The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

In its sweeping July 1, 2011 opinion in the MBIA case, the Second Circuit addressed many of the D&O insurance coverage issues that are currently the most contentious. The opinion has occasioned much discussion and commentary in the D&O insurance industry. My blog post about the case can be found here.

In view of the ongoing discussion about the case, I am very pleased to be able to publish here as a guest post an article analyzing and commenting on the Second Circuit’s decision written by Richard Bortnick and Micah J. M. Knapp of the Cozen O’Connor law firm. Rick is also the co-author of the Cyberinquirer blog. Many thanks to Rick and Micah for their willingness to publish their article here.  I welcome guest posts from responsible commentators on topics relevant to this blog. Any readers who are interested in publishing a guest post on this site are encouraged to contact me directly.

Here is Rick and Micah’s guest post:

In its July 1, 2011 opinion MBIA, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. and ACE American Ins. Co., 10-0355-cv (2d Cir. July 1, 2011), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected Insurers Federal Insurance Company’s (Federal) and ACE American Insurance Company’s (ACE) (collectively, the Insurers) appeals seeking to reverse a Finding of coverage for (1) expenses associated with federal and state government investigations into the insured’s accounting practices, and (2) a special litigation committee formed to investigate the shareholder derivative suits that followed the agency scrutiny. In an analysis heavily influenced by the facts, the Second Circuit swept aside the Insurers’ arguments that their D&O policies did not cover expenses associated with what they argued were informal agency inquiries and investigations only loosely associated with written agency orders and subpoenas. The court also concluded that expenses incurred by the special litigation committee formed by the insured, MBIA, Inc. (MBIA), to investigate two derivative suits were “Defense Costs” covered under the Insurers’ D&O policies. On close scrutiny, however, the impact of the decision may be limited based on the particular policy language at issue and the facts of the case.

The Policies

MBIA provides financial guarantee insurance for government bonds or structured finance obligations – essentially guaranteeing that bond holders would be paid with respect to MBIA’s clients’ bonds. MBIA purchased $15 million in primary D&O insurance from Federal covering the period of February 15, 2004 through August 15, 2004. ACE issued $15 million in excess coverage that followed form to the Federal policy in all respects relevant to the lawsuit (collectively, the Policies). The Policies’ entity coverage section provided: “The Company shall pay on behalf of any Organization all Securities Loss for which it becomes legally obligated to pay on account of any Securities Claim first made against it during the Policy Period ….” The Policies further covered “Defense Costs” for “Securities Claims.” “Securities Claim” was defined as “a formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document” that “in whole or in part, is based upon, arises from or is in consequence of the purchase or sale of, or over to purchase or sell any securities issued by [MBIA].”

The Agency Investigations and MBIA’s Claim

In 2001, the SEC issued an Order Directing Private Investigation and initiated an investigation into potentially unlawful accounting practices in the insurance industry. The SEC targeted MBIA in November 2004 as part of that larger investigation, issuing subpoenas compelling the company to produce documents concerning transactions involving “non-traditional products” – products that could be used to “affect the timing or amount of revenue or expense recognized.” The New York attorney general (NYAG) followed suit, serving MBIA with similar subpoenas requesting similar documents in November and December 2004.

The federal and state investigations eventually focused on three separate MBIA transactions. In the first transaction, MBIA purchased reinsurance for its guarantee of bonds issued by a group of hospitals owned by the Allegheny Health, Education and Research Foundation (AHERF) after AHERF declared bankruptcy. The investigations sought to determine whether MBIA endeavored to disguise the impact of a $170 million loss from the transaction with AHERF.

In the summer of 2005, the SEC and NYAG began investigating two additional transactions. In the second such transaction, MBIA purchased an interest in Capital Asset Holdings GP, Inc. (Capital Asset), but soon found it necessary to provide additional, unanticipated funds to Capital Asset. MBIA made the payment through a subsidiary, thereby transferring the risk of the investment loss to the subsidiary and allegedly disguising a potential loss to the parent company. The third transaction involved MBIA’s guarantee of securities used to purchase airplanes for US Airways. MBIA foreclosed on the airplanes after US Airways declared bankruptcy and treated the transaction as an investment in airplanes rather than a loss. 

MBIA forwarded the agency subpoenas to the Insurers in May 2005, informing them that it was the target of state and federal investigations. MBIA asked for the Insurers’ consent to retain counsel. The Insurers denied that the subpoenas triggered coverage, but accepted the subpoenas as notice of a potential claim. MBIA hired counsel and responded to the agency inquiries.

The SEC and NYAG considered issuing additional subpoenas concerning the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions in the summer of 2005. Concerned about additional adverse publicity, MBIA requested that the agencies hold on issuing more subpoenas, and instead accept MBIA’s voluntary compliance with the agencies’ demands. The SEC and NYAG agreed and, thereafter, MBIA complied with the agencies’ informal, often oral, requests.

In October 2005, MBIA forwarded the agencies an over of settlement concerning the AHERF transaction investigation. That over included a payment of penalties and MBIA’s proposal to retain an independent consultant to analyze the Capital Asset and US Airways matters. MBIA notified the Insurers of the settlement discussions in September 2005 and met with Federal in October 2005. At the time, however, MBIA did not advise the Insurers of its proposal to hire an independent consultant. The SEC and NYAG finalized settlements with MBIA in January 2007 in accords substantially similar to MBIA’s October 2005 over. The independent consultant later exonerated MBIA of any wrongdoing in the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions.

MBIA’s shareholders followed the state and federal agency investigations with two derivative lawsuits. Upon receiving the shareholder plaintiffs’ presuit demand letters, MBIA formed a Demand Investigative Committee (DIC) – a committee of independent directors tasked with investigating the shareholders’ demand letter. The DIC retained an outside law firm, Dickstein Shapiro (Dickstein), to assist in the investigation. When the DIC failed to act on the shareholders’ derivative demand within the time allotted by Connecticut law, the shareholders filed suit. MBIA reconstituted the DIC as a Special Litigation Committee (SLC), which again employed Dickstein to aid in the investigation of the derivative suit allegations. The SLC concluded that the suits were not in the best interests of the company and, consistent with Connecticut law, moved to dismiss the complaints.

MBIA submitted a claim with the Insurers seeking costs associated with the agencies’ investigations of the three transactions, the cost of the independent consultant retained to investigate the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions, and expenses associated with the DIC and the SLC. Federal paid MBIA approximately $6.4 million out of its $15 million limit to cover losses from the SEC investigation of the AHERF transaction and related lawsuits. The payment included $200,000 for the DIC’s investigation of the shareholder plaintiffs’ presuit demand pursuant to the Federal policy’s derivative investigation coverage sublimit. Federal denied MBIA’s claim for losses associated with the NYAG investigation of the AHERF transaction, the SEC and NYAG investigations of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions, the independent consultant, and the SLC. ACE denied that it had any obligation to pay for any of the losses based upon MBIA’s non-exhaustion of the primary policy.

The Motions for Summary Judgment and Appeal

MBIA filed suit against the Insurers on May 7, 2008, asserting three claims for breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment. MBIA and the Insurers cross-moved for summary judgment on MBIA’s claim for losses associated with the NYAG investigation of the AHERF transaction, the SEC and NYAG investigations of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions, the independent consultant, and the SLC.

Judge Berman of the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. On balance, however, the Southern District found in MBIA’s favor, holding that the Insurers owed coverage for the SEC and NYAG investigations of all three transactions, as well as for the expenses incurred by the SLC. The District Court determined that MBIA was not entitled to coverage for the costs associated with the independent consultant’s review of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions because MBIA had not provided the Insurers with adequate notice of its intent to retain the consultant. The Insurers appealed and MBIA cross-appealed. 

The Insurers’ appeal challenged the District Court’s holdings that the Policies obligated the Insurers to cover losses associated with (1) the NYAG investigation of the AHERF transaction, (2) the SEC and NYAG investigations of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions, and (3) the SLC. 

On the first issue, the Insurers argued that the NYAG subpoena was a “mere discovery device” that did not meet the Policies’ definition of “Securities Claim.” The Second Circuit disagreed, pointing out that a subpoena is the “primary investigative implement in the NYAG’s tool shed,” and that, at a minimum, it constituted a document similar to a “formal or informal investigative order,” which was within the definition of “Securities Claim.”

On the second issue, the Second Circuit rejected the Insurers’ argument that the SEC and NYAG investigations into the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions were not within the scope of the SEC’s formal order and the NYAG’s similar AHERF investigation. The court found that the language of the SEC order and NYAG subpoenas evidenced a “broad but definitive investigatory scope” that included all three of the questionable transactions. It further observed that the SEC and NYAG investigations of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions were connected to the SEC’s formal order and the NYAG’s AHERF investigation, and rejected the Insurers’ argument that they were not obligated to cover MBIA’s expenses associated with its voluntary compliance with informal requests made in the course of those related investigations.

The Insurers’ main argument in support of its third issue on appeal was that the SLC costs were incurred solely by the SLC, and that the SLC was not an “insured person” under the Policies. The District Court found coverage for the SLC expenses primarily because the expenses at issue were owed to Dickstein, and Dickstein had entered its appearance on behalf of MBIA, a nominal defendant in the derivative suits. The District Court reasoned that because Dickstein represented MBIA in the derivative suits, Dickstein’s fees were covered “Defense Costs.” The District Court then suggested that the SLC expenses would have been covered even if the outside firm had not represented MBIA, because the SLC was not an entity independent of MBIA.

The Second Circuit broadened the District Court’s reasoning and concluded that the SLC expenses were covered “Defense Costs” because the SLC was part of MBIA. After a brief analysis of Connecticut law on how and through whom corporations operate, the Second Circuit proclaimed that MBIA directed or acted through the SLC when the latter moved to dismiss the derivative suits and, as a result, the SLC was an “insured person” under the Policies. Unlike the District Court, the Second Circuit did not mention, much less rely upon the fact that Dickstein represented both the SLC and MBIA in the derivative suit. The Second Circuit further rejected the Insurers’ arguments that coverage for the SLC would render superfluous the Policies’ sublimit for investigation costs, and that the SLC expenses were excluded from coverage by operation of exclusions within the Policies’ definition of “Loss.” The court found that the investigation sublimit only applied to presuit investigations, not costs related to derivative suits, and that the Insurers had failed to establish that any exclusions applied to MBIA’s claim for SLC expenses. 

Turning to MBIA’s cross-appeal, the court reversed the District Court’s ruling in the Insurers’ favor on the issue of coverage for costs associated with the independent consultant’s investigation of the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions. In a lengthy analysis reciting what and when MBIA reported to the Insurers, the court concluded that MBIA did not breach the Policies’ “right to associate” clause, because MBIA provided the insurers with sufficient notice of the settlement discussions with the SEC and NYAG “early enough in the process to allow the insurers to exercise their option to associate effectively.”

MBIA’s Affect on Future Claim Disputes

The Second Circuit’s opinion touches on two types of expenses commonly disputed in D&O claims, expenses incurred in responding to state or federal subpoenas and special litigation committee expenses associated with the investigation of allegations in derivative suits. The court accepted the policyholder’s arguments in support of coverage for both types of expenses. 

With respect to the first category of expenses, MBIA interprets “Securities Claims” broadly, supporting the assertion that coverage extends to expenses associated with an insured’s voluntary compliance with certain types of informal or quasi-formal agency investigations. Insureds undoubtedly will cite MBIA for the proposition that a company does not forfeit its D&O coverage when it volunteers to cooperate with investigative agency requests rather than await formal, legal proceedings and risk suffering potentially damaging publicity and harsher penalties. 

The court’s ruling on coverage for MBIA’s voluntary cooperation with investigators, however, cannot be universally applied without regard to the court’s view of the breadth of the investigations and the expansive language of the primary policy’s insuring agreement. Both factors may provide bases for distinguishing MBIA from other cases. In MBIA, the policy at issue broadly defined “Securities Claim” to include any “formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document.” A formal order of investigation and regulatory subpoenas already had been issued by both agencies before any voluntary compliance was offered or undertaken. Given the Federal policy’s expansive definition of “Securities Claim,” the Second Circuit had little difficulty concluding that coverage existed. This should be distinguished from situations involving voluntary disclosure in the absence of formal agency process or where a policy contains more limited language. 

The most significant aspect of the Second Circuit’s MBIA opinion is the seemingly blanket pronouncement that special litigation committee investigative costs incurred in response to a derivative suit are covered “Defense Costs.” That holding, however, relies on two questionable propositions: (1) that the SLC was an agent of, and acted at the behest of, MBIA, and (2) that the SLC’s actions were related to the defense of MBIA or insured directors.

On summary judgment, the District Court strained to find coverage for SLC expenses by noting that outside counsel retained by the SLC to investigate the shareholders’ claims also represented MBIA as a nominal defendant in the derivative lawsuits. After linking the SLC’s expenses to Dickstein’s representation of MBIA in the derivative suits, the District Court decreed that the SLC costs were, in fact, “Defense Costs.” 

The Second Circuit abandoned the District Court’s reliance on Dickstein’s representation of both the SLC and MBIA, determining instead that the SLC was not a separate entity from MBIA and was, therefore, an “insured person” under the Policy. The court’s analysis notwithstanding, there is no support for the proposition that MBIA directed the SLC. Rather, the SLC was comprised of independent directors uninvolved in wrongdoing alleged by the shareholder plaintiffs. Indeed, under Connecticut law, the SLC was required to operate independent of MBIA and its board in the SLC’s investigation of the derivative suits. The decision to dismiss the derivative suits was the SLC’s alone. MBIA did not, and legally could not, instruct the SLC to conclude that the derivative suit was not in the company’s best interest.

More importantly, the SLC did not act in the defense of MBIA or the insured directors and its expenses should not have been categorized as “Defense Costs.” The Second Circuit’s opinion provides no analysis on this point, concluding simply that “the costs incurred by the SLC in terminating the derivative litigation were covered ‘Defense Costs.’” But the very purpose of special litigation committees – to investigate allegations in shareholder derivative suits and determine whether the company should prosecute those claims against the defendant directors – is a corporate governance function. The board, through the SLC, has a fiduciary duty to investigate whether wrongdoing has occurred and whether to seek relief on behalf of the corporation. Thus, the SLC’s investigative costs should be covered here only to the extent of the Federal policy’s investigations sublimit. 

Moreover, costs for appearing in a lawsuit are not necessarily defense expenses. The SLC, after all, was not defending itself or the corporation. It was, in this case, seeking the termination of claims against other directors on grounds that it was not in the company’s interest to pursue those claims. This is the company’s right as the true owner of the claims being prosecuted. Simply because targeted directors avoided adverse claims as a result of the SLC’s investigation does not transform the SLC into a tool to defend target directors or defeat shareholder derivative claims. Had the SLC decided to take over the prosecution of the claims, also its right, no colorable argument for coverage could have been made. The Second Circuit overlooked this crucial analytical distinction.

MBIA is likely to be cited by policyholders both within and outside the Second Circuit in support of arguments for broad coverage with respect to agency investigations and Special Litigation Committee costs. Insurers need to be aware of the limitations of the Second Circuit’s reasoning and the factual idiosyncrasies of the case.

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In a detailed 106-page opinion dated July 27, 2011 (here), Southern District of New York Judge Lewis Kaplan granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss in the consolidated Lehman Brothers Securities Litigation. Though Judge Kaplan knocked out certain of the plaintiffs’ allegations, what Judge Kaplan called the “core” of plaintiffs’ allegations remain, particularly with respect the company’s quarter-end Repo 105 transactions.

As detailed here, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants made false and misleading statements about Lehman Brothers prior to the company’s September 2008 collapse. The defendants include certain former officers and directors of the company; the company’s auditor; and the company’s offering underwriter. The plaintiffs amended their consolidated complaint following the March 2010 release of the report of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy examiner (about which refer here), which, described the company’s alleged “balance sheet manipulation,” among other things by using a quarter end accounting device know as “Repo 105.” The defendants moved to dismiss.

