Refco had an undisclosed $430 million receivable due from an entity controlled by Refco’s CEO, Phillip Bennett. Following this revelation, the company collapsed. Bennett, among others, has pled guilty to an array of criminal offenses.

 

Following Refco’s collapse, the company’s directors and officers were the target of extensive litigation. The primary and first level excess carriers advanced their entire combined limits of $17.5 million in payment of defense expense, subject to repayment if it is determined that there is no coverage. The four remaining excess carriers initiated litigation seeking a judicial determination of no coverage under their policies. In a June 18, 2008 opinion (here), Judge Lynch denied the second level excess carrier’s motion for summary judgment and in a subsequent opinion (here) determined that the second level excess carrier had an obligation to advance the payment of defense expense while the coverage issues were pending.

 

The March 2 Opinion

Judge Lynch’s March 2 Opinion relates to the motions for summary judgment of the third, fourth and fifth level excess carriers. Judge Lynch granted the motions of the third and fourth level excess carriers but denied the motion of the fifth level excess carrier.

 

The difference in outcome turned significantly on important differences between and among the excess policies each of the three carriers had issued to Refco. The third and fourth level excess policies were so-called "follow form" policies, meaning they followed the terms and conditions of the primary policy, except to the extent that their excess policies expressly adopted additional or different terms and conditions. The fifth level excess policy was not a follow form policy, a distinction that proved to be outcome determinative, at least for purposes of the summary judgment motions.

 

Each of the three policies had their own exclusionary provisions (not found in the primary policy) precluding coverage for claims arising from any facts or circumstances of which any insured had knowledge at policy inception and that might reasonably be expected to give rise to a claim. (The relevant exclusions were described in the third and fourth level excess policies as "prior knowledge exclusions" and as an "inverted representation endorsement" in the fifth level excess policy.)

 

Although he took some time getting there, in the end Judge Lynch had little trouble concluding that Bennett’s knowledge of the undisclosed receivable at the time of policy formation triggered these knowledge exclusions. The critical question was whether or not Bennett’s knowledge and the operation of the exclusions precluded coverage for all of the other insureds in light of the applicable policy terms and conditions.

 

The availability of coverage for the other insureds in turn depended on the operation of the applicable "severability language." This language determines whether or not the knowledge of one insured can be imputed to another.

 

Because the third and fourth level excess insurers’ policies are "follow form," the severability language on which the insureds relied to argue that Bennett’s knowledge was not imputable to them was from the primary policy. By contrast, because the top level excess policy was not a follow form policy, but instead had its own severability language, the insureds relied on the top level policy’s language in arguing for coverage under that policy.

 

After a lengthy discussion whether or not the primary policy’s application severability provision applied to the excess insurer’s exclusions, the court concluded that in the end the question didn’t matter. (See the following section for the distinction between application severability and exclusion severability.) Judge Lynch concluded that, under the policies’ terms, the addition of the knowledge exclusions to the third and fourth level excess policies "superseded" any contrary language in the primary policy, including the primary policy’s severability provisions.

 

Since the knowledge exclusions the third and fourth level excess policies precluded coverage where any insured has knowledge of the existence of facts giving rise to the claim, Judge Lynch concluded that Bennett’s knowledge of the receivables scheme precluded coverage for all of the insureds under the third and fourth level excess policies.

 

By contrast, however, Judge Lynch concluded that "a number of facts unique to [the top level excess insurer] preclude granting summary judgment to the insurer." The critical distinction is that the top level excess policy had its own severability provision, which, because it was in the same policy, was not superseded by the presence of the knowledge exclusion.

 

In addition, the top level excess insurer’s severability language lacked a critical sentence that the primary policy’s severability language included. The severability provision in the primary policy contained, but the top level insurer’s severability provision lacked, the following final sentence: "If any particulars or statement in the Application is untrue, the Policy will be void as to any Insured who know of such untruth." Because the top level excess insurer’s policy had no such provision, which specifically linked the severability language to the application, Judge Lynch concluded that the top level insurer "had not met its burden of showing" that its severability provision applied only to the application and not also to exclusions.

 

The Distinction Between Application and Exclusion Severabiltiy

A critical point to try to understand what is going on in this opinion is the distinction between application severability (that is, whether or not one person’s knowledge of application misrepresentations will be imputed to other persons) and exclusion severability (that is, whether or not one person’s knowledge or actions can be imputed to another for purposes of an exclusion).

 

Many practitioners will likely share my puzzlement that the decision almost entirely involves the question of the arguably more general operation of application severability provisions, even though the insurers were not relying on application misrepresentations to deny coverage, but rather upon the operation of the knowledge exclusion.

 

The explanation is that the excess policies apparently had no exclusion severability language of their own. Since the top level excess policy was not follow form and the excess policy has no exclusion severability language, the insureds relied on the arguably generalized operation of the application severability language to contend that Bennett’s knowledge could not be imputed to them for purposes of the exclusion.

 

The primary policy did, in fact, have its own exclusion severability language. However, Judge Lynch concluded (in a footnote) that because of the way the primary policy’s exclusion severability provision was worded, it applied only to the exclusions in the primary policy, and not to the distinct exclusion in the excess policy. Judge Lynch found that because the primary policy’s exclusion severability language applied only to the "above exclusions," it applied only to those found (that is, literally appearing "above") in the primary policy.

 

Discussion

If nothing else, this case provides an object lesson of the complicated way that the various components of a single D&O insurance program can operate to produce disparate results.

 

The so-called "follow form" policies wound up following neither the application severability nor the exclusion severability language of the primary policy, not because the excess policies expressly disclaimed those provisions, but simply because of the way the various policies interacted with each other. This opinion certainly highlights the truly limited extent to which "follow form" excess may actually follow form.

 

The extension of the excess policies’ knowledge exclusions to persons without knowledge is likely to trouble at least some observers. For most of the last decade, the D&O insurance industry has struggled to try to ensure that "innocent insureds" do not lose their insurance protection due to the misconduct or misrepresentations of others . The efforts to avoid these problems have concentrated on developing application and exclusion severability language limiting the consequences from the bad actors’ misconduct to the bad actors themselves.

 

This opinion illustrates an issue that may not have been a part of these industry efforts to create policy mechanisms to protect innocent insureds --  that is,  the importance of clarity of the purpose and design of application and exclusion severability provisions not just at the primary level, but all the way up the tower.

 

Another factor in this opinion not touched on above was the uncertainty whether or not the knowledge exclusions were even part of the excess policies. In addressing this issue, Judge Lynch reviewed the communications surrounding the placement of the insurance coverage. In my view, there was nothing unusual about these communications, which reflect nothing so much as the short time frame within which these kinds of insurance programs often are put together. But while the communications themselves are not out of the ordinary, the questions that subsequently have arisen do highlight the pitfalls of the policy procurement process.

 

Among other things, the process (at least to the extent reflected in Judge Lynch’s opinion) seems to suggest that in connection with the placement of the excess policies, the company’s representatives accepted the knowledge exclusion in lieu of an increased limits application. The practitioners’ pointer from this case is that severability is an equally important issue with respect to the exclusion as it would be to the increased limits application. This case suggests that in order to determine whether or not the severability issue is appropriately addressed entails consideration not only of the specific exclusionary language but also consideration of the interaction of all of the pieces in the tower.

 

The other specific practitioners’ pointer is that the exclusion severability language in a primary policy can be (and in this case, was) worded so as to restrict exclusion severability solely to the primary policy, without effect on any exclusions that may be added in any excess policies and regardless whether or not the excess policies otherwise are follow form policies. This observation suggests the need to specifically consider the question of exclusion severability in the context of any exclusions added to excess policies.

 

I wish to emphasize that nothing in these observations should be taken in any way as a criticism of anyone involved in the Refco coverage placement. This case demonstrates how complicated the interaction of the various program components can be, and that the interaction of the components can even, as this case demonstrates, produce results that might not be anticipated at the time of policy placement.

 

One final thought has to do with the fact that the court granted summary judgment for the third and fourth level excess insurers but not for the top level insurer. There has not at this point been any determination that there is coverage under the top level insurer’s policy. But if there were, I wonder whether the court’s entry of summary judgment on behalf of the third and fourth level excess insurer would create a gap in coverage that would relieve the fifth level excess insurer from its payment obligations – or rather, because the coverage underlying the fifth level of coverage will not be exhausted by payment of loss, could the fifth level excess carrier’s policy even be triggered? Obviously, the specific trigger language in the fifth level excess policy could be critical on this issue, but I suspect that before all is said and done the argument that there is a coverage gap will come up.

 

A March 3, 2009 memo from the Wiley Rein law firm discussing the Refco opinion can be found here. The Wiley Rein memo discusses a number of other important aspects of this opinion that I have not addressed above. Special thanks to the several loyal readers who sent me a copy of the opinion.

 

The Marc Dreier Scandal: The subsequent and much larger Madoff and Stanford Financial scandals have driven the Marc Drier scandal into the background, but the Dreier scandal is in some ways even more astonishing than those larger cases. A truly fascinating account of Marc Drier’s manic passage from hyper-aggressive lawyer to identity-misrepresenting fraud is set out in a March 3, 2009 American Lawyer article entitled "Anatomy of a Crack-Up: The Marc Dreier Case" (here). Alison Frankel’s comprehensive retelling of Drier’s disturbing tale makes for compelling reading.

 

We Don’t Need No Stinking TARP Money: According to a March 3, 2009 CFO.com article (here), a number of regional banks have concluded they are better off without TARP money. The article cites, for example, TCF Financial Corp, a Minnesota-based bank holding company with $16.7 billion in assets which claims that it only took the money ($361.2 million) under government pressure.

 

The article quotes the company’s CEO as saying that "the rules have definitely changed," and that whereas at the outset the message had been that only healthy banks would be granted the funds, subsequent Treasury actions and congressional mandates have created a "public perception" that banks that took TARP money "did so out of weakness." The CEO says that this perception puts the bank at a "competitive disadvantage."

 

The government recovery program is in trouble if bankers become convinced there is a stigma associated with accepting government aid. Part of the problem for the banks undoubtedly is the grandstanding politicians who insist on attempting to aggrandize themselves by flaying anyone receiving government aid. Even if some (but definitely not all) bankers made a hash of it in recent years, do we really want Congress trying to tell banks what to do?

 

Corporate Defaults, Bankruptcies and D&O Claims

Deteriorating economic conditions threaten a massive wave of corporate defaults. Corporate borrowers’ inability to fulfill debt obligations not only could prompt a bankruptcy filing surge, but also could result in a flood of ensuing lawsuits and claims as creditors and shareholders seek to recoup their losses. These claims could present a host of challenging D&O coverage issues.

 

The Growing Default Threat

According to a February 13, 2009 Wall Street Journal article entitled "Wave of Bad Debt Swamps Companies" (here), "the U.S. is entering a period likely to feature the most corporate-debt defaults, by dollar amount, in history." The article reports estimates that "U.S. companies are poised to default on $450 billion to $500 billion in corporate bonds and bank loans over the next two years."

 

In percentage terms, the default rate could "approach levels last seen in 1933." High yield default rates peaked around 15% in 1930. The Journal reports that S&P estimates that default rates will hit 13.9% this year "but could go as high as 18.5% if the downturn is worse than expected."

 

The "growing wave of souring debt" has already resulting in rising numbers of bankruptcies, including, just in the last few days, Muzak Holdings LLC; Pliant Corp.; Aleris International; and Midway Games.

 

However, as the Journal article observes, corporate defaults do not always result in Chapter 11 filings. Borrowers are sometimes able to restructure their debt outside of bankruptcy, and sometimes give creditors ownership stakes in exchange for reducing or elimination debt.

 

The Risk of Increased Numbers of Claims

In addition to the possibility of a growing number of bankruptcies, the prospect of surging corporate defaults also raises the possibility of an upsurge in claims against the directors and officers of the struggling or bankrupt companies.

 

Companies whose financial stability is deteriorating may as one consequence of their struggles get hit with a "going concern" opinion from their auditor. As the securities lawsuit filed against NextWave Wireless illustrates, the question whether a company can continue as a going concern alone can become an allegation in a shareholders’ class action complaint.

 

Claims may arise even when companies attempt a work out to try to avoid bankruptcy. These claims can come from shareholders, who may content that the workout resulted in a dilution of their interests, or it can even come from other bondholders, who may claim that their interests have been harmed or improperly subordinated, as demonstrated in the recent Station Casino bondholder claim (complaint here). Bondholders also recently filed a similar lawsuit against Harrah's Entertainment and certain of its directors and officers (refer here).

 

But a bankruptcy filing is particularly likely to be followed by claims against the bankrupt company’s directors and officers. These claims can come in the form of securities lawsuits brought against the individuals by the bankrupt company’s shareholders, as reflected for example in the recent cases filed against Pilgrim Pride’s corporate officials (refer here); against Britannia Bulk’s senior officers (here); or against the directors and officers of Charys Holding Company (here).

 

In addition, the Trustee in bankruptcy may also assert claims against the company’s directors and officers, as evidenced in the now infamous Just for Feet claim (about which refer here). As the Just for Feet bankruptcy also demonstrates, these various claims can arise simultaneously, which presents its own set of issues.

 

The Potential Coverage Issues

The advent of claims following bankruptcy presents a number of challenges in the context of any potentially applicable directors and officers’ liability insurance. Some of these challenges are a reflection of the size and structure of the insurance program; other challenges arise from the nature and extent of the coverage afforded.

 

With respect to the overall program, one critically important issue may simply be the amount of insurance available. The prospect for multiple simultaneous claims is increased dramatically when a company files for bankruptcy. The simultaneous prosecution of multiple claims presents the very real possibility that the insurance could be substantially depleted or even entirely exhausted. As demonstrated in the claims surrounding the Collins & Aikman bankruptcy (about which refer here), defense costs alone potentially could deplete the available limits.

 

And as demonstrated in connection with the multiple claims filed against the directors and officers of Just for Feet following that company’s bankruptcy, the proceeds of a traditional D&O insurance program alone may be insufficient to resolve all claims that can arise in the bankruptcy context. Both the Collins & Aikman and the Just for Feet examples have important implications for policy structure, as discussed below.

 

The interplay between the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the terms and conditions of the D&O policy may present certain specific challenges. As I discussed at greater length in a prior post (here), a recurring issue since so-called "entity coverage" has become a standard part of the D&O policy has been whether or not the D&O policy proceeds are property of the bankrupt estate under Bankruptcy Code Section 541(a) and subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code Section 362.

 

A particularly good article discussing these questions regarding the D&O policy proceeds and the operation of the bankruptcy stay written by my good friend Kim Melvin of the Wiley Rein law firm can be found here.

 

Another frequently recurring D&O insurance coverage issue arising in the bankruptcy context is whether claims asserted by the Trustee or other receivers or liquidators against the company’s directors or officers funs afoul of the policy’s exclusion for claims brought by one insured against another insured. The "insured vs. insured" issue arises because of the concern that the Trustee or other claimant is "standing in the shoes" of a policy insured, the company itself.

 

Addressing the Insurance Concerns

A number of policy solutions to these recurring bankruptcy issues have developed in recent years. For example, a coverage carve-back to the insured vs. insured exclusion, now a standard provision in most policies, has continued to evolve over the years to address concerns about coverage for claims brought by Trustees and others.

 

In addition, many policies now contain "priority of payments" provisions as a way to try to address questions surrounding the availability of the D&O policy’s proceeds for the payment of defense expense or the resolution of claims notwithstanding the bankruptcy stay.

 

Perhaps even more importantly, to address concerns about the susceptibility of the policy proceeds to depletion or exhaustion from multiple simultaneous claims, particularly in the bankruptcy context, the D&O industry has developed a number of structural solutions designed to ensure that whatever may happen, a fund of money will remain available for specified individuals so they can defend and resolve claims against them. These structures might take any one of a number of forms, including a so-called Side A/DIC policy, or even an individual director liability (IDL) policy.

 

The complexity of these coverage and structural issues underscores the need to involve a skilled insurance professional in the D&O insurance acquisition process. Financial troubled companies in particular require the contributions of an informed and experienced advocate in structuring their coverage. The structure and the terms and conditions of a company’s insurance program could determine whether or not insurance coverage is available for individual directors and officers in the event of bankruptcy and related claims.

 

One final note about the likelihood of increasing corporate defaults. That is, the current deteriorating economic conditions not only present challenges for insurance buyers, they also present serious concerns for D&O underwriters. As the Journal article cited above notes, the defaults "will likely spread across many industries." Among the industries the article specifically mentions are "media, entertainment, casino and hotel companies, car makers and retailers."

 

Up to this point, the most significant consequences of the credit crisis have been concentrated in the financial sector. D&O underwriters have had the ability to segment risk arising from the credit crisis according to whether or not companies were financially related. However, with the growing threat of corporate defaults across many industry sectors, risk segmentation will be much more challenging. At a minimum, it will no longer be sufficient for underwriters to presume that risk is limited to the financial sector alone.

 

2008: The Year in Review

2008 was a remarkably eventful year, from the dramatic developments during the fall that rocked the financial markets to the changing of the guard in the Presidential election.  Many of the events had a profound impact in the world of D&O insurance.  In all likelihood, significant developments will continue to emerge during 2009 that will have implications for the D&O insurance marketplace.



In the latest issue of InSights (here), I review the past year’s most noteworthy events in the context of the D&O insurance marketplace.  The article’s first section reviews the top ten developments in the world of D&O insurance during 2008.  The article concludes with a perspective on what may lie ahead in 2009, including, in particular, a consideration of the impact that last year’s events could have on D&O pricing and coverage. 

 

A separate addendum to the InSights article takes a closer look at the 2008 securities class action lawsuit filings.As the addendum details, the pace of shareholder lawsuit filings increased significantly in 2008. There were 224 new securities lawsuits filed in 2008 , which represents a 30% increase over the 172 securities lawsuits filed in 2007, and an 88% increase over the 119 filed in 2006.

 

The 2008 filing total also represents the highest annual filing total since 2004. Further, all signs seem to indicate that the heightened filing levels will continue into 2009.

 

D&O Insurance: Are Subpoenas "Claims"?

The question of coverage for fees and costs incurred in connection with responding to subpoenas is a perennial D&O insurance issue. Policyholders are sometimes surprised and disappointed when their D&O insurer takes the position that their policies do not cover these amounts.

 

Whether or not there is coverage for fees incurred in connection with a subpoena often critically depends both on the specific facts and circumstances surrounding the subpoena and the specific language of the applicable policy. The critical issue under the policy is whether or not the subpoena comes with the applicable policy’s definition of the term "Claim."

 

A January 21, 2009 memorandum from the Lowenstein Sandler law firm entitled "Does a Subpoena Constitute a ‘Claim’ for Purposes of D&O Insurance Coverage" (here) takes a detailed look at several recent case decisions exploring these issues. As the memorandum notes, the cases show that these issues "are fact intensive as to both the wording of the definition of ‘claim’ and the particular facts surrounding the subpoena."

 

The cases discussed in the memo show a number of things in connection with the question whether a subpoena is a "Claim."

 

First, the wordings of the policy definition of the term "Claim" vary substantially between policies and the precise wording used can be determinative.

 

Second, in addition to the wording of the policy, the nature of the subpoena involved also is critically important. A court may well have a different perception of, say, a grand jury subpoena, compared to an administrative subpoena, for example.

 

Third, courts apparently have been willing to consider outside factual matter (for example, the affidavit testimony of one of the attorneys involved regarding the nature of the investigation surrounding the subpoena), which can be highly relevant to a fact intensive inquiry.

 

Fourth, in addition to the definition of the term "claim," the presence of allegations of a "Wrongful Act" can also be an important determinant in the inquiry whether the fees and costs incurred in connection with a subpoena are covered. The typical D&O policy provides coverage for loss arising from a "Claim" based on an "actual or alleged Wrongful Act." As the memo shows, whether or not a subpoena represents a "Claim," there may still be a question whether an actual or alleged Wrongful Act is involved.

 

The question of what constitutes a "Claim" may be one of the most frequently recurring coverage issues under a D&O policy, and the actual wording used is critical. As the memo notes, "often seemingly minor differences can be coverage-determinative."

 

In that regard, in summarizing the lessons from the cases, the memo notes several truths about the D&O insurance coverage placement process with which I heartily concur:

 

it is essential that the insurance broker or consultant be expert in D&O policies and negotiate with the insurer for the best possible definition of claim. All D&O insurance policies are not created equal. More expensive D&O policies frequently provide better coverage than less expensive ones. Optimally, the insurance broker or consultant should not simply present the insured with a policy, but a consideration of different policies, so that the insured can perform a cost/benefit analysis.

 

The memo concludes with an observation of the need to provide timely notice.

 

And If SEC Subpoenas Are Involved: In many instances, the subpoena that is the source of the coverage dispute has been issued by the SEC. Readers who find themselves dealing with the issue of whether or not there is coverage under a D&O policy for fees and costs incurred in connection with an SEC subpoena may find it helpful to refer to the SEC’s Enforcement Manual, which can be found here.

 

The Manual, which was only recently made public, describes the SEC’s enforcement practices and policies in detail, and may prove useful in trying to understand what various SEC actions and processes may represent.

 

A Related Issue: An issue that also frequently occurs in conjunction with the question of coverage for fees and costs incurred in responding to a subpoena is the question of coverage for fees and costs incurred in connection with a criminal investigation. In a recent post (here), I reviewed the issues surrounding the question of coverage under a D&O policy for expenses incurred in connection with a criminal investigation.

 

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Options Backdating Lawsuit Dismissal: Although they may seem but a distant memory, the options backdating cases continue to grind through the courts. In a January 9, 2009 opinion (here), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the securities class action lawsuit filed in connection with the options backdating allegations involving Witness Systems. Background regarding the case can be found here.

 

The lower court had dismissed the case in reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in the Tellabs case, holding that the complaint did not satisfy the PSLRA’s requirements for pleading scienter. The trial court dismissed the case without allowing the plaintiffs leave to amend, though the plaintiffs had requested leave in a footnote to an opposition brief.

 

A copy of the district court’s opinion can be found here. My prior blog post discussing the dismissal can be found here.

 

The Eleventh Circuit, after noting that as a result of the options backdating the company had "minimally overstated earning" between 2004 and 2006, affirmed the dismissal.

 

Among other things, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the complaint contained no allegation that the company’s CEO "had any knowledge of the accounting principles relating to stock options," and observed that the inference that the CEO "knew that backdated options in 2000 and 2001 had led to overstated earnings during the class period in 2004 to 2006 is not as compelling as the competing inference that he was unaware that backdated options had affected financial statements several years later."

 

The court specifically noted that the "de minimus change" in the financial statements was not a "glaring ‘red flag’" that the company was overstating earning.

 

The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend, because the plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend was "imbedded within an opposition memorandum."

 

I have updated my table of options backdating securities lawsuit settlements, dismissals and dismissal motion denials in order to reflect the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. The table can be accessed here

 

A January 15, 2009 memorandum from the Carlton Fields law firm discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision can be found here. Special thanks to Dave Leonard of the Carlton Fields firm for sending along a link to the memo.

 

You Decide: Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution specifies with respect to an incoming President of the United States as follows: "Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation:--‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’"

 

Which raises and interesting question: Did Obama actually complete the oath as required by the Constitution? Roll the tape and decide for yourself. (Hat tip to the WSJ.com Law Blog for the link to the YouTube video.) Ask yourself as you watch whether or not it is relevant that Obama, while serving in the Senate, was one of 22 Democratic senators to vote against Roberts' confirmation. This was, by the way, the first time that a Chief Justice has sworn in a President that voted against him.

 

Madoff-Related Insurance Losses: How Big?

Investors whose fortunes were tied to Bernard Madoff and his firm have already been counting (and mourning) their losses. But for the insurers that provided coverage for financial firms targeted in the Madoff-related litigation, the losses have only just begun to accumulate.

 

How high the insurance losses ultimately may run remains to be seen, but early estimates suggest that that the insurance losses, even just for defense expenses, could be significant.

 

A January 9, 2008 Bloomberg article (here) reports that Madoff-related claims "may cost insurers who cover financial institutions more than $1 billion as they pay legal costs for investment managers who gave client money to Madoff." Indeed one respected industry participant is quoted as saying that a total of $1 billion "feels a little low to me."
 

 

The losses could well affect not only D&O insurers, but also insurers offering"error and omissions" E&O insurance. For many of the kinds of investment firms involved in these cases so far, the type of insurance protection they would most likely purchase provides both coverages within a single package.

 

The article correctly points out that how large the insurance losses ultimately turn out to be depends on how many of the Madoff "feeder funds" and other litigation targets actually have purchased these kinds of insurance. As one observer quoted in the article notes, hedge funds and other investment vehicles "often don’t buy coverage."

 

There are a variety of other factors that also could affect the total cost to insurers of the Madoff-related claims. The first is the question of who is insured under the policies. In many of these Madoff-related lawsuits (a complete list of which can be accessed here), the plaintiffs have named a laundry list of related defendants, often including not only investment managers and advisors, but also investment funds, offshore entities, and a squadron of associated individuals.

 

These claims are going to stress-test the insurance policies involved. The policyholders will find out how well put together the policies were, in light of the entities’ related structures and operations. There may well be instances where the entire family of advisors, managers and funds were not fully yoked together under the coverage umbrella.

 

But an even more important set of issues that potentially could affect the scope of insurance losses are the potential coverage defenses the carriers may seek to assert. In particular, insurers will be looking closely to see whether the allegations raised in these lawsuits trigger one of more of the standard conduct exclusions, particularly the personal profit and the fraud exclusions.

 

The conduct exclusions typically are written on an after adjudication basis, meaning that the only apply to preclude coverage only after an adjudicated determination that the prohibited conduct actually took place (as I recently noted in my discussion of the potential coverage insurance issues arising in connection with the Satyam scandal, here).

 

Moreover, at this point the fraud involved appears to involve misconduct of Madoff himself, rather than the feeder funds, although obviously investigators are probing the potential complicity of a wide variety and number of persons associated with Madoff.

 

The personal profit exclusion may prove to be the more relevant. A typical exclusion precludes coverage for loss "based upon, arising from, or in consequence of … an Insured having gained any profit, remuneration or advantage to which such Insured as not legally entitled, if a judgment or final adjudication in any proceeding establishes the gaining of such remuneration or advantage."

 

Investors have already claimed that the feeder funds inappropriately exacted management fees or other compensation without conducting appropriate due diligence or otherwise earning their fees. However, an adjudicated determination of these allegations would be required for the profit exclusion to preclude coverage.

 

Although there is currently no reported reason to suggest that the "feeder funds" were aware of Madoff’s scheme, insurers will also be looking closely at who know what and when, looking for possible bases to rescind coverage based on alleged misrepresentations in the policy application.

 

Yet another factor that could restrict the total insurance losses is the limitation on the amount of insurance potentially involved. In my experience, many investment advisory firms and hedge funds buy relatively lower limits of insurance coverage. Thus, in many cases, the available insurance involved could be relatively slight and could quickly be exhausted by defense costs alone. As a result, a portion of the potential defense expense and the amount of some settlements could wind up being uninsured.

 

I suspect that as a result of the Madoff-related events, many investment advisory firms, hedge funds and other financial firms will now need far less persuading of the value of this type of insurance or that more than just minimal limits could well be advised. Unfortunately, for the firms acquiring this insight for the first time now, this type of coverage could well become much more expensive even if otherwise available.

 

As noted in a December 31, 2008 publication of the Lloyd’s insurance market entitled "Madoff Scandal Poses Challenges for Directors" (here), the "sheer scale of the fallout from Madoff could seriously affect the financial insurance market’s dynamics, affecting the availability and cost of both professional indemnity and directors and officers coverage." The article quotes one source as stating with respect to this type of coverage that "prices are going to increase and cover will be restricted."

 

More Madoff Lawsuits: Meanwhile, the Madoff-related lawsuits continue to flood in. For example, on January 8, 2009, Pacific West Health Medical Center, Inc. Employees Retirement Trust sued Fairfield Greenwich Group and related entities and individuals in the Southern District of New York on behalf of all persons who purchased shares of the Fairfield Sentry funds, alleging that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties. The defendants are also accused of negligence, unjust enrichment and breach of contract.

 

A copy of the Pacific West complaint can be found here. A copy of a January 9, 2009 Bloomberg article describing the complaint can be found here.

 

It also looks as if overseas investors are about to get involved in Madoff litigation, which may be unsurprising give that, as the Financial Times reports (here), as much as half of the Madoff losses have been borne by non-U.S. investors.

 

According to a January 8, 2009 Reuters story (here), investment activist group Deminor is readying to sue UBS, HSBC, Hyposwiss and others in courts in Luxembourg and Ireland in connection with the Madoff scandal. The charge is that the defendant banks acts as depositories for sponsored funds that invested clients’ money in Madoff-related vehicles. The allegation is that the depository banks were responsible for the sponsored funds and negligently failed to check what was inside the clients’ portfolios.

 

According to an earlier Financial Times article (here), UBS at least sought to exculpate itself from any responsibility for clients’ assets through the subscription documents it used.

 

In any event, I have updated my running tally of the Madoff-related litigation, which can be accessed here.

 

Special thanks to David Demurjian for the link to the Bloomberg article, and to a loyal reader who prefers anonymity for the Reuters and Financial Times articles.

 

Can Madoff Losses Be Recovered?: In addition to all of the factors noted above that could diminish the aggregate Madoff-related insurance losses, there is also the question whether the investors’ claims are meritorious. That is, do the claimants actually have a legitimate basis upon which to try to recover their losses from the Madoff "feeder funds" and others?

