The D & O Diary : Directors and Officers Liability and Insurance : The D & O Diary : Kevin LaCroix : Securities Laws, Corporate Fraud, D & O Litigation

As I have previously noted (here), securities backed by subprime and other residential mortgages are not just held by financial companies. A wide variety of companies invested in these securities in order to try to improve their return on cash and short-term investments. As the credit markets have deteriorated, many of these investments have declined in value, and the companies holding these investments have been forced to take write-downs or charges. The most dramatic write-downs have come from companies in the financial sector. But now companies outside the financial sector are announcing downward accounting adjustments, and some of these accounting adjustments are occurring in some unexpected places.

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In a prior post (here), I noted that the subprime meltdown story is no longer just about subprime, and that the crisis spreading to other types of credit could stretch the subprime litigation wave to areas outside of subprime. The lawsuit filed today against SLM Corporation (better known as "Sallie Mae") officially brought the subprime litigation wave to the student lending arena.

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In prior posts (most recently here), I have discussed the growing threat that Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement may present for companies doing business overseas. This trend became even more pronounced in 2007, and at least one legal commentator has suggested (here) that the increasing FCPA enforcement trends raise the possibility that FCPA violations "may be this year's corporate crime of the century."

The one thing that is clear is that FCPA enforcement activity is escalating. As discussed in the January 28, 2008 Fenwick & West memorandum entitled "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Next Corporate Scandal?" (here), 2007 was "a watershed year for FCPA enforcement." Among other things, the memo notes that that "the number of enforcement actions brought by the DoJ and the SEC doubled compared with the number brought in 2006."

The memo also notes that "public companies disclosed over 50 pending government investigations." In addition, the DoJ and the SEC imposed the largest combined civil and criminal fines in history in 2007, the total fines of $44 million imposed against Baker Hughes and its subsidiaries (as discussed in my prior post, here).

There are a number of important trends driving this increased FCPA enforcement. Obviously the globalization of business activity provides an important context, but globalization alone does not explain the increased enforcement. The enforcement activity is being driven by a number of trends and patterns.

First, the DoJ and the SEC have developed a practice of targeting specific industries, through an industry-wide investigation. For example, a January 25, 2008 Sidley Austin memo entitled "FCPA Enforcement Trends During 2007" (here) notes that the authorities have targeted "sales and marketing practices of companies in the medical device industry in Europe." A January 24, 2008 Jenner & Block memorandum entitled "Recent Enforcement Activity Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" (here) also cites the recent enforcement actions involving the "companies participating in the U.N. Iraq Oil for Food program." The Fenwick & West memo cited above also notes that the FCPA is now "being actively enforced against technology companies."

Second, the authorities have targeted companies doing business in countries where bribery is part of the local business culture. The Jenner & Block memo notes that the authorities have "continued to press enforcement as to companies doing business in Nigeria." Business activities in China have also drawn scrutiny, which is certainly a challenge given that many companies are finding it indispensible to have a China strategy.

Third, the U.S. authorities have shown an increased willingness to cooperate with foreign governments in joint investigations, even, the Jenner & Block memo notes, where the target companies "are already the subject of law enforcement investigation or sanction in their home country." The most prominent example of this latter phenomenon is the current investigation involving Siemens (which I discussed in prior posts, here and here). Another example is the investigation of BAE Systems (which has been surrounded by some significant controversy, as discussed here).

Fourth, increased M & A activity has led to the discovery and disclosure to the authorities of a number of FCPA violations. The Sidley & Austin memo referenced above cites the entry of Delta & Pine into a $300,000 FCPA settlement following its merger with Monsanto (refer here) and York International's FCPA settlement following its merger with Johnson Controls, whereby York agreed (here) to a $10 million criminal penalty, a $2 million civil penalty, and the disgorgement of $10 million profit.

The Sidley & Austin memo notes that "acquisition due diligence is an essential program, and the failure to adequately assess potential liabilities can result in serious consequences." The Fenwick & West memo notes that "FCPA issues can be a major sticking point in negotiations with the acquiring party, often causing delay of the deal or a change in the price terms."

Fifth, as a result of changing priorities and increased resources, the authorities are no longer dependant on self-reporting alone as the means by which FCPA violations are identified. In recent year, the combination of the increased self-scrutiny SOX requires and corporations' desire to obtain cooperation credits have led companies to self-report, providing the authorities with the bases for many of the FCPA enforcement investigations. But, as the Jenner & Block memo notes, "the Government is increasingly interested in developing cases affirmatively, without relying on disclosures." Both the DoJ and the SEC have increased their staffing in this area, and the agencies have said repeatedly said publicly that they will be more "proactive."

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As further details have emerged, Société Générale's account of how Jérôme Kerviel triggered billions of dollars in losses has come under scrutiny, as reported on the January 29, 2009 Wall Street Journal (here). But questions are also being raised about trades in SG shares by SG director Robert Day and foundations he controls in the days prior to SG's recent disclosures, as reported here, and those questions have now apparently taken the form of a lawsuit.

Given the nature of SG's recent disclosures, it is hardly surprising that investors might file a legal action seeking management accountability. But the first lawsuit filed appears to relate not to the bank's January 24, 2008 disclosures about Kurviel's unauthorized trading, but instead to the bank's announcement the same day of a 2.08 billion euros write-down for losses related to subprime lending in the United States. As the Wall Street Journal stated on January 25, 2008 (here) when reporting on the bank's announcements of the prior day, "the disclosure of allegedly fraudulent trading overshadowed fourth-quarter write-downs by Société Générale totaling 2.05 billion euros to cover its mortgage exposure."

According to news reports (here and here) French lawyer Frederik-Karel Canoy has filed an insider trading lawsuit on behalf of 130 individual investors and "four to five" companies with stakes in the bank. Frustratingly, the news reports do not specify where the lawsuit has been filed, what the specific basis for the lawsuit is, or who the defendants are.

The news reports are clear that the lawsuit relates to the timing of Robert Day's January 2008 trades in SG shares. Day is an American billionaire financier (here), who founded the Trust Company of the West, which was sold to SG in 2001. Day is currently Chairman of The TCW Group. According to forms filed on the website of the Autoritié des Marchés Financiers (AMF), the French market regulator, Day or foundations he controls made five sales between January 9 and January 18, 2008.

The first sale (documented here), in Day's own name, took place on January 9, 2008 at a price of 95.27 euros a share and resulted in proceeds of 85.7 million euros.

The second sale (documented here), on behalf of the Robert Day Foundation, took place on January 10, 2008, as a price of 95.9 euros a share and resulted on proceeds of 8.6 million euros a share.

The third sale (documented here), on behalf of the Kelly Day Foundation, also took place on January 10, 2008, at a price of 95.9 euros a share, and resulted in proceeds of about 959,000 euros.

The fourth trade (documented here), on behalf of Day, took place on January 18, 2008, at a price of 90 euros a share and resulted in proceeds of 40.5 million euros.

The fifth trade (documented here), on behalf of the Robert Day Foundation, took place at a price of 90 euros a share, and resulted in proceeds of 4.5 million euros.

The total proceeds from all of the sales total about 140 million euros, or about $208 million. All of the trades took place at prices of between 90 and 95 euros. The bank's shares closed at 75.81 euros on January 24, the day of the bank's announcements. Day still holds about 1.8 million SG shares, worth about 148.2 million euros ($220 million) at today's closing price.

Of Day's total trades, 45 million euros ($67 million) took place on January 18, the date that bank management says that it discovered the unauthorized trading. January 18 is also the Friday immediately proceeding the Monday, January 21, on which the bank had originally scheduled to disclose its subprime mortgage write-down, but that announcement apparently was postponed to January 24 after the discovery of the unauthorized trades.