In his July 27 opinion, Judge Kaplan granted the defendants motion to dismiss s to certain of the plaintiffs’ allegations, finding that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged misleading falsity, for example, with respect to statements about the company’s use of risk mitigants and with respect to certain aspects of the company’s liquidity.

However, Judge Kaplan found that the allegations were sufficient with respect to a number of the plaintiffs’ other allegations, particularly with respect to the company’s use of the Repo 105 transactions; its statements about its net leverage; its statements about its use of stress testing; its statements about risk management; its statements about value at risk; and its statements about concentrations of credit risk.

With respect to the Repo 105 transactions, Judge Kaplan said that “repetitive, temporary, and undisclosed reduction of net leverage at the end of each quarter is sufficient to make out a claim.”

With respect to the statements that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged to be false and misleading, Judge Kaplan found that the plaintiffs had also sufficiently alleged scienter. In finding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged scienter against the officer defendants in connection with the statements concerning the Repo 105 transactions, Judge Kaplan said:

The suggestions that defendants believed that the Repo 105 transactions were permissible in and of themselves and that the financial reporting for them, in and of itself, complied with GAAP does not address the core of plaintiffs’ claims  – that they were used to reduce temporarily and artificially Lehman’s net leverage and paint a misleading picture of the company’s financial position at the end of each quarter. The allegations of that these transactions were used at the end of each reporting period, in amounts that increased as the economic crisis intensified, to affect a financial metric that allegedly was material to investors, credit rating agencies, and analysts supports a strong inference that the Insider Defendants knew or were reckless in not knowing that use of the Repo 105 transactions and the manner in which they were accounted for painted a misleading picture of the company’s finances.

Although Judge Kaplan also knocked out many of the allegations against E&Y, the company auditor, Judge Kaplan also found that the amended complaint “adequately alleges that D&Y misrepresented in the 2Q08 that it was ‘not aware of any material modification that should be made to the consolidated financial statements referred to above for them to be in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.’”

Judge Kaplan’s conclusions as to the sufficiency of the Exchange Act allegations against the individual defendants also extended to the sufficiency of the Securities Act allegations against the Underwriter Defendant.

As a result of Judge Kaplan’s rulings, one of the highest profile securities suits filed in the wake of the credit crisis will now go forward. Unsurprisingly, the allegations concerning the Repo 105 transaction had a significant impact on Judge Kaplan’s consideration of the plaintiffs’ claims. While any resolution of this case would be challenging, the difficulty for all concerned is that due to the multiplicity and complexity of the various legal matters arising out of the company’s collapse, the amount of D&O insurance remaining is rapidly declining. Even if the defendants feel strongly that they are wrongly accused, they will have to think hard about whether it is better to try to work a deal while insurance funds remain, or to fight on in the hope of ultimate vindication – preferably before the insurance funds are gone.

Nate Raymond’s July 27, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article discussing the decision can be found here.

I have in any event added the Lehman brothers ruling to my running tally of the subprime meltdown and credit crisis related dismissal motion rulings, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of Judge Kaplan’s ruling.

Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal in CBRE Realty Subprime-Related Securities Suit: In another ruling in a subprime-related securities class action lawsuit, on July 26, 2011, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the subprime-related securities suit that had been filed against CBRE Realty Finance. The Second Circuit’s opinion can be found here.

As discussed here, the plaintiffs had alleged that in connection with company’s September 2006 IPO, the company’s offering documents had not adequately disclosed the risk of default in connection with two Maryland condominium conversion projects known as Triton. In July 2009, the District of Connecticut dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims because the loans were fully collateralized at the time of the IPO. The plaintiffs appealed.

In its July 26 opinion, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, but on different grounds. The Second Circuit held that “the alleged misstatements were not material because the value of the transactions composed an immaterial portion of the issuer’s total assets.”

I have also added the Second Circuit’s opinion in the CBRE case to my table of credit crisis lawsuit dismissal motion rulings.

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In the most recent of the securities litigation analyses, on July 26, 2011, NERA Economic Consulting issued its report on the securities class action lawsuit filing during the first six months of 2011. In a report entitled “Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2011 Mid-Review” (here), NERA  suggests, perhaps contrary to other recently published reports, that securities suit  filings during the first half of the year were  “on the rise” and “indeed unusually high.” As I discuss below, the seeming variance among the various published reports is a reflection of different counting methodology. I have comments about that below.

According to NERA (and by rather stark contrast to the conclusions of the analyses of the recently released Cornerstone Research report), during the first half of 2011 “securities class action lawsuits were filed at the second highest semi-annual rate in the last eight years.” According to NERA, there were 130 filings in the first half of the year. If the filing rate were to continue at the same pace for the rest of the year, “there would be 260 filings in 2011, the highest level since 2002, and the fourth highest in the 16 years since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.”

According to NERA, a decline in the year’s first six months was offset by a “surge in suits targeting Chinese companies.” Over a third of the lawsuits during 2011’s first half were filed against foreign domiciled issuers, a rate which is “extraordinary by historical standards,” and “more than double the prior peak of 2004.”

The filings themselves has “continued to migrate from the Second Circuit to the Ninth Circuit,” as the mix of companies targeted has shifted away from financial companies and toward technology companies. Filings against companies in the financial sector has declined from a 2008 peak of 49 percent to just under 20 percent in the first half of 2011. Filings in against companies in the electric technology and technology services sector represented 22 percent of filings in the year’s first six months.

The NERA report notes that filings activity continues to be positively correlated with market volatility. Controlling for market returns, volatility is positively and statistically significantly correlated with quarterly filings from the second quarter of 1996 through the second quarter of 2011. However, the correlation is “not one-for-one.” Indeed, market volatility and market returns together explain only about 20 percent of the variance in quarterly filings. In other words, volatility is important but it does not come close to telling you everything you need to know.

In looking at the status of cases from the 2000 filing year, the NERA report shows that about 63% of all cases from that year have settled and about 37% percent have settled.

With respect to the 245 credit crisis cases filed as of June 30, 2011, 79 have produced “current dismissals” and “only 23 settlements. “

With respect to first half 2011 settlements, the average settlement was $23 million, which is sharply down from the 2010 average settlement of $108 million. The median settlement during the year’s first six months was only $6.3 million, down sharply from the all time high median settlement of $11 million in 2011. The proportion of cases settling for less than $10 million reached a post-2006 high during the first half of 2011, when 58 percent of cases settled below $10 million , up from 41 percent in 2010.

The report speculates that one reason for the lower settlement levels may be that during the first half of 2011 “cases may have been more apt to settle within insurance limits, possibly due to defendants’ reduced ability to pay.” Of the 15 out of the 48 first half settlements for which NERA was able to determine the insurance contribution, insurance paid all of the settlement in eight cases, between 71 and 81 percent in three and an unspecified rate in the remaining four.

The full report, which has a wide variety of other interesting and useful information, warrant reading at length and in full.

Discussion

It is  purely coincidental that the NERA report’s publication came in such close conjunction with the publication of the Cornerstone Research report. But because they appeared so close in time, it is impossible not to compare the two reports’ findings. The contrast between the reports’ conclusions is striking. The Cornerstone Report suggested that securities class action laws filings are in decline and trending toward historically lower levels. The NERA Report, by contrast, suggests that filings “are on the rise” and “unusually high.”

What in the world is going on? Aren’t these two reports supposed to be analyzing the same thing?

The casual reader will be forgiven for assuming that the two reports are analyzing the same thing. But careful reading of the small print and footnotes will disclose that the two reports are not analyzing the same thing. Or to put it more accurately, they are not counting the same things in the same ways. I suspect there are even more differences in what is counted and how it is counted than can be discerned from the reports themselves. But even just based on what can be gleaned from the reports,, the NERA Report (as described in its footnote 1), counts separate filings against a company in separate circuits as separate lawsuits, at least until they are consolidated. Cornerstone, by contrast, counts each target defendant company only once. Cornerstone also counts separate lawsuits brought by separate classes of securityholders separately, at least until consolidated.

I know from my own experience that another very difficult category has to do with the lawsuits arising from M&A-related transactions. Whether or not to include these cases can only be decided on a case by case basis, and reasonable people almost certainly might reach different conclusions , which could produce significantly different lawsuit counts.

My point here is that how you count affects what you count. And what you count affects the ultimate outcome of your count. The net effect is that we have two very reputable analytic firms reaching quite different conclusions about the level of securities class action lawsuit filing activity during the first six months of 2011. Truthfully, that is the reason I keep my own count, because I find it too confusing trying to make sense out of the conflicting conclusions of the reporting firms.

The problem for everyone is that these conflicting conclusions get picked up in the mass media and reported as if they representing absolute conclusions rather than alternative analyses based on mixed data. These conflicting reports create a great deal of confusion among the general public.

I think part of the problem here as the respective commentators act as if they are publishing their data in a vacuum. Nothing could be further from the truth. I suspect to a very high degree of moral certainty that every single reader that reads any one of these report reads them all. Not only that, but the authors of these reports read each others reports and they know that everyone that reads their reports reads all the reports.

 It would be extraordinarily helpful if the authors would acknowledge this reality up front (not in footnotes, not in reduced text, not in text buried deep within the document) in a simple cover page statement that declares the counting methodology used and that explains how that contrasts with counting methodologies used in other published reports. It would be even more helpful if this initial disclosure explained how the methodology selected affects the ultimate count.

By making these remarks here, I hope that no one concludes that I am being critical of anyone. To the contrary, I am one of many people who are very grateful that these high-powered analytic firms are willing to publish their reports and make their analyses available for free. These reports are extraordinarily valuable and helpful. My point is simply that these reports would be even more useful if the reports were to recognize the context within which they are read.

Finally, I want to be sure to acknowledge the incredibly fine work that the folks at these firms produce. On behalf of myself and everyone else that devours these reports as soon as they are published. I would like thank everyone associated with the production of these reports. And since this particular post is about the NERA report, I would like to salute all my friends at NERA and to thank them for another fine report. I hope no one interprets my curmudgeonly remarks as anything other than a friendly suggestion.

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Among other things, Cornerstone Research’s mid-year 2011 analysis of securities class action lawsuit filings reported that during the year’s first half lawsuits were filed more quickly. The report said that in the first six months of 2011 “the median lag between the end of the class periods and the filing dates dropped to the lowest recorded semiannual level since 1997.” But while securities suits in general may be being filed with alacrity, there are still suits that are being filed only after considerable delay. At least one recent suit filing qualifies as belated, while yet another recent filing looks positively ancient.

First, on July 20, 2011, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against Lockheed Martin and certain of its directors and officers. According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ July 20, 2011 press release (here), the complaint (which can be found here) purports to represent a class of Lockheed shareholders who purchased their shares between April 21, 2009 and July 21, 2009. 

In other words, the plaintiffs appear to have filed their complaint in the Lockheed Martin action on the last day of the two year statute of limitations period applicable to most private securities lawsuits. Given the lag between the class period cutoff date and the date the complaint was filed, the Lockheed Martin lawsuit filing would seem to qualify at least as “belated.”

But the lag time in the Lockheed Martin case is nothing compared to the time gap in the case recently filed involving Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited.

As reflected in their press release (here), on July 25, 2011, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against Fairfax Financial Holdings, its auditor, and certain of its affiliated entities and certain of its directors and officers. In their complaint, the plaintiffs purport to represent a class of Fairfax shareholders who purchased their shares between May 21, 2003 and March 22, 2006. In other words, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in this case more than five years after the end of the purported class period.

Doesn’t this apparently tardy filing violate the statute of limitation? The plaintiffs knew you were going to ask that question, and so in their complaint they expressly address the statute of limitations issue. As reflected in the complaint’s preamble, on page 2 of the complaint, it is going to be the plaintiffs’ position in the case that the statute of limitations was tolled on April 14, 2006, with the filing of a prior action – Parks v. Fairfax Financial Holdings, et al. (about which refer here) -- in the Southern District of New York, against many of the same defendants and involving many of the same allegations.

In other words, as you might expect with an ancient set of circumstances, history is important. In particular, the history of the Parks case could be determinative of the statute of limitations issues in the recently filed action.

The Parks case, it turns out, was dismissed on March 29, 2010 on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fairfax Financial Holdings is a Canadian company. In his March 2010 opinion, Southern District of New York Judge George B. Daniels, citing the Second Circuit’s opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, held that the plaintiffs in the Parks case had not alleged sufficient “conduct and effects” in the United States in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs’ subsequent appeal to the Second Circuit was dismissed.

However, after that, in June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court entered its opinion in the Morrison case, rejecting the “conduct and effects” text and substituting the “transaction” test. Moreover, the Supreme Court said that the questions of U.S. courts’ authority to hear securities cases involving foreign companies was not jurisdictional, but rather was simply a question of whether or not a claim was within the ambit of the securities laws.

The plaintiffs in the recently filed action involving Fairfax Financial Holdings, cognizant of the U.S. Supreme Court’s “transaction” test in the Morrison case, purport to represent only shareholders who purchased their company shares on U.S. exchanges. As a matter of pleading, the presentation of their claims in U.S. court should satisfy the Morrison standard, now that the “conduct and effects” test has been discarded.

While the plaintiffs in the recently filed case may avoid the jurisdictional problems that waylaid the prior plaintiffs in the Parks case, there are still those pesky statute of limitations issues. The most recent filing is not only well beyond the two-year statute of limitations, but it is even beyond the five year statute of repose. The question the parties will have to hammer out (and I expect they will) is whether or not the 2006 filing the Parks case not only tolled the statute of limitations but also stays the running of the statute of repose. There is a point where a claim or claims are not just old, but stale. The question is whether or not these claims are past their sell-by date. It will be interesting to see how these issues are resolved in this case.

An unrelated issue that comes to mind is whether or not the dismissal in the Parks case is determinative of the claims. That is, as lawyers would say, is the prior dismissal res judiciata? The question there will be whether a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction has a res judiciata effect, since it does not represent a determination of the merits of any of the claims asserted. Attorneys who have access to associates to research interesting question like that will know the answer to this question (or they will when their associates have completed their legal research).

But in the end, what is clear is that while securities lawsuits generally may be being filed more quickly, there are some of these older cases still kicking around out there. And they raise some potentially very interesting issues.

Summary Judgment Denied: Securities class action litigation observers know that very few securities suits actually go to trial. Most cases are either dismissed or settled. From time to time, a securities suit will make it all the way to the summary judgment stage. The securities suit pending against Motorola and certain of its directors and officers in the Northern District of Illinois is one of those cases where the case reached the summary judgment stage. In a July 25, 2011 order (here), Northern District of Ilinois Judge Amy St. Eve denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding inter alia that there are genuine issues of material fact on the issues of falsity, materiality and scienter. As a procedural matter, the case is now headed toward trial, depending on whether or not a settlement intervenes.

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Decreased credit crisis-related filings partially offset by an influx of new filings related to M&A transactions or involving Chinese companies resulted in slightly decreased overall levels of securities class action litigation filings during the first half of 2011, according to a recent report entitled “Securities Class Action Filings: 2011 Mid-Year Assessment,” jointly published by Cornerstone Research and the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The report can be foundhere and the accompanying July 26, 2011 press release can be found here. My own analysis of the first half filings can be found here.

According to the report, there were 94 securities class action lawsuit filings during the first half of 2011, compared to 104 in the second half of 2010. The 94 first half filings annualizes (using calendar days rather than months) to 190 filings, which is slightly below the 1997-2010 annual filing average of 194. (Cornerstone’s lawsuit count may differ slightly from other published tallies because, among other things, it counts multiple complaints against the same defendants only once and because it does not count state court filings.)

The report notes that the quarterly number of filings has generally declined during the past twelve months. Quarterly filings decreased from 56 in the third quarter of 2010 to 48 in the fourth quarter of 2011, 46 in the first quarter of 2010 and 48 in the second quarter of 2011.

One factor driving the first half 2011 filings was the upsurge in lawsuits against Chinese companies. There were 24 securities class action lawsuits against Chinese companies in the first half of 2011, with 23 of those actions involving reverse merger companies, up from 12 filings against Chinese companies, nine involving reverse merger companies, in all of 2010. By the same token there were 21 M&A-related filings in the first six months of 2011, “continuing a new pattern” that emerged in the second half of 2010, when there were 27 M&A-related lawsuits.