 

These questions will be addressed in a webinar entitled "Madoff Litigation: Can the Lost Billions Be Recovered?" to be hosted by Securities Docket on January 14, 2009 at 2:00 P.M. The speakers include Gerald Silk of the Bernstein Litowitz firm, Brad Friedman of Milberg LLP, and Fred Dunbar of NERA Economic Consulting. Further background regarding the webinar can be found here. Registration for the webinar can be accessed here.

 

A replay of a prior Securities Docket webinar entitled "2008: A Year in Review" can be accessed here. (I was one of the speakers at this prior session.)

 

"Hitler Previews the Cubs’ Winter Meeting": This video is in questionable taste, contains foul language, and is very very funny, at least for those having some acquaintance with the Chicago Cubs. (The humor is more accessible if, for example, you know who Kerry Wood is.) Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending along a link to this video.

 

What About Satyam's D&O Insurance?

As the details about the Satyam Computer Services scandal have emerged and the U.S. securities lawsuits have begun to flood in, questions have also arisen about Satyam’s D&O insurance. At least some of the questions are answered in a January 8, 2009 article in The Economic Times (India’s largest financial daily) entitled "Satyam Scam Triggers Biggest D&O Claim" (here).

 

According to the article, Satyam carries a $75 million D&O insurance program led by Tata AIG, which is a joint venture of Tata Group and American International Group. The article also states that the Satyam claim "could trigger one of the largest Directors and Officers insurance claims in India."

 

Of course, knowing the limits of liability under Satyam’s insurance program does not necessarily tell you how much insurance ultimately will be available to defend and indemnify Satyam and its directors and officers. In a case where the company’s Chairman has publicly admitted fraud, the applicable terms and conditions will be absolutely critical. I discuss below a couple of issues that seem likely to arise.

 

The Fraud Exclusion

Without knowing more about the specific terms applicable under Satyam’s D&O insurance program, it is difficult to say anything with certainty. However, at least in the U.S., D&O insurance policies do not cover fraudulent, criminal or intentional misconduct.

 

But, again in the U.S., these exclusions typically do not kick in until there has been an "adjudication." Even though Satyam’s Chairman has admitted cooking the books, he has not (yet) been convicted of anything, so to the extent the policy’s exclusions have an "adjudication" requirement, the exclusions would not apply, at least in the interim.

 

Moreover, a well-constructed U.S. policy would also contain a "severability of exclusions" provision so that even if an exclusion would apply to preclude coverage based on the Chairman’s misconduct, it would not apply to others who were uninvolved in the conduct. Of course, many questions are now being asked about who else at Satyam might have been involved in the fraudulent accounting. The Chairman’s letter sought to establish that other board members were unaware of the fraud.

 

A prior post discussing the "adjudicated fraud" exclusion can be found here. A separate post discussing an interim decision in the Refco matter and relating to the interaction of the exclusion and the funding of defense costs can be found here.

 

Application Misrepresentations?

Another insurance issue that likely will be raised is the question of policy rescission. Given the magnitude of the fraud and the apparent length of time during which it was going on, the question may be asked whether the policy was procured through misrepresentations in the application process.

 

Under the typical current D&O policy in the U.S., application misrepresentations can serve as a basis on which the carrier can rescind the policy only as to persons with knowledge of the misrepresentations and as to persons to whom that knowledge is imputed. A well-constructed U.S. policy will limit "imputation" so that innocent persons do not risk rescission of their coverage because of another’s misrepresentation. The imputation language used in Satyam’s policy could well be critical.

 

A prior post discussing D&O insurance policy rescission issues can be found here (refer especially to my "final thoughts" toward the end of the post).

 

I welcome any insight readers can provide about the provision of the typical D&O insurance policy in the Indian market, as well as any additional information anyone can supply about the Satyam program, particularly any additional carriers involved.

 

Very special thanks to loyal reader Aruno Rajaratnam for providing a copy of The Economic Times article as well as other information about Satyam.

 

Global Accounting Outlook = Bleak: Fitch's Ratings has issued a January 8, 2009 report entitled "Accounting and Financial Reporting: 2009 Global Outlook" (available here, registration required) with some very interesting observations about the year ahead for public company accountants. As the report states in its opening line, "these are indeed interesting times for accounting."

 

Among other things, the report notes the following with respect to the "going concern" questions that many companies and their accountants will face as the companies prepare their year-end 2008 financial statements:

 

The sharp decline in global debt and equity securities values and a very difficult credit environment have presented a unique set of chllenges to the interpretation and implementation of some pervasive accounting issues. An immediate question facing some companies preparing their full-year 2008 financial statements, is how best to justify a "going concern" basis, given the doubts some have about their abiltiy to refinance. Management statements on this issue should be required reading for investors and analysts. The determination of impairment charges on debt securities and the lack of clear-cut rules on the subject have pitted some issuers against their auditors. This is a particularly sensitive issue because profitability and regulatory capital adequacy are at state for many financial institutions.

 

Obviously, insurance companies are among the companies for whom the determination of impairment charges will be particularly sensitive. And among others who will want to read companies' managers' statements on the "going concern" issue, in addition to investors and analysts, are D&O underwriters.

 

A news article describing the Fitch report can be found here. Special thanks to a loyal reader for sending along the news article and a link to the report.

 

Top Ten D&O Stories of 2008

2008 was a remarkably eventful year, from the dramatic events that rocked the financial markets to the Presidential election that resulted in a change in national leadership. Virtually all of the significant events during 2008 also had an impact on the world of D&O insurance, one way or another. In all likelihood, significant developments will continue to emerge during 2009, with further implications for the D&O marketplace.

 

In a year as eventful as 2008, selecting as the most significant events is a challenging task. But with an eye toward the developments of greatest significance for the D&O industry, I have prepared the following list of the top ten stories of 2008.

 

1. Credit Crisis Becomes Global Financial Calamity: What began in 2007 as a subprime meltdown had by early 2008 become a credit crisis, which in turn evolved during Fall 2008 into a full blown global financial disaster.

 

Within the space of just a few short weeks, the government took control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; the FDIC took over Washington Mutual, in the largest U.S. bank failure ever; Lehman Brothers collapsed, in the largest U.S. bankruptcy ever; Bank of America agreed to acquire Merrill Lynch in a government brokered deal; the government undertook a massive bailout of AIG; Congress enacted a colossal $700 billion bailout package; and Wells Fargo agreed to acquire Wachovia. And those events came after a raft of prior financial shocks, including the collapse of Bear Stearns, the seizure of the auction rate securities market, and the disintegration of U.S. residential real estate market.

 

Any one of these events on its own would be significant. Taken collectively these events represent an enormous upheaval, the full ramifications and consequences of which will only emerge over the months and years to come.

 

And those are just the headlines. In other developments reported "below the fold," companies around the world have grappled with a general business downturn, wrestled with the threat of their own insolvency or that of their customers or suppliers, and basically tried to maintain their ground in an increasingly hostile financial environment.

 

All of these developments have enormous potential significance, much of it yet to unfold. These events have not only fueled litigation, but they have also presented D&O underwriters with a dramatically altered underwriting environment. The perils involve not only the challenge of underwriting financially troubled companies, but also the trial of underwriting in the context of rapidly changing (and deteriorating) conditions in the financial and credit markets.

 

During 2008, the world became significantly more dangerous for D&O underwriters. All signs suggest the current perilous conditions will continue into 2009, and perhaps beyond.

 

2. Financial Market Disruptions Hit Major Insurers: The turmoil in the financial markets also battered three insurers that are major players in the D&O marketplace. AIG’s woes required an enormous government bailout. XL and Hartford both faced differing degrees of turbulence due to write-downs in their respective investment portfolios.

 

Each of one of these insurers is dealing with their own unique set of circumstances. Rating agencies have noted and responded to these developments. Insurance buyers remain anxious and wary. The implications of these developments, both for each of these insurers and for the marketplace as a whole, remain to be seen. At a minimum, these events have disrupted the D&O insurance marketplace and introduced a significant element of uncertainty. The disruptive impact from these developments is likely to continue to affect the D&O industry throughout 2009.

 

3. Subprime and Credit Crisis Litigation Wave Rolls On: The subprime litigation wave that began in 2007 continued to surge in 2008, as there were 101 new subprime and credit-crisis related securities lawsuits filed during 2008, bringing the two-year total to 141. My running tally of the subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits can be accessed here.

 

As time has passed, the litigation wave has continued to evolve; for example, the 2008 subprime and credit crisis-related litigation included as many as 21 auction rate securities lawsuits all of which were filed in the earlier part of 2008. Later in the year, a string of lawsuits initiated by holders of preferred or subordinated securities emerged (as discussed here).

 

In February 2009, the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave will enter its third year, but the phenomenon shows no signs of abating. The credit crisis-related securities lawsuits continued to accumulate throughout 2008. Of the 101 subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits filed in 2008, 45 were filed in the second half of the year, including ten in December alone.

 

The credit crisis lawsuit filings remained high as the year ended, suggesting that significant credit crisis litigation activity will continue well into 2009 and perhaps beyond.

 

4. Credit Crisis Litigation Spreads Beyond the Financial Sector: As massive as the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave has been, it had until recently been concentrated in the financial sector. But as 2008 wore on, and largely as a result of the dramatic events in the global financial markets during September and October 2008, the litigation wave spread beyond the financial sector.

 

The companies that have become involved in this extended litigation wave include, for example, those that had significant exposure to Lehman Brothers or other companies that collapsed this fall. (Refer here and here for discussion of these "new wave" credit crisis lawsuits). In addition, companies that have been drawn in include companies that made wrong way bets on commodities or currencies (about which refer here).

 

These developments suggest that the credit crisis-related litigation wave may have entered a dangerous new phase, as I discuss at greater length here. These developments also underscore the challenges for D&O underwriters in the current environment.

 

My complete rundown of all 2008 securities litigation can be found here.

 

5. Bank Failures Surge: Led by the FDIC’s assumption of control of Washington Mutual in the largest bank failure in U.S. history, bank failures surged in 2008. According to the FDIC’s website (here), there were 25 bank failures in 2008, the highest annual total since 1994, at the end of the last era of failed banks. Perhaps even more significantly, the pace of bank closures increased as the year progressed; 21 of the 2008 bank closures took place in the second half of 2008, 12 of them in the fourth quarter.

 

In many ways, other financial events have overshadowed this sudden surge in bank failures. Indeed, as I noted here, the WaMu failure, the largest in U.S. history, has largely been relegated to yesterday’s news pile. But the timing and pace of the bank closures during 2008 suggests that there are likely to be further bank failures ahead, carrying with it the threat of associated "dead bank" litigation, a possibility I previously discussed here.

 

6. Madoff Scandal Triggers Litigation Torrent: The revelation of the massive Ponzi scheme involving Bernard Madoff and his firm has triggered a wave of litigation as aggrieved investors scrambled to try to recoup their losses. The first Madoff-related lawsuits targeted Madoff and his firm. But given the unlikelihood of a significant recovery there, investors have quickly moved on to other targets. A running tally of the Madoff investor litigation can be accessed here.

 

The primary Madoff-related litigation targets are the so-called "feeder funds" that invested with Madoff on their clients behalf. Recent blog posts discussing these "feeder funds" lawsuits can be found here and here. Given the magnitude of the investor losses and the depth of investor outrage, these lawsuits are likely to continue to accrue for some time to come. Press reports (for example, here) suggest that lawyers are gearing up for a litigation onslaught.

 

7. Presidential Election Signals Changes: I don’t know whether you heard, but there was an election in November. The coming changes in the White House as well as the increased Democratic majority in Congress could signal significant future legislative and other developments.

 

The arrival of the new administration will likely mean a change in direction for judicial appointments. A more interesting question is whether the Democratic control of Congress and the White House could lead to legislative changes in the securities laws. As discussed at the PLUS International Conference in November (about which refer here), the current financial turmoil could be used as a justification for legislative reform efforts – for example, an attempt to overturn Central Bank and Stoneridge.

 

At a minimum, the coming changes in the leadership at the SEC, together with a different leadership interpretation of the meaning and value of regulation, could lead to a changed environment for the enforcement of the securities laws.

 

8. Largest-Ever Fine Underscores the Growing Significance of the FCPA: For some time now (most recently here), I have been writing about the growing importance of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement activity and associated civil litigation. The FCPA mounting significance was dramatically underscored recently when Siemens agreed to pay an $800 million fine.

 

The Siemens fine is the largest ever, dwarfing the previous record fine, paid by Baker Hughes, of $44 million (about which refer here). The outcome of the Siemens investigation is merely the latest development in a long chain of events highlighting the growing importance of the FCPA.

 

As I have previously noted (refer here), one of the usual accompaniments of an FCPA investigation is follow-on civil litigation. As the threat of FCPA-related exposure continues to grow, the threat of follow-on civil litigation will also increase.

 

The FCPA Blog has a detailed overview of 2008 FCPA enforcement activity here.

 

9. Defense Expense Tests Limits Adequacy: Companies ensnared in high stakes litigation may find themselves confronting an unexpected new challenge – the increasing likelihood that defense costs alone could exhaust the entire amount of available D&O insurance coverage. This threat was unfortuntately realized in connection with the Collins & Aikman bankruptcy and related criminal proceeding (about which refer here), where accumulated defense expense exhausted the company’s entire $50 million D&O insurance, before the criminal case even went to trial.

 

The possibility that escalating defense expense could entirely deplete available insurance presents a frightening prospect for individuals involved in a serious D&O claim, and also raises troubling questions about traditional notions of limits adequacy. In addition, the possibility of total limits exhaustion as the result of the requirements of multiple claims and multiple insureds underscores the need for insurance buyers to consider alternative insurance structures (such as, for example, separate insurance for an individual or a group of individuals) to ensure that segregated funds remain available in the event of a catastrophic claim.

 

10. Indemnity Developments Trigger Additional Insurance Structure Concerns: In the Schoon v. Troy case (about which refer here), the Delaware Chancery Court held that a board of directors properly could eliminate former directors' advancement rights retroactively. The possibility that former directors could lose their rights to advancement or indemnification comes as unwelcome news to many directors.

 

This case development, like the development about limits adequacy noted above, highlights the need to address program structure as part of the insurance acquisition process. In general, directors and officers have become more concerned about the availability of insurance protection when they need it most. As a result, interest in a wider variety of auxiliary insurance structures has increased. These structures can include new insurance solutions designed for the needs of retiring directors.

 

In a year as eventful as 2008, reasonable minds could differ about what events deserve to be included in any Top Ten list. I am very interested in readers’ views about the top stories, particularly those who feel that other events deserved to be included on the list.

 

More "Top" Lists: Making year-end lists seems to be a nearly universal phenomenon, and Top Ten lists abound. Time Magazine simplified things by creating "The Top Ten of Everything of 2008," which can be found here.

 

Then  there are always the lists of the "Bottom Ten," like Business Week’s list of the Ten Worst Predictions About 2008 (here). Fortune has a list (here) of the "dumbest" business decisions of 2008, but given the kind of year 2008 was, a list of just ten was not enough – the magazine’s targets 21 business decisions as "dumbest."

 

Perhaps the most entertaining "Top" list is VideoGum’s list of the Top Viral Videos of 2008, which can be viewed below. (Viewer discretion is advised as some persons may find some of the content offensive.)

 

PLUS D&O Symposium: Readers will also want to be sure to register for the annual PLUS D&O Symposium, which will be held on February 25 and 26, 2009, at the Marriott Marquis Hotel in New York. Information about the Symposium, including registration instructions, can be found here.

 

The Symposium will feature an all-star cast, including keynote speakers Madeline Albright and NY Insurance Department Superintendant Eric Dinallo. Wilson Sonsini partner Boris Feldman will once again be moderating the annual panel on securities litigation developments. The schedule also includes a panel on Bankruptcies and Bailouts, with panelists including VJ Dowling of Dowling & Partners Securities and David Bradford of Advisen.

 

The conference will also include a replay of the excellent video, "The Rise and Fall of Bill Lerach" (a movie trailer for which can be found here). Stanford Law Professor Joseph Grundfest will lead a panel discussion of the video. The video was shown at the PLUS International Conference in November 2008 and received rave reviews.

 

Readers with any questions about the Symposium should feel free to drop me a note or give me a call.

 

D&O Insurance: Corporate Criminal Investigations

The initiation of a criminal investigation against a company or its directors and officers can be a watershed moment in the life of any company. In addition to the question of how it will respond, the company must also determine how it will fund the associated legal expense. It is at this critical juncture that the company confronts issues surrounding the availability and limitation of D&O insurance in connection with criminal investigations.

 

These issues are explored in a December 2008 article by Patricia Bronte of the Jenner & Block firm entitled "D&O Coverage for Corporate Criminal Investigations" (here). As Bronte notes, the availability of coverage for a criminal investigation depends upon the particular language in the applicable policy, particularly the policy’s definition of the term "claim." The critical question will be whether or not the particular circumstances presented constitute a "claim."

 

The article opens with a review of case law from an earlier era, when D&O policies did not routinely define the term "claim." However, as the article discusses, the typical D&O policy now defines the term and includes within its definition a specific reference to a "criminal proceeding," which usually is further defined as having been "commenced by the return of an indictment."

 

One of the useful things Bronte’s article does is that by reviewing the early case law, she shows how the carriers came to insert the language limiting coverage for criminal proceedings to post-indictment matters. Prior cases where carriers were compelled to fund a wide range of expenses related to investigations and other pre-indictment matters clearly led to this change.

 

However, Bronte’s article also illustrates the difficulties, from the policyholder’s perspective, of this post-indictment limitation of coverage for criminal matters. That is, "a corporation’s best hope for a favorable outcome – and sometimes the best way to avoid disaster – is to persuade the prosecutor not to file any formal criminal charges at all."

 

As a consequence of this need to try to avert indictment, the corporation can incur considerable expense pre-indictment in respond to subpoenas, addressing a grand jury investigation, or otherwise attempting to answer the investigative threat. Costs incurred in connection with these efforts represent defense expenses, whether or the investigation ultimately results in an indictment.

 

Disputes over these kinds of legal costs are among the perennial battles in the D&O claims arena. Invariably, policyholders will argue that these expenses were indispensible to their post-indictment defenses, or even that they helped avert an indictment. Further complicating these discussions is the fact that these expenses associated with the pre-indictment criminal investigation often are being incurred at the same time that the company is also incurring legal expense in connection with an SEC investigation and also separate civil litigation. These various proceedings may be covered in whole or in part under the policy.

 

Because all of these various legal matters are going forward simultaneously and usually pertain to a single set of circumstances, sorting out which legal expenses relate to which proceeding (and therefore which expenses are covered under the policy) can become a vexing problem and source of tension between the policyholder and the carrier.

 

Exacerbating these problems is the fact that among all these proceedings, the criminal matter usually looms the largest and therefore may consume the larges amount of legal effort and expense. This is particularly true if, as is often the case, the individuals involved each retain separate counsel. The potentially massive expense associated with the criminal investigation underscores why these issues can be so critical.

 

In light of these considerations, the article offers some practical suggestions. Bronte notes:

 

Brokers and risk managers should press for "claim" definitions and coverage limits that adequately protect the corporate entity from the expense of criminal investigations, which almost inevitably involve multiple teams of lawyers defending the corporation and its employees.

 

In that regard, many D&O insurers now include within the definition of the term "claim" not only a reference to post-indictment (or post-information) criminal proceedings, but also a separate explicit reference to "investigations" (including criminal investigations), usually delimited in some way around the requirement for the naming of an insured person as a target of a possible indictment. The precise wording of the definitional provisions relating to "investigations" potentially could be critical.

 

In addition, at least one major carrier now has a form that removes any reference to an indictment requirement, and instead refers simply to "criminal proceedings." The removal of the indictment requirement, together with the reference to "proceedings," at least potentially opens the door to coverage for grand jury investigations, subpoenas, and other matters. While this alternative wording is not universally or even widely available, it does present an alternative for consideration.

 

The article also notes, in connection with efforts to secure coverage for criminal proceedings that "policyholders do not advance their position if they or their brokers characterize the criminal investigation as merely a ‘potential claim.’" An alternative possibility is to refer to the matters involved as a claim, or, in the alternative, a potential claim.

 

The article correctly points out that "the high cost of defending against accusations of criminal wrongdoing is one of the reasons that corporations purchase D&O insurance." Nevertheless, the extent of coverage for criminal proceedings remains one of the perennially disputed claims issues. The further development of D&O policy wordings that better address policyholder expectations is a continuing challenge for the D&O insurance industry and one on which there are fruitful areas for further discussion.

 

More About NERA’s Year-End Securities Litigation Study: In a prior post (here), I linked to NERA Economic Consulting’s year-end report on 2008 securities litigation activity. (The report itself can be found here). In a December 19, 2008 post (here), the Securities Docket has an interesting interview with the report’s authors, my good friends Stephanie Plancich and Svetlana Starykh. Among other things, the interview quotes the authors as saying, with respect to their projections for litigation activity in 2009:

While our paper does not forecast trends into the next year, our best guess is that filing activity will remain high into 2009. As mentioned above, there have been a number of new filings in late December — traditionally a slow time for litigation activity — indicating that the rate of filings has yet to decrease.

And while the first credit crisis cases were concentrated in the financial industry, there has been an emerging trend of credit crisis- and recession-related filings emerge outside of the financial sector.

 

Ghost of Christmas Preset, 2008 Version: With apologies to Charles Dickens, I excerpt below an imagined version of his holiday classic, updated for current circumstances. We can only hope that the Ghost of Christmases Yet-to-Come bears happier tidings. 

 

And taking Scrooge by the arm, the Spirit lifted him high above the financial landscape. Below him, Scrooge could see a parade of spectacles he scarcely could have imagined: the largest bank failure ever; the largest bankruptcy ever; the largest government bailout; the collapse of the housing market and the near-collapse of the entire financial system. 

"Spirit!" said Scrooge. "Show me no more! Conduct me home. Why do you delight to torture me?"

"One Shadow More!" exclaimed the Ghost.

And below, in the mist, Scrooge could see an avuncular man. Oddly and incongruously, the man wore a baseball cap. 

"Who is that man, Spirit?" Scrooge asked.

"Those who used to think of themselves as his friends called him ‘Bernie’" the Spirit said.

"No more!" cried Scrooge. "No more, I don’t wish to see it. Show me no more!"

 

Break in the Action: I think we could all use a break. I will discontinue my regular publishing schedule for the next few days. Regular publication will resume after the New Year.

 

D&O Insurance: Inadequate Consideration Exclusion Bars Coverage

A December 15, 2008 opinion (here) in a Delaware bankruptcy court adversary proceeding provides a rare judicial interpretation of an "inadequate consideration" exclusion in a D&O insurance policy. I have reproduced with permission below a summary of the case prepared by the Wiley Rein law firm, followed by my own brief commentary. The firm’s case summary, which appears in the indented text below, can also be found here.

 

Case Summary

A federal bankruptcy court, applying New York law, has dismissed an adversary proceeding brought by a bankrupt home mortgage company against its directors and officers liability insurers, holding that coverage for a pre-petition lawsuit against the mortgage company was barred by application of an "inadequate consideration" exclusion. Delta Fin. Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., Case No. 07-11880 (CSS) (Jointly Administered) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 15, 2008).  The court also held that the coverage dispute was a non-core proceeding.  Wiley Rein LLP represented one of the insurers in this case.



The underlying lawsuit arose from the mortgage company’s 2001 restructuring transaction.  In connection with that transaction, the mortgage company allegedly first convinced its unsecured and senior secured note holders to surrender their notes to a newly-formed holding company for which the note holders were granted certain interests in the holding company.  Next, the holding company returned the senior notes to the mortgage company, and, in exchange, the mortgage company transferred excess "cash flow certificates" to the holding company.  The mortgage company and the holding company intended that value of the exchanged senior notes and cash flow certificates would each be approximately $153 million.



In 2003, the former note holders filed suit against the mortgage company and its directors and officers alleging that, at the time of the restructuring transaction, the cash flow certificates had an actual fair market value of only $43 million.  The plaintiffs ultimately asserted eight causes of action against the defendants concerning various aspects of the restructuring transaction.  The mortgage company tendered the suit to its directors and officers liability insurers, and the primary insurer denied coverage based in part on the inadequate consideration exclusion.  In 2007, the mortgage company filed for Chapter 11 and brought an adversary proceeding against the insurers seeking damages and a declaratory judgment that the insurers were obligated to advance defense costs and provide indemnification for the underlying lawsuit.



In considering the insurers’ motions to dismiss, the bankruptcy court focused on the primary policy’s inadequate consideration exclusion, which provided that "[t]he insurer shall not be liable for Loss on account of any Claim made against any Insured: . . . based upon, arising out of, or attributable to the actual or proposed payment by the Company of allegedly inadequate or excessive consideration in connection with the Company’s purchase of securities issued by any company."  Noting that New York courts rely on a "but for" causation test to interpret insurance exclusions with "arising from" lead-in language, the bankruptcy court conducted a three-part analysis to determine whether the pre-petition lawsuit was excluded by the inadequate consideration exclusion. 

 

First, the bankruptcy court noted that each of the plaintiffs’ eight causes of action sought damages related to the harm caused by the alleged difference between the senior notes, worth $153 million, and the cash flow certificates, worth $110 million less. 

 

Second, the bankruptcy court determined that this harm would not have existed "but for" the restructuring transaction, and, thus, the restructuring transaction was the "operative act." 

 

Finally, the bankruptcy court concluded that the operative act was explicitly encompassed by the inadequate consideration exclusion because the restructuring transaction involved an "actual payment" by the mortgage company of "inadequate consideration"—the cash flow certificates—in connection with the mortgage company’s purchase of "securities issued by any company"—in this case, its own senior notes.  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court determined that the exclusion barred coverage for the underlying complaint in its entirety.  As a result of that determination, the court did not reach the insurers’ other argument that the amount at issue in the underlying case did not constitute "Loss" as defined by the policies.



After concluding that all of the mortgage company’s claims in the adversary proceeding were barred by the inadequate consideration exclusion, the bankruptcy court rejected the mortgage company’s waiver and estoppel arguments, which were based on the passage of 18 months before the primary insurer denied coverage.  The bankruptcy court noted that, under New York law, an insurer could not waive a defense to coverage, and the mortgage company had failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating its reliance on the failure to issue a coverage position.  Finally, relying on the reasoning in In re Stone & Webster, Inc., 367 B.R. 523 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007), the bankruptcy court agreed with the insurers that the adversary proceeding was a non-core proceeding.

 

Commentary

In recent years, it has become increasingly common for D&O carriers to issue policies containing "inadequate consideration" exclusions, or as they are sometimes known, "bump up" exclusions. Carriers designed these exclusions to address disputes that sometimes arise in connection with merger objection lawsuits.

 

These kinds of lawsuits routinely emerge after the announcement of a merger or acquisition. Invariably, plaintiffs’ attorneys file a lawsuit claiming that the acquired company’s shareholders were receiving inadequate consideration for their shares in the acquired company. These lawsuits sometimes end with the defendant acquirer agreeing to pay some additional consideration. The acquirers then sometimes try to pass these increased acquisition costs to the D&O insurers. The carriers object to paying amounts that they contended was merely a transaction cost and did not "loss" as a result of a wrongful act.

 

In order to try to avoid disputes over these increased consideration, or "bump up," amounts, some carriers have attempted to insert exclusions for "inadequate consideration" claims into their policies. These kinds of provisions are not always included in D&O policies, nor is the wording in the various exclusions used in the marketplace uniform. In addition, there is very little case law interpreting these kinds of provisions.

 

The Delta Financial decision highlights a number of noteworthy aspects of the particular exclusion language used in the applicable policy that may be important in connection with the wording of these kinds of exclusions.

 

First, it is important to note that the allegations of inadequate consideration were made in connection with the company’s acquisition of its own securities, rather than those of another company. The court’s ruling certainly underscores the significance of the exclusion’s use of the word "any" in the phrase "the securities issued by any company," as opposed to, for example, the possible alternative use of the word "another." Had the exclusion used the word "another" rather than "any," the outcome could well have been different.

 

Although it was not relevant in the context of this particular dispute, the exclusion’s reference only to "securities" also highlights the possible outcome determinative impact in other situations if the exclusion were also to refer to "assets of" in addition to the "securities issued by" any company. The exclusion’s reference only to securities, as opposed to both securities as well as assets, is narrower, as a result of which the exclusion would, in this respect at least, have a narrower preclusive effect.

 

Many readers undoubtedly noted that this case arose out of the bankruptcy of a residential mortgage origination and servicing company that funded its lending operations by selling interests in securitized pools of mortgages, a business pattern that is not unfamiliar these days (nor indeed is the bankruptcy itself unfamiliar these days). The procedural context, and perhaps even the substantive dispute, may presage a host of disputes that may lie ahead in connection with the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave.

 

In any event, the outcome of the coverage dispute underscores a point that I have made many times in the past on this blog—that is, the critical importance of policy wording.

 

Very special thanks to Dan Standish of the Wiley Rein firm for providing a copy of the Delta Financial opinion and for allowing me to reproduce his firm’s case summary.