Canoy, the lawyer who filed the lawsuit, reportedly said that he questions the "precision and sincerity" of the bank's disclosures about its subprime exposures. A January 29, 2008 Bloomberg.com article (here) quotes a spokesperson for ADAM, a French shareholder activist association, as citing a November 2007 letter to investors from SG's CFO Chief estimating the bank's subprime loss at 230 million euros. The spokesperson is quoted as saying that "shareholders who put their trust in these reassuring statements were clearly led astray.''

The shareholders association apparently has also asked that the AMF to launch an investigation into SG for insider trading, failure to disclose the extent of its subprime losses, and how it accounted for the losses attributed to resolving Kerviel's positions. The AMF confirmed (refer here) that it has opened an investigation.

Finally, Canoy is also quoted as saying that he has filed a separate lawsuit related to Kurviel's alleged fraud. According to press reports (here), Canoy sued the bank over the way the bank unwound the unauthorized positions and sold securities into the marketplace. Unfortunately, there is even less information in the news reports about this second lawsuit.

The bank for its part denies that the trades were improper. The bank claims (refer here) that Day sold the shares during a limited window when board members are authorized to sell stock. The bank spokesperson says that "no inside information was used in any way." The spokesperson denied that Day was advised of Kurviel's trading losses and said that Board members were not told of the subprime write-down until January 20th. According to the Financial Times (here), the bank also says that the January 20th meeting was set on January 18, but that the "meeting was called in the evening of January 18, after Mr Day had executed his share sales and 'without any indication on the agenda'. "

None of the press coverage explains why the bank would have a trading window that would remain open on the Friday immediately preceding the Monday on which the company planned to make its year-end earnings release. Obviously, the danger with allowing trading that close to an earnings release is the possibility that it might create the appearance that the insider traded with knowledge of undisclosed information in the earnings release or perhaps even because of information in the earnings release.

Call it a hunch, but there just might be some additional future litigation involving one or more aspects of these various circumstances.

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Since I first began chronicling the subprime litigation wave in April 2007 (here), the wave has gained amplitude and speed. But a spate of recent subprime-related litigation developments, seemingly unrelated, suggest that the litigation wave's magnitude has crossed a significant threshold. Things seemingly have changed, decidedly for the worse.

The first development that makes me think things have worsened is the lawsuit that has been filed against Levitt Corp., which is described in the plaintiffs' counsel's January 25, 2008 press release (here). Although there are several noteworthy things about this lawsuit (as discussed further below), the significance to me of this lawsuit for the larger issue of the subprime litigation generally is the lawsuit's purported class period, which extends from January 31, 2007 to August 14, 2007. That is, the allegations in the complaint related to events that took place several months ago.

Most of the prior subprime-related lawsuits up until now have been filed in the immediate flash of dramatic subprime-related disclosures, on some occasions even on the same day. The arrival of a lawsuit based on more remote events suggests that plaintiffs' lawyers have now begun a grim process of backing and filling, completing a more comprehensive sweep of the subprime landscape.

The impression that we have entered a backing and filling phase that will entail an expansion in the scope of subprime litigation is reinforced by recent developments in the subprime-related securities lawsuit pending against Countrywide Financial Corporation. According to a January 25, 2008 press release (here), issued by New York Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, who is one of the co-lead plaintiffs in the Countrywide securities lawsuit, the plaintiffs in that case have filed an amended complaint that, among other things, adds as defendants "26 different financial services companies that underwrote Countrywide stock and bond offerings, [and] two global accounting firms."

The 26 financial services companies are listed in the press release. The two accounting firms named are Grant Thornton LLP and KPMG LLP. According to the press release, by expanding the suit, the plaintiffs "seek to ensure that the underwriters and accounting firms who participated in the marketing of Countrywide securities to the public are held accountable for their actions." A copy of the Countrwide complaint can be found here. Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog for supplying a copy of the complaint.

A third development suggesting that the stretch and sweep of the subprime litigation wave has amplified is the subprime-related securities lawsuit I previously noted (here) and that was filed last week against National City Corporation, a regional bank holding company based in Cleveland. Unlike many other subprime-related lawsuits, which have largely (although not, of course, exclusively) involved financial firms in New York, Florida and California that have experienced gargantuan writedowns or losses, the National City lawsuit involves a company in the hinterlands that experienced substantial but not nearly as massive writedowns and losses.

These disparate events are at one level unrelated. But the pattern I detect is the suggestion that plaintiffs are expanding the field of the companies and defendants they are targeting. Companies like Levitt, that seemingly were bypassed in the earliest stages. Defendants like the financial services companies and accountants in the Countrywide case, whom the plaintiffs' lawyers just didn't get to in the initial pleadings. And secondary targets like National City.

All of this suggests to me that the subprime litigation wave has entered a more encompassing and potentially more devastating phase. Up until now, plaintiffs have concentrated on what one plaintiffs' attorney recently called the "low hanging fruit." But these most recent lawsuits suggest that the threat now extends more broadly. The impression is that the subprime wave will hit not just the biggest obstacles but could inundate a much broader area of the landscape. The destructive force of the wave could prove to be even more catastrophic than seemed likely, even a short time ago.

One final observation about the changing menace of the subprime wave actually relates to a consequence from subprime litigation. That is, this past week saw the first subprime-related downgrade of a mainstream property and casualty insurer (about which refer here), in part because of the carrier's exposure to mortgage default risk though a former bond insurer affiliate, and in part because, as one rating agency noted, of the insurer's "subprime exposure through its D&O and E&O liability portfolio on both a primary and reinsurance basis."

The rating agency went on to note that this D & O and E & O exposure "gives rise to concerns that there may be a potential resurgence in claims for these lines as they relate to subprime issues in the future." More ominously, the rating agency noted that "adverse developments" in these insurance lines beyond the rating agency's expectations "will result in further rating actions." Clearly I am not the only one concerned that things have gotten bad, and could get worse.

As I noted above, there are other interesting things about the Levitt Corp. lawsuit. The first is that the lawsuit combines not just one, but two of the recent securities litigation trends. That is, it is not only a subprime-related securities lawsuit, but it is also a securities lawsuit arising out of a failed merger. I have previously noted, most recently here, there has been a recent surge of lawsuits arising from failed deals.

According to the plaintiffs' lawyers' press release (here), the Levitt Corp. lawsuit relates to the failed 2007 merger of the company with BFC Financial Corp. Levitt had announced the planned merger to great fanfare on January 31, 2007 (here), but on August 15, 2007, the company announced (here) that the merger agreement had been terminated (according to the plaintiff's lawyers' lawsuit press release, "without giving any explanation.").

The plaintiff's lawyers' press release goes on to state that the complaint alleges that

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It has been such a while since a new options backdating securities lawsuit has appeared that it was with some surprise I noted the new case that has been filed against Teletech Holdings and certain of its directors and officers. According to the plaintiffs' counsel's January 25, 2008 press release (here), the lawsuit, filed in the Southern District of New York, relates to the company's November 8, 2007 press release (here), in which the company announced a "self-initiated review of accounting for equity-based compensation practices and likely restatement of prior period financial statements."

According to the company's filing on Form 8-K (here), also dated November 8, the company delayed the filing of its quarterly report for the quarter ending September 30, 2007, due to the company's Audit Committee's review of the company's "historical stock option and other equity-based compensation grant practices." The filing also states that based on the review completed to date, "management presently believes that it will be required to incur additional non-cash compensation charges for prior periods and that restatement of interim and annual financial statements for the periods 1999 through 2007 is likely." The filing also states that the company's interim and annual financial statements for the period 1999 through the second quarter of 2007 "should not be relied upon."