The lawsuits involving Chinese companies and M&A-related activity collectively represent a very substantial part of all securities class action lawsuit filings in the first six months of 2011. These two groups of lawsuits together represented 46.8 percent of all filings in 2011’s first half, up from 32.7 percent in the second half of 2010. Excluding these two categories, there were otherwise only 50 securities class action lawsuits in the first half of 2011, 70 in the second half of 2010 and 57 in the first half of 2010. These figures, the report notes, are “similar to the low number of filings seen in 2006 and 2007.”

The report notes that the its own annualized projection for the 2011 year-end number of securities class action lawsuit filings assumes that the pace of new filings against Chinese companies seen in the year’s first half will continue in the second half. However, the report notes, the number of U.S.-listed Chinese reverse merger companies is finite, and the current level of new filings involving Chinese companies is unlikely to continue indefinitely. The report reckons, “at one extreme,” that if there were no new lawsuits involving Chinese companies in 2011’s second half and other filings continue at the same pace as in the year’s first half, there would be only a total of 166 filings this year, “making 2011 the second lowest year in filings activity during 2006.”

The report contains some interesting analysis of the frequency of new lawsuit filings involving S&P 500 companies. The report notes that only 8.5 percent of the first half of 2011 filings named companies in the S&P 500 index, down from 15.4 percent in the second half of 2010. Overall, eight companies, or about one out of every 63 companies in the S&P 500 Index, were defendants in a class action filed in the first half of 2011, compared with about one out of every 19 S&P 500 companies during the full year of 2010. Only one out of 81 companies in the S&P 500 Financials sector was named as a defendant in the first half of 2011, compared to an average of 11.7 percent of Financials sector firms named in class actions between 2000 and 2010.

The losses in market capitalization associated with adverse disclosures at the end of the class periods remains low compared to historical levels. The total disclosure loss during the first half of 2011 of $48 billion is well below the historical average of $64 billion occurring between 1997 and 2010. The market cap declines during the class periods also remained low during 2011.

Discussion

The report clearly substantiates that the number of lawsuits against Chinese companies and involving M&A transactions were a significant factor driving securities class action litigation activity during the first half of 2011. The report’s exploration of the counterfactual question of what the litigation levels might have looked like without these two categories of litigation activity is interesting. But the report’s implicit suggestion that – but for the anomalous Chinese company and M&A transaction lawsuits –  securities litigation filings are actually trending toward the lower levels that prevailed during the “lull” years of 2006 and early 2007 warrants scrutiny.

The lawsuits involving Chinese companies and M&A-related transactions may reflect short term filing patterns. But it has long been the case with securities class action lawsuit filings that they are substantially driven by short term filing patterns. For years, class action lawsuit filings have been reflected sector slides, contagion patterns, or industry events. The Internet bubble was followed by the telecom industry crash and that was filed by the era of the corporate scandals, which was followed by the mutual fund industry market timing scandal, and then came options backdating scandal and after that the subprime meltdown and then the credit crisis. Each one of these events involved an associated influx of securities class action lawsuits.

So while it is true that the current litigation activity is largely being driven by short-term trends, there is nothing unusual about that. There always seems to be something driving securities class action litigation activity and it seems likely that even after the current round of securities lawsuits involving Chinese companies winds down, the plaintiffs lawyers will find something else to agitate about. (And as for whether the pattern of lawsuits against Chinese companies is going to wind down soon, I note that there have already been four new securities class action lawsuits filed against U.S.-listed Chinese companies already this month, so there is no current suggestion that the filing phenomenon has started to slow down.)

The other thing about the “lull” period, from about mid-2005 to mid-2007, is that while securities class action lawsuit filings may have declined compared to historical norms during that period, overall litigation levels did not decline. The options backdating scandal unfolded during that period, and many more of the options backdating lawsuits that were filed during that period were filed as shareholder derivative suits (over 160) than were filed as securities class action lawsuits (only about 40). So while there may have been a decline in new securities lawsuits during that period, overall litigation levels remained at or near historical norms. It is important to keep this fact in mind when attempting to discern filing patterns over time, especially when considering the possibility that filing levels are or are not actually trending toward a putative lower level.

My own view, which is substantially dependent upon the assumption that the plaintiffs’ lawyers will always find the next new category of lawsuits to pursue, is that securities class action lawsuit filings are not trending toward some lower level. More specifically, I do not think that the mid-2005 to mid-2007 filing levels represent some sort of “new normal” to which filings levels are generally trending but for short-term anomalies that obscure the overall pattern. To the contrary, I think the lower securities class action filing levels during the 2005 to 2007 period represent the anomaly, and it is an anomaly that is entirely explainable by the plaintiffs’ bar’s temporary diversion into shareholders derivative lawsuit filings during the options backdating scandal.

As I have said before, fish gotta swim, birds gotta fly, and plaintiffs’ lawyers have to file lawsuits. The fish and the birds can be counted upon to continue their traditional activities, and so can the plaintiffs’ lawyers.

An important consideration to keep in mind along those lines is that going forward the lawsuit filings driving corporate and securities litigation may or may not involve securities class action lawsuits. As the insurance advisory firm Advisen has well documented in its periodic reports on corporate and securities litigation (refer for example here), securities class action lawsuits increasingly represent a declining percentage of all corporate and securities litigation. So it may happen, as was the case during the so-called “lull” period, that securities class action lawsuit filings may decline while overall litigation levels remain unchanged or even continue to increase.

Responding to Negative Say on Pay Vote: Although only a very small companies experienced a negative say on pay vote during this past proxy season (as detailed here), a number of the companies that did sustain negative votes wound up in litigation. For companies that find themselves in this position, the question arises of how the company and its board should respond.

In an interesting July 24, 2011 post on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation blog (here), Paul Rowe of the Wachtell Lipton law firm examines the question of the how companies that have experienced a negative say on pay vote should respond.

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For many years, one of the fundamental goals of shareholder rights activists has “proxy access,” which would require corporations to include shareholder nominated board candidates on the company’s proxy ballots. Last year, in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC promulgated rules facilitating shareholder director nominations under certain circumstances. However, on July 22, 2011, in an opinion that called the SEC’s rulemaking “arbitrary and capricious” and reflected sharp criticism of the agency, a three-judge panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals struck down the SEC’s rule. The opinion, which can be found here, makes for some interesting reading and raises some potentially significant implications.

Background

Shareholder activists have been lobbying for proxy access for years. As part of the sweeping financial reform encompassed in the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress provided the SEC in Section 971 of the Act with authority to promulgate proxy access rules. On August 25, 2011, the SEC adopted rules implementing this provision. Rule 14a-11 would have provided shareholders holding at least three percent of the voting power of a company’s securities who have held their shares at least three years with the right to have their director nominees included in the company’s proxy materials.

However, on September 29, 2010, the Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a lawsuit challenging the proxy access rules. On October 4, 2010, the SEC issued a stay of the rule’s effectiveness pending the court’s review. 

The July 22 Opinion

In an opinion written by Judge Douglas Ginsberg for a three-judge panel, the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC has acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” in adopting the proxy access rules. In language that was presented a particularly harsh rebuke to the SEC, the court said that:

We agree with petitioners and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once again …adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule. Here the Commission inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial problems raised by commentators.

The court seemed particularly concerned with the costs companies would incur as incumbent directors sought to defeat the shareholders’ electoral challenge, and with the SEC’s supposed failure to take those costs into account. The court said “although it might be possible that a board, consistent with its fiduciary duties, might forego expending resources to oppose a shareholder nominee – for example, if it believes the cost of opposition would exceed the cost to the company of the board’s preferred candidate losing the election, discounted by the probability of that happening – the Commission has presented no evidence that such forbearance is ever seen in practice. “

The court was also critical of the SEC for failing to take into account the likelihood that the proxy access process might be used by shareholders with special interests to pursue their own agendas, at the expense of other shareholders. The court said that “the Commission failed to respond to comments arguing that investors with a special interest, such as unions and state and local governments whose interests in jobs may well be greater than their interest in share value, can be expected to pursue self-interested objectives rather than the goal of maximizing shareholder value, and will likely cause the companies to incur costs even when their nominee is unlikely to be elected.”

The court granted the business groups’ petition and vacated the SEC rules.

Discussion

Both the court’s holding and the language it used have important implications for proxy access and for the SEC’s future rulemaking efforts.

With respect to the SEC’s proposed rule, the agency now has to decide whether to appeal the D.C. Circuit’s ruling or to try remedial efforts to try to address the D.C. Circuit’s  concern. The prospects for addressing all of the court’s concerns seem daunting. As a former SEC general counsel quoted in the July 23, 2011 Wall Street Journal article about the decision (here) put it, “given the number of objections the court had, the amount of work would be very substantial and it may just be impossible.”  It may be that at least this latest effort to implement proxy access has hit an insurmountable obstacle.

But beyond the proxy access question, the D.C. Circuit’s decision has important implications for SEC rulemaking generally. The court went out of its way to rebuke the SEC for its repeated failure to address legal requirements for the agency’s rulemaking. According to the Journal article, the July 22 opinion represents “the fourth time in recent years the same appeals court has invalidated an agency rule on similar grounds.”

The D.C. Circuit’s criticism of the agency’s rulemaking and its insistence on a high bar for rulemaking compliance comes at a time when the SEC is laboring under a significant rulemaking burden due to the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act and at a time when the agency is also coming under significant budgetary constraints. The SEC will have to move forward to try to meet the Dodd-Frank rulemaking requirements with awareness of the harsh scrutiny its rules will face in the appellate courts.

Shareholder activists quoted in the various news articles commenting on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion suggest they will continue to try to press ahead on proxy access. It remains to be seen how the SEC will respond. But for now, proxy access has been tabled, and it may be some time before this or another initiative resuscitates the initiative.  

The Morrison & Foerster law firm’s July 22, 2011 memo discussing the D.C. Circuit’s opinion can be found here. The statement of the U.S. Chamber and the Business Roundtable about the opinion can be found here. Special thanks to the several loyal readers who sent me links about the Court’s opinion.

Meanwhile, Back at the FDIC: Although the standard current line on the continuing wave of bank failures is that the FDIC is winding down its bank closure efforts, the FDIC does not seem to have gotten the memo. This past Friday evening, the FDIC closed three more banks, bringing the July 2011 month to date total number of closures to 10, after the agency had closed only nine banks in the months of May and June combined. The latest closures brings the year-to-date total number of bank failures to 58, and with the latest closures signs area that the number of bank failures could continue to mount for some time to come.

Another thing that is striking about the YTD bank closures is how many of the closures still involve Georgia banks. So far this year, 16 Georgia banks have failed. This is after several years of massive numbers of bank failures in the state. You do start to wonder how there could be any banks left in Georgia at this point.

Morrison: Where is the Place of the Transaction?: As explained in the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Section 10 of the ’34 Act and Rule 10b-5 apply  to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.” The second of the two prongs in this standard requires courts to determine whether or not the disputed transaction is or is not “domestic,” which leave courts to try to determine where the transaction took place.

In the Quail Cruise ship case (refer here, second item), the Eleventh Circuit recently held that because the share transaction allegedly “closed” in Miami, the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the transaction was a domestic transaction. In a more elaborate opinion, discussed here, Southern District of New York Judge Barbara Jones held in the SEC enforcement action against Goldman Sachs associate Fabrice Toure that the place of the transaction is to be determined based on the place where the transaction counterparties incurred “irrevocable liability” to take or sell the securities in question.

As discussed in Nate Raymond’s July 21, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article (here), last Thursday, Judge Jones quoted her own prior opinion in holding that the plaintiff in the civil action against Goldman Sachs in connection with the infamous Timberwolf CDO (to which an unfortunate Goldman associate referred in an email as “one shitty deal”)  had not adequately alleged that the security sale involved a domestic transaction. A copy of Judge Jones’ opinion can be found here.

In holding that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that the transaction in question took place in the U.S., Judge Jones said that in order to meet the requirements of Morrison’s second prong and establish that a transaction took place in the U.S., the plaintiff “must allege that the parties incurred irrevocable liability to purchase or sell the security in the United States.” Judge Jones dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint but with leave to attempt to replead the transactional allegations in order to establish that their transaction was cognizable under the federal securities laws.

Through sheer repetition, Judge Jones’s “irrevocable liability” test may become the de facto standard for determining whether or not a transaction has taken place in the United States.  On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit’s recent (albeit somewhat unexplained) pronouncement that the place of the transaction closing is sufficient may present an alternative test on which parties may seek to rely. 

Choice of Law: In a prior post, I noted that choice of law may be one of the sleeper issues for determining insurance coverage. I specifically discussed the potential merits of the incorporation of a choice of law clause within the D&O insurance policy.

In a July 20, 2011 post on the Delaware Business Litigation Report blog, Edward M. McNally of the Morris James law firm takes a look at the question of choice of law in the context of breach of contract disputes, and he reviews the advantages of the incorporation into business contracts of choice of law provisions. His article specifically raises the questions that can arise in the D&O insurance context in the absence of a choice of law provision in the policy.

The Plot Thickens: When discussing the allegations many Chinese companies are raising that the assertions of accounting impropriety against the companies are the product of the fevered and self-interested imaginings of short sellers, I compared the situation to the Spy vs. Spy feature in  Mad Magazine. It turns out that I had no idea of how much skullduggery might be involved.

In a July 22, 2011 Thomson Reuters News & Insight article (here), Alison Frankel details the allegations and counter allegations that are flying in connection with online securities analyst and short-seller Muddy Waters, which has been at the center of a number of the assertions of financial impropriety involving Chinese companies. Apparently an anonymous online source has posted phony content purporting to show that Muddy Waters was the target of an SEC enforcement action for fraud and was forced to pay over $240 million for improper profits on stock manipulation. Another individual (who called himself “Shaun Coffey” in possible reference to famous former plaintiffs’ securities attorney Sean Coffey) is out trying to present himself as a Muddy Waters employee and attempting to use threats to try to blackmail Chinese companies.

Meanwhile, the July 24, 2011 New York Times had an article entitled "China to Wall Street: The Side-Door Shuffle" (here) that tells the story of how Rino International, a Chinese company, obtained its U.S. listing through a reverse merger. The article also describes how a research report from the Muddy Waters firm first raised questions about the company, following which the company's share price collapsed and lawsuits ensued. You can certainly see how there might be some people who don't like the Muddy Waters firm.

I will say that since she moved over to Thomson Reuters, Frankel has consistently been cranking out top quality articles and at an impressive rate. I marvel both at how she continues to come up with interesting story topics and how she cranks out an astonishing number of interesting and entertaining articles. Alison, everyone here at The D&O Diary salutes you.

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With the temperatures reaching mind-bending levels, we considered it advisable to stay inside, drink plenty of fluids, and limit our exertions. So in lieu of a more elaborate post, we have simply noted some mid-summer quick hits below.

Action against U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies Auditors Allowed to Proceed: A recurring question during the current wave of lawsuit filings involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies has been how the plaintiffs will pursue their claims and enforce any judgments against the Chinese defendants. One likely counter to these problems has been for plaintiffs to pursue the claims against the Chinese defendant company’s more accessible outside professionals. A number of recent suits have named outside auditors and other professionals as defendants (refer for example here). Given recent U.S. Supreme Court case law, making these claims against the outside professionals stick could be tough.

But in a July 18, 2011 decision in a case filed prior to the current wave of lawsuit filings against Chinese companies, a judge had held that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient for the claims against the auditor to proceed. As reflected here, the plaintiff first filed its lawsuit against China Expert Technology in 2007. The original complaint included among the defendants the company’s outside auditors including affiliates of BDO Seidman and affiliates of PKF.

The case had been through several rounds of pleading. The defendants’ motions to dismiss were initially granted, but the dismissal as to the PKF parties was without prejudice. The plaintiff twice attempted to amend his complaint in an attempt to overcome the pleading concerns, but each time the motion as to the PKF parties was granted, without prejudice.