 

D&O Insurance: New York Regulator Decrees D&O Duty to Defend

In a deeply troublesome decision, the New York Department of Insurance has issued an October 16, 2008 opinion (here) stating that "a D&O policy may not include a provision that places the duty to defend upon the insured, rather than the insurer." A December 5, 2008 memo (here) written by Carrie Cope, a partner in the Tressler, Soderstrom Maloney & Preiss law firm, diplomatically but accurately summarizes just how far off base the opinion is.

By way of background, public company D&O insurance as it is uniformly distributed and purchased throughout the entire U.S. marketplace today is written on a duty to indemnify rather than a duty to defend basis. Under this arrangement, the insured persons, rather than the insurer, select their defense counsel, subject to the insurer’s consent, and the insured persons control their defense. The insurer reimburses reasonable defense expense.

Not only is this arrangement the uniform marketplace standard for public company D&O insurance, but it is the clear and unambiguous preference of public company D&O insurance buyers, who want to be able to use their own counsel in matters affecting their personal liability.

This arrangement has also has been approved by state court insurance regulators throughout the country. As Cope’s memo succinctly points out, the New York Insurance Department’s opinion is directly contrary to this well established regulatory record.

Cope also notes that the opinion "fails to address the needs and desires of the Insureds that it seeks to protect." She correctly points out that public company D&O insurance policies are purchased by sophisticated parties represented by risk managers and other specialized insurance professionals who seek to procure the best insurance available for their clients. The terms and conditions are highly negotiated. While virtually every word in the policy is subject to intense scrutiny, no one is trying to insert a duty to defend into their public company D&O insurance policy.

The D&O insurance industry’s uniform adoption of a duty to indemnify approach rather than a duty to defend approach is not the result of some insidious insurance company conspiracy. It is instead exactly what sophisticated and well-advised insurance buyers want.

Cope also correctly points out the opinion’s flawed logic. The opinion seeks to criticize the specific insurance policy addressed in the opinion because it transfers to the insured the burdens of litigation "such as managing, controlling or otherwise overseeing the litigation." As Cope notes, the opinion "fails to recognize that the ability to oversee the litigation is exactly what the typical insured purchasing a public company D&O policy wants." (Emphasis added).

The opinion also criticizes the policy because it does not pay the compensation costs of in-house counsel. Cope correctly notes that even if the policy were a duty to defend policy, it would not cover these costs.

Cope concludes her memo by noting that the opinion, "if not further modified, may well have a chilling effect upon the D&O insurance industry in New York and unduly cause applicants to seek means to obtain coverage they need and want outside the State of New York."

Cope is correct. This opinion is not in anyone’s interests, and in particular it absolutely is not in the interests of any person to be insured under a public company D&O insurance policy. Cope’s memo should be a rallying cry for all industry participants to have this erroneous opinion modified or set aside as soon as possible.

Special thanks to the several readers who sent me copies of Cope’s memo.

D&O Insurance: Policy Wordings, Exclusionary Preambles and Securities Claims

A recent appellate court opinion interpreting a D&O liability insurance policy securities exclusion carries some important reminders both about policy wording precision and about exclusionary language, and also raises some critical questions about the scope of coverage for securities claims generally.

 

In an October 27, 2008 opinion (here), the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, held in the In re SRC Holding Corp. case that there is no coverage under a D&O liability insurance policy containing a securities claims exclusion for claims made against a financial services company and certain of its directors and officer for alleged wrongful acts in connection with the company’s underwriting and sale of certain municipal bonds.

 

Following a description below of the case’s background and the appellate court’s holding, I discuss the implications of the Eighth Circuit’s decision.

 

Background

Between 1996 and 1999, Miller & Schroeder (M&S), a securities underwriter and broker, underwrote and sold $140 million of municipal bonds. The bonds later defaulted and the bond investors initiated lawsuits and arbitration proceedings against M&S and certain of its directors and officers, alleging breaches of federal securities laws and other violations. M&S ultimately went into bankruptcy.

 

M&S’s D&O insurance carrier denied coverage for the claims. The bankruptcy trustee initiated a lawsuit against the D&O insurer alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration of coverage. The individual M&S directors and officers intervened in the trustee’s action.

 

The bankruptcy court held that the policy exclusion on which the insurer relied to deny coverage did not preclude coverage for all of the claims and that the carrier must defend the individuals against all claims. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling and the carrier appealed.

 

The Eighth Circuit’s Decision

On appeal, the carrier argued that the district court erred in finding that the policy required the carrier to provide the directors and officers with defense cost coverage and indemnification for the bond investors’ claims.

 

The carrier relied on Endorsement No. 3 to the policy, which provides that:

 

In consideration of the premium charged, this Policy does not apply to any Claim based on, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from, in consequence of, or in any way involving any actual or alleged violation of:

(1) the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, any other federal law, rule or regulation with respect to the regulation of securities, any rules or regulations of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, or any amendment of such laws, rules or regulations; or

(2) any state securities or "Blue Sky" laws or rules or regulations or any amendment of such laws, rules or regulations; or

(3) any provision of the common law imposing liability in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of securities.

 

The district court held that this exclusion precluded coverage only for M&S’s sale of its own securities, but not otherwise. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied in part on the testimony of the insurance broker who sold the policy, who testified, according to the appeals court, that "this standard-form securities exclusion is typically intended to exclude coverage for liability resulting from the insured’s sale of its own stock."

 

As the appeals court paraphrased the district court’s logic, because the provision had a "typical effect," the meaning of the provision "must accord with that typical effect." The district court said that this was the only interpretation that "makes sense."

 

The appeals court held, however, that the district court erred in relying the broker’s testimony. Because the district court held (correctly in the appellate court’s view) that the provision is unambiguous, it was erroneous as a matter of Minnesota law for the court to rely on extrinsic evidence in interpreting the provision.

 

The Eighth Circuit said that "the effect of [the securities exclusion] as it may be generally applied in practice is not the legal authority that governs our coverage inquiry here; it is the mutually agreed-upon policy’s plain language that binds [the parties] in the first instance." The appeals court noted that

 

Sophisticated business entities who rely on experts to advise them are best suited to determine what makes the most economic sense and the language they have mutually negotiated and agree to is the best evidence of what those parties intended.

 

The appeals court held that the endorsement is "not limited to claims arising out of M&S’s sale of its own securities," as such a limitation "is nowhere to be found in its language."

 

The appeals court also rejected the suggestion that this interpretation was inconsistent with other provisions in the policy.

 

The insureds argued further that in any event coverage for claims against them for alleged violations of NASD rules were not precluded, and therefore that the carrier was obliged to fund the defense, even as to non-NASD proceedings.

 

The appeals court rejected this argument as well, in reliance on the Endorsement No. 3’s broad preamble ("based upon, arising out of, directly or indirectly resulting from, in consequence of, or in any way involving…"), as well as the policy’s provisions broadly treating interrelated matters as a single claim.

 

Because the alleged NASD violations "arise out of, flow from and have their origins in the same set of operative facts" as the claims alleging violations of the securities laws, for which coverage is broadly excluded under the policy, they fall "well within the ‘arising out of’ exclusionary language of Endorsement No. 3."

 

The Wiley Rein law firm, which represented the carrier before the appellate court, has a detailed memorandum here summarizing the Eighth Circuit’s decision is greater detail.

 

Discussion

The Eighth Circuit’s ruling is noteworthy in and of itself, as a federal appellate court decision vigorously holding that insurance policies negotiated between sophisticated parties must be interpreted strictly according to their terms.

 

The opinion also represents a cautionary tale for practitioners in this area, and it is well worth considering more fully in that light.

 

None of my remarks are meant in any way as a criticism of the broker involved. Clearly, the broker’s view of how this policy should operate had a substantial basis, as both the bankruptcy court and the district court adopted the broker’s interpretation.

 

However, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is a harsh reminder that, notwithstanding what the common understanding may be about the meaning or operation of policy provisions, ultimately courts will look at a policy‘s actual language. As the Eighth Circuit’s opinion demonstrates, a court’s policy interpretation may or may not coincide with common understandings or expectations. For practitioners in this area, the appellate court’s ruling underscores that what matters is wording not intent.

 

In addition, the court’s reliance on the breadth of Endorsement No.3’s exclusionary preamble is a reminder of the inclusive nature of this type of omnibus language. The Eighth Circuit found that the use of this broad preamble substantially extended the reach of the provision’s exclusionary effect, which represents its own reminder to practitioners of the critical importance of the way in which policy provisions are framed, particularly policy exclusions.

 

A critical part of the coverage dispute here relates to the fact that the securities violations alleged arose not in connection transactions involving the insured company’s own securities. This aspect of the dispute raises a more general question about how, in the absence of a securities claim exclusion, D&O insurance policies should respond to claims of securities law violations asserted by persons other than the insured company’s own shareholders.

 

There have been some high profile 2008 examples of securities lawsuits filed by persons other than the defendant company’s own shareholders. The numerous auction rate securities claims represent one example. Another example is the securities class action lawsuits filed against, among others, Hexion Specialty Chemical and certain of its directors and officers by shareholders of Huntsman Corporation. The Huntsman shareholders alleged that the Hexion defendants "deceived the investing public regarding Hexion’s efforts and intentions with respect to the merger with Huntsman." (Refer here for further background about the Hexion claim).

 

These recent examples, as well as the M&S case discussed above, underscore the possibility of securities allegations by persons other than a company’s own shareholders. These kinds of claims can arise not only in connection with financial companies, like M&S and the companies involved in the auction rate securities cases, but can also involve non-financial companies, like Hexion.

 

Questions of policy coverage for these types of securities lawsuits potentially could be significant not only in connection with the type of exclusionary language in the M&S case, but also in connection with the definition of "securities claim" found in the typical D&O insurance policy.

 

There are standard formulations for the definition of the term "securities claim." One formulation is oriented toward claims arising under the securities laws and the other is oriented toward claims involving the issuer’s securities or the issuer’s securities holders.

 

Definitions of the term "securities claim" oriented toward the securities laws themselves will extend more broadly without respect to who has asserted a claim and are more likely to encompass securities lawsuits filed by persons other than a company’s own shareholders.

 

Definitions of the term "securities claim" tied to claims involving the company’s own securities, rather than more broadly to claims involving the securities laws generally, could be interpreted more narrowly with respect to securities lawsuits brought by persons other than the company’s own shareholders.

 

All of which begs the question: how should the policies respond to securities lawsuits against insured persons filed by claimants other than the company’s own shareholders? In my view, because these claims allege wrongful acts by persons insured under the policies, they represent precisely the kind of litigation for which the policy should provide coverage. Of course, whether any particular policy will respond to this kind of claim depends on the actual policy language.

 

Financial Collapse: The Board Game: According to a November 28, 2008 Financial Times article entitled "Icelanders Collapse in Laughter" (here), some Icelanders, tapping into their typically "darkly ironic sense of humor" have developed a board game "that takes a grimly comical swipe at the financial crisis that has devastated the economy."

 

Players roll dice and move around the game board while drawing cards that, for example, allow them to buy a private jet or obtain a foreign loan, or perhaps go bust. Icelanders have been suggesting additional content for the cards via the Internet. Among other cards suggested is one reading "Go to demonstrate at parliament, stop to buy some eggs to throw, only to realize that prices have gone up so much you can’t afford them."

 

Credit Crisis Insurance Losses: How Big?

This past week, in conjunction with the PLUS International Conference in San Francisco, the insurance information firm Advisen issued an updated forecast of insurance losses likely to arise from the credit crisis. As reflected in its November 5, 2008 press release (here), Advisen is now estimating aggregate D&O and E&O losses of $9.6 billion, up from the firm’s February 2008 $3.6 billion forecast. The firm also issued separate reports detailing its analysis of D&O losses (refer to report here) and E&O losses (report here).

 

Advisen has not only increased its estimate since February, it has widened the scope of what it is estimating. Thus, for example, the earlier estimate referred only to projected losses from securities class action lawsuits. The most recent estimate includes anticipated losses from derivative lawsuits, governmental investigations and other matters. The more recent forecast includes other items not incorporated into the prior estimate, such as an estimate for defense fees incurred on dismissed claims. For these and other reasons, some caution is advised in comparing the two estimates, as the overall increase in part reflects differences in the estimation process.

 

In addition, Advisen’s aggregate $9.6 billion forecast falls within a broader range of estimated combined D&O and E&O losses of from $6.8 billion to $12.1 billion. The sheer breadth of this range (reflecting a potential swing of as much as $5.3 billion) underscores the continuing difficulty of attempting to quantify the insurance industry’s potential credit crisis-related losses.

 

There are several considerations that make any current attempt to quantify the insurance industry’s credit crisis related exposure particularly challenging.

 

1. What are We Measuring?: Both the credit crisis and the associated litigation have expanded and evolved since the started to emerge in early 2007. Moreover, as a result of the dramatic events that shook the global financial markets in September and October 2008, what began as a subprime meltdown has now become a more generalized downturn affecting the broader economy. As I have emphasized in recent posts (refer here and here), the broader economic turmoil has produced its own associated litigation, and further litigation seems highly likely.

 

Because of these recent developments, it has become increasingly difficult to define with precision what is and what is not "credit crisis-related." The lines defining the category have blurred to the point that it may be difficult to say with any certainty what is being measured. The absence of definitional clarity makes both descriptions and predictions particularly precarious. The very attempt to quantify credit crisis related losses implies a categorical precision that may no longer exist.

 

 

2. Measurement Distortions: Most attempts to describe the credit crisis exposure reference the total number of securities lawsuits. While this total is important, the reality is that the number of lawsuits is greater than the number of companies sued. Several companies have been sued multiple times on behalf of different sets of putative claimants, as the Advisen report duly notes. To the extent the successive lawsuits hit the same insurance program, they are less likely to increase the insurance industry’s overall losses.

 

Moreover, as I discussed here, early returns suggest that the courts have proved skeptical that investor losses in the context of a marketwide meltdown are the result of fraud. It is far too early to generalize from these early returns, but to the extent the courts remain skeptical, the overall potential impact of this litigation could be diminished.

 

In addition, the insurance losses on any particular claim will vary widely depending not only based upon the issues affecting the underlying liability exposure, but also affecting the extent of insurance coverage triggered. Issues such as retentions, program structure, limits availability, as well as overall terms and conditions, could significantly affect the extent to which the payment of insurance proceeds is triggered in any particular claim.

 

As the Advisen report notes, these issues are particularly relevant for claims against companies in the financial sector, as many of these companies carry very large self-insured retentions or have limited their insurance coverage protection solely to Side-A only protection. These coverage-related issues could substantially determine the extent of insured losses in many claims, which in turn could substantially affect the insurance industry’s aggregate exposure.

 

3. The Uncertainty of Events to Come: Any estimate of the insurance industry’s overall credit crisis-related exposure necessarily encompasses not only projections about the lawsuits that have already been filed, but also incorporates assumptions about the number and seriousness of lawsuits yet to be filed. In addition, the estimate also includes certain assumptions about how much longer the new lawsuits will continue to emerge.

 

Advisen suggests that the losses will spread into 2009, reflecting an apparent presumption that the accumulation of lawsuits will run only through 2009. My crystal ball is no better than any one else’s, but my own view is that lawsuits associated with the current economic crisis will continue to emerge for some time to come, and more specifically will continue well beyond the end of 2009. But the critical issues here is that any attempt to estimate the insurance losses entails certain assumptions about the lawsuits yet to come, and the magnitude of the losses estimated will vary materially depending on the assumptions used.

 

The foregoing analysis suggests a number of competing considerations, some of which might imply larger overall insurance losses, some of which cut the other way, and some of which that will have an uncertain impact. For that reason, I think it is particularly difficult to try to estimate the insurance industry’s overall exposure from the credit crisis related litigation. As a result, I have no opinion one way or the other about the accuracy of Advisen’s estimate.

 

That said, I agree with Advisen that the insurance industry’s overall losses are going to be very large, and that whatever the loss projection might have been in February 2008, developments since that time suggest that the number almost certainly has increased. Moreover, as a result of the events in the financial marketplace during September and October 2008, there are increased prospects for further significant losses to continue to accumulate across a wide variety of companies and across a wide variety of industries. There is every possibility that Advisen will find it necessary to increase its estimate in the future.

 

I think the most recent developments in the financial markets may be particularly significant for the insurance industry’s ultimate losses. These events included some enormously significant events, including, for example, the largest bank failure in U.S. history, the bankruptcy of one of the largest investment banks, and the government’s bailout of the largest insurance company. At the same time, commodity prices and currency exchange rates changed direction abruptly and significantly. These and other developments will continue to reverberate through the global economy for months and perhaps years.

 

One of the direct consequences from these developments is that there will be significant additional litigation, and this additional litigation will emerge for some time – as I noted above, the litigation could well continue to emerge beyond the end of 2009. Because of the turmoil in the global financial market, this litigation is widely dispersed across the entire economy. That is, unlike the litigation exposure that prevailed in the early stages of the subprime meltdown and credit crisis, which was concentrated in the financial and real estate sectors, the litigation exposure now ranges across most industries and many companies.

 

Is the D&O Insurance Industry Headed for a Hard Market?: The insurance industry in general has not yet reacted fully to these developments. To be sure, and as fully noted in the Advisen report, companies in the financial sector are now seeing D&O insurance price increases and a more challenging underwriting environment. The Advisen report also suggests, correctly in my view, that there are a variety of factors that potentially could lead to a hardening market ahead, including in particular the losses associated with Hurricane Ike and other catastrophic events, as well as the marketplace disruptions involving AIG and the investment losses that have accumulated at other leading carriers.

 

All of that said, other than with respect to companies in the financial sector, there is little present evidence of a market turn. For most companies, conditions remain competitive, and both pricing and available terms and conditions remain attractive.

 

A harder market may well lie ahead, as Advisen suggests. The question is how far ahead. I doubt companies generally will experience a hard D&O insurance market until insurers are reporting substantial calendar year losses across their D&O portfolio.

 

The Advisen report suggests that the credit crisis-related losses will be spread "across 2007, 2008 and 2009." However a close reading of the Advisen reports reveals that Advisen is referencing "accident years" not "calendar years." Losses associated with claims in a particular accident year may not be fully developed until years later. An insurer recognizes a loss only when the claim is paid or a reserve against the ultimate amount is finally established. The calendar year in which the loss is finally recognized may be years after the accident year in which the claim first arose. The lag time to the ultimate loss in the professional liability insurance lines can be as long as three years or more. The lag time creates a risk (all too often realized) of loss underreporting.

 

Another danger of the lag time is the possibility that carriers may misunderstand their own loss experience, which could produce a mismatch between the risks assumed and the pricing charged. Exacerbating this concern is the insurers’ delayed recognition that the litigation threat from the evolving credit crisis has spread to the larger economy. Simply put, current pricing may not reflect the existing litigation exposure.

 

The interaction of these factors suggests the possibility that the arrival of the harder market could be delayed but could be even more disruptive when it arrives. The carriers that are the slowest to recognize the changed circumstances will be the ones that experience the most disruptive impact.

 

Of course, to the extent that AIG’s travails and other carrier’s investment portfolio woes produce a shortage of insurance capacity, the hard market’s arrival could be accelerated. But my own view is that predictions of a hard market for D&O insurance could be premature until the insurers begin to recognize serious calendar year losses in the professional liability lines.

 

More Bank Closures: In what has become a regular Friday night ritual, after the close of business on Friday November 7, 2008, the FDIC announced the closure of two more banks.

 

First, the FDIC announced (here) that state regulators had seized and the FDIC had been appointed the receiver of Franklin Bank of Houston Texas. Second, the FDIC also announced (here) that it had been appointed receiver of Security Pacific Bank of Los Angeles, California, after the bank was closed by state banking authorities.

 

These two bank closures represent respectively the eighteenth and nineteenth bank closures so far during 2008. The FDIC’s complete list of bank closures during the period October 1, 2000 through the present can be found here. Of the 19 bank closures year to date, thirteen have occurred since July 1, 2008. Moreover, after the close of business for the past four Fridays in a row, the FDIC has announced at least one bank closure.

 

The year to date number of bank closures already represents that highest annual total since 1993, at the tail end of the last era of failed banks. More to the point, the pace of bank closures, which has increased in the second half of 2008, has accelerated over the past four weeks.

 

For anyone who remembers the last era of failed banks, these bank closures represent a particularly ominous sign. They also represent one more reason why I believe that the turmoil from the credit crisis, and associated litigation, will continue for some time to come.

 

D&O Insurance: More about Defense Expense and Limits Adequacy

For many companies, one of the most challenging parts of the Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance procurement process is determining how much insurance to purchase. Against a backdrop of basic affordability, the company must consider complex issues such as limits adequacy – that is, how much insurance is enough?

 

Determining limits adequacy is even more challenging in light of today’s escalating claims severity. Recent developments underscore the fact that in addition to rising settlement levels, growing defense expense is an increasingly important part of the limits adequacy analysis.

 

 

In the September 2008 issue of InSights (here), I review recent D&O claims defense expense developments and consider their ramifications for purposes of both limits selection and insurance program structure. The article concludes with a brief review of claims management implications arising from these defense expense issues.

Point/Counterpoint: Insurance Coverage for Section 11 Settlements

One of the most closely followed recent case developments in the D&O insurance arena is the ruling in the CNL Hotels & Resorts case that a Section 11 settlement did not represent covered loss under a D&O insurance policy. As I noted in a recent post (here), on August 18, 2008, the CNL Hotels & Resorts holding was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. These developments have occasioned a great deal of discussion and commentary in the D&O insurance community.

 

Among the more noteworthy commentary on this topic is the analysis of the well-known and widely respected D&O insurance coverage attorney, Joe Monteleone of the Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Preiss law firm. Joe’s commentary appeared in his firm’s August 2008 Specialty Lines Advisory (here, at page 2). As always, I found Joe’s analysis interesting, but I also found that I disagreed with him on a portion of his analysis.

 

Because I thought an exchange of views on these topics would be useful and perhaps even entertaining, I approached Joe to determine his willingness to engage in a colloquy on this topic to be reproduced on this site. Joe agreed, and our exchange follows below. First, I have quoted a portion of Joe’s article, which is followed by my comments on his article. Joe’s rebuttal appears after my comments.

 

Joe's Article (Extract):

In his commentary, Joe wrote the following with respect to the CNL Hotels & Resorts case (and cases with similar holdings): 

 

When you cover the entity for its Section 11 loss, you are in effect saying that your IPO was overpriced by perhaps tens of millions of dollars. While not saying that it is OK, what you are saying is we will let the insurer step in and pay that loss and the corporation can keep its ill-gotten gain. How is that any different than a company simply refusing to pay for goods it has ordered and then letting its insurer pay when it is sued for a breach of its contract to pay? Insurance may cover negligent and even reckless misconduct, but it should not cover crooked behavior.

  Kevin's Comments:

 

In his article, Joe makes a number of valid and interesting points, particularly with respect to the history of these issues. However, underlying Joe’s legal analysis is a series of value judgments. It seems to me that these value judgments misapprehend several critical considerations. I have set out these critical considerations below. In doing so, I also recognize that courts may have disfavored several of my arguments; readers will judge for themselves whether it is legitimate for me to reference these judicially disfavored points here

 

The first important consideration is that while companies that are the target of Section 11 claims may be alleged to have made all sorts of misrepresentations or omissions, these allegations are virtually never put to the test of proof. The mere fact that plaintiffs allege that offering documents contained supposed misrepresentations does not mean that the offering proceeds were in fact "ill-gotten." These kinds of claims, like all claims, are compromised because of the burdens and expense of litigation and because few are willing to accept the risk of an adverse verdict.

 

Nor does the fact that substantial sums are paid to compromise these claims, in and of itself, mean that the defendants company’s IPO was overpriced, much less that the company engaged in "crooked behavior." These settlements take place after the company has experienced a significant stock price drop. Compromising claims in the context of significant market capitalization losses can prove costly, but entry into even a costly settlement is far different than a determination of culpability or wrongdoing.

 

But I have even deeper concerns beyond just the fact that a settlement does not in and of itself betoken that a company’s IPO was "overpriced" or that the company is improperly keeping "ill-gotten gains." The fact is that the use of heavily freighted words such as "ill-gotten" and "crooked" are fundamentally misplaced in connection with alleged corporate liability in a Section 11 claim.

 

Under well-established legal principles, corporations are said to be "strictly liable" under Section 11 for material misrepresentations and omissions in offering documents. There is no element of fraud or scienter required in a Section 11 claim, and indeed plaintiffs pleading claims under Section 11 now routinely state (as a means of averting onerous pleading requirements) that they are not alleging or averring fraud in relation to these claims. The point is that in general not even the plaintiffs asserting the claims against these companies allege that the companies engaged in "crooked behavior."

 

In his article, Joe concedes that insurance properly can be paid for behavior that is merely negligent or even for behavior that is reckless. How then is it appropriate to withhold insurance benefits from companies who can be found liable without any fault at all?
 

 

I know that the district court in the CNL Hotels & Resorts case said that the absence of fraud allegations in Section 11 claims represents "distinction without a difference." But the absence of allegations of knowing or reckless misconduct does matter, deeply. The use of acutely pejorative words – that are completely unwarranted given the strict liability standard for corporate liability under Section 11 -- has the effect of demonizing the company and putting it the position of moral error. The danger is that it is easier to withhold insurance benefits from a "bad" company. The use of these morally freighted words not only inappropriately shapes the tone of the dialog but potentially enables an unjustified result.

 

Moreover, even if a Section 11 claimant should allege fraud or dishonesty, the typical D&O policy’s fraud exclusion ensures that insurers do not have to pay benefits for "crooked behavior." But here’s the thing about the fraud exclusion – at least as worded in most current policies, it is only triggered after an adjudication of fraud. The fraud exclusion is no barrier to the payment of insurance benefits to fund settlements of claims alleging fraud.

 

Indeed, insurance companies regularly fund Section 10(b) claim settlements, notwithstanding allegations of fraudulent misconduct. Surely Joe is not suggesting that insurers cannot properly fund Section 10(b) settlements? And if Section 10(b) settlements properly can be funded because there has been no adjudication of fraud, why can insurers withhold payment of insurance benefits from Section 11 benefits in the absence of an adjudication of fraud, merely because of unproven allegations of "ill-gotten gains" or even "crooked behavior"?

 

An August 25, 2008 New York Law Journal article by Joshua Sohn of the DLA Piper law firm entitled "Liable Until Proven Innocent" (here) decries the leniency of Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) pleading requirements. Among other things, Sohn quotes the Supreme Court’s recent Twombley opinion to assert that lenient Section 11 and 12(a)(2) pleading standards will continue to "push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases."

 

The lenient pleading standards make IPO companies that experience sharp stock price drops likely targets for Section 11 claims. The leniency of the Section 11 liability standards also means that the lawsuits are likely to survive preliminary motions, leaving defendant companies few options other than settling. Because of this heightened susceptibility to dangerous litigation, companies about to conduct an IPO are particularly sensitive to the need for D&O insurance.

 

An IPO company is generally regarded as an attractive insurance prospect, and many insurers compete actively to write the insurance for IPO companies. The confounding thing is that insurers that actively competed for the business and voluntarily undertook to insure an IPO company would later contend that the most likely and most dangerous claim the company would face is uninsurable. Whether or not this coverage position makes the insurance agreement illusory, it certainly raises serious concerns about the utility of the insurance agreement.

 

It will be argued that public policy prohibits insurance for corporate Section 11 liability because the relief sought is restitutionary in nature. As a general matter, the determination of private contractual matters based on public policy grounds raises certain fundamental question about the sources and uses of law. One particular concern is that the supposed requirements of public policy lack a definite point of reference and could become simply a matter of perspective. The notion than insurance for Section 11 claims is against public policy is neither inherent nor absolute, and indeed is an issue on which pertinent parties take a point of view different than followed in recent case law.

 

The SEC’s perspective is particularly relevant to this public policy question. On the one hand, the SEC takes the position (here) that corporate indemnification for ’33 Act liabilities is "against public policy" and unenforceable. On the other hand, the SEC emphatically does not specify that insurance for ’33 Act liabilities is against public policy. To the contrary, the SEC expressly designates (here) as among the expenses that properly may be charged to the costs of a securities offering the premium charged for insurance "which insures or indemnifies directors or officers against any liability they may incur in connection with the registration, offering or sale of such securities."

 

The SEC’s public policy analysis distinguishes between the indemnification of Section 11 liability and the provision of insurance for Section 11 liabilities. The SEC’s statements suggest that in its view public policy does not prohibit the enforcement of policies insuring against Section 11 liability, by contrast to its indemnification.

 

If nothing else, the SEC’s views ought to suggest that what public policy dictates as far the insurability of Section 11 claims is neither self-evident nor universally held. All of which should raise serious concerns about using judicially declared principles of supposed public policy to determine private contractual rights.

 

It was a nearly universal reaction among both D&O underwriters and brokers that this line of case law produced a result that, while perhaps perfectly logical to an insurance lawyer, ran absolutely contrary to marketplace understanding and commercial expectations. It is worth considering that both underwriters (the ones who sell insurance) and brokers (the ones who procure insurance on behalf of insurance buyers) universally agree that D&O policies should cover these kinds of settlements.

 

In response to these concerns, the entire D&O insurance industry has taken steps, as quickly and as vigorously as any insurance-related industry has ever done anything, to try to insert policy language calculated to prevent lawyers from making arguments that while perhaps logical to the lawyers defy the expectations and understandings of the commercial marketplace. The marketplace understands that the compromise of disputed Section 11 claims in no way means that a company has engaged in "crooked behavior" and in fact represents the very contingency for which policyholders buy insurance.