In light of the TeleTech lawsuit's allegations, I have, somewhat unexpectedly as this late date, amended my tally of options backdating-related lawsuits. The tally can be found here. With the addition of the TeleTech lawsuit, my count of options backdating-related securities lawsuits stands at 35.

Finding Orwell: I read with interest in the January 23, 2008 Wall Street Journal profile (here) of newly-appointed U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey that when he was a federal judge, Mukasey would require his new law clerks to read George Orwell's essay, "Politics and the English Language." Orwell's essay, which can be found here, is a declamation against the "vagueness and sheer incompetence" that Orwell believed to characterize contemporary prose, particularly political writing.

Orwell wrote that "the great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish spurting ink."

After providing many examples of bad writing, Orwell reduced his principles for clear writing to six rules, which undoubtedly are the reason Mukasey required his law clerks to read the essay. The six rules are:

1. Never use a metaphor, simile, or other figure of speech you are used to seeing in print.

2. Never use a long word where a short one will do.

3. If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out.

4. Never use the passive where you can use the active.

5. Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word, or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent.

6. Break any of these rules sooner than say anything barbaric.

The interior was dark and cool. The front room was crammed with wooden furniture. An empty teacup sat on the arm of an old planter's chair and the glass-fronted book cabinets were filled with old newspapers, their corners orange and crackling with age. Two grandfather clocks stood in opposite corners, each telling a different time.

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On January 22, 2008, National City Corporation, a Cleveland-based bank holding company, announced (here) a fourth quarter loss of $333 million, including a write-down of $181 million on its mortgage business and a $691 million provision for credit losses. On January 24, 2008, the company was hit with a securities class action lawsuit.

According to their January 24 press release (here), the plaintiffs' counsel filed a complaint (here) against the company and certain of its directors and officers in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

According to the plaintiffs' counsel's press release, the complaint alleges that:

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As reported in a prior post (here), on January 16, 2008, a civil jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the securities class action lawsuit pending against Apollo Group and its former CEO and CFO. In a January 24, 2008 statement (here), the company provided "clarification of certain matters in regard to the verdict."

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In its January 24, 2008 quarterly earnings release (here), KLA-Tencor also announced that it had entered into an agreement to settle the options backdating-related securities class action lawsuit that had been pending against the company and certain of its directors and officers for $65 million.

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In an earlier post (here), I discussed the March 14 , 2007 ruling (here) in the CNL Resorts case, in which the federal district court held that an issuing company's settlement of a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 did not constitute covered "loss" under the company's D & O liability insurance policy. In that prior case, the court did say that Section 11 settlements are not per se uninsurable, and noted that "in a Section 11 case, if an entity makes a payment that constitutes something other than disgorgement of its ill-gotten gains, it has suffered a loss."

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In response to the developing credit crisis, politicians have proposed legislative fixes and, more recently, advocated the need for fiscal stimuli. Some politicians of a more aggressive cast have launched investigations (about which refer here). In this environment, it is hardly surprising that other politicians are also resorting to litigation - and not merely to recoup supposed subprime-related losses, but also to extract political gains from the current turmoil.

The most substantial examples of subprime-related litigation as political theater are from Ohio. Exhibit One is the case filed last week in the Northern District of Ohio (Youngstown Division) against the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) on behalf of the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS). A copy of the complaint can be found here. . For its part, OPERS apparently believes that its losses from the fraud alleged in the complaint could be as much as $27.2 million.

It is the lawsuit's context rather than its relative merits that concern me. The first of the troublesome contextual elements is the January 22, 2008 press release that Ohio Attorney General Marc Dann issued in connection with the lawsuit's filing (here). The press release not only announces the lawsuit and describes its allegations, but also thanks OPERS "for supporting my effort to hold Freddie Mac accountable for the role the company and its top executives played in bilking investors and fueling the foreclosure crisis that is destroying neighborhoods across the state and the entire nation."

Dann goes on to say that "by authorizing me to bring the suit on their behalf," they are not only protecting pensioners' and taxpayers' interests but "sending a loud and clear message to Wall Street that this type of fraud and manipulation will not be tolerated by the people who live on Main Streets that are being devastated by what Freddie Mac has done." As may be seen from this January 23, 2008 Columbus Dispatch article (here), Dann's epistle achieved the media attention his press release so obviously sought.

An additional contextual element of this lawsuit is the venue where it was filed. Dann did not file the suit in Virginia, where Freddie Mac has its headquarters, or in New York, where its shares trade and where a prior lawsuit against Freddie Mac on similar grounds is already pending, or even Columbus, where OPERS has its headquarters. Rather, Dann filed the lawsuit in Youngstown. The critical thing to know here is that Dann is from Youngstown, and that is where he has his political base.

Now, given the uncertainties of litigation, it is entirely possible that this case will wind up being litigated in Youngstown. And it is entirely possible that this lawsuit could ultimately even gain a substantial recovery on behalf of OPERS' pensioners and other members of the purported class - indeed, OPERS already has an impressive track record against Freddie Mac, having recovered as lead plaintiff in a prior securities lawsuit against Freddie Mac a $410 million class settlement. And Dann did note in his press release that, in addition to the Youngstown lawsuit, he has also filed a lead plaintiff petition on behalf of OPERS in the previously pending New York securities lawsuit against Freddie Mac. But obviously, announcing a mere lead plaintiff petition wouldn't make for much of a press release.

Nor is Dann the only Ohio politician using subprime-related litigation to portray themselves as the scourge of Wall Street and the champion of the oppressed masses. For example, in a January 11, 2008 press release (here), Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson announced that the City of Cleveland was initiating a lawsuit against 21 investment banks and mortgage lenders who "financed and cultivated the subprime market." A copy of the complaint can be found here.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer reports (here) that the firms are accused of "creating a public nuisance by making mortgages available to people who had 'no realistic means of keeping up their loan payments.'" The loans allegedly have resulted in thousands of foreclosures in Cuyahoga County. Jackson also told the newspaper that "to me this is no different than organized crime or drugs. It has the same effect as drug activity in neighborhoods."

The situation in Cleveland is dire, and the specter of thousands of empty, foreclosed houses haunts the city and silently testifies to its straitened condition. On that score, I am sympathetic to Jackson's frustrated desire for retribution. But it is hard to know what to say about the lawsuit's implicit suggestion that lenders should be liable for having had the audacity to lend money to the city's residents. While subprime lending undoubtedly involved excesses, and even some unscrupulous practices, the city's current desperate condition cannot possibly be improved without outside investment, and, yes, the availability of home financing, neither of which the Mayor's lawsuit does anything to encourage.

Ohio has long-standing, complex economic problems. It saddens me that, rather than confront the real issues facing the state and its people, its political leaders would rather indulge in finger-pointing and scapegoating. Whatever the merits of these lawsuits, they will do little to solve or even relieve the deep economic problems that beset the state.

These lawsuits are troublesome not only because of the squandered political leadership they represent, they are also of concern because Ohio's politicians clearly will not be the only ones tempted to seek political capital from subprime-related litigation. (Indeed, Baltimore's leaders have also filed their own lawsuit against Wells Fargo, here, alleging reverse redlining) With so many forces already adding momentum to the growing subprime litigation wave, it is truly discouraging development that politicians feel compelled to exacerbate an already appalling situation. The problems from the subprime situation will only get worse if our political leaders are more interested in assigning blame than finding solutions.

Subprime and the Insurance Market: As the subprime meltdown has emerged, one of the recurring questions has been what impact it will have on the professional liability insurance industry. The latest attempt to answer this question appears in the January 2008 issue of Risk & Insurance, in an article entitled "Will the Liability Market Turn?" (here). (Full disclosure: I was interviewed in connection with the article.) Among other things, the article quotes "one estimate" as putting the "professional liability insurance losses connected with the subprime lending mess at $16 billion."