In the July 18 order, which is handwritten, Southern District of New York Judge Alvin Hellerstein concluded with respect to the plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint that “enough has been alleged to make out a plausible claim for relief.” Unfortunately for other litigants who might want to try and rely on or cite Judge Hellerstein’s ruling, his brief order does not provide any elaboration.

But despite the brevity of the ruling and the fact that it took four amended complaints for the China Expert technology plaintiff to overcome the pleading hurdle, the fact is that the plaintiff was ultimately able to present allegations sufficient to meet the pleading hurdles. That fact alone may provide comfort for the plaintiffs in pursuing claims against the Chinese companies’ outside professionals in other cases.

Success in overcoming the hurdles in pleading claims against the auditor in this particular case is for this plaintiff critical. As Nate Raymond pointed out in his July 20, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article about the case (here), China Expert Technology has never appeared in the case and a default was previously entered against the company. Plaintiffs in other cases may face similar challenges, and so the ability to pursue claims against the outside professionals may prove to be critical in other cases as well. Whether or not those claimants will be able to make their claims stick remains to be seen. But in at least one case, the plaintiff’s claims against a Chinese firm’s outside auditor are going forward.

A July 21, 2011 Reuters article about the decision can be found here

Who’s Paying for News Corp.’s Legal Costs?: The media frenzy over News Corp.’s phone hacking scandal has led to a host of actual and potential legal proceedings involving News Corp. and its senior managers. The legal bills no doubt are starting to mount, which inevitable leads to the question of who will be paying the lawyers. A July 20, 2011 Reuters article (here) speculates that the company’s D&O insurance may be paying for the the legal expenses.

The article appropriately notes some of the questions surrounding the availability of D&O insurance coverage for the legal fees. Among other things, depending on its terms and conditions, the D&O policy may not cover substantial amounts of the expense, even if there is coverage under the policy for some of the company’s expense. The fees the company and its senior officials incur in defending the various civil suits are likely to be most likely to be covered. The various investigations and criminal proceedings may or may not be covered depending on the nature of the proceedings and the specific wordings of the company’s policy.

And Speaking of D&O Insurance: As suggested in the prior item, the specific wording in a D&O insurance policy is critically important. Subtle wording differences can make a significant difference in whether or to what extent insurance is available for claims related expenses, settlements and judgments. In a competitive insurance marketplace , the more advantageous wordings often are available and are often available at little or no additional cost.

A July 2011 memo from the Lowenstein Sandler law firm describes the availability of more favorable coverage terms as “D&O Coverage at Little or No Additional Cost.” The memo explores some of the policy alternations that can increase the scope of coverage available under the D&O insurance policy.

They’re Getting Litigation Weary North of the Border, Too: In changes that went into effect in 2005, Ontario modified its securities laws to provide a different liability regime for holding corporate officials accountable to shareholders for material misrepresentations and omissions. One of the new law’s features was the inclusion of a procedural requirement that prospective litigants obtain judicial leave to proceed. The leave requirement was introduced at companies’ insistence as a way to try to ensure that only meritorious cases proceed.

But as discussed in a July 20, 2011 Reuters article (here), the leave requirement itself is proving to be burdensome, as the process of determining whether or not the case should be allowed to go forward is proving to be protracted and expensive. The article also reports that there are concerns in some circles that the courts have set the bar for granting leave too low.

It was perhaps inevitable that there would be grumbling in the wake of claims under the new regime. From that perspective, the complaints are hardly surprising. But it does seem as if the actual process under the new rules is turning out differently than at least some had envisioned.

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Overall levels of corporate and securities litigation during the second quarter and first half of 2011 remained at elevated levels despite a decline in regulatory and enforcement activity during the quarter, according to the latest Advisen quarterly litigation report. A copy of the report can be found here. My own survey of the second quarter and first half securities class action litigation activity can be found here.

Preliminary Notes

It is critically important to recognize that the Advisen report uses its own unique vocabulary to describe certain of the corporate and securities litigation categories.

The “securities litigation” and “securities suits” analyzed in the Advisen report include not only securities class action lawsuits, but a broad collection of other types of suits as well, including regulatory and enforcement actions, individual actions, derivative actions, collective actions filed outside the U.S. and allegations of breach of fiduciary duty. All of these various kinds of lawsuits, whether or not involving alleged violations of the securities laws, are referred to in the aggregate in the Advisen report as "securities suits."

One subset of the overall collection of "securities suits" is a category denominated as "securities fraud" lawsuits, which includes a combination of both regulatory and enforcement actions, on the one hand, and private securities lawsuits brought as individual actions, on the other hand. However, the category of "securities fraud" lawsuits does NOT include private securities class action lawsuits, which are in their own separate category ("SCAS").

Due to these unfamiliar usages and the confusing similarity of category names, considerable care is required in reading the Advisen report.

The Report’s Findings

According to the report, the annualized level of all corporate and securities litigation activity during the first half of 2011 remained “on par with the record-setting year of 2010,” notwithstanding a decline in the number of new regulatory actions against financial services firms, as enforcement activity in the wake of the global financial crisis waned.

Advisen tracked a total of 332 new actions across all categories of corporate and securities lawsuits during the second quarter, compared to 398 during 1Q11. Despite the falloff, the second quarter activity remained as a “high level” and the first half activity annualizes to a record level of corporate and securities litigation activity.

One category of litigation activity driving these numbers is the group of lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duties. Many of these breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits are merger objection lawsuits, the filing of which has been “mushrooming” in recent years. The number of merger objection suits has grown from only 21 in 2001 to 353 in 2010, and with 176 merger objection suits in the first half of 2011, the pace of merger objection litigation remains in line with 2010 levels. The report includes a chart on page 6 illustrating the dramatic growth in merger objection litigation activity.

According to the Advisen report, there were 63 new securities class action lawsuit filings during the second quarter, which is flat with the previous quarter, but above the 2010 quarterly average of 48 per quarter and in line with the 60 suits per quarter during 2009. Securities class action lawsuit filings as a percentage of all corporate and securities lawsuit filings remains down from historical levels although up slightly from 2010 levels. Class action securities lawsuits represented as much as a third of all corporate and securities litigation activity as recently as 2006, but during the second quarter, securities class action lawsuits represented only 19 percent of all corporate and securities lawsuits, which while below historical levels is up slightly from the 14 percent such suits represented in 2010. Three industrial sectors accounted for over 60 percent of all securities class action lawsuit during the first half: information technology, consumer discretionary, and industrial.

Actions involving companies in the financial services industry accounted for a smaller percentage of all corporate and securities litigation activity during the second quarter compared to recent periods. Financial firms counted for 45 percent of all corporate and securities litigation in 2008 and 45 percent in 2009. The number fell to 34 percent in 2010 and during the second quarter of 2011, the number fell to 25 percent. Despite the decline, the financial services industry still remains the “leading sector” for attracting corporate and securities litigation activity.

One prominent trend has been the growth in corporate and securities litigation activity involving non-U.S. companies. A certain amount of this litigation involving non-U.S. companies involves proceedings outside the U.S. The Advisen study reports that during the first half of 2011, there were 38 corporate and securities lawsuits filed outside the U.S., 18 of which were filed during the second quarter. Corporate and securities lawsuits involving non-U.S. companies, whether filed in the U.S. or elsewhere, have accounted for about ten percent of all corporate and securities litigation activity since 2005. But in the first half of 2011, corporate and securities lawsuit activity against non-U.S. companies accounted for 17 percent of all corporate and securities litigation activity, and during the second quarter of 2011, the figure for non-U.S. companies was up to 20 percent.

A substantial part of this rise in activity involving non-U.S. companies has been the rise in the number of corporate and securities lawsuits involving Chinese companies, of which there were 44 during the first half of 2011.

Discussion

Advisen’s report takes a broader view of corporate and securities litigation, because its scope reaches beyond just securities class action lawsuits to include all corporate and securities litigation, and not just in the U.S, but outside the U.S. as well. But even with this broader scope, it is apparent that a couple of identifiable factors are currently driving corporate and securities litigation activity, as is also the case with securities class action litigation – that is, the high levels of litigation largely  is a factor of the suits connected to merger and acquisition activity  and by lawsuits involving Chinese companies.

The table in the report depicting merger objection litigation filings dramatically illustrates the growth in this type of litigation activity in recent years. This development has a number of implications, including for the D&O insurance carriers that often wind up picking a significant part of the defense expenses and settlement amounts associated with these kinds of lawsuits. Even though these cases taken individually do not present a significant severity risk, taken collectively that represent a significant claims loss burden for the carriers, particularly those that are the most active in the primary layers.

As the mix of litigation has shifted away from higher severity claims such as securities class action lawsuits and toward higher frequency claims such as merger objection suits, the D&O carriers’ claims experience has shifted as well. As I noted in my own report on second quarter litigation activity, this is an under-discussed issue.

The burden these costs represent may be all the more painful for the carriers because the exposures involved with these kinds of suits likely are not priced into the risk premium. In addition, it is tough to underwrite the likelihood that any one company will be acquired. But because the discussion of carriers’ loss exposures tends to focus on the higher severity risk of securities class action litigation, there is relatively little consideration given to the higher frequency exposure that these merger objection lawsuits represent. This is one of those issues that just doesn’t get the airtime it deserves – at least not so far.

One interesting development involving these kinds of merger objection lawsuits is that the judges in the Delaware Chancery Court have started to show some resistence to the fee awards to plantiffs' counsel in cases that do not produce a material benefit for shareholders. The Wall Street Journal has a July 19, 2011 article (here) discussing these developments. The flip side of this judicial resistence is that in some instances the Delaware courts have proven more willing to approve larger fee awards where the court concludes the plaintiffs have produced substantial benefit for shareholders.

The surge in litigation involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies also has important D&O insurance implications, as noted in a recent Client Advisory I co-authored with Pillsbury Winthrop’s Peter Gillon, about which refer here. Alison Frankel has a July 18, 2011 post on the same topic on her Thomson Reuters News & Insight blog, here.

Second Quarter Litigation Update Webinar: And speaking of first half 2011 litigation filing trends, on Tuesday July 19, 2011 at 11 a.m. EDT, I will be participating in the Advisen's "Q2 Securities Litigation Webinar."  My fellow panelists will include Anderson Kill's Bill Passanante, Navigators' Scott Misson, and Willis’ John Connolly. The panel will be moderated by Advisen's Jim Blinn. Information about this event, which is free, can be found here.

Outside Directors and SEC Enforcement Actions: A July 16, 2011 post on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation entitled “SEC Enforcement Actions Against Outside Directors Offer Reminder for Boards” (here) takes a look at recent SEC Enforcement actions targeting outside directors. The article concludes with respect to the recent SEC enforcement actions that “when taken together, the cases signal the commission’s continued interest in bringing enforcement actions against directors of publicly traded companies who personally violate securities laws or egregiously disregard their duties.”

Among other implications, the article notes the importance for board members of considering the coverage available through their company’s D&O insurance program for regulatory investigations and enforcement actions.

Cordray for Consumers? : Many readers may have seen the news that President Obama has nominated former Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray to head the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Cordray will be a familiar figure to readers of this blog, as I have commented in the past on Corday’s actions while Ohio Attorney General in pursuing securities class action lawsuits on behalf of Ohio’s pension funds.

Reactions to Cordray’s nomination to head the new consumer agency include concerns regarding Cordray’s connections to the securities class action bar. In a July 18, 2011 post on his Full Disclosure blog on the Forbes website, Daniel Fisher takes a look at the campaign contributions Cordray received in the past from prominent members of the securities class action litigation bar and comments that Cordray’s “record of taking money from lawyers who profit from private litigation that often follows closely on the heels of government investigations could provide fodder for his enemies.”

Ross Todd has a July 18, 2011 post on the Am Law Litigation Daily on the same questions about Cordray.

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When an ex- Chairman, CEO and Director sues his former company, are the company’s defense expenses covered under its D&O insurance policy? According to the June 24, 2011 report and recommendation of Middle District of Tennessee Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant, applying Tennessee law, they are not. A copy of Magistrate Bryant’s report and recommendation can be found here.

In October 2009, David Resha, a current shareholder and former Chairman, CEO and director of American Security Bank & Trust Company, sued the company in Tennessee state court for alleged violations of law and fiduciary duty. Resha alleged that the company had violated its bylaws and asserted the right to inspect the company’s books and records. American Security is the sole named defendant in the action.

The company submitted the action as a claim to its D&O insurer, seeking reimbursement for its defense expenses. The carrier denied coverage for the claim and American Security filed an action against the carrier alleging breach of contract and bad faith and seeking a judicial declaration that all past and future expenses incurred in defending against Resha’s claim are covered.

The policy contained the standard D&O insurance agreements for nonindemnifiable loss (Side A coverage) protecting the individual directors and officers in the event indemnification is not available to them due to insolvency or legal prohibition, and for corporate reimbursement (Side B coverage), reimbursing  the company to the extent it does indemnify the individual directors and officers. At least as presented in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, the policy did not contain a separate insuring agreement providing coverage for the entity’s own losses (Side C coverage).

The policy defined the term “Claim” to mean a “civil proceeding commenced by the service of the complaint … instituted against an Insured Person or against the Company, coverage is granted to the Company.” 

Resha’s lawsuit named only American Security as defendant in the lawsuit. Due to the absence of an entity coverage insuring provision, there is no separate coverage for the company under American Security’s D&O insurance policy. The company nevertheless argued that the insurer should reimburse the company’s defense costs because the complaint asserts bad faith actions and breaches of fiduciary duty by American Security directors, and therefore “impliedly” asserts claims against the directors.

The Magistrate Judge rejected American Security’s arguments, holding that because Resha’s complaint did not name the directors as defendants, the action has not been “instituted against” them. He said that to find under these circumstances that Resha’s action was “instituted against” the directors, the court “would be required to find the words ‘instituted against’ to be ambiguous.” He said that ‘after considering the usual, natural, and ordinary meaning of these words, there is no ambiguity to be found and any premise to the contrary must be rejected.” He added that “to find otherwise would violate the intent of this D&O policy and effectively change it into a comprehensive corporate liability policy.”

The Magistrate Judge went on to hold that “to the extent that a claim has been made against the directors and officers of American Security in substance, though not in form,” the claim would be barred by the policy’s Insured vs. Insured exclusion, since Resha, as the company’s former CEO is an insured person under the policy.

American Security had tried to argue that because Resha was also a shareholder, his claim was in the nature of a derivative claim, and therefore his action fell within the exception to the Insured vs. Insured exclusion for derivative claims. Without deciding whether or not Resha’s action was a derivative claim, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the derivative claim exception to the Insured vs. Insured exclusion did not apply, because Resha’s action was not maintained “independently of, and totally without the participation of any Insured” as would be required in order for the derivative claim exception to the Insured vs. Insured exclusion to apply.

The Magistrate Judge recommended that the insurer’s motion to dismiss be granted and the complaint against it dismissed.

Discussion

Assuming that the description of American Security’s D&O insurance policy in Magistrate Judge Bryant’s report and recommendation is complete, its policy is somewhat unusual as most current D&O insurance policies include a so-called entity coverage insuring provision (Side C coverage) providing insurance for the entity’s own separate liability exposures. Subject to all of the typical policy’s terms and conditions, entity coverage does provide a form of corporate liability protection.

However, even if American Security’s D&O insurance policy had carried the typical entity coverage insuring provision, Resha’s claim would still have run afoul of the policy’s Insured vs. Insured exclusion, and indeed if anything the exclusion’s applicability would have been even more clear.

The inclusion of the Insured vs. Insured exclusion in the D&O insurance policy is usually explained as a way to avoid the provision of insurance coverage for “collusive” claims. But that is not the only reason the exclusion is there. It is also a means to avoid insurance for corporate “infighting” where company officials attempt to pursue their disputes and rivalries in Court. The requirement that a derivative claim must be independent and without the participation of an insured person in order for the exclusion’s coverage carve back for derivative claims to apply is just an illustration as the ways the typical exclusions seeks to avoid coverage for infighting type claims.