 

Joe's Counterpoints:

Kevin’s repeated admonishments for my use of the term "crooked behavior" call to mind Judge Posner’s words in the Level 3 decision, a case that perhaps more than any other establishes the public policy rationale relied upon by the CNL Resorts courts.

   

 

An insured incurs no loss within the meaning of the insurance contract by being compelled to return property that it had stolen, even if a more polite word than ‘stolen’ is used to characterize the claim for the property’s return.

 

 

 

Taking a cue from Judge Posner, I should have refrained from use of the pejorative term "crooked", and I regret any possible inadvertently implied mischaracterization of the motive of the corporate issuer in CNL Resorts or other cases.

 

Nonetheless, I will now "politely" set forth a number of rebuttal points.

 

First, I believe the fact that the underlying CNL Resorts litigation, like many other similar litigations, concluded with a settlement and, hence, no evidentiary proof of ill-gotten gain, misses the point of these insurance coverage cases. Regardless of the culpability of the conduct, there could be no liability of the issuer unless the offering was in fact overpriced. To have an insurer pay the amount of the overpricing, rather than have the issuer disgorge it uninsured, results in an unentitled windfall to the issuer.

 

That being said, I share Kevin’s observation of the irony that in these cases of what is in essence strict liability there can be no insurance recovery, but yet insurers routinely pay to cover liabilities resulting from reckless conduct in other securities cases. Ironic, yes, but it is supportive of the point that culpability of conduct is not the issue.

 

Also, I would agree that in most of these cases that are disposed via settlement, the insurer cannot apply one or both of its "conduct exclusions", which with increasing frequency in today’s insurance market are written with requirements of a final adjudication in the underlying proceeding. That may hold true for both the dishonesty exclusion and that for personal profit. The latter would arguably apply to preclude coverage for these settlements, but for an adjudication requirement, and in addition to the uninsurability reasoning of the courts in applying the law and public policy.

 

By no means do these decisions render the insurance agreement illusory, because none of them have applied the uninsurability argument to the individual directors and officers defendants. Thus, in most cases, an allocation should result, but certainly not a complete absence of coverage for all defendants. Although the court in the SR International decision enunciated a public policy argument of having the insurers stand behind the way they market their policies, that was in the context of a dispute over coverage for an underwriter defendant. There is little argument that an underwriter does not receive the proceeds of the offering, and thus its settlement payment cannot be fairly characterized as a disgorgement of ill-gotten gain. Nevertheless, the public policy arguments in that decision give a degree of validity and support to those D&O insurers who have voluntarily attempted to underwrite around the issue by endorsement, notwithstanding what may be the law now in some jurisdictions.

 

I do not want to belabor the seeming contrast between the SEC’s views on indemnification vs. insurance, but I believe the SEC may well not be inclined to enforce an indemnification prohibition in a settlement context where arguably no Section 11 "liability" has been established.

 

Finally, I must raise a bit of skepticism at Kevin’s conclusion that insurance underwriters and brokers are in universal accord as to providing "full" coverage for a Section 11 settlement, and that the debate remains only an arcane one among the wonks in the insurance coverage bar. I cannot speak for any particular insurer on this, but it appears at least some were vigorously contesting this issue before the Eleventh Circuit until its decision last month in CNL Resorts. Yes, the endorsements and new policy language purporting to clarify and grant the coverage are frequently seen in today’s market (and, in full disclosure, I have even crafted some of the endorsements and policy language at the request of clients), but I remain reluctant to concede the approach is universal.

 

Afterword: Consistent with the rules of engagement that I established for this colloquy, Joe gets the last word, so I will offer no surrebuttal. I would like to thank Joe for his willingness to engage on this topic and to offer his views. I would also like to invite readers to chime in on the debate using the blog’s comment feature. (Please note that you can add a comment without providing identifying information, so it possible to add comments anonymously.)

 

A Closer Look at the Fed's $85 Billion AIG Bailout

In a statement issued on Tuesday evening (here), the Federal Reserve announced that it had authorized a loan of up to $85 billion to American International Group. This move is described in detail in a September 17, 2008 Wall Street Journal article entitled "U.S. to Take Over AIG in a $85 Billion Bailout" (here). Bloomberg’s article describing the development can be found here.

 

The Outlines of the Loan Facility

The loan facility, which the statement says has been extended pursuant to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, has been "designed to protect the interests of the U.S. government and taxpayers." According to the Real Time Economics blog (here), the only other time this specific Fed power has been exercised since the Depression era was in connection with the Bear Stearns bailout.

 

The Fed statement says that it exercised its authority because of adverse economic effects that would follow from a "disorderly failure" of AIG. The loan facility is designed to permit AIG to "meet obligations" in order to "facilitate a process under which AIG will sell certain of its businesses in an orderly manner."

 

The facility has a 24-month term. The interest rate is set at three month LIBOR plus 850 basis points. Three month LIBOR is a variable rate that resets weekly. The current weekly rate (here) is 2.81%, so the current interest rate on this loan facility is 11.31% -- pretty hefty. Just keep in mind that annual (simple) interest of 11.31% on $1 billion is $113.1 million. On $10 billion it is $1.131 billion. And on $85 billion it is $9.61 billion.

 

The loan is collateralized by all of the assets of AIG and of its non-regulated subsidiaries. (The good news here is that the assets of the regulated subsidiaries – the insurance companies – are off limits.) The loan is to be repaid from asset sale proceeds.

 

According to the Fed statement, the government "will receive a 79.9% equity interest" in AIG, with the right to veto dividends to common and preferred shareholders.

 

The size of the facility presumably was set to accommodate all likely requirements, so AIG may or may not draw down all of it. But AIG will most likely draw down a very large part of it. AIG will have to repay its borrowings (plus interest). In referring to the means of repayment, the press release refers to the orderly sale of "businesses," so one can assume that the non-core subsidiaries are on the blocks for an "orderly" sale.

 

Questions about the Loan Facility

The problem for AIG is that sale of its non-core subsidiaries alone may not be sufficient to pay back even half of $85 billion. The Deal Journal blog estimates (here) that sales of AIG’s non-core subsidiaries and minority interests might raise "as much as $42 billion" – and that, I might add, is before taxes. (I think Uncle Sam will insist on the payment of all applicable taxes.) Which raises the question whether the sale of "businesses" specifically contemplates the sale of some or all of AIG’s core insurance operations?

 

Left unanswered in the Fed press release is the question of what this development means for AIG’s continuing business operations. The primary goal of the Fed facility is the orderly sale (as opposed to the "disorderly failure," as the Fed statement put it) of AIG’s businesses. What does this imply about the future of AIG’s operating companies? And what will be left of AIG after the "orderly sale"?

 

Presumably, the answers to many of these questions will become apparent in the days ahead. In the meantime, there are some things that everyone will want to know. I have posed some of these questions below. Please note that many of these questions may simply be a reflection of the limited amount of information currently available. Many of these questions may appear simple-minded once the information is known. But based on what we know so far, here are the other things we still need to know:

 

1. Who will run the company? Is current senior management to remain in place, or will AIG get its third CEO this year? (For the record, the government did embed new management at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as part of the recent takeover.). How about the Board of Directors, will they also be replaced?

 

UPDATE: The New York Times reports (here) that AIG CEO Robert Willumstad will be replaced by Edward M. Liddy, the former chairman of Allstate Corporation.

 

2. What exactly does government ownership of 79.9% of the company equity mean? Is this just a shorthand way of saying that the government is entitled roughly 80% of any later liquidation? Or is there more to it than that?

 

For example, does the government want the value of its ownership interest to grow? What will the government ultimately do with its ownership interest? Will the government sell its interest, and if so, when, to whom, for what price, and under what circumstance? Why is the government now the majority owner of a major insurance company? Does the government want its insurance company to compete and succeed in a competitive marketplace against investor owned insurance companies?

 

3. The government wants to get repaid, so it wants the "orderly sale" of the businesses to produce sales values sufficient to effect repayment. That implies that the operating companies should continue operating. But among the insurance companies, for example, there are many practical questions that only active and engaged management can decide – risk appetite, level of pricing aggressiveness, extent of reinsurance, limit exposures, prohibited classes, and so on. All of these decisions must now take place under potentially unusual conditions, in effect under the supervision of a government appointed caretaker/liquidator?

 

4. What impact will these developments have on credit ratings, both at the parent company level and at the insurance subsidiary level? The fact the company’s primary mission now seems to be a slow-motion liquidation is clearly a relevant factor, as are the unusual operating conditions. In addition, I would expect that all of AIG’s other debt is subordinate to the Fed loan, which also seems relevant to financial strength ratings.

 

5. What happens if $85 billion is not enough? This is not as absurd of a question as it might seem at first glance. Keep in mind that AIG just raised $20 billion in the second quarter and that clearly was not enough. What does the current lending facility imply about the future – for AIG, for taxpayers, for the economy?

 

6. What about the credit rating for the U.S. government? How far can this go? The U.S. government just assumed responsibility for $5 trillion in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt. When do we start to get concerned about the government’s balance sheet? When do we start to get concerned about the ability of the U.S. to meet of all of its obligations?

 

Policyholders’ Interests

Finally, I must address the interests of policyholders. On Tuesday, AIG released a statement (here) that its insurance subsidiaries "remain adequately capitalized and fully capable of meeting their obligations to policyholders." Along those lines, it is important to keep in mind that AIG’s current predicament is not the result of insurance losses, so the separately capitalized insurance companies’ ability to meet its obligations essentially remains unchanged.

 

Moreover, the collateral securing the Fed’s lending facility does not include the insurance companies’ assets, so even if the parent company heads south in a big way despite the $85 billion loan, the insurance companies’ existing surplus should remain to address policyholder claims, subject of course to the effects of claims payment.

 

In the days ahead it will be very important to understand how the current operating circumstances will affect the insurance companies and their operations, and in particular whether there are any other implications for policyholder surplus and the insurance companies’ claims paying ability.

 

After the Storm: AIG, Lehman and More

Because of trees felled last night as Ike’s remnants swept through Ohio, I was unable to make it to the office today. I spent more or less the entire day on the telephone talking about AIG, looking out at my yard strewn with fallen tree limbs, branches, twigs and leaves – a visually suitable tableau give the winds that ripped through Wall Street over the last 48 hours.

 

With respect to AIG, can I just say that today’s mainstream media coverage regarding AIG was absolutely terrible? For most of the day, various news reports seemed to suggest that New York insurance regulators had authorized AIG’s insurance subsidiaries to loan the parent company $20 billion. However, when the transcript of New York Governor David Paterson’s Monday afternoon press conference (here) was later made available on the Governor’s website, it became clear that what the regulators had authorized was quite a bit different than depicted in the media.

 

As the transcript explains (if you read the whole thing), the regulators have authorized an "asset swap." The idea is that the insurance subsidiaries are swapping the more liquid assets they hold for less liquid assets of equal or greater value held by the parent company, so that the parent company can post the liquid assets as collateral. The transaction is further explained in a CFO.com article here.

 

The governor himself noted that this swap transaction alone is not sufficient to see AIG through this current crisis, as the working number for AIG’s current requirements is $40 billion. Much about the asset swap transaction "depends" – that is, it depends on the company’s ability to raise the additional funds it requires, it depends on the actual assets that are transferred, it depends on what further capital requirements AIG may have in this rapidly changing environment.

 

The critical question of the sufficiency of policyholder protection in light of the asset swap will depend on the quality of the assets exchanged. One can hope that given what is at stake that there is a great deal of transparency concerning the assets the insurance subsidiaries receive. Given the regulators’ involvement, one can also hope that policyholders’ interests will not be subordinated to the interests of AIG’s shareholders or bondholders.

 

In the final analysis, AIG’s ultimate circumstances may finally depend on what the credit rating agencies do. CNN is reporting tonight (here) that Fitch’s has already downgraded AIG’s financial ratings, which potentially could trigger significant additional collateral requirements on the AIG’s credit default swap contracts, perhaps as much as $13.3 billion. The specifics regarding the Fitch downgrades can be found here. Following suit, S&P has also downgraded AIG's counterparty and financial strength ratings (refer here), with the lowered ratings remaining on credit watch "with negative implications." Apparently the downgrades fully considered the potential benefits to AIG as a result of the asset swap transaction.

 

Perhaps of equally significant (if not greater) concern to readers of this blog is the action this evening by A.M. Best’s to downgrade AIG’s property/casualty insurance financial strength rating to A (Excellent) from A+ (Superior), about which refer here.

 

UPDATE: A September 16, 2008 Financial Times article entitled "Downgrades Deepen AIG Woes" can be found here. Moody's has apparently downgraded AIG as well (refer here).

 

There will be further material developments ahead. The ultimate outcome remains to be seen. The company itself did not publicly comment as these events unfolded today, but some reports suggest that there will be a company statement prior to the opening of the markets tomorrow.

 

About Lehman: At the same time as AIG’s struggles, the details of Lehman’s demise have started to emerge, starting with the company’s Monday morning bankruptcy petition, which can be found here. The Dealbreaker blog has distilled some of the more interesting tidbits from the petition, here.

 

A more scholarly look at the Lehman petition can be found on the Bankruptcy Litigation Blog (here), which notes that the petition bears the indicia of having been prepared in haste. The blog also notes that as a result of recent bankruptcy law revisions, Lehman’s petition may face some rather complicated challenges. (Hat tip to Francis Pileggi of the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog, here, for the link to the Bankruptcy Litigation Blog.)

 

Roger Parloff also discusses on the Legal Pad blog (here) the challenges that Lehman’s petition presents. As statements Parloff quotes on his blog make clear, Lehman may not be able to enjoy one of the primary benefits usually available to company’s filing a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay. Bankruptcy laws relating exclusively to investment banks provide that Lehman’s transaction counterparties can now, even after the petition filing, seek to terminate their contracts with Lehman, which could further exacerbate the current distress.

 

And on another note, CFO.com has an interesting article (here) asking the question whether Lehman’s creditors can try to recoup the $5.7 billion in bonuses that Lehman paid its employees in December 2007.

 

The damage from Lehman’s collapse will be widespread, as investors holding its shares and even its debt securities will likely see little or nothing on their investment. This asset wipeout comes on the heels of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac takeout, and at the same time as the precipitous decline in AIG’s shares. All of this means that in a few short days a significant chunk of asset valuation has disappeared (and that is not even counting the overall decline in market values today). These investment losses are going to hit a lot of other companies, not to mention pensions, mutual funds, hedge funds, other insurance companies, endowment funds and so on. These losses will have to be reckoned in the weeks and months to come.

 

The extent of the consequences from these events may be difficult to foresee even now,  though the events have been widely reported. Who could have foreseen that when Ike came roaring ashore early Saturday morning in Galveston that on Monday morning trees would be down all over Northeast Ohio?

 

For Those Who Can’t Wait: If you are (like me) one of those people who need to know what it all means, you will want to refer to Professor Davidoff’s overview on the Dealbook blog (here). An analysis that takes a darker, more cynical view of these events can be found on The Big Picture blog (here).

 

About the AIG Derivative Settlement

In what is, according to news reports (here), the largest settlement to date in a shareholders’ derivative lawsuit in Delaware Chancery Court, four former AIG executives and former AIG managing general agent C.V. Starr today reached a $115 million settlement in the 2002 AIG derivative lawsuit.

 

The lawsuit was filed by the Teachers’ Retirement System of Louisiana in 2002 against AIG, as nominal defendant; certain former AIG directors and officers (many of whom were later dropped from the case); and Starr.

 

According to news reports (here), the plaintiff alleged that half of the $2 billion AIG paid C.V. Starr between 2000 and 2005 "represented sham commissions for work that, in some cases, was done by AIG employees." The lawsuit also questioned "why some executives were allowed to serve simultaneously as officers of C.V. Starr, a closely held insurance agency, while profiting from business between the two companies." The complaint also alleged that Starr gave the individual defendants bonuses on fees from AIG. In effect the complaint alleged that the commissions were a mechanism for the defendants to "line their pockets."

 

The case was scheduled to go to trial on September 15, 2008. The four settling individual defendants include former AIG Chairman and CEO Maurice Greenberg; former AIG CFO Howard Smith; former Vice Chairman of Investments Edward Matthews; and former director and Vice Chairman of Insurance Thomas Tizzio.

 

The vast bulk of the settlement -- $85.5 million – is to be paid by AIG’s D&O insurance carriers. A list of the carriers on AIG’s D&O program can be found here.

 

The more interesting question is where the remaining $29.5 million will come from. Some of the news reports give the impression that the individuals are funding the settlement. However, it appears that the individuals themselves are funding only a small portion of the remaining $29.5 million.

 

Greenberg’s counsel’s statements to the press (for example, here) are quite emphatic that Greenberg himself will not be contributing anything the settlement. One news report (here) does suggest that Tizzio "is expected to pay between $1 million and $5 million," Smith and Matthews "would pay very small amounts, if anything."

 

It appears that the bulk of the $29.5 million will be paid by C.V. Starr. According to Greenberg’s counsel, Starr "expects to contribute between $20 million and $30 million."

 

The details about who will be paying what seem surprisingly imprecise. In particular, the wide potential variance in Tizzio’s contributions seem odd to me, as even a wealthy individual generally would require a more precise determination of how many millions of his dollars are going to be required. Which makes me wonder whether perhaps Tizzio has an individual source of insurance that may be contributing on his behalf.

 

There are a variety of other odd features to this settlement, at least as it is described in the news reports, the most striking of which is that Tizzio apparently will be making a material settlement contribution but apparently Greenberg will not. To be sure, C.V. Starr, of which Greenberg is still Chairman and CEO, will be making a more than $20 million contribution, raising the question whether the amount of Starr’s contribution and the fact that Greenberg himself is not contributing to the settlement are linked.

 

And even with respect to C.V. Starr’s contribution, certain questions arise. For example, given the fact that some or all of the individual defendants apparently were also officers of C.V. Starr, is Starr’s D&O carrier funding some or all of Starr’s contribution to the settlement?

 

It should also be noted with respect to Starr’s payment to AIG that Starr is in fact AIG’s largest shareholder. As of July 15, 2008, Starr owned 10.5% of AIG’s outstanding shares, which represents Starr’s largest asset. Maybe that is just context, but it is an interesting context nonetheless.

 

I also have questions concerning the $85.5 million contribution from AIG’s D&O carriers. Beyond sheer curiosity about how much of AIG’s D&O insurance tower was depleted by defense expense, I also wonder whether the insurer’s settlement contribution to this derivative settlement drew upon the insurance program’s Side A coverage, which provides protection for nonindemnifiable loss. You would not expect the $85.5 million payment to AIG to be indemnifiable in the absence of insurance, so all else equal the amount would seem to represent a Side A loss. The same would also seem to be true with respect to the individuals’ own separate contribution to the settlement.

 

My question about which D&O policy coverage funded the settlement may require some context. Given the size of this derivative settlement, as well as other recent large derivative settlements (including, for example, the $50 million Hollinger derivative settlement), there seems to be a growing threat of very large derivative settlements, which is a relatively new development.

 

Many companies, particularly large financial services companies, often have D&O insurance programs built exclusively or predominantly of Side A-only protection. These kinds of programs have become increasingly common in recent years, but in general losses have really not yet caught up to this coverage to a significant degree.

 

The options backdating derivative cases presented the possibility of significant potential losses for these types of coverages, but it is my understanding that the Side A-only losses from these cases really have not yet significantly materialized. There has been speculation that the subprime litigation wave might also produce significant Side A losses, but those cases are only in their earliest stages yet, so the losses have yet to fully develop.

 

The possibility of derivative settlements of the magnitude of the recent AIG settlement may represent the most significant threat to these Side A programs and coverages, at least outside of the bankruptcy context. Which is why I am curious to know which policy coverage funded the AIG D&O insurers’ portion of the AIG settlement.

 

Finally, I am curious about how likely coverage issues were dealt with in connection with this settlement. I expect that the insurers would have raised the personal profit exclusion typically found in most D&O policies as at least a potential defense to coverage. I am guessing that the existence of this issue complicated the settlement process (or at least the insurers’ contribution to the settlement). The absence of a judicial determination that the individuals had improperly profited undoubtedly ameliorated this potential impediment. The individuals' desire to avoid any determination that might preclude coverage may have helped precipitate settlement on the eve of trial.

 

As always, I am interested if any readers can shed any light on the details. I am particularly interested details involved with the individuals’ contributions; around the extent of insurance funding for C.V. Starr’s contribution; and concerning AIG’s insurers’ contributions. Anonymity will be scrupulously protected.

 

What to Watch Now in the World of D&O

Each fall for the last two years, I have taken a look at the current trends and hot topics in the world of D&O. There are of course certain perennial topics that are always critical, but this overview is intended  to focus on the issues the most significant current interest for D&O insurance professionals and their clients. Here is my list of the current issues to watch:

 

1. Limits Adequacy: The question of limits adequacy has long been one of the more challenging parts of the D&O acquisition process. Against a backdrop of basic affordability, the company must try to determine how much insurance is "enough"?

 

Several recent developments have surrounded these issues with even greater urgency. The most dramatic of these developments arises from the claims surrounding the collapse of auto parts supplier Collins & Aikman. The company carried $50 million D&O insurance limits, but the cumulative expense of the various civil, regulatory and criminal proceedings arising from the company’s demise have entirely exhausted the $50 million insurance program, leaving individual defendants to face ongoing criminal prosecutions and civil litigation without insurance available to fund their defense. (Refer here and here for further discussion of the Collins & Aikman case.)

 

There have been several other recent examples where astronomical defense expense has exhausted or substantially depleted entire D&O insurance programs.

 

The escalating cost of defense is only one of several factors raising limits adequacy concerns. The steady rise in average and median claims severity, as well as the growing threat of separate opt-out litigation following the settlement of class litigation (about which refer here), also underscore the growing complexity of limits adequacy issues.

 

In light of these developments, particularly the catastrophic potential for defense expense to deplete policy limits, it may be time to rethink traditional notions of limits adequacy, because past assumptions may no longer be sufficient.

 

2. Insurance Structure: For several years now, conversations in connection with the D&O insurance transaction have included the discussion of additional Side A insurance to provide additional protection for individuals’ liability and defense expense that is not indemnifiable due to insolvency or legal prohibition. In recent months, interest in Side A protection and other auxiliary D&O insurance structures has recently taken on increased urgency, as a result of two developments.

 

The first derives from the preceding topic; that is, concerns about limits adequacy inevitably lead to questions about structure, because even substantially increased limits may not be sufficient to address all concerns, given the potential for defense expense to consume available limits.

 

One way for corporate officials to ensure they are not left without insurance to protect them is through the creation of an auxiliary insurance structure dedicated solely to their protection. There are a number of different auxiliary D&O insurance products available to address these concerns. Most of these structures have been available in various forms for some time now. What has changed is the level of interest in these insurance structures.

 

A separate legal development is also driving interest in auxiliary insurance structures. In March 2008, a Delaware Chancery Court opinion in the Schoon v. Troy Corporation case held that a Delaware corporation may retroactively eliminate former directors’ advancement rights. (Refer here for my prior discussion of the case). The possibility that former directors could lose their rights to indemnification or advancement after the end of their board service may come as unwelcome news to many directors.

 

The typical D&O insurance policy provides coverage for former directors and officers. Under most circumstances, a former director from whom corporate advancement and insurance has been withheld would still be able to seek defense expense protection and indemnification under the company’s D&O insurance policy.

 

Directors who are concerned that events following their departure from the board could conspire to leave them unprotected (for example, if limits were exhausted or substantially depleted , as discussed above), yet another auxiliary insurance product is now available. A retired director insurance policy is dedicated solely to the protection of the named individual and cannot be terminated or discontinued by the action of others.

 

The point is that directors and officers rightly are more concerned about the availability of insurance protection when they need it most. As a result, interest in the wider variety of auxiliary insurance structures has increased.

 

3. Excess Insurance: For reasons that should be clear from the first point above, excess D&O insurance is an increasingly important part of the D&O claims resolution process. Perhaps because of excess D&O insurance’s increasing involvement, there have been a series of D&O insurance coverage disputes involving excess D&O insurance. These disputes have highlighted the importance of two particularly important issues concerning excess D&O insurance.

 

The first of these issues involves the excess policy’s language describing the circumstances under which the excess policy’s payment obligations are triggered. This language can become critically important if the policyholder reaches a compromise with an underlying insurer as a result of which the underlying insurer pays less than its full policy limits, leaving an insurance "gap" to be funded by the policyholder.

 

In two recent decisions, one involving Comerica (refer here) and one involving Qualcomm (refer here), courts interpreting policy language providing that the excess insurer’s obligations are triggered only if the underlying insurance is exhausted by the underlying insurer’s payment of loss held that the excess insurer’s obligations were not triggered even if the policyholder funded an insurance "gap."

 

These case developments have increased the awareness of the importance of excess insurance exhaustion language and coverage triggers. Alternatives now available in the marketplace allow payments by policyholders funding "gaps" as sufficient to trigger excess insurance payment obligations.

 

The second of the excess insurance issues involves coverage issues that so-called "follow form" excess insurers. The particularly troublesome issues arise when excess insurers raise policy defenses that the underlying insurers did not assert. Each policy of course represents a separate contract, but policyholders obviously expect each layer of a single insurance program to respond similarly to the same set of claims circumstances.

 

These issues have drawn even greater scrutiny in recent cases in which "follow form" excess insurers contend that their policy contains exclusions not found in the underlying policies, or that the excess insurer has policy application defenses different from the underlying insurers.

 

Although excess insurance frequently is described as "follow form," the increasing frequency of coverage defenses raised only by excess insurance suggest that, regardless of how the policy is characterized, the operation of excess insurance can be something substantially different than "follow form." The factors described above regarding escalating defense expense and increasing average and median claims severity ensure that these excess insurance issues are likely to be increasingly important.

 

4. Subprime Claims and The Cost of D&O Insurance: Largely as a result of the litigation activity surrounding the subprime meltdown, D&O claims activity has in recent months returned to historical levels after a period of reduced activity. Because much of the subprime litigation has been high profile, there is a frequent assumption that the cost of D&O insurance must be increasing.

 

As I noted in a recent post (here), so far, except with respect to certain marketplace segments such as the financial sector, D&O insurers generally have not restricted capacity, reduced coverage or raised prices. These buyer-friendly conditions are largely the result of the relatively positive results insurers have enjoyed in recent years. The insurance marketplace remains competitive.

 

The subprime litigation wave is continuing to spread. The risk for insurers is that in a competitive environment, pricing can fall below risk-related requirements, leading to an eventual correction. To the extent the current litigation wave produces significant insurance payouts, the current competitive conditions could change quickly, particularly if the litigation wave spreads beyond the financial sector. However, at this point, these possibilities continue to appear remote and the marketplace remains competitive.

 

Afterword: There are other developments that I think are important and worth watching, such as the growing potential for possible climate change disclosure issues (about which refer here) and the emergence of civil litigation arising from corrupt practices enforcement proceedings (about which refer here). These and other developing concerns still fall more in the category of emerging issues rather than current trends. The one thing that is clear is that the world of D&O continues to be characterized by constant change.

 

I have set out above what I consider to be the critical current issues but I am certain that others may have a different view of what the hot topics are in the current environment. I would like to encourage readers to use the comment function to add their own views about the current hot D&O insurance topics. Please note that comments can be added anonymously.

 

D&O Insurance: The Pollution Exclusion and Securities Claims

A recurring D&O insurance coverage concern involves the question whether the standard pollution exclusion typically found in most D&O policies could preclude coverage for a securities lawsuit alleging pollution-related misrepresentations or omissions. An August 15, 2008 opinion (here) by a New Jersey intermediate appellate court addressed this issue squarely.

 

The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division per curiam opinion affirmed a trial court determination, in a coverage case arising out of a securities class action lawsuit alleging misrepresentation of contingent asbestos liabilities, that the "alleged pollution at issue was too attenuated from the damages arising from the alleged misrepresentations to trigger the pollution exclusion."

 

Background

The underlying case arose out of a series of complex corporate recapitalization, reorganization and merger transactions, as result of which Sealed Air Corporation acquired certain assets and liabilities previously held by W.R. Grace. In post-transaction statements, Sealed Air made representations concerning its contingent liability for asbestos-related claims retained by a spun-off subsidiary.

 

As a result of asbestos liability lawsuits against the spun-off subsidiary, the subsidiary sought bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy court later determined that the corporate reorganization transaction represented a fraudulent conveyance. After the fraudulent conveyance ruling became public, Sealed Air’s stock price plunged.

 

Sealed Air shareholders initiated a securities class action lawsuit against the company and its directors and officers. Background regarding the securities lawsuit can be found here. The company sought coverage for its litigation costs from its D&O insurer. The D&O insurer denied coverage in reliance upon the pollution exclusion in its policy. The pollution exclusion precludes coverage, in pertinent part, for loss "based on, arising out of, or in any way involving: (a) the actual or threatened discharge, release, escape, seepage, migration or disposal of Pollutants."

 

Sealed Air filed a declaratory judgment action against the insurer. Following a trial in the coverage action, the trial court entered judgment in the company’s favor, requiring the insurer to advance the company’s securities litigation defense expense. The insurer appealed.

 

The Appellate Ruling

On appeal, the insurer argued that the exclusion should be "given a literal reading," contending that "the language and effect of the Policy’s pollution exclusion is clear and unambiguous." Sealed Air, for its part, argued that "the alleged loss to shareholders arises out of the allegedly misleading financial statements, not from air-borne pollutants." The company contended that because "the alleged damages arise from securities misrepresentation and not traditional environmental pollution," the policy provides coverage.