My own thoughts on the impact on the professional liability insurance industry are reflected in a December 17, 2007 interview published in full on the Risk & Insurance website and entitled "Coverage Expert on Subprime Pricing" (here).

A Closer Look at a Busted-Buyout: In prior posts (most recently here), I have examined the lawsuits that busted buyouts have spawned. Among other deals I have examined is KKR's now canceled deal to acquire Harman International, which I discussed here. A January 23, 2008 Fortune article entitled "An Old Hand in a Strange New World" (here) takes a closer look at the failed deal, and examines the myriad of forces that led to its demise.

Of particular interest is the article's discussion of the company's increased capital spending while the deal was pending and that was the source of the "material adverse change" KKR attempted to invoke to try to scuttle the deal. Apparently, the company's German division, anticipating KKR's post-deal fiscal austerity, and exhibiting "exuberant behavior," overspent its capital budget by $25 million. The article, anticipating the presumed question, states, "no, there weren't controls then in place to prevent this."

Though KKR and Harman have resolved their legal disputes, the separate lawsuit brought by Harman's shareholders against Harman's management remains pending. In that context, the article is particularly interesting.

Now This: The Professional Liability Underwriting Society has decided to join the blogosphere, with their new blog, The PLUS Blog (here). The site has just come out of beta testing and they are off to a great start. The blog, which will focus on breaking news and features affecting the professional liability insurance industry, should be worth watching.

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A shareholders' derivative lawsuit that generated the most prominent judicial pronouncements about options "springloading" has been settled. According to the company's January 18, 2008 press release (here) and its filing on Form 8-K of the same date (here), the parties have settled the consolidated shareholders' derivative lawsuit that has been been pending since 2005 against Tyson Foods, as nominal defendant, and certain present and former directors and officers of the company.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement (here), Don Tyson (the company's former CEO) and the Tyson Limited Partnership, the Company's largest shareholder are jointly and severally liable to pay the company $4.5 million. No other defendant will make any payments. The company also agreed to implement or continue certain governance measures, as detailed in the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs will be seeking a fee award of $3 million from the company, out of the $4.5 million to be paid under the settlement. The Company has said it will contest the fee award, but will not contest any award up to $1 million.

The derivative complaint contained a variety of allegations, only some of them relating to the timing of the company's stock option grants. Other allegations related to certain consulting contracts, as well as to executive compensation and related-party transactions involving Tyson and his family. But what has drawn notoriety to the case are the complaint's allegations concerning options "springloading" (that is, the award of options in anticipation of an event expected to trigger an increase in the company's stock price). The opinions in the case regarding springloading are undoubtedly represent the leading judicial commentary on the practice.

In opinions dated February 6, 2007 (here), and August 15, 2007 (here), Chancellor William B. Chandler III used memorably scathing language in denying the defendants' motions to dismiss the springloading allegations. Among other things, Chandler said that in the August 15 opinion that the company's proxy disclosure describing the options grants displayed "an uncanny parsimony with the truth" that "raise an inference that the directors engaged in later dissembling to hide earlier subterfuge."

Chancellor Chandler added that he "may further infer that grants of springloaded options were both inherently unfair to shareholders" and that "the long-term nature of the deceit involved suggests a scheme inherently beyond the bounds of business judgment." He added that the Court "may reasonably infer that a board of directors later concealed the true nature of a stock option," from which it may further infer that the options "were not granted consistent with a fiduciary's duty of utmost loyalty."

My prior more detailed discussion of Chandler's August 15 opinion can be found here.

The settlement is of course still subject to court approval, a condition that may be a relevant consideration in this case, given the seeming disparity between the flights of the Court's rhetoric and the scale of the settlement.

In any event, I have added the Tyson Foods settlement to my list of options backdating lawsuit settlements, dismissals and denials, which can be accessed here.

A January 21, 2008 CFO.com article further discussing the Tyson Foods settlement can be found here.

Supreme Court Rejects Enron Appeal: Less than a week after issuing the Stoneridge decision, the Supreme Court has denied (here) the petition for writ of certiorari in the case Enron investors had brought against a number of investment banks. News coverage of the denial can be found here and here.

As noted in the 10b-5 Daily blog (here), the Supreme Court also vacated and remanded to the Ninth Circuit the "scheme liability" case of Avis Budget Group v. California State Teachers Retirement, "for further consideration" in light of the Stoneridge decision.

While the Enron cert petition denial was probably inevitable after the Stoneridge decision, it is also dicey to read too much into the denial. For example, as the Conglomerate blog points out (here), the Enron case was in an odd procedural posture, having come up to the Supreme Court from the Fifth Circuit where it was on an interlocutory appeal after the denial of class certification. The Supreme Court does not have to explain itself when it declines to act. The lower courts will have to live with the Stoneridge decision and work out its meaning in the context of specific cases without further guidance from the Supreme Court, for now.

Professor Larry Ribstein has further thoughts about the meaning (and limitations on the meaning) of the Enron cert petition denial on his Ideoblog, here. The SEC Actions blog, here, finds greater significance to the Supreme Court's actions in the wake of Stoneridge. The WSJ.com Law Blog has more "post-game" analysis on the Enron cert petition denial, here.

More About the Subprime Litigation Wave: Way back in July 2007, when I declared (here) that subprime litigation was "this year's model" (that is, the hot litigation trend driving lawsuit activity), I noted that "subprime litigation is arising in an ever-increasing variety of additional forms" and that "as the concentric rings from asset valuation issues spread outward, an increasing array of companies will become engulfed in the litigation wave."

Sounding similar themes in a January 22, 2008 article entitled "If Everyone's Finger-Pointing, Who's To Blame?"(here), the New York Times observed that

a wave of lawsuits is beginning to wash over the troubled mortgage market and the rest of the financial world. Homeowners are suing mortgage lenders. Mortgage lenders are suing Wall Street banks. Wall Street banks are suing loan specialists And investors are suing everyone.

The article mentions a number of different cases, including in particular a case brought last week by the Maher family against Lehman Brothers Holdings. The lawsuit is described in greater detail in the a January 18, 2008 Bloomberg.com article entitled "Lehman Clients Demand $1.1 Billion on Auction Dispute" (here). The allegations have been brought by two brothers, Brian and Basil Mahan, in an arbitration complaint filed with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.

The complaint alleges that the brothers relied on Lehman to invest proceeds from the family's sale of its ship container company, claiming that the family's stated investment objectives were to preserve capital and provide liquidity. Lehman allegedly put the money in auction-rate securities, which lost value due to the turmoil in the credit markets. The brothers seek to require Lehman to buy the illiquid securities and pay treble damages of $857 million. The complaint accuses Lehman of negligence, deception, breach of contract, making unsuitable investments, and supervisory failures.

Thanks to the several readers who sent me copies of or links to the New York Times article.

Now This: The turbulence in the financial markets is scary enough in and of itself. Of perhaps even greater concern is what it may signify. George Soros, the Chairman of Soros Fund Management, suggests in a column in the January 23, 2007 Financial Times (here) that we now face "The Worst Market Crisis in 60 Years."

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In a decision noteworthy both for the prominence of the case and for the implications of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit, hearing the Makor Issues & Rights Ltd. v. Tellabs Incorporated case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, has once again reversed the district court's dismissal of the case.

The Supreme Court, in its June 21, 2007 opinion in the Tellabs case (about which refer here) had directed the Seventh Circuit to dismiss the complaint "unless a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged."

In a January 17, 2008 opinion (here) written by Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "the plaintiffs have succeeded...in pleading scienter" and therefore the court decided to "adhere to our decision to reverse the judgment of the district court in dismissing the suit."