Although Magistrate Judge Bryant’s report and recommendation does not say, it seems possible that Resha’s action represents just such an example of corporate infighting. The report and recommendation does not explain why Resha no longer is Chairman, CEO and a director of the company, but his action alleging by law violations and seeking access to the company’s books and records sounds like part of an ongoing dispute after his departure from office. In any event, Resha’s claim is the kind for which most D&O insurance policy’s typically would not provide coverage.

For a more detailed discussion of the Insured v. Insured exclusion generally, refer here.

Morrison: Domestic Transaction in Other Securities?: In its June 2010 decision in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case, the U.S. Supreme Court said that the Exchange Act applies only to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.” Among other issues with which the lower courts have struggled in the wake of Morrison has been the reach of Morrison’s second-prong; that is, what are “domestic transactions in other securities?”

A July 8, 2011 decision by the Eleventh Circuit may shed at least a little bit of light on this question. The case, styled as Quail Cruise Ship Management Ltd. V. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, which can be found here, involved the sale of M/V Pacific, a boat once featured in The Love Boat television series. The sale was effected by a transfer of shares.  The buyer alleged that it had been induced to purchase the shares through a series of misrepresentations, in violation of the U.S. securities laws.

The district court had concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because the shares were not listed on a U.S. exchange (the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted that the issue was not jurisdictional at all, but was rather under Morrison a question as to whether or not the U.S. securities laws applied).

The Eleventh Circuit held that because the complaint alleged that "the acquisition of the Templeton stock closed in Miami, Florida, on June 10, 2008, by means of the parties submitting the stock transfer documents by express courier into this District," the Complaint at least alleged that the final act to effect the share transfer took place in the U.S. Of course, whether or not the share transfer actually took place in the United States and whether the transfer actually effected the sale of the ship are questions of fact for later determination. 

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that it “cannot say at this stage in the proceedings that the alleged transfer of title to the shares in the United States lies beyond § 10(b)’s territorial reach.” the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. 

A further discussion of this case can be found in a July 15, 2011 post on the Corporate and Financial Weekly Digest blog, here.

The Message is Getting Through in China, Too -- At Least to a Certain Extent: In numerous posts on this blog, most recently here, I have noted the increasingly challenging D&O insurance market for U.S.-listed Chinese companies. The word about the challenging insurance market for these firms apparently is getting heard in China, too, at least based on one recent article. On June 24, 2011, the People’s Daily Online (English edition) carried an article entitled “D&O Premiums Skyrocket After U.S. Lawsuits” (here).

Although it is good that this message is getting communicated in China, the article soft-pedals the problem. D&O insurance premiums for U.S.-listed Chinese companies have gone up much more than the 20% increase cited in the article – that is, if you can find coverage at all. The article does at least go on to note, with greater (but not yet complete) accuracy, that in some cases the premiums have doubled. The premium increases have in fact been even more dramatic than that.

“Starring Your Love Boat Crew”: Those of you interested in having a look at the M/V Pacific or who just want a short trip down memory lane will want to view this video clip of the opening credits from The Love Boat, which according to Wikipedia, aired on television from 1977 to 1986.

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During the twelve months ending June 30, 2011, at least 32 Chinese companies were hit with U.S. securities suits. In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has initiated a number of enforcement actions and other proceedings against U.S.-listed Chinese companies, issued a formal bulletin warning investors about the risks of investing in Chinese companies that have gone public through reverse merger transactions, and launched a task force to investigate U.S.-listed Chinese companies that have sold stock to investors in the U.S.

These developments have significant D&O insurance implications for the directors and officers of these firms. In a July 14, 2011 Client Advisory from the Pillsbury Winthrop law firm, Pillsbury partner Peter M. Gillon and I review the current litigation exposure facing U.S.-listed Chinese companies and examine the questions that officials at these firms should be asking about their D&O insurance.

The Client Advisory can be found here.

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On July 14, 2011, the FDIC filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia against 15 former directors and officers of Haven Trust Bank of Duluth, Georgia. This suit is the ninth the FDIC has filed as part of the current bank failure wave and the second that the FDIC has filed in Georgia. A copy of the FDIC's complaint can be found here. Scott Trubey’s July 14, 2011 Atlanta Journal-Constitution article describing the lawsuit can be found here.  

Haven Trust was one of the earliest bank closures of the current wave when it failed on December 18, 2008. The bank’s failure has already been the subject of extensive litigation. In late December 2008, the bank’s investors filed a securities class action lawsuit against the former directors and officers of the bank. But as discussed here, on January 14, 2011, Northern District of Georgia Judge Charles A. Pannell, Jr. granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the securities suit.

The FDIC’s suit filing against the Haven Trust officials may come as little surprise; indeed, as discussed here, the FDIC had previously sought to intervene in the investors’ securities suit. Among other considerations the FDIC cited as part of its bid to intervene was the FDIC’s own intention to assert claims against the individual defendants and the FDIC’s concomitant “interest” in the bank’s D&O insurance. On December 29, 2010, Judge Pannell denied the FDIC’s motion to intervene, as discussed here. He specifically rejected the argument that the FDIC has a “legally protectable interest” in the D&O insurance, as a mere prospective claimant.

In its lawsuit, the FDIC accuses the former directors and officers of gross negligence and alleges that they breached other duties. The complaint specifically alleges improper lending practices and seeks to recover over $40 million. Among other things, the FDIC alleges that the bank suffered losses of over $7 million on improper loans to family members of two bank insiders.

While this lawsuit is only the second that the FDIC has filed against former directors and officers of a failed Georgia bank as part of the current round of bank failures, there undoubtedly will be many more to come. Georgia, with 65 bank failures since mid-2008, has had more bank failures than any other state during that period. The prior FDIC lawsuit involving a Georgia bank failure was the lawsuit filed in January 2011 against former directors and officers of Integrity Bank, about which refer here. 

Though the FDIC has so far filed only nine lawsuits against failed bank officials, many more lawsuits will be coming. According to the professional liability lawsuit page on the FDIC’s website (which can be found here), the FDIC had as of July 7, 2011 authorized lawsuits against 248 individuals at 28 failed institutions. Even with the Haven Trust lawsuit, the FDIC has sued only 68 individuals in connection with nine failed institutions. Many more suits have been authorized, and it seems likely that even as the suits already authorized are filed, even more with be authorized in the months ahead.

Haven Trust was one of the first banks to fail back in late 2008, and the FDIC is just getting around to filling suit now. Since Haven Trust failed, well over 300 other banks have failed, and further bank failures seem likely. Given the lag time on the Haven Trust lawsuit, the FDIC lawsuits could continue to accumulate for at least another three years or more.

A Final Observation: The online registration form for Google+ provides the following choices for the registrant’s gender on a drop-down menu: “Male,” “Female,” and “Other.”

“Other”?

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The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2010 decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank looked like the end of securities claims in U.S. courts on behalf so-called “f-cubed” claimants – that is, foreign shareholders of foreign-domiciled companies who bought their shares on foreign exchanges. In the aftermath of Morrison, these foreign claimants have pursued a number of avenues to pursue their claims, including, for example, initiating litigation in the defendant company’s home jurisdiction.

Among the more creative approaches was the attempt to pursue – in U.S. courts – claims on behalf of non-U.S. claimants under the laws of the claimants’ home country. The highest-profile attempt along these lines emerged in the Toyota shareholder litigation pending in the Central District of California, where the plaintiffs had amended their complaint in shareholder arising from the company’s sudden acceleration problems to assert claims under the Japanese Financial Instruments and Exchange Act.  The plaintiffs had substantial incentive to pursue this approach since only a small fraction of the company’s shares (less than 10 percent) trade in the U.S. as American Depositary Shares.

However, in a July 7, 2011 opinion (here), Central District of California Dale Fischer made short work of this attempt to circumvent the impact of the Morrison decision. In her July 7 ruling, Judge Fischer rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the court had original jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ Japanese law claims under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). She further declined to exercise the court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the claimants’ Japanese law claims. He dismissed the plaintiffs’ Japanese law claims with prejudice.

In seeking to argue that the court had original jurisdiction over their Japanese law claims, the plaintiffs’ had contended that because Toyota shares were listed but did not trade on the New York Stock Exchange, they were not a “covered” security to which CAFA applied, and, because CAFA did not apply, they could assert claims in U.S. court under Japanese law even though they could not otherwise assert claims under U.S. law. (I have attempted to summarize the plaintiffs’ CAFA arguments as best I could; Alison Frankel has a more thorough discussion of these issues in her July 11, 2011 Thomson Reuters News & Insight article entitled “Morrison End Run Hits Brick Wall in Toyota Case” (here)). Judge Fischer declined to read into CAFA the requirements that plaintiffs urged, as “to do so would ignore the plain language of the statute.”

Judge Fischer’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Japanese law claims is even more interesting, and is likely to spell the end of most future attempts by f-cubed claimants to try to assert claims in U.S. under foreign law. Among other things, because of the vast predominance of Japanese holders, “the damages analysis would focus overwhelmingly on these claims” and the Japanese law claims “unquestionably would dominate the litigation.”

Judge Fischer also found that the requirement of comity to Japanese courts “strongly argues against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.” He added that the respect for the rights of other countries to regulate their own securities markets “would be subverted if foreign claims were allowed to be piggybacked into virtually every American securities fraud case,” which would result in “imposing American procedures, requirements and interpretations likely never contemplated by the drafters of the foreign law.”

Judge Fischer did not say that there would never be an occasion when a U.S. court could properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign securities fraud claims. However, he specifically noted that “any reasonable reading of Morrison suggests that those instances will be rare.”

Whether or not any readers consider this outcome unexpected, the one thing that is clear is that the U.S. District Courts continue to take an expansive reading of Morrison. As Frankel put it in her article to which I linked above, the Toyota plaintiffs “fared no better than everyone else who’s tried to find any vulnerability in the Supreme Court’s ruling.”

M&A Litigation Soaring, For Sure: In my first half 2011 securities litigation analysis (here) one of the most distinctive trends I noted was the rise of M&A related litigation. Fox Business News has a July 12, 2011 article entitled “M&A Lawsuit Skyrocket as Fee-Hungry Law Firms Smell Easy Money” (here) which takes a closer look at the subject.

The article sounds themes that will be familiar to readers of this blog. However, the article is accompanied by a startling graphic that dramatically illustrates how massively the M&A-related litigation has ramped up since 2008. The article graphics also show how the M&A-related litigation has grown relative to M&A-related activity. In addition, the article provides numerical substantiation for the generalizations about the rising levels of M&A litigation.

I continue to believe that in the aggregate, these cases represent a serious problem for the D&O insurance industry, or at least for the carriers that are most active as primary carriers. I expect the increasing frequency of M&A –related litigation will be of increasing focus in the months ahead.

Second Quarter Litigation Update Webinar: And speaking of first half 2011 litigation filing trends, on Tuesday July 19, 2011 at 11 a.m. EDT, I will be participating in the Advisen's "Q2 Securities Litigation Webinar."  My fellow panelists will include Anderson Kill's Bill Passanante, Navigators' Scott Misson, and  Willis' John Connolly. The panel will be moderted by Advisen's Jim Blinn. Information about registering for this event, which is free, can be found here.

Parting Thought: Am I the only one that finds the new nickels, with Thomas Jefferson’s oversized and distorted face looming off to one side, weird and creepy?

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Largely due to last summer’s enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, we have entered a watershed period of corporate governance reform. Processes already underway have transformed the relations between corporate boards and corporate shareholders. Even further changes loom. In a July 2011 article entitled “Corporate Governance Perspective: Current Bearings, Future Directions”  in the latest issue of InSights (here),  I  take a look at where we are now with respect to the current round of corporate governance reforms , what lies ahead, and what it all means.

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The short week after the July 4^th holiday is usually quiet. There certainly did seem to be less traffic on the roads. But nevertheless, there was news of note this past week on several stories we have been following, as discussed below. The traffic on the roads may have slowed but the circulation on the information superhighway continued unabated.

Pace of Bank Failures Slows – But More Closures Loom: Earlier this year (refer here), I had noted that it seemed as if the pace of bank failures had finally started to decline. As discussed in a July 9, 2011 Wall Street Journal article (here), the pace of bank failures did indeed slow  in the first half of 2011, compared both to the equivalent period a year ago as well as to the second half of last year. There were 48 bank failures in the first half of 2011, compared to 74 in the second half of 2010 and 86 in the first half of 2010.

This slowdown is consistent with the FDIC’s projections. The agency had previously indicated that it believed 2010 would represent a high water mark for bank failures. But while the pace of bank closures has finally started to slow, the wave of bank failures is far from finished. As I noted here, the FDIC’s most recent Quarterly Banking Profile, released in May, showed that the number of “problem institutions” was a record levels, a situation that the Journal article characterized as representing a “backlog” of troubled banks. The FDIC reported that as of the end of March 31, 2011 there were 888 “problem institutions.”

And while the 48 bank failures in the year’s first half represents a decrease compared to recent periods, that figure still represents a sizeable number. By way of comparison, in 2008, when the financial crisis reached its crescendo, there were only 25 bank failures. Moreover, it is clear that bank failures will continue for the foreseeable future, even if at reduced levels from a year ago. Indeed, on Friday evening – the first Friday of the year’s second half – the FDIC took control of three more institutions.

The Journal article quotes one commentator as saying that historically about 19% of the banks on the FDIC’s problem list wind up failing, which implies about 169 bank failures after March 31, 2011. Since 22 banks failed in the second quarter of 2011, that would suggest that there may be about 147 bank failures yet to go. The completion of the current  bank closure process could, according to a source cited in the Journal article, take about two more years. As another commentator quoted in the article put it, the process is about in “the seventh inning” of the cycle of failures.

Though the bank closure process may now be slowing and will run its course in time, the mopping up process may only have just begun. Allowing for the extensive post-mortem that follows each failure, and the attendant lag time before the FDIC initiates litigation against the directors and officers of failed banks, the era of failed bank litigation may just be getting started. If the wave of bank failures is in the seventh inning, we are much earlier in the bank litigation wave ball game. Refer here for my recent review of the details surrounding the failed bank litigation.

U.S. Investors Are Not the Only Ones Concerned About Chinese Company Accounting Scandals: As various accounting scandals involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies have emerged, shareholders have launched a series of lawsuits in the U.S. against the companies and their senior officials, as I have previously noted on this blog. It turns out that U.S. investors are not the only ones upset about the problem involving Chinese companies.

A July 8, 2011 Bloomberg article (here) examines the concern that investors in Singapore have about Chinese companies, based on the various accounting issues that have come to light. Among other things, the article states that since 2008, more than ten percent of the Chinese companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange have been delisted or had trading in their shares suspended. The article also reviews investor concerns that executives of Chinese companies are outside the reach of Singapore enforcement authorities.

The crescendo of voices raising concerns about the Chinese companies may be being heard in China itself. News reports this past week (refer here) suggest that officials from the SEC and the PCAOB will be meeting with their Chinese counterparts this upcoming week to discuss the possibility of allowing the U.S. regulators to investigate Chinese companies and Chinese audit firms for the first time.

In the meantime, however, the wave of lawsuits in the U.S. involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies continues to mount. The latest lawsuit involves A-Power Energy Generation Company, which obtained its U.S. listing by way of a reverse merger with a U.S. listed publicly traded shell company. According to their July 5, 2011 press release (here), plaintiffs’ counsel have filed a securities class action lawsuit in the District of Nevada against the company and certain of its officers. The complaint (which can be found here), refers to published reports describing the company’s auditors concerns about weaknesses in the company’s internal controls and differences between financial figures the company reported to Chinese regulatory source compared to those reported in the company’s SEC filings. On June 28, 2011, the company announced (here) that its auditor had resigned because of the company’s failure to hire an independent forensic accountant to investigate certain business transactions.

With the arrival of this latest lawsuit, there have now been a total of 27 securities class action lawsuits filed against U.S. listed Chinese companies so far in 2011, representing about one-quarter of all 2011 securities lawsuit filings in the U.S.