 

The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division found that "the language of the policy at issue precludes [the insurer] from disclaiming based on the pollution exclusion." The court said that "it is clear to us that the gravamen of the securities holders’ complaint has its root in securities fraud and misrepresentation, not pollution." The Court found that the pollution on which the insurer sought to rely "is too attenuated from the damages sought and the legal grounds supporting such alleged damages."

 

The appellate court specifically addressed the insurer’s argument that the broad preamble to the exclusion, precluding coverage for loss "based on, arising out of, or in any way involving" excluded pollution. The appellate court concluded that the damages sought in the securities lawsuit were neither "based on" nor "arising out of" excluded pollution. In concluding that the "in any way involving" wording similarly did not trigger the exclusion, the appellate court noted:

Read together with the surrounding words, "based on" and "arising out of," in the context of the pollution exclusion clause, "in any way involving" requires a more direct causal relationship between the pollution and the harm. [The insurer’s] interpretation of the pollution exclusion is too broad, unfair and contrary to the reasonable expectations of the insured.

The appellate court concluded that the "plain and ordinary language of the policy, as well as the reasonable expectations of the insured," prevent the insurer from precluding coverage.

 

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the appellate court’s opinion is designated as "Not for Publication." Under Rule 1:36-3 of the New Jersey Rules of Court (here), "no unpublished opinions shall constitute precedent or be binding on any court." In addition, under the Rule, an unpublished opinion cannot be cited "unless the court and all other parties are served with a copy of the opinion and of all other relevant unpublished opinions known to counsel including those adverse to the position of the client."

 

While the appellate court’s opinion is therefore of no precedential authority and of only restricted persuasive potential, there are nonetheless lessons that can be derived from the case.

 

First, it should be noted that Sealed Air was able to establish its entitlement to coverage under the Policy for its defense expense incurred in defending against the securities litigation only after enduring a trial and subsequent appeal (and any other proceedings that the insurer may yet pursue in its attempt to deny coverage). It clearly is in the interest of any policyholders for their policy to clarify that the policy is intended to provide coverage for securities claims, even if the underlying misrepresentations alleged relate in some way to pollution.

 

In the current marketplace, many carriers will agree to provide a coverage carve back from the pollution exclusion specifying that the exclusion does not in any event apply to securities claims or to shareholders’ derivative actions.

 

In addition, in the current marketplace, many carriers will also agree to modify the exclusion’s preamble so that rather than the broad preamble wording found in Sealed Air’s policy, the preamble specifies that the exclusion applies only if the claim is "for" excluded pollution. This wording provides some measure of protection against carrier attempts to rely on remote connections between the actual claim against the insured persons and underlying facts involving pollution as a basis to deny coverage.

 

It should also be noted that certain of the so-called Side A/DIC policies available in the marketplace do not contain pollution exclusions. Depending on the coverage provided under these policies, the policies could potentially "drop down" and provide a measure of protection for individual defendants if the first line D&O insurer denies coverage for a claim based on the pollution exclusion.

 

One final note pertains to the underlying securities claim. I have previously commented (most recently here), about the possibility that growing social and political pressures relating to climate change issues could lead to climate change-related claims against directors and officers of publicly traded companies, particularly in connection with climate change-related disclosures. My views in this regard have met with some interest, but also with some skepticism.

 

The underlying securities lawsuit involved here demonstrates how shareholders might allege that a company did not fully disclose, for example, its contingent liabilities arising out of climate change-related issues. The Sealed Air case suggests (to me at least) how short the leap might be to these kinds of allegations. But the risk, however measured, underscores the need for the policy-wording issues identified above to be addressed.

 

An August 28, 2008 memorandum from the Wiley Rein law firm discussing the outcome of the Sealed Air coverage appellate decision can be found here.

 

Securities Docket: Bruce Carton of the Unusual Activity blog (here) has launched a new securities litigation news website called the Securities Docket (here). The Docket bills itself as a "globlal securities litigation and enforcement report." The first iteration is certainly visually attractive and full of a wide variety of interesting items. The Docket looks like it will be an interesting resource that we intend to monitor closely. Congrats to Bruce on getting the Docket launched.

 

WSJ RIP: Joe Nocera of the New York TImes has a post on his Talks Business blog (here) in which he mourns the death of the Wall Street Journal -- not the death of the newspaper itself, just its death as the repository of important business news. I have felt the same things that Nocera expresses for a while. The pre-Rupert Murdoch WSJ filled a valuable role that no one other paper (or other news source) plays. Now instead of a unique and indispensible source of business news, it is just one more source for stories about politics that have already been reported in any number of our media sources. I agree with Nocera --  I miss the old Journal a lot.

D&O Insurance: Consequences of Withheld Settlement Consent

In prior posts (here and here), I discussed two recent decisions in which courts held that D&O insurance coverage was precluded for settlements the insureds entered without first obtaining the insurers’ consent as required under the applicable policies. An August 19, 2008 Second Circuit opinion (here) addressed the related question of what happens when the insured seeks but the insurer withholds settlement consent.

 

Based on the somewhat strained circumstances involved, the Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict holding two excess carriers liable under their policies to fund their portion of a settlement, even though the insured had requested settlement consent on a Sunday evening at 10:00 PM and givn the carriers only eleven hours to respond.

 

Background

The underlying claim arose out of the Globalstar Telecommunications securities litigation (about which refer here). After the corporate defendants sought bankruptcy protection, the case went forward solely as to Globalstar’s former CEO, Bernard Schwartz. There were various pretrial mediation and settlement conferences, but the case did not settle and proceeded to trial.

 

The first four layers of Globalstar’s D&O insurance program consisted of a primary $10 million layer and three successive excess layers of $5 million each. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs’ latest settlement demand was $15 million. The primary insurer’s last pretrial settlement offer was $5 million. The plaintiffs reportedly warned that once trial began, their demand would rise to $20 to $25 million.

 

 

After two weeks of trial and on the day before he was scheduled to testify, Schwartz agreed to a $20 million settlement. Schwartz’s defense counsel sought the insurers’ consent to enter into the settlement. The request for consent was sent via email on a Sunday night at 10:00 pm. According to the Second Circuit’s later opinion, Schwartz’s defense counsel "offered to discuss the reasonableness of that figure later than night or between 8:45 am and 9:00 am on Monday." Over the next few days, all four insurers refused to consent. The court entered judgment approving the settlement. Schwartz later funded the $20 million settlement with a personal check.

 

 

The Coverage Litigation 

Schwartz then sued the four insurers. Schwartz sued the primary carrier for bad faith refusal to settle and for breach of contract. Schwartz sued the three excess carriers for breach of contract. (The third layer excess carrier was involved because at the time Schwartz agreed to settle the case, defense fees had eroded the first $3 million of the primary policy, so the $20 million settlement implicated the third layer excess policy.) The second and third layer excess insurers also cross claimed against the primary insurer alleging bad faith, on the theory that as excess insurers they were equitably subrogated to Schwartz’s bad faith claims against the primary insurer.

 

Before the coverage lawsuit went to trial, both the primary insurer and the first level excess insurer settled with Schwartz by paying their full policy limits. The coverage trial went forward on Schwarz’s claims against the second and third level excess insurers, and on these two excess insurers’ cross claims against the primary insurer.

 

Following trial, the jury found in favor of Schwartz and awarded damages of $5 million against the second level excess insurer, and $4 million against the third level excess insurer (the full amount that Schwartz had sought).

 

On the excess insurers’ cross claims against the primary insurer, the jury awarded the second level excess insurer damages of $2 million and the third level excess insurer damages of $3 million. However, the jury also specifically found that the primary insurer had not acted in "gross disregard" of Schwartz’s rights. In a post-trial ruling, the district court dismissed the excess insurers’ cross claims, holding that New York law applied to the cross claims and that under New York law there could be no recovery for bad faith in the absence of a finding of "gross disregard."

 

The Second Circuit Opinion 

On appeal, the excess insurers argued "Schwartz’s failure to satisfy the condition precedent of consent to settlement absolved them of their contractual duties." The excess insurers contended that Schwartz’s settlement request "gave them mere hours (over a Sunday night and Monday morning) to decide whether to settle." The Second Circuit characterized these arguments as contending that the 11-hour period represented "the interval in which the Excess Insurers had to assess – for the first time – the risks, opportunities and settlement demands at play."

 

The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs, said that "the insurers’ opportunity to consider settlement extended over a prolonged course of consultation, monitoring and negotiation, so that the settlement was in the nature of anticlimax rather than surprise." The Second Circuit found the jury appropriately considered this evidence and concluded that the excess insurers "had an adequate opportunity to consider and evaluate the settlement opportunities; that $20 million was a reasonable sum; and that [the excess insurers] unreasonably withheld consent." The Second Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict in Schwartz’s favor.

 

The Second Circuit also rejected the excess insurers’ argument that the trial court inappropriately applied New York law to the excess insurers’ equitably subrogated bad faith claims against the primary insurer.(Under New York law, but not under California law, a finding of "gross disregard" is required to support the imposition of bad faith liability.) Among other things, the excess insurers argued that it was not appropriate to apply California law to Schwartz’s breach of contract claims but New York law to their equitably subrogated bad faith claims.

 

The Second Circuit found that applicable choice of law principles allowed different jurisdictions’ laws to apply to different aspects of the same dispute. The Second Circuit also rejected the excess insurers’ argument that application of different law to their cross-claims inappropriately deprived them of the same right of recovery as the person to whom they were equitably subrogated.

 

Discussion 

The most critical fact in these strained circumstances may be that in the absence of the insurers’ consent Schwartz accepted personal liability for the settlement and funded it out of his own assets. That step substantially undercut the insurers’ ability to argue that the settlement amount was unreasonable, and by extension that their withholding of consent was reasonable.

 

These circumstances nevertheless present some very troublesome aspects. One particularly questionable part is the settlement consent request that was presented in an email at 10 pm on a Sunday evening with an 11-hour response time. However one might characterize this communication, it was hardly calculated to provide the insurers with what most people would consider a reasonable opportunity to consider the request and respond.

 

In seemingly overlooking the unorthodox nature of these communications, the Second Circuit placed great weight on the excess insurers’ prior attendance at mediation and settlement conferences, and at trial. During these proceedings there were opportunities to settle the case for $15 million. To be sure, the plaintiffs had indicated that the settlement demand would rise once trial started. The second and third level excess insurers had demanded that the primary and first level excess insurers settle the case for the $15 million amount. Had the case settled for that amount, the second level insurer would only have paid a portion of its limits and the third level excess insurer’s limit would not have been implicated at all.

 

Under these circumstances it seems that what this case really was about was the question of who ought bear the costs of the $20 million settlement. In that regard, it is significant to note that the jury specifically awarded substantial damages in favor of the second and third level excess insurers against the primary insurer, notwithstanding the jury’s finding that the primary insurer had not acted in "gross disregard" of Schwartz’s interests.

 

The amount of the cross claim awards seems to be explained by the fact that at the time of the settlment, the first $3 milion of the primary policy had been eroded by defense expense. The sum of the $7 million remaining on the primary policy, the $5 million under the first level excess policy, and the first $3 million of the second level excess policy collectively represented the $15 million amount at which the case could have been settled before trial. The jury shifted to the primary insurer responsibiltiy for the incremental $5 million difference between the $15 million for which the case could have been settled before trial and the $20 million for which it actually settled, by awarding damages of $2 million to the second level excess insurer and $3 million to the third level excess insurer.

 

However, the trial court negated these cross claim damage award in its post-trial choice of law decision, which the Second Circuit affirmed. I am insufficiently steeped in "decapage" and other rarified choice of law principles to have any informed opinion about the merits of the Second Circuit’s analysis of the law to be applied to excess insurers’ cross claims. The excess insurers undoubtedly are frustrated that they were found liable to Schwarz (to whom they were equitably subrogated) under California law, but that the primary insurer was not liable to them (despite the jury verdict in their favor on the cross claims) because New York law rather than California law applied to their cross claims.

 

The net effect is that the excess insurers are left holding the responsibility for amounts that the jury assigned to the primary carrier. The primary insurer of course would that in the absence of a finding of "gross disregard" it would be inappropriate for it to have to bear liability for these amounts.

 

In the end, the outcome of this case may be best understood as the result of the strained circumstances. It should probably be emphasized that demanding insurer consent on a Sunday evening with an 11-hour deadline does not, shall we say, represent an advisable approach. Of course there may be sufficiently pressing circumstances (including, it should be noted, during the constraints of trial) where rushed communications may be unavoidable. But in general, complete, timely and business-like communications are to be preferred, and are likelier to avoid disputes with the carrier.

 

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a link to the Second Circuit opinion.

 

When Introducing Her, McCain Did Say Something Like "And Now For Something Completely Different": Prior to this past Friday, the only person I had every heard of with the last name of "Palin" was Michael Palin, of Monty Python fame.

 

Subprime Lawsuits Mount, So What About D&O Pricing?

Observers outside the D&O insurance industry frequently comment to me that with all the subprime-related litigation, D&O pricing must be skyrocketing. These observers are often puzzled when I respond that the D&O marketplace remains generally competitive and pricing advantageous to buyers. This same conversation recurs with sufficient frequency that if may be worth exploring in greater depth. It may also be worth considering whether or not current marketplace conditions may be vulnerable to abrupt change.

 

With respect to the litigation activity, there have indeed been a significant number of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuits, as detailed further below.

 

 

Nevertheless, except with respect to certain marketplace segments (such as the financial services industries), D&O insurers generally have not restricted capacity, reduced coverage or raised prices. As IRMI noted in its September 2008 publication The Risk Report (here, subscription required), it may seem “counterintuitive” but “most companies, particularly those outside the financial sector, continue to enjoy ample capacity and relatively advantageous terms and conditions.”

 

 

The most important reason for the competitive marketplace conditions is that historically low securities class action activity levels prevailed during most of the period 2005 through 2007. Insurers’ D&O results for those claim reporting periods undoubtedly appear favorable. At the same time, insurers overall results during that same period were also favorable, due to low levels of catastrophe claims after the hurricane intensive period in 2004 and 2005.

 

 

Insurers’ business-writing capabilities are directly proportionate to their “policyholder surplus” (which is, in simple terms, the insurance company financial reporting equivalent to shareholders’ equity). As a result of insurers’ strong results in recent reporting years, property and casualty insurers’ industry-wide policyholder surplus is at or near record levels. The insurers’ business-writing capability is correspondingly high – and so the marketplace for most lines of insurance, including D&O, is competitive.

 

 

These are of course exactly the conditions that drive the insurance cycle, as ability to write business translates into an appetite for business, with price as the primary means of competition. Eventually, pricing falls below the risk related requirements, results deteriorate, and, when surpluses and redundancies are exhausted, the marketplace corrects.

 

 

The current heightened claim activity level is exactly the kind of circumstance that can lead to deteriorating results, particularly to the extent that there is a mismatch between pricing and the risk exposure. Indeed, IRMI noted in its recent report that if the current litigation wave “produces significant loss payouts, and spreads beyond the financial sector” the current wave could “ultimately affect the larger D&O marketplace.”

 

 

The ultimate outcome will of course only be revealed in the fullness of time. But in addition to policyholder surplus levels, there are a variety of other factors that could be mitigating the impact of the current litigation wave on the D&O insurers.

 

 

First, insurance may not even be involved in many of the highest profile subprime-related claims. Many of the largest banks, for instance, self-insure for their D&O exposure or only carry so-called Side A coverage for nonindemnifiable loss. At least for those banks that have not gone insolvent, these Side A policies are unlikely to be triggered.

 

 

Second, much of the current claims activity may not involve losses to which D&O insurance even applies. For example, the buybacks at the center of the recent high-profile auction rate securities settlements (about which refer here) may not involve insurable losses. To the extent that there are damages paid (for example, if the losses must pay investors’ consequential damages), the losses are likely to be more in the nature of investment bank errors and omissions losses than D&O losses.

 

 

Third, although the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave has spread, the vast majority of the lawsuits have been concentrated in the financial services sector. There are certain D&O carriers that are more exposed to this space than others, but many other carriers have long shunned this space. As a result many carriers may not be experiencing the current heightened claims activity levels, and the ones bearing the brunt of the activity arguably are larger and more diversified.

 

 

Fourth, a certain amount of the litigation wave involves companies domiciled (and, most likely, insured) overseas – for example, UBS, Swiss Re, RBS, RBC, Fimalac, Societe Generale, and so on. Losses related to these claims, which represent a significant portion of the subprime related litigation, may not impact the domestic D&O insurance market.

 

 

Fifth, although I have on this blog, and even in this post, referred to the current litigation as a “wave,” one could argue that although the current activity exceeds the claim level of the preceding three years, the current level is not far above historical claims activity levels. I suspect there are senior insurance executives whose D&O unit managers are telling them that current claims activity levels are within expected ranges. (Some of these managers may have different employers three to five years from now.)

 

 

Sixth, but perhaps most importantly, most of these claims are only in their earliest stages. Carriers’ case reserves may not yet be fully developed. There is also the danger that aggregate loss reserve picks are skewed by several years of better than average results. Carriers may feel confident they have a handle on this situation and fully understand their ultimate exposure, and their confidence may be warranted. It will of course be years before they know for sure.

 

 

Earlier on as the subprime litigation wave was just gaining steam, there were a number of dramatic pronouncements (refer, for example, here) about how large the large the potential loss for the insurance industry from the subprime meltdown could be. It has been awhile since anyone has ventured any similar pronouncements, probably because the sky has not yet fallen. But while prognosticators may have become more circumspect, there remains an abiding danger in the current circumstances.

 

 

Despite -- or maybe because of -- all of the foregoing, the subprime and credit-crisis litigation wave remains highly dangerous for the D&O insurance industry. Among other things, there is the possibility that the most significant danger could be underestimation of its long-run significance.

 

 

Thanks to the several readers with whom I have spoken and corresponded on these topics in recent days. And very special thanks to Bob Bregman at IRMI for permission to quote The Risk Report.

 

 

Another State Court Subprime Class Action Lawsuit: In an earlier post (here), I noted that as part of the current subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave, plaintiffs’ lawyers have seemed increasingly interested in filing actions under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 in state court. In the latest example of this phenomenon, on August 26, 2008, a plaintiff filed a purported Section 11 class action lawsuit against National City Corporation and several of its directors and officers in Florida (Palm Beach County) Circuit Court. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

 

 

The complaint is brought on behalf of the former shareholders of Fidelity Bankshares who acquired National City stock in connection with National City’s acquisition of Fidelity, which was completed in January 2007. The complaint alleges that the offering documents “concealed billions of dollars of risky construction loans” that National City made to finance residential real estate construction, in Florida and elsewhere.

 

 

Among other things, the complaint alleges that the construction loans were plagued by “bad product design” and were susceptible to “the high likelihood of default and extreme loan loss severity.” Many of the loans “featured the worst qualities of subprime” though National City supposedly represented its loans as “prime” and “conforming.” The complaint also alleges that the offering documents misrepresented other aspects of National City’s financial condition, including its “nonperforming assets” and its loan loss reserves.

 

 

This new lawsuit is merely the latest lawsuit filed against National City regarding subprime-related issues (refer here and here). In any event, I have added this latest lawsuit to my running tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits, which can be accessed here. With the addition of this latest complaint, the current tally of subprime and credit crisis-related securities lawsuits now stands at 109, of which 69 have been filed in 2008.

 

 

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch for providing a copy of the National City/Fidelity Bankshares complaint.

Eleventh Circuit: Section 11 Settlement Not Covered Loss

In an unpublished August 18, 2008 per curiam opinion (here), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in the CNL Resorts case that a Section 11 settlement is not covered "loss" under a D&O insurance policy. The appeals court reversed and remanded the case on other grounds, as discussed below.

 

This coverage action arose out of an underlying securities class action (about which refer here), in which the plaintiffs alleged violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. The plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased their CNL shares at an inflated price of $20/share. The plaintiffs sought to recover the $8/share difference between what they had paid and the $12/share valuation that was later placed on the company. CNL settled this shareholder action for $35 million. Details regarding the settlement can be found here.

 

CNL had a $30 million D&O insurance program, arranged in three layers of $10 million each. CNL initiated a declaratory judgment action against the three insurers, seeking a determination of coverage for the settlement as well as related litigation costs and expenses and other amounts. CNL reached a settlement with the primary insurer, but the action proceeded as to CNL’s two excess insurers.

 

As I discussed in a prior post (here), on March 17, 2007, the district court granted partial summary judgment on behalf of the two excess insurers. The district court held that the $35 million settlement represented a disgorgement of CNL’s "ill-gotten gain," which did not constitute a "loss" under the relevant policy language and therefore is not insurable under applicable law.

 

In its August 18 opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this portion of the district court’s rulings. The Eleventh Circuit said that "because we conclude that the payment to the Purchaser Class was restitutionary in nature, the payment was not covered loss" and the excess carriers are "not liable for payment."

 

CNL had argued on appeal that the $35 million settlement did not represent the return of ill-gotten gains, contending that "without a finding of fraud, it is impossible to conclude that the money was wrongly acquired." The Eleventh Circuit said that "the return of money received through a violation of law, even if the actions of the recipient were innocent, constitutes a restitutionary payment, not a ‘loss’." The Eleventh Circuit also affirmatively held that Section 11 damages are restitutionary in nature.

 

The Eleventh Circuit also rejected CNL’s argument based on the statement in the settlement agreement that the $35 million was not "restitution or disgorgement." The Eleventh Circuit said that the settlement agreement "is not binding on any third party or this Court. The policy, not the settlement agreement, governs our resolution of this appeal."

 

The Eleventh Circuit did reverse a separate summary judgment ruling of the district court. The separate ruling related to the question of coverage for the settlement of the claims of a separate plaintiff class, the so-called Proxy Class, which had alleged misrepresentations in proxy materials. CNL had settled with this separate class in an agreement that, among other things, had resulted in its payment of the Proxy Class counsel’s fees of $5.5 million.

 

The primary insurer, in its separate settlement with CNL, had agreed to reimburse CNL for this $5.5 million settlement. The excess insurers argued, based on language in the primary policy, that the $5.5 million settlement did not represent covered "loss," and therefore the primary policy had not been depleted by payment of covered loss and the excess carriers’ payment obligation had not been triggered. The district court granted summary judgment on this issue for the excess insurers.

 

The Eleventh Circuit reversed this portion of the district court’s ruling. The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further factual proceedings on the question whether the language on which the excess carriers sought to rely properly is a part of the primary policy. The question to be determined is whether or not the relevant policy endorsement form had been filed with the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, as the form would be void if not so filed.

 

At one level, the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance of the district court’s ruling on the question of coverage for Section 11 settlements represents a significant development. A federal appellate court’s adoption of the position that a company’s Section 11 settlement is not covered loss under a D&O policy certainly reinforces the developing case authority on this point. The possibility that another court might reach a different conclusion seems increasingly remote.

 

At the same time, there are limitations on the significant of the Eleventh Circuit opinion. The first is that the opinion itself carries the designation "Do Not Publish." This is less of a restriction in the Eleventh Circuit than it might be in other courts; some courts actually prohibit the citation of unpublished opinions. The Eleventh Circuit’s Rule 36-3 (refer here) specifies that "unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority." Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion may at least be cited, but it still does not represent binding authority.

 

There is a practical development that also diminishes the significance of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. That is, since the time of the district court’s summary judgment ruling on the question of coverage for Section 11 settlements, most D&O carriers have introduced policy endorsements specifying that they will not take the position that there is no coverage under their policies for settlements under Sections 11 and 12 of the ’33 Act. Not all of these endorsements were created equal, and they are all as yet untested in court, but at a minimum they ought to restrain most carriers whose policies have this endorsement from taking the position that a Section 11 or Section 12 settlement does not represent a covered loss under the policy.

 

Of course, not all policies have yet been adapted to this new approach, and there are still many claims pending in which the relevant policy does not have this new language. In connection with these existing policies and claims, it is important to note a couple of things.

 

First of all, even if a company’s Section 11 settlement is not covered under a D&O policy, the company’s expense incurred in defending against the Section 11 claim still ought to be covered.

 

Second, because the settlement of Section 11 claims against individual defendants (as opposed to the company itself) typically would not represent the return of ill-gotten gains, (since typically they would not have received any of the offering proceeds), a D&O policy ought to provide coverage for the settlement of a Section 11 claims against them, as well as their costs of defense, all other things being equal.

 

Very special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of the Eleventh Circuit opinion.

 

Auction Rate Settlements: Plaintiffs’ Bar Bummer?: As I noted in a recent post (here), one of the as yet unanswered questions surrounding the high-profile auction rate securities buybacks is what impact these settlements will have on the numerous auction rate securities class action lawsuits (about which generally, refer here).

 

In an August 18, 2008 Legal Week article entitled "Billions Not for the Plaintiffs Bar" (here), Michael Rivera and Erik Frias of the Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson law firm suggest that these settlements could have a "debilitating impact on the numerous class actions and other private lawsuits filed since the market seized up." The basis on which the authors reach this conclusion is that as a result of the buybacks and other settlement elements, "the losses of individual investors who might be plaintiffs will now be fully compensated, leaving little to no damages to pursue in court."

 

The authors suggest that as a result of the buybacks and other reimbursements incorporated into the settlements, the "bottom line" is that the claimants "will be made whole without assistance from the courts." As they put it, "government and industry have worked cooperatively to craft a solution to the auction-rate securities problem in such a way that private litigation will be largely unnecessary and unavailable." As a result, the authors suggest, there may now be "little opportunity for the plaintiffs bar to profit."

 

The authors may have a point, but I haven’t yet seen the voluntary dismissal of any of the pending auction rate securities lawsuits. The plaintiffs’ lawyers may not go quietly, and one angle I can imagine them trying to work relates to institutional investors, benefits under the various settlements are less defined and less comprehensive.

 

In any event, there are still a host of auction rate securities lawsuits that have been filed against banks and other institutions that have not yet reached a regulatory settlement. To be sure, it may only be a matter of time before the regulators set their sights on these others. In the interim, the existence of the shareholder lawsuits may represent one additional factor pressuring them to reach a regulatory settlement.

 

Finally, as I recently noted (here and here), though the settlements have started to mount, auction rate securities lawsuits continue to accumulate. There apparently are some members of the plaintiffs bar who continue to perceive an opportunity to profit from the auction rate debacle. It will certainly be some time before it is all sorted out.

 

D&O Insurance: The "Insured v. Insured" Exclusion

It remains to be seen whether the current economic turmoil will result in significant additional bank failures. But if history is any guide, to the extent that there are further bank failures, there likely will also be follow-on lawsuits in which the regulators pursue claims against the failed institutions’ former directors and officers. As these claims emerge, there may also be disputed issues regarding the applicability of the failed institutions’ D&O insurance policies.

 

As I noted in a recent post (here), among the issues that may arise is the applicability of the regulatory exclusion. In addition, another issue that may arise relates to the potential applicability of the so-called “insured v. insured” exclusion found in most D&O insurance policies.

 

The “insured v. insured” exclusion typically precludes coverage for claims by or on behalf of the insured corporation, its affiliates or directors and officers against other insured persons. Over the years, the standard exclusion has been modified to provide coverage carve-backs for certain types of claims for which coverage would otherwise be precluded, such as derivative claims and employment practices claims.

 

During the S&L crisis in the late 80s and early 90s, the federal banking regulators actively pursued claims against the failed institutions’ former officials. As described in a July 29, 2008 memorandum from the Latham & Watkins law firm entitled “The ‘Insured v. Insured’ Exclusion in D&O Policies” (here), many of these regulator claims implicated the insured v. insured exclusion.

 

As the law firm’s memorandum explains, in many instances the regulators were able to argue successfully that the exclusion should not apply to preclude coverage for their claims, because the lawsuits were not the “collusive” type disputes for which the exclusion historically was meant to preclude coverage. However, as the memorandum also notes, there were cases in which the exclusion was held to bar coverage for the regulators’ claims, on the grounds that the regulator was in effect “standing in the shoes” of the failed institution.

 

The memorandum correctly points out that the “insured v. insured” exclusion is “heavily litigated” and “continues to be at the heart of many coverage disputes.” There are a number of reasons why coverage disputes involving the exclusion are so frequent.

 

First, over the years, the scope of persons insured under the typical D&O policy has expanded – for example, to include “employees” within the definition of insured persons for purposes of securities claims. In addition, many companies for their own reasons have sought to schedule additional named insureds to the policy by endorsement. While these policy extensions may be desirable from the policyholder’s perspective, problems can arise later if the extensions are not also coordinated with the language and operation of the “insured v. insured” exclusion.

 

Second, companies may take on forms or structures that raise fundamental questions about who is an insured under the policy. For example, insolvent companies may continue in business as a debtor-in-possession or may have its activities taken over by a receiver. These and other situations have raised and continue to raise a myriad of contentious questions about the scope and applicability of the insured v. insured exclusion.

 

Third, in many lawsuits, the plaintiffs’ claims may be based on information or assistance provided by former company officials. The former officials’ involvement may run afoul of the wording in the typical insured v. insured exclusion, which specifies that for claims to be covered they must be “instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of” any insured person.

 

The question whether a former official’s litigation involvement falls within one of these precluded categories is a frequent source of contentious coverage disputes. (Refer here for discussion of a recent case involving these issues.) In order to try to reduce the opportunities for these types of disputes, many carriers will now agree upon request to add wording providing that the exclusion will not apply in the event of the involvement of former officials whose departure was more than a specified amount of time before (typically, four years).