In determining whether or not the plaintiffs' allegations supported a "strong inference" that the defendants acted with scienter (as required in the heightened pleading requirements in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act), the Seventh Circuit said that it was "exceedingly unlikely" that the alleged false statements "were the result of merely careless mistakes at the management level based on false information fed it from below, rather than of an intent to deceive or a reckless indifference to whether the statements were misleading."

In considering whether or not the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to establish that the corporation itself acted with scienter, the court articulated a broad concept of "collective scienter"; the court said

it is possible to draw a strong inference of corporate scienter without being able to name the individuals who concocted and disseminated the fraud. Suppose General Motors announced that it had sold one million SUVs in 2006, and the actual number was zero. There would be a strong inference of corporate scienter, since so dramatic an announcement would have been approved by corporate officials sufficiently knowledgeable about the company to know that the announcement was false.

Is it conceivable that he was unaware of the problems of his company's two major products and merely repeating lies fed to him by other executives of the company? It is conceivable, yes, but it is exceedingly unlikely.

A note, finally, on advocacy in this court. The lawyers' oral arguments were excellent. But their briefs, although well written and professionally competent, were difficult for us judges to understand because of the density of the reinsurance jargon in them. There is nothing wrong with a specialized vocabulary--for use by specialists. Federal district and circuit judges, however, with the partial exception of the judges of the court of appeals for the Federal Circuit (which is semi-specialized), are generalists. We hear very few cases involving reinsurance, and cannot possibly achieve expertise in reinsurance practices except by the happenstance of having practiced in that area before becoming a judge, as none of us has. Lawyers should understand the judges' limited knowledge of specialized fields and choose their vocabulary accordingly. Every esoteric term used by the reinsurance industry has a counterpart in ordinary English, as we hope this opinion has demonstrated. The able lawyers who briefed and argued this case could have saved us some work and presented their positions more effectively had they done the translations from reinsurancese into everyday English themselves.

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On January 16, 2008, plaintiffs' lawyers filed a securities lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against Ambac Financial Group and certain of its directors and officers, raising allegations in connection with the company's disclosures concerning its provision of insurance for collateralized debt obligations. A copy of the plaintiff's counsel's January 16 press release can be found here. A copy of the complaint can be found here.

during the Class Period, defendants issued materially false and misleading statements regarding the Company's business and financial results related to its insurance coverage on collateralized debt obligations ("CDO") contracts. According to the complaint, the true facts, which were known by the defendants but concealed from the investing public during the Class Period, were as follows: (i) that the company lacked requisite internal controls to ensure that the Company's underwriting standards and its internal rating system for its CDO contracts were adequate, and, as a result, the Company's projections and reported results issued during the Class Period were based upon defective assumptions and/or manipulated facts; (ii) that the Company's financial statements were materially misstated due to its failure to properly account for its mark-to-market losses; (iii) that, given the deterioration and the increased volatility in the mortgage market, the Company would be forced to tighten its underwriting standards related to its asset-backed securities, which would have a direct material negative impact on its premium production going forward; (iv) that the Company had far greater exposure to anticipated losses and defaults related to its CDO contracts containing subprime loans, including even highly rated CDOs, than it had previously disclosed; (v) that the Company had far greater exposure to a potential ratings downgrade from one of the credit ratings agencies than it had previously disclosed; and (vi) that defendants' Class Period statements about the Company's selective underwriting practices during the 2005 through 2007 timeframe related to its CDOs backed by subprime assets were patently false; as the Company's underwriting standards were at best aggressive and at a minimum were completely inadequate. As the truth began to be disclosed, shares of Ambac common stock plummeted, causing substantial losses to investors.

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On January 16, 2008, a civil jury in the Apollo Group securities lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff class on all counts, awarding damages of $5.55 per share, an amount that according to Bloomberg (here) could reach as much as $277.5 million. The Bloomberg report also states that Apollo is responsible for 60 percent of the plaintiffs' losses, former Apollo CEO Tony Nelson is responsible for 30 percent, and former CFO Kenda Gonzales is responsible for 10 percent. The company's statement about the verdict can be found here. The plaintiff's counsel's statement about the verdict can be found here.

Background

Apollo Group is the parent of the University of Phoenix (UOP), the largest for-profit provider of higher education in the United States. According to the plaintiff's amended complaint (here), in 2003, two former UOP employees filed a False Claims Act action against UOP alleging that UOP received U.S. Department of Education funding in violation of laws specifying the way company educational recruiters may be compensated. Background regarding the False Claims Act case can be found here.

The Department of Education initiated an investigation of the issues raised in the False Claims Act action, and on February 5, 2004, a Department of Education employee issued a "Program Review Report" that accused UOP of violating the Department of Education rules with respect to education employees' compensation. The plaintiff in the securities case alleges that the violations in the report could have resulted in the limitation or termination of Department of Education funding to UOP.

On September 7, 2004, Apollo agreed to pay the Department of Education $9.8 million to settle the program review. The settlement agreement (a copy of which can be found here) specified that Apollo's entry into the agreement did not constitute an admission of wrongdoing or liability. News of the allegations in the Department of Education report first became public on September 14, 2004. The price of Apollo's stock fell significantly on September 21, 2004, when a securities analyst issued a report expressing concern about the company's possible exposure to future regulatory issues.

The Lawsuit

The lead plaintiff in the case is the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, on behalf of a class of persons who purchased Apollo stock between February 27, 2004 and September 14, 2004. The case was pending before Judge James A. Teilborg.

In a September 11. 2007 order (here), Judge Teilborg denied the parties cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants had sought summary judgment arguing that they had no duty to disclose an interim regulatory report (which they believed to be both unauthorized and false). The court found that while the defendants "may not have an affirmative duty to disclose the interim regulatory findings they do have 'a duty to disclose material facts that are necessary to make disclosed statements...not misleading.'" Judge Teilborg found that there was a jury issue as to whether any of the defendants' statements between the February delivery of the report and the September disclosure were misleading. Judge Teilborg also found that there were jury issues on the question whether the interim report was material and whether the defendants' acted with scienter in withholding information about the report.

In a particularly interesting holding, Judge Teilborg also found that there was a jury issue on the question of loss causation. The defendants argued that that there was no jury issue because the company's stock price did not react to the September 14 disclosure of the settlement. But the plaintiffs argued that the corrective disclosure was actually a cumulative process that included the analyst's September 21 report. Judge Teilborg said he could not conclude as a matter of law that the analyst report was not part of the corrective disclosure. The judge said it was a jury question whether or not the corrective information was fully absorbed into the marketplace before the analyst's report issued. (This mattered because there was no significant stock price drop until the report came out.)

Trial commenced on November 14, 2007. During the trial the plaintiff called both Nelson and Gonzalez to the stand to testify as hostile witnesses for the plaintiff. (Calling adverse parties as hostile witnesses is an unusual move, but it has the advantage of allowing the examining attorney to use leading questions and other techniques of cross-examination, which would otherwise not be allowed on direct examination.) According to news reports (here), Gonzalez testified that the company withheld the report from investors to avoid news coverage about the allegations. The news reports quote Gonzalez as having said that "when we received the program review report, we felt very strongly we did not want it basically tried in the press." The news reports also state that Nelson testified that the company's lawyers advised the company against disclosing the report, and that he thought disclosing it would have caused the company's stock price to drop.

The jury began deliberation on January 10, 2008 and returned a verdict on January 16. The jury found for the plaintiff on all counts. In its statement on the verdict (here), the company said that the case was premised on the company's "supposed failure to disclose unsubstantiated allegations from a preliminary government report." The company's counsel is quoted in the statement as saying that the "law does not require the disclosure of preliminary or unproven damages." The statement also says that "the ultimate disclosure of the report's contents caused no statistically significant movement in Apollo's stock price."