One variation on this litigation theme has arisen in a separately filed securities suit that has been brought as an individual action rather than as a class action. As discussed in Jan Wolfe’s July 5, 2011 Am Law Litigation Daily article (here). Starr International has amended its securities suit against China MediaExpress Holdings and certain of its directors and officers to include as defendants three American businessmen who helped the company obtain its U.S. listing by way of reverse merger.

While there have been calls to reform the reverse merger process, particularly for foreign companies, if the functionaries that make the process possible are going to find themselves hauled into litigation involving the companies they help to go public, the reverse merger process may cease to exist as a means for non-U.S. companies to use in order to process the more conventional method of going public. In any event, in the current climate, it seems likely that there would be much investor interest in shares of foreign domiciled companies that obtained their U.S. listings by way of a reverse merger.

Variation on the Auction Rate Securities Concerns: There have been extensive developments recently involving financial companies involved with marketing or selling auction rate securities, as Tom Gorman summarized in a July 5, 2011 post on his SEC Actions blog. But a new adversary action filed in the Land American Financial Group bankruptcy proceeding shows an interesting variation on the usual auction rate securities litigation theme.

As discussed at length in the bankruptcy trustee’s June 24, 2011 complaint (here), Land America had a division (“LES”) whose purpose was to facilitate tax-advantaged land swaps. In essence, a property seller could “park” the proceeds of a land sale with LES until an appropriate land swap counterparty emerged, allowing the “exchange” to take place. The property sales proceeds were invested during the holding period. According to the complaint, beginning in about 2003, LES invested a substantial portion of the proceeds in auction rate securities. When the auction rate securities market froze up in 2008, 41% of LES’s assets were tied up in auction rate securities. The failure of the auction rate securities market eventually created a liquidity crisis for LES and for its parent company. The liquidity crisis, according to the complaint, was a substantial cause in the demise of the parent company.

According to the complaint, the parent company (LFG) “met its demise because the LFG and LES directors and officers failed to properly inform themselves and failed to consider and implement any timely action to mitigate the effects of the LES liquidity crisis. These failures caused LFG and its stakeholders to incur hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.”

As discussed in this July 8, 2011 Richmond Biz Sense article (here), the bankruptcy trustee is seeking damages of $365 million in the action , which names 21 former Land America directors and officers as defendants. The article quotes sources as saying that “the purpose of the suit is to trigger insurance policies that protect executives and directors in such instances.” 

Though the lawsuit itself may be an unremarkable bankruptcy-related effort to snare D&O insurance proceeds for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, the allegations themselves represent an interesting variation from the usual action rate securities allegations. The typical auction rate securities lawsuit involves allegations by the securities buyer against the firm that sold the securities. Here the allegations are brought against the buyer’s own company officials in connection with the purchases.

These kinds of auction rate securities allegations are not unprecedented – as I have previously noted (for example, here), there have been prior lawsuits brought against the auction rate securities buyers rather than the sellers. The fact that these kinds of complaints are continuing to arise even critical events of the financial crisis continue to recede into the past suggests that while time may have passed, the critical effects of the crisis remain. And the lawsuits continue to mount.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for forwarding the news article about the Land America case.  

Second Circuit Rules out RICO Claims Against Securities Fraud Aiders and Abettors: One of the interesting questions is whether private claimants, foreclosed from pursuing claims against third parties for aiding and abetting securities law violation, could pursue their aiding and abetting claims against the third parties under RICO. In a July 7 decision (here), in a case captioned MLSMK Investment Company v. J.P. Morgan, the Second Circuit held that the aggrieved investors cannot pursue the aiding and abetting claims under RICO.

Alison Frankel has an excellent summary of the legal issues and of the holding in her July 8, 2011 article on Thompson Reuters News & Insight (here). As Frankel’s article discusses, the case has mostly drawn attention for its connection to the Madoff scandal and for its implications for the Madoff trustee’s pending claims against certain litigation targets. However, as she notes, the case does “far more” – it “forecloses the only possible route to recovery through federal court for securities investors suing defendants who help a company engage in securities fraud.” Frankel’s interesting article details the larger significance of the decision.

Special thanks to the several loyal readers who called this decision to my attention and for sending me a link to Frankel’s article.

Apologies: I would like to extend my regrets that on two occasions this part week there were duplicative email distributions in connection with a single new blog post publication. I am very sorry to have burdened anyone’s email box with duplicative email distributions. The duplicate emails were an unfortunate byproduct of an error I made in putting content up on my site for publication. It really was a rookie mistake, and even worse, I made the same mistake twice in the same week. Some readers may have found that they were unable to access the links in the initial email distributions.

The good news is that I know what caused the duplicate email distributions and I will take steps to try to ensure that the duplicate distributions do not recur.

I really feel bad about the duplicate email distributions. I really want to make it up to everyone. So what I have decided to do is to send everyone a bunch of roses. Wild roses. Please accept these flowers with my sincerest apologies.

Wild Roses

Shaker Heights, OH, Bicycle Path

July 6, 2011

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In what is as far as I know the first settlement of a securities class action lawsuit brought by mortgage-backed securities investors as part of the subprime and credit crisis-related litigation wave, the parties to the Wells Fargo Mortgage-Backed Certificates securities litigation have agreed to settle the case for $125 million. The lead plaintiffs’ July 6, 2011 motion for preliminary approval can be found here, and the stipulation of settlement can be found here. A July 7, 2011 Bloomberg article describing the settlement can be found here.

Bank of America last week announced an $8.5 billion settlement with Countrywide mortgage-backed securities investors, but as discussed here, that settlement involved only the investors’ repurchase claims under the documents governing the securities and expressly did not  resolve investors’ separate claims with respect to the Countrywide mortgage-backed securities under the federal securities laws.

As detailed here, purchasers of the mortgage pass-through certificates filed their initial lawsuit in March 2009, asserting claims under Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and alleging that the Certificates’ offering documents contained misrepresentations and omissions. The plaintiffs alleged that the documents misstated Wells Fargo’s underwriting processes and loan standards; falsely stated the appraisal value of the underlying mortgaged properties; and misstated the investment quality of the securities, which had been assigned the highest ratings regardless of the lower quality of the underlying mortgages.

In an April 22, 2010 order (here), Northern District of California Judge Susan Illston granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss. She dismissed, for lack of standing, plaintiffs’ claims based relating to 37 out of the 54 referenced offerings in which the named plaintiffs had not purchased securities. She denied the motion to dismiss as to the 17 remaining offerings at issue, holding that the plaintiffs, in reliance on confidential witness testimony, had adequately alleged misrepresentations in connection with the defendants’ underwriting practices, improper appraisal practices, and the process by which the securities obtained their investment ratings. Further discussion of the dismissal motion ruling can be found here.

In an October 5, 2010 order (here), Northern District of California Judge Lucy Koh (to whom the case was reassigned) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended Section 12(a)(2) allegations as well as certain other factual allegations. In a separate order (here), Judge Koh granted the motion to dismiss of certain underwriter defendants. The same order also dismissed as untimely the claims pursued by additional plaintiffs as to a total of eleven additional offerings.

The final settlement relates to a total of 28 different offerings. The settlement has been reached on behalf of not only Wells Fargo itself and related Wells Fargo entities, but also nine offering underwriters and four individual defendants. The settlement stipulation does not indicate whether or to what extent any of the other defendants are contributing toward the settlement amount. Indeed paragraph 6 of the settlement stipulation expressly states that “other than the obligation of Wells Fargo to cause to be paid [the settlement amount] to the Escrow Agent, no Defendant shall have any obligation to make any payment into the Escrow Account.”

There is nothing in the settlement stipulation to suggest, one way or the other, whether or not there is  any to insurance payment or reimbursement for any portion of the settlement amounts. The operative release provisions in the stipulation recites that the release parties shall include the defendants’ “related parties” which are defined to include “insurers and reinsurers,” but there is otherwise no reference in the stipulation to any insurance payment.

The Wells Fargo settlement comes close on the heels of the $208.5 million settlement in the WaMu securities suit (about which refer here). But there still have been only 24 settlements out of the over 230 credit crisis-related securities lawsuits filed between 2007 and now. I have long thought that the apparent settlement logjam in the credit crisis securities litigation would eventually break and that the settlements would then quickly start to accumulate. With these two recent substantial settlements, it may be the settlements will now start to quickly pile up.

As I mentioned at the outset, this settlement is as far as I know the first settlement of a subprime meltdown or credit crisis-related securities class action lawsuit brought on behalf of investors in mortgage backed securities. There were squadrons of other securities lawsuits filed on behalf of various mortgage backed securities investors, many of which have survived dismissal motions in whole or in part. It may be that we will start to see settlements in the other various mortgage backed securities cases shortly.

I have in any event added the $125 million Wells Fargo settlement to my running list of subprime meltdown and credit crisis-related lawsuit resolutions, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to a loyal reader for alerting me to this settlement.

Quick Hits: A number of interesting law firm memos have come across our desk in recent days here at The D&O Diary. Here’s a quick list.

First, the Lowenstein law firm has issued an interesting July 1, 2011 memorandum discussing the perennial issues involving D&O insurance in the bankruptcy context. The memo, entitled “Navigating the Intersection of Bankruptcy and Insurance,” can be found here.

Second, I have had several posts on this site discussing the U.K Bribery Act (most recently here), which became effective July 1, 2011. With respect to possible D&O insurance issues arising in connection with the Act, the Pillsbury law firm published a July 5, 2011 memo entitled “U.K. Bribery Act: Consider Your Directors and Officers Insurance?” (here).

Third, readers may recall my recent post discussing the phenomenon of shareholder litigation arising after a negative “say on pay” vote. The Drinker Biddle law firm has a June 2011 memo about these lawsuits, entitled “Lawsuits in the Wake of Say on Pay” (here). The Bingham McCutchen law firm also has a July 7,2011 memo on the same topic, entitled "'Say on Pay': Shareholder 'No' Votes Now Leading to Derivative Actions Challenging Executive Compensation," (here).

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In the eighth lawsuit that the FDIC has filed so far as part of the current round of bank failures, on July 6, 2011, the FDIC filed suit in the Central District of California against former IndyMac CEO, Michael Perry. The FDIC’s complaint can be found here.  

IndyMac failed nearly three years ago, on July 11, 2008, as discussed here. The FDIC’s complaint against Perry alleges that he caused over $600 million in losses by causing the bank to purchase mortgage loans in 2007, just as the mortgage marketplace was destabilizing. The complaint alleges that Perry acted negligently when he allowed IndyMac to generate and purchase $10 billion in loans when the secondary mortgage market was becoming illiquid. When IndyMac was later unable to sell the loans, the bank transferred them to its own investment portfolio, which then caused over $600 million in losses.

The news articles report that the Complaint alleges the “instead of enforcing credit standards, Perry chose to roll the dice in an aggressive gamble to increase market share while sacrificing credit standards.”

Even though its complaint against Perry is only the eighth so far during the current banking crisis, the lawsuit is the second that the FDIC has filed against former IndyMac executives. As discussed at length here, the first lawsuit the FDIC filed during the current round was filed in July 2010 against four former officers of IndyMac’s Homebuilder Division.

The FDIC’s concentration on IndyMac likely has something to do with the fact that the bank’s closure represented the second largest bank failure as part of the current banking crisis, following only the massive WaMu failure. (IndyMac has assets of about $32 billion at the time of its closure). IndyMac was also one of the earliest banks to fail – it was just the fifth bank to fail during 2008, while there have been well over 300 bank failures since then. So the FDIC’s post-mortem processes may be further along on IndyMac than with respect to the many other bank failures that have followed.

The FDIC’s lawsuit is far from the first legal imbroglio in which Perry has become involved. As discussed here, on February 11, 2011, the SEC filed a lawsuit against Perry and two other former IndyMac officers, accusing them of “misleading investors about the mortgage lender’s deteriorating financial condition.”

Perry is also one of the defendants named in the consolidated securities class action lawsuit first brought in the Central District of California in 2007 by IndyMac shareholders. The shareholder suit has a long and involved history, as discussed here. On March 29, 2010, Central District of California Judge George Wu denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ sixth amended complaint, while at the same time certifying the case for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Judge Wu’s order can be found here.

In any event, a list of the eight lawsuits that the FDIC has filed can be found on the FDIC’s website, here. As noted on the same page, as of July 7, 2011, the FDIC “has authorized suits in connection with 28 failed institutions against 248 individuals for D&O liability with damage claims of at least $6.8 billion.” Since the eight lawsuits filed so far involve only seven institutions and only 53 former directors and officers, there clearly are many more lawsuits (perhaps as many as 21 or more) the FDIC is preparing to file. In all likelihood, even further lawsuits will be approved in the future as well. All of which means that we could be heading into a period of very significant failed bank litigation.

Readers who scan the FDIC’s website closely will undoubtedly notice that one of the eight lawsuits has already settled. The settled case  is the lawsuit the agency filed in March 2011 in connection with Corn Belt Bank and Trust Company (about which here). As reflected in the FDIC’s May 10, 2011 motion (here), the parties settled the case. However, the court records do not reveal any of the details of the settlement.

The Name Game:  As far as I am aware, Michael Perry, the former Indy Mac CEO, is not related to Michael Dean Perry, who played football in the NFL, for the Cleveland Browns among others, during the 80s and 90s. According to Wikipedia (here), Michael Dean Perry had a McDonald’s hamburger sandwich named after him – the “MDP,” which was only served in Cleveland-area McDonald’s while Perry played for the Browns. As far as I am aware, the former IndyMac CEO did not have a sandwich named after him.

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In a sweeping July 1, 2011 opinion in MBIA’s favor, the Second Circuit held that the company’s D&O insurance policies cover the investigative and special litigation expense the company incurred during a regulatory investigation of its accounting practices. This case had been closely watched in the D&O insurance community because of widespread carrier concerns over the district court’s coverage findings. The insurers had hoped for relief on appeal. But the Second Circuit’s decision, if anything, is even more expansive in favor of coverage than was the district court.  

Background

For the policy period February 15, 2004 to August 15, 2005, MBIA carried $30 million of D&O insurance, arranged in a primary layer of $15 million and an additional $15 million layer of excess insurance.

In 2001, prior to the policy period, the SEC had issued an Order Directing Private Investigation in connection with certain of insurance industry accounting practices. In November and December 2004, the SEC issued subpoenas to MBIA concerning "nontraditional products." The New York Attorney General also issued subpoenas in November and December 2004 regarding nontraditional products. Both the SEC and the NYAG issues additional subpoenas in March 2005. In spring 2005, MBIA, because of concerns about the cumulative impact in the marketplace, asked regulators to forbear from issuing additional subpoenas and agreed to comply voluntarily with informal document requests.

The investigation ultimately narrowed to three MBIA transactions. The first involved MBIA’s retroactive purchase of reinsurance on it guarantee of bonds issued by an Allegheny Health hospital group (knows as “AHERF”). The regulators latter contended that MBIA’s retroactive reinsurance purchase allowed MBIA to avoid recognizing a large ($170 mm) one-time loss. In the second transaction involving General Asset Holdings GP, the allegation was that MBIA transferred its risk of an investment loss to an MBIA subsidiary, allowing the parent company to avoid reporting the loss. The third transaction involved MBIA’s guarantee of securities US Airways issued to purchase aircraft. When US Airways went bankrupt, MBIA foreclosed on the aircraft, and treated the transaction as an “investment” rather than a “loss.”

In October 2005, MBIA submitted an offer of settlement to SEC. In the offer of settlement, MBIA undertook to retain an independent consultant to review MBIA’s accounting for the transactions. In January 2007, the SEC entered a Cease and Desist Order and the NYAG entered an Assurance of Discontinuance, both of which documents largely incorporated the company’s prior offer of settlement. Thereafter the company hired a consultant to undertake the proposed review. The independent consultant found no wrongdoing in connection with the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions.