 

As the Latham & Watkins memorandum discusses, one of the issues frequently disputed in these cases is whether the underlying claim must be “collusive” in order for the exclusion to be triggered. As the Latham & Watkins memo explains, the exclusion’s original intent was to bar coverage for collusive claims. However, not all courts have required collusion for the exclusion to be applied (refer, for example, here), although there are many jurisdictions in which collusion has been held to be required.

 

The importance of the “insured v. insured” exclusion and the opportunities to revise the standard wording to reduce the exclusion’s preclusive effect highlights the importance of addressing these basic wording issues at the time the policy is purchased. As the Latham & Watkins memorandum notes, each company “should seek the assistance of an insurance broker to attempt to limit the exclusion’s breadth.” The potential significance of these issues underscores the need for companies to enlist the assistance of an experienced and knowledgeable broker in their acquisition of D&O insurance.

 

Duties of Outside Directors Under Delaware Law: As noted by the ever-vigilant Francis Pileggi on his Delaware and Commercial Litigation Blog (here), on July 29, 2008, the Delaware Chancery Court issued an opinion in the Ryan v Lyondell Chemical Company case (opinion here) that has important implications for the duties and potential liabilities of outside directors in the merger and acquisition context.

 

The court held that the outside directors were not entitled to summary judgments and would have to stand trial for their role in the sale of the company, as Pileggi notes, “despite selling the company to the only known buyer for a substantial premium.”

 

As explained in the opinion, when the Lyondell board received the offer, it delegated much of the negotiations to the company’s Chairman and CEO; never conducted a “market check to determine whether a better price could be obtained; agreed to a deal that included protective rights, including a “no-shop provision.” Moreover, “the whole deal was considered, negotiated, and approved by the Board in less than seven days.”

 

The Chancery Court held that the Board could not invoke the exculpatory provisions under the company’s charter and the Delaware Code because “the Board’s apparent failure to make any effort to comply with the teachings of Revlon and its progeny implicates the directors’ good faith and, thus, their duty of loyalty, thereby, at least for the moment, depriving them of the benefit of the exculpatory charter provision.”

 

Pileggi’s post does an admirable job explaining the implications of the decision. Further valuable analysis of the decision can be found on the Legal Profession Blog (here).

 

Monster Settlement, Dude: As reflected in its July 31, 2008 press release (here), Monster Worldwide has reached a settlement in the options backdating related securities action lawsuit pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers. As reflected in the press release, the settlement consists of “a payment to the class by the defendants of $47.5 million in full settlement of the claims asserted in the securities class action. The Company's cost is anticipated to be approximately $25 million (net of insurance and contribution from another defendant).”

 

The Monster settlement is only the latest of the options backdating related securities class action settlements. A full list of settlements and case dispositions in the options backdating related litigation can be accessed here.

 

A WSJ.com Law Blog post describing the Monster settlement (and containing a nice link to The D&O Diary) can be found here.

 

The Securities Litigation Watch blog as updated its detailed analysis of the options backdating securities class action lawsuits, which can be found here.

D&O Insurance: Remember the Regulatory Exclusion?

The recent news (here) that federal regulators had seized IndyMac Bank in one of the largest bank failures in history brought back memories from the late 80’s and early 90’s, when numerous financial institutions around the country met a similar fate. The litigation surrounding the financial institutions’ collapse kept legions of lawyers profitably employed for years, including your humble correspondent.

 

Among the many types of cases litigated in that era were D&O insurance coverage disputes, and in particular, disputes involving the applicability of the so-called “regulatory exclusion.” The regulatory exclusion typically precludes coverage for claims brought by any governmental, quasi-governmental, or self-regulatory agency.

 

In the competitive underwriting environment that has prevailed in recent years, the regulatory exclusions has become an infrequent part of financial institutions’ D&O insurance policies, a development that has seemed unremarkable as the prior failed bank era has receded into the past. However, with the dramatic news of IndyMac’s regulatory seizure, and the consequent concern that further financial institutions failures may lie ahead (refer here), the issues surrounding the regulatory exclusion could once again become relevant.

 

Undoubtedly in response to these very issues, on July 21, 2008, the Latham & Watkins law firm issues a memorandum entitled “D&O Policies – Regulatory Exclusions” (here). The memorandum briefly reviews the issues that were debated concerning the regulatory exclusion in the last era of failed banks.

 

Among other things, the memorandum correctly recollects that it was not just the insured persons who disputed the regulatory exclusion’s applicability, but it was the governmental agencies as well. The agencies “fought regulatory exclusions clauses using mainly public policy arguments” because the exclusions “impair the ability of the government to seek redress in the situation of a failed bank.”

 

The memorandum notes that the courts found that the “freedom to contract overrode the government agency’s right” to bring claims against individuals. The courts also found that it would not have been against public policy for banks to purchase no D&O insurance at all, so therefore “excluding optional coverage in certain situations would clearly not fall against public policy.”

 

The government also tried to argue that the exclusions were ambiguous. But the courts read the exclusions broadly and in the context of the policy as a whole, and on the basis did not find them to be ambiguous. The courts found that the exclusions applied whether the government was pursuing claims as a regulator or as a liquidator, and regardless whether then government actually brought or was merely maintaining the claims.

 

It remains to be seen whether or not there will in fact be further financial institution failures, and if there are, whether the regulators will pursue claims against the failed institutions’ former management. Even if the government does pursue these kinds of claims, it is relatively unlikely that many of the institutions current policies contain a regulatory exclusion that would preclude coverage for these claims.

 

But the spate of bad news that banks have reported in recent days is a vivid reminder of the challenging circumstances that banks face. D&O underwriters are monitoring these developments with mounting anxiety. As conditions continue to deteriorate, and in particular if there are any further significant financial institution failures, D&O insurers relatively benign approach to the regulatory exclusion could change. The regulatory exclusion could once again become a more common part of D&O coverage for some financial institutions.

 

Of course, all of these things will be revealed in the fullness of time. But the IndyMac bank failure sure does have a familiar ring to it. As Mark Twain famously said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” Along those lines, the current circumstances could start to sound more and more like the prior era of failed banks, and it could involve many of same endings.

 

Oy, Canada: The subprime litigation wave has been sweeping the U.S. for now well over a year. But now the wave finally seems to have spread to our neighbors to the north.

 

On July 23, 2008, a Canadian law firm announced (here) that it had launched a securities class action lawsuit in the Ontario Court of Justice against the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and certain of its directors and officers.

 

According to the press release, the Complaint alleges that:

CIBC misrepresented the magnitude and level of risk associated with its U.S. subprime residential mortgage investments. In particular, CIBC represented during the class period that its total exposure in USSRMM investments, including both hedged and unhedged investments, was "not a major issue" when, in fact, the bank had exposure to billions of dollars of losses, as was only subsequently disclosed.

Further, CIBC failed to disclose that one of its principal hedge counterparties, ACA Financial, was woefully undercapitalized with an asset to guarantee ratio of "1-180" and was far from able to provide any meaningful hedge protection to the bank's USSRMM investments

CIBC had previously been named as a defendant in a U.S. securities class action lawsuit (as detailed here), but that prior lawsuit involved investments and disclosures by CIBC’s MFS family of mutual funds, and did not relate to CIBC’s own disclosures or activities.

 

In addition to CIBC, another Canadian company, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), was also previously named as a defendant in a U.S.-based securities class action lawsuit (refer here), but that lawsuit relates to the sales of auction rate securities by RBC’s affiliate, RBC Dain Rauscher, and does not relate to RBS’s own disclosures or activities.

 

So far as I am aware, the recent lawsuit filed against CIBC in the Ontario Court of Justice represents the first subprime-related securities class action lawsuit to be filed against a Canadian company for the company’s own disclosures or activities.

 

A July 23, 2008 Bloomberg article describing the CIBC lawsuit can be found here.

 

UPDATE: In response to my comment above about Canadian subprime litigation, Ari Karoly of NERA Economic Consulting sent along the following observation: "I wanted to point out that the FMF capital class action which settled last year (refer here) was a class action brought against a US company in Canadian courts with respect to alleged misrepresentations made by FMF regarding subprime exposure and risks. You were technically correct because FMF was a US company which traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange, but I still wanted to bring that case to your attention."

Now We Know Where the Airline Industry Found Its Service Model:  According to a complaint filed on July 18, 2008 in the Hamilton County (Tenn.) Circuit Court (here), when a resident of the Shallowford Trace luxury apartment homes complained of being unable to find a parking place, an employee of the apartment company put a gun between the resident’s eyes and stated “You f***ing b**ch, I’ll blow your f***ing brains all over this concrete” and also “Please give me a reason. I’ve got a permit. I’ll blow your brains out.”

The permit makes everything nice and legal. You wouldn't want someone without a permit putting a gun between your eyes.

Hat tip to Courthouse News (here) for the Shallowford complaint.

D&O Insurance: Defense Expense Advancement

On June 26, 2008, Judge Gerard Lynch of the Southern District of New York issued another opinion (here) in the D&O insurance coverage litigation arising out of the Refco debacle (My recent post discussing Judge Lynch’s prior opinion in the case discussing insurance application issues can be found here.)

 

In yet another judicial decision that resonates with significance for excess D&O insurance issues, Judge Lynch, hearing an appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling, addressed the question whether an excess insurer may withhold advancement of defense costs based on its determination that an exclusion in its policy precluded coverage. Judge Lynch held that even if the excess policy has the distinct exclusions, the policy's terms do not  affect the operation of the applicable defense cost advancement provisions, and the advancement provisions should be enforced according to their terms.

 

The background of the case can be found in my prior post. Of significance here, the primary insurer’s $10 million limit and the first level excess insurer’s $7.5 million were exhausted in payment of defense expense. As also discussed in the prior post, the second level excess insurer disputes coverage on a number of grounds. The second level excess insurer also disputes that it has any obligation to advance defense costs pending a determination of coverage.

 

The parties agree that the advancement provisions in the primary policy control the advancement issue; they dispute how the provisions apply in the context of the second level excess carrier’s policy.

 

The primary policy specifies that:

The Insurer will pay covered Defense Costs on an as-incurred basis. If it is finally determined that any Defense Costs paid by the Insurer are not covered under this Policy, the Insureds agree to repay such non-covered Defense Costs to the Insurer.

The second level excess insurer [hereafter in this post, simply “the insurer”] contended that notwithstanding this language, it has no obligation to advance defense costs. In making this argument, the insurer relied on the word “covered” in the first sentence of the advancement provision, qualifying the type of defense costs that the provision requires to be paid on an as-incurred basis.

 

The insurer’s argument is based on its contention that its policy’s conduct exclusions, unlike the primary and first level excess policies’ exclusions, do not have an adjudication requirement. The insurer argued, according to the court, that because the conduct exclusions in its policy have no adjudication requirement, “prior to a court determination, [the insurer] has the unilateral right to determine whether defense costs are ‘covered,’” and that it has made a “good faith determination” that the insureds’ claims are precluded under its policy.

 

As the court paraphrased the insurer’s position, the insurer contended that the terms of its contract “authorize it to apply its exclusions to deny coverage unilaterally – and thus to refuse to advance defense costs – unless and until a court determines that the costs are ‘covered’” under its policy.

 

The insureds contend in their counterclaim in the coverage litigation that the exclusions on which the insurer relies to deny coverage “are not, in fact, part of the policy.” With respect to the advancement issue, the insureds argued that the advancement provisions require the insurer to advance defense expense, contending that as long as the claim “falls within the policy’s insuring agreement, it is covered unless and until there is a final determination that an exclusion applies.”

 

The insureds also argued that nowhere in the insurer’s policy does it state that the insurer can unilaterally withhold defense expense absent a court determination, and nothing in the insurer’s policy states that its exclusions are not subject to the “final determination” language in the second sentence of the advancement provisions.

 

In his June 26 opinion, Judge Lynch observed that “in essence, the central dispute among the parties centers on who bears the burden regarding whether defense costs are ultimately covered.” Judge Lynch, while noting that the insurer’s position regarding advancement “is not unreasonable on its face,” also noted that the insurer’s interpretation “places enormous emphasis on the word ‘covered.’” Judge Lynch said that the word’s inclusion in the advancement provisions “can hardly be said to make an unambiguous change in the provision’s literal meaning,” and “seems, at best, an unusual way to effectuate a fundamental change in the parties’ expectations.”

 

Because the court found the wordings to be ambiguous, it interpreted the provision in favor of the insureds – a result that the court noted “makes eminent sense, as adopting [the insurer’s] interpretation … would effectively render the advancement obligation worthless.” Judge Lynch concluded by saying that if the insurer “wants the unilateral right to refuse a payment called for in the policy, the policy should clearly state that right.” (citations omitted)

 

Whatever else might be said about the court’s opinion, it is certainly a sharp reminder of the importance of inclusion of adjudication requirements in the D&O policy’s conduct exclusions. If, in the absence of an adjudication requirement, the insurer may contend (as did the insurer in the Refco coverage litigation) that it has the unilateral right to determine coverage and withhold policy benefits, then the omission of adjudication requirements is perilous indeed for insureds.

 

But the crux of the dispute is whether the second level excess insurer’s policy contains exclusions not found in the primary or first level excess policies. The insureds apparently dispute that the exclusions are part of the second level excess policy (although the precise nature of that dispute is not clear from the face of the opinion). Assuming that the distinct exclusions are in fact part of the second level excess insurer’s policy, it does suggest that the insurance program is something less than pure “follow form” insurance. Indeed, many insurance programs that are characterized as “follow form” in fact have characteristics that may make them something less than follow form, a consideration that may sometimes be overlooked in the insurance transaction process.

 

It is of course true that each policy in a tower of insurance represents a separate contract. Excess insurers have every right to insist on terms differing from the underlying layers. The Refco coverage dispute highlights the pitfalls that can arise when (or perhaps if) an excess policy has terms that differ from the underlying policies. Indeed, the arguments raised by the second level excess insurer in the Refco coverage litigation show that differences in wording between the layers potentially can cause the different layers to operate quite differently, potentially in ways that may not necessarily be apparent or anticipated.

 

One final note has to do with the parties’ apparent dispute whether the exclusions are in fact part of the second level excess policy. It is hard to tell from the face of the opinion, but this dispute may be due to the process issues discussed briefly in my prior post. At least until the merits are sorted out, it may be premature to try to draw any conclusions. But as I noted in my prior post, and to the extent the dispute is due to process issues, this case may be a reminder of the opportunities for and the dangers of ambiguities in insurance placement process communications. From the perspective of every process participant, after a serious claim has arisen is a very difficult time to have to try to sort out, for example, whether or not exclusions are part of a policy.

 

Special thanks to Kelly Reyher for providing me with a copy of Judge Lynch's June 26 opinion.

 

And Finally: For those of us laboring in the salt mines of the blogosphere, it is always exciting when a fellow blogger steps out in some dramatic way. And so I was delighted to see in the July 16, 2008 Wall Street Journal that Mark Herrmann of the Drug and Device Law Blog published a book review critically analyzing the recent book "Side Effects" by Alison Bass. Kudos to Mark for his excellent and well written review.

May all new media practitioners continue to prosper and succeed. Gradus ad Parnassus.

D&O Insurance: The Adjudicated Fraud Exclusion

In a June 25, 2008 decision (here), the Delaware Superior Court (New Castle County) refused to apply a D&O policy adjudicated fraud exclusion to preclude coverage for the settlement, defense fees and costs incurred in connection with an underlying securities lawsuit.

 

The coverage action arose out of the AT&T Corporation Securities Litigation, the background regarding which can be found here. The case ultimately settled for $100 million. Prior to the settlement, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, narrowing the case. The case went to trial on the remaining issues, but the parties reached a settlement before the jury reached a verdict. The court in the subsequent coverage litigation specifically noted that “there is no dispute that no court has held, and no jury has every found, that AT&T or any of the defendants in the Common Stock Litigation engaged in any deliberate, dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal act or omission.”

 

The primary policy in the applicable D&O insurance program provided in its base form that the insurer “shall not be liable to make any payment in connection with any Claim: brought about or contributed to in fact by any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act or omission.” However, by Endorsement, this exclusion was deleted and replaced by language providing that he insurer is not obligated to pay any claim:

brought about or contributed to in fact by any deliberate dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act or omission, or any personal profit or advantage gained by any of the Directors and Officers to which they were not legally entitled and providing any such finding is material to the cause of action so adjudicated.

The primary carrier’s $20 million limit had been exhausted through payment of defense fees and costs. The first level excess carrier provided $25 million in “follow form” excess coverage. The excess carrier refused to pay either defense fees or contribute toward the settlement, claiming that the fraud exclusion bars coverage.

 

The Delaware court first turned to the question of what law to apply. The court ultimately determined that New York law governed. Interestingly, the basis of the court’s decision was language in the fourth level excess carrier’s policy. Because the court assumed that the parties’ intended that only one jurisdiction’s law would govern the entire program, the court found that the fourth level excess carrier’s language controlled even though the fourth level excess policy sits above the first level excess carrier’s policy.

 

The court then turned to the merits of the insurance coverage issue. The court paraphrased the exclusion as precluding coverage “for deliberate, dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal acts or omissions upon ‘such finding is material to the cause of action so adjudicated.’”

 

The court said that “no fact finder considered all the evidence and rendered a ‘finding” or verdict.” The court also observed that neither the summary judgment ruling nor the settlement adjudicated anything.

 

The court also specifically ruled that “the ‘adjudication’ contemplated in the policy does not, as [the excess insurer] asserts, mean an adjudication within the coverage dispute. It means an adjudication in the underlying action.” The court specifically noted that the excess insurer “cannot argue its way around” the change that the Endorsement introduced in the dishonesty exclusion wording. The court said the position argued by the excess carrier is “belied by the plain language of the policy.” The court added that “it is not a close question.” The court also observed that “to hold the fraud exclusion applicable” to a securities claim in the absence of an adjudication “would effectively eviscerate the purpose of the policy.”

 

The precise wording at issue in the AT&T coverage case is not typically used today. But the court’s analysis is nevertheless important as it pertains to the adjudication requirements for the typical adjudicated fraud exclusion that is found in many policies today. The court’s refusal to read into the clause a right by the insurer to adjudicate the issue of fraud in a separate coverage case amounts to a ruling that an adjudication fraud exclusion does not permit the fraud issue to be separately litigated, at least absent language to the contrary.

 

This is an important holding because while most contemporary D&O policies have an “adjudicated” fraud exclusion, there are also still some other policies that allow the insurer to litigate the fraud exclusion in a separate proceeding. The court’s holding in the AT&T case underscores the point that, without the separate proceeding language, the “”adjudication” referenced in the fraud exclusion pertains to the underlying proceeding, and the fraud exclusion therefore is inapplicable if there has been no fraud determination in the underlying proceeding.

 

The excess carrier’s inability to further litigate the fraud issue in the ATT&T coverage case also demonstrates the value to the policyholder of fraud exclusion language that does not permit separate adjudication. The presence of separate adjudication language potentially could have permitted the AT&T coverage litigation to go forward and potentially could have led to a finding that could have barred coverage. For that reason, a fraud exclusion that permits separate adjudication is undesirable from the policyholder’s standpoint. In the current insurance environment, most policyholders should be able to obtain adjudicated fraud exclusion language without any provision allowing separate adjudication.

 

A couple of final points about the decision. The first is that yet again a coverage dispute has arisen in which the excess carrier contested coverage after the primary carrier’s limits were exhausted. As I have frequently noted (most recently here), the D&O insurance industry continues to be challenged with issues arising as losses escalate through the insurance tower. The problem of excess insurer coverage disputes is an increasingly important issue that the industry must address.

 

Second, the court’s resolution of the question of the law to be applied to the first level excess carrier’s policy based on language in the fourth level excess carrier’s policy is interesting but at the same time potentially troublesome. The court’s reasoning seems practical and informed by a desire to reach a common sense solution; it is logical that only one jurisdiction’s law   should apply to the entire tower.

The troublesome part is the court’s reference to upper layer policy provisions to resolve lower layer issues. The lower layer insurers often are unaware of provisions in the upper layer policies, and problems could emerge if the view were to develop that the meaning of lower layer policies can be discerned from language in upper layer policies. Maybe this concern reads too much into the court’s opinion, but the mere suggestion is troubling.

 

Very special thanks to Francis Pileggi at the Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog (here) for alerting me to the AT&T coverage decision and providing me a copy.

 

Nearer to the Heart’s Desire: A July 12, 2008 Cleveland Plain Dealer article (here) reports that 34 Ohio charitable organizations will share a $14 million pool of uncollected money from a class action lawsuit. The settlement arose out of a class action lawsuit based on an auto insurer’s alleged overcharges for uninsured motorist coverage. The case settled for $51 million, but when some of the funds went unclaimed, the plaintiff class’s attorney succeeded in having the doctrine of “cy pres” applied to the unclaimed funds so that, rather than going back to the defendant insurer, the funds would go the charitable organization.

 

The term "cy pres" is law French, derived from the phrase  cy pres comme possible  -- meaning as near as possible or as close as possible to the original intent. The phrase is sometimes relevant in the trust and estates context when the trustor’s or the testator’s original intentions can no longer be fulfilled due to changed circumstances.

 

The concept of a cy pres settlement is actually not new, although it apparently has gained popularity recently among certain plaintiffs’ attorneys. Ted Frank wrote an interesting article earlier this year entitled “Cy Pres Settlements” (here) in which he discusses other recent cy pres settlements and some of the problems they present.

 

The phrase has a certain poetic quality, and not merely because of its gallic residue. The very concept is almost literary, as it requires an exercise of the imagination to implement. I have always felt this attribute of the doctrine is nicely summarized in the lines from The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam: “Ah Love! could you and I conspire/To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire/Would not we shatter it to bits—and then/Remold it nearer to the heart’s desire!”

 

And Finally: In a recent post (here), I discussed an academic paper in which three Stanford professors analyzed four corporate governance companies’ governance ratings. In the post, I expressly invited the governance rating companies, if they so desired, to provide a response to my discussion of the academic paper.

 

In reply to my invitation, Ric Marshall, the Chief Analyst of The Corporate Library, and Kimberly Gladman, the Director of Research and Ratings at The Corporate Library, sent me a response, which I have added to the end of my original post.

 

Because Ric and Kimberly make a number of interesting points, I urge all readers to refer back to the now updated post (here) to see their comments.

D&O Insurance: A Bonfire of Policy Application Issues

A June 18, 2008 opinion (here) by Judge Gerald Lynch in the coverage litigation between former Refco directors and officers and one of the company’s excess D&O insurers presents a veritable conflagration of policy application issues, including perennial questions concerning warranties, severability, and imputation, as well as a host of related issues arising from the policy procurement process itself.

 

Background: In the year preceding Refco’s ill-fated August 2005 IPO, Refco had maintained a $30 million D&O liability insurance program (the 2004-2005 program). In connection with its IPO, Refco obtained a total of $70 million of D&O insurance for the period from August 11, 2005 to August 11, 2006 (the 2005-2006 program). Both programs were arranged in multiple layers, with a primary carrier and several excess carriers.

 

In connection with placement of the 2004-2005 program, Refco completed the primary carrier’s insurance application (the “Application”). In addition, one of the excess insurers (and the ultimate litigant in the coverage dispute) required that the company submit a Warranty Letter on behalf of all insureds, affirming that no person for whom the insurance was proposed is “cognizant of any fact, circumstance, situation, act, error or omissions which … might afford grounds for any Claim.”

 

The Warranty Letter, submitted to the excess carrier on January 21, 2005, was signed by Phillip Bennett, Refco’s CEO. It later was revealed that Refco had an undisclosed $430 million receivable due from an entity Bennett controlled. The company subsequently collapsed, and Bennett, among other has pled guilty to an array of criminal offenses.  

 

At least as appears from the June 18 opinion, there were no additional applications or warranties in connection with the placement of the 2005-2006 program.

 

Following Refco’s October 2005 collapse, the company’s directors and officers were the target of extensive litigation, for which they sought defense expense coverage under the 2005-2006 program. The primary and first layer excess carriers advanced their entire limits (totaling $17.5 million) in payment of defense expense, subject to repayment of it is determined that there is no coverage under the policies.

 

The Coverage Denial:

The second level excess insurer, by letter dated March 6, 2006, denied coverage for the claims under its 2005-2006 policies. As the basis for its denial, the second level excess insurer relied on the representations in the Warranty letter and Refco’s failure to answer question 12(b) on the primary carrier’s Application (which asked whether any proposed insured was “aware of any fact, circumstance or situation” that might give rise to a claim).

 

The second level excess insurer also relied on a “Knowledge Exclusion” that was included in the insurer’s policy when issued in March 2006 (which was at or about the same time as the insurer issue its coverage denial). The Knowledge Exclusion essentially provides that the second level excess insurer is not liable for any loss (including defense expense) “in connection with any claim arising out of, based upon or attributable to any claim, fact or circumstance disclosed or required to be disclosed” in Question 12(b) of the Application.

 

The Coverage Litigation:

In May 2007, the second level excess insurer initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking a judicial declaration of noncoverage under its 2005-2006 policy, largely for reasons enumerated in its March 2006 denial letter. Several of the individual Refco officers and directors filed an answer and counterclaim, among other things seeking an injunction compelling the second level insurer to advance defense fees. The bankruptcy court entered an order in October 2007 requiring the insurer to advance defense expense, which the insurer has now done, as a result of which its $10 million limit is now depleted.

 

The second level excess carrier refilled its declaratory judgment complaint in federal district court, again seeking a judicial declaration of noncoverage. The individuals refilled their counterclaims, seeking a determination of coverage. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, which were the subject of the June 18 opinion.

 

The June 18 Opinion

In reviewing the court’s rulings, it is important to note that the summary judgment motions were filed pre-discovery. This unusual procedural posture was a critical factor in the court’s decisions process, as the court, pursuant to established authority, was reluctant to interject merits-based rulings where further discovery might provide additional factual context.

 

The insureds argued that the Warranty Letter had been submitted in connection with the placement of the 2004-2005 program and therefore was not a part of the second level carrier’s 2005-2006 policy. The insurer for its part argued that the Warranty Letter did relate to the placement of the 2005-2006 policy and that in any event it relied on the Warranty Letter when making underwriting decisions in connection with the 2005-2006 policy. The insurer submitted an affidavit from its underwriter in support of its assertions. Judge Lynch concluded that “genuine issues of material fact abound as to whether the Warranty Letter is properly part of the 2005-2006 [policy].”

 

The insureds further argued that in any event, the applicable “severability provision” bars the insurer from imputing Bennett’s knowledge to the other insureds and therefore the Warranty Letter could not serve as a basis to deny coverage to them. The severability provision was contained in an Endorsement to the Primary Policy. The insurer argued that the severability provision restricted the imputation of knowledge exclusively to statements in the primary insurer’s Application, and therefore it had no bearing on the second level excess insurer’s ability to rely on the Warranty Letter, which was not part of the Application. Judge Lynch agreed, and he therefore denied the insureds’ summary judgment motion based on the application severability provision.

 

Judge Lynch similarly rejected the second level excess insurer’s attempt to rely on Bennett’s failure Question 12(b) on the Application. Judge Lynch found that the insurer’s issuance of its 2005-2006 policy without challenging the omission of an answer to Question 12(b) was a waiver of any objection to coverage on that basis.

 

With respect to the second level excess carrier’s attempt to rely on the so-called Knowledge Exclusion to deny coverage, the insureds argued that the insurer’s coverage binder had not listed the Knowledge Exclusion as an endorsement that was to be added to the policy, nor had the company’s broker authorized the addition of the Knowledge Exclusion. The insureds argued that the insurer had “unilaterally changed the terms of the 2005-2006 [policy] after learning of the events that would give rise to a claim.”

 

The insurer countered that the company’s broker had authorized the addition of the exclusion. The insureds contended this response “fundamentally misconstrues” the meaning of the broker’s communications. These arguments clearly reflect the detailed particulars and disputed meaning of communications between the broker and the underwriter, which Judge Lynch found suffices to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on the issue.

 

The insureds further arged that the severability of exclusions language in the primary policy precluded application of the Knowledge Exclusion to them. They argued that even if Bennett’s knowledge triggered the exclusion, the excluded state of mind could not be imputed to them. Judge Lynch found that the severability of exclusions provision in the primary policy applied only to the exclusions in the primary policy, and not to the Knowledge Exclusion which was found only in the second level excess insurer’s policy.

 

Discussion:

The court’s opinion does not represent a definitive conclusion either for or against coverage under the policy. Indeed, at its most basic level, the court’s opinion merely represents a determination to allow discovery as a prelude to a later merits-based determination.

 

But the opinion raises too many questions about the potential availability to insurers of coverage defenses, and about the limitations of insureds’ policy protections, for the opinion not to raise a host of concerns. The concerns fall into two basic categories – that is, the concerns that are substantive and the concerns that are procedural.

 

The substantive concerns are numerous and relate to many of highest profile issues in the D&O insurance arena, including the use, applicability and duration of warranties and warranty letters; the extent of protection afforded to “innocent insureds” by severability provisions (including both application severability and exclusion severability); and the extent to which insureds may (or may not) be able rely on policy protections in the primary policy to preclude the assertion of policy defenses by an excess insurer.