Discussion

According to the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here), 19 securities lawsuits have gone to trial since 1996. Of these, six cases (including the Apollo Group case) involving post-PSLRA conduct have reached a jury verdict, with three verdicts going in favor of the plaintiffs and three going in favor of the defendants. The Ninth Circuit recently reversed one of the three defense verdicts, as noted further below. Among the six verdicts is also the November 27, 2007 defense verdict in the JDS Uniphase trial (about which refer here).

It is important to keep in mind that this case is not over - indeed, it may have a long way yet to go. The defendants undoubtedly will pursue an appeal to the Ninth Circuit if their post-trial motions are unsuccessful. On appeal, both parties will look with interest (and in the defendants' case, concern) on the Ninth Circuit's November 26, 2007 opinion in the Thane International case (here), in which the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded a trial verdict that had been entered on behalf of the defendants in that case. (Refer here for my prior discussion of the Thane International case). While the ultimate outcome of any appeal in the Apollo Group case remains to be seen, there may well be significant issues on appeal, particularly with respect to the defendants' obligation to disclose the report; scienter; and loss causation. (Of course, the parties always have the opportunity of entering into a post-trial settlement, as well...)

It is worth asking why all of a sudden securities cases are going to trial. It is not clear why the Apollo Group case did not, like most of these cases, settle. The parties may simply have been unable to reach a mutually acceptable compromise. The Apollo Group case does seem like an odd case for the plaintiff to have pushed to trial since there were no insider trading allegations or other suggestions that the individual defendants personally benefited - although the jury verdict obviously validates the decision (to the extent there was an active decision) to try the case, and the absence of individual benefit clearly did not influence the ultimate outcome.

There is at least potentially an interesting insurance coverage question, which is whether the jury verdict represents an adjudication of fraud sufficient to trigger the fraud exclusion that typically is found in directors and officers liability insurance policies. I have not been able to obtain a copy of the questionnaire the jury used to see what specific factual findings the jury made, but to the extent the jury found knowing misrepresentations, the verdict could preclude coverage, although the possibility of an appeal could also affect this issue. (The possibility of a jury verdict triggering the fraud exclusion is one reason why so few securities cases go to trial.) It should also be noted that the amount of damages could exceed any amounts of insurance that are available. (I want to emphasize in making these insurance observations that I have no knowledge of any kind about the particulars of Apollo Group's insurance, and so I am merely speculating not expressing any insurance opinions.)

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On January 15, 2008, in a 5-3 majority opinion (here) written by Justice Kennedy (pictured to the left), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit in the Stonridge Investment Partners, LLC v Scientific Atlanta case. The Court concluded that the implied right of action under Section 10(b) did not reach the respondent companies' conduct because the investor claimants did not rely on the alleged deceptive conduct. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, dissented. Justice Breyer, as previously disclosed, did not take part in the case.

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On January 11, 2008, MBIA became the latest bond insurer to be named as a defendant in a subprime-related securities class action lawsuit. Bond insurers ACA Capital Holdings (about which refer here), Security Capital Assurance (refer here) and Radian Group (refer here) have previously been named in subprime-related securities lawsuits. MBIA is one of the leading triple-A rated bond insurers, and the company's difficulties may represent among the more significant developments arising from the subprime meltdown. A copy of the plaintiffs' lawyers January 11, 2008 press release regarding the MBIA securities lawsuit can be found here, and a copy of the securities lawsuit complaint, which also names MBIA's CEO and CFO as defendants, can be found here.

In addition to the securities lawsuit, MBIA's benefit plan fiduciaries were also hit with a lawsuit under ERISA, filed on behalf of MBIA employees in connection with company stock held in the employees' 401(k) plan. The plaintiffs' counsel's January 11, 2008 press release about the ERISA lawsuit can be found here. The company also disclosed on January 8, 2008 (here) that the SEC and the New York Insurance Department have started informal inquiries into the company's recent disclosures and a deal the company struck with Warburg Pincus.

The centerpiece of the securities lawsuit complaint is the company's December 19, 2007 detailed accounting (here) of its exposures to collateralized debt obligations, a disclosure that contained information the complaint describes as a "bombshell." According to the complaint, in the December 19 release, the company "disclosed for the first time that it faced $8.1 billion of exposure from insuring some of the riskiest securities in the marketplace - collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) comprised of other CDOs (so-called "CDOs squared" securities) whose underlying collateral included residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS)." The complaint alleges that "with this disclosure, investors learned for the first time that Defendants had placed their triple-A rating in jeopardy."

The company's December 20, 2007 press release (here) attempted to respond to the market criticism and reaction that followed the December 19 disclosure. Nevertheless, the company later came under further pressure when it announced on January 9, 2008 (here) that the company actually held $9 billion of the CDO squared securities, rather than the $8.1 disclosed just weeks before and that, according to the complaint, "nearly 60% of these securities were originated in 2006 or later (which was material because recent vintages are defaulting with greater consistency) and that the portfolio had already caused a $200 million impairment."

The MBIA securities lawsuit is the first subprime-related securities lawsuit of 2008. In light of the magnitude and recency of the events involved in the lawsuit, it seems likely that there will be further developments, both with respect to the company itself and in general. While it is obviously still quite early, the MBIA lawsuit does at least suggest that the 2007 subprime-related securities litigation wave was not, as some have suggested, a one-time event.

I have in any event added the MBIA lawsuit to my running tally of subprime-related securities lawsuits, which may be found here. With the addition of the MBIA lawsuit, the current tally (including subprime-related securities lawsuits pending against the credit rating agencies and against residential home construction companies) stands at 38. With the addition of the MBIA ERISA lawsuit, the number of subprime-related ERISA lawsuits stands at 9.

My prior discussion of bond insurers' exposure to subprime risk, including a detailed discussion of the securities lawsuit that has been filed against ACA Capital Holding, can be found here.

CDOs Squared: I have previously noted (most recently here) that among the contributing factors to the subprime meltdown are the complicated investment instruments into which mortgage loans were repackaged and sold in the global financial marketplace. The MBIA complaint's allegations about CDOs squared underscore this point rather impressively. MBIA (and other bond insurers) played a particularly critical role in the viability of these instruments, since MBIA's willingness to provide insurance against the instruments' default enabled the instruments to carry MBIA's AAA rating making them acceptable even to conservative investors.

Readers who like me do not feely fully briefed on CDOs squared may want to review this 2005 Nomura Securities publication (here), which explains that a CDO squared security is a type of collateralized debt obligation where the underlying portfolio consists of other types of CDOs.

According to the article,

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More About Foreign Claimants, Foreign Companies: In earlier posts (here and here), I discussed issues arising as a result of foreign litigants suing foreign domiciled companies in securities class action lawsuits in U.S. courts. These issues were involved in a recent opinion in a case pending in the Southern District of New York. In a January 8, 2008 ruling (here), U.S. District Court Judge Denny Chin appointed Luxembourg-based investment company Axxion S.A. Luxembourg as lead plaintiff in the consolidated securities lawsuit pending against GPC Biotech AG, a biotechnology company based in Munich, Germany.

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In prior posts (most recently here), I have written about the increasing importance of opt-out settlements in the context of securities class action litigation. Along the way, numerous readers have inquired whether I am aware of a publicly available resource that is tracking the securities lawsuit opt-out settlements. I am not aware of any public resource, but because there clearly is an interest in having this information available, I have gone ahead and compiled all of the opt-out settlement information of which I am aware. My list of the opt-out settlements can be found here.