In addition to the regulatory investigations, the company, as nominal defendant, was also sued in two derivative lawsuits. Prior to filing the suits, the shareholder plaintiffs had sent demand letters to MBIA asking the board to file suit against the directors and officers for the alleged wrongdoing. The company organized a demand investigative committee (“DIC”) to investigate the demands, but the DIC failed to act within the statutory time limit. The shareholders then filed suit, as a result of which the company organized a Special Litigation Committee (“the SLC”). The SLC hired an outside law firm, which investigated the derivative lawsuit allegations. Following its investigation, the SLC determined that maintaining the lawsuits was not in the company’s interest and recommended that the derivative lawsuits be dismissed. The derivative suits ultimately were dismissed.

MBIA claimed that it has spent $29.5 million in defending or responding to the regulatory investigations and the follow-on litigation. The primary insurer had agreed it was obligated to pay the costs associated with the SEC’s AHERF investigation and also its $200,000 sublimit for the DIC investigation. The primary insurer disputed that it was obliged to reimburse other amounts incurred. Specifically the primary insurer disputed that it was obligated to reimburse the costs associated with NYAG’s AHERF subpoena; the Capital Asset and US Airways transaction investigations; the SLC expenses; and the independent consultant’s expenses. The primary carrier reimbursed MBIA $6.4 million.

MBIA filed an action against the two insurers alleging breach of contract and seeking a judicial declaration that the insurers were obligated to reimburse the company for legal fees and other costs associated with the regulatory investigations and the derivative actions. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.

In December 30, 2009 opinion (discussed here), District Judge Richard M. Berman held that the policies covered all of the investigative costs and the special litigation committee counsel’s expenses, but that they did not cover the independent consultant’s post-settlement investigation. The parties cross appealed.

The July 1 Second Circuit Opinion

In a 43-page July 1, 2011 opinion for a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit, Southern District of New York Chief Judge Loretta Preska (sitting by designation) affirmed the district court’s holdings finding coverage for the investigative expenses and for the special litigation committed expenses. However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court with respect to the independent consultant’s expenses, holding that the policies covered this category of expense as well. In short, the Second Circuit found for MBIA with respect to all items in dispute.

The insurers argued that NYAG’s AHERF subpoena did not represent a covered “Securities Claim” within the meaning of the primary policy. The primary policy defined a “Securities Claim,” inter alia, as “a formal or informal administrative or regulatory proceeding or inquiry commenced by the filing of a notice of charges, formal or informal investigative order or similar document.”

The Second Circuit agreed with the district court’s “sensible intuition that a businessperson would view a subpoena as a ‘formal or informal investigative order’ based on the common understanding of these words,” adding that in any event a “subpoena is a ‘similar document’ to those listed the definition of a ‘Securities Claim’ because it is similar to other forms of investigative demands made by the regulators.” The Court rejected the insurer’s “crabbed view” that a subpoena is a “mere discovery device” that is “not even ‘similar’ to an investigative order.”  Rather, it is the “primary investigative implement in the NYAG’s toolshed.”

The coverage debate with respect to the Capital Asset and US Airways transactions was whether or not the transactions fell within scope of the SEC’s formal order and the NYAG’s AHERF subpoena. The insurers had argued that descriptive limitations in the formal order’s caption put these matters outside the scope of the SEC’s order and NYAG subpoena. The Second Circuit rejected this argument holding that the order “announced a broad but definite investigative scope that includes these transactions.” It reached a similar conclusion with respect to the NYAG subpoena.

In addition, the Second Circuit rejected the insurers’ arguments that because the investigative documents connected with these matters were produced voluntarily by oral request rather than by subpoena or other formal process, there was no coverage in connection with the related investigation. The Second Circuit found this argument “meritless” since the investigations were connected with the formal order. The Second Circuit added that “insurers cannot require that as an investigation proceeds, a company must suffer extra public relations damage to avail itself of overage.”

The Second Circuit also rejected the insurers’ argument that the SLC expenses were not covered. The insurers had argued that the SLC was “independent” of MBIA and therefore was not an insured person under the policy. The Second Circuit observed that “MBIA formed the SLC to determine MBIA’s response to this litigation, and the SLC decided to terminate the litigation. The SLC entered appearances for MBIA and filed motions to dismiss on it behalf in both the state and federal cases.” Because “the dismissal of the suits was MBIA’s decision, undertaken pursuant to the powers granted to MBIA under Connecticut law,” the Second Circuit rejected the insurers’ argument that the SLC was not an “Insured Person” under the policy.

The Second Circuit further  rejected the insurers’ argument that because the SLC was required by law to operate “independently” of MBIA, it took on a separate identity and operated separately from MBIA. The Second Circuit characterized this as “sleight of hand,” because “independent” in this context means “independence of judgment,” a “lack of conflict of interest.” The Court noted that “independence of judgment does not generate a new source of authority to terminate derivative litigation; that authority is still exercised by the corporation, which can only act through its agents.”

Similarly, the Second Circuit rejected the insurers’ attempt to rely on the $200,000 sublimited coverage for investigative costs. The Court found that this sublimit related solely to pre-litigation demands. However the SLC’s activities were, consistent with Connecticut law, post-litigation, as a result of which the operative policy provisions were the general policy provisions relating to litigated matters, rather than the narrow sublimit relating to pre-litigation demands.

Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the insurers’ argument that against coverage for the post-settlement consultant’s investigation expenses. In a highly fact-based analysis, the Court determined that the insurers had been given adequate notice of these expenses and that MBIA’s provision of information relating to these expenses had not violated any of its notice or settlement consent obligations under the policy.

Discussion

The Second Circuit’s MBIA opinion is an important decision addressing many recurring D&O insurance coverage issues, Because of the Second Circuit’s reasoning and the breadth of its language, policyholders will undoubtedly seek to rely heavily on this opinion in connection with the perennial issues such as coverage for costs associated with responding to a subpoena and special litigation committee expenses.

The Second Circuit’s opinion largely mirrored the district court with respect to the issue of the policy’s coverage for costs associated with responding to the NYAG’s subpoena – although even there, policyholders may find the Second Circuit’s language useful.

But the Second Circuit’s reasoning on the question of coverage for the SLC expenses goes further than the district court did. Judge Berman had found coverage for the SLC’s outside counsel’s expenses largely because of his specific factual determination that the SLC’s counsel had appeared on behalf of MBIA to have the derivative suits dismissed. The Second Circuit’s logic was more basic, having to do with the fundamental character of the SLC and its relation to the company under Connecticut law. The Court’s rejection of the insurers’ argument that the SLC was “independent” of the company seems particularly critical.

Another aspect of the opinion that many policyholders may find helpful is the section where the Second Circuit found coverage for the company’s expenses incurred in voluntarily providing investigative material to the regulators. Companies are often fighting with carriers over whether there is coverage for voluntary or cooperative efforts, which are often undertaken in an effort to fend off more formal regulatory action. Insurers can expect to have quoted back to them frequently the Second Circuit’s words that “the insurers cannot require that as an investigation proceeds, a company must suffer public relations damage to avail itself of coverage a reasonable person would think was triggered by the initial investigation.”

From the carrier’s perspective, this is a very fact-specific opinion that in many ways is largely a reflection of the unusual circumstance that all of the investigation followed the SEC’s issuance of its very broad formal investigative order. Much of the coverage analysis, including for example the court’s discussion of coverage for the voluntarily produced information, is merely  a reflection of the fact that the disputed expenses arose  after the formal order of investigation.

The much more frequent dispute involves costs incurred before the issuance of a formal order of investigation, a circumstance that was not involved here.  In that respect, it is critical to note that as broad as the Second Circuit’s opinion is, the decision has nothing to say concerning the recurring question of policy coverage for expenses incurred in connection with an informal investigation.

In addition to being fact-specific, the Second Circuit’s analysis, particularly in connection with the SLC expenses, is very law-specific too, depending narrowly on the details of Connecticut corporate law. Carriers can be expected to argue when the laws of other jurisdictions are applicable, the Second Circuit’s determination in the MBIA case is inapplicable.

While there are ways that the carriers can try to narrow the application of the Second Circuit’s MBIA decision, the fact is that this decision is a strong one for policyholders. This may be one of those instances where the carriers, if they really didn’t intend to cover these things and really don’t want to cover these things, may have to go back and look at their policy language. But since the general marketplace trend recently has been toward increased investigative cost coverage, the carriers may find that they lack sufficient marketplace room to maneuver on these issues from a policy language standpoint.

UPDATE: Joe Monteleone has an interesting July 6, 2011 post about the SLC portion of the Second Circuit's MBIA opinion on his The D&O E&O Monitor blog, here.

Same Name, Different Reference: I may be the only one that cares, but there is a Camaroonian soccer player named Stephane Mbia, who plays in the French top flight soccer league, League 1, for the Olympique de Marseille club.

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I am pleased to present below a guest post from Angelo G. Savino of the Cozen O’Connor law firm discussing the Southern District of New York’s application of the Morrison decision in an SEC enforcement action pending against Goldman Sachs employee Fabrice Tourre. This guest post will also be published and distributed in the future as a Client Alert from the Cozen law firm.

My thanks to Angelo for his willingness to publish his guest post here. I welcome guest posts from responsible commentators on topics relevant to this blog. Any readers who are interested in publishing a guest post on this site are encouraged to contact me directly.

Here is Angelo’s guest post::

On June 10, 2011, Judge Barbara Jones of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision in a case entitled SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-3229 (“Goldman Sachs”), that applied the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision to claims by the SEC under both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933. Goldman had previously settled the claims against it for $550 million, but left Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman Vice President who had worked at its New York headquarters, to face the SEC’s claims. 

The decision is noteworthy because it is the first to apply Morrison, which held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially, to claims by the SEC. It is also the first decision to provide a detailed analysis of the second prong of Morrison’s transactional test involving domestic transactions in securities that are not listed on an exchange. Lastly, the decision is the first to apply Morrison to section 17(a) of the Securities Act. 

The SEC alleged that in 2007, Goldman structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) called Abacus 2007-ACI (“Abacus”) that was based on the performance of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”). CDOs are debt securities collateralized by other debt obligations such as, in this case, RMBSs. The complaint also alleged that Goldman was assisted by a hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. (“Paulson”) in selecting the RMBSs that would collateralize the CDO. At the same time, Paulson allegedly entered into a credit default swap (“CDS”) that essentially bet that the RMBSs would perform poorly. According to the SEC, Goldman and Tourre marketed the CDOs without disclosing to investors that the underlying portfolio of mortgage-backed securities had been selected by Paulson while Paulson was betting against their performance. Tourre was allegedly the Goldman employee principally responsible for structuring and marketing the Abacus securities. 

The SEC also alleged that Goldman and Tourre marketed and sold $150 million worth of Abacus notes to IKB, a German commercial bank, and $42 million worth of notes to ACA Capital Holdings, Inc. (“ACA Capital”), a U.S.-based entity. ACA Capital also entered into a credit default swap involving a $909 million super senior tranche of Abacus. Essentially, ACA Capital assumed the credit risk associated with that portion of Abacus’s capital structure in exchange for premium payments. Thereafter, through a series of credit default swaps among ABN, Goldman, and ACA Capital, ABN assumed the credit risk regarding that $909 million tranche. ABN is a Dutch bank.

The closing for Abacus occurred in New York City and Goldman delivered the notes through the book entry facilities of Depository Trust Company in New York City. Tourre, however, provided the court with trade confirmation indicating that Goldman Sachs International, located in London, was listed as the seller of the notes to an IKB affiliate based on the Island of Jersey, a British dependency. Similarly, the CDS confirmations regarding the ABN transaction listed the seller as Goldman Sachs International and the purchaser as the London branch of ABN. 

The SEC claimed that Tourre had violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and aided and abetted violations of section 10(b). Tourre moved to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings based on Morrison on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim because it did not allege securities transactions that took place in the United States. 

Judge Jones first analyzed the SEC’s Exchange Act claims against Tourre. She noted that the Supreme Court, in Morrison, had adopted a clear transactional test: “whether the purchase or sale is made in the United States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange.” Nevertheless, Judge Jones also noted that, because the securities at issue in Morrison were traded only on foreign exchanges, the Supreme Court was largely silent regarding how lower courts should determine whether a purchase or sale is made in the United States. That, however, was the issue she faced because the Abacus securities were not traded on an exchange. 

The court began its analysis of the issue by looking to the statutory definitions of “purchase” and “sale” in the Exchange Act, which were relatively “unhelpful.” The court then turned to case law and determined that the concept of “irrevocable liability” was at the core of both a “sale” and a “purchase.” The court noted that at some time a purchaser incurs irrevocable liability to take and pay for a security while a seller incurs irrevocable liability to deliver a security. 

In applying this concept to the IKB transaction, the court rejected the SEC’s arguments based on Tourre’s presence in New York while he engaged in structuring and marketing of Abacus on the grounds that it was merely conduct, which had been rejected as the determinative factor in Morrison. Judge Jones also rejected the SEC’s argument that courts must look to the “entire selling process” to determine whether a securities transaction is foreign or domestic. The court observed “in reality, the SEC’s ‘entire selling process’ argument is an invitation for this court to disregard Morrison and return to the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests.” 

The SEC had also conceded at oral argument that the closing in New York, by itself, was not sufficient to make IKB note purchases domestic transactions for purposes of Morrison. For good measure, however, the court noted Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt. v. Agencia De Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, which also rejected the place of closing as determinative under Morrison. Accordingly, the court concluded as follows: 

In view of the fact that none of the conduct or activities alleged by the SEC, including the closing, constitute facts that demonstrate where any party to the IKB note purchases incurred “‘irrevocable liability[,]’” . . . the SEC fails to provide sufficient facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the IKB note “purchase[s] or sale[s were] made in the United States.” 

Turning to the ABN transaction, the court stated that the SEC provided no facts from which the court could draw the reasonable inference that any party to the ABN CDS transaction incurred “irrevocable liability” in the United States. Thus, Judge Jones ruled that the SEC failed to allege that the ABN CDS transaction constituted a domestic transaction under Morrison for the same reasons as the IKB purchases. 

Because AKA Capital was based in the United States, there appears to have been no opportunity for the court to apply Morrison to those transactions. Instead, the court analyzed whether the SEC had sufficiently pled the elements of a violation of section 10(b), and found that it had. 

The court also analyzed the sufficiency of the SEC’s claim under section 17(a) of the Securities Act, and whether Morrison applied to that statutory section. The court observed that Morrison did not involve or consider section 17(a), none of the parties had cited any cases applying Morrison to section 17(a), and the court was not aware of any such case. Judge Jones observed that In re Royal Bank of Scotland Grp. PLC. Litig. applied Morrison to sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act, but did not address section 17(a). Nevertheless, the court agreed with Tourre that Morrison applies to section 17(a), stating that “Morrison itself expressly states that the Exchange Act and the Securities Act share ‘[t]he same focus on domestic transactions.’” Because Morrison focused on whether sales of securities were domestic or foreign, Judge Jones concluded that, to the extent section 17(a) applied to sales, it does not apply to sales that occur outside the United States. The court therefore dismissed the section 17(a) claim, but only to the extent that it was based on sales to IKB and ABN. 

The court continued its analysis, however, observing that section 17(a), unlike section 10(b), applies not only to sales of securities, but also to offers to sell securities. The court examined the definition of the term “offer” in the Securities Act, which states that an offer includes “every attempt to offer or dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.” The court stated that this definition left no doubt that the focus of “offer,” under the Securities Act, was on the person or entity attempting, or offering, to dispose of, or soliciting an offer to buy, securities. Applying this definition to the allegations of the complaint, the court noted that the SEC alleged Tourre, acting from New York City, offered Abacus notes to IKB and solicited ABN’s participation in Abacus CDSs. The court observed that Tourre allegedly engaged in numerous communications from New York City that constituted domestic offers of securities or swaps. Thus, Judge Jones permitted the section 17(a) claim to survive to the extent that it was based on such “offers.” 