 

The procedural concerns are perhaps equally significant for practitioners in the field. Judge Lynch’s opinion underscores the potential importance of communications between broker and underwriter and is a reminder of the opportunities for and dangers of ambiguities in communications (or, as the insureds would argue, supposed ambiguities). Perhaps these issues will get sorted out in later decisions in the case, but current state of play in the case raises troubling concerns about the pitfalls of the policy procurement process while providing little guidance (except by negative inference) about how those pitfalls might be avoided in the future.

 

There may yet be further ruling in the case that will clarify the issues. But the opinion nevertheless highlights that many of the issues the industry has been struggling with for the last decade – including in particular severability and imputation issues – remain very much alive and continue to pose significant concerns, and indeed may have edges that have not previously been addressed or even contemplated.

 

Two final observations about the case. The first is that the parties appear to have exhausted at least $27.5 million of the $70 million tower on defense expense alone, which is yet another reminder of the extraordinary expense involved in catastrophic type claims (a topic I discussed in a recent post, here).

 

The other observation is that yet again a critical D&O coverage decision has arisen in a case involving defenses raised by a follow-form excess insurer (see my prior comments on this issue here). The issues involved here underscore the myriad of difficulties that potentially can arise as losses escalate through a multilayer program. I do not mean to suggest any views one way or the other about the merits of the excess carrier’s positions in this case. Indeed, given the circumstances involved in this claim, it is unsurprising that the insurers might raise questions. Nevertheless, the specific issues in dispute suggest a level of flex in the interplay between the primary and excess layers that many policyholders would find disconcerting.

 

Special thanks to Michael Early for sending along a copy of the opinion. I hasten to add that the views and opinions expressed in this post are exclusively my own.

 

My recent post discussing whether Phillip Bennett's use of the D&O insurance proceeds was an appropriate factor in his criminal sentencing can be found here. My prior post regarding the D&O insurance implications of Bennett's cooperation with the class action plaintiffs can be found here.

 

What Awaits Those Who Spurn Berkshire: A June 25, 2008 Bloomberg article (here) reports that while recently addressing a group of Toronto business executives, Warren Buffett was asked what makes people want to sell their companies to Berkshire. Buffett reportedly said that he tells a prospective seller to think of their company as a work of art:

You can sell it to Berkshire and we’ll put it in the Metropolitan Museum; it’ll have a wing all by itself; it’ll be there forever. Or you can sell it to some porn shop operator, and he’ll take the painting and he’ll make the boobs a little bigger and he’ll stick it in the window, and some other guy will come along in a raincoat, and he’ll buy it.

And Finally: If you have not yet seen this amazing catch by the Fresno Grizzlies’ ball girl, you have to watch this video. It is truly marvelous. [UPDATE: I have to add that a reader advised me that the video may be a hoax, refer here -- alas. It is still an awsome video.]

Some Thoughts About the Towers Perrin D&O Survey Report

Last week, Towers Perrin released its report of the firm’s 2007 Survey of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Purchasing Trends, which can be accessed here. The firm’s annual survey report is widely read throughout the D&O insurance industry, and is generally viewed as an important information resource. Every year, the survey report is full of interesting observations, and this year’s version is no exception. The report merits reading at length and in full.

 

But while the survey report is widely read, I don’t know if the survey’s limitations are always fully understood or appreciated.

 

The report itself expressly acknowledges that it is based on a “self-selecting non-probability sample” The significance of this fact is briefly explained in the final two sentences at the bottom of the report’s preface page, where the report states that:

A non-probability sample is one in which respondents choose – or are selected – to participate. Such a sample is therefore not random. Because not all potential respondents are equally likely to participate, survey biases must be considered when interpreting results.

It is this latter point – that is, that “survey biases” must be considered when interpreting the survey’s results – that is all too often overlooked when the survey’s results are cited.

 

Let me just say that in referring to “bias” here, I am not in any way criticizing the report or its authors. The word “bias” as commonly understood has a negative connotation, but in this context, the word bias simply represents a mathematical property. But while the word bias should not suggest any negative connotations here, it should also be understood that, as stated in Wikipedia (here), “a biased sample causes problems because any statistic computed from that sample has the potential to be consistently erroneous.”

 

The survey results that most clearly reflect the sample bias are in the report’s discussion of what it calls “broker rankings.” As a footnote makes clear, the table relates solely to retail brokers, and does not contain any information about wholesale brokers. But even with respect to retail brokers, the table on which the “ranking” is based shows that over 88% of the survey responses relate to just four brokerages. Nor are these four survey-dominant brokerages the nationwide industry giants – to the contrary, these four participants would more accurately be described as strong regional players with an important presence in their respective geographic regions. The three largest nationwide industry giants meanwhile are represented collectively in only about 1.2% of responses.

 

My observations here should not in any way be taken as a criticism of these four survey-predominating brokerages. I will stipulate that they are in fact strong and significant industry participants. But no informed person actually thinks they are the four largest D&O brokers in the country. They are undeniably the leading firms in getting their clients to complete the Towers Perrin survey. Again, no criticism here; I salute their enterprising spirit in achieving this result. However, no one should confuse the survey “ranking” with an actual market share ranking.

 

I emphasize this aspect of the survey report because the bias in the broker participation population has pervasive effects throughout the entire report. For example, the four survey-predominant brokerages all have portfolios that are heavily weighted toward the technology and life sciences industries. Not too surprisingly, therefore, the two industry groups most heavily represented among both public and private company survey participants are “Technology” and “Biotechnology & Pharmaceuticals.” These two industry groups together represent about half of both public and private company survey participants.

 

Obviously, this heavy concentration of survey participants in just these two industry groups does not correspond to the economy as a whole. But this industry concentration – which is a direct result of the concentration of the survey population in the portfolios of a small handful of brokerages – has very significant ramifications for the report’s other findings. The report itself expressly recognizes this in the portion where it discusses the distribution of survey respondents’ primary insurance among the various leading carriers. The report's analysis recognizes that the distribution of primary insurers is directly affected by the industry distribution, and the report examines this effect in detail.

 

But while the report examines in the impact of the survey population industry distribution on the distribution of business among primary insurers, the report does not elsewhere make this analysis. For example, the report does not similarly consider whether or not the industry concentration is relevant to the distribution of business among excess carriers, nor does it consider the possible impact of the concentration of the survey population on the other findings in the report.

 

I emphasize these points because I think they show a couple of important things. First, not only is the survey population concentrated into the portfolios of just a small handful of brokers, but this concentration has important implications for the rest of the report. It clearly affects, for example, the industry concentration of the survey population, which in turn affects the reported distribution of primary insurance among the various carriers.

 

These apparent effects raise the question whether the concentration of the survey population has similar effects on the other areas examined in the survey report. While the impact of the population concentration is most self-evident in the industry distribution, it is more difficult to tell from the report whether the other components of the report’s findings are similarly affected by the survey population’s concentration in the portfolios of just a very small handful of brokers.

 

It is a fair observation that Towers Perrin makes survey involvement available to all industry participants, not just the four survey-predominant firms. It is also a fair observation that if survey involvement were more widespread, many of the concerns noted above might be alleviated. But what has happened is that a few brokerage firms have clearly made their clients’ participation in the survey a top priority, while other brokerage firms have obviously decided to take a different approach, for reasons that one might speculate are related.

 

None of this is meant as a criticism of Towers Perrin, which should be saluted for performing the survey and distributing the survey report without charge. Moreover, Towers Perrin itself acknowledges that there may be biases arising from the survey population distribution. So I don’t mean to criticize Towers Perrin, or anyone else for that matter. Rather, my analysis here is presented as a petition to all industry participants that in using the survey data, they should explicitly recognize and acknowledge the sample bias limitations inherent in the report. In particular, no one should try to make the survey results represent anything more than they actually do, particularly with respect to the concentrations noted above.

 

The Option Backdating Case Resolution Scorecard: Over at the Securities Litigation Watch, Adam Savett has prepared an updated options backdating case resolution scorecard, which can be accessed here. Savett has a number of interesting observations about case dismissals and the speed of case resolution. The D&O Diary’s own scorecard of options backdating lawsuit dismissals, denials and settlement can be accessed here.

D&O Insurance: A Criminal Sentencing Factor?

In a prior post (here), I commented on former Refco CEO Phillip Bennett’s extraordinary cooperation with the Refco class action plaintiffs, following his entry of a guilty plea in the criminal case against him. As might have been anticipated, Bennett is hoping that his cooperation with the class plaintiffs, as well as the Bankruptcy Trustee, will win him leniency in his June 19, 2008 criminal sentencing. The government opposes leniency, arguing in reliance upon, among other things, Bennett’s acceptance of D&O insurance proceeds to pay his defense expenses.

 

In February 2008, Bennett entered a guilty plea, without a plea agreement, to all 20 counts against him, including conspiracy, securities fraud, filing of false statements, wire fraud, bank fraud, money laundering and lying to Refco’s auditors. He faces a statutory maximum of 315 years’ imprisonment.

 

In Bennett’s June 1, 2008 sentencing memorandum (here), which was made public on June 12, his lawyers urged the judge to impose a sentence “for a term of years well short of the remainder of Mr. Bennett’s life.” His lawyers cited, among other reasons supposedly warranting leniency, that Bennett has “offered his cooperation to both the Litigation Trustee of the Refco Estate and the Refco Civil Class Action Plaintiffs, in their efforts to return hundreds of dollars to those who lost money in the Refco bankruptcy.” His lawyers further argued that his cooperation in those cases is “an indication of the extent to which Mr. Bennett has sought to make amends for the harm he has caused, and further reason to impose a sentence well below an actual or de facto term of life in prison.”

 

In its June 6, 2008 response (here), also made public on June 12, the government urged that “given the duration and intensity of the fraud, Bennett should receive no leniency.” In urging the maximum, the government pulled out all rhetorical stops; the government argued:

Bennett’s willful frauds on Refco’s investors, purchasers, customers, counterparties, banks, the public and others resulted in countless victims being defrauded of billions of dollars, causing uncompensated losses, even after the dissolution of Refco’s assets and large legal settlements of well over $1.5 billion, and of course drove Refco into bankruptcy. The defendant’s criminal conduct, motivated by greed that drove him to lie and scheme in ways previously unimaginable, brought him wealth that has scarcely been seen before in a … fraud case, launching Bennett into the rarefied air of a billionaire. In terms of scope, length, sophistication, harm, and criminal benefit, Bennett stands on a plateau of criminality that frankly makes comparisons difficult. Accordingly, the Government respectfully submits that an appropriately stiff term of imprisonment, consistent with the sentences imposed in the similar cases discussed above, should be imposed in order to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just and fair punishment, and deter potential corporate criminals.

In this same vein, the government showed little respect for Bennett’s plea for leniency made in reliance on his cooperation with the civil claimants (or at least “some” of the civil claimants, as the government emphasizes). The government said only that while the Court is not prohibited from considering such putative cooperation, “that does not mean that the Court necessarily should give the defendant credit for such cooperation.”

 

Among other reasons why it contends Bennett should received no leniency, the government specifically argued that “rather than limit the impact of his fraud, he knowingly accepted millions of dollars from Refco’s directors and officers insurance (the premiums for which, of course, were paid with fraud proceeds) to pay his legal bills, money that Bennett knew he had no right to claim.” The government added in a footnote that Bennett was also aware that in light of the government’s asset forfeiture case “there would be no money left to repay the insurance company upon his conviction. In substance, at the same time that Bennett was supposedly accepting full responsibility for his actions, he was in fact, taking millions of dollars from insurance companies under false pretenses. Notably, Bennett has not offered to cooperate with these civil litigants.”

 

Bennett may well deserve the maximum sentence as a result of his wrongdoing. The government may persuasively argue that Bennett only belatedly acknowledged his guilt, and that his late-arriving contrition ought not to be the basis of leniency, particularly where the delay exacerbated the harm he caused. But I wonder about the government’s attempt to bootstrap this argument by citing Bennett’s use of the D&O insurance proceeds to finance his defense.  

 

Let me just say as a preliminary matter that in expressing the views below, I am expressing no opinions about the carriers’ rights or interests. I am unfamiliar with the specifics of Refco’s D&O insurance coverage and none of the opinions below should be taken as opinion about Refco’s carriers’ coverage positions in this case. The carriers certainly  have their own grievances based on these circumstances, but I am not addressing those grievances here.  My opinions here relate solely to the government’s arguments against leniency based on Bennett’s use of the D&O policy proceeds.

 

My first concern with the government’s argument is the general principle it represents. The government may be justified in arguing that Bennett knew all along that his conduct was fraudulent. But take the principle on which the government seeks to rely outside the context of this specific case. Defending against a criminal charge is extraordinarily expensive, and one of the purposes of D&O insurance is to provide for the advancement of post-indictment criminal defense expense. For many criminally accused corporate officials, particularly those whose former company is bankrupt, the D&O insurance may be their only means of defending themselves. An insured forced to rely on this last line of defense should not be have to be concerned that accepting these contractual rights will put them at hazard that it might later be used against them if they ultimately face a criminal sentencing.

 

My second concern is that the circumstances Bennett’s case presents arguably are a product of the structure of D&O policies. The policies of course preclude coverage for loss based on criminal misconduct. But at the same time, the policies provide for the advancement of post-indictment criminal defense expense, subject only to an unsecured obligation to repay in the event a coverage preclusion is triggered.

 

In the course of events, it is inevitable that some insurance proceeds will be advanced in defense of insureds whose guilt is later established. The carrier can then seek to recover the advanced expense, which the insured is obliged to repay. But as an unsecured creditor, the carrier may not be able to recoup its costs in many instances. Bennett may well have known he would never be able to repay the amounts advanced, but I suspect that most criminal defendants know that, if called upon, they too could never hope to repay the amounts advanced in their defense. If awareness of an inability to repay is bar to seeking leniency, the ability to seek leniency would be unavailable to many corporate criminal defendants.

 

Carriers could refuse to cover criminal defense expenses or require more security before advancing criminal defense expense. Of course, any carrier trying to do either of these things would sell no more policies. D&O policies are structured as they are because that is what the marketplace requires for the policies to be commercially competitive. Presumably the carriers believe they are adequately compensated for the risks inherent in the structure.

 

The government may well be justified overall in arguing that Bennett should receive the maximum sentence. But I wonder: should an insurance outcome made possible as a result of the requirements of commercial competition really serve as a factor in the length of someone’s criminal sentence?

 

I suspect that some readers may have strong views on this topic. I hope readers will be willing to publish their views using the blog’s comment feature.

 

Hat tip to the White Collar Crime Prof Blog (here) for the links to the sentencing memoranda.

 

Speakers’ Corner: On June 17, 2008, I will be in Quebec City at the spring meeting of the Casualty Actuarial Society, speaking on a panel entitled “Subprime Issues for D&O.” The conference sessions agenda can be found here. My fellow panelists include Stephanie Plancich of NERA Economic Consulting and David Bradford of Advisen.

D&O Insurance: Defense Expense and Limits Adequacy

For many companies, one of the hardest parts of the D&O insurance transaction is determining how much insurance to buy. Against a backdrop of basic affordability, the company must consider complex issues of limits adequacy – that is, how much insurance is “enough”? These issues are even more fraught in a time of generally rising claims severity (about which, refer here).

 

As discussed below, recent developments in one current claim underscore the fact that in addition to rising settlement levels, escalating defense expense is an increasingly important part of the limits adequacy equation. In addition, these recent developments also demonstrate that many related issues should also weigh into the limits adequacy analysis, and these same issues also have important implications for the structure of the insurance program, as well.

 

University of Denver Law Professor J. Robert Brown, Jr. has a post today (here) on his indispensable blog, The Race to the Bottom, discussing developments involving Paul Barnaba, a former employee of bankrupt auto parts supplier Collins & Aikman. Barnaba is caught up in the criminal case involving David Stockman, the former head of the OMB under Ronald Reagan, who was C&A’s CEO from 2001, when Stockman’s private equity fund took control of C&A, until shortly before the company’s 2005 bankruptcy. Barnaba is described in the indictment as “employed by the purchasing department” and identified as Director of Financial Analysis and eventually Director and Vice President of Purchasing for the Plastics Division. Background regarding the criminal prosecution can be found here.

 

As Professor Brown explained in an earlier post (here), Barnaba has moved to sever his criminal case from the other criminal defendants and to set the case for an early trial date. Barnaba asserts that, due to his indictment, he faces overwhelming personal and professional difficulties. He also argues that the protracted criminal proceedings threaten him with financial ruin, and he contends further that the proceeds of the applicable D&O policy “are quickly dwindling.”

 

The government opposed Barnaba’s motion, arguing among other things that Barnaba’s concerns about the dwindling D&O insurance are “wholly speculative and unsubstantiated.”

 

In his Reply to the government’s opposition, Barnaba vigorously disagrees with the government’s attempt to belittle his concerns about the dwindling D&O policy. His Reply explains that Collins & Aikman has a $50 million insurance program arranged in four layers. This insurance “provides coverage to a wide variety of former Collins & Aikman executives and employees,” including not only the criminal defendants, but also “those who have been sued or subpoenaed in the civil SEC matter, and those who have been sued or subpoenaed in various class actions and other civil suits.”

 

Barnaba explains in his Reply that the first $15 million layer of coverage was exhausted on or about June 15, 2007, and the second $15 million layer was exhausted on or about March 31, 2008 (for defense work completed through February 2008). As Barnaba notes, “the second $15 million layer of coverage was exhausted in nine months at a rate of approximately $1.67 million per month” and he adds that the “monthly rate was higher at the end of than at the beginning of this nine-month period.”

 

In any event, for the defense work completed in March 2008 and later, only $20 million of coverage remains. Barnaba argues that “[a]ssuming a monthly burn rate of $2 million to $3 million, which is realistic and likely conservative, all policy proceeds will be exhausted sometime between mid-September 2008 and December 31, 2008. This is not speculative.”

 

It is hard not to sympathize with Barnaba’s plight, regardless of the merits of the criminal matter. He has been caught in the maelstrom. The outcome of his motion to sever and to set a trial date remains to be seen, but it is hard to imagine a court agreeing to allow a high-profile criminal case like this one to be tried piecemeal. The D&O insurance could well be gone long before the case finally goes to trial.

 

Separate and apart from the actual merits of Barnaba’s motion are the implications of his plight for the issue of D&O insurance limits adequacy.

 

The first and most basic point is the importance of defense expense in the limits adequacy analysis. The potential for defense expense to exhaust or substantially deplete the available limits is most obvious in a catastrophic claim like the one involving Collins & Aikman, but even in less catastrophic circumstances, accumulating defense expense can substantially reduce the indemnity protection available even in a large insurance program. And the insurance is supposed to able to respond adequately in all circumstances, even the unlikely event of a catastrophic claim. In considering the requirements that a catastrophic claim can present, it is important to note that the aggregate defense expense related to the Collins & Aikman claim consumed $15 million in just nine months.

 

The second point is that one of the problems in the Collins & Aikman claim is that so many different people are accessing the policy, for a wide variety of different matters. The potential for the policy limits to drain away through so many different access points is perhaps inherent in the current standard D&O policy structure, in which so many different people are included as “insured persons” and so many different kinds of matters fall within the definition of a covered “claim.”

 

While this breadth of coverage is generally viewed as a positive thing from the policyholder’s perspective, it has the inherent potential (a potential that is being dramatically realized in the Collins & Aikman claim) for accelerated policy erosion and even depletion. The erosion potential inherent in the breadth of available policy coverage is a consideration that is too infrequently considered in connection with the question of limits adequacy.

 

Third, the problem Barnaba faces is not just his alone – all of the other “insured persons” are also facing imminent insurance program depletion. Once the available insurance is used up, these individuals will face continued complex litigation without further insurance available to defend or indemnify themselves. Among other things, it could prove difficult and painful for the defendants in the civil lawsuits to extricate themselves without insurance available.

 

All of that said, the solutions to these problems are not easy. With the benefit of hindsight, it is tempting to argue that the company should have carried higher limits. The fact is that many companies of Collins & Aikman’s pre-catastrophe size (the company had a market capitalization of approximately $500 million a year before it went bankrupt) choose to carry D&O limits lower than the $50 million that Collins & Aikman carried. Many companies are unwilling or unable to buy greater limits.

 

In the end the analysis comes down to the perennial question of limits adequacy – that is, how much insurance is enough?

 

In light of the escalating average claims severity, and of the numerous implications from Barnaba’s plight (including the catastrophic potential for defense expense to deplete policy limits), it may be time to rethink commonplace concepts of limits adequacy, because past notions may no longer be sufficient. Average claims severity is increasing. Defense expense does have the catastrophic potential to exhaust policy limits. In addition, new developments, such as the growing opt-out phenomenon (discussed most recently here), pose additional challenges to the traditional limits adequacy analysis.

 

Increased program limits alone, however, may not solve all of the problems. Indeed, it could be argued that even were higher limits available, they might not adequately protect Barnaba and the other Collins & Aikman defendants. Given the astonishing potential for defense expense to consume available insurance (I mean, $15 million in nine months, for crying out loud), even a substantially larger insurance program than the one Collins & Aikman maintained might prove to be insufficient.

 

Part of the solution has to be program structure. Clearly, a key reason that the Collins & Aikman program is melting away is that so many different people are accessing it. One way that well-advised corporate officials can ensure they are not left without insurance to protect them as individuals is through supplemental D&O insurance structures dedicated solely to their own protection. These supplemental structures might take any one of a number of different forms, including for example, excess Side A coverage for a specified group of individuals, or even through an individual D&O insurance policy (so-called IDL coverage). While there are a variety of ways this supplemental insurance might be structured, the crisis Barnaba faces underscores the importance of addressing these issues as part of the insurance acquisition process.

 

One final thought about Barnaba. That is, the typical insurance acquisition process conversation is usually limited to considerations involving the exposures of the most senior corporate officials. The possible exposures of “supporting cast” employees such as Barnaba are usually not a central part of the dialog. For that reason, it is relatively unlikely that the deployment of supplement insurance structures, as important as they are, would do much for someone like Barnaba.

 

In the end, someone at Barnaba’s level is, in all likelihood, going to be (as in the case of Barnaba himself) dependent on the continued availability of insurance proceeds under the traditional D&O insurance policy. This final point underscores the importance of a thorough review of all considerations involved in the issue of limits adequacy, including in particular the number of persons potentially dependent on the policy for protection. As I noted, it may be time to reconsider traditional notions of limits adequacy, in light of all of these considerations.

 

Very special thanks to Professor Brown for providing a heads up about his post.

 

Brocade Settles Options Timing-Related Securities Class Action Lawsuit: According to the company’s June 2, 2008 press release (here), Brocade Communications has reached an agreement to settle the options-backdating related securities class action lawsuit pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers, in exchange for an agreement to pay $160 million. Background regarding the litigation can be found here.

 

I have added the Brocade settlement to my table of options backdating-related settlements and dismissals, which can be accessed here.

 

A WSJ.com Law Blog post about the settlement can be found here.

Former Refco CEO Aids Class Action Plaintiffs--An Insurance Issue?

In a development that is in my experience absolutely unprecedented, Phillip Bennett, the former CEO of defunct futures trader Refco, after having pled guilty to criminal charges, is actively cooperating with the lead plaintiffs’ counsel in the civil securities lawsuit pending against the company and its former directors and officers. As discussed below, Bennett’s conduct, in addition to being highly unusual, could also raise some potentially significant insurance coverage questions.

 

A detailed description of the circumstances surrounding Bennett’s cooperation in the class action can be found in a May 28, 2008 article (here) by Bloomberg News reporter Thom Weidlich. The circumstances are also discussed in a WSJ.com Law Blog post (here).

 

Within weeks after it went public in August 2005, Refco announced that Bennett had hidden $430 million in bad debts from the company’s auditors and investors. The details of the scandal can be found here. IPO investors initiated securities class action lawsuits almost immediately. (Refer here for background regarding the class action lawsuit; a website devoted to the lawsuit can be found here.).

 

On February 15, 2008, Bennett pled guilty to bank fraud, conspiracy, money laundering and 17 other charges.

 

In connection with Bennett’s upcoming June 19, 2008 sentencing, counsel for the lead plaintiffs in the class action lawsuit – Sean Coffey of the Bernstein Litowitz firm and Stuart Grant of the Grant & Eisenhofer firm – submitted a letter to the court to provide information they hope “proves helpful as the Court considers the appropriate sentence.” A copy of their letter can be found here.

 

According to the attorneys’ letter, after Bennett pled guilty, his lawyer approached the class counsel to offer cooperation in connection with the civil case. According to their letter, “Bennett has helped to advance our understanding about matters within Refco, providing insights not readily discernable from our ongoing review of documents or cross-examination of deposition witnesses who are almost universally aligned with the defendants.” The letter goes on to report that Bennett has identified “‘red flags’ and other circumstances that would have alerted a diligent gatekeeper that things at Refco were not what they appeared to be.”

 

The letter states that Bennett’s cooperation has “materially strengthened the class claims against a number of defendants.” The defendants specifically mentioned in the letter are Thomas H. Lee, the IPO Underwriters, Grant Thorton, and Mayer Brown. The letter states that:

 

In the opinion of Lead Counsel, his assistance has substantially enhanced the ability of Lead Plaintiffs to hold those defendants more fully accountable for their role in the events resulting in the devastating losses suffered by Refco investors.

 

The Bloomberg article and the WSJ.com Law Blog post linked to above contain remarks from several commentators as to whether the letter will benefit Bennett as his sentencing.

 

There are a number of interesting things about the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ letter. Among other things, Bennett’s cooperation holds the prospect of shifting to Refco’s outside professionals some of the financial consequences for Bennett’s own criminal misconduct, based on their supposed failure to stop or catch him.

 

Another interesting thing, interesting to me at least, is the potential effect from Bennett’s behavior on the D&O insurance coverage that might otherwise be available for other former Refco directors and officers in connection with the Refco securities lawsuit. I emphasize at the outset that I have no direct knowledge of Refco’s D&O insurance program, and I am expressing no views about the availability of coverage under its D&O insurance. My comments here are strictly to note a potential coverage issue that might arise as a result of Bennett’s cooperation with the plaintiffs’ attorneys.

 

The specific insurance issue relates to the possibility that Bennett’s cooperation might trigger the so-called “Insured vs. Insured” exclusion (or IvI as it is more commonly known) that is found in most D&O insurance policies. A typical IvI exclusion provides, among other things, that the insurers is not liable for any loss in connection with a claim “which is brought by any security holder or member of an Organization, whether directly or derivatively, unless such security holder or member’s claim is instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance of, or active participation of, or intervention of, any Executive.”

 

Bennett’s extensive cooperation with the plaintiffs – the significance and materiality of which the plaintiffs’ lawyers expressly acknowledged – would appear at least potentially to implicate this D&O policy exclusion. Now, as a result of his criminal plea, Bennett himself would likely no longer have coverage under the policy, as would appear to be the case for other Refco officers who were criminally convicted in April of this year. But the other former Refco directors and officers, if any, who remain as defendants in the civil lawsuit and who have not pled guilty or been criminally convicted, may still hope to have remaining D&O insurance limits available to fund their defense and indemnity. (A number of the individual defendants have already entered settlements with the class, as described here.) Bennett’s cooperation with the plaintiffs could at least potentially raise coverage concerns, to the extent coverage is otherwise available to these persons.

 

In other words, Bennett’s cooperation not only represents a threat to Refco’s former outside advisors, but could also have serious adverse consequences for the company’s former directors and officers.

 

These events, as noted, are highly unusual and unlikely to recur. Nevertheless, the potential insurance issues that Bennett’s conduct could trigger are a reminder that there claims resolution is a complicated process, with a host of potentially significant consequences at every point. Although sometimes overlooked, the insurance issues can sometimes be particularly significant.

What Do D&O Insurers Look For?

Company managers are increasingly sophisticated about D&O liability insurance. Largely as a result of the corporate scandals from earlier in this decade, what used to be a peripheral and disfavored topic is now a top agenda item in many C-suites and boardrooms. But even as company officials have developed a deeper appreciation for the importance of D&O insurance, many misunderstandings about D&O underwriting persist. One thing that is frequently misunderstood is what D&O underwriters are looking for.

This post is intended to provide an overview of the key components of public company D&O underwriting. Of course, the underwriting concerns for different specific companies could vary substantially. In addition, there are many D&O insurers, and underwriting practices vary significantly between (and, regrettably, even within) insurers. That said, there are certain common elements that will likely be part of the D&O underwriting for any company. These elements are listed below. A great deal more might be said about each of these items, but in the interest of brevity, I have provided a summary description only.

1. The Company’s Basic Characteristics: First and foremost, the underwriter must understand the company’s basic profile. Specifically, the underwriter will want to know the company’s size (by market capitalization) and industry. These factors may seem basic and obvious, but they will nonetheless have a significant impact on an underwriter’s willingness to accept a risk, as well as on the price, terms and conditions likely to be offered.

2. The Company’s Financial Picture: A basic component of D&O underwriting is developing an understanding of the company’s financial circumstances, particularly its key income statement components (revenue, expenses and expense ratios, etc.) and balance sheet items (especially cash and other liquid assets, debt, and reserves/accruals). Although there are many important financial issues, the key question is whether or not the company has sufficient cash or available credit to fund its operations and service its debt during the proposed policy period.

3. The Company’s Accounting Practices: A very specific component for underwriters in developing an understanding of the company’s financial picture is developing an understanding of the company’s accounting policies and practices. The most important issue here is usually revenue recognition, but depending on the kind of company at issue, other critical issues may be the company’s practices regarding reserves and accruals, and these days, asset valuation.