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On January 3, 2008, State Street Corporation announced (here) that for the fourth quarter of 2007, it will be establishing a reserve of $618 million, on a pre-tax basis, "to address legal exposure and other costs associated with the underperformance of ... fixed-income strategies managed by... the company's investment management arm." The net charge to the company, "after taking into account the tax effect of the reserve and associated lower incentive compensation cost" will be $279 million.

In its January 3 press release, the company did not identify the specific litigation to which the reserve will relate; rather, the company referenced only "customer concerns as to whether the execution of [the fixed-income strategies] was consistent with the customers' investment intent." The press release goes on to state that the strategies "were adversely impacted by exposure to, and the lack of liquidity in, subprime mortgage markets."

A January 4, 2007 New York Times article entitled "State Street Corp. Is Sued Over Pension Losses" (here) states that State Street decided to create the reserve "after five clients sued it, claiming they had lost tens of millions of dollars in State Street funds they were told would be invested in risk-free debt like Treasuries." The Times article briefly identifies four of the claimants, but adds that "it was unclear who brought the fifth suit."

Because of the possibility that, as stated in the Times article, that State Street's litigation and related reserve "highlight the legal challenges that lie ahead for financial firms," it would appear to be worthwhile to review here the five State Street lawsuits. The value of this exercise is underscored by the perception (which I share) voiced by one commentator quoted in the Times article that "there could be many, many more" lawsuits like those against State Street.

The first of the five lawsuits was brought on October 1, 2007 by Prudential Retirement Insurance and Annuity Company. (I previously posted about the Prudential lawsuit here.) A copy of the Prudential complaint can be found here. According to Prudential Financial's October 1, 2007 filing on Form 8-K (here), the action "seeks, among other relief, restitution of certain losses attributable to certain investment funds" sold by State Street's investment management arm, and alleges that State Street "failed to exercise prudent investment management." The specific legal basis of Prudential's claim is that State Street and its investment arm violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

The complaint alleges that the defendants "radically altered" the investment strategies of two bond funds, the Intermediate Bond Fund and the Government Credit Bond Fund. The complaint alleges that the funds "took undisclosed, highly leveraged positions in mortgage-related financial derivatives" and thereby "exposed" the funds to "an inappropriate level of risk" that during the summer of 2007 "produced catastrophic results." The complaint further alleges that as these events unfolded the defendants provided "untimely, incomplete and misleading information."

The Prudential complaint alleges that the defendants caused losses of "roughly $80 million" to assets held by about 165 retirement plans for which Prudential is responsible, affecting approximately 28,000 plan participants. The complaint seeks restitution and compensation for the investor losses (which Prudential has, according to an October 2, 2007 Wall Street Journal article, here, already reimbursed). The complaint also seeks recovery of fees and other amounts the defendants' received, as well as recovery of the plaintiff's attorneys' fees.

Of the five lawsuits against State Street in connection with which the company established its litigation reserve, three others (in addition to the Prudential lawsuit) allege violations of ERISA. The first of these three other ERISA lawsuits was brought on October 17, 2007 by Unisystems and the trustee of the Unisystems Employees' Profit Sharing Plan. A copy of the Unisystems amended complaint can be found here. (My prior post about the Unisystems complaint can be found here.)

The second of the three other ERISA lawsuits was brought on October 24, 2007 by the Composite Pension Trust of Nashua Corporation. A copy of the Nashua complaint can be found here.

The third of the three other ERISA lawsuits (and the fourth of the five total lawsuits brought against State Street) was brought on October 31, 2007 by the plan administrator and the trustee of the Employees' Savings and Profit Sharing Plan of the Andover Companies. A copy of the amended Andover Complaint can be found here.

The fifth of the five lawsuits against State Street (which is also the lawsuit which the Times was unable to identify) was brought on November 5, 2007 in Harris County, Texas, District Court by Memorial Hermann Healthcare System. On December 3, 2007, the defendants removed the Memorial Hermann complaint to the Southern District of Texas. A copy of the removal petition, to which the initial state court complaint is attached, can be found here. Unlike the four other State Street lawsuits, the Memorial Hermann complaint does not allege a violation of ERISA. Instead, the complaint asserts against the State Street defendants a variety of state law claims, including breach of contract, fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

The Memorial Hermann complaint essentially alleges that the State Street defendants breached an "Agreement of Trust" to serve as trustee of nearly $91 million in the plaintiff's assets. The assets allegedly were invested in the State Street Limited Duration Bond Fund, which the complaint alleges lost 37 percent of its value during three weeks in August 2007, and 42 percent of its value for the 2007 year. The losses allegedly were the result of "unjustified investments in mortgage securities without diversification and using derivatives, all contrary to the stated Investment Objectives and representations."

UPDATE: In a later post, I discuss (here) a sixth lawsuit that has been filed against State Street.

The State Street lawsuits are significant in and of themselves, but also for what they might foreshadow. As I noted above, these lawsuits may well represent the kinds of legal problems that other financial services companies may face, particularly as the mortgages backing many of these investment funds and investment securities continue to detiorate.

There are a number of other important implications from the State Street lawsuits. The first relates to the identity of the claimants - these are very large institutions suing other very large institutions. These lawsuits are not the kind of lawyer-driven stock drop lawsuits that have drawn so much ire from would be reformers. These are conservative business litigants using plaintiffs' tools seeking to recoup significant losses. These sophisticated litigants may be unlikely to accept quick compromises, and, mindful of their own fiduciary obligations, may well be unwilling to accept any compromise that does not represent a very significant percentage of the losses.

The second important implication of the State Street lawsuits is the sheer magnitude of the dollars involved, as demonstrated by State Street's pre-tax set aside of $618 million for cases that are only in their earliest stages. The State Street litigation reserve underscores the staggering exposures that these cases and others like it represent. The stakes in these cases are enormous.

The third implication derives directly from the enormity of the financial exposures involved; that is, these cases clearly have very serious repercussions for liability insurers, a consideration discussed in a January 4, 2008 Dow Jones newswire article entitled "Subprime Litigation May Dent D & O Insurers Like Chubb, AIG" (here). The article's overall conclusion - that the subprime litigation wave may represent a significant concern for D & O insurers - is a valid point that I have in fact previously considered in a prior post (here). However, while I generally agree with the Dow Jones article's overall thrust, I do disagree with some the article's premises.

The most egregious of the article's faulty premises is that the State Street lawsuits represent a D & O insurance exposure. The article disregards the fact that four of the five State Street lawsuits are brought under ERISA. The typical D & O policy contains an ERISA exclusion, primarily because exposures under ERISA are covered under a separate fiduciary liability policy, not a D & O policy.

In addition, none of the five complaints name as a defendant any individuals; there are no director or officer defendants in any of these complaints (although there are John Doe defendants named without further identification in several of the complaints). The entity coverage under the typical D & O policy provide coverage only for securities claims against insured entities, and none of the five complaints raise securities law allegations.

So, contrary to the Dow Jones article's presumption, the State Street complaints do not themselves appear to embody any particular D & O insurance threat, as in their current forms at least, they would not appear implicate the typical D & O insurance policy. To be sure, the complaints may represent serious threats to fiduciary liability insurers and perhaps even to investment management errors and omissions (E & O) insurers, and to that extent the implication would seem to be that the subprime litigation wave represents a much more extensive threat to the insurance industry beyond just D & O. All of which does indeed suggest that the subprime litigation wave is a potentially complex and serious threat to insurers generally. To that extent, at least, the Dow Jones article is correct when it states that State Street's reserve "has increased concern that insurers offering policies covering such exposures could be hit with big claims from the credit crisis."

In any event, I do agree that the subprime litigation wave represents a threat to the D & O insurers, even if the State Street lawsuits themselves may not. My prior blog posts on the potential impact on D & O insurers from the subprime meltdown can be found here and here; even though I wrote these posts months age, the analysis still appears more or less valid.