Conclusion

This case adds significantly to the jurisprudence applying the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision. As an initial matter, the case represents the first time that any court has applied Morrison to claims by the SEC. Because this action was brought prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, which purports to grant subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims by the SEC, it remains to be seen whether subsequent post-enactment SEC cases will follow this decision. It is arguable that Dodd-Frank should not change the Morrison analysis as applied to the SEC. Although Dodd-Frank purports to grant subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial securities claims by the SEC, the Supreme Court, in Morrison, held that district courts already had subject matter jurisdiction, but that section 10(b) itself had no extraterritorial reach. Nothing in Dodd-Frank modified section 10(b) in that regard. Thus, courts in post-enactment cases may conclude that they are able to follow Judge Jones’s decision in Goldman Sachs. 

In addition, the Goldman Sachs decision is significant for its analysis of how Morrison applies to transactions in securities that are not listed on an exchange. As Judge Jones noted, because Morrison involved securities traded on foreign exchanges, the decision is essentially silent on the second prong of its transactional test involving the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States. The Goldman Sachs decision furnishes a well reasoned analytical roadmap for other courts to follow in this respect. 

Lastly, the decision is noteworthy for its articulation of the applicability of Morrison to claims under section 17(a) of the Securities Act involving sales of securities, and to the Securities Act generally. 

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The parties to the consolidated class action litigation arising out of the collapse of Washington Mutual – the largest bank failure in U.S. history -- have agreed to settle the suit for a combined $208.5 million. The settlement, which has a number of interesting features, actually consists of three separate agreements: one agreement to pay $105 on behalf of the individual defendants; another to pay $85 million on behalf of the underwriter defendants; and a third to pay $18.5 million on behalf of the company’s auditor, Deloitte & Touche. The settlement is subject to court approvals.

As reflected here, the first of the consolidated lawsuits was first filed in November 2007. Additional suits followed as the subprime meltdown continued to unfold during 2007 and 2008. Further suits followed WaMu’s September 2008 collapse (about which refer here).

The cases were consolidated in the Western District of Washington before Judge Marsh Pechman. The plaintiffs’ sprawling complaint asserted numerous allegations, but the gist is that the defendants: "(1) deliberately and secretly decreased the efficacy of WaMu’s risk management policies; (2) corrupted WaMu’s appraisal process; (3) abandoned appropriate underwriting standards; and (4) misrepresented both WaMus’ financial results and internal controls." Judge Pechman initially granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss (refer here), but she denied the defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended consolidated complaints (refer here).

Following class certification as well as additional procedural wrangling well-detailed in Alison Frankel’s July 1, 2011 Thompson Reuters News & Insight article about the settlement (here) , the parties entered mediation, which ultimately resulted in the settlement  

The settlement stipulation entered on behalf of the individual director and officer defendants (the “D&O settlement agreement”) can be found here; the underwriters’ settlement stipulation can be found here; and the Deloitte & Touche settlement stipulation can be found here.

The $105 million D&O settlement on behalf of seven officer defendants and 13 outside director defendants apparently will be funded entirely by D&O insurance. The bank’s D&O insurers for the May 1, 2007 to May 8, 2008 policy period are identified in the definition of the term “Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies” on pages 14-15 of the D&O settlement agreement. The bank’s 2007-2008 insurance program apparently consisted of $150 million of traditional D&O insurance (arranged in eleven layers), with an additional $100 million of Excess Side A DIC insurance (arranged in six layers). Given the bank’s holding company’s bankruptcy, presumably the full $250 was at least theoretically available for defense and settlement of claims against the insured persons.

The parties released in the D&O settlement agreement include the “Contributing Insurers” who are not themselves identified by name, but are described as those insurers that have exhausted their respective limits of liability in payment of defense expense, that were contributing their limits of liability in connection with this settlement; or that had exhausted their limit in settlement of other claims against the insured persons. The settlement agreement does not clarify whether the D&O settlement will exhaust the D&O limits that remain after payment of the individuals’ defense expenses.

The question whether or not the insurance is exhausted is a potentially important issue, as numerous other claims remain pending against various of the WaMu directors and officers, most notably the claim that the FDIC filed against three former WaMu offices and their spouses in March 2011 (refer here). As far as I could tell, the D&O settlement stipulation in the consolidate securities suit does not mention the pending FDIC action, which reportedly is moving toward settlement itself. According to news reports about the efforts to settle the FDIC action, the prospective settlement requires the approval of third parties, which could possibly refer to the D&O insurers.

There is no doubt that the FDIC and the shareholder plaintiffs are potentially in competition for scarce D&O insurance funds. It is probably not a coincidence that, at least according to news reports, the parties to the consolidated securities suit first reached their settlement in principle to resolve the securities suit within a week of the filing of the FDIC action.

If the March 2011 FDIC suit “relates back” to the policy period of the bank’s 2007-2008 program, the funds remaining for any FDIC settlement would appear to be substantially depleted by the consolidated securities suit settlement, as well as by defense expenses. On the other hand, if the FDIC suit triggered a later or a different insurance program, there may well be additional insurance funds available. Of course, the individual defendants to the FDIC action may also be compelled to contribute toward any FDIC settlement out of their own funds.

In any event, the aggregate WaMu settlement is the fourth largest securities lawsuit settlement so far as part of the wave of securities litigation that followed the subprime meltdown and the credit crisis. As reflected in my table of the credit crisis lawsuit resolutions, which can be accessed here, the only three larger settlements are the over $600 million Countrywide settlement (refer here), the $475 million Merrill Lynch settlement (refer here), and the Charles Schwab settlement, which as revised amounted to $235 million.The three larger settlements all involve either solvent companies or at least sovlent successors in interest. Due to WaMu's bankruptcy, its settlement was restricted by the amount of available insurance. 

According to Alison Frankel’s Thompson Reuters article linked above, the $85 million underwriters’ settlement is the largest offering underwriter settlement of Section 11 claims since the $6 billion WorldCom settlement. According to a July 1, 2011 Seattle Times article (here), the WaMu settlement is the largest securities class action settlement ever in the Western District of Washington – although, according to the article, the WaMu investors stand to realize no more than 5 cents on the dollar through the settlement. The Seattle Times article also reports that the under the settlement agreements, the plaintiffs’ lawyers are to receive fees of $46.9 million and expense reimbursement of $5.8 million.

Special thanks to the several readers who sent me links about the WaMu settlement.

Yet Another Failed Bank Securities Lawsuit Settlement: On June 27, 2011, lead plaintiffs in the securities class action lawsuit filed in the Southern District of Florida on behalf of shareholders of the BankUnited Financial Corporation, the bankrupt holding company for the failed BankUnited FSB, filed a notice that the parties had reached an agreement to settle the case for $3 million. There are a number of interesting things about this notice and about the case in general.

First, the notice states that “the settlement of this case is part of a larger settlement that includes the FDIC and others who are not parties to this case.” The reference to the FDIC is interesting because as far as I know, the FDIC has not yet filed a civil action against BankUnited’s former directors and officers. (The FDIC’s online list of failed bank lawsuits it has filed as part of the current wave of bank failures does not list a lawsuit involving BankUnited.).

However, readers may recall my prior post (here), in which I discussed the November 5, 2009 demand letter that the FDIC had sent to BankUnited’s former directors and officers. In the letter, the FDIC presented its "demand for civil damages arising out of losses suffered as a result of wrongful acts and omissions committed by the named Directors and Officers." The letter explains that the demand for civil damages is "based on the breach of duty, failure to supervise, negligence, and/or gross negligence of the named Directors and Officers." Though the letter was nominally sent to the individual directors and officers, the message in the letter was clearly intended for the bank’s D&O liability insurance carriers.

Which brings us to the second interesting thing about the lead plaintiffs’ June 27 notice in the shareholder lawsuit. The notice specifically says that the parties’ settlement in principle is “subject to the approval of the Travelers Insurance Company, as primary directors and officers liability insurance carrier.” What makes the reference to the bank’s primary D&O insurer interesting is the combination of this reference to the insurer together with the reference to the fact that there is a larger settlement involving the FDIC.

As appears to be the case in connection with WaMu, the FDIC and the BankUnited shareholders were essentially competing with each other for the same pool of insurance dollars. In addition, defense expenses incurred were reducing the pool, and the longer the various proceedings dragged on the smaller would be the pool of available proceeds.

As discussed in my prior post about the FDIC’s demand letter, according to court filings in the bankruptcy proceedings, BankUnited carried $50 million in directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, arranged in four layers. The FDIC’s motion papers in the bankruptcy proceeding explain that the FDIC sent the demand  letter to the bank’s primary and first level excess D&O insurers, but not to the second and third level excess D&O insurers, because the second and third level excess insurer’s policies "contain a regulatory exclusion." In other words, the FDIC’s prospective recovery (if any) in these circumstances was even further constrained by possible constraints on the availability of the insurance to provide coverage for any claims it might bring.

These circumstance illustrate the kinds of challenges the FDIC will face as it tries to salvage losses the bank failures have caused the FDIC  insurance fund. In the S&L crisis, the FDIC faced some of these same challenges – for example, there were coverage issues then, too. But during the S&L crisis, the FDIC was rarely competing with shareholder claimants for scarce D&O insurance proceeds.

Most of the financial institutions that failed during the S&L crisis were small and very few were publicly traded. By contrast, many of the failed institutions involved in the current round of bank failures are larger, quite a few are publicly traded, and the ownership of many of the privately held institutions is widely distributed. The greater spread of ownership (particularly where the shares are publicly traded) increases the likelihood that following a bank failure, shareholders might pursue their own claims, putting them – as was the case with BankUnited – in competition for scarce and dwindling D&O insurance proceeds. These circumstances clearly represent a complicating factor for the FDIC as it seeks to try to recover the losses associated with the current wave of bank failures.

I have in any event added the BankUnited settlement to my list of credit crisis-related lawsuit resolutions, which can be accessed here.

And Speaking of Failed Bank Shareholder Lawsuits: According to the June 29, 2011 Santa Rosa Press Democrat (here), shareholders of the failed Sonoma Valley Bank have filed a class action shareholder lawsuit in Sonoma County (Calif.) Superior Court against eight former director s and officers of the bank. The lawsuit accuses the defendants of mismanaging over $40 million in loans. An earlier article about the shareholders claim (here) makes it clear that the purpose of the shareholder suit is to try to recover from the bank’s $20 million D&O insurance policy.

As I said, shareholder suits against the former directors and officers of failed financial institutions are a feature of the current wave of bank failures. The news coverage about the Sonoma Valley Bank lawsuit underscores that the litigation is all about trying to snag a recovery from the insurance proceeds. And as the BankUnited example above underscores, the shareholders’ efforts in that regard put them in competition with the FDIC for scarce and dwindling D&O insurance proceeds.

There are in any event many more FDIC lawsuits yet to be filed. The FDIC’s online page describing the agency’s efforts to pursue professional liability states that as of June 14, 2011, the FDIC has authorized lawsuits against 238 directors and officers of failed banks. However, as of that date the FDIC had only actually filed a total of seven lawsuits involving only 52 directors and officers. The difference of 186 directors and officers suggests that there are many more lawsuits yet to come.

While You Were Out: In case you missed it, on Friday July 1, 2011, I published my analysis of  securities class action lawsuit filing trends for the second quarter and for the first half of the year. Refer here.

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Largely driven by M&A-related litigation and securities suits against U.S.-listed Chinese companies, federal securities class action lawsuit filings continued to mount during the second quarter of 2011. With 48 new securities suits during the second quarter, the year-to-date total mid-way through the year stands at 105. The 2011 filings are on pace to finish the year with about 210 new lawsuits, which is well above the 1997-2009 average of 195.

The M&A lawsuits included in my tally are those that were filed in federal court and that allege a violation of federal securities laws. There were ten M&A-related federal securities lawsuits during the second quarter, or about 20% of all second quarter filings.  

Many of the M&A-related lawsuits are being filed in state court and so don’t enter into the count of federal securities suits. In addition, there are a number of federal court M&A-related lawsuits that don’t allege violations of the federal securities laws; these suits typically allege breaches of fiduciary duties.

M&A-related litigation overall, including all state and federal court suits, continues to surge. Because many of these suits are filed in state court, it is difficult to get complete information. But based on the filings I have been able to track, and counting all state and federal suits of which I am aware, there have been a total of at least 125 merger-related lawsuits YTD involving as many as 90 transactions (some transactions have drawn multiple lawsuits). While this information may be incomplete, it is clear that there are many more merger-related lawsuits now being filed than traditional securities class action lawsuits. This mix of litigation has some important implications, discussed below.

But the most interesting story line relating to 2011 securities class action lawsuit filings is the number of new filings involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies. As I have previously noted (most recently here), lawsuits filings against these Chinese companies have been surging, particularly during the second quarter. There have been a total of 26 securities suits against Chinese companies so far in 2011, 19 of them filed during the second quarter. The 26 lawsuits represent almost one-quarter of all 2011 securities class action lawsuit filings. The 19 securities suits filed against Chinese companies during the second quarter represent almost 40% of all new securities lawsuit filings during that period.

Signs are that the lawsuit filings against U.S.-listed companies will continue as we head into the year’s second half. Plaintiffs’ lawyers have published news releases that they are “investigating” additional U.S.-listed Chinese companies (refer for example, here). These types of releases usually precede lawsuit filings.

Lawsuit filings against foreign companies in general have been a significant part of the 2011 securities lawsuit filings. Although the vast majority of the suits against foreign companies have involved Chinese companies, lawsuits have been filed against a number of companies from other non-U.S. jurisdictions. There have been a total of 34 lawsuits against foreign companies so far this year (about 32% of all YTD 2011 filings), involving companies from eight different countries.

These filings against non-U.S. companies are all the more notable given the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2010 decision in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case, which seemingly would have produced a decline in the number of new securities suits involving non-U.S. companies. But because the shares of most of these foreign company defendants trade on U.S. securities exchanges, the Morrison decision poses no barrier to the shareholder plaintiffs suing these foreign companies in U.S. courts.

Although the year-to-date filings are largely characterized by the features noted above, the suits are in other ways remarkably diverse. For example, the 105 companies named as defendants represent 70 different Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code categories. The SIC Codes with the highest number of filings are SIC Code Category 7372 (prepackaged software), and SIC Code Category 6022 (state commercial banks), each of which has had six securities suits during the first six months of 2011.

Though there were a number of filings in the year’s first half against banking institutions, overall far fewer of the first half filings involved financial institutions than was the case in recent years in the wake of the credit crisis. However, as I noted in a recent post, there are still lawsuits coming in that are based on credit crisis-related events. By my count, there were at least four credit crisis-related lawsuits in the year’s first half.

The first half lawsuit filings were also quite dispersed geographically. The securities suits in the year’s first six months were filed in 32 different U.S. districts. The districts with the highest number of filings in the first half were the Central District of California, with 24 filings, and the Southern District of New York, which had 19.

Discussion

As is always the case and as I have frequently noted, definitional issues significantly affect the lawsuit count. For example, if I were to include the federal court M&A lawsuits that do not involve securities law allegations, I would be reporting 113 first half lawsuits, rather than 105. On the other hand, by including the federal court merger objection suits that have securities allegations, the count arguably is inflated in the other direction. (I have struggled for some time to decide whether or not the merger objection suits properly belong in this tally.) In other words, my count may vary from other published figures, largely due to these kinds of definitional issues.

The growing wave of M&A litigation is an under-discussed issue. Even though the M&A cases cases tend to be resolved quickly and usually don’t involve significant financial settlements, taken collectively they still impose an enormous cost on the system. Even if the settlement in any one case is modest (usually just the payment of the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees), there are still the defense expenses to consider. In the aggregate this litigation imposes a huge expense on the financial system. In the aggregate they are also imposing significant costs on D&O insurers, or at least those that are most active as primary insurers. Sooner or later these kinds of costs have to start taking a toll on the carriers.

The burden these costs represent may be all the more painful for the carriers because the exposures involved with these kinds of suits likely are not priced into the risk premium. In addition, it is tough to underwrite the likelihood that any one company will be acquired. But because the discussion of carriers’ loss exposures tends to focus on the higher severity risk of securities class action litigation, there is relatively little consideration given to the higher frequency exposure that these merger objection lawsuit represent. This is one of those issues that just doesn’t get the airtime it deserves – at least not so far.

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