4. The Company’s Corporate History and Structure (Including M&A): Because share offerings, financing activities and M&A activity are the kinds of events that often generate claims, the underwriter will want a complete understanding of the company’s involvement in all of these kinds of activities.

5. Continuity Risk (Things That Have Already Happened): An underwriter will want to establish whether the company has already experienced events or circumstances that could lead to subsequent claims. The list of potential problems could be infinite, but the kinds of things that will particularly attract the underwriter’s concern are things like significant stock price drops, earnings disappointments, regulatory setbacks, product recalls, adverse litigation developments, officer resignations, and so on.

6. Going Forward Risk/Vulnerabilities: A key risk attribute for any company is whether or not the company is susceptible to a single event or change that could substantially alter the company’s fortunes. These kinds of vulnerabilities include such things as: dependence on a single customer, contract, product or supplier; a looming regulatory milestone for a company with a single product in development; or a company-dependent debt obligation with a single-trigger acceleration clause or covenant.

7. Stock Price Volatility: A company that has a share price that dramatically registers even small events is capable of producing large shareholder-style damages. For that reason, companies with volatile stock prices represent a disfavored risk class for many underwriters. 

Some underwriters go so far at to make stock price volatility the most important component in their risk selection and stock price algorithms. I have always felt this analysis represents both an oversimplification and a confusion of correlation and causation. Simply put, while many companies involved in securities class action lawsuits have volatile stock prices, not all companies with volatile stock prices are involved in securities lawsuits. In my view it is the presence or absence of the above identified factors are more indicative of risk than volatility alone.  

8. Company Management and Executive Compensation: The background and experience of the company’s senior management and board members is important information. Underwriters will be particularly interested in any changes in the lineup, and in particular will want to understand the reasons for any changes.

A significant issue related is executive compensation. Some industry observers go so far as to assert that outsized executive compensation is the single most reliable risk marker, as it usually invites a host of dangerous (and sometimes destructive) behaviors. Certainly, many of the most egregious corporate scandals in the last several years have involved excessive executive compensation. Accordingly, underwriters will consider executive compensation information as an important component of the risk analysis.

9. Insider Trading: The most dangerous component of a serious securities class action lawsuit is the presence of significant insider trading at suspicious time and in suspicious amounts. A skilled underwriter will plot the timing of insider trades on the company’s stock graphs to understand who is trading and when. The corollary of this point is that the underwriter will also be interested in the company’s insider trading policy, and in particular will look to see that the company has well-established trading windows and rational trading blackouts, as well as an effective compliance officer.

10. Disclosure practices: The nature, content and tone of the company’s public disclosures are important risk indicators. Underwriters are concerned about companies that devote a lot of energy to generating hype. They are also focused on companies that are very publicly setting and straining to meet very specific short-term earnings estimates. Again, the corollary is that companies with conservative disclosure practices, particularly those that avoid specific, short-term earnings guidance, are viewed more favorably.

11. Corporate Governance: A detailed review of a company’s corporate governance practices is an important part of public company underwriting. However, most underwriters understand that standard corporate governance practices alone are no guarantors that a company will not be involved in a claim. But by the same token, underwriters understand that companies that are actively implementing best practices are the kinds of companies that are interested in trying to play by the rules and perhaps less likely to have problems elsewhere – and better able to defend themselves if a claim does arise.

There is obviously a lot more that might be said about each of these items. In addition, there are a host of other factors that could be relevant to any specific company or to companies in certain industries.

A common misconception is that the D&O underwriting process is like picking a stock. (Frustratingly, some underwriters labor under the misimpression, too.) Many company officials think that their role in the underwriting process is to tout the company and its prospects, as if they were on a road show speaking to prospective investors and analysts. Because most underwriters are by nature suspicious of hype, an underwriting meeting characterized by a high level of salesmanship can be counterproductive.

Underwriters generally do not care whether or not a company’s stock is a good investment, as such. Companies that are mediocre investments are often (although not always) attractive D&O risks, and companies that are Wall Street darlings are sometimes rotten D&O risks. Underwriters are trying to figure out if a company is susceptible to a claim during the policy period, which is often a very different question than whether or not the company’s stock is doing or will do well.

Another common misunderstanding is the expectation that if the company does or does not do certain things, the company ought to get a discount of a certain type or amount. In the soft insurance market that has persisted in recent years, risk specific discounts are hard to isolate, since many companies are enjoying favorable pricing. But more to the point, because underwriting is an uncertain science, the most important factors in determining the price, terms and conditions to be offered are the company’s outward characteristics, which are categorical attributes.

Which is not to say that better managed companies will realize no benefit. But rather than a discount, the benefit is often in the form in the absence of a debit. Or, to put it another way, companies presenting certain specific negative risk factors will be debited, even in the current underwriting environment.

All of that said, there unquestionably are things companies can do to advance their interests during the underwriting process. Working with a skilled insurance professional, a company can identify and address likely underwriting concerns, in an effort to inoculate the company against adverse underwriting perceptions. Moreover, it will be useful for every company to adopt a systematic, timely and business-like approach to the underwriting process, as these practices will expedite the process, remove potential impediments, and encourage efficiencies that benefit all process participants.

The foregoing is merely a summary; there is a great deal more that could be said about all of the above. There are good resources available to supplement the above. One very good resource is the curriculum materials created by the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) entitled “Public/Financial D&O Insurance” and available on the PLUS website (here).

Because this is one of those topics on which a great deal more might be said, I would like to encourage readers and observers to post their comments to this blog. I always welcome audience participation but I am particularly interested in readers' comments on this topic.

Former Directors, Advancement Rights, and D&O Insurance

It is generally understood that under Delaware law, directors enjoy broad rights of indemnification and advancement. The Delaware statutory regime does allow corporations a great deal of flexibility in how they adapt these provisions to their own circumstances. But while these principles are generally understood, it may nevertheless come as a surprise to many that a corporation’s flexibility to adjust the provisions includes the ability to eliminate former directors' advancement  rights, at least according to a recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion.

A March 28, 2008 opinion in Schoon v. Troy Corporation (here) by Vice Chancellor Stephen P. Lamb held that as a result of a board approved by-law amendment eliminating advancement rights for former directors, a former company director did not have the right to advancement of attorneys’ fees.

The company’s by-law had originally provided that “the Corporation shall pay the expenses incurred by any present or former director.” After one of the company’s directors left the board but before the director became involved in litigation relating to his prior board service, the company’s board deleted the by-law’s reference to former directors.

The former director argued to the court that his right to advancement had vested when he commenced his board service. The former director also sought to rely on a prior Delaware court decision which had held that a board cannot terminate a former director’s advancement rights while litigation is pending. Vice Chancellor Lamb rejected the former director’s arguments, holding that the director’s advancement rights do not become “vested” until litigation is actually commenced.

As Steven M. Haas of the Hunton & Williams law firm noted on the Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog (here), “[t]his holding may surprise some practitioners, given that the purpose of indemnification and advancement is to encourage board service and assure directors that their expenses relating to their official actions will be repaid – even if litigation arises after they resign from the board.”

The possibility that directors could lose their rights to indemnification or advancement after they leave the board may not only “surprise some practitioners,” but it would shock many directors, whom I believe rightly would be appalled to learn that they could be stripped of these rights after they leave the board. At a minimum, this holding strongly reinforces the need for each director to have their own separate indemnification agreement with the company, to reduce the possibility for a later board to eliminate these rights after the director has left board service. Without a separate contractual undertaking, directors may have no assurance that after they leave the board their rights to advancement and indemnification will be preserved.

At the same time, however, it should be emphasized that most directors and officers liability insurance policies include former directors within their definition of insured persons, and that under most circumstances a former director for whom corporate advancement and indemnification has been withheld would still have right to seek defense expense protection and indemnification under the company’s D&O liability policy. There might be some question about which retention would apply under the policy, but that issue aside, the insurance coverage should be available to protect the former director (subject to all of its terms and conditions).

Accordingly, In most circumstances, the company’s D&O insurance program should provide adequate protection even for former directors – assuming that the company has procured and continued to maintain insurance protection, and assuming further that the limits available under the insurance program are not otherwise consumed by other insured persons’ defense expense and indemnity requirements.

For directors who have left board service and who are concerned that events could conspire (whether through by-law revision, or as a result of discontinuance or exhaustion of the D&O insurance) to leave them unprotected, there is another insurance solution available. That is, a director concerned about these circumstances may want to consider a so-called former director and officer liability insurance policy. This kind of coverage, which was described at greater length in a recent CFO.com article (here) is buyer-specific; that is, it belong exclusively to the individual director or officer, and would not be subject to termination or discontinuance by the action or inaction of others. It is also noncancelable, nonrescindable, and provides coverage for up to 6 years after the director resigns, retires or is fired.

The point that should not be lost here is that the director in the case cited above lost his anticipated rights after he left the board. Directors concerned about their rights following board service will want to fully consider the available insurance alternatives.

The Ropes & Gray law firm has a May 5, 2008 memorandum (here) discussing the ways in which by-laws and indemnification agreements might be modified to protect against retroactive elimination of directors' rights.

The Delaware Corporate and Commercial Litigation Blog has a post (here) discussing other aspects of the Schoon v. Troy decision.

Speakers’ Corner: On May 6, 2008, I will be in Montreal, Quebec, participating in a panel sponsored by the Canadian Chapter of the Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS). The panel (more information about which can be found here) is entitled “The Subprime Meltdown and its Impact on the Canadian Insurance Landscape” and includes a number of distinguished speakers, included Dr. Faten Sabry of NERA Economic Consulting, David Williams of Chubb, and Denis Durand of Jarislowsky Fraser Limited.

In addition, on May 8, 2008, I will be moderating a panel at a American Bar Association Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section conference in New York. The title of the conference is "Beyond Legal: A Business Approach to Corporate Governance" and the panel is entitled "Identifying, Predicting and Minimizing Securities Litigation Risk." Joining me on the panel will be Nell Minow of the Corporate Library, Professor Eric Talley of the Boalt Hall School of Law at UC Berkeley, and Patrick McGurn of RiskMetrics. A copy of the conference brochure can be found here.

Excess D & O Insurance: The Exhaustion Trigger

As I have noted in prior posts (most recently here), due to increasing average claims severity and escalating defense expense, excess D & O insurance is an increasingly important factor in the resolution of claims involving directors and officers of public companies. The greater involvement of excess D & O insurance has also meant an increasing number of claims disputes involving excess D & O insurers.

A recurring issue has been the question of the excess carrier’s obligations when the primary carrier has paid less than its full policy limits as a result of a compromise with the primary carrier. A March 25, 2008 opinion (here) by California’s intermediate appellate court held, that given the policy language involved, an excess D & O insurance policy was not triggered where the underlying insurer neither paid nor was obligated to pay its full policy limit of liability.

For the policy period March 15, 1999 through March 15, 2000, Qualcomm had $40 million of D & O insurance, structured with a primary layer of $20 million and an excess “follow form” layer of $20 million above the primary $20 million. During the policy period, Qualcomm employees and former employees brought lawsuits asserting rights to unvested company stock options. Qualcomm later settled these lawsuits and sought reimbursement from its D & O insurers for its defense expense and the settlement amounts.

Qualcomm ultimately reached a compromise with its primary D & O insurer, whereby Qualcomm gave the primary insurer a full policy release in exchange for the primary carrier’s payment of $16 million. Even with this $16 million payment, however, Qualcomm still had unreimbursed defense expense of $3.6 million and also had an additional unreimbursed $9 million in settlement expense.

In October 2006, Qualcomm sued its excess D & O insurer for breach of contract and declaratory relief, seeking compensatory damages as well as a judicial declaration that the excess carrier was obligated to indemnify Qualcomm for more than $9 million in unreimbursed expenses. The excess carrier contended, among other things, that the underlying policy had not been “exhausted” as required by the excess policy. The excess policy’s exhaustion clause provided that the excess carrier “shall be liable only after the insurers under each of the Underlying policies have paid or have been held liable to pay the full amount of the Underlying Limit of Liability.”

The trial court sustained the excess carrier’s demurrer (in effect, granted the carrier’s motion to dimiss) without leave to amend on the grounds that the excess policy had not been triggered, and Qualcomm appealed.

On appeal, Qualcomm argued that an excess carrier was liable for losses exceeding the actual limits of underlying primary insurance, even where the primary carrier settled for less than the actual policy limit. Qualcomm also argued that denying excess coverage in the circumstances presented would be contrary to public policy because such a denial would work a forfeiture, provide a windfall to the excess carrier, and encourage litigation by discouraging settlement.

The court of appeals declined “to reach a broad holding on public policy considerations” and instead concluded that “the literal policy language in this case governs.” The court said that the excess policy was not triggered because Qualcomm’s pleadings “establish that the primary insurer neither paid the ‘full amount’ of the liability limit nor had it become legally obligated to pay the full amount of the primary limit.” The court said that

the exhaustion clause here compels us to conclude that the parties expressly agreed that [the primary carrier] was required to pay (or be legally obligated to pay) no less than $20 million as a condition of [the excess carrier’s] liability. Because [the primary carrier] did not so pay, [the excess carrier’s obligations] did not arise.

The Qualcomm decision is consistent with the 2007 decision in the Comerica case, about which I wrote here, and which the Qualcomm court said presented “factual circumstances almost identical to those present in this case." This developing line of case authority has important implications both for the claims resolution and for the insurance acquisition processes.

Let me say at the outset that I am not attempting to criticize the position taken by the excess carrier in the Qualcomm case. Given the court’s ruling, it would be difficult to suggest that the carrier’s legal position was not well founded, and I do not propose to do so here.

In general, however, a claims outcome where a policyholder is stuck with millions of dollars of unexpectedly uninsured claims, after having funded a coverage gap as a result of a compromise with the primary insurer, and after having paid substantial insurance premiums, is highly undesirable from the policyholder’s perspective. Indeed, everyone involved in the D & O insurance industry, including ultimately even excess D & O insurers, has an interest in avoiding claims outcomes where policyholders gets “stuck,” as the value component of the insurance equation—the very thing that insurers’ sell – depends on the policyholders’ not getting “stuck.”

By the same token, the industry could be doing its customers and itself a service by keeping track of claims activity that produces adverse policyholder outcomes, whether it is a primary carrier that is hotboxing the policyholder into making a compromise or an excess carrier that is refusing to play along. Our industry could be improved were it to keep track of the carriers whose claims decisions result in policyholders getting “stuck” – by keeping track the industry might ensure that claims decisions involve not only detached legal analysis but also due consideration of the concrete business assumptions on which our industry ultimately depends.

At a minimum, it is increasingly clear that policyholders should consider only global compromises, involving all insurers, as any other arrangement could leave the policyholder exposed.

The Qualcomm decision has lessons for the policy acquisition process as well. The outcome in the Qualcomm case was a direct reflection of the excess policy’s exhaustion trigger language. While alternative language was not generally available at the time Qualcomm placed the D & O program involved in that case, many excess D & O carriers now offer exhaustion trigger language that reduces the restrictions on the kinds of payments that could trigger the excess carrier’s payment obligation. Indeed, many policies recognize payment by the policyholder as satisfying the underlying limit. The need for these issues to be address in the insurance placement process underscores the need to have skilled insurance professionals involved in the D & O insurance acquisition process.

Special thanks to John McCarrick of the Edward Angell Palmer & Dodge law firm for providing me with a copy of the Qualcomm decision. I should add that the views expressed in this post are solely my own.

D & O Insurance: Consent to Settlement Really is Required

One of the standard provisions of the typical D & O insurance policy is a clause requiring the insurer’s prior consent to settlement. This clause can be the source of tension between carriers and policyholders, and policyholders and their counsel sometimes view the clause as little more than an impediment. However, a March 13, 2008 opinion (here), the New York Court of Appeals makes it clear that policyholders who disregard the settlement consent requirements do so at peril to coverage under the D & O policy.

The insurance coverage dispute in the case arose out of the securities analyst/conflict of interest investigation that unfolded earlier in this decade. Among the investment banks targeted in investigation was Bear Stearns. On December 20, 2002, Bear Stearns entered a settlement in principle with the regulators in which it agreed to pay a total of $80 million, with $25 million allocated as a penalty, $25 million in disgorgements, $25 million for independent research, and $5 million for investor education.

On April 21, 2003, Bear Stearns executed a consent agreement in which it acceded to the entry of final judgment in the SEC’s pending enforcement proceeding. Bear Stearns also agreed to payment of the $80 million and explicitly agreed not to seek insurance coverage for the $25 million penalty.

Three days after executing the settlement agreement, Bear Stearns sent letters to its D & O carriers requesting the carriers’ consent to the settlement. Bear Stearns sought coverage for $45 million of the settlement (which represented the settlement amount, excluding the penalty, in excess of the policy’s $10 million self-insured retention). The insurers disclaimed coverage and initiated a declaratory judgment action.

In October 2003, the federal court presiding over the regulatory enforcement action entered judgment on the terms to which Bearn Stearns previously had agreed.

The insurers disputed coverage on a number of grounds, but because the Court of Appeals opinion addresses only the consent to settlement issue, that is the sole issue I discuss in this post.

Bear Stearns’ primary D & O insurance policy had a provision specifying that:

The Insured agrees not to settle any Claim, incur any Defense Costs or otherwise assume any contractual obligation or admit any liability with respect to any Claim in excessof a settlement authority threshold of $5,000,000 without the Insurer's consent, which shall not be unreasonably withheld . . . The insurer shall not be liable for any settlement, Defense Costs, assumed obligation or admission to which it has not consented.

The New York Supreme Court (trial court) found that triable issues of fact existed whether Bear Stearns breached the consent to settlement clause. The Appellate Division modified the lower court’s opinion in certain other respects, but affirmed the Supreme Court on the consent to settlement issue. The Appellate Division then certified the case to the New York Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Justice Victoria A. Graffeo, held that “Bear Stearns breached [the consent] provision when it executed the April 2003 consent agreement before notifying the insurers or obtaining their approval.” The Court of Appeals said that it was “unpersuaded by the contention that a triable issue of fact exists because the federal court did not approve the settlement until it entered a final judgment in October 2003.”

Judge Graffeo specifically noted that

As a sophisticated business entity, Bear Stearns expressly agreed that the insurers would "not be liable" for any settlement in excess of $5 million entered into without their consent. Aware of this contingency in the policies, Bear Stearns nevertheless elected to finalize all outstanding settlement issues and executed a consent agreement before informing its carriers of the terms of the settlement. Bear Stearns therefore may not recover the settlement proceeds from the insurers.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Court and granted the carrier’s motion for summary judgment. Because of its ruling on the consent provision, the Court of Appeals did not reach the other issues on which the carriers disclaimed coverage.

There may well have been additional grounds that could also have precluded coverage here, but it is still an arresting development – and a cautionary tale – that the Court of Appeals precluded coverage altogether based solely on the failure to obtain advance consent to settlement. Significantly, the Court of Appeals enforced the consent provision without superimposing any requirement for the insurer to show that it was prejudiced in any way by the failure to obtain consent. The Court of Appeals focused strictly on the policy’s language.

Companies and their counsel sometimes regard the consent settlement requirement as if the language were merely precatory, or perhaps even as optional if they believe settlement circumstances suggest the need to press ahead without bringing the carrier into the loop. It is not an unprecedented development for a carrier to learn of a settlement only after the fact. But the Bear Stearns opinion provides unambiguous notice to companies and counsel that they disregard the policy’s advance consent requirement at peril of precluding coverage.

The larger lesson here is that the carrier should be kept in the loop. Indeed, the better practice, the one likeliest to produce the best claim outcomes, is for companies and their counsel to treat the carrier as a collaborative partner in the claims process. While there are unfortunate situations where the carrier does not respond appropriately, even in those situations the policyholder will be better off (for example, before a court if coverage litigation ensures) if the policyholder has consistently maintained professional and timely communications with the carrier.

And whatever else may be said, it is clear, at least in New York, that the D & O policy provision requiring the carrier’s advance consent to settlement means what it says, and policyholders should take care to comply with its requirements.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing a copy of the New York Court of Appeals opinion.

D & O Insurance and Securities Settlements: Professor Griffith Responds

Last week, I added a post (here) discussing the March 2, 2008 paper entitled “How the Merits Matter: D&O Insurance and Securities Settlements” (here) by Connecticut Law Professor Tom Baker and Fordham Law Professor Sean Griffith. In response to my invitation, Professor Griffith prepared a reply to my comments, which is as follows:

Before beginning, I’d like to thank Kevin for his careful and thoughtful reading of our paper and for his many kind words and comments. Kevin’s comments have improved all of our papers in this area, and they will surely improve this one. I do, however, have a few remarks to make in response to three comments Kevin made towards the end of his write-up. I’ll address: (1) the impact of disclosure on insurance, (2) the possibility that additional disclosure will increase the incidence of lawsuits against corporate insureds, and (3) the ways in which additional disclosure will make the world a better place.

1.         In his review of our paper, Kevin writes that Baker and I “do not seem to have reviewed the idea of compelled disclosure with anyone in the insurance industry.” Not so. We have indeed run the idea of additional disclosure by folks in the insurance industry. In fact, I well remember one of the first conversations I had on this subject. I was working on an earlier paper (here) that proposed mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance details when I received a voicemail message from one of the broker’s I’d been talking to. He excoriated me on the message, offering a stream of expletives that would have made George Carlin blush. He’d read my draft (or, at least the title) and, I gathered, was rather displeased at the prospect of public disclosure of D&O insurance information. This, I believe, is the general reaction, of folks in the insurance industry to the proposal, although their reactions are typically more calmly expressed.

I am neither surprised nor particularly bothered by this reaction. First, it is hardly surprising that more transparency within a market would make an intermediary’s life more difficult. Intermediaries will worry that their profit margins will be eroded away if their customers can see the price paid by comparable companies. Buyers will insist that brokers get them an equally good deal as a competitor or justify why they can’t. But why is that a bad thing? What’s bad for the broker looks good for the consumer. Moreover, brokers often say that they do more than just price a coverage package. If that’s really true, then there will be a place in the market for them post-disclosure. They’ll still be providing a service that’s not available elsewhere. But if it’s not true, then the broker’s role starts to look like waste, and why wouldn’t we then want to disintermediate the market and, perhaps, let risk managers build their own coverage towers?

Second, moving to the insurer’s perspective, I’m not sure that disclosure would be bad. It might be a problem if the insurer is offering discounts for some clients but not others on the basis of factors that are not risk-related, perhaps because a buyer’s price on their D&O program is tied to the fact that they’re buying a (more expensive) general liability policy from the same insurer. (Some suggested to us that tying arrangements of this sort occur in the D&O market.) If we had a disclosure rule, we can expect buyers to demand the same D&O premiums as all similarly situated companies, which would make it harder to engage in tying arrangements. The only valid basis for an insurer to offer different prices would be differences in risk. Underwriters would be in the position of having to articulate why Company A is a better risk than Company B. This would obviously be good for the buyer, but I suspect in the long term it would be good for the seller too. It would focus underwriters on what matters—risk-assessment—and inhibit their ability to make sales that discriminate on some other basis (like tying). From the insurer’s perspective, that’s probably a good thing because insurance that is sold with better risk assessment up front is less likely to lead to losses down the road than insurance that is sold on some other basis.

Now, I don’t know how any of that would ultimately play out. I’m just skeptical of the gloom-and-doom-for-the-industry story. I suspect that those within the industry who are doing what the industry is supposed to do—assessing risk and tailoring coverage—will survive. Also, to be honest, my concern is not so much with the insurance industry as it is with the corporations buying the insurance. And, frankly, when anyone other than the consumer complains about market reform, that’s usually a sign that market reform is a good idea. Producers and (especially) intermediaries have shown themselves across industries and throughout history to be opposed to reforms that enhance competition. I suspect that this market reform would benefit the consumer in a variety of ways, not just in the bottom line price paid by insureds, but more about that in my response to #3, below.

2.         Second point. Disclosure would be bad for corporate insureds, Kevin suggests, because the additional disclosure will make them “lawsuit targets.” In other words, the incidence of lawsuits will go up if plaintiffs lawyers know more about corporate insureds’ coverage packages.

We here this objection fairly often, but I think it’s easily disproven. Here’s how: First, everybody knows that virtually every public company in the US carries D&O insurance. Second, everybody knows that average settlements are much less than average coverage limits (in spite of the rare high profile above-limits settlement, just look at Tillinghast, Cornerstone, or NERA—average limits far exceed average settlements). Those two things being true, plaintiffs’ lawyers needn’t fret about insurance when they file claims. They can reasonably assume that coverage will be there. Moreover, insurance coverage is one of the first disclosures that the parties must make once they’re in litigation. If, in the rather unlikely event that a corporate defendant is not well covered, the plaintiffs’ lawyer can drop the claim before their sunk costs have gotten too large. Bottom line: currently, plaintiffs’ law firms reasonably assume that most corporate defendants will have sufficient D&O coverage to fund claims, and they file any time they can put together the basic elements of liability. If Tom and I got the disclosure rule we want, true, plaintiffs law firms would know the coverage profile of the corporate defendant, and they’d file any time they could put together the basic elements of liability. In other words, the additional disclosure would not be a boon to the plaintiffs’ bar, and the incidence of suit would be about the same.

3.         Kevin also remarks that although we, as academic researchers, would benefit from additional disclosure (true!), we haven’t really specified how additional disclosure would deter securities violations. 

            First, regarding Tom’s and my self-interest. Yes, if we got the disclosure rule we want, we’d crunch the data in more papers. But, let’s face it, we’re not going to get famous doing this. And Tom and I both have tenure, so we don’t really have career incentives that distort our devotion, putting it somewhat grandly, to truth and justice. We want the additional disclosure because we think it would be good for the world and we write the papers because we think the world ought to know what’s good for it.

            Okay, so why would additional disclosure be good for the world? Or, more concretely, how would it deter securities law violations? 

As we said in the papers about underwriting, disclosure of D&O pricing, limits, and coverage structure would enable financial analysts to use this information as a proxy for downside risk and, on the basis of that proxy, to change their valuation of corporate insureds. With enough people in the market using this information (which one might assume on the basis of the efficient capital markets hypothesis), insurers’ collective assessment of a prospective insured’s risk should have a direct impact on the prospective insured’s share price. And, last step, because managers care about share price, anything that has an effect on it (e.g., wobbly corporate governance structures) is something they’re likely to address. So disclosure of D&O pricing, limits, and coverage structure would improve corporate governance. 

What’s different in this paper is that we think the required disclosures should be broadened. Not only should corporations be made to disclose their limits, pricing, and coverage structure on a regular basis (with each renewal), but also any time a corporation settles a securities claim, they should be required to disclose how the settlement is funded. E.g., What amount comes from insurers? What amount comes from the company? Putting this information together with information about the corporate insured’s coverage package, financial analysts and capital market participants ought to be able, as we say in the paper, to assess “which corporations are likely to have engaged in bad acts and which have not.” In other words, which corporations got stuck settling a nuisance claim and which allowed some form of fraud to occur.

How would analysts be able to draw this conclusion? Consider a settlement well within total limits to which a corporate insured nevertheless contributes a substantial amount. The insured’s contribution in this case might indicate that the insurers were able to cash in their coverage defense for savings off of their full exposure. Granted it might indicate other things as well, but if I were a financial analyst, I’d want to know why did the company pay when it had more limits available. And if the insurers had a strong coverage defense, doesn’t that suggest that there was some merit to the plaintiffs’ claim (i.e., that it was not just a nuisance suit)? And if there was some merit to the plaintiff’s underlying claim, have the problems that led to the claim been fixed or management just back to business as usual, denying all the while that the plaintiffs’ claim had any basis at all. Either way, this information would make me reconsider my valuation of the insured corporation’s shares. Again, with enough people in the market acting on this information, the corporation’s share price ought to be effected. And, because managers care about share price, this creates an incentive for managers to actually avoid the kind of things that lead to fraud claims. In other words, disclosure, in the context of both underwriting and claims, gives the market what it needs to provide deterrence. If the information disclosed is useful to capital market participants (we obviously believe that it would be), they will use it in ways that create natural incentives for managers to mend their ways. In my view, that’s the big payoff of all of our research in this area.

Thanks again to Kevin for his comments and for the lively debate as this project has evolved.

I would like to thank Professor Griffith for taking the time to write a detailed response to my prior post. I hope other readers will post their thoughts, comments and reactions to Professor Griffith’s observations by using the “Comment” feature in this blog’s right-hand column. I look forward to hearing readers’ reactions to Professor Griffith’s observations.

D & O Insurance and Securities Lawsuit Settlements

Although there have been some significant exceptions in recent years, it is still generally the case that securities class action settlements are largely funded by D & O insurance. Yet the impact of D & O insurance on the process and ultimate value of securities lawsuit settlements is little understood outside the small world of practitioners in this area. In an excellent March 2, 2008 paper entitled “How the Merits Matter: D & O Insurance and Securities Settlements” (here), Connecticut Law School Professor Tom Baker and Fordham Law Professor Sean Griffith take a closer look at the role of D & O insurance on securities lawsuit settlements.

In this paper, the authors use a technique they have employed in their prior studies of D & O insurance (about which I previously commented here) – that is, in order to understand that actual workings of the D & O insurance industry, they have interviewed a wide variety of involved participants. In this case, they interviewed over fifty persons, including plaintiffs’ attorneys, defense counsel, insurance claims professionals, insurer’s monitoring counsel, and others. As a result of this practical approach, the authors have developed a realistic understanding of the actual settlement dynamics, and what emerges