It should also be noted that there have been a number of other subprime related lawsuits brought under ERISA, primarily by employees raising allegations relating to company stock held in the 401(k) plans. A list of these employee ERISA lawsuits may be found in my running tally of subprime-related litigation, here.




The January 6, 2007 New York Times has an article entitled "Testing Investors' Faith in State Street" (here) that examines the market's curious reaction to State Street's announcement concerning its litigation reserve -- its stock price went up, hitting a 52-week high, a response that Times columnist Gretchen Morgenson is at a loss to explain.



Now This: The American Dialect Society has chosen (here) "subprime" as the 2007 Word of the Year. Pondering this development, I was moved to reflect that the subprime meltdown has moved beyond a mere financial event; it has become a cultural, social, and even political phenomenon.


Like all important phenomena, the subprime meltdown has deep roots, which arguably go back to the early 80s when the market for mortgage securities was more or less invented at Salomon Brothers, as entertainingly retold in Michael Lewis's classic, Liar's Poker. Though the events described in Lewis's book took place over twenty years ago, they resonate now with irony and sometimes even ominous portent, although much of the current resonance was perhaps unintended when the words were originally written.


The most portentous segments detail the creation in the mid-80s of the recently eventful mortgage security, the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO), about which Lewis notes, in words that contemporary investors in Norway, Japan, Australia and the U.K might now rue, that "CMOs opened the ways for international investors who thought American homeowners were a good bet." Lewis also notes, in an observation that seems particularly ironic today, that that as a result of the innovation of CMOs, "investors now had a new, firm idea of what the price of a mortgage bond should be." Lewis goes on to describe how the Wall Street Bankers "found a seemingly limitless number of ways to slice and dice home mortgages."


Space constraints prevent doing full justice to Lewis's account, so fraught with significance in light of today's circumstances. Suffice it to say that given recent events, Liar's Poker merits and rewards a re-reading. It is as entertaining as it ever was, but the description of the invention of the market for mortgage bonds seems to matter in ways that it did not previously.


Special thanks to loyal reader Matt Rossman, who pointed out Liar's Poker's newly relevant historical value some time ago - I only recently got around to following up on Matt's suggestion to re-read the book.

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Chinese Checkered: In an earlier post (here), I reviewed the recent checkered track record of Chinese companies listed on the U.S. securities exchanges, including in particular Chinese IPOs. A December 2007 Dewey & LeBoeuf article entitled "China's Top Ten at the Corporate Governance Bottom" (here) sounds many of the same themes as my prior post.

The article notes that "the ten largest Chinese companies trading in the U.S. rate poorly when it comes to corporate governance." The article cites research showing that the ten companies have "an average rating of 0.5 stars for corporate governance, with five being the highest rating and three being average." Five of the companies received "0" ratings for corporate governance.

Among the reasons for the low ratings is a NYSE guideline allowing "foreign private issuers" to follow their home country governance rules. Because China does not require that a majority of directors to be independent, "Chinese companies listed on the NYSE are allowed to stack the board with inside directors."

In addition, that article notes, "lack of strong outside oversight" can lead to problems "when it comes to transfer pricing, related-party transactions, intergroup guarantees, tax rates, and the valuation of contingent liabilties." The control role of the Chinese government in these companies' ownership and operation can "lead to considerable pressure," because "these large companies are instruments of state policy."

There may be a view that the exchanges' allowances for Chinese companies are indispensable if the U.S. financial markets are to attract these and other overseas listings. And it may well be argued that the governance concerns, which reflect the biases of U.S. expectations, are merely components of the market information that should be taken in to account in the companies' valuations.

At a minimum, these considerations certainly do argue in favor of a more cautious approach to Chinese companies, both for investors and D & O underwriters alike. As I noted in my prior post, a disproportionate number of Chinese companies have become involved in securities litigation in the U.S.. a fact that may not be unrelated to the governance concerns.

Changing Environment for Climate Change Disclosure: In prior posts (here and here), I have reviewed the changing circumstances surrounding environmental disclosures, particularly as relates to global climate change. A January 2008 McKenna, Long & Aldridge article entitled "The SEC is Getting Hot and Bothered Over Climate Change" (here) takes a detailed look at the current and proposed requirements that potentially could affect public companies' disclosure obligations relating to global climate change.

The article's conclusions are that "publicly traded companies can expect scrutiny of their SEC filings to increase" and that "companies that have yet to squarely confront the question should consider taking a closer look at future filings."

Apollo Group Securities Lawsuit Trial Wrapping Up: In recent posts (most recently here), I discussed the JDS Uniphase securities lawsuit trial, which, on November 27, 2007, resulted in a jury verdict in the defendants' favor. The JDSU trial was noteworthy because trials in securities cases are so rare. But as I also noted that there was, coincidentally, another securities trial, involving Apollo Group, going on at the same time.

Adam Savett reports on his Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) that the plaintiffs in the Apollo Group trial rested their case on December 12, 2007, and the court subsequently denied the defendants' motion for directed verdict. Closing arguments in the case apparently are scheduled to take place on January 9, 2008. Savett predicts a jury verdict on January 10.

In any event, we won't have long to wait to find out the outcome of yet another civil securities lawsuit trial. It is probably a worthy topic for another day to consider why this flurry of trial activity is taking place now and what it may mean. Certainly, if the Apollo Group trial results in another defense verdict, it would further discourage other plaintiffs from hazarding a jury, and perhaps further encourage settlement.

Readers my be interested to note that the Securities Litigation Watch blog is also maintaining (here) a list of all post-PSLRA securities class action lawsuits that have gone to trial.

Finally, readers interested in details of the trial may want to read this December 7, 2007 Arizona Republic article (here) describing the trial testimony of Apollo Group's former CFO.

Busted Buyout Lawsuit Reaches the Finish Line: In an earlier post (here) I discussed the litigation arising out of Finish Line's bid to walk away from its planned $1.5 billion acquisition of Genesco. In case you missed the news over the holidays, on December 27, 2007, the Tennessee court (here) rejected Finish Line's contention that there had been a "materially adverse effect" sufficient to permit Finish Line to invoke the termination procedures in the agreement. The court ordered Finish Line to complete the transaction.

However, as noted in the December 28, 2007 CFO.com article (here) discussing the ruling, there is still a second action pending in New York, that could affect whether or not the transaction ultimately is completed. UBS, which had committed to finance the transaction, contends that the merger will result in an insolvent entity. The Tennessee court has said that if that is the case, the court would "halt the agreement."

Finally, the WSJ.com Law Blog notes (here) that though the court has issued its ruling in the Genesco case, there are still plenty of other busted deals to fuel additional litigation for the foreseeable future in the New Year.

PLUS D & O Symposium: The 2008 Professional Liability Underwriting Society (PLUS) D & O Symposium will take place on February 6 and 7, 2008 in New York. I will be co-chairing the Symposium again this year, with my good friend Chris Duca of Navigators Pro. We are very proud of this year's agenda, which includes former SEC Chairman William Donaldson as the keynote speaker and features a stellar lineup of panelists, including SEC Enforcement Division Director Linda Chatman Thomsen. The entire schedule is available at the PLUS website, here.

Readers will be interested to know that the early registration discount is available only until January 11, 2008, so you will want to be sure to register before the end of this week.

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As the latest of the year-end 2007 securities lawsuit reports (including my own, here), Cornerstone Research has released (here) its 2007 report on securities class action filings. Cornerstone's January 3, 2008 press release describing the report can be found here. The numbers in the Cornerstone report differ from those in the previously released year-end report of NERA Economic Consulting (here), but the numbers are directionally consistent. The Cornerstone report does make some additional observations about the 2007 securities lawsuit filings, and also adds some interesting analysis.

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